Editorial Comments on Content and Structure

GENERAL COMMENTS

**Chapter 2: What Is Accidental to What (12:48–2:35pm) 2 hours**

p. 64 “Another puzzle arises when Aristotle seem say now…” [seems to say]

p. 66 “I begin by going through a number of examples of one thing is said to be…” [examples of cases in which one thing is said to be…]

p. 77 “Now, the flute-player is is a kind of expert…” [reduplication]

p. 77 n. 111: Perhaps you could engage in slightly more detail with Loux. Why does he deny that dependents can be accidental to accidental unities, and what is wrong with his argument? (Or is this something to be considered in the next section?)

p. 78 “not parts of any demonstration; he dubs such predication…” [two spaces after the semicolon]

p. 83 n. 116 “However, I take the restriction in to apply only to dependents.” [the restriction in [T2.6]?]

p. 84 n. 118 What is Lewis’ “accident\* of” relation, and how is it different from “accident of”?

p. 90 n. 123 “but Socrates’ flesh and bones underlies Socrates’ human soul…” [flesh and bones underlie Socrates’ human soul…”

p. 91 “if we simply apply reasoning based on ontological priority to this instance of case, …” [to this instance/to this case]

p. 91 “so too does *a* being accidental to *b* relative to intrinsic causation prevents *b*…” [causation prevent *b*]

In this chapter, it might help to (briefly) clarify the differences between something being an accident, a dependent, and ontologically prior, since it initially seemed like these might be equivalent, but became clear throughout the chapter that they are in fact distinct. (I know that part of the chapter is meant to establish these differences, but hinting at them early on might help.)

**Chapter 3: Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works (3:08-4:30) 1 hr 30**

p. 107 n. 136 “it is only in reference to house-builder’s art…” [to the house-builder’s art/the art of house-building]

p. 107 n. 136 :”Fernandez and Mittelman take their efficiently causality…” [efficient causality]

The point about the art of medicine being a state of someone’s soul might also be supported with reference to the *Posterior Analytics*.

This chapter does a really good job of setting the stakes, stating the orthodox view (and its supporters, and their reasons for supporting it), and then contrasting this with the view to be developed in the chapter.

p. 121 “efficient causal failure — else his inference in…” [failure — or else his…]

p. 129 “it nevertheless is temporally contrastive..” [contrastive.]

p. 130 “in taking powers to change, they buy in to much…” [buy into much…]

p. 134 n. 176 “just it is not enough for being burgundy…” [just as it is not…]

p. 134 n. 177 “to appreciate that this does not entail the *pale* efficiently causes…” [does not entail that the *pale…*]

Aristotle elsewhere (Parts of Animals) identifies the formal and final causes (or says at least that the formal and final causes are often the same). How does this work with your account in this chapter? If the art of housebuilding is the formal cause of the house, is it also the final cause? Surely the final cause of the house is shelter, not the art of house building (and similarly for other arts). (Or perhaps the identification of the formal and final causes applies only in the biological realm.)

You might also explain what is meant by ‘Cambridge change’ when it is first introduced (unless you think it is fair enough to assume that readers know this term).