Out with Fiduciary Out?

*Guy Firer[[1]](#footnote-1)\* & Adi Libson[[2]](#footnote-2)\*\**

## *Abstract*

*In one of the most renowned and highly controversial decisions in Delaware in the last 20 years, Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a board of a public targe company cannot decide to completely lock-up a merger. According to the court’s ruling, the merger must include a fiduciary out clause, enabling the board and the company to terminate the agreement if a superior offer arrives before the deal is approved by the company’s shareholders. The Omnicare decision has been highly criticized by practitioners and scholars, who argue that it prevents the execution of deals that are time sensitive or especially sensitive to uncertainty and cannot take place without a complete lock-up of the agreement. No solid justification was provided to explain this anomaly, which led Vice Chancellor Lamb to assert that “Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality.”*

*In this article, we offer a novel justification for the Omnicare ruling: the inability of shareholders to effectively monitor the functioning of the board when deals are insulated from market forces. Shareholders lack the information necessary to assess whether the price the board approved is the optimal price the company could have received. The main “check” on the board in making this crucial decision is the market: the emergence of a better offer that will cause shareholders to question the desirability of the transaction the board has approved. A complete lock-up of a deal prevents the emergence of competing offers and leaves the board without effective oversight in this crucial decision. In this article, we discuss the implications of the oversight rationale in fine-tuning the Omnicare ruling. In light of the oversight rationale, we argue that cases in which directors and managers commit to having no role in the company after the merger or acquisition should be exempt from the Omnicare ruling. On the other hand, in contrast to the narrow interpretation of Omnicare by courts in subsequent cases, it should apply to mergers without an intervening bidder and lead to their enjoinment, and should also apply to mergers approved by immediate written consent of shareholders.*

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## Introduction

In one of the most renowned and controversial decisions in Delaware in the last 20 years, the Delaware Supreme Court (in a rare split decision) ruled, in *Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc.,* that the board of a public target company cannot decide to completely lock-up a merger.[[3]](#footnote-3) Hence, the merger agreement must include a fiduciary out clause, enabling the board and the company, *inter alia*, to terminate the agreement if a superior offer arrives before the deal is approved by the shareholders. If the agreement does not include such an exit clause, the deal is “preclusive and coercive”[[4]](#footnote-4) and the board would be deemed to have failed to discharge its duties.

The *Omnicare* decision has had a great impact on merger and acquisition agreements since. The requirement to add a fiduciary out clause complicates merger and acquisition agreements by preventing the parties from “sealing the deal” and forcing them to address contingencies in which the board may decide to back down from the deal if a superior offer emerges. This has led to much frustration among practitioners.[[5]](#footnote-5) It is not only practitioners who have resented the decision: many scholars have also critiqued the decision, echoing the opinion of the dissenting minority in the case that not permitting a complete lock-up would be detrimental to the interests of the company in certain cases.[[6]](#footnote-6) There may be parties to which the value of the certainty of the deal is extremely high. Removing the ability to lock-up the deal would prevent them from making an offer in the first place, or would significantly reduce the amount they would be willing to pay for the company. A fiduciary out clause is essentially an option that allows the company to terminate the deal if a superior offer emerges. Mandating a fiduciary out is equivalent to a mandate to purchase an exit option. Just like any option, the price of the option may be too high and not worthwhile for the company to purchase. Mandating such a purchase may generate a social loss.

Can there be any other justification for a fiduciary out requirement? In this paper, we would like to provide an alternative justification. The problem with a merger agreement that does not include a fiduciary out clause is not that it damages the interests of shareholders by preventing them from receiving a better offer in the future. A deal with a complete lock-up may actually be ideal for shareholders: the complete lock-up may enable them to receive the best offer possible. The problem is of a different sort: enabling a complete lock-up would preclude effective monitoring of the functioning of the board. As with any other agent, there is a risk that the board is not maximizing value for the principals: in this case, shareholders. This fear is especially relevant in endgame decisions, which are not only critical for shareholders but touch on various external interests of members of both management and the board, from securing their position after the merger to just “getting on with the transaction.” It is very hard for shareholders to know whether the board has pursued the optimal deal. Information regarding the potential value of the company to various market actors is very costly to obtain. Thus, shareholders cannot directly know the likelihood that the price offered is the best possible price. Without such information, they may not only be able to monitor the board effectively and may approve bad deals due to their lack of information. The most effective mechanism that reins in the board and may provide some monitoring over their actions is the market mechanism, assuming there is an efficient market for supervising deals of this nature. The board knows that if the deal they are pursuing is not necessarily the optimal deal from the perspective of shareholders, the market may disclose this fact via the emergence of a superior offer. The complete lock-up of a merger insulates it from market oversight: no player will invest in presenting a better proposal if no deal can be made in any case. Absent any market oversight, the board functions without any effective monitoring of its actions, during a phase when such monitoring is critical. The prohibition on complete lock-ups is directed to prevent the board from functioning without effective oversight. It does not stem from a conventional understanding of fiduciary duties, but rather from a wider consideration of the need to prevent the board from circumventing effective oversight.

This rationale, which we propose underlies the prohibition on complete lock-ups may have important policy implications. There may be situations in which no oversight is needed if it is clear that the board does not gain even indirect benefits from the deal—that they will not maintain their board seats in the merged company or enjoy any other direct or indirect gain. In such cases, the need for oversight over the board’s actions is weaker, permitting a complete lock-up of the deal by excluding a fiduciary out clause from the agreement. On the other hand, the proposed rationale may call for the enjoining of a merger for which there is no fiduciary out clause, even when there is no intervening bidder. This is in contrast to subsequent rulings that have exempted the full application of *Omnicare* from such cases. According to the oversight rationale, the fact that there is no intervening bidder only exacerbates the problem of oversight and does not serve as a mitigating factor. Similarly, the rationale also calls for the full application of *Omnicare* in cases of immediate shareholder consent, opposing rulings that exempted such cases from the fiduciary out requirement. Such immediate consent does not mollify the oversight concern and thus the fiduciary out requirement should apply also to such cases.

Structurally, this Essay will unfold in four parts. In Part I, we present the *Omnicare* ruling, the problem it raises, and how this problem was dealt with in the interpretation of the ruling by subsequent court decisions. In Part II, we explore the possible theoretical justifications for the *Omnicare* ruling and the problems that each of the justifications raises. In Part III we introduce the novel monitoring rationale for the *Omnicare* ruling, which overcomes the problems mentioned in the previous part. In Part IV, we discuss the policy implications of the monitoring rationale: how it may require limiting the *Omnicare* ruling in some cases and expanding it in others. A conclusion will ensue.

1. Fiduciary Out: The *Omnicare* Ruling and Following Decisions.

The issue of the complete lock-up of merger agreements arose in *Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc*. NCS was immersed in debt and was searching for an acquirer that would save the company. Omnicare was willing to offer $270 million in its improved offer for NCS as a sale of assets in bankruptcy. It would thus only pay existing debtors of NCS and would not leave any consideration for the shareholders. This led NCS to reject the offer. As a result, NCS entered into negotiations with Genesis. Genesis was willing to offer a price exceeding Omnicare’s offer, which would also provide consideration to shareholders. The rivalry between Genesis and Omnicare, and the fact that it previously lost in a bitter bidding war with Omnicare, led Genesis to insist on exclusivity agreements and lock-ups in its negotiation with NCS.[[7]](#footnote-7) Genesis emphasized that it wanted to insure it would not be used as a “stalking horse.”[[8]](#footnote-8) As a result, when Omnicare sent an improved offer that was conditional on due diligence, NCS received an improved offer from Genesis and did not negotiate with Omnicare. Genesis’ offer was made conditional upon NCS granting approval by midnight the next day, otherwise, it would terminate discussions and withdraw the offer.[[9]](#footnote-9) The board of NCS decided to approve the agreement, which as the legal counsel emphasized “would prevent NCS from engaging in any alternative or superior transaction in the future”[[10]](#footnote-10) given its complete lock-ups: the lack of a fiduciary out clause and the agreement with NCS’ major shareholders, which held over 50% of its shares, obligating them to vote in favor of the agreement. Omnicare once again sent an improved offer. The NCS board withdrew its recommendation that shareholders vote in favor of the NCS-Genesis merger in view of this improved offer. Yet, due to its contractual obligation to submit the merger to a stockholder vote and Genesis’ voting agreement with the major shareholders, together with the lack of a fiduciary out clause, the rejection of the Genesis merger was deemed impossible.

Omnicare filed a lawsuit to prevent the consummation of the Genesis merger based on the claim that the approved merger was inferior to the one they offered, and thus the fiduciaries of NCS violated their duty of care by their decisions that led to the acceptance of the inferior offer. The Delaware Chancery court rejected Omnicare’s claim, determining that “the NCS board of directors has not breached their duty of care by entering into the exclusivity and merger agreements with Genesis.”[[11]](#footnote-11) The Chancery Court held that complete lock-ups constitute defensive measures that require special scrutiny under the two-part test set in Unocal. “…the directors acted in conformity with their fiduciary duties in seeking to achieve the highest and best transaction that was reasonably available to [the stockholders].”[[12]](#footnote-12) The Delaware Supreme Court overruled the ruling of the Chancery Court, determining that it didn’t comply with the *Unocal* test. The second part of the *Unocal* test is that the defensive measure is “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”[[13]](#footnote-13) In *Unitrin*, the court held that a preclusive response, depriving stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers, falls outside the scope of Unocal’s reasonableness test.[[14]](#footnote-14) The board’s defense of the transaction is coercive because it is absolute: “Genesis made the NCS board’s defense of its transaction absolute by insisting on the omission of any effective fiduciary out clause in the NCS merger agreement … deal protection devices that result in such coercion cannot withstand Unocal’s enhanced judicial scrutiny standard of review because they are not within the range of reasonableness.”[[15]](#footnote-15)

In addition to the unenforceability of the protective measures, because they are preclusive and coercive, the court held that the protective measures are unenforceable because they prevent the board from discharging its fiduciary responsibility: “the provision in the merger agreement requiring the board to submit the transaction for a shareholder vote and the omission of a fiduciary out clause in the merger agreement completely prevented the board from discharging its fiduciary responsibilities to the minority stockholders when Omnicare presented its superior transaction.”[[16]](#footnote-16) The court based its position on the ruling in *Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,* where it was held that “to the extent that a [merger] contract or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.”[[17]](#footnote-17) The Supreme Court concluded that boards do not have the authority to accept absolute lock-ups: “We hold that the NCS board did not have the authority to accede to the Genesis demand for an absolute ‘lock-up.’”[[18]](#footnote-18) The court ruled that the NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause:

“[t]he NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to protect the NCS stockholders if the Genesis transaction became an inferior offer. By [A][a]cceding to Genesis’ ultimatum for complete protection *in future*, the NCS board disabled itself from exercising its own fiduciary obligations at a time when the board’s own judgement is most important, i.e. receipt of a subsequent superior offer … The NCS board was required to contract for an effective fiduciary out clause to exercise its continuing fiduciary responsibilities.”[[19]](#footnote-19)

The weakness in the majorities’ opinion was already reflected in the dissent of the minority. Chief Justice Veasey and Justice Steele opposed the determination that failing to negotiate a fiduciary out clause constitutes a breach of the board's fiduciary duties *per se*:

“The beauty of the Delaware corporation law, and the reason it has worked so well for stockholders, directors and officers, is that the framework is based on an enabling statute with the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court applying principles of fiduciary duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case basis. Fiduciary duty cases are inherently fact-intensive and, therefore, unique.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

This position leads them to object to the conclusion that fiduciary out clauses should be mandatory:

“We respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the NCS board breached its fiduciary duties to the Class A Stockholders by failing to negotiate a ‘fiduciary out’ in the Genesis merger agreement.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

The minority opinion emphasizes that the directors were fully pursuing the interests of the shareholders when committing to a complete lock-up, stating that “this conclusion is indisputable.” For some parties, the certainty of the deal may be crucial, and without that certainty, no deal would be executed.[[22]](#footnote-22) “A lock-up permits a target board and a bidder to ‘exchange certainties … situations will arise where business realities demand a lock-up so that the wealth enhancing transaction may go forward.’”[[23]](#footnote-23) The minority held that the business judgment rule should apply to such cases, but even if the enhanced business judgment rule of *Unocal* is applied, the complete lock-up meets its test: the complete lock-up is a reasonable response to the threat, as Genesis’ offer was the ‘only game in town’ and was the only path for curing NCS from insolvency. Keeping that only possibility viable by committing to a complete lock-up should be deemed within the scope of reasonability.[[24]](#footnote-24)

The problematic features of the decision in *Omnicare* have not escaped the attention of scholars and practitioners. Professor Sean J. Griffith has raised the positive-law problem with a rule that does not enable the board to commit itself to a certain decision in the future, in that it unwarrantedly privileges the decision in the future over the decision in the present:

The trouble of course, with adopting a *per se* rule that the board cannot act at T1 to inhibit information available at T2 is that such a rule privileges T2 over T1. Barring the board from so acting necessarily constrains the board’s choice set at T1. The rule in other words, inhibits the board’s authority and interferes with the exercise of t duties at T1 in favor of the ‘unremitting’ duties at T2. However, why should the board’s duties at T2 trump its duties in T1? What is the basis for allowing the boards’ authority at either time to trump the other? … there is no doctrinal basis to interpret that duty to trump other powers and responsibilities of the board.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Professor Julian Velasco notes that the courts’ elimination of the ability of the board to commit to a bidder, irrespective of later bids, limits the board to a certain form of auction: an English auction, where bidders continuously attempt to top each other, rather than a blind auction, where bidders secretly submit their best offers.[[26]](#footnote-26) Unlike in a blind auction, bidders have no incentive to offer the best price. Because of the rule that limits the board’s commitment to any bid, they are vulnerable to a topping bid.[[27]](#footnote-27) Although there isn’t a clear-cut answer to which of the two bidding processes generates a higher price, it is not appropriate that the court should determine the bidding process, which is purely a business issue, on a *per se* basis.[[28]](#footnote-28)

The problematic *Omnicare* ruling has led subsequent court rulings to distinguish it, yet it hasn’t been overruled. In *Orman v. Cullman*, the court distinguished between the actions of the board and management to lock-up a deal and the actions of shareholders to lock-up a deal. The court ruled that the restrictions of *Omnicare* apply to the former and not the latter. In *Orman*,Swedish Match merged with General Cigar, buying out the public shareholders of General Cigar for cash and leaving the controller of General Cigar with a stake of 36% in Swedish Match and maintaining control over General Cigar.[[29]](#footnote-29) In order to prevent the offer from being shopped to other bidders, Swedish Match required the controlling party of General Cigar, the Cullmans, who held a majority of the voting power, to sign a voting agreement in which the Cullmans agreed to vote their shares *pro rata* concomitant with the vote of the public shareholders and against any alternative merger for a period of 18 months. The agreement included a “majority of the minority provision,” which enables the public shareholders to exercise the power of veto over the merger.[[30]](#footnote-30) A majority of the public shareholders approved the merger.[[31]](#footnote-31)

The public shareholders who voted against the merger objected to the merger proceeding on the grounds of *Omnicare*: that the voting agreement together with the merger coerced the public shareholders’ vote, and this combination amounted to a breach of fiduciary duties. The court rejected the argument of the minority public shareholders, pointing to two central points that distinguish the case from *Omnicare*. The first is that the shareholder vote was still an effective “out” mechanism: unlike *Omnicare*, the shareholder approval was not mathematically certain, due to the effective majority of the minority provision.[[32]](#footnote-32) Even though the shareholders’ approval was influenced by the protective measures, such as the limitation to accept any other offers in the 18 months window, it still posed a viable check on the agreement.[[33]](#footnote-33) The second is that the lock-up agreement was with the Cullmans as shareholders, and not in their capacity as fiduciaries. The limitation on lock-up agreement under *Omnicare* applies to fiduciaries and not to shareholders.[[34]](#footnote-34)

An important additional limitation of the Omnicare ruling was raised in *Optima Int’l of Miami Inc. v. WCI Steel Inc*. It excluded from the fiduciary out requirement cases where there is an immediate written vote by shareholders.[[35]](#footnote-35) WCI, a troubled steel company, canvassed the market for potential buyers, and out of 20 identified two companies with which it initiated a bidding process: Optima and Severstal. The United Steelworkers Union had a veto right on any change of control in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement it had with WCI. Severstal won the required approval of the union, but Optima outbid it by $101 M with a bid of $150 million. As a consequence, Severstal increased its bid to $136 million, to which Optima reacted by circumventing the board of WCI and initiating a hostile takeover, offering to purchase shares from WCI shareholders at a premium. WCI offered to support Severstal’s bid, due to its higher certainty because it had obtained the required consent of the labor union if it agreed to one of the following conditions: allowing a 20-day solicitation period after signing the agreement or increasing its bid. Severstal opted for the latter and increased its bid to $140 million, conditioned on shareholder consent within 24 hours of signing. WCI agreed and provided the immediate written consent of the major shareholders constituting a majority, essentially locking-up the transaction. Optima joined shareholder plaintiffs in a suit to enjoin the Severstal transaction. Their claim was that the complete lock-up, enabled by the requirement for approval within 24 hours and the willingness of two shareholders holding a majority of voting rights to approve the deal, violates the *Omnicare* restriction on complete lock-ups, and therefore constitutes a violation of the fiduciaries’ duties.

The Chancery Court refuted their claim, by distinguishing between actual voting through written consent and a voting agreement. Vice Chancellor Lamb emphasized that there is no legal requirement to separate the signing of the agreement and the shareholder vote.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Nothing in the DGCL requires any particular period of time between board’s authorization of a merger agreement and the necessary stockholder vote. And I don’t see how the board’s agreement to proceed as it did could result in a finding of a breach of duty.[[37]](#footnote-37)

If there isn’t significant time between the two, fiduciary out is simply irrelevant. This ruling essentially enables companies to circumvent the *Omnicare* requirement if the two following conditions apply. The first is that the target’s charter enables shareholder action by written consent. The second is that it is possible to aggregate the votes of large shareholders to form a majority of shareholder votes. Vice Chancellor Lamb admitted that the written consent of shareholders circumvents *Omnicare*: “It’s really not my place to note this, but *Omnicare* is of questionable continued validity.”[[38]](#footnote-38)

In *In-re Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,* the court reaffirmed the *Optima* ruling that if the agreement is effectively locked-up by an immediate shareholder vote via written consent, the agreement does not have to include a fiduciary out. In *Openlane*, the board, which effectively held a majority voting control over the company, solicited prospective strategic acquirers due to financial distress. It entered into an agreement with KAR under which KAR would acquire Openlane for $210 million in cash. The agreement included a stringent non-solicitation clause and lacked any type of fiduciary out clause. The agreement was approved by a majority of shareholders which the directors controlled a day after the signing by written consent, but it required a super-majority of at least 75% of the outstanding shares. The shareholders sued to enjoin the transaction on the basis that the defensive devices—the non-solicitation clause without a fiduciary out and the immediate vote of shareholders—were impermissible according to the *Omnicare* decision. Vice Chancellor Noble rejected their claim based on the *Optima* ruling that an immediate vote of shareholders does not conflict with the *Omnicare* decision.[[39]](#footnote-39) Similarly to *Optima*, Vice Chancellor Noble interpreted *Omnicare* narrowly: the problematic lock-up is when there is no fiduciary out, *together* with shareholder voting agreements that the board promises to deliver.[[40]](#footnote-40) The immediate written consent of shareholders is not an act of the board and thus does not pose the problem of a board-initiated lock-up.[[41]](#footnote-41)

Furthermore, Vice Chancellor Noble emphasized that even if the absence of a fiduciary out is prohibited *per se* according to *Omnicare*, it does not provide sufficient grounds for enjoining the merger if no superior offer has emerged. The absence of a fiduciary out provision does not preclude the possibility that other offers will emerge. Potential bidders are aware that the Delaware courts may not enforce a merger agreement that lacks a fiduciary out if they present a superior offer to the board.[[42]](#footnote-42)

These three decisions consequent to the *Omnicare* decision demonstrate that the Delaware courts do not feel comfortable with the *Omnicare* decision. While they did not overrule *Omnicare*, they strived to limit it as much as possible by permitting a lock-up through shareholder agreement if the outcome is not certain and enabling companies to completely lock-up the deal, without a fiduciary out clause, if it is done through the written consent of shareholders.[[43]](#footnote-43) There has even been a suggestion in the Delaware courts to overrule *Omnicare* given the analytical problem it poses by applying a blanket restriction on the board and management to eliminate risk, without sensitivity to the circumstances that may justify such elimination of risk. However, this opinion was only expressed as an obiter in a footnote by (then) Vice Chancellor Strine, in *In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, pointing out that *Omnicare* is an aberration from the principle that what matters in the adoption of defensive mechanisms is whether the “board acted reasonably based on the circumstances then facing it.”[[44]](#footnote-44)

The big question is why did the Delaware courts leave the *Omnicare* decision standing, notwithstanding its “aberrational departure” from the logic of the Delaware courts?[[45]](#footnote-45) What is the underlying justification for leaving this problematic ruling intact?

## II. Justification for the *Omnicare* decision

As noted in the previous section, the *Omnicare* decision is highly problematic: it prevents potential deals in which the value of certainty for the acquirer is high. While the Delaware courts limited the *Omnicare* ruling, it was not overturned. What is the rationale behind *Omnicare* that justifies its persistence? Scholars have provided a few distinctive explanations for the Omnicare decision. We decipher weaknesses in each of these explanations, which leads us to provide our novel explanation for the decision.

### Fulfilling the Duty to be Fully Informed

Professor Sean Griffith places *Omnicare* among a wider set of cases that impose on fiduciaries an unremitting duty to always be “fully informed”—a duty that can never be abdicated. Griffith points to the *Phelps Dodge* decision as the “ancestral spirit” of *Omnicare*. In *Phelps Dodge*, shareholders sued for enjoining an agreement in which the management agreed to a no-talk provision, which eliminated the possibility of communicating with any other party besides the potential acquirer.[[46]](#footnote-46) Chancellor Chandler decided to enjoin the agreement, determining that agreeing to such provisions, violates the fiduciaries’ “duty to take care to be informed of all material information reasonably available.”[[47]](#footnote-47) Griffith also views cases that limited the use of ‘don’t ask, don’t waive’ (DADW) standstill provisions as part of a wider family of cases establishing the board’s duty to stay informed. Standstill provisions prevent a bidding party from approaching shareholders directly in order to launch a hostile bid. DADW standstill provisions limit the parties’ ability to communicate with the target, sometimes even privately, in order to regain permission to approach shareholders. In *In Re Complete Genomics Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, Vice Chancellor Laster ordered an injunction to the merger agreement because of the impermissibility of DADW provisions. As Griffith emphasizes,[[48]](#footnote-48) Vice Chancellor Laster did not base his holding on a violation of duty, based on *Revlon*, to remain open to superior offers, but on a violation of the board’s duty to stay informed:

“By agreeing to this provision, the Genomics board impermissibly limited its ongoing statutory and fiduciary obligation to properly evaluate a competing offer, disclose material information, and make a meaningful merger recommendation to its stockholders.”[[49]](#footnote-49)

The DADW provision prevents the board from being informed regarding other bids before making its recommendation. The problem didn’t seem to be the exclusivity in the merger agreement, but rather willful blindness.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Less than a month later, in *In Re* *Ancestry.com Inc. Shareholder Litigation* the Chancery Court softened the position of Vice Chancellor Laster in *Complete Genomics*. With respect to a shareholders’ claim against an acquisition that included a DADW standstill provision, which should be viewed as illegitimate, Strine emphasized that DADW standstills are not prohibited *per se*, and may be used as commitment devices in some cases. The test is highly context-sensitive. He stroked down the utilization of the DADW standstill provision based on the finding that the board was not fully informed of the potency of the DADW standstill provision. This could be remedied by a detailed description of the deal process, including the number of bidders that signed on such standstills, so that shareholders would have an indication of the possibility of an alternative deal, even if the present one is struck down. Thus, although *Ancestry* deviates from *Complete Genomics*, they both identify the problem of DADW standstills as an impediment to the flow of information.[[51]](#footnote-51)

Griffith notes that an “unremitted duty” to be informed in the future, which bars the board from making commitments in the present, effectively privileges future decisions over present ones. Corporate law does not support the attribution of higher value to decisions in the future than to present decisions. Griffith suggests employing enhanced scrutiny deal protection without a fiduciary out. This would provide greater flexibility than the current *Omnicare* doctrine, but still impose considerable limits on such provisions. The board would be justified if it can prove that it had acted reasonably to prevent the loss of a deal that might be beneficial to shareholders.[[52]](#footnote-52) The focus should be both on the motive and the means, unlike traditional enhanced scrutiny, which focuses on threats and proportionality. Before approving protective measures, one should rule out the existence of any impermissible motives of directors—subtle variations of personal interest. Next, the chosen means should fall within a range of reasonable alternatives.[[53]](#footnote-53) According to Griffith, the alternatives should also be examined in light of the sale process. Both *Revlon* and *Unocal* should be understood as points along the continuum of enhanced scrutiny, in which different contexts require different ways to examine the motivation and means through which protective measures are implemented. Deal protection provisions should be placed at a mid-point in this spectrum.

Enabling greater flexibility in examining deal protection provisions, including the exclusion of a fiduciary out clause, circumvents the problem of privileging future decisions of the board over present ones and the inefficiency of the outright ban on complete lock-ups. At the same time, the application of enhanced scrutiny in such cases maintains the main and important advantages of the *Omnicare* decision, uprooting the practice of complete lock-ups and providing certainty regarding what is a legitimate means and what is not.[[54]](#footnote-54) While it may seem that an enhanced scrutiny test would impose considerable limitations very similar to those of the complete banon lock-ups in *Omnicare*, this is far from true. The reasonableness test is very wide and may include many more than the few cases in which the transaction would not materialize without a complete lock-up. One may almost always raise the argument that the expected increase in price attributable to the certainty that a complete lock-up provides is greater than the expected increase in price as a result of an additional offer. This argument may not be valid when there are indications of other potential players willing to pay a greater price, but there are many cases in which there are no such indications.

Furthermore, applying the enhanced scrutiny test on complete lock-ups that do not contain a fiduciary out will generate much uncertainty and high litigation costs. As noted above, in most cases it could be claimed that the complete lock-up will generate value for shareholders due to the greater certainty it generates for the acquiring party, which would be willing to bid higher amounts given that certainty. As a rule, the reasonable test is not an effective filter of cases *ex-ante*, and mainly provides guidance for courts *ex-post*.[[55]](#footnote-55) Of course, this claim would not be accepted by the courts in all cases. Yet it is very hard to determine in which cases the assumption that the lock-up generates value for shareholders would be accepted, due to the inherently gray nature of the reasonable test. Thus, replacing the clear-cut *Omnicare* rule with enhanced scrutiny in relation to the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision will generate high uncertainty and considerably increase the amount of expensive litigation that would follow.

### Protecting Shareholder Rights

Professor Julian Velasco offers a different justification for the problematic decision in *Omnicare*. Although the requirement for a fiduciary out may prevent certain efficient deals from taking place, the requirement is justified based on the purpose of protecting shareholder rights from abuse at the hands of directors. Shareholders have been vested with a right to vote and approve certain fundamental transactions, specifically acquisitions and mergers of the company. Merger agreements require the approval of shareholders of both merging companies.[[56]](#footnote-56) Shareholder approval is required also in the case of a sale of a substantial part of a company’s assets.[[57]](#footnote-57) Tender offers do not require a shareholder vote at the corporate level, but shareholders can directly express their consent or rejection by their decision on whether or not to tender their shares.[[58]](#footnote-58) The ability of shareholders to vote on crucial corporate decisions represents the ‘stockholder franchise,’ one of the ‘ideological underpinnings on which the legitimacy of the directors and managerial power rests’.[[59]](#footnote-59) The Delaware court in *Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc.* also expressed the importance of shareholder voting rights and the need to protect them. “Because of the overriding importance of voting rights, [the courts] have consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with such rights.”[[60]](#footnote-60)

Management and directors who exclude a fiduciary out provision may well be exclusively motivated by the desire to further the interests of the company and its shareholders by obtaining an optimal deal that could not have been obtained if a fiduciary out was included in the agreement. The problem with the exclusion of a fiduciary right provision cannot be that it represents a violation by directors of their fiduciary duties by acting in a way that harms the company. The exclusion may not harm the company but actually further its interests. Velasco suggests that the problem with such action is not the damage to the company and its shareholders done by preventing them from accepting subsequent, potentially preferable, offers, but the infringement of the right of shareholders to determine whether to approve the deal.[[61]](#footnote-61) Although shareholders still vote on mergers and acquisitions that don’t include a fiduciary out, Velasco claims that the exclusion of fiduciary out may considerably restrict shareholders’ ability to vote as they like, and render such votes largely meaningless.[[62]](#footnote-62) Shareholders may approve a deal that they think is suboptimal purely because they know there wouldn’t be any other option due to lock-up mechanisms. According to Velasco, “[f]or directors to agree to provisions that interfere with shareholder voting rights is not only unseemly but actually strikes at the very foundations of corporate law.”[[63]](#footnote-63)

There are two main problems with Velasco’s shareholder rights justification of the *Omnicare* ruling. The first is whether the exclusion of a fiduciary out actually imposes a serious impediment on shareholders’ right to approve or disapprove the merger. In our eyes, the answer to this question is negative. Shareholders may still vote against the merger and the merger still requires their consent. Even if there is no fiduciary out but shareholders are under the impression that there are better deals out in the market, they can vote against the merger. If there is a player willing to bid a significantly higher value, it is most likely that it will wait until the prior offer is rejected by shareholders before making the new offer. There are two reasons why shareholders would opt not to reject an offer. The first is the opportunity cost of the rejection: while there is a chance that the company will receive a higher bid after the rejection of the initial offer, there is also a possibility that the company and shareholders will find themselves burned at both ends of the candle, with no offer at all. If such an outcome is a serious consideration, the agreement that management and the board reached is likely the best, and while they *could* reject it, it is *preferable* that they do not reject it. The fact that shareholders value the present offer more than the expectancy of future offers does not imply that their rights as shareholders were infringed. It is true that they cannot accept an additional offer without rejecting the prior offer, and in this respect, shareholders do not have the opportunity to respond to a potential second offer if they have fully accepted the first. But, by the same token, the mandatory inclusion of a fiduciary out clause may prevent the initial offer from being made; in this case, shareholders would not be able to respond to the initial offer either. Not being able to have any input on responding to the missed first offer could also be viewed as an infringement of shareholders’ rights, to the same extent that missing the inability to respond to a second offer is interpreted as such an infringement. In this respect, there is no difference between missing the second offer due to the acceptance of the first, and missing the first offer due to a mandated fiduciary out clause.

The second reason why shareholders may not reject the first deal is the high cost imposed on breaking the initial agreement. Even if shareholders are confident there is a higher offer behind the corner, they may not reject the initial agreement because the break-up fee would cause them to lose even if they received a higher offer. This, of course, is a valid concern: certain breakup fees may make it impossible to receive a higher offer because the net gain would most likely be negative. Yet this is a separate concern from the issue of fiduciary outs. It is an alternative lock-up mechanism, which could be dealt with and monitored separately. There are standard break-up fees (around 3%), and any fee that exceeds the standard range should be abolished, or at least reviewed critically. As long as the break-up fee does not significantly exceed the standard rate, there is still the potential that a higher bid may emerge, thus shareholders do have a real choice even when there is a breakup fee.

The second problem with Velasco’s justification is that pointing to existing shareholder rights in itself does not necessarily have normative gravitas. Why should shareholders have the right to vote on mergers, especially if it may work to their determent, and at the risk of losing more advantageous deals? There are many important decisions that the board makes without the need for shareholder approval. On the other hand, even if the law dictates that shareholders should have a voice in some matters, why is it necessarily required that they voice their preferences in all mergers? In the next section, we will delve more deeply into this question, and provide alternative justification for the *Omnicare* ruling.

## III. Monitoring of the Board as Justification for the *Omnicare* Ruling

### Introducing the Oversight Justification for Omnicare

The *Omnicare* ruling does prevent certain mergers that may be more beneficial to the company: some bidders value the certainty of a completely locked-up agreement without a fiduciary out more highly than the company and its shareholders value having the option to exit the merger. Even though shareholders may *want* a transaction that reflects this higher valuation, corporate law, as exemplified by the *Omnicare* ruling, precludes this possibility. The reason for imposing this limitation is to ensure an effective monitoring mechanism over the board by shareholders in crucial decisions for the company. Boards are supposed to monitor management on behalf of shareholders, but in some cases, they themselves have to be monitored, especially when there is a structural conflict of interest and the decision is a crucial one for the company. This is the central rationale for *Unocal* and *Revelon*:in crucial endgame decisions and structural conflicts of interest (where directors may maintain their seats on the board by adopting defensive mechanisms against a hostile takeover or preferring a bid that doesn’t necessarily offer the highest price for shareholders) the board must be monitored more closely, in these cases by the court. Similarly, complete lock-ups in merger or acquisition agreements are also important decisions in which there may be a structural conflict of interest. Yet the conflict of interest is more subtle in the case of complete lock-ups than in the protective measures in *Unocal* or the rejection of the highest offer in *Revlon*. Unlike *Unocal* and *Revlon*, in which there is a higher offer lurking in the background, in cases such as *Omnicare*, there are no indications that there actually exists a better offer than the one the board has agreed to. In such circumstances, there is less risk that the board is prioritizing one offer based on its own interests over an alternative offer that would be more beneficial to shareholders. However, the problem is that there is no mechanism available to monitor whether the offer the board is pursuing is the optimal offer for the company. Although merger agreements are approved by shareholders, a merger agreement that is completely locked-up by the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision, and assuming no competitive process was performed prior to signing, does not enable shareholders to effectively monitor the board’s decision. The main tool through which shareholders can ascertain whether the agreement is the best the company can receive is the market mechanism. In order to be able to determine the best price a company can receive, one must have a thorough knowledge, not only of the selling company but also of the potential acquirers, including the ability to estimate the potential synergies that potential acquirers may derive by purchasing the company. This information is highly complex and very costly for shareholders to obtain. Most likely, they will not have access to this information which is crucial for estimating the highest price the company can receive for its sale. Market exposure is the main vehicle through which shareholders can be assured that the company received the highest price possible. As long as the company is fully exposed to the market, shareholders can presume that the offer they received is the best offer, otherwise, a bidder that attributes higher value to their company would have made a higher bid.

Furthermore, if boards understand that the merger or acquisition they would like to promote will be exposed to the market, they will be more careful and selective in the deals they bring to the table. If the acquisition price is relatively cheap, another potential acquirer will bring a higher offer to the table. This will put any board that pressed for a cheaper deal in a tough spot. In order to avoid such a scenario, boards will make an extra effort to bring to the table lucrative offers that are very hard to top.

The need to monitor the board in merger transactions does not stem only from the suspicion of structural biases: that the board may actually be promoting its own interests in pursuing a specific transaction. It may also stem from a basic feature of corporate law: the idea that the actions of agents in the corporation should be overseen by other organs within the corporation, to make sure the actions actually promote the interests of the corporation. Actions may be detrimental to the company not only because of conflicts of interest but also due to bad judgement or negligence. The board is the main organ within the corporation charged with monitoring management and management’s oversight over other employees. Yet when the board is the decision-maker and the stakes of the decisions are high, such as in endgame decisions, some monitoring is required over the board. This is the main reason why shareholders must approve important decisions such as mergers: to monitor the decisions made by the board. Yet this monitoring does not have to be implemented by shareholders. As noted above, shareholders do not have sufficient information to determine whether transactions represent the best possible offers available. The market assists them in monitoring the board: given market exposure, if the transaction is suboptimal, a better offer may emerge and shed a bad light on the functioning of the board if it was willing to pursue a suboptimal offer.

Essentially, it is the market, and not necessarily the shareholders, that monitors the board in merger decisions. Even without the need for shareholders’ approval, the market itself functions as a monitoring mechanism, holding boards accountable for bad decision-making. The reputation of boards that have pushed for a certain deal where a better deal subsequently emerged, would be tainted. There is ample evidence that the market for board members is sensitive to tainted reputations, which would increase the likelihood that such board members would not hold on to their seats, diminish their chances of being nominated to serve on the boards of other companies, and impact their potential compensation.[[64]](#footnote-64) The more that board members push for a suboptimal deal, the more their reputation would be tainted. But when they really push hard to promote a certain transaction—agreeing to a complete lockup of the transaction including the omission of a fiduciary out clause—they shield themselves from monitoring by the market and reduce their accountability. Even if it is a bad deal, it is most likely that this will never be made known: because of the complete lock-up, it is most likely that no better offer will emerge. This is the central problem that we believe the *Omnicare* ruling is addressing. There is no reason to think that an agreement with a complete lock-up is bad for the company. As noted above, it is certainly possible that the acquirer values the certainty to a greater extent than the company and its shareholders value the exit option, and the compensation offered for a complete lock-up is worthwhile for the company and its shareholders. Even if a complete lock-up may be worthwhile in a specific case, it would remove the central mechanism for monitoring crucial decisions by the board. Such a complete ban is similar to other cogent features of corporate law, which does not enable companies to opt out of certain corporate governance features, even though shareholders may be interested in opting out because the cost of the element is greater than its benefit. For instance, shareholders cannot eliminate the existence of a board, even if they think its cost is greater than its benefit.[[65]](#footnote-65) The reason for these rules is the basic feature of corporate law that agents should be monitored. This justification applies also to the decision-making of boards, especially in crucial endgame decisions. As explained above, the most effective mechanism for monitoring such board decisions is the market. This is an additional and important reason for the *Omnicare* ruling: the board’s decision should be effectively monitored by the market. The board is not permitted to completely lock-up its decision by the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision in order to maintain exposure to monitoring by the market.

Although the monitoring justification may seem related to the justification based on voting rights, the perspective it presents on the importance of a fiduciary out clause is completely different. The voting rights justification emphasizes shareholders’ right to influence and control crucial decisions, especially those involving the sale of their investment. In this sense, a shareholder’s right to vote is akin to a property right: being able to exert some control over the asset in which you have a stake. This right seems to have intrinsic value: the ability of shareholders to have some degree of control over their stakes in the company. By contrast, the value of shareholder voting according to the monitoring justification is not intrinsic; rather, it is one of the means through which oversight of managers and directors is provided. According to the monitoring justification, it even is not required to have shareholders vote in order to monitor managers and directors. As mentioned above, the most effective mechanism for the oversight of managerial and board actions is the market mechanism. In some instances, shareholder voting is only a mechanism to enable an effective market mechanism: the fact that there is an additional decision-making layer motivates market players to make offers even when they feel that the board is biased against them.

The central feature of the monitoring justification—that shareholders are interested in mechanisms that provide oversight of directors, even if there are quite a few cases in which that mechanism may generate a suboptimal deal for the company—has been utilized by one of us in a different context, also to explain what may seem to be a legal anomaly. We will turn to that example in order to demonstrate how the justification works.

### Monitoring justification: analogy to the case of legal risk

The presentation, through the lens of monitoring, of a novel justification for a problematic practice in corporate law is not unique to this article. A similar explanation has been provided by one of us to explain an even more problematic practice in corporate law: the legal distinction between business uncertainty and legal uncertainty.[[66]](#footnote-66) This differentiation is one of the central enigmas in corporate law. Let us compare two similar decisions of management and the board—in both, there is an assumption of risk in order to obtain greater expected returns, with a similar risk and return profile. The only difference between the two decisions is the source of risk: in the former, the risk is a conventional business risk and in the latter, the risk is a legal risk. In case the risk materializes, in the former case, shareholders cannot sue, via a derivative suit, the fiduciaries for the exposure to the risk due to the business judgement rule that protects fiduciaries so they would not be deterred from assuming risks that enlarge the expected gains.[[67]](#footnote-67) By contrast, if legal risk materializes, then shareholders can sue the fiduciaries via a derivative suit for assuming the legal risk, even though the risk had a positive expected outcome for the company.[[68]](#footnote-68)

This distinction raises questions: why should the shareholders be able to sue in the latter case and not in the former? Conversely, given the strong rationale for not enabling them to sue in order not to deter the assumption of risk with a positive expected return: why are shareholders not able to sue in the former case but are able to sue in the latter? Why should the source of risk matter to them? Shareholders should care only about the profile of the risk, and not whether the risk stems from a business or legal context.

Scholars have attempted to provide an answer to this intriguing question,[[69]](#footnote-69) but as one of us has demonstrated elsewhere, these answers provided suffer from major weaknesses.[[70]](#footnote-71) We provided an alternative answer that provides a solid justification for the intriguing distinction between legal and business risk: the oversight and monitoring gap between business decisions and legal decisions. The main function of the board is to oversee and monitor major decisions by managers. This oversight will typically take place in a business context: the board will assess whether the risk taken is worthwhile. In contrast, decisions regarding the assumption of legal risk would not be brought to the board for monitoring. The reason for this is that managers acknowledge that if they bring a decision to assume a legal risk to the board, the board will rule it out, regardless of the probability of illegality and the potential upside.[[71]](#footnote-72) Board members realize that a decision to assume legal risk may expose them to personal criminal liability. Even if there is an extremely small risk, which the company should take based on a cost-benefit analysis, board members tend to be completely risk averse when it comes to personal criminal liability. Because managers know that the board will never approve the assumption of legal risk, they will not present such risks for board approval. If the risk is low and the returns for the risk are especially high, managers who want the company to assume the risk know that they shouldn’t bring it to the board for approval.[[72]](#footnote-73)

Thus, even though business risk and legal risk may have the same risk profile and expected value for the company and its shareholders, there is a difference in the degree of oversight they receive: decisions regarding business risk receive board oversight, while decisions regarding legal risk tend to evade board oversight. This difference justifies the legal distinction between the two forms of risks. Even though a decision involving legal risk *may* benefit shareholders, such a decision is prohibited because it will not benefit from the board’s oversight.

The same form of justification applies also to the *Omnicare* ruling regarding the mandated fiduciary out provision in mergers: even though the company and its shareholders may benefit from deals that enable complete certainty by excluding fiduciary out provisions because such provisions eliminate oversight over important board decisions, they are viewed as categorically opposing the interests of the company and shareholders. The oversight over crucial decisions is a vital component of fair corporate governance. In the next part of this essay, we will delineate the possible legal policy ramifications of the oversight justification.

## IV. Legal Policy Implications

### Exclusion of Fiduciary Out Provisions When Directors and Managers Have No Involvement in the Company After the Execution of the Deal.

The oversight justification explains why there is a need to include a fiduciary out provision even in transactions where it is likely that shareholders would benefit more by excluding a fiduciary out provision to secure the deal. The question is whether there is always a need for market oversight. There are a few possible answers to that question. One may claim that there is always a need for oversight and that that is the point of *Omnicare*: even when there are substantive reasons to believe that a certain deal is the best possible deal for shareholders, we still require market oversight. Market oversight is a basic element of corporate law. On the other hand, one may claim that shareholder and market oversight are not required for every corporate action. There are many actions that do not require such oversight, such as consumer contracts. There are two main reasons for requiring the oversight of an additional entity. The first is the possibility of grave mistakes that will be detrimental to the company. This rationale is especially relevant to endgame decisions, which are the most important decisions in the life of the corporation and are key in determining the outcome of the shareholder’s investment in the company. Of course, private individuals may also make mistakes, and they do not necessarily have a second tier of oversight to supervise their decisions. However, there are two reasons why we are more concerned with mistakes in the corporate context than in the individual context. First, individuals make decisions for themselves. They are the ones bearing the consequences of their decision-making. Because they directly experience the full economic impact of their decisions, they are less likely to make erroneous decisions than the directors of a corporation. Furthermore, the impact of an erroneous decision is small, while the impact of erroneous decisions made by corporations may be huge.

The second reason for oversight is the potential for actual or structural conflicts of interest. Settings in which there is a structural conflict of interest require oversight so that the decision-maker is careful to prevent bias towards his own interests, and so that if he is, an overseeing entity can correct his decision. An example of oversight based on this reasoning is the requirement that CEOs’ compensation is approved by both the board and shareholders. Needless to say, CEOs have an interest in making their compensation package as large as possible. Even directors have an interest in approving a large compensation package for the CEO, both for the sake of augmenting their own compensation package, which may be pegged or related to that of the CEO,[[73]](#footnote-74) and because of their proximity to the CEO, who in many cases suggested their nomination.[[74]](#footnote-75)

In the context of a fiduciary out requirement in mergers and endgame decisions, both rationales seem to apply, but the second rationale dominates. The terms of a merger are a complex matter, which the directors and managers may get wrong, especially if there is no input from the market. Yet on the other hand, endgame decisions are also crucial for directors and managers, because they generally have a significant impact on their compensation. The second rationale applies even more strongly: managers and directors may have a structural interest in shielding the terms of a merger from the influence of market forces. Their power enables them to protect an agreement with a party that would maintain their position, even if the terms for the company are suboptimal.

Given the central role of the second rationale—the structural conflict of interest—in justifying the oversight of endgame decisions by management and directors through market exposure, in extreme cases where there is no such structural conflict of interest, there may be no need for market oversight. There is a structural conflict of interest in most cases, but not in every case. If the agreement does not include a reference to the role of the current managers and directors in the merged company or the company after the acquisition, the potential for a structural conflict of interest is significantly diminished. The main cause of structural conflicts of interest for management and directors in endgame decisions is that they may prefer an agreement with a certain party because of the role they would have in the future under that transaction. If the purchaser does not refer to the roles of directors and managers in the new business structure, the potential for a conflict of interest is significantly diminished, and the need for market oversight also decreases considerably. As a result, in cases where there is no commitment made to management or directors concerning their roles in the new business structure, a complete lock-up with the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision may be legitimate, even if we accept the general rule that the agreement should include a fiduciary out provision.

A possible objection is that, even if there is no direct commitment or reference made to the role of management and the directors in the new business entity, there may be a tacit understanding that the merging or acquiring party has a commitment toward management or the directors, especially if they have prevented other parties from competing with the proposal by locking-up the agreement and excluding a fiduciary out provision. This may well be true: a structural conflict of interest, albeit weaker, may remain even if there is no explicit reference to the role of directors and managers. Yet it is possible to eradicate even this weak structural conflict of interest. Directors and management can commit not to take any position in the company after the merger for a certain period of time (for example, three years). Such a commitment on the part of directors and managers would eliminate any potential conflict of interest. In such cases, directors and managers would have no expectation of any role as a result of the agreement. Thus, even if we accept the objection to the ability to exclude a fiduciary out provision when there is no reference to the roles of management and directors, there are no grounds for such an objection when management and directors commit themselves not to take any role in the company after the merger or acquisition, and permit the exclusion of a fiduciary out clause in such a case.

It is true that a commitment by management and directors not to take any role in the merged entity is inefficient and undesirable in most cases. The experience of management and the board with the company provides them with an important advantage if they are involved in the company after the merger or acquisition, and smooth its transformation. This may well be true. We do not call for managers and directors to sign on to such commitments. All we are saying is that if managers and directors make such a commitment, the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision may be legitimate.[[75]](#footnote-76) Even though a commitment such as this may seem unusual and insignificant, it could address situations where the potential acquirer attributes a very high value to the certainty of the deal. In such cases, the potential acquirer may offer such a large premium for the company if it receives a complete lock-up including the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision, that directors and managers may be willing to make such a commitment. If this policy recommendation is accepted—that a fiduciary out provision could be excluded if managers and directors commit to non-involvement in the merged company—it raises an interesting question: what happens if a party offers a high premium for a completely locked-up agreement without a fiduciary out provision, under which the managers and directors would commit to non-involvement in the merged company, but the managers and directors are not willing to make such a commitment. Would they be violating their fiduciary duty by effectively blocking the best deal the company can receive, or do the fiduciary duties not require them to make personal commitments for the period of time when they are no longer fiduciaries? This is an interesting question that we will not pursue in this essay but plan to address in the future.

### Enjoining a Merger with No Fiduciary Out Provision Even Without an Intervening Bidder

As noted above, in the *Openlane* decision, Vice Chancellor Noble seemed to have supported limiting the *Omnicare* ruling to cases in which there was an intervening bidder who offered to outbid the initial bidder with the locked-up agreement. Scholars have supported this view,[[76]](#footnote-77) which is mainly based on the notion that the main purpose for requiring a fiduciary out provision is to obtain the optimal deal for the company. This rationale applies when the presence of an intervening bidder signals that, at the current point in time, the existing deal may not be the optimal deal for the company. In contrast, when there is no intervening bidder, there is no indication that the current locked-up agreement is not the optimal deal, and thus there are no strong grounds for enjoining the merger, even if the agreement did not include a fiduciary out provision.

The analysis is quite different from the perspective of the oversight rationale for fiduciary out. The main concern is that there is no effective oversight over the decisions made by management and the directors. In this sense, a case in which there is no intervening bidder may be more worrisome than a case in which there is an intervening bidder. When an intervening bidder emerges, there is, by definition, oversight over the decision by management and the directors to enter into the lock-up agreement. As noted above, the market mechanism is the most effective mechanism for the effective oversight of management and the board. Even if the company cannot accept the offer of the second bidder due to the locked-up agreement, management and the board are held accountable to a certain extent for not maximizing returns for shareholders. They will suffer a reputational loss if they cannot explain to shareholders why the locked-up agreement was the optimal strategy for the company, which without it would not have received the later offer. By contrast, in cases in which there is no intervening bidder, managers, and the board would not be held accountable for ‘missing’ a better deal as a result of the complete lock-up, although it is perfectly possible that there exist such potential offers, but that the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision discouraged prospective acquirers from bringing their offers forward. It is plausible that such prospective acquirers might conclude that it would be futile to bring forward an alternative offer when the initial agreement did not include a fiduciary out provision. From the perspective of the oversight rationale, the case of no intervening bidder is worse than the case in which there is an intervening bidder and requires *greater* involvement of the court by enjoining the merger, and not *less* involvement. Thus, the limitation of the *Omnicare* ruling to cases with an intervening bidder, as suggested in the *Openlane* decision and supporting scholars, is unwarranted according to the oversight justification.

The application of the oversight rationale to cases with no intervening bidders has a surprising result. While the main application of the rationale noted above, in section A, is the narrowing of the *Omnicare* ruling and a justification to circumvent it in cases in which managers and directors have no involvement in the post-merger company, the application to contexts with no intervening bidder widens the *Omnicare* ruling, or more precisely, negates the possibility of limiting its applicability to such cases. The fact that no actual bidder is blocked by the locked-up agreement does not mollify the fiduciary transgression but rather exacerbates the violation of fiduciary duties. Thus, even in cases with no intervening bidder, shareholders should be able to sue the fiduciaries for violating their fiduciary duties by locking the agreement and preventing oversite by market actors. The ramifications of the oversight rationale are more nuanced than may appear at first glance.

### Immediate Shareholder Written Consent

As noted above, in *Optima*, Vice Chancellor Lamb distinguished between agreements with locking-up mechanisms such as fiduciary outs in which there is a time lag between the signing of the agreement and the shareholder approval, and agreements that are approved almost immediately, less than 24 hours after signing, by the written consent of shareholders. The *Omnicare* restrictions apply to the former but not to the latter. In the former case, the time lag imbues the lock-up mechanism with significant impact. Without the lock-up mechanism, the company may have received additional offers. In the latter case, because there is no time lag, the existence of lock-up mechanisms is insignificant, as there essentially is no time to receive alternative offers. As Vice Chancellor Lamb stated, there is no requirement in corporate law that there should be a time lag between the signing of the agreement and shareholder approval. Thus, there is no problem with conditioning the agreement on approval by shareholders via written consent within 24 hours, and if such a condition is set, any limitation on lock-up mechanisms, including the exclusion of a fiduciary out mechanism, is completely irrelevant. An additional rationale for such a distinction is that a shareholder vote is not an act of the board, and thus, especially from the perspective of the shareholder rights’ rationale, no limitations should be imposed on such a vote. *Openlane* has continued the line of reasoning in *Optima* and extended the ruling that the *Omnicare* decision doesn’t apply in cases of immediate shareholder approval to cases where the agreement has no fiduciary out provision.[[77]](#footnote-78)

According to the oversight rationale, the distinction between agreements in which a shareholder vote is obtained immediately by written consent and conventional shareholder approval is weaker than it may appear. From the perspective of oversight, the fact that the agreement was approved immediately by shareholders does not necessarily increase the oversight of the merger. Quite the contrary: a short time frame for approval only limits and restricts the ability to oversee the agreement by limiting its exposure to a market test. The time frame may be even more crucial in examining the agreement than the lock-up mechanisms included in the agreement. Immediate approval does not improve shareholders’ ability to monitor the agreement compared to later approval. The only difference that may justify such a distinction is if shareholders are more proactive in a vote that requires written consent than a regular vote. While in a conventional shareholder vote, shareholders tend to be passive (it is sufficient that they don’t object in order for the agreement to be approved), in written consent, a majority of the shareholders must actively express support for the agreement.[[78]](#footnote-79) Yet, if there is a difference in the oversight, it doesn’t stem from the time lag itself, but from the special majority that is required to obtain the written consent: an absolute majority in favor, and not only a relative majority. Such a rule is similar to the voting rules imposed in some companies on board members, which require an absolute majority (majority voting rule) for the election of a board member, to enable shareholders to express a lack of confidence in the proposed board member even if the board member is eventually elected by a relative majority (plurality voting rule).[[79]](#footnote-80) In any case, according to the oversight rationale, there is no justification for excluding immediate voting by shareholder written consent from the *Omnicare* rule. At most, one may justify excluding from the *Omnicare* ruling an agreement decided by a vote of shareholders in which the majority of the shareholders actively support the agreement., However, this was not implied in either the *Optima* or *Openlane* rulings.

## Conclusion

Vice Chancellor Lamb noted, in *Optima*, that “Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality.” There was a good reason for this skepticism regarding the *Omnicare* ruling, which seems to have imposed an obligation to include a fiduciary out provision in all merger agreements. Such an obligation suffers from an analytical weakness that is hard to account for: a complete lock-up, including the exclusion of a fiduciary out provision, may serve the interests of shareholders. The bidder may attribute very high value to deal certainty, for which it may be willing to compensate shareholders in excess of any rival offer.

Scholars have provided various explanations to overcome this analytical problem with the *Omnicare* decision. In this essay, we provided a new vantage point on the *Omnicare* ruling. Its main purpose is not necessarily to maximize shareholder returns, protect their rights, or fulfill the board’s duty to be fully informed. Rather, its main purpose is to enable effective oversight over endgame decisions by exposing such decisions to market powers. The oversight justification has policy implications that both narrow and widen the application of the *Omnicare* decision. On the one hand, it may narrow the *Omnicare* ruling and exclude its application to cases in which management and directors have no relationship with the post-merger company, which significantly reduces the need for market oversight. On the other hand, it may widen the *Omnicare* ruling, or more precisely, refute proposals to limit the ruling and exclude its application from enjoining a merger without an intervening bidder or an agreement with immediate shareholder written consent. The *Omnicare* decision is still with us, and the oversight justification may place it on firmer ground.

1. \* Partner, S. Horowitz & Co. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. \*\* Assistant Professor, Bar-Ilan University Law Faculty. We thank Sharon Hannes and participants in the Bar-Ilan scholarship workshop. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. E.g., Edward Herlihy and David Shapiro, *Court Holds No Duty to Include a “Fiduciay Out” in Extra-ordinary Transaction Agreements, Wachtel Lipton Firm Memorandum*, April 18, 2011, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/04/18/court-holds-no-duty-to-include-a-fiduciary out-in-extra-ordinary-transaction-agreements/ (supporting the decision of the California Court of Appeals in *Monty v. Leis* No. B225646 (Cal. Ct. App. March 30, 2011), which rejected the Omnicare ruling which requires a fiduciary out provision in mergers). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.*, 818 A.2d 914, 921 (Del. 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Id*. at 922-23 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Id*. at 925 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Id*. at 929 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Id*. The Chancery Court held that the enhanced scrutiny standard of Revlon does not apply to the Omnicare case because there was no change in control as a result of the merger, but it also held that even if the Revlon standard did apply, it would make no difference because the board complied with the Revlon standard in seeking the highest transaction price. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,* 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Omnicare*, *supra* note 2 at 935 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Id.* at 934-935 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Id.* at 936 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,* 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Id.* at 983 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Id.* at 938 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Id.* at 939 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Id.* at 945 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Id.* at 950 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Id.* at 942 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Id.* at 943 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Sean J. Griffith, *The Omnipresent Specter of Omnicare*, 38 J. Corp. L. 753, 783-84 (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Julian Velasco, *Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs*, 21` Geo. Mason L. Rev. 157, 203-204 (2013) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Id*. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Orman v. Cullman*, No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) \*2 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. *Id*. at \*3 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Id*. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Id*. at \*7 (“the public shareholders were a 'minority' in terms of voting power. But the provision in the agreement requiring the Cullmans to vote their Class A shares *pro rata* concomitant with the public shareholders effectively gave the public shareholders veto power over the proposed transaction”). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Id*. at \*7-\*8 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc.,* C.A. No. 3833-VCL, (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *Id*. at 127-28 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *Id.* at 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *IN RE OPENLANE, INC.*, Consolidated CA No. 6849-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011), \*9 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Id*. at \*24 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *See* Griffith, *supra* note 20 at 766. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *OPENLANE, supra* note 32 at \*10 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Griffith, *supra* note 20 at 767. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation*, 877 A.2d 975, 1016 (note 68) 2005 Del. Ch. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Id*. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co*., Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. 1999 Sept. 27, 1999) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Id*. at at \*2. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Griffith, *supra* note 20 at 774-775 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Phelps Dodge*, *supra* note 38 at 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Griffith, *supra* note 20 at 775. Griffith attributes this ‘pre-*Omnicare*’ position, which does not object to exclusive agreement *per se*, but only as much as they bar the board from being informed as per *Smith v. Van Gorkom,* 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Griffith, *id.* at 778. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Id.* at 785. Unlike the distinction in *Revlon*, the test should apply independently of whether there was a change in control as a consequence of the transaction. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *Id.* at 789 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. The trade-off between the predictability of rules and precision of standards has been much discussed in the literature on rules and standards. *See*: Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst: A Toolkit for Thinking About the Law 163-71 (2007); Joseph Raz, Practical Reasoning and Norms (1990); Cass Sunstein, *Problems with Rules*, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 961-62 (1995); Issac Erlich & Richard Posner, *An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking* 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974); Kathleen M. Sulivan, *The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards*, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Louis Kaplow, *Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analysis*, 42 Duke L. J. 557 (1992). There are two central considerations regarding why the cost of rules is lower than standards in the case of mergers and acquisitions. As Professor Louis Kaplow notes, from an economic perspective if the case to which the two apply is a of high frequency, rules are cheaper than standards—rules save the expensive case-by-case determination of the law. See Kaplow, *id*. at 563. Mergers and acquisition cases are frequent and thus rules are advantageous in this context. The second consideration is the cost of the unpredictability of standards. *See* Kaplow, *id.* at 622. The cost of unpredictability is especially high, with typical transaction amounts of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in many mergers and acquisitions of public companies. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Regarding the lower compliance with standards in comparison to rules, due the higher costs of prediction, *see* Kaplow *id.* at621. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(a) [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. *Id.* at §271(a) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_] [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. *MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,* 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (citing *Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,* 564 A.2d 651,659 (Del. Ch. 1988)). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,* 637 A.2d 34, 42 & n.l I (Del. 1993) [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Velasco, *supra* note 21 at 189-190. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. *Id*. at 175 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Id*. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, *Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking the Distinction Between Legal and Business Risk in Corporate Law*, 102 Bos. U. L. Rev. 1601 (2022) [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Libson & Parchomovsky, *supra* note 56 at 1604-05. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. *See* Stephen M. Bainbridge*, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management*, 34 J.CORP. L. 967, 988 (2009) (distinguishing between the two risk on the epistemic level); Elizabeth Pollman, *Corporate Oversight and Disobedience*, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2029 (2019) (providing an expressive justification for the distinction). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. See Libson & Parchomovksy, supra note 56 at 1606. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. The assumption that managers have greater interest in maximization of profits despite legal risks is based on the greater sensitivity of their pay to the performance of the company in comparison to directors’ compensation, which is much less sensitive to performance. A study comparing CEOs’ compensation and directors’ compensation that examined panel data of over 1,000 firms between 1992 and 2001 found that the cash element in CEOs’ compensation is almost double that of director compensation: over 40% for the former and only 26% for the latter. *See* Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, *CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?*, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403, 408 (2006). However, the gap in the sensitivity of their compensation to performance is much larger. In general, independent directors’ compensation, unlike executive compensation, rarely includes an option component. *See id.* at 410 (concluding that director total compensation is “positively related to the need for monitoring and the difficulty of the directors’ tasks”). Even when it includes a stock component, in many cases it is a fixed-value stock component, which is insensitive to the performance of the stock. This is more prevalent than the fixed-number stock component which is sensitive to performance. The prevalence of the fixed-value component at the expense of the fixed-number component is only growing in the last years. *See, e.g.*, Kathleen A. Farrell, Geoffrey C. Friesen & Philip L. Hersch, *How Do Firms Adjust Director Compensation?*, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 153, 157 (2008). The literature on director compensation is relatively modest in comparison to that of CEO compensation, and thus does not provide a detailed picture of directors’ compensation packages. *Cf.* SANJAI BHAGAT, FINANCIAL CRISIS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND BANK CAPITAL 101, 101 (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. We assume that this option exists mainly for strategic investors, and is less plausible for financial investors. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Griffith, *supra* note 20 at 766-767. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. *Optima*, *supra* note 29 at 127-28 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. Regarding the rise of the majority voting rule for electing directors, *see* Lisa M. Fairfax, *Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy*, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 53, 65–66 (2008); See also Mary Siegel, *The Holes in Majority Voting*, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 364, 369 (2012) (noting that while many corporations have voluntarily adopted a majority voting rule for the election of directors, the majority voting rule is the default rule in only five states).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-80)