The Relationship between “You Shall Not Let Your Cattle Mate with a Different Kind” (Lev 19:19) and “You Shall Not Plow with an Ox and an Ass Together” (Deut 22:10): A Reexamination

Abstract

Leviticus 19:19 presents the following sequence of prohibitions: “You shall not let your cattle mate with a different kind”; “you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed [*kil’ayîm*]”; “you shall not put on cloth from a mixture of two kinds of material [*ša‘atnēz*].” There are many ways to sow mixed seeds or to produce clothes by combining fabrics. These prohibitions however did not necessarily have any negative impact on the daily life in the biblical period. The prohibition on animal hybridization is different: this prohibition, practically speaking was only applicable to breeding horses and donkeys to produce mules and hinnies, and it would have had a far-reaching impact on life in the biblical period. The prohibition in Deut 22:10 (“You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together”) seems to be a sophisticated attempt to counter a legal tradition which proscribed the production of mules and hinnies.

1.

Leviticus 19:19 presents the following sequence of three prohibitions: “You shall not let your cattle mate with a different kind”; “you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed [*kil’ayîm*]”; “you shall not put on cloth from a mixture of two kinds of material [*ša‘atnēz*].” The meaning of the term *kil’ayîm* is a matter of scholarly consensus: it denote two kinds or species hybridized together.[[1]](#footnote-1) There is also a broad consensus regarding the meaning of the term *ša‘atnēz*: clothing made of two different materials; usually wool and linen are mentioned.[[2]](#footnote-2) The three prohibitions thus reflect a wish demarcate between different species of animals and plants, and types of material used to produce clothing according to taxonomical criteria.

The biblical text provides no rationale for these commandments. In the Jewish exegetical tradition, the prohibitions are often touted as paradigmatic examples of statutes with no patent rationale. Traditional explanations of such mysterious laws range between the following extremes: on the one hand, some wish to simply make peace with the mystery: e.g., “These statutes are a decree of the King,” and “I, the Lord have made it a statute, and you have no right to criticize it.” Such exegetes often mention that the rationales of the commandment are revealed only to a chosen few,[[3]](#footnote-3) that they can only be explained with recourse to esoteric teachings,[[4]](#footnote-4) or that their reasons will only become apparent in the afterlife or the World to Come.[[5]](#footnote-5) On the other hand, various attempts have been made to provide a cogent explanation for the logic underlying these laws: e.g., “to give reasons for the commandments in a manner that conforms to the way of the world,” or “that all the Torah explanations [*ṭa’ămê torâ*] seemed, [relative] to them, like grass of the field.” Lying between these two extremes – i.e., between total resignation and attempts to provide a rationale – lie various intermediate positions. Thus, for example, a distinction has been drawn between providing “some rationale based on rational methods,” to explain the law in broad outlines, as opposed explicating the minutiae of a law that often elude any clear explanation.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Modern scholarship has similarly drawn attention to the opaque nature of the *kil’ayîm* laws. As far as plants and animals are concerned, a common explanation accepted by most scholars asserts that such actions were regarded as a violation of a divine order of the world. God created animals and plants “according to their kind” (Gen 1:12, 20-21, 24-25) and such prohibitions are aimed at limiting the production of new species that were not part of God’s initial, perfect act of creation.[[7]](#footnote-7) As to the prohibition of wearing a garment composed of mixed fabrics, many have suggested that the purpose is to create a hierarchical or moral distinction between the realms of the sacred and profane. The temple rite, so the argument goes, avails itself of *ša‘atnēz* in its structure and in the priestly vestments;[[8]](#footnote-8) for a layperson to don clothes comprised *kil’ayîm* would represent a similar violation of the divine order.[[9]](#footnote-9) This notion, that prohibitions on *kil’ayîm* seek to prevent disruption of the divine order of creation, has been developed in several directions over the years – both in traditional exegesis as well as in modern scholarship. More often than not, it is the figurative aspect of the various *kil’ayîm* prohibitions, or their overarching characteristics that have been the point of focus – some arguing, for instance, that the laws are not limited to plants, animals, and garments.[[10]](#footnote-10) It seems that such developments, some of which have met with opposition in scholarship,[[11]](#footnote-11) were made possible by the fundamental opaqueness which pervades the three prohibitions.

In what follows, I wish to offer an approach that, while certainly based on existing explanations for *kil’ayîm* prohibitions, seeks to clarify a particular point which pertains to the prohibition of animal *kil’ayîm* specifically – a point that has yet to receive significant attention in scholarship. I will argue that this point must be taken into account if we are to clarify the complex relationship between the *kil’ayîm* prohibitions in Leviticus 19 and those in Deuteronomy 22.

2.

In keeping with the common suggestion that *kil’ayîm* prohibitions reflect a desire to preserve natural boundaries established by God, the three prohibitions represent three distinct spheres: fauna, flora, and human production (which is in turn based on animal and plant products). The three prohibitions, taken together, thus represent a comprehensive proscription against any mixing or combination of distinct species or types, and this may have been precisely what the biblical legislator had in mind. However, a comprehensive and abstract theological concept can often turn out to be problematic when reduced to its finer details.

The prohibition on animal-*kil’ayîm* differs from its counterparts in other spheres in one interesting respect. There are many ways to sow mixed seeds or to produce clothes by combining fabrics (usually wool, but perhaps also fur, and even leather and bone). Accordingly, a legislator wishing to proscribe sowing the seeds of distinct species in the same field, or wearing a garment made of materials from both animals and plants, will naturally employ a more general language designating a “field” or a “garment.” By contrast, the possibilities for crossbreeding are far more limited. In the biblical period, at least, the only real application of hybridization was between donkeys and horses: breeding a male donkey with a mare, to produce a mule, or a stallion with a she-ass (a slightly more complex operation due to the stubborn nature of the latter) producing a hinny.[[12]](#footnote-12) There are no other known instances of interbreeding in the Levant.[[13]](#footnote-13) Given that the laws of the Pentateuch were formulated and rooted in an agricultural milieu, it would be difficult to suggest that the people of the time would have so simply assumed that one could breed a sheep with a goat, or a cow with a camel.[[14]](#footnote-14) It would thus be safe to say that the choice of the generic noun *bǝhemtǝka* (“your cattle”) is not meant to extend the prohibition beyond what was actually possible. Rather it is a consequence of the prohibition’s place in the larger sequence: a series of three prohibitions with a tight thematic structure, which, when taken together, convey an overarching ideological conception regarding God’s world and the limits of human conduct within it.[[15]](#footnote-15)

If it is true that the prohibition of animal hybridization was practically relevant only to the breeding of horses and donkeys, then it is inherently different from other modes of *kil’ayîm* in another important respect. As mentioned, it is possible that the prohibition on *ša‘atnēz may* have sought to create some kind of cultural, ethical or class-based hierarchy. If so, the prohibition on *ša‘atnēz* had no direct, or necessarily negative, impact on the life of a biblical farmer. In terms of plant-*kil’ayîm*, some scholars have noted the inherent benefits of mixed sowing – planting different crops in the same field enriches the soil and reduces the risk of reliance on a single staple subject to the ravages of seasonal disease.[[16]](#footnote-16) That being said, sowing different species in a single field does have some possible downsides, chief among them impairing the growth rate of the weaker and more delicate crops. In other words, not only does the prohibition on sowing mixed seeds not necessarily *harm* a farmer; it may even adhere to a certain agricultural logic.[[17]](#footnote-17)

By contrast, a prohibition on interbreeding exacts a concrete toll. The mule was a well-known creature in the Bible; it was used for agriculture, carrying loads, and riding – even being used to transport the king and the royal family.[[18]](#footnote-18) The physical qualities of a hinny are no less than those of a mule, and the preference for the latter over the former is, first and foremost, a cultural one.[[19]](#footnote-19) It therefore seems that the use of the noun *pered* in the Bible does not necessarily refer specifically to a mule as opposed to a hinny. The distinct advantages of the hinny and the mule vis-à-vis the weaker donkey and the more expensive horse (who tends to be selective a eater)[[20]](#footnote-20) have led to the diverse use of mules and hinnies even in the modern era.[[21]](#footnote-21) Indeed, research offers unequivocal data suggesting that the mule and hinny’s fitness and endurance in hot climatic conditions exceed both those of the donkey and the horse.[[22]](#footnote-22) As mules and ninnies are sterile – a fact known to (and even alluded to by) the biblical writers [[23]](#footnote-23) – a ban on producing such hybrids would have had a negative and far-reaching impact on the prosperity of a farmer in the biblical period.

A similar sequence of three prohibitions appears in Deuteronomy: “You shall not sow your vineyard with a second kind of seed, else the crop—from the seed you have sown—and the yield of the vineyard may not be used. You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together. You shall not wear cloth combining wool and linen” (22:9-11).[[24]](#footnote-24) The prohibitions on mixed-sowing and mixed-garments is expressed here using a different formulation from that employed in Leviticus. Here only sowing seeds in a *kerem*, i.e., in a vineyard (e.g., Deut 23:25; Amos 9:14) is prohibited. It is difficult to determine unequivocally whether this wording proscribes all sowing between the rows of vine – i.e., the very act of planting another plant-species next to a vine is considered *kil’ayîm* – or whether the prohibition applies only to sowing two species of plants between rows of vine.[[25]](#footnote-25) As for the prohibition of *ša‘atnēz*, Deuteronomy – unlike Leviticus – specifies which specific materials may not be mixed. These distinctions notwithstanding, the two prohibitions conform to the spirit of those delineated in Leviticus 19. By contrast, the gulf between the prohibition of “You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together” and that of “You shall not let your cattle mate with a different kind” is notable. Whereas the prohibition in Leviticus is centered around breeding, the law in Deuteronomy addresses an act of mixed plowing. Widening the gap between the two laws is the fact that the two animals specified – a bull and an ass – cannot be crossbred at all. Throughout history, traditional exegetes have sought to draw the three prohibitions of Deuteronomy closer to those of Leviticus. Among other things, some have sought to explain why mixed plowing is a first step towards interbreeding.[[26]](#footnote-26) These, are however, likely attempts at harmonization.

 I wish to argue that the prohibition of “You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together” represented an attempt to directly contend with the prohibition on interbreeding – which, due to its concrete impact on agricultural life, likely met with some opposition. This was accomplished by formulating a new law, which would subtly and cleverly echo the formulation of an earlier law code – one that may not have been much different in its wording from the prohibition as it is articulated in Leviticus 19:19. Specifying a bull and an ass more clearly defines the vague term *bǝhemtǝka*, and preserves, in the guise of two animals walking together along a single furrow, the imagery of mating. The image of plowing, drawn from the realities of day-to-day life, corrects that of crossbreeding, which, as mentioned, was only practically applicable to horses and donkeys. The choice to specify the act of plowing preserves something of the sexual connotations of interbreeding, or at the very least the notion of inappropriate contact between distinct species (cf. “had you not plowed with my heifer” Judges 14:18).[[27]](#footnote-27) The choice to mention a donkey next to a bull is certainly not accidental and should not be construed as reflecting the routine of plow work during the era.[[28]](#footnote-28) Fields were plowed primarily by bulls (cf. 1 Kings 19:19-21; Proverbs 14:4). This is no less true today in the modern Levant where bulls are used by farmers who lack access to motorized farm equipment. The use of mules and hinnies for plowing is also common. Photos from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attest to combined plowing with a bull and a mule/hinny. As for a donkey, while one certainly can harness it to a plow – and when alternatives are lacking this is what a farmer will do – the donkey’s limited physical strength will make sustained labor difficult. Indeed, in Job 1:14, a realistic agricultural picture is painted in which the plowing of bulls is contrasted to the grazing of she-asses: “The bulls were plowing and the she-asses were grazing alongside them.”[[29]](#footnote-29) It can thus be argued that the mention of a donkey yoked together with a bull in Deuteronomy may be an attempt to echo an earlier prohibition against interbreeding horses and donkeys – an act which, as mentioned, is the substance of the general interdiction against hybridization.

Exegetes and modern scholars have sought the underlying logic of the prohibition on mixed plowing without reference to the prohibition on hybridization. Attention has been drawn to the physiological disparity between the bull and the donkey. Some have even suggested that the prohibition represents a form of compassion for living beings (in the spirit of other laws and prohibitions to which exegetes and scholars have ascribed such an element).[[30]](#footnote-30) It should be noted in this context that with the exception of the prohibition, “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing” (Deut 25:4) all the other laws which supposedly promote compassion for living beings present a much clearer picture of cruelty and killing.[[31]](#footnote-31) It should further be noted that there is no real reason to assume that joint plowing using a bull and a donkey will cause either one of them any real harm – neither to the weaker donkey nor to the stronger bull. The most one can say is that harnessing two animals with disparate physical abilities to a single plow, is less advisable than using two animals with equal strength; in the former case, the plow will veer in the direction of the stronger animal. The prohibition, to my mind at least, seems to have no ethical component, and at best embodies a logic of productivity: perhaps something resembling the proverb: “‘Mind well the looks of your flock, pay attention to the herds” (Prov 27:23), “Take thought for your livestock, remember the plowing [*e-re-šá*]’”[[32]](#footnote-32) and “The proper kind of ox to be purchased for ploughing: they should be powerful and equally matched, so that the stronger will not excused the weaker when they work together.”[[33]](#footnote-33) The prohibition is largely consistent with some scholars’ overall characterization biblical wisdom literature: practical knowledge about life and the world based on human experience.[[34]](#footnote-34) And if this is true, the formulation of advice for agricultural productivity as an apodictic law, is surely an artificial literary device.[[35]](#footnote-35)

The three prohibitions in Deuteronomy 22 adhere to a distinct structural pattern: “You shall not sow,” “you shall not plow,” “you shall not wear.” Specifically, the prohibition on plowing with an bull and a donkey is cast in the pattern of the prohibition on *ša‘atnēz* which immediately follows it: “You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together//You shall not wear cloth combining wool and linen.” It is no coincidence that the prohibition on mixed-plowing lies between the prohibition on sowing mixed-seeds and wearing mixed clothing (unlike in Leviticus 19 where prohibition pertaining to animals appear first). The meticulous structuring of the three prohibitions, the stylistic and structural similarity to the prohibition on wearing *ša‘atnēz,* and the placement of the law in between two others – all of these aim to blur the fact that the prohibition of mixed-plowing no longer bears any resemblance whatsoever to animal hybridization. This law is artificial in terms of its content, and its juxtaposition with the other two prohibitions indicates artificiality as well.

A common practice of biblical and even Second-Temple literature is to oppose an ancient tradition through revision and rewriting.[[36]](#footnote-36) The extent or depth of rewriting varies; some satisfied themselves with slight changes, while others took a far heavier hand. The relationship between the contents and language of the new, alternative tradition and those of its ancient predecessor are characteristically complex. Generally speaking, the scope of rewriting can be said to correspond to the reviser’s attitude to the ancient tradition – minor and delicate revisions are indirect evidence of agreement with the broad details of the ancient tradition, while more fundamental acts of rewriting that leave only a loose connection to the earlier tradition are indirect evidence of opposition. The transition from a prohibition on hybridization to a prohibition on mixed plowing seems to be an example of a heavy-handed act of revision. I propose that its purpose is to do away with an unreasonable legal tradition, supplanting it with an alternative.

3.

The precise relationship between the laws of the Holiness Code (H) and those of Deuteronomy (D) is one of the more difficult questions in Pentateuchal studies. A very common opinion, formulated in the early nineteenth century (when the Holiness Code was first identified), suggests that the laws of H indicate dependence on those of D.[[37]](#footnote-37) In recent years, however, several important scholars have proposed that the direction of influence is the reverse. At the same time, there are some who take a more cautious approach and argue that no indication of direct influence between the two sources can be discerned, and that instead, elements of a shared legal tradition (or traditions) have been integrated into both D and H independently.[[38]](#footnote-38) Comparisons of the laws of *kil’ayîm* appearing in Leviticus 19:19 to those appearing in Deuteronomy 22:9-11 are generally based on one of the aforementioned approaches. It is especially common for scholars to use the applicability of the two sets of prohibitions to support their respective positions. The prohibitions in Leviticus apply to every animal, every field, and any combination of animal and plant material. Those in Deuteronomy, by contrast, are notably more specific – sowing mixed-seeds in a vineyard, plowing with a bull and a donkey, and wearing a garment composed of wool and linen. Those who assert that H was influenced by D, posit that the former extends the scope of the prohibitions delineated in the latter.[[39]](#footnote-39) By contrast according to those who suggest the opposite direction of influence and a different literary purpose, the later D source is refining and interpreting the earlier H source.[[40]](#footnote-40) Alongside these two approaches, some have stressed that such differences do not indicate a distinct direction of dependence or development; all they indicate is the existence of a shared legal tradition, formulated independently of (and prior to) both codes, and integrated into both.[[41]](#footnote-41) It seems that when it comes to sowing mixed seeds and wearing mixed clothing, it is difficult to present a convincing or agreed-upon direction of development. Indeed, attempts to compare the two sets of laws seem just as likely to lead to one conclusion as the other. By contrast, if my analysis above is correct, and the prohibition on hybridization is only practically relevant to the breeding of horses with donkeys, then a comparison of this prohibition to that of plowing with a bull and a donkey indicates a far clearer direction of development. It can be argued that the prohibition on plowing with a bull and donkey is an attempt to abrogate the prohibition on interbreeding – which is different from its parallels because it directly impedes on a farmer’s prosperity. By contrast, it would be difficult to describe the relationship between the two prohibitions as developing in the opposite direction. This is not to say that the prohibitions of *kil’ayîm* in Deuteronomy are based directly on those in Leviticus 19. But it is possible, in accordance with the scholarship mentioned above, that the two law codes are based on a common legal tradition; and, if this is the case, one can propose that the prohibition on animal-*kil’ayîm* within this theoretical *Vorlage* was articulated similarly to that currently appearing in Leviticus 19:19.

1. The word *kil’ayîm* preserves the consonants *k-l-’* which in various Semitic languages denote “both”… [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Scholars have pointed to the etymological affinity between the Hebrew word *ša‘atnēz* and the Egyptian and Coptic word (or better yet, words)… [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. … [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. … [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. … [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Quotes… [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. It goes without saying that sowing two species of plants in the same patch of ground does not produce a new species. On this point, see …. For this reason, scholars generally view the prohibition as a symbolic separation of species and kinds. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Ša‘atnēz* is used for the lower cloths of the Tabernacle, for the curtain that covers the inner sanctum (Exod 26:1, 31) and for the breastplate and belt of the high priest (ibid., 28:6, 15; 39:29 [verse 29 refers to the vestments of regular priests as well]). By contrast an Israelite layperson must make do with a blue cord (Num 15:39). [correct citation is, if im not mistaken, 15:38] [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This explanation for the laws of *kil’ayîm* was already anticipated in antiquity…. It was also commonly used in classical exegesis… see… and studies cited there. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Thus *kil’ayîm* prohibitions were cast as representing any invalid admixture of incompatible elements – the upper world with the lower world, judgment with mercy, purity with contamination and the like – all of which fall under the category of “the prohibition of *kil’ayîm* and the mixing of powers” [is this a quote?]…; for an explanation in this spirit, and that of modern religious-anthropological scholarship, see …; it further bears noting that already in the late Second-Temple period, the laws of *kil’ayîm* were adduced as a basis for the laws of marriage. For relevant sources, see …. For a similar approach in scholarship (disconnected from earlier sources), see …. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Thus, for example, the explicit debate about the studies of … [a bit hard to translate without context] [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Cf. “Every type of mule is the same” as opposed to “one with small ears – his mother is a mare and his father a donkey; one with large ears – his mother is a she-ass and his father a stallion.”… It should be noted that hinnies and mules are a purely human creation; horses and donkeys will not naturally mate. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. In various tractates of the Mishnah there are discussions revolving around an animal called a *koy*. According to one opinion, this is a hybrid, the offspring of a billy-goat and a gazelle [yes?] (and in order for the laws of *kil’ayîm* to apply, the gazelle in question must have been raised in captivity other it does not fall under the category of *bǝhemtǝka* [“your cattle”]). It seems however that the debate is merely theoretical, the *koy* being used as a general case study of animals which can variously be defined as domestic or wild. It should further be added that there is a wide consensus that the *koy* (which seems to be the buffalo) was brought to Palestine relatively late in history – towards the end of the Second-Temple period. For a detailed discussion of the identity of the *koy*,including a summary of traditional and scholarly opinions, see …. For a discussion of the opinion that it is a hybrid, see … [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. In Mishnah, *Kilayim* of various hybrids are mentioned such as the offspring of wolf and a dog, a wild-dog and jackal, a wild goat and a sheep etc. (for summary, see Milgrom, Law, 545). However, even if we accept the possibility that the Sages assumed such unions to be productive, these animals nevertheless do not fall under the category of a *bǝhemtǝka* (i.e., a domestic or captured animal). I should note that in the 1980s certain manipulations were employed [a bit vague - what do you mean? genetic engineering?] to crossbreed ibexes and goats – the product of which (Capra Hircus X Capra Ibex) ultimately died out from disease. Regardless, there is no historical precedent for such a hybrid. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For a detailed analysis of the structure of this verse, see … See also in n. … which cites earlier suggestions and emendations. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For such materialist explanations, see … [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Regardless, it is not difficult to divide a field into separate planting zones based on species. Cf. the discussions in Mishnah, *Kilayim*, chs. 1-2, which have as one of their bases the desire to minimize the farmer’s losses. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. A mule for carrying loads: 2 Kings 5:17; 1 Chr 12:41; a mule for riding: 2 Sam 13:29; 18:9; 1 Kings 1:33, 38, 44; Isa 66:20. See also: 1 Kings 10:25; 2 Chr 9:24 (a gift to a king); Ezek 27:14 (in the context of merchandise from “Beth-togarmah”). The physical advantages of the mule and its popularity were already emphasized in antiquity…. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The mule and hinny have been presented as distinct from each other in physiology and temperament. That being said, empirical findings rule-out such a conception. See ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The mule and hinny (as well as the donkey) have more efficient digestive systems than that of the horse. Thus, the mule hinny cope better with low-fiber, high-fiber foods. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. For instance: the mule corps in the early twentieth century and in World War I. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. … [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. This can be seen from the prophetic admonition: “For they themselves have relations [*yǝfārēdû*] with whores” [Hos 4:14]. [the JPS reads “turn aside” but that seems to be a different interpretation] The verb *yǝfārēdû* seems to be derived from the word *pered* and it indicates having sexual intercourse with no intention of bearing offspring… accordingly, cases of mules bearing offspring are considered miraculous… [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. For details regarding the affinities and differences between Lev 19:19 and Deut 22:9-11, see …. and in modern commentaries on Leviticus and Deuteronomy. As scholars have not taken into account the fact that the prohibition on animal hybridization, practically speaking, refers only to breeding horses and donkeys, they have reached conclusions different than those discussed here. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. On this see the reading of the Septuagint (n. 000). Basing themselves on the expression *kerem zāyit* (Judges 15:5), some have argued that the word *kerem* in Deuteronomy may denote not just a vineyard but an olive grove as well. If this is the case, the law may be proscribing planting grapes and olives in a single plot of land…. It seems, however, that the correct reading of the verse in Judges is to be found in the Vulgate: “vineyards *and* olive groves.” [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. For example: “the Merciful One forbade plowing with two species [of animals] – lest he make them familiar with each other and breed them with each other” (*Yosef Bekhor Shor* on Deut 22:10); “It also seems to me that the reason for the prohibition against bringing together two species for any kind of work may also be found in the wish to render more difficult the interbreeding of two species… due to the possibility that if the two are brought together they might sometimes copulate” (Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, III, 49). [I used Pines translation p. 609] In modern scholarship similar parallels between the two laws have been drawn. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. For modern scholars, see …. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Cf. Mishna, *Kilayim*, 5:7: “common practice,” and Jan A. Wagenaar, ‘“You Shall Not Sow Two Kinds of Seed in Your Field”: Leviticus 19, 19 and the Formation of the Holiness Code’, *Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte* 7 (2001), 321. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Some have suggested that the different animals participated in different parts of the plowing: the she-ass was used to transport the plow to the field, but the plowing itself was performed by the bull. See …. For further mentions of donkeys and bulls in the Bible (besides Job 1:14), see Isa 30:24; 22:20. None of these cases, however, refer to joint plowing. The reference to a “calf plowing” (see above n. 000) is merely poetic language. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Cf. “the Lord has compassion on all of his creations, for the power of the donkey is not like that of the bull”…; “inflicting pain upon animals is prohibited according to the Torah. And it is known that species of animals and fowl are greatly concerned about dwelling with [animals] of other species – certainly to perform labor with them.” Explanations in this spirit have also been developed in symbolic and kabbalistic directions.… [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. … To be clear, this is far from a matter of consensus (I for one do not agree with this approach), but nevertheless the notion that these laws express compassion for living creatures is, nevertheless, an oft-repeated one. For a collection of relevant examples, see …. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. …. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. …. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. …. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. If I am correct, one can perhaps view Deut 22:10 as yet another example of the close affinities between Deuteronomy and biblical Wisdom Literature. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Extensive scholarship is dedicated to biblical rewriting, encompassing many discussions regarding the definition of the phenomenon (whether it is an exegetical approach or a literary genre), its characteristics, its place in ancient literature – above all in the biblical apocrypha [וראש לכול בחיבורים בני התקופה שלא נכללו במקרא; I assume this is what you mean]. For an introduction to such discussions, see …. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. That this is a consensus in scholarship, which has been proved beyond a doubt, see specifically … [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. For multiple studies sorted according to the various scholarly positions, see [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. For an extensive list of scholars who subscribe to this position, see …. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. …. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See in detail … Schwartz’s conclusions regarding the relationship between *kil’ayîm* prohibitions in Leviticus and those in Deuteronomy mesh with his detailed comparisons between the laws of H and D… It should be noted that the Septuagint of Lev 19:19 actually does mention a vineyard “Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with diverse seed.” Unless this is an attempt to harmonize Lev 19:19 with Deut 22:10, it may be that mention of a vineyard was part of the earlier legal tradition common both sources, and that the differences between Leviticus and Deuteronomy regarding sowing mixed seed do not represent an important or intentional development. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)