**פרולוג: פרגמטיזם, פסיכואנליזה ויצירתו של עמוס עוז כמפתח להבנת מילים במלוא מובנ**

“But the words, significantly uttered, have, after all, not only a surface, but also a dimension of depth!” After all, something different does take place when they are uttered significantly from when they are merely uttered.[[1]](#footnote-1)

[…] A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections.” Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate links.*[[2]](#footnote-2)

One should write philosophy only as one writes a poem.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Words can be understood on two levels: a surface level and a deep level. According to Wittgenstein, the former includes the agreed upon pattern of meaningful usage of words, grounded in the grammar and rules that are characteristic of a particular society. The deep level expresses a specific speaker and may embody intention and will. This level is often unconscious or elusive. Identifying it might thus require identifying connections among things and articulating “intermediate links.” Such connections may produce a “surveyable representation” by which we can interpret our words or those of others. When dealing with literary works, the deep level involves an additional aspect, namely the aesthetic aspect of the language. According to Wittgenstein, this aspect is also the aim of any philosophical debate.

This book presents, for the very first time, “intermediate links” between three intellectual domains: the literary works of Amos Oz; American Pragmatism (Charles Sanders Peirce and William James); and object-relations psychoanalysis (Freud, Klein, Winnicott). The intersectional method employed here will involve a presentation of one of Oz’s writings as the starting point for an existential debate that addresses some challenge or mental-conceptual struggle. This conceptual conflict, which has been given aesthetic shape in the literary work, will inspire the presentation of central pragmatic and psychoanalytic concepts with which we may evaluate how each of these domains might contribute to a new and richer understanding of the conceptual tension or existential challenge. Upon completing the pragmatic and psychoanalytic examination, each chapter presents an interpretation of additional works of Amos Oz. His literary work begins and ends each conceptual investigation and emphasizes certain aspects that have, thus far, hardly been discussed in extant scholarship about of his work.

This interdisciplinary method is applied in each chapter to interpret Oz’s literary works. I will discuss both works whose significance is recognized by scholars and critics and those that have received mixed or even negative reviews. The choice of works was driven by their significance to the conceptual-existential debate with which the chapter is concerned, and not necessarily by the traditional concerns of literary criticism. This is in light of the fact that, although Amos Oz is considered the most important Israeli author in the second half of the twentieth century, his work has been met with tough criticism throughout the years, in complete contrast with its phenomenal success outside of Israel (his writings have been translated to more than forty languages!). A central virtue of his literary works is embodied in the coalescence of personal and individual processes along with universal cultural processes. This book’s central claim is the introduction of pragmatic and psychoanalytic concepts clarifies and enriches this amalgamation of processes in novel ways.

The book provides a conceptual investigation that is grounded on interconnections between the different domains, on the one hand, and on differences among the characteristics of the concepts belonging to each domain, on the other. The central methodological argument is that such an investigation enriches our understanding of the function of these concepts in life itself. Though most of Oz’s literary works were written during the twentieth century, the method advanced here aims to provide possible existential solutions to fundamental challenges that afflict Generation-Z. Primary among these is the question of the nature of my own self and how my originality and my concrete impact on the world might be expressed.

The interpretive method of the book is interdisciplinary: the book examines key concepts that are common to the psychoanalysts who founded psychoanalysis, Freud, Klein, and Winnicott, as well as to the pragmatist philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. The book shows that such concepts are topical and useful to understanding literature, in particular, and culture, more generally. Furthermore, the concepts to be investigated, from psychoanalytical and pragmatist perspectives, will form an interdisciplinary method by which a new and original interpretation of the works of Amos Oz will be proposed:

 *The Same Sea, A Tale of Love and Darkness, Where the Jackals Howl*, *My Michael, Unto Death, Panther in the Basement*, *Judas, Elsewhere, Perhaps, A Perfect Peace, Black box, and Don't Pronounce It Night.*

Wittgenstein’s assertion that ‘words, significantly uttered, have … a dimension of depth’ serves as an important inspiration for this book. As of the mid-sixties of the twentieth century, Oz’s writings constituted the most significant body of work in Hebrew prose.The works selected for analysis in this book make apparent the wide range of topics and perspectives with which his work engages. On the one hand, Oz’s writings focus on the inner workings of the soul and a person’s encounters with those closest to them. On the other hand, his writings document significant stages in Israel’s history, such as the period during which the kibbutz played a central role in Israeli life, the era of the British Mandate, and others. Furthermore, Oz’s work reframes the story of Jesus by focusing on second-century Judas Iscariot and a corresponding character in the twentieth century. Beyond the richness of Oz’s body of work, and in the spirit of Wittgenstein’s assertion, this book also focuses on the depth of language. The depth of language will be investigated from two perspectives: from the perspective of object-relations theory, which emphasizes the chasms between different aspects of the mind, and from the perspective of the pragmatists, who investigated different modes of meaning determination both by the individual and in communicative acts.

Pragmatism, as developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, analyzed and defined the basic components of the relations between everyday language and the personality traits of regular people in their daily activities. Psychoanalyst proponents of the object-relations theory (Freud, Klein, and Winnicott) investigated human development and personal relationships. In so doing, they provided causal answers to questions regarding the conditions underlying beneficial development and those that cloud, stunt, and even completely paralyze human functioning. Their heavily criticized starting point in this investigation was the centrality of the “I.”

Correlatively, everything and everyone external to the “I” was considered an “Object.” As mentioned, this conception raised much concern and criticism. Yet, Peirce’s pragmatism allows us to discover this conception grounded in daily life: all of one’s experiences, and all meaning one ascribes to one’s actions, whether consciously or unconsciously, are based on one’s body and feelings as an individual. Of course, the social circles in which one lives and acts are important, be it one’s family, one’s immediate society, or even the entire generation to which one belongs. Yet the ‘upshot’ of both Peircean pragmatism and psychoanalysis is the individual’s capacity to choose. The common factor that makes this possible is the possibility of change, which can arise from internal motivation but is usually aided externally, through the assistance of a therapeutic figure.

Two reasons motivate my drawing a connection between these two fields and the writings of Amos Oz. The first is an attempt to provide an overview of the literary works of an author who played a central (perhaps, the most central) role in shaping the foundations of Hebrew literature in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether or not these foundations were imitated or rejected, Oz’s works have always been, and remain, a source of inspiration and a necessary background to comprehending Israeli culture. Amos Oz passed away on the 28th of December 2008, and this investigation is a homage to his significant contribution to Hebrew literature. The second reason is the scarcity of existing scholarship on the universal aspects of Oz’s works. Utilizing his literary works to illustrate concepts that are centrally relevant to people’s self-understanding in Western culture may expand our understanding of his work and supply additional justification for the many translations it has received.

The book contains five chapters. Each chapter focuses on a concept that appears in Oz’s work and that is central to understanding the relations between the self and the world. Each chapter begins with a challenge that arises from the work and continues with an interdisciplinary confrontation with the questions that surfaced.

**The first chapter studies the functions of different kinds of symbolization in Oz’s work and suggests that these can be better understood by appealing to the different kinds of signs discussed by Peirce.** After presenting the symbolic function in *The Same Sea*, the chapter proceeds to present Peirce’s concepts of sign, symbol, and index, to illustrate the symbolization in the literary work. The chapter then provides a chronological discussion of the centrality of the concept of the sign in psychoanalysis, along with the lacunas and controversies that it entailed. Finally, inspired by Peirce and psychoanalysis, the chapter will analyze *A Tale of Love and Darkness* by appealing to the characteristics of the concept of a sign. This analysis offers a new perspective on the symbolization in the novel and its contribution to understanding the author’s reflection on his experiences.

**The second chapter presents Oz’s collection of short stories *Where the Jackals Howl*, which exemplifies a unique and original approach to categories of consciousness.** The stories involve different expressions of unconscious decisions that can only be understood by appeal to concepts that distinguish between different categories of consciousness. Even now, some one hundred years after the introduction of such categories, they provide a clear and efficient description of how humans think. Peirce’s description makes room for all aspects of human experiences (sensations, feelings, thoughts), and, as such, provides a deep understanding of different modes of action, decisions, and resolutions. In addition, Freudian psychoanalysis involves significant discussions of the transitions between different states of consciousness, which illuminates further aspects of these states. An investigation of the different states of consciousness in the novel *My Michael* will show a developmental process of those states.

**The third chapter will discuss the novella *Unto Death* as a literary work that, already at an early stage of Oz’s writings, placed the concepts of guilt and betrayal at the center of self-constitution.** The chapter will further discuss the concepts of **guilt and self-control from pragmatist and psychoanalytic perspectives.** At this point of the book, the discussion turns from the level of description to that of judgment. These two concepts are expressions of self-judgment, which is grounded in a recognition of, and responsibility toward, the other. The investigation of one’s actions as an agent, including one’s ability to plan and bear responsibility for them, is central to pragmatism. This is also the case in therapy, and the difficulty in both fields is to develop reflective capacities that allow one to recognize the consequence of one’s actions. Oz’s *Panther in the Basement* and *Judas* present both personal and universal perspectives on the concepts of betrayal and self-control. Additionally, intertextual relations can be found between these works, both historical (the British Mandate period) and thematic (questions of betrayal and responsibility).

**The fourth chapter examines how the possibility of self-transformation is presented in the novel *Elsewhere, Perhaps*. The chapter draws on insights from William James and Donald Winnicott to deepen our understanding of the concept of the self.** Following the previous chapter’s discussion of the possibility of judgment, this chapter presents characteristics and criteria for authenticity judgments in our self-conception. James’s discussion of the different aspects of the self interfaces with Winnicott’s view on the possibility of evaluating its function. To complete the picture, the chapter will investigate the development of the individual self as a controversial process that was shaped in Oz’s novel *A Perfect Peace*.

**The fifth chapter** discusses the epistolary novel *Black Box* and focuses on creative processes in the different characters, in contrast to how it is discussed in literary criticism. Studying the genre alongside the plot calls for an interdisciplinary discussion about the nature of creativity with which to understand different events in life and the decisions that followed them. The chapter **examines the concept of creativity at different levels: literary, social, and personal.** Beyond the significance of creativity in therapy, Peirce’s work adds conceptual distinctions that allow us to identify creativity and nurture it. Furthermore, an interdisciplinary investigation of the concept of creativity will allow for a renewed interpretation of one of Oz’s scarcely discussed works, *Don’t Pronounce It Night*. The novel creatively explores different possibilities of love, from the unique introspective lens of each of the characters, up to the creative and unresolved ending with the question of whether love is even possible.

In summary, the creative intersection between Amos Oz’s writings, pragmatism, and psychoanalysis is meant to enrich existing interpretations of his complex works and deepen our understanding of concepts that are fundamental to our ability to examine ourselves and others. The different disciplines comprise distinct modes of investigation and interpretation of aspects of the self; each discipline clarifies different characteristics. The combined discussion can serve to refine and expand our ability to think about the characteristics of the self and increase our understanding of how it functions as well as how such functioning can be improved.

The book is intended for a diverse audience, for scholars from each of the disciplines, modern Hebrew literary criticism, psychanalysis, and pragmatism. The book reevaluates central concepts in these fields and uses them to illustrate an interdisciplinary interpretation. Additionally, the book is intended for teachers and lecturers from various fields who would like to bolster their teaching methods. Finally, it is aimed at every seeker of knowledge, who would like to expand their knowledge of concepts that are crucial to self-understanding and to understanding the period in which we live.

**Chapter Two: Categories of consciousness in *Where the Jackals Howl* and *My Michael* – A pragmatic and psychoanalytic interpretation**

2.a. Where the Jackals Howl: A Lot of Blank Areas

Every story is autobiographical. Not everything is a confession, but everything is autobiographical. I agree with your comment on *Where the Jackals Howl*. It was there that I drew my borders. Like a map of Africa—first it was delineated from the outside, with a lot of blank areas. I know I won’t have time to fill in all the spaces, it is too ambitious and the terrain is too vast.[[4]](#footnote-4)

In his interview with Helit Yeshurun, Amos Oz agrees with her that the main lines of his autobiography were drawn in *Where the Jackals Howl*, even though the stories are told in the third person. Oz describes a metaphorical process of drawing a map, starting with the outside borders and then moving inward.

Oz’s map metaphor points to an autobiographical mental pattern upon which the stories are constructed. Yet, Oz himself admitted that there are a lot of blank areas in the stories. The current chapter proposes an interpretation of those hidden places in the mind by appealing to concepts derived from Freud and Peirce, who addressed the simultaneous operation of both visible and hidden states of consciousness. Fundamental to this is the assumption, expressed in Oz’s interview, that multiple states of consciousness are always in operation. כדי להבין היבט פסיכולוגי זה,

Peirce’s insights about how the states of consciousness create meaning will allow us to view the interaction among those states in a way that expands and deepens Freud’s discussion of primary and secondary processes. Although Freud focused on the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious, Peirce’s system permits us to understand the relations among the states of consciousness within the conscious mind; this understanding makes it possible for individuals to expand the freedom of choice in their lives.

The two works discussed in this chapter, *Where the Jackals Howl* (1965 1st ed./1975 2nd ed.) and *My Michael* (1968), are two of Oz’s early works. Both manage to express distinct levels of consciousness by using a variety of literary techniques, such as anthropomorphizing nature, metaphor, and symbolization, and by using different kinds of narrators.

Nonetheless, the integration of each character’s different states of consciousness is also the work of the reader-interpreter. We will therefore identify the direct and indirect functions of these states of consciousness, the characters’ blindness to them, and the thematic ramifications of this state of affairs. The different kinds of signs and how they are interpreted, as discussed in the first chapter, may shed light on the symbolization of the different states of consciousness of the characters in the stories. Furthermore, Peirce’s different levels of consciousness will be presented to allow us to categorize the character’s mental states and illuminate their actions more fully.

The collection of short stories *Where the Jackals Howl* first appeared in 1965 and included nine stories. The second edition appeared in 1975 and included many linguistic changes along with an additional story, *Before his Time*. In all these stories we can identify two common features. The first is the symbol of the jackals, which represents an inaccessible level of human consciousness. The second feature is the link between the stories’ genre (short stories) and the poignant, sometimes harsh, and dark descriptions that appear in each of the stories. In these stories, we can often see how a state of awareness begins to take shape from a description of a natural event or bad weather, continues with a description of a problematic social environment, and only then focuses on the description of a concrete person. Many times, the narrative does not delve into the inner mental state of the characters, but only provides an external, third-person description. This creates an atmosphere of alienation between the characters and between the different levels of consciousness within each character. Identifying and characterizing the different states of consciousness is important as it provides readers with a retrospective interpretation, which allows them to recognize the initial stages of disintegration of different frameworks: the kibbutz, the family, and the character itself.

A clear example of the power of the jackals and of difficult events described in harsh language can be found in the story *Before his Time*, which was added to the second edition of the collection. The story involves a retrospective point of view and reflects central themes within the entire collection. Retrospectively, the title of the story serves as a double foreshadowing that at once refers to the killing of Samson the bull, and the death of Ehud, a beloved son of the kibbutz, in battle. Both died before their time, both died at the hands of men, and both killings involved jackals. A retrospective reading of the title calls for an interpretation according to which both deaths could have and should have been prevented. Additionally, though Ehud’s death preceded that of the bull, the narrator chose to present the latter before the former in a way that is reminiscent of the parable of the poor man’s sheep: the story of the bull affords a gradual psychological preparation for the description of the death of the son.

The opening line of the story already reflects extraordinary symbolic power:

THE BULL WAS warm and strong on the night of his death. In the night, Samson the bull was slaughtered. Early in the morning, before the five o’clock milking, a meat trader from Nazareth came and took him away in a gray tender. Portions of his carcass were hung on rusty hooks in the butcher shops of Nazareth. […] And a Nazareth breeze, heavy with smells, plucked at the bells and the treetops, stirring the hooks in the butcher shops, and the flesh of the bull gave out a crimson groan. [[5]](#footnote-5)

The text begins by focusing on the bull and personifies him by mentioning his name in the second sentence. The narrator also delays any description of the person responsible for his death but details the different stages of the murder in a way that emphasizes its injustice and cruelty. Furthermore, the narrator stresses the sharp contrast between how Samson the bull died and his strength in life, as he was a symbol of power in the kibbutz.[[6]](#footnote-6) The death of Samson, “The most ferocious bull in the Valley of Jezreel,” was brought about by a jackal, which represents the evil that lies in wait and pounces without warning. At this stage of the story, the link between the sign (the death of the bull) and the members of the kibbutz is yet unclear. Later on, the sign becomes a symbol, once the generational relations between the jackals are linked to the generational relations between members of the kibbutz and their children.[[7]](#footnote-7) The narrator complains about the youngsters of the kibbutz who have not improved their behaviors even though generations of jackals have passed away since the founding of the kibbutz. The sentence is structured as though the comparison between people and jackals is natural, and one might ostensibly wonder why people do not change in accordance with the generational changes of jackals. The metaphorical comparison emphasizes the youths’ problematic behavior, and the apparent conclusion is that the members of the kibbutz are even worse than a poisonous and evil animal like the jackal. Lakoff and Johnson, who revolutionized metaphor research, showed that metaphors have two central functions: metaphorical highlighting and metaphorical hiding.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The thought is that we cannot simultaneously present all aspects of some specific thing. The choice of metaphor indicates the aspect we wish to emphasize and which to conceal. The structure of the metaphor’s source-domain is known, and the purpose of the metaphor is to provide a coherent structure with which to understand experiences in the target-domain.[[9]](#footnote-9) The jackals in the story, and in the entire collection, hint at an unconscious plane of consciousness, the contents of which cannot be articulated but only its results.

For example, the killing of Samson, “the pride of the kibbutz,” precedes the falling of Ehud in battle, one of the heroes of the kibbutz. Ehud functions as both a sign and a symbol. After his death, his friends attempted to rescue his body from behind enemy lines, and only on the fourth day, having managed to do so, they discovered that “the jackals had torn his face and ruined his beautiful square chin.”[[10]](#footnote-10)

In describing the apparent involvement of the kibbutz in the lives of its members, the narrator chooses to use the first-person plural (“Ehud, our friend”). Yet, just as it was impossible to prevent the jackal from biting Samson the bull, so it was impossible to prevent them from mutilating Ehud’s face. Ehud symbolized the “Sabra,” the brave soldier, whose courage does not shield him from death, from the jackals’ abuse, and from the challenge of bringing his body to burial. Ehud’s story is also a symbol of the limited power of the Israeli-kibbutz society, which fails to consider and address its own vulnerabilities.

The jackals in this story do not remain behind the scenes. They eventually reach the center of the narrative, and the narrator describes their actions in a way that reflects the declining sanity of Dov Sirkin, Ehud’s father. Dov divorces his wife and leaves the kibbutz and moves to the desert. His memories and, apparently, also regrets overcome him and the narrator describe how an unclear state of consciousness, which also involves physical collapse, overwhelms him. Toward the end of the story, he is struck once more by the trauma of his dead and mutilated son. The narrator describes how the jackals operate in Dov’s hazy consciousness,[[11]](#footnote-11) and an associative link is formed with Dov’s attitude to the kibbutz:

The jackal pack of the Bethlehem hills gave a laugh. […] When the kibbutz was founded we believed that we really could turn over a new leaf, but there are things that cannot be set right and should be left as they have been since the beginning of time. I said, there are things that man can do if he wants them with all his heart. But I did not know that there is no point in leaving a fingerprint on the face of the water. I am the last, my child, and I am not laughing.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Dov’s musings reflect deep doubts about the kibbutz, and his use of the first-person plural (“we believed”) expresses at least two themes. The first is the fusion between the individual and the kibbutz so that individuals take upon themselves the values of the group without the separation necessary for criticism. The second theme is that the failure of the kibbutz applies to all of its members. A fascinating question that arises is what is the symbolic role that the jackals play in the context of this personal and collective disillusionment with the kibbutz. Avraham Balaban suggests viewing the bull and the jackal as Jungian symbols.[[13]](#footnote-13) In another article, he argues that “Oz conceives of the primeval forces within the soul as concrete entities.”[[14]](#footnote-14) Yair Mazor characterizes the symbols of the dark forces that appear in all of Oz’s works as representing the “libido and eroticism that course through his writings.”[[15]](#footnote-15)

Yigal Schwartz describes the plot of another story in *Jackals* as one that proceeds along two parallel tracks: “the ‘collective track,’ where national and historical conflicts are described, and the ‘private track,’ where personal and interpersonal conflicts are described”.[[16]](#footnote-16)

It is possible to conjoin the above interpretations and argue that in the stories, collective and individual-internal- processes take place at the same time. For example, this is how we can see the processes of raising doubts and uncovering truths that had been concealed. Oz's literary language casts doubt on common ideas and attitudes in Israel.[[17]](#footnote-17) It raises doubts by illuminating paradoxes, attaching question marks, and deconstructing the consensus about institutions, such as the family and the kibbutz, and even about the Hebrew language , his aesthetic tool-box.[[18]](#footnote-18) On the personal level, Oz’s work deconstructs concepts such as love and motherhood (as we saw in the previous chapter and will see again in this chapter), as well as masculinity and femininity, and cruelty and compassion.

The interpretive argument I would like to add to the existing interpretations is that what is missing is attention to the characters’ different levels of consciousness. We may be able to enrich and clarify the relations between the different stages of rising doubt about a given circumstance or concept, and to deal directly with criticisms, with a Peirce-inspired discussion of levels of consciousness. After presenting an initial analysis of *Where the Jackals Howl*, I will utilize Peirce’s concepts to show how the symbolization system operates at the different levels of consciousness. I will further illustrate a central methodological claim of this book, that will fill in the blank areas in *Where the Jackals Howl* as well as in the novel *My Michael*, which will be analyzed after the theoretical overview: pragmatic concepts clarify **how** human consciousness operates and the psychoanalytic concepts suggest an explanation as to **why** it operates as it does. This is why I chose to examine both fields, so as to provide a new interpretation of a central portion of Amos Oz’s literary writings.

**2.b. Meeting with a fact: When does instinctive behavior stop?**

We are blind to our own blindness; but the world seems to declare us simply incapable of rising from narrowness and specialism to take [a] broad view of any facts whatsoever.[[19]](#footnote-19)

In our daily routine we are generally unaware of the ways in which meaning is formed in our lives and behave instinctively. Peirce asserted that we are in fact “blind to our own blindness.” Still, according to him, the world hints to us that, despite our limited abilities, there is a much broader perspective on the facts.[[20]](#footnote-20)How it is possible to distinguish the modes of symbolization’s operation, at all levels, from states of consciousness? The following discussion will show the function of states of consciousness, according to Peirce, and the connections between them and the ways in which signs function.

Peirce distinguished the unconscious mental space from categories of consciousness: the unconscious operates without volition and thus cannot be criticized or controlled.[[21]](#footnote-21) In contrast, the characteristics of the categories of consciousness can be stated in language. The similarities and differences between Peirce’s account of states of consciousness and Freud’s description of the conscious and the unconscious will enable us to answer questions and resolve ambiguities in the description of the transformation among states of awareness, in order to achieve a better understanding of how self-consciousness is constituted, in life and in literature.

Although the psychoanalytic approach of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion delved repeatedly into the relations between unconscious and conscious processes, no systematic discussion has been devoted to the types of symbolization employed in these in relations. The most important discussion of the contribution that Peirce’s concepts offer psychoanalysis is that by André Green, who essentially asserted that it is necessary to forge “a developmental perspective to see these relationships [those between mother and infant] as shifting from two-part ones to three-part ones.”[[22]](#footnote-22)Building on Winnicott, Green maintained that the concept of thirdness should be applied in various contexts of intermediate spaces, both in the description of the process of child development and in the practice and the description of therapy.[[23]](#footnote-23) But the use of thirdness in these contexts still does not tell us what states of consciousness are or illuminate the connection between the states of consciousness and the types of symbolization.[[24]](#footnote-24)Despite the importance of states of consciousness as a concept in psychoanalytic thought, there has never been a systematic discussion of the topic.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Peirce’s main assertion is that the operation of consciousness in the stages that precede symbolization has a major influence on symbolization processes that have manifest results. Therefore, if we would fully understand how we assign meaning to various aspects of our lives, we must systematically examine the nature of the states of consciousness that can be formulated in language, and then seek to understand the function of the synergy among them. Consciousness, according to Peirce, is not a cognitive capability, but is exposed in action as a process of opposition in the encounter with a fact.[[26]](#footnote-26) We generally function instinctively, in accordance with habits, and this mode of operation continues as long as no doubts arise (about another person, a concept, or some aspect of reality).[[27]](#footnote-27) Doubt and habit are core concepts in Peirce’s philosophy and facilitate an understanding of the nature of both human activity in general and of the functioning of the states of consciousness in particular.[[28]](#footnote-28)

When doubt arises about any habitual thought or relationship, individuals attempt to navigate their ship to a safe harbor by reprocessing the meaning that has been undermined, until the doubt is resolved through a new meaning that is embodied in a new habit. Peirce proposed that we see every philosophical or psychological process in this way: new meaning is not created by intentional thought about a concept or position, but only after doubt has emerged about a current habit. Our states of consciousness are in perpetual motion along a continuum, whereas the meaning we can be aware of is the end product of symbolization, which originates in previous dimensions of consciousness. This continuum includes categories of consciousness that participate in every process of meaning-creation. The symbolic operation of its three elements (sign, index, and symbol) reflects the result that can be seen by all. The importance and scope of Peirce’s contribution exceeds what can be seen in terms of results, because he proposed an interpretive method that also permits an examination of the categories of consciousness that operate without our being aware of them. Before describing the characteristics of states of consciousness, according to Peirce, we must highlight the gaps between the operation of the unconscious and the operation of consciousness in Freud’s writings and demonstrate the need for Peirce’s insights in order to fill in those gaps.

**2.c. Freud on the unconscious: Bridging the translation gap**

Freud’s description of the relations between the unconscious and the conscious underwent a significant change during the course of his career. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1900, Freud deals with the disparity between dream-language, which is pictorial, and the everyday language in which dreamers describe the content of their dream, to themselves and to the therapist.[[29]](#footnote-29) Freud emphasized the need for translation between these two forms of expression in order to bridge the differences between the rules and characteristics of each language.[[30]](#footnote-30) However, despite his declaration that these are two different languages, Freud later relates to dream-language and therapy-language as the same language, albeit with two main differences: the compression and concision of dream-language, along with its use of symbols (which in practice also function as a concise representation of more detailed content). To deal with these two characteristics, Freud proposed a translation technique based on two key concepts: dream-content is concise and must be expanded by means of “condensation”[[31]](#footnote-31) and “displacement.”[[32]](#footnote-32)

Despite Freud’s very broad description of dream-language, he does not linger to address the problematic nature of translating two completely different modes of consciousness. The challenge Freud faces is the need to formulate an effective interpretation that the analysand can accept and that can promote the analytic dialogue; but he does not see this problem as inherent to the act of translation. At the start of his article “The Unconscious” (1913), though, Freud makes two assertions that reflect the gap that must be bridged between unconscious content and conscious content. His first point is that the unconscious can be known only *post factum*, after translation.[[33]](#footnote-33) His second point expresses confidence in the therapist’s ability to translate the analysand’s conscious content, but also makes the success of this translation contingent on the therapist’s ability to overcome the analysand’s resistance to exposing the unconscious content.[[34]](#footnote-34) Later Freud attempts to justify the axiom of the existence of the unconscious and even asserts its imperative nature, even though, as he admits, in practice the unconscious can be known only *post factum*, because postulating the existence of the unconscious makes it possible to explain gaps in our consciousness, symptoms, and obsessions, and also to explain a routine in which “our most personal daily experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our head we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how.”[[35]](#footnote-35)

Nevertheless, Freud describes a complex picture in which the states of consciousness are known with certainty, although the physical aspect that includes physical elements that can be observed contributes nothing to understanding them.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Freud accordingly proposes ignoring the physical dimension of states of consciousness and restricting the focus on the content relations between the conscious and the unconscious to the emotional level. This is astonishing, to say the least, because, according to Freud, the impulses that work on the unconscious are physical (motor impulses, erotic impulses, and so on). Later in the article Freud makes an even more extreme assertion—not only do physical processes fail to illuminate the activity of the unconscious, neither do “instinctual impulses, emotions and feelings.”[[37]](#footnote-37) This is because the latter are accessible to consciousness only when they are consciously represented by an idea.

We can thus say that for Freud, the content relations between the conscious and the unconscious are formulated in a problematic way. This is because, on the one hand, they are indexical relations; and this structure is the most important attribute of the unconscious. [[38]](#footnote-38)On the other hand, the unconscious does not have the properties that would enable the creation of distinctions, ranks, or contradictions. [[39]](#footnote-39)How does the unconscious make it possible to index content while avoiding categorization and distinctions? Freud addresses this problem, at least in part, in a later article, “The Ego and the Id” (1923).

Here we discover is a surprising change in Freud’s account of the unconscious.[[40]](#footnote-40) He describes a series of internal actions performed by the unconscious, such as solving mathematical problems in a dream, self-criticism, and conscience.[[41]](#footnote-41) In other words, the unconscious incorporates the highest level of human judgment. Even more surprising is the connection Freud makes between the highest element of the individual, the super-ego, and the id. [[42]](#footnote-42)

This description enables us to understand why the unconscious also includes manifestations of guilt, conscience, and self-criticism. Freud asserts that there are two factors that influence the super-ego: the first, which he introduced in earlier articles, is the historical reflection of the internal and external system of values.[[43]](#footnote-43) The second, according to the passage above, is the id. In this way the super-ego represents the mediation or the conflict between the ego and the id. These descriptions further blur the differences between the three states of consciousness, because the same content can appear in all of them. Later Freud emphasizes that the significant difference between the states of consciousness is in the dynamism of their content.[[44]](#footnote-44) This difference is expressed by the three terms he coined (conscious, preconscious, and unconscious), which highlight the level of awareness, rather than any distinct content attributed to each of these states.[[45]](#footnote-45) Freud’s assertion that the difference between the states of consciousness lies in how they function, rather than in the types of content they contain, becomes clearer in his structuralist description of the conscious state. Consciousness is the *surface* of the mental apparatus; that is, we have ascribed it as a function to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the external world—and spatially not only in the functional sense but, on this occasion, also in the sense of anatomical dissection.[[46]](#footnote-46)Following this structuralist account of the functioning of the states of consciousness, which parallels Saussure’s description of the role of language,[[47]](#footnote-47) Freud asserts that there is a language-related element in the transition between the unconscious and the conscious states—verbalization: “The question, How does a thing become conscious? would thus be more advantageously stated: How does a thing become preconscious? And the answer would be: Through becoming connected with the word-presentations corresponding to it.”[[48]](#footnote-48)

Freud stresses that “these word-presentations are residues of memories.” For our purpose, though, two other emphases are more important. First, only a memory that was conscious can transition from unconscious to preconscious; second, only perceptions, and not feelings, can be transformed from residues of memories to word-presentations.[[49]](#footnote-49)

If we combine all of Freud’s statements about states of consciousness, we are led to wonder how— if only perceptions, rather than feelings, can become word-presentations— it is possible to understand the existence of symbolic content (solution of a math problem) and verbalized content (themes of guilt and conscience and expressions of self-criticism) in the unconscious? In fact, word-presentations seem to already exist in the unconscious. What is the difference between verbalization in the unconscious and verbalization in the preconscious and the conscious? Freud’s distinction between primary and secondary processes is evidently supposed to answer these questions.[[50]](#footnote-50) However, this distinction, which Freud formulates in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, leads him to the conclusion that “the mind has free play in its functioning in dreams.”[[51]](#footnote-51) In other words, the relationship between the attribution of meaning in a dream and the conscious meaning given to the events is only a relation of levels of compression; hence “all thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a satisfaction.”[[52]](#footnote-52)I would like to suggest that Peirce, in his account of the categories of consciousness, answers these questions and fills in Freud’s incomplete picture of the states of consciousness.

**2.d. Peirce’s Categories of Consciousness: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness**

Peirce describes three categories of consciousness—firstness, secondness, and thirdness—and shows how the content we grasp by means of symbolization exists in the category of thirdness.[[53]](#footnote-53) However, the meaning of anything in our consciousness originates in firstness, continues to develop in secondness, and reaches its final stage, of transformation into a symbol, in thirdness. A different type of cognitive activity takes place in each category. [[54]](#footnote-54)

 Peirce’s categories are, in order, a passive consciousness of quality, which he also calls “feeling”; then a consciousness of disturbance or disruption; and finally, a consciousness that integrates the two previous states and makes it possible to assign and fix meaning. Although Peirce’s categories of consciousness have something in common with the ideas of earlier thinkers, from Plato to Hegel, his important innovation is his anticipation of the linguistic turn by formulating the categories of consciousness in language. Peirce brings to the fore the fact that meaning is singular, and it is impossible to separate meaning in language from meaning in consciousness. Although we tend to think that there is a difference between “what one *means* to do and a *meaning* of a word,”[[55]](#footnote-55) in fact there is a “conformity” between them; the difference between the meaning of an intention and the meaning of a word is the stage at which they are available to consciousness. The meaning of an intention is considered to be prior to the meaning of a word—but this is an illusion: meaning is available to human consciousness only at the stage of thirdness, as a symbolizing word, and not beforehand. Meaning cannot be grasped in consciousness in the quality stage, firstness, or in the reaction stage, secondness.[[56]](#footnote-56)

This assertion has major ramifications, both for the therapeutic approach and for the actual therapy, in that it presents the possibility of verbalizing the three consciousness states that Peirce describes, even if *post factum*. The grounding the understanding of the consciousness-categories on language is based on the linguistic characteristics of each of the states of consciousness, although firstness and secondness can be isolated only *post factum*, and not as they occur.

Each of the states of consciousness contains a principle that corresponds to its location on the continuum: firstness contains first; secondness second, and thirdness third. Each of these ordinal numbers expresses an essential characteristic that is also grammatical: “first” is autonomous and independent and does not refer to anything other than itself. Hence it cannot be expressed as a sentence (which includes a subject and a predicate that relates to the subject). By contrast, “second” exists by virtue of referring to something else, that to which it is second. “Third” mediates between the two preceding states of consciousness and defines the relationship between them.[[57]](#footnote-57)

Peirce goes on to note many additional attributes of “first,” each of which sheds light on the grammatical function of the consciousness-state of firstness in constructing meaning: alongside attributes like “initiative, original, spontaneous, and free,”[[58]](#footnote-58) Peirce formulates an important tension in the nature of the “first”: “It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation.”[[59]](#footnote-59) On the one hand, firstness is the consciousness-state of which one can be aware, but on the other hand it cannot be felt or described as the object of sensation. Peirce sharpens this tension, cautioning that “every description of it must be false to it.”[[60]](#footnote-60) If so, what is the meaning of consciousness when there is no possibility of concrete description? To answer this we must illuminate the place of firstness when the consciousness grasps reality and assigns meaning to it.

2.e. Firstness: Being of Itself

Peirce distinguishes between three modes of being in a way that creates a natural link between human awareness and experience of the outside world. The first mode, firstness, it includes qualities of objects that exist separately from the objects’ actual existence.[[61]](#footnote-61) For example, redness exists independently of the existence of any red object. The important innovation here is that there is a substrate that underlies all things that our mind can grasp, and this substrate is the condition for their existence and basis of their attributes.[[62]](#footnote-62) In the stage of firstness there are no relations among things; instead, every quality exists in and of itself. Being is a state of possibility. [[63]](#footnote-63)

Understanding the nature of firstness is important for understanding the nature of the concepts *freshness*, *life*, and *freedom.*[[64]](#footnote-64) For this purpose it is appropriate to return to the concept of *feeling*, mentioned above. Feeling is a state that is not given at a specific time and therefore cannot be reconstructed at another time.[[65]](#footnote-65) Nevertheless, feeling underlies not only but also every other state of consciousness; accordingly, as part of an experience that bears meaning, in the category of thirdness, it can certainly be reconstructed in memory.[[66]](#footnote-66) Feeling lies at the foundation of every construction of meaning, including what are considered to be the most immediate functions of consciousness, such as objective perception, will, and thought.[[67]](#footnote-67) Firstness is an activity of consciousness in the present, at the first moment that consciousness grasps experience: “The immediate present, could we seize it, would have no character but its Firstness. […] The *quality* of what we are immediately conscious of, which is no fiction, is Firstness.”[[68]](#footnote-68)

This immediate perception includes identifying any quality that is not associated with some internal or external object but is experienced in and of itself. In order to describe the mode of being of firstness, Peirce adds the noun *quality*, and later *suchness,* in order to describe a process of identification that does not include attribution to some object. [[69]](#footnote-69)

According to Peirce, it is possible to observe the universe of phenomena from an inclusive point of view and experience qualities such as red, sour, and toothache without the ability to describe them. This is the fundamental space of human experience, which does not necessarily include a specific relation to objects in the world, alongside the ability to contain relations of many sorts. This is similar to Freud’s assertion that there is no negation in the unconscious. In contrast to Freud’s notion of the unconscious, though, Peirce’s firstness includes distinctions, but only distinctions that are created within feeling and suchness. In order for some particular relation or concrete characteristic to be created, there must be a collision, crisis, or doubt that takes place in the next mode of being in the sequence of events—secondness.[[70]](#footnote-70)

2.f. Secondness: The Element of Struggle

*Secondness* is the state of consciousness that reflects the encounter between the inner imagination-world and the outer fact-world.[[71]](#footnote-71) It is the first fragment of experience that can be detected as a result of struggle and opposition to something external, when we experience objects that are external to us. At a certain stage the experience becomes a unique experience, an event.[[72]](#footnote-72) Beyond the act of perception that is involved, there are also compulsion and constraint to think in a different way than we were previously habituated. Because compulsion and constraint cannot exist without resistance,[[73]](#footnote-73) the main characteristic of this state of consciousness is struggle:

The second category that I find, the next simplest feature common to all that comes before the mind, is the element of struggle. This is present even in such a rudimentary fragment of experience as a simple feeling. For such a feeling always has a degree of vividness, high or low; and this vividness is a sense of commotion, an action and reaction, between our soul and the stimulus. […] . By struggle […] I mean mutual action between two things regardless of any sort of third or medium, and in particular regardless of any law of action.[[74]](#footnote-74)

In secondness, there is a certain change in feeling. In contrast to firstness, where concrete characteristics cannot be discerned, in secondness something can be said about feeling, and thus one can detect the relation between two elements. In this category, it is impossible to see a habitual action; nor is it possible to identify what supports the relationship between the two elements. However, the category of secondness allows us to see a trend to a change in what we have been accustomed to seeing and the need to open another door (despite our natural resistance to doing so).[[75]](#footnote-75) The change, as mentioned, is not created as a sign, and thus no regularity can be inferred from it. A sign, and, accordingly, the possibility of repetition and regularity, are created in the category of thirdness.

2.g. Thirdness: The Medium between the Absolute First and Last[[76]](#footnote-76)

*Thirdness* is the state of consciousness in which meaning is created on the basis of the two previous states. Thirdness includes personal and cultural patterns of thought, various sets of rules (grammatical, biological, etc.), as well as religious and ethical decisions. It is in thirdness that the purpose of an action, or a particular interpretation of a specific interpretant, is defined. This interpretation depends on two preexisting elements—the sign and the object—that have a dyadic relationship between them. The “third” functions, for example, in the act of symbolization, in which “a sign […] refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object.”[[77]](#footnote-77)

It is interesting to note Peirce’s assertion that although meaning is grasped by individuals, even plants, animals and every other part of nature create meaning. For example, a sunflower that follows the sun creates a sign. Nevertheless, only human thought alone can perceive the sunflower in this way—so thought is the only mode of interpretation that actually exists.[[78]](#footnote-78)

What enables the formation and comprehension of meaning in thirdness is the correspondence between an inner intention and its outer expression. Both expressions of intention are based on language:

When a person *means* to do anything he is in some state in consequence of which the brute reactions between things will be moulded [in]to conformity to the form to which the man’s mind is itself moulded. […] I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future.[[79]](#footnote-79)

Peirce’s innovation is his complex description of consciousness. This description breaks down every process of assigning meaning into the three layers on which it is based. The interdependence among the categories of consciousness means it is impossible for meaning to be fixed in only one of the categories. Therefore, Peirce’s description attributes equal value to each stage: to feeling and experience in firstness; to struggle, and the encounter between something and what is said about it, in secondness; and the routinization of meaning as a habit in thirdness.

In conclusion, we have seen that in Freud’s later article in which he offers his most systematic description of the three states of consciousness (conscious, preconscious, and unconscious), the significant distinction among them is only relative (the dynamism of the content, which determines the possibility of passing to the conscious). The fact that both Freud and Peirce divide consciousness into three states encourages us to compare the content of those states. At first glance there seems to be a significant difference between the two sets of categories, because firstness is not unconscious. However, two points do allow us to draw a parallel between Freud’s unconscious and Peirce’s firstness. To begin with, the content of both the Freudian unconscious and Peirce’s firstness can be verbalized only *post factum*. Second, for both thinkers, the content that cannot be verbalized at the stage in which it is created can be transformed and become knowable to the individual through a process of interpretation (both Freud and Peirce call the process of understanding signs “interpretation”).

This basis for comparison enables us to juxtapose these two systems of consciousness, enriching our understanding of Freud’s account with the assistance of Peirce’s, which sharpens the distinction among the different character of the consciousness states beyond their dynamism.

**2.h. From *Where the Jackals Howl* to *My Michael*: The Darkness of the soul and its consequences**

Despite the difference in genre, the two works employ the same key technique - multiple descriptions of nature and landscapes interpolated in the progress of the plot. Although the nature descriptions perform functions commonly assigned to them, such as foreshadowing, delaying, and emphasizing, they also function as symbols of states of consciousness. These descriptions, which symbolize firstness, secondness, and thirdness, illuminate the characters’ emotional states and help readers understand these states, which would otherwise be opaque because of their anomaly and because the omniscient narrator rarely describes the characters’ internal processes.

In each of Oz’s descriptions that represent firstness, secondness, or thirdness, there is a plot stage that involves a mystery, event, or characterization that lacks an obvious explanation. This stage causes readers to have doubts and makes interpretation necessary. Peirce’s pragmatism does not make it possible to predict when and how doubt is aroused; it can shed light on it only *post factum*, after it arises. Poetic language employs linguistic devices that support a distinction between characters’ direct reflection on themselves and their experiences, on the one hand, and the space in which meaning is formed, on the other hand. There are major differences between *Where the Jackals Howl and* in *My Michael* in how this space is created: In *Jackals*, the space is (mostly) nature; in *My Michael,* it is the city. In contrast to the common critical reading of Oz, which sees a parallel between the characteristics of the physical spaces—the city or nature—and those of the protagonists,[[80]](#footnote-80) the interpretation following Peirce, views these spaces *as emotional process that unfold within the characters’ self-consciousness.*

Thus, for example, the scholar Avner Holtzman already noted the similarity between one of the stories in *Where the Jackals Howl*, called *Strange Fire*, and the novel *My Michael*: In both, “post-1948 Jerusalem is represented as a dreary and gloomy city, as crazy, neglected, baren, full of restrained violence, torn by polar tensions, and surrounded by real and metaphorical threats.”[[81]](#footnote-81) The main characters of both stories conceal dark secrets. Peirce’s concepts allow us to recognize that in both narratives contents from the level of firstness are exposed when the narrative leads to their clashing with reality (secondness). Eventually, a stable meaning is also formed: the female protagonist’s deep frustration with her life in general and with her marriage in particular. In many respects, Lily Dannenberg in *Strange Fire* foreshadows Hanna Gonen in *My Michael*. Both are sensitive and difficult, as the narrator puts it, and both are quickly disappointed with their marriages and find sexual excitement in unrealized fantasies about unobtainable men. The short story, as well as the novel, are staged in Jerusalem, and in both narratives, the city and its residents function as a difficult and gloomy space, which seemingly constitutes the background for an eruption of madness.

This concept of the states of consciousness is at odes both with Freud’s approach to conscious processes and with the Jungian and/or deterministic interpretation of the stories in *Jackals* proposed by scholars such as Josef Even and Avraham Balaban.[[82]](#footnote-82) Whereas Freud, even in the last stage of his thought, defined the differences among the states of consciousness as differences in their dynamism, rather than essential differences in how they operate,[[83]](#footnote-83) the distinction Peirce draws among the states of consciousness makes it possible to identify processes of doubt and choice. For example, we can see the description of nature in the following passage from the title-story of *Where the Jackals Howl* as representing firstness and secondness in the form of indecision and internal conflict in the character’s self-consciousness. After a brief introduction of some of the characters, the story continues with a description of nightfall on “our kibbutz.” The narrator, who uses the first-person plural, hints that this description serves as the mental background for all the characters in the story:

In the mountains the sunset is sudden and decisive. Our kibbutz lies on the plain, and the plain reduces the sunset, lessens its impact. Slowly, *like a tired bird of passage*, darkness descends on the land surface. First to grow dark are the barns and the windowless storerooms. *The coming of the darkness does not hurt them, for it has never really left them*. Next it is the turn of the houses. […] The old people of the kibbutz are still at rest in their deck chairs. *They are like lifeless objects, allowing the darkness to cover them and offering no resistance.*[[84]](#footnote-84)

This description of nightfall at the kibbutz can be interpreted as symbolizing the members’ state of consciousness at this hour: a fatigue that includes a dark emotional, which does not harm them nor stir them to try to change it. This mental state is one of no resistance—which Freud describes as characteristic of the unconscious and Peirce as characteristic of firstness. Later, Matityahu Damkov is described in a way that, for Yair Mazor, represents “the motif of the stranger.”[[85]](#footnote-85) If we follow Mazor’s interpretation, we can see Damkov as a stranger who functions as “second” in Peirce’s terminology—what Peirce refers to as “[the] second [category,] consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something.”[[86]](#footnote-86)

However Damkov, unlike the other characters in the story, chooses the path of candor and reveals to his daughter—previously unaware of the fact—that he is her father. In other words, Damkov does not merge into the human routine of the other members of the kibbutz, whose fatigue after their daily labor helps them ignore the dark aspects of their personalities. He decides to confront a fact—as in Peirce’s secondness: the fact that there is a girl living on the kibbutz, Galila, who is his daughter from an illicit romance. At a certain point, Damkov decides to take the bull by the horns, buys canvas and paints, and invites her to his house to use them. After she agrees, the narrator lingers on further descriptions of descriptions, which delay the plot, and reflect the fact that there is an intermediate space between her agreeing to come to her father’s house and the visit itself.

I would like to discuss a passage from this intermediate space, which describes a jackal pup caught in a lethal trap, at the end of which the narrator merges the event in nature (the jackal in the trap) and the human trap of the psyche:

At last *the creature* bowed his head and brought his nose close to the flesh of the bait. […] Then came the moment of cold steel. With a metallic click, light and precise, the trap snapped shut. *The animal* froze like stone. *Perhaps he thought he could outwit* the trap. […] For a long moment *jackal* and trap lay still. […] Suddenly *despair* seized him. […] Pain ripped through his body. […] Then *the child* opened his mouth and began to cry. The sound of his wailing rose and *filled the night.*[[87]](#footnote-87)

The narrator gradually interweaves nature and human: he starts by referring to “the creature,” which can be either an animal or a human being; then he continues with the unambiguous *animal* and *jackal*, although he attributes it feelings like despair and the thought of escaping the trap, which properly belong to humans. The ultimate closeness of nature and the human in the passage comes in the light sentence, of course, where the jackal pup becomes “the child.” In this way, Oz deconstructs the common image of the jackal as a repulsive and dangerous animal and transforms it into an object of the reader’s compassion. This transformation is intensified by the description, which concludes the chapter, of the “child’s” wailing that fills the night. I believe that a close reading of this text highlights the striking similarity between the jackal pup and human beings and the person to be presented next.

The jackal pup is reflected in Damkov: he too risks being caught in a trap when he invites Galila to visit his home. Although it is clear that as soon as he tells her the truth she will reject him, cruelly and unequivocally, he is willing to take this risk in the false hope that he can outwit the trap. The bait in the trap is his longing for a family, or at least a certain degree of familial closeness. The nature descriptions always precede the events they illuminate and prefigure the characters’ mental state before the next scene in the plot: hence we have states of firstness and secondness. In this story, Damkov seems to be described in a stereotypical fashion that keeps readers from sympathizing with him, much like the common image of the jackal. But in addition to this similarity, there is a significant difference between Damkov and the jackal: although we see both the animal and the human pain, through Peirce’s states of consciousness we can understand that whereas the animal must surrender to its nature and fall into danger, the man can choose how to deal with his impulses and desires. We can see the story as critical of Damkov not because of the circumstances he cannot control (such as his appearance), but because of his decision to expose his daughter to the disgraceful fact that he is her father, for which she bears no guilt, even though the revelation will cause her endless suffering. We can also see Galila as the jackal pup: she comes to Damkov’s house because she is attracted by the bait (the paint and canvas), but is caught in the trap he forces on her—the necessity of facing the painful truth. By the same token, Galila could choose not to visit Damkov’s house; she too makes the mistake of choosing to be seduced into doing so.

In conclusion, although Oz’s skillful characterization of his characters’ mind, especially their ability to continue their routine while ignoring and denying dark secrets, is applied characters who happen to be kibbutz members, this trait reflects a broader human phenomenon that extends beyond the kibbutz. The situation facing the jackal pup, “the child,” is paralleled in the childlike aspect of all those who are caught against their will in a situation from which they cannot break free, in any setting, rural or urban.

Oz’s criticism of the mental patterns that prevail on the kibbutz is expressed with even greater force in “The Way of the Wind.” This is the first link in a long series of stories that address the difficult relations between father and son, in which the father is harsh and demanding, and the son, in response, rebels against the father’s path.[[88]](#footnote-88) Mazor summarized the social criticism inherent in the story as targeting both the demand that young men be “heroes” and the image of the leaders; the demand made of the young men was emasculating, and the image of leaders as people who could overcome any difficulty imposed an additional demand on them.[[89]](#footnote-89) Balaban proposed an interpretation of the book as a whole that sees in it a struggle between culture and nature; this interpretation transforms the individual characters’ mental processes into a fixed pattern of a struggle between two worldviews.[[90]](#footnote-90) Schwartz sees this story as one of the two essential stories in the volume as “representative stories of the State Generation [the generation of Israeli authors who grew up with the new state of Israel and began publishing in the late 1950s and the 1960s],”[[91]](#footnote-91) written by “the most-read author in the history of Hebrew literature.”[[92]](#footnote-92) According to Schwartz, this story presents “a regressive process in which the fathers are represented as people, but the sons as marionettes or monkeys.”[[93]](#footnote-93) A close look at what takes place in the characters’ mind indeed supports the possibility of this interpretation.

The story’s closing event—Gideon Shenhav’s suicide, specifically on Israeli Independence Day—certainly fits in with Schwartz’s interpretation. But the story’s opening, which Schwartz presents as a key to understanding the narrator’s criticism of the paternal generation’s obsession with their sons,[[94]](#footnote-94) can be interpreted in a different way, following Peirce. The story begins as follows:

Gideon Shenhav’s last day began with a brilliant sunrise. The dawn was gentle, almost autumnal. Faint flashes of light flickered through the wall of cloud that sealed off the eastern horizon. Slyly the new day concealed its purpose, betraying no hint of the heat wave that lay enfolded in its bosom. Purple glowed on the eastern heights, fanned by the morning breeze. Then the rays pierced through the wall of cloud. It was day.[[95]](#footnote-95)

The story opens with an anthropomorphic description of the time just before sunrise. Verbs like “sealed off,” “concealed its purpose,” “betraying no hint,” and “lay enfolded” create a sense of harmony typical of firstness, in which one can observe qualities that exist in harmony within the individual’s experience. Later a transition characteristic of secondness occurs: “Then the rays pierced through.” Sunrise is a fact that breaches the harmony of firstness.

This is when the protagonist, Gideon, wakes up and remembers that today is Independence Day. This realization is also an instance of “resistance, of an external fact,” which forces him to decide how to relate to it. He prepares for a parachute display at the kibbutz where he grew up. At this stage there are no solid hints to the tragedy foreshadowed by the opening reference to “Gideon Shenhav’s last day.” From here until the story’s climax, the narrator heaps up several hints about the unavoidable ending (including repetition of the story’s first sentence at the start of the fourth section). Pace the prevalent interpretations (such as Schwartz’s, noted above) that the story reflects the conflict between the generation of the fathers who built the state and the generation of the sons forced to follow in their fathers’ footsteps, I believe that the story has a complexity that demands a different interpretation.

We are told that Gideon’s father, Shimshon Sheinbaum, married late, at 56, and his only son was born shortly afterwards. With a touch of irony, the narrator continues that although he lived apart from his son’s mother, “Sheinbaum did not neglect his duties as his son’s mentor, nor did he disclaim responsibility.”[[96]](#footnote-96)

Shimshon’s relationship to his son is described as lacking emotion, except for his sense of disappointment, because the young Gideon focused on writing sentimental poems and did not make a mark in society. On the day Gideon asked his father to sign a waiver so he could serve in a combat unit, despite being an only son, Shimshon was happily surprised. He ignored Gideon’s mother’s opposition to the move and asked a friend for a special favor to allow Gideon to do so without her consent. Up to this point, the description of Shimshon accords with the stereotype of the pioneer generation, which was hostage to the conventions of self-sacrifice, repression of individuality, and never showing emotion. In contrast with the stereotype, however, he is presented as having devoted his life to ideological writing (even more intensively after his son enters the armed forces). In other words, he is not engaged in physical toil or national security, but a man of words who takes a reflexive look at the period in which he lives. This makes him a complex and even paradoxical figure.

In parallel, Gideon too is depicted as complex and even paradoxical. In contrast to the gentle, poetry-loving teenager he had been, Gideon the soldier became a young man whose “delicate” side did not come into conflict with his military experience, but just the opposite: parachuting caused him pure joy. The fourth section of the story begins by repeating its opening sentence, a repetition that emphasizes that Gideon’s last day began promisingly: “Gideon Shenhav’s last day began with a brilliant sunrise. […] This was a day of celebration, a celebration of independence and a celebration of parachuting over the familiar fields of home.”[[97]](#footnote-97)

Later, Gideon’s thrill while falling through the air is described in superlatives that indicate how the experience fits “new” personality perfectly:

Gideon adored the delicious moment of free fall between the jump from the aircraft and the unfolding of the parachute. The void rushes up toward you at lightning speed, fierce drafts of air lick at your body, making you dizzy with pleasure. The speed is drunken, reckless, it whistles and roars and your whole body trembles to it, red-hot needles work at your nerve ends, and your heart pounds. Suddenly, when you are lightning in the wind, the chute opens. The straps check your fall, like a firm, masculine arm bringing you calmly under control.[[98]](#footnote-98)

The second-person description of a jump is a brilliant expression of firstness and secondness. Free fall between sky and earth is the ultimate stage of “neither here nor there”: the protagonist feels a range of sensations, though only for a short time; all the same, the chief experience is one of emancipation and freedom. The moment the chute opens, the “resistance, of an external fact” occurs, which prepares the parachutist for the impending collision with the ground. Until the day the story takes place, Gideon has landed safely after every jump. Moreover, our impression is that during his military service as a paratrooper, Gideon has managed to free himself from the sense of inferiority he felt before his enlistment. The emphasis on what he feels during a jump isolates and focuses the reader’s attention on the change that Gideon has experienced. The narrator creates this effect by focusing on firstness and secondness; in so doing he supplements Freud’s idea of states of consciousness by answering the question: “In what circumstances does consciousness change?”

The reader is not surprised that when Gideon is happy and excited to parachuting over the kibbutz where he was born. The climax of the story, the jump that ends with his tragic death, starts with a description of his supreme joy when he leaves the plane:

When Gideon’s turn came he gritted his teeth, braced his knees, and leapt out as though from the womb into the bright hot air. A long wild scream of joy burst from his throat as he fell. He could see his childhood haunts rushing up toward him as he fell. He could see the roofs and treetops and he smiled a frantic smile of greeting as he fell toward the vineyards and concrete paths and sheds and gleaming pipes with joy in his heart as he fell. Never in his life he had known such overwhelming, spine-tingling love. […] The delicious falling sensation was replaced by a slow, gentle swaying, like rocking in a cradle or floating in warm water.[[99]](#footnote-99)

And then, suddenly, Gideon has an idea that ultimately costs his life. He suddenly fears that his father and mother, and the other members of the kibbutz cannot pick him out among all the paratroopers. He decides to open his reserve parachute, so they would identify him falling slowly beneath two open chutes. After he does this, he is even happier than before: “Happy, intoxicated, he drank in the hundreds of eyes fixed on him. On him alone. In his glorious isolation.”[[100]](#footnote-100)

Unfortunately, as a result of this decision Gideon’s chutes become tangled in high-tension power lines. Unable to bring himself to jump to the ground, despite his father’s relentless urging, he is eventually electrocuted. The tragic end hinted at in the story’s first sentence seems to involve at least a measure of criticism of the social pressure on young men to enlist in combat service even when they could avoid doing so. But this thematic progression does not contradict the progression we can observe on the basis of Peirce’s states of consciousness. The moments when Gideon feels pure joy, and then takes his fatal decision is a situation in which he brings his firstness to its highest pitch. The physical and emotional dimensions fuse in the joy of firstness, with no thought of consequences and ramifications (the dimension of thirdness). The isolation of firstness that the narrator creates in this moment enables readers to fathom the change in Gideon, a change that makes it possible for him to feel happiness and belonging—to the military, to his father and mother, and to the kibbutz. He has never before felt such a sense of belonging, a sense produced by the fact that all those who are important to him have assembled to see *him*.

This analysis of the story in no way justifies obsessive encouragement of young men to seek to serve in a combat unit. It certainly does not justify ignoring the danger of and unsuitability of such any particular young man for military service or the creation of a need to take unnecessary risks in order to appease the desires of family and society. In order to expose the story’s complexity, though, I have enlisted Peirce’s concept of the states of consciousness to uncover an aspect of this story not previously noted by critics: the relative degree of freedom enjoyed by individual even his only aspiration seems to be satisfying those around him. Gideon’s freedom is manifested in the intensity of his joy, in the correspondence between his physical sensations and his emotions, and even in his fateful decision.

The passages quoted here show that Gideon changed during his military service. From a shy and quiet lad who spent his musing and writing poetry, Gideon grew into a young man who loved the sense of risk and power associated with the experience of falling from heaven to earth. Gideon deliberately sought to join the paratroops and eagerly awaits his jump from the sky above his kibbutz. From the perspective plain meaning of the plot, he has become an active agent of his own life, rather than a submissive, passive, and obedient character. If we may assume that no detail is coincidental, his father bears indirect responsibility for Gideon’s death because he made it possible for Gideon to join a combat unit despite his mother’s refusal. In fact, Gideon’s mother is not portrayed as a soft, warm, and feminine, but rather as a person with a masculine appearance; it is unclear whether she gave Gideon more warmth and love than his father did.

The use of Peirce’s categories of consciousness for an analysis of “The Way of the Wind” brings into sharper focus that the characters do not act in a stereotypical manner expected of them or in accordance with a particular ideology. This interpretation correlates with Amos Oz’s reply to the question of whether his stories express “dark curiosity.[[101]](#footnote-101) His answer was that they do, citing the end of “The Way of the Wind” as an example.[[102]](#footnote-102)

To sum up this analysis of *Jackals*, a look at the states of consciousness in the stories included in the volume reflects an important aspect of Peircian pragmatism—the relationship between the individual and the world. In the previous chapter I showed how Peirce’s three types of symbolization express different relationships between the individual and the world; in this chapter I have shown how these relations are reflected in Peirce’s three states of consciousness. In firstness, the individual identifies sensations as part of harmony of the world, without distinctions or concrete implementation. In secondness, a conflict is created between the individual and some object in the world, or, alternatively, the individual identifies a conflict in the world. In other words, the transition from firstness to secondness entails a transition from harmony to conflict. In thirdness, the relationship between the individual and the world is shaped symbolically and, as we saw in the previous chapter, can articulate a variety of possibilities: expression, sublimation, confrontation, etc. Although the stories in *Jackals* are told in the past tense, their literary form makes it possible for us to understand the characters’ states of consciousness as permitting a choice among possibilities.

Unlike the stories in *Jackals*, the novel *My Michael* presents a very different type of choice. Its characters are more complex than those in *Jackals* and are full of contradictions.[[103]](#footnote-103) Their states of consciousness are depicted in a way that exposes their relations with themselves and with others and reflects the paradox of aloneness.

**2.i. The paradox of aloneness in *My Michael***

When I was writing *My Michael* and Hannah pulled me into some scene that wasn’t appropriate for her, I told her: “I’m sorry, I’m not going to write that, that’s not in your nature.” And then she would tell me, while I was writing: “Shut up and write! You won’t tell me what is in my nature and what isn’t in my nature.” I would say, “No, I beg your pardon—you’re my heroine, I’m not your hero. You work for me, I don’t work for you.” Then she would say, “Leave me alone. Don’t take me over. Let me live and don’t bother me.” […] So Hannah was stubborn and I was stubborn—and then I knew the story was alive.[[104]](#footnote-104)

An overview of Amos Oz’s work and interviews with him reveals a striking ambivalence regarding his relationship with his characters. Leaving aside his autobiographical *A Tale of Love and Darkness*, in which he dealt directly with his childhood years,[[105]](#footnote-105) we can observe a range of degrees of connection between his fictional characters and elements in the life and personality of Oz the narrator.[[106]](#footnote-106) For example, we can see that Oz had a multifaceted relationship with the character of Hannah Gonen: first, as Oz admitted, identification with Hannah’s attitude about Jerusalem; second, strong reservations about her; and third, devotion to “what she wanted,” as described by him in the passage quoted above. Literary theory proposes two perspectives on authors relate to their work: total separation of the author from the plot (in the spirit of the New Critics); or an interpretation that integrates author and work (such as a psychoanalytic analysis of the characters as a key to understanding the authors themselves). The interpretation I offer below, drawing on Peirce’s states of consciousness, offers a third perspective: observing the narrator’s changing relationship to a character in a novel detects different states of consciousness—not necessarily the author’s, but of individuals in the world. My assertion is that the ability to write is realized by, among other skills, the ability to verbalize different states of consciousness whose differences are reflected in various characters, or in the narrator’s or author’s changing relationship to a particular character. Oz used diverse of terms to describe his complex and changing reflective relationship as an author to the character Hannah Gonen, including agreement, dedication, and “invad[ing] my soul.”[[107]](#footnote-107)

The interpretive question this line of inquiry seeks to answer is how the characters reflect the possible relationships between language and events in the world:

One tries to capture in language something that the language does not really want to encompass. Language is a constant. Words are supposed to denote constant things. How can you capture what is fluid, changeable, and between states, in a no-man’s-land? There is an inherent contradiction that I can’t quite resolve. And I find it very difficult. I have nothing but words to work with. […] I seek to do with language something which goes against the language. This is the nature of my work. Not what A does to B. […] I want to convey something very physical: the reaction of his face and his body as he approaches and sees that it is the wrong person. This is my task. What you call inventing a plot is rather easy, because how many plots are there in the world? Not many. Love, hate, jealousy, friendship.[[108]](#footnote-108)

According to Oz, the relations between language and the world are reflected, for example, in the attempt to track the interplay between the body and the emotions when a person is surprised, and in general in processes of change where language, which “is supposed to denote constant things,” is unable to express the change, its causes, and its implications. *My Michael* can be seen as a novel that deals with the emergence and subsequent deterioration of the relationship between Hannah and Michael. Nevertheless, the key factor is not the “plot,” as Oz noted in the interview quoted above, but rather the attempt to understand the change in consciousness: what creates a feeling of a developing relationship? What elements go into one person’s image of another person? How is a shared experience created and what occurs in the characters’ minds as it is taking place?

The novel is a first-person retrospective narration by its main character, Hannah Gonen. In this sense it differs from the stories in *Jackals*, with their omniscient third-person narrator. The important element of social criticism that dominates all those stories of *Jackals* is secondary in *My Michael*. To use Roman Jakobson’s term, the dominant of Oz’s novel is the couple and family relationship.[[109]](#footnote-109) The first-person narration is a very clear invitation for us to understand the plot through the lens of Peirce’s states of consciousness.

At the start of the novel, Hannah comes across as a rather opinionated person, in her thoughts and musings as well as in her conversations with Michael. This is manifested in repeated instances of her thirdness. For example, she formulates a “rule” about people, which applies to her as well: “My late father often used to say: Strong people can do almost anything they want to do, but even the strongest cannot choose what they want to do. I am not particularly strong.”[[110]](#footnote-110)

In this passage, Hannah is justifying in advanceher later inability to curb her desires, because even strong people cannot do so; so she, who is “not particularly strong,” certainly cannot. Hannah locates desire in an uncontrolled area of consciousness. In contrast to Peirce’s view that thirdness, which makes it possible to perceive rules, also enables self-control,[[111]](#footnote-111) Hannah, despite formulating rules, indirectly admits that it is hard for her to control her desires. This difficulty is, in fact, the freedom experienced in firstness, in which nothing can be controlled and it is accordingly also impossible to act morally (or immorally).[[112]](#footnote-112) Early in her relationship with Michael, Hannah formulates another rule: “A family isn’t a relay-race, with a profession as a torch.”[[113]](#footnote-113)

Later, as her relationship with Michael gets closer, Hannah formulates a rule that explains her initial excitement about Michael.[[114]](#footnote-114) Although the relationship is still young, she keeps remembering and even tells Michael about the Arab twins who had been her neighbors: she had played with them and even, in her teens, been in love with them.[[115]](#footnote-115) In terms of their character, the twins are certainly Michael’s polar opposite: not men of words, they were a “pair of grey-brown wolves,” as compared to Michael, the son and hope of a good family that is pointing him towards a successful academic career. Alongside his gentleness and intellectualism, Hannah soon uncovers a short-tempered and insensitive side; she says that she feels she knows his hand, rather than him. She overcomes this difficulty, however and they get married. Then she formulates a new rule, based on her father’s insights: “Pure truth, […] is thoroughly destructive and leads nowhere. What can ordinary people do? All we can do is silently stand and stare.”[[116]](#footnote-116)

In the first part of the novel, Hannah directs the plot with her dogmatic ideas. The rules she formulates on the basis of events seem to express a “smooth” transition from the experienced firstness of the event, through the conflict with her desires (secondness), and on to formulation of a rule, a new habit that helps her dealing with what she discovers in the relationship. At a certain stage, though, Hannah’s ability to rise above every unpleasant event by means of a “rule” grows weaker; as the Arab twins begin to appear in her dreams after every unpleasant event. The twins act but never speak in these dreams. Before her wedding, Hannah dreams that one of them opens a door so she can escape to freedom; immediately after the wedding she dreams that the twins are approaching her, handsome and violent, silent and flexible.[[117]](#footnote-117) Hannah does not understand this dream, because Michael would appear to match her conscious rules for choosing a life partner. “I have never wanted a wild man,” she confesses to herself.[[118]](#footnote-118) The twins continue to appear in her dreams, while, in parallel, she experiences a series of missed opportunities, moments when her expectations of familial intimacy are left unmet. One of the most significant such moments occurs after the birth of their son Yair, when Hannah sinks into apathy and rocks the cradle “in an ecstasy of pain.”[[119]](#footnote-119) When she has to sum up the situation of the new family threesome, she says: “I would suddenly observe in both of them, in all three of us, a quality which I can only call melancholy, because I do not know what other term to use.”[[120]](#footnote-120)

Hannah uses the term “quality,” which Peirce uses to describe firstness, as her foundation whenever she formulates a rule. Finding it hard to overcome her post-partum depression, Hannah connects to the fundamental state that has in fact characterized her interactions with Michael ever since the moment, early in their relationship, when she felt closer to his hand than to him. This melancholy continues to accompany their relationship throughout the novel. At various incidents in the plot, such as the visit to Michael’s father and Hannah’s visit to the university, this melancholy is concealed behind apologetic or provocative comments.

The situation at the novel’s end is not simple. On the one hand, Hannah discovers she is pregnant again; on the other hand, she starts to have doubts about Michael is being faithful to her. He is about to submit his dissertation and another student, Yardena, volunteers to type it for him. Hannah wonders whether the relationship between Michael and Yardena extends beyond this favor before coming to a lucid conclusion:

I do not suppose that Michael went any further than shy thoughts and speculations. I can see no reason why Yardena should have given herself to him. On the other hand, I can see no reason why she should have refused him. But *the word “reason” is meaningless to me*. I do not know and I do not care to know.[[121]](#footnote-121)

In this passage, especially its last sentence, Hannah admits that she is unable to determine, in causal or rational terms, what has happened, what is currently happening, or what will happen in her relationship with Michael. This is the key insight as we finish the novel. Peirce’s states of consciousness can help us go beyond the mere statement that Hannah’s actions are contradictory[[122]](#footnote-122) and understand its meaning. It is impossible to point to causality in firstness, which applies to the encounter with the world, and the rules that individuals formulate for themselves during the course of their life. Diverse qualities can inhere in firstness; in Hannah’s case, they include attraction to mute and undisciplined men, but also to the intellectual who has difficulty connecting emotionally. The contradiction between these poles is expressed by her decision to marry Michael and stay with him, even while she continues to dream about the Arab twins.

A page before the novel’s end, Hannah makes a confident declaration about her ability to control what goes on in her mind (a statement not expected by readers, who until this point have repeatedly observed Hannah’s failures to direct her thoughts): “But I have more left than words. I am still able to unfasten a heavy padlock. To part the iron gates. To set free two twin brothers, who will slip out into the vast night to do my bidding. I shall urge them on.”[[123]](#footnote-123)

At this point, it seems like Hannah the narrator merges with Hannah the character, erupting in a sense of omnipotence and confidence that she can free herself of her vain dreams. The narrator decides to endow the character with the narrator’s power, which goes beyond the use of words to relate events and emotions and entails the ability to decide what will happen next. It is only with the narrator’s assistance that Hannah can express such confidence, despite her past experiences.

But this hope shrivels in the novel’s final sentences—a cold and serene description of nature that overpowers Hannah’s confident declaration and returns the plot to firstness, where there is no longer any possibility of discerning and saying what is happening now and what will happen in the future.[[124]](#footnote-124)

Thus, Peirce’s descriptions of the states of consciousness provide a lens through which we can interpret the apparent contradiction between Hannah’s verbal abilities and need to express her experiences in words, on the one hand, and her difficulty in understanding herself and her relationships, even retrospectively, on the other hand. Peirce demonstrated both the richness of self-consciousness and its limited nature, in that it functions in diverse ways. Hence, we have only a limited ability to explain our actions and choices, contingent on the ability to understand the transitions between states of consciousness states and not only to depict those transitions.

Chapter Three: Between Guilt and Betrayal and the possibility of Self-Control: Oz's

***Unto Death,* *Panther in the Basement* and *Judas* from an interdisciplinary point of view**

**3.a. *Unto Death:* Guilt as an existential attitude**

Is there any reason in looking for signs in the sensible sphere? And what is Jewish in a Jew – surely not any outward shape or form but some abstract quality. The contrast does not lie even in the affections of the soul. Simply this: a terrible, a malignant presence. Is not this the essence of treachery: to penetrate, to be within, to interfuse, to put out roots, and to flourish in what is most delicate. Like love, like carnal union. There is a Jew in our midst. Perhaps he had divided himself up, and insinuated himself partly here, partly there, so that not a man of us has escaped contagion. [[125]](#footnote-125)

After publishing the collection of short stories *Where the Jackals Howl* as well as two well-received novels,[[126]](#footnote-126) Oz published two additional novellas in 1971 in the book *Unto Death*. The novella *Crusade* describes a crusade that was carried out in 1096 after a call by Pope Urban II “to liberate the Holy Land from the hands of the infidel.”[[127]](#footnote-127) The story is told intermittently from the perspective of an omniscient narrator and from the first-person perspective of Claude Crookback, the deputy of the noble Count Guillaume of Touron, who lead the crusade. The crusade begins with the Count’s personal crisis, the death of his wife and the revolt of the peasantry (the narrator also hints at other unspecified events that served to unsettle the Count’s mind). Two key motifs direct the plot: Jews as responsible for all the world’s woes and loyal Christians as tormented by feelings of inner embarrassment and guilt. The novella gradually exposes the causal relations between the two motifs and calls forth a new understanding of betrayal, guilt, and existential frustration.

Previous chapters examined the different ways of symbolizing mental states and relations between the characters’ states of consciousness and the world. The psychoanalytic interpretation proposed that we examine how the structural components of the mind participate in, and influence, these relations. The current chapter will add an existential perspective that can be found in Oz’s writings. In the three works that will be analyzed in this chapter a clear existential attitude of guilt can be found, which develops and is shaped by the concept of betrayal (the concepts of guilt and betrayal were hinted at already in Oz’s writings analyzed in previous chapters, but only indirectly). Usually, the characters grasp these concepts only in retrospect. That is why we must first decipher the text following Wittgenstein, as “significantly uttered,” because we are dealing with two layers: the past in which the betrayal occurred and the present in which the feelings of guilt emerge. Following this investigation, we must provide a pragmatic examination of retrospective meaning, after it has become a rule that guides reality. By appealing to Peirce’s insights, we will see how it is possible to criticize one’s self-conduct and revise it according to one’s moral position. Peirce, like the psychoanalysts, sees such a process of self-criticism as a developmental process. This insight inspires the interpretation to be suggested of the concepts of guilt and betrayal in Oz’s writings.

The central topic of the novella *Crusade* is “the essence of treachery.”[[128]](#footnote-128) As can be seen in the quotation above, an inner need to identify and remove the source of the betrayal is composed of both attraction and repulsion. The motif of attraction and repulsion is also manifest in Oz’s interview to Hilit Yeshurun, when explaining his choice to write about the zealots in the crusades.[[129]](#footnote-129) David Ohana quotes Oz to illustrate the different layers of the historic plot in the novella,[[130]](#footnote-130) yet it is possible to apply this polyvalence also to the concept of betrayal: on the one hand, Oz is drawn to shaping it, yet his works in this chapter illustrate the danger and problematic nature of betrayal.

The novella involves a constant tension between inner feelings of guilt and a socio-religious conception of guilt, at the center of which is Judas Iscariot’s betrayal, which is responsible for the archetype of the Jew as a traitor in the Christian tradition:

“The sweetest apple is always the first to turn rotten. A wolf in sheep's clothing would naturally exaggerate his disguise. This is a sign for us: Who was it who embraced our Saviour and kissed His cheek and reveled in honeyed words and signs of love, if not he who had sold him for thirty pieces of silver, the traitor Judas Iscariot.”[[131]](#footnote-131)

In the above passage, as in many others, the narrator uses the first-person plural to express feelings shared by all those participating in the crusade. They all adhere to their faith and are Christian crusaders to Palestine, led by the nobleman Gerome de Touron and his faithful servant Claude the crooked-shouldered.

The main character, Count Guillaume of Touron, is a leader who aspires to lead the crusade to redemption yet at the same time represses his own guilt, which is that he is the traitor. Toward the end of the novella, a recognition of his guilt begins to emerge within him, yet rather than expose it he commits suicide. The figure of the traitor is shaped slowly by first projecting the treasonous trait onto the Jews. The journey to the Holy Land is also a journey of self-discovery at the end of which no correction is found but tragedy. Nonetheless, the novella does not address the nature of the betrayal, nor does it attend to its causes. The idea of the leader who turns out to be a traitor corresponds to the character of Judas Iscariot, both within the novella and in the external text, yet such inter- and intra-textuality do not function as a mental or pragmatic explanation but as an aesthetic means for enriching the work. As such, several questions, which will guide the discussion in this chapter, arise: What is betrayal, why does betrayal come about, and how does the sense of guilt make it possible to deal with betrayal?

It is interesting to note that in his last-published novel from 2017, *Judas*, Oz also characterizes the ultimate traitor of the Christian tradition, Judas Iscariot. Shaping the character of the traitor from a historical-Christian perspective is common to both works. In so choosing, Oz performs an interesting act of distancing. Unlike Freud, who did not know Hebrew well and did not have ready access to the Bible, Oz could have easily chosen a biblical analogy, which contains many clear examples of betrayal of different kinds (e.g., Absalom who betrayed David, or Delila who betrayed Samson). Yet betrayal from the perspective of the Christian tradition is especially interesting, for two reasons. Judas Iscariot represents a betrayal of an ideology, of the religious testament delivered through Jesus. The fact that this betrayal also involved payment makes the contrast even clearer between Judas Iscariot – the traitor – and Jesus – the betrayed ideologue, whose death is taken to represent atonement for the sins of all of mankind. Nonetheless, within the two works to be examined below, the traitor is also a complex character, who feels love and even admiration to the betrayed. In the fourth chapter, I will bring together the context of betrayal and the historical-cultural context in Oz’s writings, which shaped and informed the crisis of the kibbutz movement. At this point note that criticisms of the kibbutz, presented through characters who live in a kibbutz, as can be found in Oz’s *Elsewhere, Perhaps*, *A Perfect Peace*, and already in *Where the Jackals Howl*, are also ideological criticisms directed at a certain faith and way of life. In this respect, the traitor in the traditional Christian context is a more accurate and truthful parable than the kinds of traitors found in the Bible.[[132]](#footnote-132)

The novella *Crusade* occurs in an unusual context relative to the typical contexts of Oz’s works, which mostly occur in a kibbutz or in Jerusalem. The novella is developed with a European atmosphere, and its plot is described through a journey along murky terrain. The objective is Jerusalem, but Jerusalem is presented metaphorically, as an object of spiritual yearning. Oz emphasizes that it is not a place in the geographic sense:

“Jerusalem they were seeking was not a city but the last hope of a guttering vitality.”[[133]](#footnote-133) “Jerusalem, which is not a place but disembodied love.”[[134]](#footnote-134)

Jerusalem plays the role of a Peircean symbol of an intangible place that embodies abstract redemption. Jesus, who according to Christian faith is the symbol of spiritual love, is also the symbol of loyalty and faith, in contrast to the traitor. Guillaume de Touron must set out on a journey to distance himself from everything he ever knew, a journey that is mostly internal, so as to reconstitute himself and arrive at the Jerusalem of Jesus:

Everything was somehow open to several interpretations. Had Guillaume de Touron considered the possible interpretations? If so, he did not show it on the surface. His few, brief words of command bore witness to an inner distance. It was as he were sunk deep in a problem of logic or preoccupied with the checking of books which would not balance. Our chronicler, Claude, who frequently noticed his lord's silence, was sometimes inclined to attribute to him abstract speculations or spiritual exercises[[135]](#footnote-135)

Though this journey is internal, the narrator identifies it through de Touron’s external behavior. The narrator’s testimony intersects with that of de Touron’s deputy, Claude: they both identify the reflexive process that the Count is going through, wherein distancing from people allows for introspection. This process of distancing – both of the character in the novella and of Oz as an author – can be clarified by reflecting on the philosophy of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). At the beginning of his career, Kierkegaard wrote pseudonyms. He argued that one must distance from oneself as much as possible when writing literature in order, eventually, to reach one’s subjective truth:

The subjective thinker has […] aesthetic passion and ethical passion. […] The subjective thinker is nevertheless not a poet even if he is also a poet; he is not an ethicist even if he is also an ethicist. […] **The subjective thinker is not a scholar, he is an artist.** **To exist is an art.** The subjective thinker is aesthetic enough for his life to have aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it, and dialectical enough to master it in thought. **The subjective thinker’s task is to understand himself in existence**[[136]](#footnote-136)

Each of the central choices that shape the novella, the choice of period and of the narrator, can be seen as a choice to distance significantly from Amos Oz’s biographical context, that of a native Israeli author whose extensive writing focused on Israeli society in the twentieth century. According to Kierkegaard, a literary work operates like the magic of theater. Every person with an active imagination wishes to merge with it so as to find oneself in it:

"In such a self-vision of the imagination, the individual is not an actual shape but a shadow, or, more correctly, the actual shape is invisibly present and therefore is not satisfied to cast one shadow, but the individual has a variety of shadows, all of which resemble him and which momentarily have equal status as being himself."[[137]](#footnote-137)

The Kierkegaardian transformation that Guillaume de Touron undergoes involves four shadows: a moment of distress that leads to a journey (as previously illustrated) and to the development of several possibilities of interpretation (as quoted above); a stage of projection in which the Count is committed to the idea of blaming the Jews; elimination of factors that are external to the betrayal; and recognition that “the traitor is me,” which leads to his suicide. Already at an early stage of the novella, de Touron concludes that there is a traitor, throughout the novella he tests all the available options until he concludes that he himself is the traitor and, without confessing it, kills himself. It is interesting to point out the similarity to Kierkegaard’s real and intellectual biography. Kierkegaard began his self-reflection with a sense of dissatisfaction with his life, which lead to the dissolution of his engagement to Regina and the idealization of Jesus, who went willingly to his death.

Despite the processes of reflection and enlightenment that occur in the novella, the existential questions of what causes betrayal and what the nature of betrayal is remain a mystery. Additionally, the emerging feeling of guilt is unexplained, though there are external causes that apparently brought it about, as mentioned above. After all, we know that guilt does not necessarily arise as a result of external events, as awful as they may be, especially in light of the fact that de Touron did not cause them directly. The literary work artistically shapes an existential state but retains an unclear dimension of meaning. As such, I propose an interdisciplinary discussion of these questions with which I will later analyze two additional works by Oz, which revolve around the concepts of guilt and betrayal.

**3.b. An Interdisciplinary view of the Concept of Guilt: Pragmatism, Psychoanalysis, and Oz's *Panther in the Basement* and *Judas***

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language. In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world […] The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.[[138]](#footnote-138)

Wittgenstein presented the good or bad exercise of the will as a motive that underlies every person’s actions, but which cannot be expressed in language. Will, good or bad, like happiness or unhappiness, cannot be defined as facts, in contrast to gravity or the facts of every person’s birth and death.[[139]](#footnote-139) However, Wittgenstein clearly highlighted the importance of the will, which is the foundation of ethical decision-making: will colors a person’s world and leads to happiness or unhappiness.[[140]](#footnote-140) This pragmatic position,[[141]](#footnote-141) which holds that the “test of consequences” does not necessarily permit us to understand the process that led to the result, is already present in Peirce’s writings. The *phaneron[[142]](#footnote-142)* is a phenomenon whose sources are not necessarily known but which is itself clear and visible and present to the mind. It makes it possible to understand the phenomenon of Wittgenstein’s “will,” which will serve as a foundation for this discussion, in this chapter about phenomena that result from the will: guilt and betrayal. Wittgenstein and Peirce proposed a philosophical way of thinking about guilt and betrayal that anticipated the scientific research in cognitive linguistics from the 1980s on.[[143]](#footnote-143) This was possible because research on the functioning of the brain (and not only on its linguistic products) recognizes that most cognitive activity is unconscious.[[144]](#footnote-144) Despite comprehensive efforts to clarify how the brain functions retrospectively, it is difficult to deal empirically with all the neurological and biological mechanisms that participate in cognitive decision-making, including decisions about ethics.[[145]](#footnote-145)

Since the start of the twenty-first century, research aimed at clarifying the connections between physical, neurological, neural, and other processes, on the one hand, and thought, action, and self-control, on the other hand, have not made substantial progress beyond the insights of Peirce and Wittgenstein. In addition to the interdisciplinary agreement (among linguistics, cognitive science, and philosophy) about the important role played by the unconscious in thinking and judgment, there is also agreement about the interaction between processes internal to the individual and those that are external and social. Here too we can see how the pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey anticipated the science and philosophy of the twenty-first century. However, despite the recognition of their importance, only Dewey’s thought has received serious attention in the interdisciplinary research about thinking and judgment. In my humble opinion, Peirce and James not only preceded Dewey chronologically; they also created the initial and fundamental stages for understanding Dewey’s thought in particular and for understanding the interaction between internal and external processes of thinking and judgment in general.

This following discussion will focus on Peirce’s contribution to understanding judgment as one aspect of thinking, examining its contribution to the discussion of guilt in the psychoanalytic context. To deal with the complex process of recognizing guilt and transforming it into part of existence and of the self, we will look at Peirce’s proposal for the development of self-control, psychoanalytic object-relations theories, and two works by Amos Oz, and demonstrate their unique contribution to enriching the concepts of guilt and betrayal.

Amos Oz’s works are deeply engaged in analyzing the character and character of the will, in various contexts. One of the contexts he analyzed in an especially interesting way is guilt. In his last novel, *Judas*,*[[146]](#footnote-146)* Oz dealt with the ultimate traitor (Judas Iscariot), portrayed as a disappointed lover, and thereby undermined a concept of guilt that prevails far beyond the boundaries of Christian belief. Oz’s positive and admiring depiction of Judas has been supported by a scientific discovery,[[147]](#footnote-147) but in Oz’s novel it serves to refer to the condition of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine during the British Mandate) and refashions a political stance that had been deemed to be “betrayal” as legitimate and even constructive.

The analysis of *Judas* will also refer to Oz’s teen novel *Panther in the Basement*.[[148]](#footnote-148) The allusions in this novel that foreshadow *Judas* show the importance he attached to the issue of guilt. To be precise, in these two works Oz addressed guilt as it relates to loyalty to one’s country. Although this may seem a narrow context, it can be argued that it was the most important of all for Oz, who was a public intellectual and thinker in addition to being an author. The discussion in the previous chapters of self-constitution through symbolization and of the transitions among various states of consciousness leads into an additional focus in this chapter: the notion of guilt that Oz fashioned in these two works as a key to understanding him as an Israeli intellectual who came to be viewed as a traitor by a large sector of the population.[[149]](#footnote-149) This chapter integrates three levels of the topic of guilt: the literary context (Oz’s works), the pragmatic context (how the approach to guilt is linked to constitution of the self), and the psychoanalytic context (the possible causes for the emergence of guilt, according to the three key thinkers of the object relations school—Freud, Klein, and Winnicott).

Our discussion of the writings of Freud, Klein, and Winnicott and of Oz’s novels will highlight a striking complexity: will is not “good” or “bad,” and people are not only “happy” or “unhappy.” Many people feel guilt and betrayal as an integral and significant part of their emotional development and constitution of the self. The passage from Wittgenstein quoted above is important as an introduction to the complexity of our discussion: we can recognize our wills, judge them, and control them, but find it difficult to formulate the process in words.

How is the sense of guilt or betrayal created? How does guilt reflect awareness of the existence of others and of the obligation not to harm them? Does guilt arise from actual interaction with another subject, or can it emerge in a person’s mind, targeting himself or internalized objects? Finally, does the perception of some action as betrayal depend on an external ethical judgment, or is it only internal (in the light of a person’s individual scale of values)?

After presenting Peirce’s position, we will see what stimulates a person’s sense of guilt, in order to answer the above questions from the psychoanalytic perspective. Psychoanalysts have focused on guilt primarily in the context of intersubjectivity, and only since the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century.[[150]](#footnote-150) But the line of thought I develop below proposes a different way of addressing the topic, from the perspective of object-relations psychoanalysis, and offers a complex answer to the question of guilt. Psychoanalytic thought, from Freud on, has been ambivalent about decision-making in general and about coping with guilt and betrayal in particular.

The discussion integrates the line pursued by Freud, Klein, and Winnicott as it applies to object relations that cause guilt. In object-relations psychoanalysis, recognition of the existence of an external object that holds the key to the subject’s pleasure produces an ambivalence that has several consequences, including guilt. This is because the object is an object of will but also can prevent fulfillment of the will; this duality provokes anger, and even hatred and aggression. Object relations theory describes the individual’s development as a complex process in which the emergence of guilt stems from concrete relations but also from the development within the psyche of the superego and conscience (Freud), guilt and reparation (Klein), or guilt and concern (Winnicott).

The lacuna in this psychoanalytic approach is the absence of a psychological mechanism that supports free choice and, consequently, reflection about the self that is not dictated by psychological, social, or causal determinism. Freud’s, Klein’s, and Winnicott’s accounts of how guilt is created as a function of certain conditions and characteristics severely narrows the space for individual decision-making. Freud addressed this issue, noting that this constriction rules out a serious discussion of ethics, because ethical choice is based on freedom. For example, Freud asserted that obsession is problematic because of “the apparent contradiction in terms.”[[151]](#footnote-151) Freud posited that recognition of guilt is based on awareness and acceptance of responsibility. If so, how can it be unconscious? Here Freud was expressing a philosophical pragmatism that is at variance with his discoveries as a psychoanalyst.

For Peirce, by contrast, the self-functions in a way that includes mechanisms of self-assessment, self-evaluation, and self-judgment, and these lead to ethical conduct. Ethical action is made possible by mechanisms that are present in the internal make-up of every person, in every society and every period.

**3.c. Peirce: From self-reflection to self-control**

In the previous chapter we saw how Peirce described the three states of consciousness and defined the stage of firstness, feeling, as the basis for the encounter with the world (secondness) and for creating meaning and habits (thirdness). Hence it is only natural that a sense of guilt and, consequently, the emergence of a will for rectification, are two meanings or patterns of thought that are based on an experience in firstness. When individuals, especially infants, interpret an emotion they feel as guilt, they provide it with a meaning in a moral context. Peirce did not write directly about morality to any great extent, but he did formulate the concept of self-control as an objective of the constitution of the self.[[152]](#footnote-152) This is how he could then link self-control and morality. But his contribution to psychoanalysis goes beyond this connection: As asserted above, his contribution is that he shed light on the connection between the states of consciousness and self-control. Whereas Freud, Klein, and Winnicott all described guilt as caused by universal mechanisms, as we shall see below, Peirce allows us to understand the creation of guilt as an individual matter. In this way he opened the door for the analysand to relive his experience in the context of transference, on the one hand, and to counselling the analysand to develop self-control (as Freud demanded), on the other.

In this chapter we will discuss the stages of the development of the idea of guilt in the writings of Freud, Klein, and Winnicott, and discover that two layers are missing. The first is the internal mechanism of mental states (sensations, emotions, and thoughts) and the role this mechanism plays in the coalescence of guilt. The second layer is people’s ability to judge and behave morally, which together compose an element of the self that is both individual and universal. The fact that these two layers are missing from the psychoanalytic process of guilt is problematic when we wish to attain two important objectives of object relations theory.

The first objective is the development of analysts’ self-control, such that they will be aware of the problems created by counter-transference. The second objective is the development of self-control as a therapeutic objective for the analysands, so they can improve how they deal with their past experiences and their interpretive omnipotence about the self in the present. The first distinction that is important for understanding the creation of guilt in an individual and voluntary manner, rather than deterministically, is that between reality and existence:

*Reality* and *existence*are two different things. […] Existence, […], is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them. If Man is the measure of things, as Protagoras said, then there is no complete reality; but being there certainly is, even then.[[153]](#footnote-153)

Peirce remained in the logical space and proposed a distinction between the actual existence of things (reality) and assertions about them (which create existence). Things actually exist without reference to what is said about them or to the way they are viewed. However, reality is only one aspect of existence, and thus, following Protagoras, is never complete. Peirce exemplified independent reality through the laws of motion and the law of gravitation: these laws can be formulated in words, reflect reality, and are independent of any particular existence: they are “distinct from existence.”[[154]](#footnote-154)

This complements Wittgenstein’s approach, presented at the beginning of this chapter. Integrating the two leads to the following sequence: Reality consists of facts. A person can interpret certain facts, or others, in accordance with his will. This will does not change the facts, but it does create a certain quality in his life, a “suchness,”[[155]](#footnote-155) which is unique and which may also include an ethical space. Thus Peirce and Wittgenstein created an approach that is both individual and universal: a person can create a unique suchness by interpreting reality, and this ability is available to everyone in the world who can employ his own mind.

**3.d. Between states of consciousness and individual existence**

In the two previous chapters, we examined types of signs and states of consciousness, according to Peirce. Now we will show how these two stages provide the background for understanding individual existence. Such existence can be created, according to Peirce, only as a function of a relationship to another object:

Every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an *Index*; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit […], when I call the sign a *Symbol*.[[156]](#footnote-156)

When a sign is dictated by a particular object, it functions as an icon; but when the sign functions as a separate object with its own individual existence, facing another individual object, the sign functions as an index.[[157]](#footnote-157) When an interpretive process, which is the result of habit, is added, a symbol is created. Thus, in practice, according to Peirce, individual existence is a function of the ability to respond to another object.[[158]](#footnote-158)

For example, Freud’s description of the concept of taboo can be explained cogently with the assistance of Peirce’s idea: The taboo as object—for example, the father or the mother—functions as an icon. When a separate object is created, such as will for one of the parents, an individual existence is created—a prohibition or the violation of a prohibition. When Freud formulated this attitude as a pattern, he turned it into a habit; or in Freud’s lexicon, the “Oedipus complex.” From that moment on, the Oedipus complex became a symbol and was viewed as a foundation of the process of psychological development. Peirce makes it possible for us to see that this foundation is a function of interpretation, which can be changed. In contrast to reality, the interpretation of the Oedipus complex as a developmental stage is an expression of individual existence, in Peirce’s terminology. It is a way of viewing reality; but this reality is only one of many aspects of existence. Other aspects include the cultural context, concrete life circumstances, and innate personality traits.

**3.e. Peirce on the relationship between states of consciousness and self-control**

Man comes from the womb in actuality an animal little higher than a fish; by no means as high as a serpent. His humanity consists in his destination. He becomes not actual man until he acquires self-control and then he is so in the measure of his self-control […] Man’s existence qua man […] consists solely in his growing to act from rational self-conduct.[[159]](#footnote-159)

The concept of self-control has special status within Peirce’s idea of the self, because, for Peirce, the capacity for self-control is the key difference between human beings and other animals.[[160]](#footnote-160) As Colapietro emphasized, the uniqueness of the self as a “type on its own” is entailed by the self’s autonomy and self-control.[[161]](#footnote-161) Peirce’s pragmatic philosophy includes a variety of conceptual tools that he created as part of his effort to clarify how an individual functions in the world, from the stage of feeling, through the stage of action, and finally to the stage of thinking, in which he can examine his behavior reflectively and critically. The purpose of this reflection is the continual improvement of the individual, in order to constitute his selfhood in accordance with the ideas he seeks to implement.

Peirce examined the characteristics of cognition and concluded that the criterion for its operation is external and pragmatic—action in a certain manner. However, every action is an expression of “inward actions.”[[162]](#footnote-162) Although there are several possible actions that may be taken, certain stimuli, bodily in nature, motivate us to perform one particular action. This bodily motivation includes intentional action, which is a person’s rational thought. This thought includes the possibility “to exert self-control over some of its inferences.”[[163]](#footnote-163) In practice, this intentionality creates deliberation.[[164]](#footnote-164) Deliberate action is necessarily conscious and is expressed in the consolidation of a position or habit in the face of a specific reality.[[165]](#footnote-165)

The concept Peirce proposed to embody the possibility of self-criticism, both *ab initio* and *post factum*, is self-control: “Feeling, Conduct, and Thought ought to be controlled supposing them to be in a measure, and only in a measure, to self-control, exercised by means of self-criticism, and the purposive formation of habit, as common sense tells us they are in a measure controllable.”[[166]](#footnote-166)The three states of consciousness—firstness (feeling), secondness, and thirdness (conduct and thought)—can be controlled through conscious and deliberate planning; but consciousness and criticism are possible only on the level of thirdness. Only there is it possible to speak about guilt and the distinction between good and bad.[[167]](#footnote-167)

It is only consciously that self-control and self-criticism can take place; in fact, reasoning, or alternatively, “to call […] a proposition false,” is required for moral judgment.[[168]](#footnote-168) Peirce asserted that there can be no doubt that self-control is possible and is the objective and purpose of the sum total of an individual’s habits.[[169]](#footnote-169) Larry Holmes emphasized the special importance of the concept in Peirce’s thought. Given that Peirce formulated it in his later writings, the concept seems to express Peirce’s further reflection and even regret that he himself had not sufficiently exercised self-control.[[170]](#footnote-170) It was therefore important for him to emphasize that habits are not only instinctive but can also stem from a conscious effort of prior planning. Peirce was aware, however, that some of the mechanisms of self-control are unconscious and function in a manner that appears to us instinctive.[[171]](#footnote-171) He accordingly distinguished between types of self-control; and, what is important for our purpose, he emphasized that it is possible to develop and improve self-control. A person’s ability to practice self-control is activated in his imagination, whereas the motivation for it is some moral rule.

This point caused Holmes to question the effectiveness of the concept of self-control, because self-control is performed by a particular person with regard to the correspondence between a future action and a particular moral rule.[[172]](#footnote-172) Yet whereas self-control is an individual capacity, the moral rule is not determined by the individual but by external parties. A person’s ability to control what is dictated to him by the outside world is at the very least questionable. Hence there is a gulf between the mechanism (internal) and the objective towards which it aims (external). Peirce’s starting assumption was that morality is based on self-control: “As morality supposes self-control, men learn that they must not surrender themselves unreservedly to any method, without considering to what conclusions it will lead them.”[[173]](#footnote-173)

There is no reason to expect a person to act morally unless he has a mechanism of self-control that enables him to choose between good and bad. This means that a person can consider the consequences of his actions and not be led by a mode of conduct that may cause unwilled consequences. The existence of the self-control mechanism is also the basis for the sense of guilt. According to Peirce, it is impossible to expect a person whose conduct exceeded the bounds of his ability for self-control to feel guilt.[[174]](#footnote-174) Thus Peirce defined ethics as a science expressed in both action and thought in a theory of “self-control.”[[175]](#footnote-175)

Peirce made an assumption that can be seen as naïve—that we can take for granted that truth and power are human aspirations and are achieved by self-control; so it is only natural that every person aspires to developing self-control in order to behave morally.[[176]](#footnote-176) In practice, self-control is expressed in habit, which is the aspect in which meaning is reflected in every context; not all habits reflect the same degree of control, however, and there are “degrees of self-control.”[[177]](#footnote-177) Self-control is hard to attain because it is conflictual: it is represented in a person’s inner world, within his “synthetical consciousness,” but self-control represents a split between inside and outside (“internal will” and “external compulsion”).[[178]](#footnote-178)

Summing up what we have seen so far, we can say that Peirce’s contribution to the understanding of moral capacity, including the sense of guilt, lies in his two key assertions. First, that because moral decision-making is a cognitive and rational process, the decision is conscious and controlled. Second, the process by which self-control operates can be described in detail: the methodology he used to study processes of consciousness, reality, and human existence can also be used to study self-control and moral decision-making.[[179]](#footnote-179) This is an immense contribution to psychoanalytic thought, as we shall see below. Indeed, Freud noted incidentally that the positive operation of the conscience must be conscious. As we shall see, however, Freud was concerned mainly with the negative ramifications of guilt, because he saw guilt as primarily an expression of a conflict within the individual or between the individual and external social forces (to the point of neurosis). But Peirce, in contrast to Freud, focused on the positive function of moral feelings expressed in self-control and on the individual’s ability to have those emotions, follow them, and analyze the results. This line of thought is a major contribution to psychoanalytic therapy, given that one of its explicit and accepted goals, for all schools and in all historical periods, is to empower individuals with the capacity to deal with their own pain.

3.f. The Distinction between Self-Control and Morality in Peirce’s Writings

Pragmaticism was originally based, […] upon a study of that experience of the phenomena of self-control which is *common to all grown men and women* […]. For it is to conceptions of *deliberate conduct* that Pragmaticism would trace *the intellectual purport of symbols*; and deliberate conduct is self-controlled conduct. Now control may itself be controlled, criticism itself subjected to criticism. [emphasis in original].[[180]](#footnote-180)

Peirce saw the capacity for self-control as the basis of Pragmaticism and as the factor common to all human beings that is the basis for the assignment of symbolic meaning in every context. Building on this, he formulated a humanistic and universal stance that expresses absolute confidence in every individual’s ability to plan his behavior and to afterwards critique that plan. Despite Peirce’s link between self-control and ethical conduct, it is important to note that he expressed serious misgivings about morality as a consensus social system and described its features in a way very similar to Freud’s account of the development of guilt in “Totem and Taboo” (1912–13), but even more negatively, when he described morality as analogous to manners.[[181]](#footnote-181)

Peirce classifies morality as part of the array of social conventions that people follow so as not to feel they are outliers.[[182]](#footnote-182) Morality, he writes, is not the result of individual deliberation and decision-making and is not based on free will or “an inner categorical imperative,” as Kant asserted. Peirce connected people’s obedience to the conventions of social morality with dealing with passions, an assertion similar to that by Freud in “The Ego and the Id” (1923).

Whereas Freud did not address the possibility of moral decision-making on an individual level, without reference to drives or social conventions, Peirce formulated a complete doctrine centered on the idea of self-control, which in the psychoanalytic context can be offered to both therapists and patients. Peirce’s description coincides closely with Freud’s directive to analysts that they must control counter-transference,[[183]](#footnote-183) because in his discussions of self-control Peirce also described the possibility of self-control over the emotions.[[184]](#footnote-184) Given that every habit created in thirdness is based on the previous two states of consciousness, self-control, which is expressed by habit in the form of deliberate conduct, must be based on a “habit of feeling”[[185]](#footnote-185)

To conclude this section, we should emphasize the necessity of seeing self-control as part of the semiotic apparatus Peirce proposed as the foundation of emotional experience. This semiotic apparatus was described at length in the previous chapters. It can now be summarized with the assertion that, like other aspects, the concept of self-control, too, can be actively interpreted by the individual, functioning as an interpretant. In other words, in one person a particular situation in reality can waken the need to exercise self-control, whereas it would not do so for another person. A person grasps a certain experience as a sign and interprets it in his own way, one that depends on the integration of the individual aspect with the social aspect.[[186]](#footnote-186) Cheryl Misak asked how, according to Peirce, it could be possible for us to base ourselves on instinct, convention, and common sense for moral decision-making here and now, when we also view ethics as endowed with long-term importance and meaning.[[187]](#footnote-187) Her answer is that the same consciousness, with all its mechanisms, participates in the creation of both moral habits and scientific habits.[[188]](#footnote-188) Therefore, moral decisions are not simply made in discrete spontaneous moments but are also influenced by moral habit that is molded by an individual’s long-term self-criticism in thirdness and the ethical values developed in the longer term by society’s reasoning and self-critique.

**3.g. Freud: Ambivalence is Evidently the Rule**[[189]](#footnote-189)

Freud’s starting point in his discussions of the development of eros, and of the psyche in general, is that all children feel ambivalence towards their parents. Freud cited the Oedipus myth as a pattern that is typical of normal development. In this pattern, the child simultaneously feels identification with and hostility towards the same-sex parent: the son towards his father,[[190]](#footnote-190) and the daughter towards her mother.[[191]](#footnote-191) In fact, throughout Freud’s writing, the key to understanding object relations is locating ambivalence towards another person. What is important for our purposes is that, according to Freud, ambivalence creates discontent, which if it becomes permanent can turn into a sense of guilt. Retrospectively, it appears that Freud explained guilt as a pragmatic process. He started by pointing at the existence of guilt as an experienced phenomenon—Peirce’s *phaneron*—that reflects emotional ambivalence. To help us understand the background of Freud’s view of ambivalence, we should note that the phenomenon of ambivalence first appears in Freud’s writings in his discussion of the interpretation of absurd dreams[[192]](#footnote-192) in which the image of a dead person appears as alternately dead and alive. This double representation, Freud asserted, reflects an inner emotional reality of ambivalence about the deceased person. The absurd representation (of the dead person as if alive) represents an emotional complexity that is completely natural—for example, when it appears in a child’s relationship with its parents.[[193]](#footnote-193)

We have noted Freud’s belief that ambivalence can lead to guilt. But Freud was not referring to the existential guilt described by Peirce, which we discussed in the previous section.[[194]](#footnote-194) Freud expressed strong reservations about any value, norm, or philosophical principle that is prior to experience and observation, including any ethical principle. In “The Ego and the Id” he directly addressed the arguments that psychoanalysis ignores “the higher, moral, supra-personal side of human nature.”[[195]](#footnote-195) He offered two answers to such arguments—one historical and the other methodological. Historically, Freud asserted, content of this sort is naturally repressed. Methodologically, psychoanalysis is not a philosophical system that posits theoretical assumptions prior to experience, but rather a method of discovery (*post factum*).[[196]](#footnote-196)

These two answers strike me as insufficient: Historically, it is possible there are people who repress aesthetic and moral content; but there are also many, such as authors and poets, teachers, and clerics, who engage with such content on a daily basis. Methodologically, too, Freud’s answer is deficient, because it reflects his lack of familiarity with philosophers who relied on empirical inquiry (Locke, Hume, and others). In addition, his description of his method is too general and vague (what does “step by step” mean?[[197]](#footnote-197)) Therefore, we can use Peirce’s approach, which is faithful to Freud’s two methodological principles (the avoidance of initial assumptions and a reliance on inquiry based on experience) but proposes methodological concepts and a methodological path.

To sum up this section, Freud’s assertions about the centrality of ambivalence in the life of every individual and about the transition from ambivalence to guilt engender the need to trace other appearances of guilt in Freud’s writings, despite his reservations about ethical discussion per se. As we will see below (with the assistance of the method Peirce proposed), the concept of guilt functions as a phaneron and emerges from Freud’s discussions *post factum*, in his evaluation of various experiences. Freud described instances of guilt that surfaced in therapy or life, with no necessary link to concrete external reality (although some cases of guilt do stem from such a reality). This understanding of Freudian guilt as a phaneron fits in with Peirce’s doubt that a phaneron is shared by all individuals; Freud, too, described possible instances of guilt but did not classify any type of guilt as inevitable.

3.h. The Concept of Guilt in Freud writings

The concept of guilt appears in many places and various contexts in Freud’s writings. From an overarching perspective, these instances may refer to conscious guilt or unconscious guilt, though there are also places where Freud described a transition from unconscious to conscious guilt. This frequency reflects an interesting complexity between Freud’s engagement with pangs of conscience and guilt as a mystery whose source is unknown, on the one hand, and cases where the guilt has obvious and demonstrable sources and reasons, on the other hand. If we zoom in further from this global perspective, we can see that Freud articulated several distinct aspects of conscience and guilt.

The first aspect grew out of the sociolinguistic study of taboo in “Totem and Taboo” (1912–13). In this paper, Freud addressed the ambivalence that classical philology had uncovered in the concept of taboo. The vagueness of its linguistic sense, he wrote, reflects emotional ambivalence towards the forbidden act or object.[[198]](#footnote-198) Continuing from this point, Freud asserted that the process of individual development, which includes ambivalence towards one’s parents, is paralleled by a social development, also based on ambivalence, with regard to prohibitions, holy objects, and leadership figures.[[199]](#footnote-199) As a result of this ambivalence, every decision engenders a sense of guilt. This is the fundamental source of guilt for both individuals and societies.

The second aspect is retrospective examination of expressions of guilty emotions, which Freud discussed in “Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work” (1916). This paper begins with an analysis of characters in dramas by Shakespeare and Ibsen who experience guilt that Freud, as reader-interpreter, could not explain.[[200]](#footnote-200) As is known, Freud saw canonical works of literature as expressions of common psychological structures (the most famous is the Oedipus complex), including guilt.

The third aspec**t** is of the emergence of guilt as an unconscious process of human and universal ego development. In “The Ego and the Id” (1923), Freud proposed that guilt is a product of the collision between the ego, which represents external reality, and the superego, which represents internal reality.[[201]](#footnote-201) Later, in “Civilization and its Discontents” (1930), he showed how guilt is created as a function of object relations already in infancy. Here too he described the development of guilt as a personal and universal process that is not dependent on a particular culture and is in fact an organic process experienced by every infant.

The fourth aspect includes ethical ideas that Freud formulated as demands/expectations of the therapist that are imperative for successful treatment. Ambivalence also appears in the context of transference, in which the patient relates to the therapist in two contradictory ways.[[202]](#footnote-202) Freud emphasized that ambivalence is a natural emotion as long as it does not become so strong as to produce neurosis. He noted (here and in other places) that the term had been coined by Bleuler (1910), but he expanded its use to multiple contexts, including, for our purposes, as a foundation of the sense of guilt.

3.i. The First Aspect of Guilt: From Ambivalence to Acceptance of a Social Taboo

The explanation of taboo also throws light on the nature and origin of *conscience*. It is possible […] to speak of a taboo conscience or, after a taboo has been violated, of a taboo sense of guilt. Taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with. For what is ‘conscience’? On the evidence of language it is related to that of which one is ‘most certainly conscious’. Indeed, in some languages the words for ‘conscience’ and ‘consciousness’ can scarcely be distinguished. [[203]](#footnote-203)

The first clear connection between ambivalence and guilt appeared in Freud’s most famous paper about guilt: “Totem and Taboo.” (1912–13). Here he states clearly and explicitly that the idea of conscience first appeared in the context of social prohibitions that apply to abstract ideas and concrete objects. Freud also linked sure and conscious knowledge with conscience, thereby paving the way for understanding the sense of guilt.[[204]](#footnote-204)

In the section headed “Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence,” Freud wrote that the psychological mechanism for dealing with taboo is based on the ambivalence of the conscious will to obey an external prohibition that is in tension with an internal unconscious urge to touch the forbidden object.[[205]](#footnote-205) This ambivalence emerges in relation to an object or to an action associated with a particular object. Freud explained the motivation that causes the individual to take the risk of feeling ambivalence as follows: It seduces the individual to transgress boundaries.[[206]](#footnote-206) Ambivalence is present in an individual’s urges from the outset; in the context of a taboo it can be aroused as corresponding “simultaneously to *both* a wish and a counter-wish.”[[207]](#footnote-207) Freud also drew a parallel between violation of a taboo and obsession, noting that in both cases the person “satisfies” his ambivalence by feeling guilt: he simultaneously violates the prohibition and feels guilt for doing so, because of his emotional identification with the forbidden content.

Summarizing the first aspect of guilt in Freud we can see that, according to him, guilt develops naturally from a basic ambivalence that is part of all object relations: between every individual and those who raised him; and in every society towards certain ideas or objects. The taboo reflects the will to possess the forbidden object, whether concrete or abstract, and at the same time to avoid it and maintain a distance from it. This aspect also includes the adoption of features of language as part of the linguistic turn: Every word can have different and even contradictory meanings (as an object of will as well as an object of repulsion). In the psychoanalytic discourse, Freud implemented the linguistic turn both in the methodological sense (examining how words function), and as a means of illuminating psychological content under the light of psychoanalysis, by drawing parallels between the linguistic function and the psychological function.

3.j. The Second Aspect: Retrospective Examination via Works of Literature

Freud frequently referred to literary works, from diverse directions and in various ways: from associative mentions, to citing a work to exemplify a psychoanalytic idea, and even presenting a literary work as anticipating and symbolizing a psychological structure. Freud’s discussions of guilt, too, draw on literature. The instances brought below were chosen for the contribution they make to a better understanding of the concept of guilt in Freud’s writings.

Freud’s best-known use of literature is his interpretation of the Oedipus myth. He employed it as the basis for his account of emotional and sexual development, of which a crucial component is betrayal of the same-sex parent and the consequent sense of guilt. Freud thought that normal development includes this element, as well as overcoming "The primal schene"; but it also inserts a fundamental element of guilt in the most basic relationship, that between parents and children. Because he saw the Oedipus myth as exemplifying this core element of emotional and sexual development, Freud, in his first book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), coined the term “Oedipus complex” to refer to it. The first context in which he referred to the Oedipus myth was that of “children who later become psychoneurotics” (with regard to dreams about death), but he also associated it with children who have no symptoms of mental pathology.[[208]](#footnote-208)

Note that Freud was ambivalent about proposing an analogy to the Oedipus complex for sons by positing a similar complex for daughters, based on the role of Electra in the story of the House of Atreus.[[209]](#footnote-209) For our purposes, it is interesting to see how Freud used the Oedipus myth as a structure for interpreting not only child development but also another literary classic in which guilt plays a major role. He proposed a new interpretation of *Hamlet,* drawing a parallel between Hamlet and Oedipus and asserting that Hamlet’s sense of guilt did not derive from his hesitation about killing his uncle but rather his ambivalence about his dead father.[[210]](#footnote-210) Oedipus fulfilled his will, but Hamlet repressed his. Freud’s innovation here was the presentation of Hamlet as a modern secular intellectual who represses his wills, which are then revealed indirectly “from its inhibiting consequences.”[[211]](#footnote-211) As Ernest Jones emphasized, Hamlet breaks free of his guilt only when it leads to his own death.[[212]](#footnote-212) Here we see a dialogue between the literary work and Freud’s concept of guilt, in that Freud proposed a psychoanalytic reading of the play at the same time as *Hamlet* supports a new interpretation of the psychoanalytic notion of guilt that is based on the Oedipus myth.

In Freud’s writings, the Oedipus myth is undoubtedly the most important and most frequently referenced literary theme, with regard to guilt in particular but also in his discussion of emotional development in general. A more fruitful use of the dialogue between literature and psychoanalysis with regard to guilt (and in general) is found in “Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work” (1916).[[213]](#footnote-213)

One of the topics addressed in that article is the character types that come for therapy and suffer feelings of guilt that seem to derive from a source that is unknown or not understood. It is fascinating to see two forms of dialogue based on literary works that Freud employed. The first type is exemplification. The second is when a work of literature poses an interpretive difficulty for the reader-interpreter (Freud himself) and ostensibly forced him to respond to it. The first type—exemplification—is the most common way in which Freud and other psychoanalysts draw on literature. It is important to emphasize that Freud took a romantic position towards canonical works, which holds that the poet-author is more skilled at exposing the secrets of the psyche than other people are. In “Some Character-Types” Freud provided an example of guilt that has an unknown source in the character of Rebecca, the heroine of Ibsen’s *Rosmersholm*.[[214]](#footnote-214) He demonstrated that Rebecca does not discover the sources of the guilt she feels after her lover’s wife commits suicide. Freud complimented Ibsen for his ability to gradually reveal the several reasons for her emotion, thereby showing that guilt can function both unconsciously and consciously.[[215]](#footnote-215)

Freud’s second use of literary works is more important for our purposes. In his discussion of *Macbeth*, Freud the interpreter probed Lady Macbeth’s motives and the guilt she feels, as if the play were a report on a real occurrence rather than fiction. His commitment to understanding the play reflects Freud’s great admiration of Shakespeare, not only as a playwright but also as a master at documenting human emotions, including guilt. Freud proposed “studying [guilt’s] psychological mechanism”[[216]](#footnote-216) and concluded that Lady Macbeth was split, initiating and encouraging the murder of Duncan but later overwhelmed by guilt. Here we see clearly the importance that Freud attached to literature throughout his writings (a topic for a separate discussion). In brief, however, with regard to guilt, we perceive that Freud saw literature as a field of equal or even greater importance than psychoanalysis. In the case of *Macbeth*, Freud saw the play as completing and supporting his psychoanalytic ideas, as he made clear in the paper’s conclusion: “After this long digression into literature, let us return to clinical experience—but only to establish in a few words the complete agreement between them.”[[217]](#footnote-217)

The inevitable inference from this statement is that Freud recognized that guilt is the product of artistry, imagination, and emotion, as manifested by literary characters, no less and possibly even more than it is the outcome of a particular pathological relationship to one’s parents. Indeed, the connection between the second aspect above and the third aspect of guilt, to be discussed below, lies in the connection Freud made between the Oedipus myth and the superego.[[218]](#footnote-218)

3.k. The Third Aspect: Unconscious Guilt as Dictated by the Superego

By setting up this ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and at the same time placed itself in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, between the external world and the internal world.[[219]](#footnote-219)

This passage expresses the essence of Freud’s position on how guilt comes to be.[[220]](#footnote-220) The tripartite division of the psyche is the basis of Freud’s psychology; his description of the conflict between the inner world (embodied in the ego and the id) and the external world (embodied in the superego) defines guilt as a central and perhaps everyday function. Freud wrote: “the *ego* is essentially the representative of the external world” and the “*super-ego* stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id.”[[221]](#footnote-221)

In Freud’s third aspect of guilt, the conflict sometimes breaks through and is exposed in reflection by the ego (when a person feels pangs of conscience or a conscious sense of guilt); often, however, the conflict remains unconscious. For Freud, though, this is a transient situation; he explicitly emphasized that in contrast to the religious view, in which guilt results from belief in God and is a permanent component of the human psyche, in the real world we see that guilt is a passing phenomenon.[[222]](#footnote-222) Freud described conscious conflict as problematic and even as an expression of neurosis, because the conscience, as it were demands a certain behavior in the “the actual performances of the ego.”[[223]](#footnote-223)

In “The Ego and the Id,” Freud addressed the possibility of “an unconscious sense of guilt” as a source of confusion and mystery.[[224]](#footnote-224) In the first stage, he provided a pragmatic and functional account of the operation of the ego: “The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it.”[[225]](#footnote-225)

Describing the relationship between the ego and the id as corresponding to that of a rider on a horse, Freud takes a position that is strikingly similar to Peirce’s concept of self-control: Individuals can control and direct their urges; if they wish they can rein them in and if they wish they can satisfy them. Towards the end of his discussion of this ability, though, Freud revealed in an aside that the higher functions are in fact created and operate in the unconscious (of certain people):

In our analyses we discover that there are people in whom the faculties of self-criticism and conscience—mental activities, that is, *that rank as extremely high ones*—are unconscious and unconsciously produce effects of the greatest importance. […] But this new discovery […] compels us, […] to speak of an *‘unconscious sense of guilt’.* […] If we come back once more to our scale of values, we shall have to say that *not only what is lowest but also what is highest in the ego can be unconscious.*[[226]](#footnote-226) [emphasis added]

Later in the article, when he discusses the third component of the psyche, the superego, Freud distinguished two types of guilt that have their source in it: conscious and normal guilt, which he designates “conscience,” and unconscious and silent guilt, which is expressed in resistance to therapy. The resistance is created because the analysand derives satisfaction from his illness and does not want to give up the punishment it provides. As a result the patient is resistant to the analysis, when the problem at hand is a “moral” factor, as it were, that leads him to hold tight to his illness. The patient is not conscious of this guilt, and Freud emphasized how difficult it is for the patient to deal with unconscious guilt.[[227]](#footnote-227)

Conscious guilt, too, must be dealt with, but it is not difficult to do this.[[228]](#footnote-228) In a note, Freud directed the analyst to transform unconscious guilt into a conscious feeling by laying bare the reasons for it.[[229]](#footnote-229) This possibility again demonstrates the link between self-control and coping with guilt: Both are based, as Peirce proposed, on a rational process in which there is a degree of freedom that permits choice and a psychological realignment.

In a later paper, “Civilization and its Discontents” (1930), Freud described how the infant begins to realize that the source of the fulfillment of its needs, its mother’s breast, is an external object; this is the most significant stage in the development of “ego-feeling.”[[230]](#footnote-230)

The infant recognizes that “Some of the things that one is unwilling to give up, because they give pleasure, are nevertheless not ego but object.” In order to protect itself from the suffering caused when its needs are satisfied by its own bodily organs, the infant develops “the reality principle.”[[231]](#footnote-231) Later in the paper Freud focuses on the sources of human suffering, all of which stem from this psychological structure, which absorbs the many collisions between the inner will for pleasure and the fact that its fulfillment usually depends on an external source.[[232]](#footnote-232)

According to Freud, this leads to aggression, which is the expected result of the ambivalence individuals feel towards the object of their love: on the one hand, they will the object; but at the same time they hate it. In every person’s development process, Freud asserts, the aggression is toned down and internalized, so that instead of targeting the loved object it is directed towards the ego and takes the form of conscience.[[233]](#footnote-233) Freud called this tension between the ego and the demands of the superego, embodied as the conscience, “the sense of guilt.” The external factor that supervises the challenge posed by conscience is civilization. “Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous will for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.”[[234]](#footnote-234)

Here the metaphor of horse and the rider used in “The Ego and the Id” has been replaced by “a garrison in a conquered city.” The change in Freud’s conception of guilt, however, is much more significant than the exchange of metaphor. The later paper is where Freud first brings the individual face to face with society and culture and with the ambivalence that spawns the sense of guilt as a result. As to the source of the sense of guilt, Freud had a simple answer: “A person feels guilty […] when he has done something which he knows to be ‘bad.’ […] Even when a person has not actually *done* the bad thing but has only recognized in himself an *intention* to do it, he may regard himself as guilty; and the question then arises of why the intention is regarded as equal to the deed.”[[235]](#footnote-235)

In this passage Freud went beyond the link between psychoanalysis and literature, however high it may be, and represented the psychoanalytic theory of development as universal. Guilt plays a central role for every individual, creating: a balance between the internal demands for pleasure as well as other aspirations, and the demands of society. From the perspective of cultural criticism, it is certainly true that society’s demands may sometimes be damaging and even disastrous; but from the psychoanalytical perspective of the object relations school, which Freud founded, such a balance leads to integration, which is both a personal and a pragmatic achievement.

Returning to Peirce’s terminology, we can summarize this stage and say that this integration permits self-control, and that the compass guiding this control is the conscience (which includes the sense of guilt). Peirce enables us to shed light on the diverse and contradictory aspects of Freud’s notion of conscience and guilt, which progress from seeing them as problematic, and even as an expression of neurosis, to seeing them as an integral part of normal development. This leads to an understanding of the fourth aspect of guilt, which already in Freud’s early writings is implicit in his perception of the therapist’s role. In this context as well, the sense of guilt is a “compass” that the therapist must follow in the therapeutic present rather than a “disturbance” or neurosis.

3.l. The Fourth Aspect: Guilt and the Therapist’s Obligation

In his discussions of transference and counter-transference, Freud frequently employed terms from the semantic field of *guilt*. There are only four occurrences of the term *counter-transference* in Freud’s writings. In my estimation, however, it constitutes the largest ethical challenge that Freud faced as a therapist, both on the personal level and on the theoretical level, as the father of all the major lines of psychoanalytic thought. For example, in his 1910 paper “The Future Prospects of Psycho-analytic Theory,” Freud stipulated that the therapist must undergo psychoanalysis before employing the technique on patients, because therapists must deal with their own resistances and complexes before they can deal with such unconscious situations in their patients. Psychoanalysts cannot initiate processes of reflection and observation unless they have already experienced the processes required in therapy. Freud adamantly insisted that “Anyone who fails to produce results in a self-analysis of this kind may at once give up any idea of being able to treat patients by analysis.”[[236]](#footnote-236)

Freud embedded two ethical norms in this sentence: failure in the process of self-reflection is not only a technical failure; it also renders the therapist unfit to treat others. Freud demanded that therapists also have a practical experience of analysis, so they can feel the problems and challenges of therapy themselves, and also judge whether they are suited to conducting analysis. This self-judgment before therapy is the first stage of the self-control required of therapists. In the second stage they must do their utmost to avoid counter-transference.

Freud saw counter-transference as especially problematic and to be rejected. I believe that this position, which was at the root of Freud’s debate with Sándor Ferenczi and others, is the highpoint of the Freudian concept of guilt. Five years later, in 1915, Freud was even more insistent that therapists must not fall into counter-transference. He presented the two perspectives on therapy, that of the therapist and that of the patient, and defined his demand of the therapist as an ethical demand.[[237]](#footnote-237) Psychoanalysis—according to Freud—looks at a situation from a new perspective, which includes as an ethical principle that patients are allowed to have emotions about the therapist—even romantic love—as a result of the therapeutic process in which they relive their past experiences. Patients must focus on these experiences, even though the feelings they include may be problematic. In brief, the transferred emotions are a condition for reliving past experiences. Therapists, in contrast, must control their feelings, because their function is to guide the process and propose interpretations; if they give in to their own emotions, they will spoil the process intended to help their patients.

Another key aspect where Freud instructed the therapist to take ethical responsibility is his demand for honesty. This is the context in which Freud expressed himself most clearly and insistently about the ethical basis upon which therapy rests: “Psycho-analytic treatment is founded ontruthfulness. In this fact lies a great part of its educative effect and its ethical value. It is dangerous to depart from this foundation.”[[238]](#footnote-238)

Freud demanded that the therapist engage in constant reflection about his performance, and this includes admitting failures, the treatment’s ineffectiveness, and missed opportunities. Of the patient he demanded honesty and truth in the therapy.[[239]](#footnote-239) This demand is based on self-control: “Our control over ourselves is not so complete that we may not suddenly one day go further than we had intended.”[[240]](#footnote-240) These two characteristics hold the potential for a patient to feel guilt, and so does transference.

To sum up our discussion of Freud’s view of guilt, we can say that he referred to it as a product of natural development but also as an expression of neurosis (personal or social). In contrast with conscious guilt, which therapy can deal with, Freud saw unconscious guilt primarily as an obstacle and problem. In one of his later papers, in which he offered a brief account of psychoanalysis, Freud went so far as to define conscience as an enemy.[[241]](#footnote-241) He went on to assign resistance to therapy to two main sources in the neurotic’s psyche: “the sense of guilt or consciousness of guilt” and “self-injury and self-destruction.”[[242]](#footnote-242) Freud presented the feeling of guilt as a source of resistance in therapy and an obstacle to progress; but also as a sign of the possibility of an escape from suffering and as an explanation for the healing and improvement of neurosis that emerges from actual bad luck. These statements join in a single context the problem of coherence in Freud’s discussion of the sense of guilt. He described it as a positive development that stems from the growth of the recognition of the principle of reality, on the one hand, and as an expression of psychological imbalance, on the other hand.

Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott have invented a new turn in the psychoanalytic view of guilt. They transformed it into a focus for the study of psychological development, which primarily expresses a positive relation to an object, enables recognition of separateness from it, and, finally, the development of an attitude of generosity and compassion towards it. But they did not provide an answer to Buber’s criticism or formulate a concept of existential guilt. Nor did they address the concept of guilt in broader pragmatic contexts, as Peirce had done with regard to self-constitution and self-control. Nevertheless, their contribution to the turning point and new understanding of object relations, moving from the narcissistic in the direction of self-realization through separateness, is extremely important.

3.m. Klein: Guilt—the Royal Road of Mental Development

Klein strongly disagreed with Freud and proposed a different view of the development of conscience. She saw Freud’s important discovery, the distinction between the death-instinct and the life-instinct, as the key to the development of the personality, including the conscience. Yet in contrast to Freud, who emphasized the libido and the narcissistic drive to sadistic behaviour, Klein asserted that it is anxiety that motivates the child to deal with the death-instinct. This anxiety, she continued, produces a split within the id, creating the superego, which at a later stage embodies conscience. Parallel to the development of conscience, the concept of guilt appears throughout Klein’s writings. We can focus on five significant points in her view of child development, as presented below.

**3.n. The Development of Conscience**

At the start of “The Early Development of Conscience in the Child” (1933), Klein presented her work as an expansion of Freud’s studies in which he distinguished the several parts of the self.[[243]](#footnote-243) However, rejecting Freud’s assertion that the Oedipus complex disappears at age five, giving way to what can be seen as signs of the superego, Klein asserted that the superego is already evident in children of three and four.[[244]](#footnote-244) This issue is very important for the emotion of guilt, because for Freud, throughout his writings, the Oedipus complex is a main source of guilt. By contrast, Klein reported the significant discovery she made as a result of her observations of children. She saw two main types of anxiety in children: anxiety about their actual parents (that they may leave them or punish them, etc.), and anxiety that is the product of imagination and has no connection with their actual parents. These anxieties, according to Klein, are produced by the superego (rather than by the Oedipus complex, as Freud asserted) and lie at the root of the development of conscience.

Anxieties lead to a “corresponding amount of repressed impulses of aggression”;[[245]](#footnote-245) with the support of the narcissistic libido this aggression is directed outwards, towards the object. Later, when the genital stage sets in, the aggression is transformed into a positive attitude towards the object. The child transitions to the next stage with the assistance of a kind mother, who calms its fears of imaginary objects. The child’s ego changes and gets used to asking for what can be provided in reality. This is the point where conscience is created. Klein summarizes her observations of the game-playing of children, which disclosed a close connection between the intensity of the anxiety and the degree of violence. When the superego develops and anxiety diminishes, the anxiety is transformed into a sense of guilt. In other words, according to Klein, guilt is the product of development, of a relationship better suited to reality and a balanced relation to the external object. At his point the “moral and ethical attitude are activated, and the child begins to have consideration for its objects and to be amenable to social feeling.”[[246]](#footnote-246) This contrasts with Freud’s view of guilt as regression to an earlier developmental stage (that of the superego) in which the Oedipus complex was dominant.

Klein did not merely assert that guilt and conscience are developmental milestones. Towards the end of the article she expanded the discussion to take up the influence that successful analysis of children may have on society as a whole. She claimed that were it possible to offer psychoanalysis to many children in order to help them to probe their anxieties and aggression, the world would soon be dominated by peace and good will.[[247]](#footnote-247) This conclusion was certainly foreign to Freud’s spirit; even Klein would not have reached it several years later, after the start of the Second World War. Nevertheless, this line of thought is extremely important for understanding not only the development of the sense of guilt but also for realizing the moral responsibility that Klein assigned to psychoanalysis.

**3.o. Guilt and the Depressive Position**

Klein’s important innovation in the second stage of her discussion of guilt is that she includes guilt among the positive emotions, the most important of which is love.[[248]](#footnote-248)

In “A Contribution to the Psycho-Genesis of Manic-Depressive States” (1934),[[249]](#footnote-249) Klein described the appearance of guilt in the depressive position. According to her observations, guilt appears during an infant’s first year of life and is a function of the ambivalence in object relations that Freud had already pointed out many times. According to Klein, though, ambivalence is the result of the paradoxical influence of anxiety: it creates a sense of concern and responsibility for the object, but also doubt about the object.[[250]](#footnote-250) This anxiety spawns the concern to avoid harming the object and leads to feelings of guilt, despair, and grief. Along with these feelings, anxiety also engenders “doubt in the goodness of the loved object.” Klein offered a dramatic description of the events in internal life that lead to the development of conscience:

The persecution and demands of bad internalized objects; the attacks of such objects of one another […]; the urgent necessity to fulfil the very strict demands of the “good objects” and to protect and placate them within the ego, with the resultant hatred of the id; the constant uncertainty as to the “goodness” of the good object, which causes it so readily to become transformed into a bad one—all these factors combine to produce in the ego a sense of being a prey to contradictory and impossible claim from within, *a condition which is felt as a bad conscience. […] The earliest utterances of conscience are associated with persecution by bad objects. The very word “gnawing of conscience” (Gewissens-Bisse) testifies to the relentless “persecution” by conscience*.[[251]](#footnote-251) [emphasis added]

In this passage, Klein distinguished between the persecution anxiety (which is associated with the paranoid position) and anxiety about preserving the internal objects, which is associated with the depressive position. Klein asserted that it is only when the connection to the external world and real people grows that the infant can feel uncomfortable about its sadistic will to destroy the object.[[252]](#footnote-252) Only then can the ego recognize the full value of the loved object. At this point the will emerges to repair and restore the loved object that was destroyed as a result of anxiety. The state of depression includes despair because of the fear that it will be impossible to repair the object. The ego attains a full and concrete understanding of its love for a complete and concrete object along with an “overwhelming feeling of guilt towards it.”[[253]](#footnote-253) This full identification with the object includes anxiety, guilt, and regret, as well as a sense of responsibility for its preservation. Klein’s conclusion is that guilt develops along with the capacity for love. Guilt is not defined *ab initio*, but only *post factum*: It is created by an ambivalent attitude towards the object; its result is the will to repair; and it involves adjusting to reality (and the ability to distinguish between the real world and the internal world of the psyche).

**3.p. Guilt, Reparation and Conscience**

The third stage of Melanie Klein’s approach to guilt is presented in “Love, Guilt, and Reparation” (1937), which is undoubtedly one of the most significant landmarks of psychoanalytic thought.[[254]](#footnote-254) Here too Klein emphasized the close connection between love and guilt; but the paper’s contribution is in its broad discussion of other possible consequences of this connection in both childhood and adulthood. She warned about parents with an overly loving or smothering relationship towards their children, which is liable to damage the child’s ability to identify with and love another person. Too much pampering, Klein asserted, increases children’s feelings of guilt and harms their ability to repair and to be considerate of others. Surprisingly, she added, excessive harshness leads to a similar result.

In addition, for children who did not deal adequately with the conflict between love and hate, feelings of guilt are liable to cause them to become distant or hostile to their parents and later to people who are important to them. Repression of the capacity to love and avoidance of strong emotions can cause a displacement of the ability to love in the direction of non-human objects and interests (such as collecting and animals). The opposite response to distancing is over-dependence, in which the other person is wholly responsible for the individual, and which protects the dependent individual from feelings of guilt.[[255]](#footnote-255) Throughout these descriptions Klein did not provide a definition of guilt *ab initio*, but only *post factum.* On the philosophical level, Klein employed a pragmatist methodology in which there are no initial assumptions prior to experience (as Freud explicitly asserted before her). For our purpose here, the main innovation of this article is the term “harsh conscience,” which Klein coined to describe a form of conscience she warned about.[[256]](#footnote-256) An overly harsh conscience, she said, provokes worries and misery and is even liable to lead to suicide. The main line of thought behind this warning is her assertion that hatred directed towards other people is in fact an expression of hatred of the people in our internal world. It is fascinating to see how, for Klein, a sense of guilt sometimes leads not to repair but to pathology.

**3.q. The Essence of Guilt**

In the fourth stage of Klein’s discussion of guilt, in “On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt” (1948), she formulated a theory and definition of guilt *ab initio,* and not only *post factum*.[[257]](#footnote-257) In the first section of the paper she revised her assertion, in a 1935 article, that guilt appears only at the stage when the infant can conceive of a complete object. In the wake of her observations, she had discovered that guilt appears earlier, in relation to the partial object of the mother, the breast.[[258]](#footnote-258)

 In the fifth and last stage of her discussion of guilt, Klein distinguished two types of guilt: guilt that leads to destructive behavior and guilt that leads to constructive behavior. According to “Envy and Gratitude” (1957),[[259]](#footnote-259) the starting point of object relations is envy. Klein defined envy as a position of anger towards only one other person in order to possess something desirable and enjoyable.[[260]](#footnote-260) One of its offspring, she continued, is jealousy; here two persons other than the subject are involved and the subject feels that the love due him has been taken away by another.

Klein’s assertion was that guilt appears as a result of excessive envy. Such guilt is dangerous and is liable to lead to a failure to process the depressive position, that is, to obstruct the normal perception of reality and a real and balanced relationship. Moreover, even if the patient recognizes his envy during the course of therapy and directs it towards the analyst, as the good object the patient seeks to destroy, the sense of guilt is liable to harm his abilities.

There are two reasons why this article is important for understanding Klein’s view of guilt: First, here she defined a different starting point for the assessment of an individual’s personality than Freud had—the assertion that excessive envy may be inborn in some people. Freud referred briefly to mother-infant relations but did not delve deeply into them as a key to personality development. Klein, by contrast, cited a wealth of examples to demonstrate how it is possible to identify traits from early childhood, including envy, during therapy with adults. According to her, even before the development of object relations with partial objects or a full object, there is already a background of an innate sense of guilt. Similarly, even before the development of Oedipal relations, on which Freud focused, there are object relations that may include envy, and these may interfere with relations with parents from the very beginning. This envy behaves like the superego and prevents or disturbs all attempts at creativity or repair.[[261]](#footnote-261) Klein claimed that there is recognition of damage, but guilt stems from a fear of punishment rather than from compassion towards the separate object. There are two types of guilt. The first type, guilt that stems from the paranoid-schizoid complex, is marked by an unbearable sense of the suffering caused, in an attempt to deny it and project it outwards, and by fear of revenge and negation.

The second type is guilt that stems from the depressive position: recognition of the object’s separateness, anxiety about its loss, responsibility for aggression, regret, and mourning on the one hand and repair and creativity on the other hand. In the context of therapy and the therapist’s response, when there is resistance of the type that Freud discussed with regard to the sense of shame, it is advisable to examine which position it stems from.

**3.r. Winnicott: Concern as the Positive Consequence of Guilt**

In Winnicott’s discussion of guilt we can see both a philosophical move and a psychoanalytic move, which consists of three stages. The first stage, in 1958, was in a review article about the development of the concept of guilt in psychoanalysis.[[262]](#footnote-262) In the second stage, in 1960, Winnicott wrote about the roots of guilt and the possibility of repair.[[263]](#footnote-263) In the third stage, in 1963, he proposed replacing guilt with “concern.”[[264]](#footnote-264) It is interesting that in a later article in which Winnicott focused on guilt he returned to the original concept, with its negative connotation.[[265]](#footnote-265)

In the first of these articles, Winnicott cited a line from a 1785 letter by the eighteenth-century British statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke: “Guilt resides in the intention.”[[266]](#footnote-266) He acknowledged the profundity of Burke’s thought but emphasized that although philosophers and poets may excel at expressing philosophical statements, psychoanalysis contributes the practical application in therapy. This article is very important because, unlike Freud’s writings, which emerged in the context of psychoanalytic theory, or Klein’s papers, which were based on her clinical work, Winnicott here proposed an overarching view of the concept of guilt. He combined the ideas of Freud and Klein to serve as his starting point and proposed a complex and compelling position of his own, based on Freud and Klein but offering new ideas as well.

Winnicott chose to leave out both cultural influences and the individual’s inborn psychological structure. Instead, he began with an empirical assertion that has both clinical and philosophical consequences: “We do find all degrees of success and failure in the development of a moral sense. I shall attempt to explain these variations.”[[267]](#footnote-267)

Winnicott goes on to corroborate his declaration of intent at the beginning of the article: “The capacity for guilt-sense” may be lost, but it can also be recovered in psychoanalysis.[[268]](#footnote-268)

In the third article Winnicott advanced a positive description of guilt. He proposed that the concept is appropriate for describing a relatively early stage in development, in which the infant feels anxiety due to ambivalence towards the object: On the one hand, the infant views the object as good; on the other hand, the infant want to destroy the object. But *concern* is different: “Concern refers to the fact that the individual *cares,* or *minds,* and both feels and accepts responsibility. At the genital level in the statement of the theory of development, concern could be said to be the basis of the family, where both partners in intercourse—beyond their pleasure—take responsibility for the result.”[[269]](#footnote-269)

In the fourth article, Winnicott discussed children whose behavior indicates that they lack a sense of guilt. Inspired by the concept of the depressive position, Winnicott proposed two key factors that lead to the absence of a sense of guilt: “(1) the unreliability of the mother figure […] and (2) the early experiences [which] have not enabled the innate process towards integration to have effect, so that there is no unit and no total responsibility felt for anything.”[[270]](#footnote-270)

It is interesting to see how Winnicott dismissed the sources of guilt proposed by Freud and insisted that “we do need to abandon absolutely the theory that children can be born innately amoral. This means nothing in terms of the study of the individual developing along the lines of the inherited maturational processes all the time intertwined with the operation of the facilitating environment.”[[271]](#footnote-271)

Winnicott abandoned Freud’s three sources of guilt: guilt as a function of the Oedipus complex; guilt as an embodiment of the collision between the superego and the ego; and guilt as an expression of a cultural convention, such as some taboo. Instead, Winnicott proposed held that “Sanity spells compromise. […] Each child must be enabled to create the world […] else the world is to have no meaning. Each baby must have enough experience of omnipotence if he or she is to become able to give over omnipotence to external reality or to a God-principle.”[[272]](#footnote-272)

In this article Winnicott followed Klein, who described guilt as a developmental milestone. Winnicott’s innovation was to highlight the development of the self, a process that involves a paradox: “The baby found the object and then created it.”[[273]](#footnote-273) It follows that guilt cannot emerge from a sense of loneliness but only after the child finds the object that was already there. Object relations, according to Winnicott, are relations of creation—not in the miraculous, *ex nihilo* sense, but just the opposite: the creation of something out of something. The child does not create the object, but only the object as someone to whom it has an obligation. Consequently, children who did not grow up in a supportive environment that allowed them the omnipotence that enables creation are unable to develop a sense of guilt.

To sum up our discussion of guilt in pragmatist and psychoanalytic thought, we have seen how both view guilt ambivalently. On the one hand, it results from an inborn psychological structure and a universal developmental process. On the other hand, the discussions of guilt often assign it negative and deterministic characteristics and do not allow individuals the slightest degree of choice. My main assertion is that Freud’s and Klein’s treatment of the ego and Winnicott’s treatment of the self leave out individual aspects; all three make do with describing universal mechanisms from which the sense of shame emerges. The exclusive focus on universal mechanisms leaves no room for a sense of shame that results from individual narratives or an individual’s unique experiences in life. Another result of the limitation to the universal is a narrowing of the individual’s freedom of choice; this casts a heavy shadow on the patient’s ability to deal with his feelings of guilt and free himself from them.

Before we move on to an discussion of Oz’s works it is appropriate to consider the concept of betrayal. The noun *betrayal* denotes the violation of trust or loyalty in any context. Although guilt accompanies betrayal, betrayal is the result of the two key concepts presented at the beginning of the discussion: will or will (Wittgenstein) and self-control (Peirce). Literary representations of betrayal, from classics such as the *Antigone*, *Hamlet*, and *Macbeth,* through Oz’s works, emphasize the conscious aspect and element of choice related to guilt, thereby filling the lacuna of individual mechanisms we have identified here.

**3.s. Guilt and Betrayal**

As we turn to discuss Oz’s works, we need to connect the threads woven by Wittgenstein, Peirce, Freud, Klein, and Winnicott in order to provide an interpretive background for a richer understanding of the concepts of guilt and betrayal. For Wittgenstein, good or bad will exists outside the limits of language and the world. The importance of the intention that lies at the foundation of any moral decision is that it dictates the nature of a person’s individual world. Peirce’s introduction of *self-control* further clarified how will functions and is linked to moral decision-making. By contrast, Freud, Klein, and Winnicott emphasized the unconscious aspect of guilt and the fact that it derives from factors external to the individual more than from the individual’s own wills. Their ideas do not offer a way to explain how betrayal can occur. The literary works discussed below enable us to map out various facets of guilt, thereby to understand betrayal, and to suggest that guilt has positive aspects.

In *Between Philosophy and Literature* (2018), Adi Parush provides an excellent summary of the various ways of assessing the benefit that can be derived from great literature.[[274]](#footnote-274) These approaches include seeing literature as a source of knowledge about the world; as a source of experiential knowledge (the experience of certain situations, sensations, or feelings); as a source of moral knowledge; and finally, as a source of cognitive knowledge. Parush himself did not decide which of these approaches is closest to the truth, but merely demonstrated how works of literature can stimulate readers in all these ways. Following Parush, I propose that Oz’s novels expose reader to all these types of knowledge. For us here, the most important is the experience of guilt, in various and even contradictory ways. We can even see this as the principal theme of the two novels discussed below. The question relates to the variations of guilt and how they dialogue with the pragmatic and psychoanalytic horizons.

 From a psychoanalytic perspective, our focus is the domain of ambivalent object relations that simultaneously include both love and hate. Is it possible to see betrayal as positive? What is the specific place of loyalty and betrayal in the constitution of the self? Psychoanalytic thought came late to the topic of betrayal; it was not until 2013 that a collection of articles that deal with betrayal in various contexts, edited by Salman Akhtar, was published.[[275]](#footnote-275) In the biblical context, the verb *bagad* means “betray” or violate a trust. But the cognate noun, *begged,* means “garment” and extends in many directions, from the priestly vestments and royal robes to mourners’ clothing. The garment manifests the significance of an event or character trait and symbolizes the link between an event or social convention outside an individual and the individual’s inner world. Accordingly, we can say that there are different types of betrayal and that they express diverse internal positions.

**3.t. The Traitor as a Lover: Aspects of Guilt in Amos Oz’s Works**

The pragmatic and psychoanalytical overview of the concepts of guilt and betrayal offers to shed new light on Oz’s novella, *Unto Death*, and to view it as the first link in his meta-literary discussion of these concepts. The start of the chapter presented the process of reflection that the novella’s main character undergoes, which takes the form of a crusade to Jerusalem. Presenting the mental process as a concrete journey allowed for the gradual exposition of the protagonist as a traitor. This is in stark contrast with the novella’s starting point in which the protagonist leads a crusade that involves war against heretics to the faith in Jesus. The gradual nature of the exposition and the reader’s surprise when discovering the identity of the ‘true traitor’ demonstrate the complexity of the feelings of betrayal and the fact that, sometimes, the person who views himself and is viewed by others as the most loyal is in fact the traitor. In the two other literary works to be discussed presently, the identity of the traitor is already known from the start. The discovery that unfolds throughout the plot is the complexity, the ambivalence, and the development that can be understood in light of the pragmatic and psychoanalytic background that was presented above.

I HAVE BEEN called a traitor many times in my life. The first time was when I was twelve and a quarter and I lived in a neighborhood at the edge of Jerusalem. It was during the summer holidays, less than a year before the British left the country and the State of Israel was born out of the midst of war[[276]](#footnote-276)

Proffy, the first-person narrator of Amos Oz’s teen novel *Panther in the Basement,* recounts his twin acts of betrayal in the 1940s, during the last years of the British Mandate in Palestine. First, he betrayed his friends, who had established an organization to spy on the British, by developing a friendship with a British officer. Then he betrayed the British officer when he told the members of the anti-British underground group about him. At the very start of the novel, Proffy (a "short for Professor, which they called me because of my obsession with checking words"), defines himself as someone who "love words: I like collecting, arranging, shuffling, reversing, combining them".[[277]](#footnote-277) delves into the diverse meanings of “betrayal” by means of a list of the words that belong to its semantic field:

**Traitor:** turncoat, defector, deserter, renegade, informer, sneak, collaborator, stool pigeon, saboteur, spy, fifth columnist, plant, mole, foreign agent, double agent, *agent provocateur,* Brutus (see Rome), Quisling (see Norway), Judas (*Christian usage*). *Adj*.: treacherous, disloyal, faithless, unfaithful, perfidious, two-faced. *Vb*.: betray, deceive, break faith, deal treacherously, defect, play false, rat. *Phr*.: snake in the grass, wolf in sheep's clothing, stab in the back, do dirty. *Bibl.:* confidence in an unfaithful man in time of trouble is like a broken tooth (Prov. 25:19); they be all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men (Jer. 9:2); wherefore lookest thou upon them that deal treacherously? (Hab. 1:13).[[278]](#footnote-278)

In this passage the narrator presents a thesaurus of betrayal, divided into grammatical categories: noun, adjective, verb, phrase, and biblical quotations. In all of them the sense and connotation are clearly negative. Why this verbal plethora? It is clear that at this stage of the plot the narrator is spotlighting the thematic centrality of betrayal in his story and demonstrating his own obsession with words. Beyond this, however, we can propose that he is attempting to examine the gulf between the conventional negative sense of betrayal and other possible meanings of treachery. Later in the novel it indeed becomes clear that the narrator focuses on the complexity of betrayal and subverts its habitual negative connotation. In addition, because we are aware of Oz’s novel *Judas*, written nineteen years later, in which the narrator reconstructs what took place in the mind of Judas Iscariot, from an intertextual perspective we can say that the two novels depict emotional and cognitive processes that show how betrayal can be a result of love. This possibility, which is foreign to the semantic field covered by the thesaurus list, is Oz’s new departure in both novels.

The plot of *Panther in the Basement*, which takes a positive perspective on betrayal, foreshadows the positive interpretation of Judas’s betrayal proposed by the narrator of *Judas*. The child-narrator of *Panther in the Basement* is interested in the semantic field of betrayal not only on the intellectual level but also as a matter of experience: “I have been called a traitor many times in my life. […] One morning these words appeared on the wall of our house […]: PROFI BOGED SHAFEL ‘Proffy is a low-down traitor.’ […] Is it possible for a traitor not to be low-down?”[[279]](#footnote-279)

At the start of the story, the child-narrator is targeted by verbal abuse when his treachery leads children to write a harsh insult outside his home. Only later in the story do readers find out what that betrayal was: the boy had become friends with a British officer. At the start of this friendship he is surprised both by the officer’s warm ge[[280]](#footnote-280)nerosity and by the emotions he feels in response: “Against the urging of my conscience, against my principles, against my better judgment, I was suddenly quite taken by him. (Is such a British policeman, who sides with us even though it is against the orders of his king, to be considered a traitor?).”[[281]](#footnote-281)

At first Proffy is swept up by the officer’s charm and draws a parallel between the two of them: he accuses himself of betraying his people and accuses the officer of betraying the British. But then Proffy begins to wonder whether betrayal requires a rational decision to act against those towards whom one has an obligation of loyalty, or whether betrayal that is unplanned and uncontrolled is just as bad. When he asks his father what cynical betrayal is he receives the following answer: “‘Cynical betrayal is cold-blooded, immoral and unfeeling betrayal.’ I asked (myself, not Father): Is there any betrayal that is not cynical? That is not selfish and calculated. Is there such a thing as a traitor who is not low-down? (Today I think there is.)”[[282]](#footnote-282)

This short passage includes duality on two levels: On the level of the conversation, the child asks himself as well as his father whether every betrayal is cynical. On the chronological plane, the narrator confesses that whereas he used to believe that all betrayal is cynical, in the literary present when he is writing the novel he thinks there is another type of betrayal. This foreshadows the possibility of treachery due to a positive rather than a cynical motivation, as Proffy explains later:

The essence of treachery does not lie in the traitor suddenly getting up and leaving the close circle of faithful. Only a superficial traitor does that. The real, deep-down traitor is the one who is right inside. In the heart of hearts: the one who most resembles and belongs, who is most involved. The one who is most like the others, even more so than the others. The one who really loves those he is betraying, because what betrayal is there without love?[[283]](#footnote-283)

In this fine passage Proffy offers a rare and touching account of the essence of betrayal. Betrayal can express deep emotions of belonging, involvement, and even love. The passage even concludes with a rhetorical question that might seem to wrap his words in an air of triviality. But it is most astonishing, for example, when juxtaposed with the thesaurus list of the various grammatical functions of betrayal. Although its semantic field includes many possibilities, there is nothing positive about any of them. At this point Oz demonstrates the special quality of belles-lettres, which can offer readers a new experience and introduce them to emotions associated with actions that transcend the familiar cultural horizons, including the psychoanalytic horizon. It is hard to imagine a society that views betrayal as positive, certainly not in the sweeping fashion described in the novel. I would like to propose that this is a case of rational self-control à la Peirce. The child’s act of betrayal, which derives from involvement and love, is a phaneron. The officer’s betrayal of his country and collaboration with the child is also a phaneron, although there were many cases of British soldiers who collaborated with the Jews in Mandatory Palestine. Taking our cue from Winnicott, the officer’s behavior can be interpreted as an expression of concern that is the positive result of the guilt of occupying another country. Proffy’s, by contrast, is an individual act that, drawing on Wittgenstein and Peirce, we can describe as an intentional choice, whose motives are beyond language, and which is manifested in intentional actions that become habit, based on self-control. The moral aspect revealed here lies in the ability to see a person as divorced from his nationality and position and exclusively in accordance with his character and behavior.

Note that the narrator of *Panther* does not end the story with a fixed stance but with a question, the answer to which anticipates *Judas*.

What did I have left? Only a little Bible in Hebrew and English that he gave me. […] I couldn’t take it to school, because it contained the New Testament, which Mr. Gihon said was an anti-Jewish book (but I read it, and I found, among other things, the story of the traitor Judas).[[284]](#footnote-284)

The narrator keeps the Bible, which represents the deep and age-old conflict between Jews and Christians, but mentions Judas to express the possibility of transition between the two religions. Although it is considered to be betrayal, in the last sentence of the novel the narrator offers yet another and different possibility that is taken from the semantic field of betrayal: “Have I betrayed them all again by telling the story? Or is it the other way round: Would I have betrayed them if I had not told it?”[[285]](#footnote-285)

Telling the story gives voice to the narrative truth of the betrayal as perceived when it took place; but not telling the story can also be considered betrayal, in that it conceals the truth. This ambivalent conclusion references the central psychoanalytic position regarding guilt: guilt always appears as a function of object relations and expresses ambivalence. Oz enriches this concept of ambivalence by painting the theme of betrayal as a duality—love and abandonment at one and the same time.

**3.u. Judas: The Traitor as the True Believer**

See the traitor run in the field alone.
Let the dead not the living now cast the first stone.

Nathan Alterman, “The Traitor,” from *The Joy of the Poor*[[286]](#footnote-286)

This line from Alterman’s poem is the epigraph of the novel *Judas*. Prima vista, from the very first page Oz depicts the traitor as pursued by the dead. But reading Alterman’s poem in full[[287]](#footnote-287) discloses a completely different picture:

Towards the end of the poem, the traitor changes places with the dead man, who in fact is the traitor. With this knowledge, we can see that the epigraph hints that in the novel, too, the alleged traitor will be transformed from accused to accuser. No explanation is offered for this; but the novel’s title creates an atmosphere haunted by Judas Iscariot, who is transformed in the course of the novel from the ultimate traitor to Jesus’ most faithful follower.

The novel is replete with dead traitors: Atalia’s father, Shealtiel Abravanel, is considered a traitor because he disagreed with Ben-Gurion’s line, opposed partition in 1947/48, and had many Arab friends.[[288]](#footnote-288) The hero Shmuel Ash’s grandfather was murdered by Jewish extremists who saw him as a traitor because he served in the Mandatory police. The figure of Judas Iscariot is central to the story, and pieces of Shmuel’s thesis on “Jewish Views of Jesus” litter the narrative. In fact, the novel shows that none of those suspected of betrayal were truly disloyal, whereas those who have survived betray again and again—first and foremost betraying themselves. Shmuel cannot decide what he wants to do with his life; at the end of the novel moves to a small town in southern Israel for a job as a librarian. Atalia is involved in one transient love affair after another. Wald feels that he betrayed himself when he persuaded his son Micha to enlist, even though he was an only child and his mother’s was firmly opposed. Micha fell in the War of Independence; ever since Wald has agonized over the fact that, in keeping with the educational spirit that dominated the country at the time, he influenced his son to go and fight.

When a bond develops between them, Shmuel explains to Wald his historical perspective on who should be deemed a turncoat, including examples from outside the Israeli experience. Wald enumerates a series of ancient and modern leaders whom their countrymen denounced as traitors:

De Gaulle […] those who previously enthusiastically supported him now call him a traitor. […] The prophet Jeremiah was considered a traitor both by the Jerusalem rabble and by the Royal court. […] Abraham Lincoln, […] was called a traitor by his opponents. […] Theodor Herzl was called a traitor just because he dared to entertain the thought of a Jewish state outside the Land of Israel. […] Even Ben-Gurion, when he agreed to the partition of the Land into two states, […] was called a traitor.[[289]](#footnote-289)

All of these leaders acted for the benefit of their people; none had evil or impure motives. Nevertheless, their ideas that ran counter to the majority’s anxiety, or that disclosed their own ideological rigidity, generated hostility that sometimes led to their ostracism and political failure. In one of their talks, Wald links what is taking place in the novel’s present to events in the Roman period—the story of Jesus and Judas Iscariot—in what at first glance appears to be a throwaway remark: “We are all Judas. Even eighty generations later we are still Judas.”[[290]](#footnote-290)

This sentence, early in the novel, foreshadows the thematic climax, which relates to the guilt of the novel’s namesake, Judas and his apparent act of betrayal. Jesus tells Judas to give him up to the Romans, because he wants to die on the cross. Judas refuses at first; later, however, he agrees to do as his master and teacher bids and betrays Jesus to the Romans. According to the characters in that story (Jesus and Judas)—and also as the narrator understands it—Judas was responding to an inner drive that compelled him to obey his teacher and to surrender him to the authorities: “The traitor, in this version, is actually a faithful disciple: in handing Jesus over to his pursuers all he is doing is submissively fulfilling the task his master has forced upon him.”[[291]](#footnote-291)

Judas Iscariot took a unique and individual decision that can be seen as a phaneron. He made a rational decision. He believed that Jesus would be spared crucifixion or at least would be resurrected afterwards.[[292]](#footnote-292) It is fascinating to see how the most historically remote incident, Judas’s betrayal of Jesus, is depicted in a sharper, more dramatic, and more compelling fashion than any of the other accounts of betrayal in the novel. Oz intertwines anticipatory moments throughout the novel and then, at its center, reaches the climax in the portrayal of the crucifixion, during which Jesus cries out in despair and Judas’s heart is broken:

Judah of Kerioth became Judas the Christian. The most enthusiastic of all apostles. More than that: he was the first man who believed with total faith in Jesus’ divinity. He believed that Jesus was all-powerful. He believed that very soon the eyes of all men, from sea to sea, would be opened, that they would see the light, and the redemption would come to the world. But for this to happen, Judas thought, being a man of the world and understanding a great deal about public relations, it was necessary for Jesus to leave Galilee and go to Jerusalem. He had to perform in Jerusalem, in the presence of the whole nation and before the entire world, a miracle such as had never been seen since the day God created heaven and earth.[[293]](#footnote-293)

Judas becomes the strongest believer in Jesus’ power. The revelation of Jesus’ doubts turn Jesus into a traitor who betrays the great hopes placed in him. Jesus betrays himself, more than anyone, when, overcome by doubt, he cries out and asks the Lord why He has abandoned him, thereby also betraying those who believe in him. Thus, self-betrayal and betrayal by another are merged in the characters of Jesus and of Judas:

And Judas, the meaning and purpose of whose life were shattered before his horrified eyes; Judas, who realized that he had brought about with his own hands the death of the man he loved and adored, went away and hanged himself. So died, Shmuel wrote in his notebook, the first Christian. The last Christian. The only Christian.[[294]](#footnote-294)

With an artistry unparalleled in modern Hebrew prose, Oz links the characters of Jesus, Judas, and Gershom Wald: Jesus felt betrayed by God; Judas felt betrayed because his faith in Jesus’ power was shattered; and Gershom Wald feels betrayed by his people, who had encouraged his only son to go to war. From a different perspective, all three of them betrayed others: Jesus betrayed the Jewish people. Judas Iscariot pretended to be a believer—deceiving Jesus—and then became a true believer and betrayed the Jewish people. Gershom Wald was rejected as a traitor by his fellow Israelis but felt that he had in fact betrayed his son and himself.

Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes the space of object relations: guilt is always created as a result of an ambivalent attitude to an external object (subject). But the guilt felt by the characters in *Judas* stems from individual will rather than a universal psychological structure in which guilt is natural. In every stage of their lives the thoughts and actions of Jesus, Judas, and Wald, as well as of Proffy in *Panther*, reflect a choice based on ethics, and thus self-control. Oz’s novels can allow us to understand the special nature of key figures in Jewish and Christian history. The novels also depict the broad emotional spectrum of guilt and betrayal in a way that includes many positive emotions, and not only negative traits.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th ed., ed. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and J. Schulte (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), para. 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, para. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains*, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998), p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Amos Oz, “Amos Oz Talks about Amos Oz: ‘Being I, Plus Being Myself’—An Interview with Hillit Yeshourun,” in Yair Mazor, *Somber Lust: The Art of Amos Oz*, trans. Marganit Weinberger-Rotman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 159–194, on p. 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Amos Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* [1976]translated by Nicholas de Lange and Philip Simpson (New York: Mariner Books, 2012: 61-83), p. 61 (emphasis originally; D.L.). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. " SAMSON THE bull was at the height of his powers, the pride of the kibbutz herdsman, the finest b

ull in the valley. Poisoned bait, thought Yosh. The howl of the jackals rose from the darkness. In late autumn a stray jackal had broken into the cattle shed, rabid or crazed with hunger, and had bitten Samson in the leg. Samson killed him with a kick, but the poison in the bite killed the bull’s potency. Thus was sealed the fate of the most ferocious bull in the Valley of Jezreel" (ibid, p. 62 [emphasis originally; D.L.]) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. "Generations of jackals have passed away since then, but the young ones follow the lead of their fathers, and nothing is changed. In every generation the gray open spaces are filled night after night with sounds of wailing and jubilation, with cries of impiety, malice, and despair" (Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1980), *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Lakoff & Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. "For three nights Ehud lay in no man’s land. […] Night after night Ehud’s comrades risked their lives, crawling into that godforsaken patch of ground, riddled with bushes and mines, but they were driven back again and again. […] On the fourth night, and at the cost of six casualties, Ehud’s comrades succeeded in recovering him—in spite of all the dangers, and although they had been ordered to abandon the attempt. They brought him to the camp, and from there to his home, and they said to him: Ehud, our friend, you would not have deserted us even to save your life, and we have not deserted you. Rest in peace. But the jackals had torn his face and ruined his beautiful square chin" (Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. "The jackals circle on tiptoe. Their snouts are soft and moist. They dare not approach the lights of the perimeter fence. Around and around they shuffle, mustering as if in readiness for some obscure ritual. A ring of jackals prowls every night about the circle of shadows that encloses the island of light. Till daybreak they fill the darkness with their weeping, and their hunger breaks in waves against the illuminated island and its fences. But sometimes one of them goes insane and with bared teeth invades the enemy’s fortress, snatching up chickens, biting horses or cattle, until the watchmen kill him with an accurate volley from medium range. Then his brothers break into mourning, a howl of terror and impotence and rage and anticipation of the coming day" (Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. "The bull, The archetypal symbol of masculinity in nature, is defeated by the jackal, the representative of darkness, the symbol of the Great Mother, the Ocean" (Avraham Balaban, Between God and Beast: An Examination of the Fiction of Amos Oz [University Park: Penn State University Press, 1993], p. 54). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. "Oz conceives of the primeval forces within the soul as concrete entities, forces which have existed in the world since its very beginning. These forces inhabit his world as archetypes or Platonic forms. He does not always take pains to recreate them. Often he is content with merely pointing these forces out, assuming that they are as meaningful in the reader's world as they are in his own."(Avraham Balaban, "Language and Reality in the Prose of Amos Oz", *Modern Language Studies*, 1990 20:2, pp. 79-97, p. 93). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Yair Mazor, *Somber Lust*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Yigal Schwartz, *Do You Know the Land Where the Lemon Blooms* (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2007), p. 395 [Hebrew]). On some level we can suggest these tracks as a key to understanding all the stories in *Jackals*. However, Schwartz does not address personal conflicts among states of consciousness, but only conflicts such as that between one perceived as favored and one perceived as inferior, as in the context of a (culturally) forbidden love. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Gershon Shaked wrote about this characteristic of Oz’s writing, which produced two camps of scholars. Those on the nationalist and rightwing end of the political spectrum saw Oz’s work as problematic because it raised doubts about the justice of the Zionist project; while those on the far left saw his work as overemphasizing nationalist power. See Gershon Shaked, *A Group Portrayal* (Or Yehuda: Kinneret Zmora-Bitan and Heksherim Institute, 2009), pp. 416–417 [Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. “There are some emotions that the Hebrew language isn’t sufficiently developed to express. If I say that to Yosef or his friend Kleinberger, the pair of them will attack me, and there’ll be a terrific argument about the merits of the Hebrew language, with all kinds of unpleasant digressions. Even the word ‘digression’ does not exist in Hebrew” (Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 124). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 6.560. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. This assertion by Peirce is very similar to one of Wittgenstein’s central points:

“A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have *an overview* of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections.’ Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate links*.” (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §122]; emphasis in original).

These two assertions have led scholars of Peirce and Wittgenstein to deal with the natural difficulty and, drawing on these two thinkers, to try to formulate a broader examination of the real world, which clarifies connections between overt facts and the hidden links among them. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Reasoning, properly speaking, cannot be unconsciously performed. A mental operation may be precisely like reasoning in every other respect except that it is performed unconsciously. But that one circumstance will deprive it of the title of reasoning. *For reasoning is deliberate, voluntary, critical, controlled, all of which it can only be if it is done consciously*. An unconscious act is involuntary: an involuntary act is not subject to control; *an uncontrollable act is not deliberate nor subject to criticism in the sense of approval or blame.* A performance which cannot be called good or bad differs most essentially from reasoning” (Peirce*, Collected Papers,* 2.182; emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. André Green, “Thirdness and Psychoanalytic Concepts,” *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 73(1) (2004): 99–135, p. 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. “Some theoretical systems have developed notions involving thirdness as the transitional phenomenon […] that takes place between the internal and external space. Already during the 1950s, Bleger (1967) and Winnicott (1975), each in his own framework, recognized the existence of a third factor apart from the analysand and the analyst. The setting was seen as a transitional state between symbiosis (Bleger) and potential reunion (Winnicott)” (ibid., pp. 101–102). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Moreover, Green admits that he did not delve deeply enough into Peirce’s thought, and one can indeed find substantive inaccuracies about Peirce in his writings. First, he merges the types of signs and states of consciousness into the “triadic conception of the sign,” rather than presenting them separately, as Peirce does (ibid., p. 112). Second, he draws a parallel between firstness and the first stage of the distinction between good and evil in Freud’s 1925 article “Negation.” Peirce repeatedly describes firstness as a state of consciousness with no distinctions, and certainly with no moral distinctions, which is a complex stage and the last run on the ladder of distinctions (ibid., p. 113). Third, in Green’s conclusion he asserts in Peirce’s name that it is impossible to see firstness as a separate stage of development and should be seen only as part of an overarching process (ibid., p. 131). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. For a concise discussion of the relevance of Peirce’s categories of consciousness for understanding Freud’s and Lacan’s concepts of the unconscious, see Vincent Colapietro, “Notes for a Sketch of a Peircean Theory of the Unconscious,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* Vol. 31, No. 3 (1995): 482–506. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. “Looking once more at activity, we observe that the only consciousness we have of it is the sense of resistance. We are conscious of hitting or of getting hit, of meeting with a *fact****.*** But whether the activity is within or without we know only by secondary signs and not by our original faculty of recognizing fact” (Peirce*, Collected Papers,* 1.376). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “Doubt is […] the privation of a habit. […] A condition of erratic activity that in some way must get superseded by a habit” (Peirce, ibid., 5.417). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Peirce, ibid, 5.371–2). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Freud, The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, p. 751. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. “The dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation” (ibid.). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid., p. 752. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Ibid., p. 767. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. “It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious.” (Freud, ibid.,p. 2991). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. “Psycho-analytic work shows us every day that translation of this kind is possible. In order that this should come about, the person under analysis must overcome certain resistances—the same resistances as those which, earlier, made the material concerned into something repressed by rejecting it from the conscious” (Freud, ibid.). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. " We shall therefore be better advised to focus our attention on what we know with certainty of the nature of these debatable states. As far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: *no physiological concept or chemical process can give us any notion of their nature."* (ibid, p. 2992). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., p. 3000. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. " The index-value of the unconscious has far outgrown its importance as a property. The system revealed by the sign that the single acts forming parts of it are unconscious we designate by the name ‘The Unconscious’.[…] And this is the […] most significant sense which the term ‘unconscious’ has acquired in psycho-analysis." (Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works*, p. 2583). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. "There are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty. […] To sum up: *exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process* […], *timelessness*, and *replacement of external by psychical reality*—these are the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system *Unconscious"* (ibid., pp. 3009–3010 [emphasis in original]). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. “‘Being conscious’ is in the first place a purely descriptive term, resting on perception of the most immediate and certain character. Experience goes on to show that a psychical element (for instance, an idea) is not as a rule conscious for a protracted length of time. On the contrary, a state of consciousness is characteristically very transitory. […] The philosophers would no doubt object: ‘No, the term “unconscious” is not applicable here; so long as the idea was in a state of latency it was not anything psychical at all’ (ibid.*,* p. 3948). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. “In our analyses we discover that there are people in whom the faculties of self-criticism and conscience—mental activities, that is, that rank as extremely high ones—are unconscious and unconsciously produce effects of the greatest importance” (ibid., p. 3961). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Freud, ibid, pp. 3969—3970. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. In his 1914 article on narcissism, Freud coined the term “ego ideal”: “What prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents […], to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment—his fellowmen—and public opinion.” (ibid. p. 2949). Freud describes the superego more clearly in his 1921 article “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego”: “We have called it the ‘ego ideal,’ and by way of functions we have ascribed to it self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression.” (ibid., p. 3801). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “I have already […] suggested that the real difference between a *Ucs*. [unconscious] and a *Pcs*. [preconscious] idea (thought) consists in this: that the former is carried out on some material which remains unknown, whereas the latter (the *Pcs*.) is in addition brought into connection with word-presentations.” (ibid. p. 3953). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. “We have two kinds of unconscious—the one which is latent but capable of becoming conscious, and the one which is repressed and which is not, in itself and without more ado, capable of becoming conscious. This piece of insight into psychical dynamics cannot fail to affect terminology and description.” (ibid., p. 3939). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid., p. 3953. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, translated by Wade Baskin (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works*, p. 3953. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Ibid., pp. 3953–3954. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. “I propose to describe the psychical process of which the first system alone admits as the ‘primary process,’ and the process which results from the inhibition imposed by the second system as the ‘secondary process’” (ibid., p. 1028). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., p. 1018. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. “The primary process endeavours to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus accumulated, it may establish a ‘perceptual identity.’ The secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its place—the establishment of a ‘*thought* identity.’ All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a satisfaction” (ibid., p. 1029). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. For previous discussions of the contribution of Peirce’s categories of consciousness to psychoanalysis, see: J. H. Smith, “Feeling and Firstness in Freud and Peirce,” in J. Muller and J. Brent, eds., *Peirce, Semiotics, and Psychoanalysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 68–83; the reference to Peirce’s states of consciousness by Philip Rosenbaum (*Making our Ideas Clear* [Charlotte: Information Age Publishing, 2015]*,*p. 68n); Paulo Duarte Guimarães Filho, “Examining the Relationship of C. S. Peirce’s Semiotic and D. Winnicott’s Transitional Phenomena and Playing,” *Cognitio* 18(1) (2017): 69–88. None of these mentions Peirce’s contribution to the formation of meaning as a function of relations among (conscious) states of consciousness. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. " It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought." (Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.377). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid., 1.343 (emphasis in original). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. “Meaning is irreducible to those of quality and reaction. [….] Every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic relation. […] A triadic relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone” (ibid., 1.345). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid., 1.356. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Ibid., 1.357. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. “The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be *initiative, original, spontaneous, and free*; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something *vivid and conscious*; so only it *avoids being the object of some sensation*. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence—that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it” (ibid.; emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid. 1.25. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. "The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while universal First-ness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, possibility would have answered the purpose") Ibid., 1.531). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “The free is that which has not another behind it. […] Freedom can only manifest itself in unlimited and uncontrolled variety and multiplicity” (ibid., 1.302). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Ibid., 1.307. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid., 1.308. (This property will be very relevant for the later discussion in Freud’s article “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through.”) [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Ibid. (emphasis in original). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. " There is a point of view from which the whole universe of phenomena appears to be made up of nothing but *sensible qualities*. What is that point of view? It is that in which we attend to each part as it appears in itself, in its own *suchness*, while we disregard the connections. Red, sour, toothache are each *sui generis* and indescribable" (Ibid., 1.424 [emphasis added; D.L.]). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. “We live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy. Each of us is accustomed to think that he is the creator of his world of fancy; that he has but to pronounce his fiat, and the thing exists, with no resistance and no effort; and although this is so far from the truth that I doubt not that much the greater part of the reader's labor is expended on the world of fancy. […] We call the world of fancy the internal world, the world of fact the external world” (ibid., 1.321). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Ibid., 1.336. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., 1.322. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid., 1.324. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Ibid., 1.338. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Ibid., 2.249. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. “If a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But *thought* is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation” (ibid., 2.275; emphasis in original). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Ibid., 1.343. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. See, for example, what Shaked wrote about the novel: “One can see the heroine, Hannah, as a metaphor for of Jerusalem, and Jerusalem as a metaphor of her. Just as the Arab villages surrounding Jerusalem choke it, Hannah is choked by her family life” (Shaked, *A Group Portrayal*, p. 114). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Avner Holtzman, *Loves of Zion: studies in Modern Hebrew literature* (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2006), p. 234. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. According] to Josef Even, “Sometimes the protagonists carry their destiny as a sort of weight that depends only on their complicated and rigid character, and sometimes they are rooted in broader or narrower biographical circumstances. […] This world of people with defective fates and defective characters, clouded by an atmosphere of gloom and bereavement, […] is symbolized (and sometimes quite consciously and prominently) by the motif of the jackal” (Josef Even, “Where the Jackals Howl,” *Moznaim* 21:2, 1965: 170–173, p. 170 [Hebrew]). Avraham Balaban shows how the mountains in the novel function as a phallic symbol, just as in Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams*. This discussion by Freud is an exception that does not prove the rule: he lists a series of universal symbols and thereby anticipates Jung’s discussion of the topic. See Balaban, Between God and Beast, p. 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “We hold firmly to the view that the distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious state lies in dynamic relations of this kind, which would explain how it is that, whether spontaneously or with our assistance, the one can be changed into the other. Behind all these uncertainties, however, there lies one new fact, whose discovery we owe to psycho-analytic research. We have found that processes in the unconscious or in the id obey different laws from those in the preconscious ego. We name these laws in their totality the *primary process*, in contrast to the *secondary process* which governs the course of events in the preconscious, in the ego. In the end, therefore, the study of psychical qualities has after all proved not unfruitful” (Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works*, pp. 4974–4975). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 3 (emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. “The motif of the stranger who hails from afar, invades the family unit, and undermines it (but not necessarily destroys it), such as: […] Matityahu Damkov in *Where the Jackals Howl* […]. Each of these interlopers insinuates himself into an orderly (and seemingly stable) world but does so in his own unique manner, carrying with him the seeds of confusion and havoc” (Mazor, *Somber Lust*, p. 119). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.377 [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* pp. 8–9 (emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Mazor discusses the literary motif of father-son relations in Oz’s various works, including “The Way of the Wind” (*Somber Lust*, pp. 28–36). He distinguishes between the ideological struggle, within which the emerging Hebrew society repressed individuals who did not conform to its values, and the universal struggle between father and son, which represents a natural tension between generations (ibid., p. 31). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. “‘The Way of the Wind’ seeks to undermine not only the image of the national hero but also the collective image of those who fostered him, the ‘larger-than-life’ leaders of the Labor movement whose ultimate representative is Shimshon Sheinbaum, the harsh, demanding, castigating father” (ibid.). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. “The story [“Where the Jackals Howl”] depicts *the vitality of nature as opposed to any fixed, limiting, petrified framework*. It is the vitality of *cruel and evil* beast: at night the kibbutz lands relapse into their *primal, natural state*, and they are described as nocturnal beasts of prey. […] The world of nature is symbolized by the jackals, by their riotous evil; ‘the lands of the jackals’ (the literal translation of the Hebrew title) are *natural realms in which eternal, undisturbed darkness reigns*. This characteristic of the natural world gives rise to *uninterrupted battle* between the world and culture. Every fragment of culture is like *a piece of land rested from nature by force*, and nature seeks to regain it and take vengeance upon the invaders” (Balaban, Between God and Beast, p. 243; emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Schwartz, *Do You Know the Land*, p. 368. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Ibid., p. 442. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid., p. 455 n. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Oz, *Where the Jackals howl,* p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Oz, *Where the Jackals Howl,* p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Ibid., p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Ibid., pp. 49–50. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Ibid., pp. 55–56. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Ibid., p. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Amos Oz with Shira Hadad, *What’s in an Apple?*, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Yair Mazor sees Matityahu Damkov as the opposite of Hannah Gonen: “In earlier texts, shameful, embarrassing, incriminating weaknesses were silenced or muted by being ascribed to certain reprehensible characters, some central, some marginal, who did not enlist the reader’s sympathy. They were the shock absorbers, the receptacles for unsavory traits or offensive behavior. And since they contained the reprehensible, embarrassing qualities, the rest of the fictional world remained untainted, decent, blameless. Who are those characters? […] for instance, Matityahu Demkov (*Where the Jackals Howl*). […]If there were manifestations of ugliness or evil in the ‘likable’ characters (such as Hannah Gonen in *My Michael*, […] the implied author made sure that he offset those less attractive aspects by infusing charm, mystique, or intense and savage passion into the depiction of those characters” (Mazor, *Somber Lust,* p. 121). The two characters are indeed contraries. But the question at the focus of our reading relates to the degree of freedom allowed the character of Hannah Gonen (given the complexity pointed out by Mazor). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Oz, *What’s in an Apple?,* p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. For a more extensive discussion of Oz’s conversion of his autobiography into a work of literature, see Nitza Ben-Dov, *Written Lives: On Israeli Literary Autobiographies* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 2011) [Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. “Most of the people I wrote stories about are relatives of mine. We have many things in common, but most of them believe in things that I don’t believe in. They believe in happiness. They want eternal love and absolute justice and freedom at all cost. These are things I don’t believe in, but I understand very well how others can. There is great seduction in them, and I am easily seduced” (from interview with Oz quoted in Mazor, *Somber Lust,* p. 171). [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “Jerusalem and Kibbutz Hulda appear in your work as two opposing poles. In *My Michael,* you write: ‘I was born in Jerusalem. But I cannot write: Jerusalem is my city.’ Why?

“Amos Oz: This is said by Hannah Gonen. I happen to agree with her on this one, although I want to make absolutely clear that I am not to be identified with that woman. She gave me hell. She crawled under my skin and invaded my soul. While I was writing the novel, I wanted to kill her. I could never say, ‘Jerusalem is my city’” (ibid.,p. 172). [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Ibid., p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Roman Jakobson, “The Dominant,” in *Language in Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 41–46. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Oz, *My Michael,* p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. “Each habit of an individual is a law; but these laws are modified so easily by the operation of self-control, that it is one of the most patent of facts that ideals and thought generally have a very great influence on human conduct. That truth and justice are great powers in the world is no figure of speech, but a plain fact to which theories must accommodate themselves” (Peirce*, Collected Papers,* 1.348). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. “Morality supposes self-control” (ibid., 1.57). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Oz, *My Michael,* p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. “I enjoyed his discomfiture. At that time I was still repelled by the sight of the rough men my friends used to worship in those days: great bears of *Palmach*-men who used to tackle you with a gushing torrent of deceptive kindness; thick-limbed tractor-drivers coming all dusty from the Negev like marauders carrying off the women of some captured city” (ibid., p. 8). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Ibid., p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Ibid., p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Ibid., p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Ibid., p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Ibid., pp. 213–214 (emphasis added; D.L.). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. As Balaban puts it, “If consciousness is characterized by setting boundaries, in contrast, Hannah’s world is that of flow and the blurring of borders, a world devoid of outlines. […] That phenomenon, infatuation with a cloudy, vague world, free of forms, appears several times during the novel” (Balaban, Between God and Beast, pp. 167–168). [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Oz, *My Michael,* pp. 214–215. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. “A peaceful breeze touches and stirs the pines. Slowly the far sky pales. And on the vast expanses quiet cold calm descends” (ibid.*,* p. 216). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Amos Oz, *Unto Death, Translated by Nicholas De Lange* (New-York: Harcourt, 1971), p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. *Elsewhere, Perhaps* (1966), and [*My Michael*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Michael) (1968). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Oz, *Unto Death,* p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. This is, of course, one possible interpretation. On the other hand, David Ohana interpreted the novella as an allegory of the Holocaust (David Ohana, "Amos Oz: A humanist in the darkness, Journal of Israeli History", 38:2, 2020: 329-348, DOI: 10.1080/13531042.2021.1904544, p. 333 [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. "I seem to have been fascinated all my life by the crusades, by fire and snow, by operatic death, by great gestures of self-immolation. That seems to be my Revisionist genes. And as long as I have the strength, I will oppose it, I will spew it out, I will struggle against it politically and I will depict it in stories. I will also depict what it leads to" (in Ohana, ibid, p. 334). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. "Oz’s story depicts in a few different layers the theme of the crusaders. He even describes with a shred of sympathy the crusader anti-hero" (Ohana, ibid). [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Oz, *Unto Death,* p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. We must distinguish between the figure of the traitor and that of the heretic: the Talmud speaks of a character called Elisha ben Abuyah, who is considered to be the ultimate heretic, and was known as “Other.” Even though his student Rabbi Meir continued to have halachic discussions with him, Elisha ben Abuyah eventually said that he had “heard behind the curtain” that he would not be able to repent (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Chagigah, page 15b). However, there is a huge difference between Elisha ben Abuyah and Judas Iscariot. The former did not betray anyone, certainly did not receive any money for his heresy, and continued to have complex relations with his community. In contrast, Judas Iscariot brought about the killing of Jesus and, in so doing, precipitated the enormously significant historical process of the formation of the Christian tradition. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Oz, *Unto Death,* p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Oz, *Unto Death,* p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Oz, *Unto Death,* pp. 13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Søren Kierkegaard*, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs,* Edited and Translated by Alastair Hannay, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 294 (my emphasis; D.L.). [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. SØren Kierkegaard*,* *Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard's Writings VI,* Edited and Translated byHoward V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (New-Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), §6.43 [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Wittgenstein addresses the impossibility of defining anything in words, and not just will, through the concept of “family resemblance” (See: Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §66–67). The influential linguists Lakoff and Johnson adopted this method in their book that revolutionized the study of metaphors—George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)—in the following passage: “Our view also accords with some of the key elements of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: the family-resemblance account of categorization” (182). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Wittgenstein never wrote explicitly about ethics, faithful to his claim that it cannot be expressed in words. It can be embodied indirectly, however, as in works of literature. For an exposition of this argument, see Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, “Wittgenstein and Leavis: Literature and the Enactment of the Ethical,” *Philosophy and Literature*, 40:1 (2016): 240–264. In addition, I addressed the topic in my book, Dorit Lemberger, *A Red Rose in the Dark: Self-Constitution through the Poetic Language of Zelda, Yehuda Amichai, Admiel Kosman, and Shimon Adaf* (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Wittgenstein did not declare himself as an adherent of pragmatism, but there are significant pragmatic elements in his thought. For an assessment of the philosophy of Wittgenstein as a pragmatist and a comparison of Wittgenstein and Peirce, see Cheryl Misak, *Cambridge Pragmatism:* *From Peirce and James to* *Ramsey and Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. “By the *phaneron*I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present *when,* and to *whose*mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds" (Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.284; emphasis in original). [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh* (New York: Basic Books, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. “One of our most important claims is that the same motivational processes that operate unconsciously in our embodied biological functioning are equally active in shaping our conscious higher acts of conceptualization and reasoning. In other words, there is a continuity between our sensory, motor, and affective processes as we perceive and act in the world, and those same processes as they configure our higher cognitive operations involving abstraction and language. This is one important sense in which mind and knowing are profoundly embodied processes” (Mark Johnson and Don M. Tucker, *Out of the Cave: A Natural Philosophy of Mind and Knowing* [Boston: MIT Press, forthcoming]. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Johnson and Tucker admit that the causal processes are vague and cannot be precisely examined and verbalized. Despite the existence of a dialogue between philosophy and science, even in the early twenty-first century, when the mainstream of linguistics is based on the study of the links between bodily processes and all our uses and functions, it remains difficult to clarify the mystery of human choice for good or bad (ibid.). [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. The novel in Hebrew: Jerusalem: Keter, 2014. Here it is quoted from Amos Oz, *Judas,* trans. Nicholas De Lange (London: Chatto & Windus, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. The National Geographic Chanel, in 2006, published an essay that was discovered and attributed to the time of Jesus. Contrary to custom when it comes to the gospels, this essay is called “the gospel **of** Judas” and not “the gospel **according to** Judas.” According to the essay, Judas is the only apostle who understands the true nature of Jesus. And to him Jesus delivers the **knowledge**. When Judas handed Jesus to the authorities, he helped him shed his human form and allow his spirit to return and unite with the almighty God. The content of the gospel contradicts the other gospels in the New Testament with regards to the role Judas Iscariot played in turning over Jesus to the Romans. The gospel, in contrast to the others, says that Jesus commanded Judas Iscariot to surrender him to the authorities. As such, it absolves Judas of the negative image that is associated with him, according to which he is the symbol of betrayal. This gospel did not make it into the New Testament. It was declared heretical and was banned by the Catholic Church. Amos Oz used this historical discovery as inspiration for the novel *Judas*. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. The novel in Hebrew: Jerusalem: Keter, 1995. In English: Amos Oz, *Panther in the Basement*, trans. Nicholas De Lange (London: Vintage, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. This line of thought accords with observations by Oz himself, who frequently addressed the false charges against him in articles and interviews (see, e.g., the volume of interviews conducted by \_\_\_\_\_. Of course, we should clearly separate works of literature, which are fictional, from opinion articles. Nevertheless, I would assert that Oz’s interest in betrayal was a personal matter ant not only a literary interest. Oz experienced his removal from the object public adulation to the margins of public discourse as someone out of sync with the majority. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. David M. Goodman and Eric R. Severson (eds.), *The Ethical Turn: Otherness and Subjectivity in Contemporary Psychoanalysis,* (New York: Routledge, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 1907. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.43. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Ibid., 6.349. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. “That mere *quality,* or suchness, is not in itself an occurrence, as seeing a red object is; it is a mere may-be. Its only being consists in the fact that there *might be* such a peculiar, positive, suchness in a phaneron” (ibid., 1.304). Every concept has suchness: monad, dyad, self-control, etc. The discussion is of the possibility of being sui generis (ibid.). [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Ibid., 4.531. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. “An Index is nothing but an individual existence in a Secondness with something; and it only becomes an Index by being capable of being represented by some Representamen as being in that relation” (ibid., 2.311). [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. “Individual existence is a markedly dualistic conception. […] It is easy to see that only existing individuals can react against one another” (ibid., 2.84). [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. P 330: “The Argument for Pragmatism anachazomenally or recessively stated,” A.Ms., unpublished. Larry Holmes quoted this passage in order to demonstrate the importance Peirce attributed to self-control. See Larry Holmes, “Peirce on Self-Control,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,* 2:2 (1966): 113–130, 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Ibid., 113–129. It is important to emphasize, as Edward S. Petry showed in his review of the stages of development of the concept of self-control, that Peirce did not ignore uncontrolled mechanisms of consciousness, such as perception and instincts, alongside his emphasis on the capacity for self-control. See Edward S. Petry, “The Origin and Development of Peirce’s Concept of Self-Control,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,* 28:4 (1992): 667–690, 668. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Vincent Michael Colapietro, *Peirce’s Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), pp. 95-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 6.286. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Colapietro, *Peirce’s Approach to the Self,* 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 6.454. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Ibid., 5.440. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Peirce, unpublished manuscript 655; quoted in J. J. Stuhr, “Rendering the World More Reasonable,” in: H. Parret (ed.), *Peirce and Value Theory* (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1993), 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 2.182. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Peirce, *Collected Papers*,

 8.191. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.418. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Holmes, “Peirce on Self-Control,” 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 5.533. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Holmes, “Peirce on Self-Control,” 126–127. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 1.57. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Ibid., 5.419. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Ibid.*,* 1.191**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Ibid.*,* 1.348. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Ibid.*,* 5.511. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Ibid.*,* 1.383. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. “The secret of rational consciousness is not so much to be sought in the study of this one peculiar nucleolus, as in the review of the process of self-control in its entirety. The machinery of logical self-control works on the same plan as does moral self-control, in multiform detail. […] For in moral life we are chiefly solicitous about our conduct and its inner springs, and the approval of conscience, while in intellectual life there is a tendency to value existence as the vehicle of forms.” (ibid., 5.440). [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Ibid., 5.442. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Ibid., 1.50. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. For a broader discussion, see Rosa Maria Mayorga, “Beauty and the Best,” in *Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words,* Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen (eds.), (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014), 279–283, 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. “For the doctor the phenomenon [of transference] signifies a valuable piece of enlightenment and a useful warning against any tendency to a counter-transference which may be present in his own mind. He must recognize that the patient’s falling in love is induced by the analytic situation and is not to be attributed to the charms of his own person; so that he has no grounds whatever for being proud of such a ‘conquest’, as it would be called outside analysis. And it is always well to be reminded of this” (Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 2510). [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. “If conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of hetero-criticisms” (Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 1.574). [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Ibid. The connection between emotion and self-control is discussed in Christopher Hookway, “Sentiment and Self-Control,” in: *The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce,* ed.Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1997, 201–222. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 5.421. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. Cheryl Misak, “C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Peirce* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 150–174, 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. “Like any other field, more than any other [morality] needs improvement, advance. […] But morality, doctrinaire conservatist that it is, destroys its own vitality by resisting change, and positively insisting, this is eternally right: That is eternally wrong” (Peirce, *Collected Papers,* 2.198). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. "In the first phases of erotic life, ambivalence is evidently the rule. Many people retain this archaic trait all through their lives. It is characteristic of obsessional neurotics that in their object-relationships love and hate counterbalance each other. In primitive races, too, we may say that ambivalence predominates" (Freud, ibid*,* p. 4599). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Ibid.*,* 3797. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Ibid.*,* 4599. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Ibid. 881. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Ibid.*,* 3774. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Direct criticism of Freud’s lack of attention to guilt in the existential sense can be found in Martin Buber, “Guilt and Guilt-Feelings.” *CrossCurrents* 8(3) (1958), 193–210. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 3969. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Ibid. In this article Freud demonstrated the revelation of guilt on the basis of experience: commands and prohibitions by father and teachers act “in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship, and create a sense of guilt” (ibid., 3971). But this discovery does not cover all cases, not even in Freud’s writings. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Ibid., 3969. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. Ibid*,* 2711. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. Freud significantly expanded his discussion of ambivalence towards the leader and God in “Moses, His People, and Monotheist Religion” (1938), to which I will refer below in my of the novel *Judas*. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works*, 3108–3113. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Ibid., 3791. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. “The negative transference deserves a detailed examination […]. In the curable forms of psychoneurosis it is found side by side with the affectionate transference, often directed simultaneously towards the same person. Bleuler has coined the excellent term ‘ambivalence’ to describe this phenomenon. Up to a point, ambivalence of feeling of this sort seems to be normal; but a high degree of it is certainly a special peculiarity of neurotic people” (ibid*,* 2463). [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Ibid.*,* 2711 [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. “"Anyone who has a conscience must feel within him the justification for the condemnation, must feel the self-reproach for the act that has been carried out. This same characteristic is to be seen in the savage’s attitude towards taboo. It is a command issued by conscience; any violation of it produces a fearful sense of guilt which follows as a matter of course and of which the origin is unknown. Thus, it seems probable that conscience too arose, on a basis of emotional ambivalence, from quite specific human relations to which this ambivalence was attached” (Ibid.*,* 2712). [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. Ibid*,* 2677 [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Ibid., 2680**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Ibid., 2684**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. Ibid.*,* 740. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. In one context Freud rejected the similarity between them and the possibility of identifying an “Electra complex” (ibid.*,* 4593). In another place, Freud drew a parallel between the two complexes for the two sexes, but described the girl’s complex as of lesser importance (ibid., 5001). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. Ibid.*,* 743. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Ernest Jones, *Hamlet and Oedipus* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 3099–3119. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. Ibid., 3112–3113. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Ibid.*,* 3110. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. Ibid.*,* 3117. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. “The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id” (ibid.*,* 3790). [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. In the broadest discussion of the successive avatars of the concept of shame in object relations psychoanalysis, Judith Hughes presented the concept of superego as the foundation of Freud’s moral thought (Judith M. Hughes, *Guilt and Its Vicissitudes* [New York: Routledge, 2008], 103). [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 3970. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Freud, *The Complete Psychological Works,* 4670. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Ibid.*,* 3962. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. Ibid., 3959. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. Ibid.*,* 3962. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. Ibid., 3983–3984. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Ibid., 3985. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. Ibid., 3984. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. Freud, “Civilization and its Discontents,” in *The Complete Psychological Works,* 4467. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. Ibid., 4475. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. Ibid., 4514. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Freud, “The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Theory,” in *The Complete Psychological Works,* 2309. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. Freud, “Observations on Transference-Love (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psychoanalysis III)”, in *The Complete Psychological Works,* 2510. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. Ibid., 2514. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. “Anyone who has become saturated in the analytic technique will no longer be able to make use of the lies and pretenses which a doctor normally finds unavoidable; […] Since we demand strict truthfulness from our patients, we jeopardize our whole authority if we let ourselves be caught out by them in a departure from the truth. […] In my opinion, therefore, we ought not to give up the neutrality towards the patient, which we have acquired through keeping the counter-transference in check. […] The treatment must be carried out in abstinence” (ibid., 2514–2515). [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Ibid., 2515. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. Freud, “The Technique of Psycho-Analysis,” ibid., 4983. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Freud, ibid., 4989. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. Melanie Klein, in *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921–1945* (London: The Hogarth Press*,* 1965) 267–278. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Ibid., 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. Ibid., 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Ibid., 271. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. Ibid., 277–278. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. “The ego comes to a realization of its love for the good object, a whole object, and in addition a real object, together with an overwhelming feeling of guilt towards it. Full identification with the object based on libidinal attachment, first to the breast, then to the whole person, goes hand in hand with an anxiety for it (of its disintegration), with guilt and remorse, with sense of responsibility for preserving it intact against persecutors and the id, and with sadness relating to expectations of the impending loss of it. These emotions, whether conscious or unconscious, are in my view among the essential and fundamental elements of the feeling we call love” (ibid., 291). [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. Melanie Klein, “The Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” in ibid., 282–310. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. Ibid. Klein quotes Freud’s statement that “A man who doubts his own love may, or rather *must*, doubt every lesser thing” {emphasis added?}. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. Ibid., 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. Ibid., 289. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. Ibid., 290. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. Melanie Klein, “Love, Guilt and Reparation,” in *Love, Guilt and Reparation: And Other Works 1921–1945* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975), 306–343. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. Ibid., 322. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Ibid., 340. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. In Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, ed. M. Masud R. Khan (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975), 104:1–346, 25–42. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Ibid., 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Ibid., 176–234. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Ibid., 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. Ibid., 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Donald W. Winnicott, “Psycho-Analysis and the Sense of Guilt,” in *The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development* (London: Routledge, 1965), 15–28. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Donald W. Winnicott, “Aggression, Guilt and Reparation,” in: *Deprivation and Delinquency* (London: Routledge, 1985), 116–123. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Donald W. Winnicott, “The Development of the Capacity to Concern,” ibid., 86–90. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. Donald W. Winnicott, “The Absence of a Sense of Guilt,” ibid., 91–96. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Winnicott, *The Maturational Processes,* 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Ibid., 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Winnicott, *Deprivation and Delinquency,* 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. Ibid., 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. Ibid., 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Ibid., 95–96. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Ibid., 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. Adi Parush, *Between Philosophy and Literature* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2018) [Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Betrayal: Developmental, Literary, and Clinical Realms, ed. Salman Akhtar (London: Karnac, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. Oz, *Panther in the Basement*, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. Oz, *Panther in the Basement*, 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. Ibid., 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Ibid., 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. Ibid., 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. Ibid., 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Ibid., 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. Ibid., 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. Oz, *Judas,*1. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. "The traitor said: Return, dead man, to your rest. / Because the Lord was righteous in everything that happened to you. // Because a scream rose from the wall / And you kept a shameful silence, / Because they tortured your brother on the other side of the wall / And you kept your head down.” (Nathan Alterman, “The Traitor,” *Shirim she-mi-kvar* [Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1972], 192 [Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. “‘They called him a traitor,’ Wald said, ‘because he fraternised with Arabs. He went to see them in Katamon, Sheikh Jarrah, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beit Jallah. He often entertained them here in his home. All sorts of Arab journalists used to come here. Public figures. Union leaders. Teachers. They called him a traitor because in ’47 and even in ’48, at the height of the fighting in the War of Independence, he continued to argue that the decision to create a Jewish state was a tragic mistake” (Oz, *Judas,* 199). [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Ibid., 223. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Ibid., 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Ibid., 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. “Judas Iscariot was therefore the author, the impression, the stage manager, and the director of the spectacle of the crucifixion. […] Even when Jesus was dying in terrible torment on the cross, […] Judas’ faith did not waver for an instant: it was surely coming. The crucified God would arise and shake himself free of the nails and descend from the cross and say to all people falling on their faces in astonishment: love one another” (ibid., 136). [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Ibid., 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Ibid., 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)