Editorial Comments on Content and Structure

GENERAL COMMENTS

**Chapter 2: What Is Accidental to What**

p. 64 “Another puzzle arises when Aristotle seem say now…” [seems to say]

p. 66 “I begin by going through a number of examples of one thing is said to be…” [examples of cases in which one thing is said to be…]

p. 77 “Now, the flute-player is is a kind of expert…” [reduplication]

p. 77 n. 111: Perhaps you could engage in slightly more detail with Loux. Why does he deny that dependents can be accidental to accidental unities, and what is wrong with his argument? (Or is this something to be considered in the next section?)

p. 78 “not parts of any demonstration; he dubs such predication…” [two spaces after the semicolon]

p. 83 n. 116 “However, I take the restriction in to apply only to dependents.” [the restriction in [T2.6]?]

p. 84 n. 118 What is Lewis’ “accident\* of” relation, and how is it different from “accident of”?

p. 90 n. 123 “but Socrates’ flesh and bones underlies Socrates’ human soul…” [flesh and bones underlie Socrates’ human soul…”

p. 91 “if we simply apply reasoning based on ontological priority to this instance of case, …” [to this instance/to this case]

p. 91 “so too does *a* being accidental to *b* relative to intrinsic causation prevents *b*…” [causation prevent *b*]

In this chapter, it might help to (briefly) clarify the differences between something being an accident, a dependent, and ontologically prior, since it initially seemed like these might be equivalent, but became clear throughout the chapter that they are in fact distinct. (I know that part of the chapter is meant to establish these differences, but hinting at them early on might help.)

**Chapter 3: Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works**

p. 107 n. 136 “it is only in reference to house-builder’s art…” [to the house-builder’s art/the art of house-building]

p. 107 n. 136 :”Fernandez and Mittelman take their efficiently causality…” [efficient causality]

The point about the art of medicine being a state of someone’s soul might also be supported with reference to the *Posterior Analytics*.

This chapter does a really good job of setting the stakes, stating the orthodox view (and its supporters, and their reasons for supporting it), and then contrasting this with the view to be developed in the chapter.

p. 121 “efficient causal failure — else his inference in…” [failure — or else his…]

p. 129 “it nevertheless is temporally contrastive..” [contrastive.]

p. 130 “in taking powers to change, they buy in to much…” [buy into much…]

p. 134 n. 176 “just it is not enough for being burgundy…” [just as it is not…]

p. 134 n. 177 “to appreciate that this does not entail the *pale* efficiently causes…” [does not entail that the *pale…*]

Aristotle elsewhere (Parts of Animals) identifies the formal and final causes (or says at least that the formal and final causes are often the same). How does this work with your account in this chapter? If the art of housebuilding is the formal cause of the house, is it also the final cause? Surely the final cause of the house is shelter, not the art of house building (and similarly for other arts). (Or perhaps the identification of the formal and final causes applies only in the biological realm.)

You might also explain what is meant by ‘Cambridge change’ when it is first introduced (unless you think it is fair enough to assume that readers know this term).

**Chapter 4: The Nature of Accidental Causation**

p. 145 It might be helpful to explain what it means to be a cause in the ‘Pickwickian’ sense.

Explanatory vs frequency approach

Neither: not a cause at all (inertness approach).

p. 153 “The following two sentences that might be used…” [sentences might be used…]

p. 157 [T4.2] “modified, my emphasis” [but I don’t see any emphasis, assuming this means italicizing]

p. 158 “the fact that an F is not included in the art of house-building” [I take it that F is specified immediately after (“that power in virtue of which the house-builder efficiently causes”), but I found this sentence confusing. Perhaps you can specify F first.]

p. 165 n. 227 Does Sorabji fit into the explanatory or frequency camp?

 p. 172 “when I say that an intrinsic cause is necessary *for* its effect, I do not mean that it is necessary *that* intrinsic causes.” [that intrinsic causes …?]

p. 173 n. 236 “*e.g.* pigeons being trained…” [“e.g.” is here italicized, but not elsewhere.]

p. 176 n. 241 “are the such as to formally cause…” [are they such as to formally cause…]

p. 178 “there are such things as an accidental unity…” [there are such things as accidental unities OR there is such a thing as an accidental unity…]

**Chapter 5: Causal Inference: Aristotle on ‘*Qua*’**

 p. 183 n. 252 It may be helpful to briefly explain the differences between the extensional and Intensional accounts (especially since this distinction is mentioned again on the following page).

p. 188 “for Aristotle’s considered view is in incompatible with that claim.” [is incompatible]

p. 191 The initial three conjuncts are labelled (A), (B), and (C) when labelled, but (1), (2), and (3) when discussed in the text.

p. 193 To why Aristotle opposes… [To explain why…?]

p. 201 n. 275 “not accidents of what brign about….” [what bring about…]

p. 203 n. 280 “productively-healthy or preservatively healthy…” [hyphenate both or neither]

p. 205 “If, by unsound we instead understand…” [If by unsound…]

p. 208 “neither are causal properties are preserved across qualification” [neither are causal properties preserved…]

**Chapter 6: The Causal Profile of Lucky Occurrences**

p. 218 n. 303 “Charlton’s analysis of the market case is differs from mine…” [case differs from mine]

p. 224 “an entailment would be undesirable, for it easy to construct…” [, for it is easy to…]

p. 229 “But what both camps agree on is that…” [Small point: does ‘both camps’ refer to the scholarly consensus and Sorabji? If so, perhaps something like: what the consensus and Sorabji agree on… I recall the author earlier mentioning that Sorabji is somewhat on his own here, so it sounds awkward to call him a camp.]

p. 230 “coming to Athens not because he would wanted to visit but because he would been shipwrecked…” [not because he wanted to visit (OR: would have wanted to visit) but because he would have been shipwrecked…]

p. 231 “And so, his being there is no more accident: …” [is no mere accident]

p. 236 n. 321 “first, they does not rely on it…” [they do not rely…]

p. 238 n. 322 “(Meyer (1992, 808).” [(Meyer (1992, 808)).]

p. 243 n. 330 “And so, that there is nothing in these cases to which attribute being a possible intrinsic cause.” [?]

p. 246 The introduction of the label “the expanded model” for this model of accidental causation seems somewhat out of place. Is it possible to mention it earlier in the chapter? (Or again at the beginning of the next chapter?)

**Chapter 7: Why Aristotle Needs Accidental Causation**

p. 248–249 “working through the relationship shows why Aristotle has a place in his causal theory: …” [has a place for accidental causation?]

Perhaps the general question of this chapter—motivating why accidental causation is important—should be taken up earlier in the book.

p. 252 Why does the example switch from the indefiniteness of days gone by to the indefiniteness of natural numbers?

p. 258 It may be helpful to introduce this shorthand (SR and ER) earlier, when Substance Richness and Effect Richness are introduced, if these designations are going to be used throughout.

p. 261 “Because this is an formulation of…” [is a formulation…]

p. 261 “in logical scope than the standard model” [than the standard] (spacing)

**Chapter 8: Expert Activity and the Metaphysics of Action**

p. 273 “pumping is the means of Socrates’ (say) poisoning” [Can this sentence be rephrased? It is initially unclear whether Socrates is the one doing the poisoning or the one being poisoned.]

p. 281 Perhaps you can draw attention to the discussion of the final causal structure of the expert’s activity earlier. This chapter initially seemed to stand out from the rest of the book as a turn towards Anscombe and action theory, but in the discussion of expert activity it is very clearly still unified.

p. 282 n. 367 “avoids sadding Aristotle with that problem” [saddling Aristotle]

p. 293 “and so the house-builder alone sets this process in train” [in motion?, used again further down the page]

p. 304 “that my shoes are grue” [Do you want to explain the origin of this term, i.e. Goodman’s new problem of induction, or is it fair to assume that the reader knows?]

Concerning commensurateness, have you given any consideration to Posterior Analytics 2.17 and the surrounding chapters?

**Chapter 9: The Role of the Accidental in the Physical World**

p. 310 Should the Schaffer quote at the top say: dependent on, and independent from it” (rather than dependent from it)?

p. 316 “Moreover, the science of natures is the science…” [the science of nature?]

p. 318–319 “there being Polyclitus does not imply that there a sculptor, for…” [that there is a sculptor]

p. 323 “some are sorted the class of potential causes; and not only…” [some are sorted into the class…]

Why is the discussion of causal and ontological priority important for the project of the rest of the book?

p. 331 “Asnd generally, it just is not…” [And generally, it just is not…]

The payoff on p. 339 of the role of accidental unities in Aristotle’s world was a highlight and might be mentioned earlier.

p. 341 n. 419 “There is, then, an brisk way…” [a brisk]

Have you looked at Andrea Flacon’s book on the topic of the hierarchy of Aristotelian ontology (Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity)? It might have some discussion relevant to your final chapter.