Exergue

###  It can be argued that birth surmounts the interest in rational science. The modesty of critical unknowability demands a perspective on language as a proposed horizon, on the science of writing, on teleology in the interest of totality. What is origin, genesis in the absence of the question of birth as such? What is this to inscription, that is, to the prospect of writing to writing in writing? To what extent does birth, as such, proclaim the nuances of the miraculous birth and anticipate in that mode of precision measures of demarcation that remain out of step? Is there a mobility in this ventured demarcation, in cognitive recognition? Language, in the unknown that has no exergue, remains a worrisome horizon in the extremity of infliction and the longevity of drifting, whose shores are neither a matter of precision, nor, for that reason, here in deliberate deliberation. *Frankenstein* exemplified in monstrosity wearing of framed – disclaimer, a divine precise generality to an astronomical proposition, seamlessly hyphenates a precursor intention in calculated calculability. Perhaps, in co-opting to disclaim or transcend danger, we are “co-opted” to a particular sense of mourning. Writing eulogies or obituaries habituates the specificity of intellectual memory and coincides with acknowledgment. Temporal specificity, historical unfolding as distinct and isolable dates: the death of Princess Diana on August 31, 1997, the shooting of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, and the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 are not hypotheticals rehearsed in presumed vulnerability, but are, as Ferguson puts it, occurrences with a significant “localized impact”.[[1]](#footnote-1) Derrida’s exergue on monstrosity, hence, is anything but an entitled grievance. Disclaimed monstrosity, though, questions at once and simultaneously the “as such” of the “localized impact” of these occurrences. This foregrounded notion simply outsources the claim of legibly disclaiming the self. The supposed inflation of *Frankenstein* is perhaps an exergue on these “simulated” inventions. The future of its unknowability risks the foreboding grounds of monstrosity. A contextualized, monadic steppes up, goes forth beyond itself, in the milieu of disclaimed responsibility. In this tentative mapping, we are far from ascribing a “communicative intent to these preceding issues, when being in closer proximity to the problematic nature of ‘involuntary association’”*.*[[2]](#footnote-2)The future that has no exergue is a crossed-out contingency whose visibility and spatiality, at the level of the literal death of self-presence, signify the death of speech. Post post-script, there is an unfathomable conquest that nevertheless circumstantially apprehends the infinitude writing this “dis-claimer” to Derrida’s exergue on monstrosity, which arguably apprehends an author. In this cordially conjoined and hyphenated topography intertwined with pure receded intelligibility, I dare to foresee a more effective general preoccupation with the problematic notion of birth, as such, within and at the fringes of *Of Grammatology*.

###  The science of writing foresees no reading of genesis outside the question of birth, nor can it accredit “origin” to cybernetic writings, nor extend genesis to the Freudian notion of “self-assembly psyche”.[[3]](#footnote-3) A constituency of sorts, this “circumfesses” the problematic preemptive ventured within circumscribing effect and co-intent. Diachronic mobilizations are, thereafter, intentions gesturing at reality not simply to our discretion but to their noted disclaim. Paul de Man observed in form and intent, as Ferguson argues, that “intentionality in Husserl’s intuitive articulation may convert a rock into a seat without any further material working”.[[4]](#footnote-4) Cognitive ponderings risk their mobilizations, perhaps even underscore the difference between literary and textual analysis, but, above all, presume the exodus that must exceed writing.

### Birth, as such, seamlessly confronts a philosophical contention with an involuntary exposition, but nonetheless cohorts an exclamation of a different intention than strictly or only *Frankenstein*. *Dissemination* is a vastitude, at once “violent and arbitrary” in a beginning that is arguably fictional and far from being inaugural, implemented by an overwhelming absence.[[5]](#footnote-5) In *Dissemination,* Derridawrites about a contended scientific contingency of “fictitious beginnings,” surrounding the singularity configuration, and a murder that is unfolding. The latter is, to an arguable extent, the act of writing under erasure. However, what does this murder unfold into? The unconditional intrigues of such a binding subtlety, the liberty of its illustrative understanding of the inexplicable in the light of reason, confer in seriousness a “mobilized projection” as well as associative “efforts,” “sentiments,” “desires,” “interest,” and “longing” onto the legibility of a deconstructive contemporariness of the “now” that, in some sense, has always been here. In *Dissemination*, Derrida meditates quite extensively on Pierrot’s murder of his wife, viewing it as a simulacrum of an “explicitation,” a reference to the law of unknown (authorial) origin, the play of anonymous axiom that clearly describes Marguerite in Mallarmé fiction for Derrida.[[6]](#footnote-6) The avenir of this “floating outwork” grants a “temporal and textual structure” to a conflicting mime-value. A mime-drama restitutes a preface planned and then written after the fact, in the solitude of a mime-program, which is written after the fact (Derrida, *Dissemination* 199). What happens in this mime-drama is murder. “Columbine,” the mime’s wife, is dead. The circumstances of her death are more than interesting: the mime tickled her to death. Of course, we are reminded that these are deliberations on a crime “yet to be committed” by Mallarmé.

### Of course, there’s the rope – pull it tight and blam! It’s done! Yes, but then the tongue hanging out, the horrible face. No – the knife? Or a saber, a long saber? zap! in the heart...yes, but then the blood flows out in torrents, streaming. – Ugh! what a devil of a... Poison? a little tiny vial, quaff it and then...yes! then the cramps, the runs, the pains, the tortures, ah! how awful (it would be discovered, anyway). Of course, there’s the gun, bam! but bam! would be heard. – Nothing, I can think of nothing. (He paces gravely back and forth, deep in thought. By accident, he trips). Ow! that hurts! (He strokes his foot.) Oof! that hurts! it’s not serious, it’s better already. (He keeps on stroking and tickling his foot.) Ha! ha! that’s funny! Ha! Ha! No, it makes me laugh. Ah! (He abruptly lets go of his foot. He slaps himself on the head.) I’ve got it! (Slyly:) I’ve got it! I’m going to tickle my wife to death. There![[7]](#footnote-7)

Derrida sees Marguerite’s mime-drama as “an epigraph,” “an hors d’oeuvre,” “a seed,” “a seminal infiltration,” speaking less to Mallarmé and more to the conceptualization of a “systematic treatise on the textual graft”.[[8]](#footnote-8) Beyond the “principal or capital text” and beside “the author’s proper name and title,” there is, Derrida argues, “an epigraph,” a space for a “a third proper name,” a derivation, if you wish, of Marguerite’s “Mallarméanism”.[[9]](#footnote-9) There is, however, no third name as such. Instead, the figure of that denoted third name takes the form of Gautier’s *Pierrot Posthume*.[[10]](#footnote-10) A shift in focus, perhaps, but one that Derrida sees as necessary for grafting singularity in the unfolding of a mime-murder. The murder subtitles a critical appreciation, reinscribing on blankness a contentious bureau “grafted onto the arborescence of another text”.[[11]](#footnote-11)

 Mallarmé, a text “marked in proposition,” a calculable incision, a present epigraph in “grafting,” via short “cross-references” that address the ruminated futility of “bibliographical research” and “source studies” on the Mallarmé text.[[12]](#footnote-12) There is, thereby, as Derrida argues “no more ‘inside’ inferences than can properly be said by Mallarmé”.[[13]](#footnote-13) In Mallarmé, as Derrida argues, “the imitator in the last instance has no imitate, the signifier has not signified, the sign having in no instant a referent, their operation is no longer comprehended within the process of truth but on the contrary they comprehend it”.[[14]](#footnote-14) The effect of this “specular doubling” on analysis, on “the movement of truth,” the adequation scales the present and extends the Mallarméan text to the broader limits of a simulacrum. The residual Hegelian/Platonic resonances later re-inscribe the fluidity or the fluency of indented disappropriation on the text of Mimique.

The “cipher of pirouettes prolonged toward another motif” is, like the whole of the text, ciphered to the second power. This is remarked by its cipher in that, while disengaging the dancer’s pirouette as a cipher or hieroglyphic, it also enciphers the sign “pirouette,” which it causes to pirouette or turn upon itself like a top, this time designating the movement of the sign itself. The cipher of pirouette is also a pirouette as a cipher, as the movement of the signifier that refers, through the fiction of this or that visible dancing pirouette, to another pirouetting signifier, another “pirouette.” In this way, the pirouette, like the dancer’s pointed toe, is always just about to pierce with a sign, with the sharp bit of nothing, the page of the book or the virginal intimacy of the vellum.[[15]](#footnote-15)

The work of “unrealization,” as Derrida puts it, concerns time, not temporality.[[16]](#footnote-16) The nuanced “supreme spasm” illuminates boundary points that dwell on the interrogative site, serving as an auxiliary monument to the edifices in untimely disregard of the matter in question.[[17]](#footnote-17) What becomes “the internal” de facto of the mime, Derrida argues, intuitively reflects an unavoidable “internal practice of spacing.” Supplementarity then, is not a Rousseauistic “unilateral movement” of inside/outside, but, as Derrida continues to argue, “it is the excess of a signifier […], in its own inside, makes up (for) space and repeats the opening”.[[18]](#footnote-18) Mallarméan “spacing” introduces the question of the law governing the theatrical and literature to their respective effects and induces the “i” that calligraphs writing prior to any unrealization. On Mallarmé’s “i”:

That text, which exhibits a modernity that could be judged untimely, puts the dots on the *i*’s. With its little suspended dot, the *i* continually pricks and rips through – or almost – the veil, reaches a decision – or almost – about the text, as do so many Mallarméan *i*’s.[[19]](#footnote-19)

 In retribution, an “exquisite crisis” in literature folds over the blankness of the white paper in the process of unfolding itself.[[20]](#footnote-20) In the robustness of the proper, a “crinkling” sound of dissemination folds into a systematic “signing-out.” At best, shrugs from the unfolded blankness, correspondences in utter presumptuousness, apart from the undecidable, in this timid formality is the contour of the undecidable. Mallarmé envisions “an internal reality” within a disseminating structure. This time happens “at last” with the exact “matter-reality,” “mise en scene.”

Or rather – since this sort of exhibition and the “as such” of phenomena are no longer in the last instance in control here but are rather being maneuvered as inscribed functions and subordinate mechanisms – what is in question here, this time at last, finds itself not displayed but given play, not staged but engaged, not demonstrated but mounted. Mounted with confectioner’s skill is some implacable machinery, with “consummate prudence and implacable logic.” […] “This time at last” does not mean that what had always obscurely until now been sought has finally, in a single blow – a stroke of a pen or a throw of dice – been accomplished. Nothing could be more foreign to eschatology, particularly any eschatology of or by way of literature than the finite-infinite seriation of these numbers.[[21]](#footnote-21)

As the situation currently stands, a state is not preceded by an opening but a scission. A scission to epigraph, a crowning formula, a camouflaging disappearance within the unfolding appearances accompanied by detotalitarian reading and cemented writing apparatuses. The ideality of structure is necessarily the ideality of an “encasing” approval.[[22]](#footnote-22) The presence in “parenthesis,” writing the case in the avenir of presence, is “a demystifying” obligation.

What! Perfect writing rejects even the slightest adventure, so as to delight in its chaste evocation on the tain of memories as drawn by some extraordinary figure... nothing immediate or outward happening […]. If our external agitation is shocking, on the screen of printed pages, all the more so on the stageboards, a materiality upright in gratuitous obstruction. Yes, the Book or that monograph it becomes of a type (the superimposition of pages as in a jewel-case, defending an infinite, intimate, trucked-in delivery of
(the) being in itself against brutal space) is sufficient with many a truly new procedure analogous in refraction to the subtlest features of life. in a present that plays (at being) effaced so as to cover some more hybrid underside...materiality upright in gratuitous obstruction.[[23]](#footnote-23)

Ideal structures, in Derrida’s opinion, would respond to the poetics of in-spacing. In this cluster of opening, the movement of close-apart-open is not a question of the symptomatic tie but the symbiotic tie of “being with-in” the “outlook.”

Mallarmé himself indeed envisioned the internal reality of a poem and the ideal architecture of the objects the poem must reorder within itself: grottos, diamonds, spiderwebs, rose windows, kiosks, shells, all stand as so many images which translate the search for a total correlation of nature within itself, a perfect equalization of all things […]. The keystone of this architecture, functioning as the absolute center through which everything communicates, balances out, and is neutralized […]. Mallarmé’s thematics itself provides us with the technical tools needed for its own elucidation.[[24]](#footnote-24)

In the offset of grammatology, an obelisk continuum subsumed within a “felicity of expression,” the “as such” effortlessly echoes “state equilibrium.” Does the irreducibility of gender inseminate a physiology of writing, engulfed in the simplicity of this evocation as well as the complexity of the effortless presumptuousness of “this,” an erect in transcendence? If there is a “surplus” mark in this polysemy of “blanks” and “folds,” theological in retribution, the latter arguably associates the notion of “the precursor” with a wide spectrum of the “overdue,” without, however, being liable to deposited inventory as such. A more scientific comprehension shies away from partaking the immaculate birth to an overdue. Instead, it fully exposes the retractions and refractions oblivious to the language in range: the terrific, the magnificent, the miraculous. The disciples’ testimonials are, at best, eyewitness accounts of mystifying boundaries, but, of themselves, ultimately have recourse to the disciple in the discipline, the blank in the fold. As “an inexhaustible totality of semantic valences,” what exactitude defines the “in-bounds” of this space now ?[[25]](#footnote-25) The now is always an “upright fixity” to a certain stand-out in interpellation. Innumerable imperfection, however, in the “plu-presence” irreducible in form, formation, information to the dislodges of de-formation, that is, transformations based on no original form and no raw material[[26]](#footnote-26). This inter-surface of space, I would argue, is in need of a more articulated notion of birth, as such, whereas Derrida would argue for a more meticulous approach to writing in the wake of grammatology, and Hegel perceives the “epigraph,” in interpellated reading, as an itemized “raw corpus in the warehouse of philosophical determination, namely an “epigraphic premises” entrusted to past irrelevancy, to the past of its irrelevancy.

The very attempt to determine the relationship of Philosophical work to other efforts concerning the same subject introduces an ‘alien and irrelevant’ interest, which obscure precisely that which matters for the reconfiguration of the truth.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Oblivion recounts, “the blank folds over,” “the folds fold,” “the fold of the blank” and “closed by the frame,” so to speak. The praxis of “illusions,” “errors,” “irrelevancy” is contingent on their disseminations, on “the intactness of some absolute opening.” Reading happens by the “red blades of the knife.” The language whose “gambol” is the taxonomy of the “white” polysemic referent marks up a principal valence, a reboot of the “blank paper,” the “glacier,” the “snowy peak,” the “swan,” the “ceiling” in the lateral capacity of the particular articulation of the simplicity of the “as such” of the properly conceived. Reciprocity revamps a discipled question hedging “phonic difference” rather than “intuitive presence” on the death of the canonical mother, on the polysemic series of re-inscribing within a sequence no longer arched.[[28]](#footnote-28) Mobility is simultaneously immobility; in this co-narration, the legibility of no consequence deconstructs a canonized but not necessarily immortalized death of the mother. On that ground of proximity, Armour writes:

A failed plentitude gives rise to speech’s supplantation by writing but, in so far a failed plentitude attends speech as well as writing, speech’s origin lies in writing.[[29]](#footnote-29)

A formidable text on the faltered conceptuality of origin withheld from grammatology’s exergue withholds the question of canonization: *Frankenstein*. The narrative conceptualizes plentitude as the enigma canonizing the death of a mother, thereby extending the “supplementary blank” to the predicament of the theological. The unreadability of the signified re-marks the blank in the structure of the text. Finitude, as Derrida continues to argue, resurges as erasure, disappearances and as nonsense in the blank of the hymen and the fold. To “accident” the occident is vaguely autobiographical. Among the configuration “Homage to Wagner,” referring perhaps to the singularity of the text “Homage to the father,” in reference to the divinity of singularization, the constellation of blank, the practically empty space, holds no “beneficent figures” next to the nothing of the hymen: next to no hymen, next to no phenomenological affinity with the hymen. Regardless of this complex rehabilitation, these debates and their contingencies are arbitrary semantic signifiers, themselves within the semiology of magnetization and production. Logocentric entry in the blank, the shortcoming of analogy, and further ambiguities surrounding the notion of supplementation unfold into reprehensive metaphysics and logocentrism’s economy of truth. The tropes of the father, as Armour argues, “[figure] prominently in relation to writing and beyond in the platonic corpus”.[[30]](#footnote-30) Armour insinuates that, in the Platonic corpus, the value of writing measures proximity as much as it is the measure of proximity to the father. Gravity falls. *Frankenstein*, the modern *Prometheus,* in this context, is at worst a hyperbolic occident arguing for the accidentally canonical, insofar as Frankenstein the doctor does not. Perhaps Frankenstein’s conceptuality of origin, as an exergue on the exergue, is henceforth an inexplicable eschatological denunciation that crosses all categories, capacities, and intentions. Suffice it to say, the *Of Grammatology* exergue is, possibly in retrospect and in its aftermath, an infinite assurance on the accidental introsection of origin. “The excavation of writing,” as Armour calls it, warns against the danger of “recapitulation”.[[31]](#footnote-31) The tradition of disclaiming safeguards and upholds the assumption that there is no monstrosity to a world of written disclaimers. Derrida’s exergue arguably “floats out” in bewilderment a question of origin by not referring to *Prometheus* in *Frankenstein* nor *Prometheus* in his exergue on monstrosity*.*

*Frankenstein* inundates an agreement, short of being a contract, between Mary Shelley and the group of friends she was staying with at that time: Mary, Percy, Byron, Claire and Polidori (Byron’s personal physician). They all had been reading German ghost stories in French translation when Byron suddenly announced: “We will each write a ghost story.” They all agreed to write ghost stories. Only Mary Shelley wrote *Frankenstein*. This singularity has modestly, if not convincingly, grappled with the origin of faltered agreements and the evasiveness of associated causalities. The undifferentiated space between peace and silence, a “causality of miming,” conjures not the real in fact but the colliding “cipher.” How does a contingency of explicated writing in faltered irreducibility write itself into the science of writing outside a transient existentialist cogito of a Prometheus, in mime, in miming mimesis? Prometheus-Frankenstein, as argued in the introduction to Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein,* is “the product of Mary Shelley’s own intuitive genius, even if biographical literary and philosophical factors influencing her outlook were left indelibly fixed in the story. It was her astonishing ability to synthesize these factors into a vital whole that makes the achievement so remarkable”.[[32]](#footnote-32) *Frankenstein* is a synthesizing exigency, the outcome, now, of a singularity harbored in sheer repression within the writing conditions to be within the aftermath of an overdue. In a hasty conclusion, the creation of *Frankenstein*,written todisseminate a primal interest in science, is a monopoly on origin as the origin of disclaimed writings. It is arguable whether what is being disclaimed here is the simple origin of faltered agreements. Grammatology acknowledges generality in retrospect, the risk of monstrosity promising the original birth of the disclosed disclaimer. Such acknowledgments of risk, Ferguson argues, in and of themselves, however, are not questions of production, distribution and consumption but rather what points or “appoints” structures, hence, the absence of precision conveys above all “the desire to avoid claiming that one has arrived at truth”.[[33]](#footnote-33) Inherent to site-pondering is perhaps a *Prometheus*-inheritance in the debasement of structure. “On that dreary night”: this citation inexplicably declares the first-intended scissions of the red blade knife to be out of the question.

On what conditions can birth, as such, and birth as the effortless effort to address a predicament of origin be questions put to grammatology as questions of grammatology? In the space of radical intelligibility, genesis contentiously circumscribes, contentiously is circumscribed, by the metaphysics of radical intelligibility. Let us begin with a hypothesis, if not a “straightened” stipulation: it is a re-commandment to outlive, to outsource the literal meaning of genesis. The extent to which we can convincingly transcend the question of birth as such presupposes a form of indeterminations ruffled in the fringe concerns *Of Grammatology*. The strictly non-philosophical measures are unavoidable risks or pitfalls for philosophy. Teleologically eccentric exposition, necessarily, though, defines a trustee on restitutions. A numerating disregard for writing’s disassociable prior disarray is overly due to biographical and psychological narratives. In “Transcendental Difference and Auto-Relation,” John W. P. Philips argues that repression, deviation and “the degree to which it is an ‘error’ reveals what Philips [quoting Ronse here] recalls the repression of the actual condition of writing”.[[34]](#footnote-34) On what matters for restitutions can be read from John W. P. Philips’ reference to Hegel’s status quo, as being nothing short of an enigma in the presence of parenthesis:

The very attempt to determine the relationship of a philosophical work to other efforts concerning the same subject introduces an alien and irrelevant interest, which obscure precisely that which matter for the reconfiguration of the truth.[[35]](#footnote-35)

“Concourse consciousness,” a contention in writing, manifest in writing, is heavily invested in philosophical prefigures, determining the aporetic notion of “a mark infinitely repeatable,” an encryption within “in-stilled” “destitution. Grammatology conjures up a set of problems that *Of Grammatology*, in retrospect, inundates. Philips’ axioms pondering composition are concealed from parenthesized relevance in the excess of citation. The enigmatic sense of writing, John W. P. Philips argues, “constitutes writing in general within the essentials of a structure”.[[36]](#footnote-36) The specular value of writing disseminates into the present tense and, as Philips continues to argue, “cannot be the notion of a mark repeatable to infinity”.[[37]](#footnote-37) Christopher Johnson argues that “the conceptualization of genetic codes as a form of script is obviously of capital interest to philosophers interested in language. Conservative and metamorphic code, the idea of DNA as a cybernetic circuit based on the movement of information around a circuit rather on the static storage of information, is a dynamic process of instilled difference – difference”.[[38]](#footnote-38) Is it a truism to say that genesis is an ontological empiricism? The ontology of adequation, the grammatological radicalization of the science of writing, is dependent on the ontology of being sexually marked in general. This preliminary association defers the difference between the mark and being sexually marked and is freighted with numerous questions, as a result, within the realm of ethical responsibility. There is no value to the mark, the latter remains a writing prerogative, “a presumption of an order, and a discloser, a systematic representation within zero value” feminism.[[39]](#footnote-39) Cybernetic robotic data depreciates when the forefront of the science of writing is grammatology. The question of the technique relating to cybernetic programming, for example, deconstructs not only the irreducibility of gender/sexual difference, but, more ambitiously, the symbolic apparatus of the machine. The irreducibility of machine-based production to birth can only be radicalized: the effortless furrows, a borrowed viability that writes itself with questions of cybernetic transparency, another disclosure whose generosity of exposition harbors the greatest expectations of all. To speculate on the question of sexual difference, as such, Heidegger argues that, in the radical absence of difference, being outside technologies of productions is, however, within the difference of sexual difference, not of sexual difference as it pertains to gender. In *Ontology and Equivocation*, Elizabeth Grosz argues that Heidegger insists that *Dasein* is a neutral term, a term that must be stripped of its humanist, egoist, anthropomorphic association, and characteristics to be understood in terms of fundamental ontology.[[40]](#footnote-40) Therefore, in addition to the question of responsibility, there is a question of procreation redundant with circumstanced circularity, a circumpending capacity within contracting jurisdiction and contouring constituency, an implacable formless turn that returns to ontology and birth as such. What, then, is the fortress of intelligibility in this passage to ontology? The specificity of what Heidegger circumfesses, namely the neutrality of sexual difference, cannot, in the science of difference, astutely differentiate, even though, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, neutrality is tantamount to “the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity” and foresees ontology’s equivocation.[[41]](#footnote-41) Sexual indifference predicated in difference is neither neutrality in gender nor gender. A crossed-out pre-differential state of neutrality wavers an intrinsic order. Radical intelligibility is supposedly cybernetic. The notion of programming that defies all limits becomes, therefore, a contingency for writing. In that muted space of writing, the mutiny of disclosed writing is a discloser. Suffice it to say that the language addressing the question of language is not cybernetic mutations. For now, the questions of “threading out” what pertains to this question are provocatively more evocative. If composition is a teleological deviation, the question then is a parenthesis at the margins of writing. The hymen of a contentious presence in the absence of birth “as such” for grammatology regroups “the sublimate of an instigated abstraction” and defines “a Hegelian cite-attraction”.[[42]](#footnote-42)

The novel *Le Perjure* was titled *Mercure de France*, interestingly committing the self, under oath, to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. What can survive on this incidental, confessional pledge? And moreover, what vantage can be foreseeable, unthought, in its indicative horizon? Immediately, a contentious sense resounding in perjury perjures a crisis. The latter may be nothing more or less than, as Asfour argues in *Wrongful Enrichment*, “fictitious contractual privity”[[43]](#footnote-43) whereby the plaintiff, in this case, Chalier, dispenses with the wrong (repents, asks for forgiveness, and so on) and consents to “morphologic compensation” (*Mercure de France* is now titled *Le Perjurer*). A constituent recognition affirms a perspective on a “subsidiary part” to be out of acquisition but within the perjurer’s own deprived claim for a proceeding precedent, Chalier.[[44]](#footnote-44) Restatement, Asfour continues to argue, “prescribes the laws of restitutions” by sourcing what is considered indispensable for legal “concourse development” in the United States.[[45]](#footnote-45)

I sincerely promised in the past, but time has passed, precisely, passed, surpassed, and he, one who promised, long ago or in the past, can remain faithful to his promise, but it is no longer me, I am no longer the same me, I am another, *I* is another, I have changed, everything has changed, the addressees of the promise as well. For example: I was in love, I am in love no longer in the same way, I love someone else, and I am unable to account for that, myself, ask the other who decides this for me.[[46]](#footnote-46)

The Chalier “sorrow affair” is an incidental miscellaneous that falls within the irregularities of the anacoluthon and exemplifies what a perjury of promise scrutinizes politically. A professor who had cheated on a television quiz show constitutes no threat to inherited entitlement. The audience/student noticed the difference between the return pending on the professor cheating on this show and the question of cheating the administration. The investigation of this breach of oath was conducted by the Quaker lady who signed the letter convoking him to Washington. This investigation was necessary for the winner of the first fellowship awarded by the Papaios foundation. The problematics of the novelist’s narrative character-witness to the question of perjury are foundational. The space of that maneuvering is literary to the extent that it succeeds in questioning this perjury as the origin of perjury. Boundaries are consolidated within the performative confines of Chalier’s second marriage. Chalier finds himself being charged by his first wife and subjected to legal proceedings by the American authorities. In this seriousness of questioning perjury, this faded incident of writing became the ciphered space of discussing meta-narratives. Equating, as Asfour argues, Anglo-American common law with James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* or Hercules with the “empire laws” is an “ongoing enterprise,” “a novel serialization” reflecting a prudent perspective on law, in its own interpretations and applicability. The deselect stemming from what Asfour sees as “legal contracts and normative uncertainties,” has an infinite, not an abyssal, resistance to “meta-narrative”.[[47]](#footnote-47) The story about the writing of the story over there in America circumfesses “a quasi-contract on restitution and wrongful enrichment,” as Asfour might argue, but to what does it make us liable, by means of justice? What does it really comprise? What are its boundaries and borders that can perjure the novel to the certitude of canonical presence? Is it possible to ask such a question without speculating on origin, as the origin of perjury? The Christian marriage of politics and repentance is an act of “espionage” on the noticeably diffused notions and styles of a past in the retrospect of its relevance of incidents, choices, characters, and events. These “faded” notions, however, are remarkably extended and extend remarkably. The indefiniteness of textuality is an “incident,” the depletion of the reflected in refracting. The predicament of formality structures debasement. “Before the I there was you” no longer has the threading of the S before P, only the certainty of Plato before Socrates. This, sequentially, promises depth in this fidelity to Platonic-Christian eschatology. Such question would have to hold a prior “claim” on the Platonic transformation of the myth, namely Christianity, arguing that the elusiveness of an event wavered. For Gasché, the understanding of the gift thereby remains obscure, at best.

“Uncanny reversal,” a case study of the occupy movement in Zuccotti Park, for example, precipitates a form of return to more normative proliferations of elusiveness. “Occupy has come to Oakland,” is more than a slogan and less than a profession that one can intelligibly make in view of academic disciplines.[[48]](#footnote-48) An iconic insurgency such as the ballerina standing on the Bull is ostensibly declarative of her intention not to kill the bull. “Coming alive against the background” aligns with the position “not to kill the king” and, with that, the disappearance of the arrest. As Mitchell continues to argue, a surveillance of the event “mic check” resolutely resonates with Rousseauistic attribute declaration regarding the sound of the human voice in promising an echo-connection to the “foundational figure of democracy itself”.[[49]](#footnote-49) Mass-ornamentation is a sovereign momentum that extends and retracts “empty spaces,” as realized on a monumental scale in “Tahrir Square,” “occupied Parliament Square,” “Moscow’s Red Square,” “Tiananmen Square in Beijing,” the “Champs-Elysées,” is an “exuberant style” shuffled to attending primacy. What is then “civil disobedience” when, as Harcourt argues, “there is nothing to overthrow in America?”.[[50]](#footnote-50) The affirmative of this response is weighted in relation to more emerging ideas such as the third space or the fourth left succession of radical social movements in the United States,[[51]](#footnote-51) but even more interestingly, the decentralized network echoes the more formative “segnon” of the “blockchain’s” demystifying algorithms. In the wake of this “body of crisis,” how do we then move to engendered speculations on “self-authoring” phenomena in their promo-confrontation? The question is posed by *Le Perjurer* in a far more interesting manner on a treatise tilling the ground-furrow of personhood. Tristrapaedia, a form of treatise written, as Keenleyside argues, for Tristam alone, specifying the meaning of civil society, to be in their domestic sphere but with this originating notion of a man, woman, and bull/ox, as identity pertaining more directly to the plight of the ploughman and nourishment.[[52]](#footnote-52) Keenleyside then turns the discussion to Locke and Descartes, seeking a more proper philosophical, intuitive approach inspired by selfhood, self and consciousness.

I turn to Anscombe because I think she articulates something very close to the model of personhood or self-consciousness that Locke, at times, intimates and that Sterne fleshes out. […] Lockean: self-consciousness means “consciousness of the self.” […] Anscombe contends that this Lockean form of self-consciousness runs aground in much the same way as the *cogito*: by looking for something that is not there, trying ,as Hume puts it, to “catch *myself.*” Properly understood, Anscombe argues, the hyphen in “self-consciousness” does not function to split subject from object (as she thinks it does in Locke). Instead, the hyphen serves to disrupt the usual logic of predication and denominate the curious phenomenon of speaking in the first person. To illustrate the use of “I” she is after, Anscombe cites the example of a man who has lost his memory and no longer knows that he is “Smith, a man of such-and-such a background.” Anscombe points out that he may not know that he is such-and-such a man, but “he has neither lost the use of ‘I,’ nor is he usually at a loss what to point to as his body, or as the person he is.”[[53]](#footnote-53)

The usurpation of this canonical imperative in *Le Perjure*, for example, “The hills of Bohemia Andalusia, Crete, everything attracted him, except the country whose accent he found so ugly”,[[54]](#footnote-54) is a formidable problematic in fullness and plentitude. Paul de Man confided to Derrida that what holds fragmented fiction, Hölderlin in America, prior to its inclusion in the publication of *Mercure de France*, conveyed, to an extent, part of de Man’s life: “If you wanted to know part of my life, read Hölderlin”.[[55]](#footnote-55) It is to be argued discursively that effortless viability is a sentiment so enticing for interpretive readings. There is nothing Stephane Charlier desired more than being less present in America. In a stunned silence, Taussig envisions the “clickety-clack of an Apollonian Zuccotti peddling and ethnographic magic”.[[56]](#footnote-56) An anxiously dichotomized gender, *Pussy Panic*’s first response to the fiction maintained highlights the feminist predicament in the woman we follow, as the “primatology” we follow in dissociative triple readings.[[57]](#footnote-57)

There are at least three ways of reading and interpreting it, three ways of situating its thematic referent, but each of the three haunts the others. Each of the three raises the number of titles (3+n), to be sure, but each also make apparent the title’s intrinsic multiplicity. Each recall as well its divisibility, without possible end, its essential disassociation, its internal interruption.[[58]](#footnote-58)

This reading names the performative in the three grammars of the future and the three performatives in the grammar of three futures; three commitments or three promises to be kept in the now of beginnings. These three performatives are not just anyone: they are carried now by verbs such as “to be,” “to go,” “to know,” or “I will be there,” “I will go,” “I will know”.[[59]](#footnote-59) Will “he” not be Hölderlin in America! If there is a singularity to perjuring perjury, is it Hölderlin? There is a heritage to this question that coincides, perhaps in haste, immediately with the sublimation of mourning and, in the foreseeable future, with the project disclaiming the responsibility towards the divine heritage of Athens and Rome. From this standpoint, we can understand Gasché’s claim that “essential Christianity is an acknowledged emergence of responsibility in the face of everydayness and sacredness”.[[60]](#footnote-60) In sublimation, as Cixous argues, what arrives happens.

Are Philia and Alethia at the table with me and with Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy? No? Yes? In truth, we share the need to share. to eat at the same time, to taste what the others like to eat, to feast [...] But I know I am preaching to friends who share my experience, at least philosophically, so I will stop.[[61]](#footnote-61)

“A split in the all-inclusive terms of restitutions,” as Asfour puts it, is a cordial structure not only reminiscent but also affirmative of a proper anacoluthon exposed to its signified impact.[[62]](#footnote-62) This grammatical possibility playfully appropriates. A legal congeniality in the foregrounds of writings contingently debriefs its own entangled complexities and the playfulness of the present writing. This enormous adventure in appropriation: “will ‘he’ not become Hölderlin in America?” is a rhetorical question that merits a sober consciousness and withstands the automaton of “I cannot adequately respond to such self-denying gift”.[[63]](#footnote-63) Is this automated paternity, within the tradition or heritage of “the gift,” a question to beginnings in any beginning? Origins contest beginnings! There is a casual, perhaps unusual, satisfaction in the sacrificial threshold of this here and this now. The “giving in,” the “giving away” by grave recollection, no matter how it is contemplated or eulogized, respectfully aspires to the continuity of “logical mining” in the tradition of the promise. Substituted presence, an ex-post to an established case as Asfour sees it, an ex-post grammatical mishap, now names the anacoluthon “executive body” forged in no satirical undertakings but perhaps forged in legendary grounds.[[64]](#footnote-64) Having said that, can we then be sacrificed in this “disgorgement” here and now? In retrospect, this is emphatically a question.

The ideal singularity, as Gasché would argue, cannot compromise a connection to Christianity. Heidegger’s notion of the “exemplar” and de facto Heideggerian *Dasein* weave a textual understanding of difference in the text, marked by extensions stretching from Rousseau to Claude Lévi-Strauss. Christianity’s heretical, redundant interest in renewed crossing (Rousseau, Strauss), “these textual extensions,” must be crossed with Christianity’s broader wavering textuality. In *Of Grammatology*, Strauss interviews an anthropologist, but in keeping with neutrality, also interviews a member of the Nambikwara, and if you wish, Rousseau’s by-standing apprentice. The disciples’ real and borrowed “textual extensions,” the intelligibility of seamless transiency, engender here the comprehension of difference. The vagueness of the umbilical extension, the question of birth “as such,” risks, at this point, no ambiguity. The presumed Heideggerian neutrality, truism “as such,” is no more or less than applicable neutrality in waivered textuality. The neutrality of the exemplary, such as the one described above, is phenomenal, not necessarily phenomenological. However, a political critique of the force of law, for example, as Fraser argues, would be able to show how an apparatus of legal judgment can be a vehicle for the cooperation of masked structural violence when it is constrained by constitutional principle to protect private property in the means of production.[[65]](#footnote-65) In the discharge of Fraser’s insight, one must conclude that an event is only contingently a legal precedent of a masked constituency anticipated in the transiency of commencement. What is problematically co-gendered in this notion of production within the general problematics of sexual difference suggests that any horizons of the “envoi,” if it exists, are dispelled in greater affinities with the predicament of “birth.”

Heidegger’s topology elucidates the internal possibility of the multiplication of which *Dasein*’s own body represents an organizing factor-element and yet is not offered, based on hyperbolic saturation.[[66]](#footnote-66) Re-figuring the subject more precisely in Heidegger’s analytical tradition of sexual difference is a debate, above all, on the assessment of the problem of “engendering.” To recognize a problem, and to recognize the problem in the configuration or re-figuration of sexual difference, engenders feminism within values, foundations, and systems of infinite multitude. “Sexual difference is more topical than ever, and in the context of the European community’s, apparent philosophical scheme in the mishap of writing forms the de-voids of gender”.[[67]](#footnote-67) In the play-off of foundational presence, Braidotti asks if we are sufficiently present: “The nomadism of our texts and belongings in the wake of the European de-unionization and the nuclearization of daily normative life re-figuring the subject matter of Virginia Woolf, is presence”.[[68]](#footnote-68) In hastiness, this post-script subscribes Virginia Woolf’s nomadism to “a latter” Coca-Cola situation of prescribed “irradiation” in relation to the company’s expanded notion of a “global village” and “cultural forms.” “Technologies of the self,” the “politics of the self,” the “acquisition of subjectivity” rhizome out of effective foundations. The radicalization in the here and now inundates a different temperament and an urgent temporality that are not crises, but matters of re-configuration in the philosophical logos.

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*Dasein*, in its neutrality, must not be confused with existent. *Dasein* only exists in factual concretion, to be sure, but this very existence has its originary source (*Urquell*) an internal possibility in *Dasein* as neutrality. The analytic of this origin does not deal with existence itself. Precisely because it precedes them, such an analytic cannot be confused with a philosophy of existence, with a wisdom (which could be established only within the “structure of metaphysics”), or with a sermonizing that would teach this or that “world view,” it is therefore not at all a “philosophy of life.” Which is to say that a discourse on sexuality of this order (wisdom, knowledge, metaphysics, philosophy of life or of existence) falls short of every requirement of an analytic of *Dasein* in its very neutrality.[[69]](#footnote-69)

 The asexuality of “the being there,” *Geschlechtslosigkeit* is not a tribute to transcendence, but rather an aspect that fissures leaps within the harmonious structures of the gendered physiology of loopholes. Spivak, in “On French Feminism in an International Frame,” argues that “fracture, knowing (epistemology), being (ontology), doing (practice), history, politics, economics, institutions as such” are customized structures whose origins and ends are necessarily provisional and absent,[[70]](#footnote-70) with “female sexual pleasure independent from the need of production”.[[71]](#footnote-71) Apparent neutrality induces the question of sexual difference to the neutrality of conduct. Neutrality is a function of production. It remains to be argued that the contingencies of sexual difference are reducible to Heidegger’s contingency of *Dasein*. The radical offsets of “event context signature” delimit the signifying power to what Spivak argues in “On French Feminism in an International Frame”*:* “indeterminate suggestions rather than determinate references that could overwhelm and sabotage the signifying conventions”.[[72]](#footnote-72) There ought to be, therefore, and this is perhaps what I have been trying to argue for some time now, a binding emerging or emergency constitutionality to the neutrality when the question relates to difference. Whether it is Heideggerian, feminine, theological, structuralist or simply deconstruction, the question of the “uniqueness” in the neutrality of exemplified being ciphers in the philosophical milieu a political condemnation to the detriment of speech. I am Plato. In the history of the error, I am the truth.

The Platonic inheritance promising the truth is unquestionably extensive. The truth can only be contemplated in the duality of error-truth. In these old fashions, their tentative nature is an issue. The venture primes logocentrism to the non-dialectical motion in the production of an ideal. Is it, therefore, outrageous to assume that Platonic irreducibility constitutes the writing of the history of error? The Platonism of arrivals is foregrounded in itineraries. Plato must arrive. It is arguable whether it is the history of error that deliberates Plato to his presence or further exploration of what, in Plato’s terms, has not arrived at Christianity or by means of Christianity. The question of the “as such” presents itself here, therefore, in this style of deliberation. The contrary, the counterfeit, the other in its absoluteness are contested by a much grander European project of urbanization, one that is fathomable only in responsibility. As Gasché indicates, the heirs of European discourses, Hegel, Heidegger, and Husserl, to name a few, “address Europe from the perspective of its end as the end (in the sense of telos)”.[[73]](#footnote-73) Is it an issue in constitution to name this history of error and conjure up an itinerary of arrival? What does this linguistic attentiveness (urbanization) ground?

Platonism hinges truth-contingencies on perspective-arrivals. There is no conceived irreducibility to this Platonism, in mentioning Plato. The “as such,” I would argue, articulates an “arrival” in hyperbolic saturation, confiding nothing more than the indeterminacy of Plato’s notion of the “envoi.” Unfolding and decorum are obvious propositions, pointing to historicity in the yields of the line, conducive to the historical sacredness of irreducible mobility, a synonymous arrival substantially reconfiguring the thinking of “arrival,” but not the “arrive,” of Plato. The seriousness of the hyperbolic accusation is profound. The horizon of “no more” is structurally bound up with that of economics, technics, and ideology. An “empirically coarse” and convoluted extremity of crimes against humanity, a morbid speech, decanonize the canon, safeguarding “the public national and international truth”.[[74]](#footnote-74) The hyperbolic, the excessiveness of lies and promises, prompt, at this point, no juridical response. Useful lies in “distributed emphasis” are obligating serviceable errors.[[75]](#footnote-75) The hyperbolic saturation is, therefore, speculative. Juridical initiations offer further regrets as regards the exemplary historical manifold on Nazism to be, Eichmann. The latter, as Hannah Arendt argues, is a hyperbolic abstention within a historical juridical system that remains ambitiously historical in reviewing and disseminating chronology.

Two examples taken from European politics restage lies of the modern type. The actors in this restaging are de Gaulle and Aderauer. The former claimed, and almost succeeded in making citizens believe, that “France belongs among the victors of the last war”; the latter “that the barbarism of National Socialism had affected only a relatively small percentage of the country.” (TP, 252) These examples are framed by formulas that opposes once again in the *traditional* political lie to the *modern* rewriting of history.[[76]](#footnote-76)

A flagged origin, an egoistic identification by untimely knowledge, can only be an “immaculate” threat in judgment. De Gaulle’s interrogations construe, to an extent, what typifies the philosophical question of debasement. This chief revelation would bear on De Gaulle’s consumerism rather than on his ministerial leadership. The consumer, as Barthes argues in *Mythologies* while discussing the subjectivity of substance, is, insubstantially, an accomplice to liberation rather than the mere beneficiary of a result. An abrasive modification of matter within its absoluteness defines an immaculate molecular order in *Mythologies*. The matter here, as Barthes continues to argue, endows consumerism with “value-bearing states,” an obscurity at the helm of an establishment that strongly resonates with residual displacement.[[77]](#footnote-77) In sourcing obscurity and errors, science is inseparable from white-paper consumerism (chlorine, ammonia, soap-powders, detergent). Prestige on the evidence of a result is a “dated urgency” comparable in proficiency only to the “detergency” of whiteness.[[78]](#footnote-78) The substance of any contention, as Ferguson points out, “problematizes the inability to register all that we perceive by the constructive device that we developed to endorse or overcome that partiality of Jacques”.[[79]](#footnote-79) What can sufficiently be entrusted to de Gaulle’s hyperbolic period in French history exemplifies the transient horizons rummaged in being impossible. The question of the performative capacity to contemplate, reinstate, as well as explicate, however, transcends the mobility of involuntary “staging” by stooges on the epiphany of the stage continuum.

François Mitterrand, on the periphery of affiliative acknowledgment, states that “the French Republic” had nothing to confess; it did not have to assume the culpability of a period in which it had been put out of action.[[80]](#footnote-80) The truth aggregating the counter-truth, the failing on the juridical ground, is a slippage in consequence neither of the lie nor with the error, irrespective of the irreducible to the irreducibility of the “as such.” The inconclusiveness, at best, animates “the geography of zero proximity.” The whereabouts of François Mitterrand, the grounding of this statement, evaluates “the real in fact” in the conjuring of this interterrestrial spacing. The irreducibility of that statement to search-engine, Mitterrand, is an echo-écoute to *my* irreducibility to the matter of the irreducible in de-act.

 Restituting the truth in pointing is a playful jouissance irreducible to painting, without necessary circumstances pointing at, for example, Mitterrand. Perhaps there is more sedimented reality to painting in pointing. Derrida’s discussion of Van Gogh’s painting of shoes restitutes the shoes to their rightful owner, indefinitely discharges a ghostly debt, the hypokeimenon “as such” of shoes, pointing and painting. Grounding remains the grandiose desire of a specific interest in the use-value of a surplus; the absence of the *Bodenlosigkeit* of Western thought ushers us into a new era. This groundless loss of translation is baseless exaggeration. To say that “I was in search of you, Mitterrand, on the other side of the galaxy,” for example, is reclusively inclusive. The desire to find one’s feet again in grounding, this foundational experience, is egoistic in so far that it complicates us in the question of groundless value. Whatever is lost is supposedly found in that ground-zero restitution. The point in pointing points to Van Gogh’s painting. For what foreseeable reason do we choose to dwell on this point by choice? The spectrum of this spectatorial presence is, therefore, a question of the apprehensiveness in comprehension. My comprehension apprehends.

[T]he ground of the Greek experience is, he says, lacking in this “translation.” “What I have just too hastily called “metaphor” concentrates all the difficulties to come: does one speak “metaphorically” of the ground for just anything? And of walking shoes (clothing, the tool, the institution, even investiture) for thought, language, writing, painting and the rest.

What does Heidegger say? This: As soon as one no longer apprehend the thing as the Greek did, in other words as hypokeimenon but instead as substantia the grounds falls away.[[81]](#footnote-81)

The exchange between Heidegger and Schapiro regarding Van Gogh’s painting reflects the desire to restitute correspondences, most immediately between Heidegger and Schapiro. Van Gogh’s painting of shoes entraps the ground in thinking the groundless, no doubt. But does it point to the “as such,” “the thing in itself” in the Greek tradition, the hypokeimenon? The question of the hypokeimenon, “the thing in itself,” in complete regard to the matter at hand is nothing more than a fleeting instance in Derrida’s text. It may well emphasize a truism: what we fail to complicate in the instant of origin cannot omit a subjective interpellation. There is no “as such” as such, except in this mediated apparition of the thing to itself. Perhaps the “as such” of this “thus far,” the thing to itself, is what, nonetheless, arrives to Derrida. The Greek hypokeimenon therefore appropriates a disputed entrapment in proper inheritance, within the epistemological stretch of copyrights. We can trauma-write the ejection to combustible possibilities. What is then the question of the “as such” that presents itself to Derrida’s consciousness in this trajectory? It is undoubtedly in inheritance. To what extent does Derrida in dismissal, Derrida’s dismissal, precondition the erasure irreducible to the Greek conception of inheritance? Derrida promises an epistemology, premises the comprehension of “as such” on the Greek understanding, positively in that fleeting instant identifying an exchange on hypokeimenon. Does this inheritance inherently inherit? If it does, what does it inherit? It is inherently what? Epistemological copyrights? Can the Greek hypokeimenon, “the thing in itself,” theorize the epistemological copyrights? The possibility of this question opens with the Judaic betrayal and the exchange of money. Did Judas betray Christ for money? How do we begin to contemplate such a possibility? How does theology account for this transient proposition? We can proffer the “as such” of betrayal to Christianity, a narrative describing transcendence as an event to his arrivé. The “as such” saved by the Greek comprehension of the “as such” hypokeimenon risks, therefore, its own betrayal. Is it possible to betray Judas Iscariot’s betrayal? Not biblically. There must, therefore, be a history of responsibility and a presence to the input that has no history, but, nonetheless, writes us into writing innocence. Can this history of imperative accountability, a state pending responsibility, be circumscribed within the general distinction between money and counterfeit money? Can this contention sufficiently address the Christian origin of betrayal as fidelity rather than infidelity, along those lines and in that respect? The Rousseauistic experience on this subject is arguably an order of this order. The rhetorical, here, permeates an extension in Christian temperament coinciding with its theological evocation.

The question of money in Rousseau is contested in delirium and, as such, there is no wider entry point in grounding Rousseau’s confession: it simply demonstrates a peculiar undertaking to money, short of value appreciation, the demarcation of solicited presence conveyed by currency and exchange. The now-three tenses of “a novel presence” construct a privileged outlook, an aimable decay, thereby peculiar to value in the fidelity that coins currency.

I should involve myself in the most boring details were I to continue the subject of my money and its spending – by me or by other people – and to relate all the embarrassment and shame, the repugnance and discomfort and repulsion I have always felt regarding it. But as the reader learns more of my life, he will get to know my disposition and feel all this for himself without my needing to tell him.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Rousseau’s repugnance is well-described in a fleeting gesture of inundation. There is no attempt to conceal his inner thoughts on these matters of engraved value, nor there is an attempt to indulge in explanation. His future disposition on the matter is not immediately in question. It is difficult to imagine from this confession that Rousseau is concerned with currency, value, money or, for that matter, translation. Infidelity “in itself” is not a subject in Rousseau’s confession, but money as an abstraction is in question here. The whereabouts of the counterfeit item reveal an utter lack of interest in future ambiguity. Are prefaces confessional to another acknowledgment? Is there merit to this question? Rousseau’s taxonomy exonerates from further staggering involvement in the counterfeit and ushers us into a less delirious modernity, one receptive of this disengaged Mitterrandian “political real.” This sentiment intuitively suggests that what is out of temperament in Rousseau, however, liaisons -risk Rousseau, less by the desire to “coin reality,” to say nothing of the counterfeit walkathon.

The absolute nature of contemporariness questions further ambiguities surrounding the being in disjointed modernity. The notion of “citadinity” refers to “city squares” in relation to “idealized ideology,” with a special interest in the mosque as a space existing in the overload of melodic space. Reasoning “an indigenous self-expression” to be within the latter asserted insertion of Israeli “statehood” indefinitely reclaims the mundane socio-economic “politique real”.[[83]](#footnote-83) Is it counterproductive to address postmodernity from a disengaged perspective, recalling the aspects that are out of joint? The question of the fidelity of repetition insofar as it recalls Rousseau’s hypothetical absolute risks only the re-possession of recollection. From the perspective of the biblical absolute of betrayal, however, the sim-factor remains a reduced impact in a monopolized meddling, mediating Rousseau to the disseminated presence of betrayal. To what extent we can dwell on this travesty is another question.

I was engraving medals of a sort to serve me and my fellows as the insignia of an order of chivalry when I was caught by my master at this illegal pursuit and severely beaten. He accused me of teaching myself to forge money, for these medals of ours bore the arms of the Republic. I can freely swear that I had no idea of false money, and very little of true coin, and knew more about the making of Roman denarii than of our three sou bits.[[84]](#footnote-84)

Perhaps there is nothing more incriminating for voluntary confessions than the concealment of the truth: there is no confession that does not confess its desire to confess the involuntary. Such engraving desire models, by meddling, the absolute in Rousseau: “I had no idea of fake money. I knew more about Roman denarii”.[[85]](#footnote-85) The Greek hypokeimenon, the thing in and of itself, grants a foreseeable exchange in terminated difference. If we must speak falsely, the truth regardless is here in reinstating, perhaps, the truth. The absoluteness of that engraving is substitutional in a besieged scope. The “as such” of the Greek inheritance leases out a fleeting instant to regain itself. The frontiers of the undecidable confronts us: Isaac was sacrificed in the undecidable, Isaac was sacrificed at the boundaries of the undecidable, Isaac must not be sacrificed. The performative manifestation of a lie promises reinstatement in the Abrahamic truth. The uncompromisable cannot be sacrificed at the riverbank. An itinerary with no scheduled arrival is Abrahamic in scope, in truth. To what sacrificial origin are we referring when addressing “the irreplaceable Isaac” to “the threshold” of the sacrifice? This radicalism of no radicalization commences the sexually gendered in the nowhere of botany. The differentiated element that is itself subject to gender indifference is supposedly botanical. There is no sexual difference that knows how to intelligibly address the foregrounds of botanical production. There is no tradition of substantiating such restitution. The striking aspect of the question of reproduction is that it can withstand the sacrificing of the source of Abraham’s sacrificial threshold. There is no productive technology as such that does not have a deep interest in the “as such” of sourcing sacrificial origin. Intelligibility, in the tradition of the sacrifice, sacrileges the arguably autobiographical: thy shall not sacrifice thee. The truth “circumstancing” the lie comprehends the name Jacques Derrida to be without equal.

If I have insisted on a massive fact, namely, that this unrefined, square, solid, decidable, in a word *frank* definition of the lie delimits a prevalent concept in our culture it is first because no ethics, no law or right, no politics could long withstand, precisely in our culture, its pure and simple disappearance.[[86]](#footnote-86)

 To what intelligibility does this unrefined, decidable solid square refer? Infinity, as such, withstands a structure of deliberation, resists further elaboration, and cannot transcend signifying the sacrificial: it finds itself bizarrely in the semiotic sacrilege of yet another synchronously dominated rehabilitation. In essence, initiated horizons camouflage each other at their own sacrificial threshold. The sacrifice is unfathomable in its abbreviation. Does the sacrificial comprise a sacrificed “bio” and is it, to that measurable extent, Abrahamic in teleological contention and visibility? How do we then contemplate the question of the solidly square? How do we deliberate withstanding significance intelligibly? In this turbulent jouissance, there is a faint recognition that a derailed autobiography cannot risk the autographic sacrifice. A signified imperceptibility, as Ferguson argues in *“*Jacques Derrida and the Critique of the Geometrical Mode,” individuates a cultural threshold passing and/or surpassing the mono of that individuation and, in effect, questions the determination of discontinuities. The botanical individual, as she calls it, is a form of manifestation that interrogates a presumed autographic manifesto of species in precipitated reclines. There is no manifest order seeking the prohibition of “thy shall not sacrifice thee.” The irreplaceable jeopardized by botanical individualization or otherwise does not replace Isaac in playfulness. A broader sense of logical investigations can contemplate typified “absurdities” in “formal procedures,” but recognizes, nonetheless, aptness determining logical geometrical space within unmediated awareness, pure and simple. A cubic vantage point manifests a squarely subsidiary taxonomy in evidencing, to use Mitchell’s term, a “quantum cloud” contention in relation to the differentiated character of the sign.[[87]](#footnote-87) A re-called “point of closures” well resides the system deep structure. Irreplaceability, such as ontologized sacrifice, fathoms the irreplaceable Isaac to be on “the threshold” of the sacrifice as the sacrifice. Meaning in a “predicative form” or, as Derrida puts it, “forms of possible reference to an object,” circumfess not only their sense of error but more importantly an “aberration” by being “of course,” swayed in a way as if in the whorl of persuasion.[[88]](#footnote-88) “A supra-empirical generality” cannot categorically be indicative of comparable form and content without such “conventional designations”.[[89]](#footnote-89) The truly temporal is a predicament revealing, as Derrida proceeds to argue, “a temporality inorganic with wavering allegory or satire.[[90]](#footnote-90) More perplexing still, allegory as it were, from beyond the grave (jackals, cats, leopards…) conceptualizes no supremacy. Within jurisdiction, this is an impressing juridical judgment.

After closing the pharmacy Plato went to retire, to get out of the sun. He took few steps in the darkness toward the back of his reserve, found himself leaning over the *Pharmakon*, decided to analyze... The night passes. In the morning, knocks are heard at the door. They seem to be coming from outside, this time.

Two knocks… four…

But maybe it’s just a residue, a dream, a bit of dream left over an echo of the night… that other theatre, those knocks from without…[[91]](#footnote-91)

In “Allô Allô,” Melville argues that “the hermeneutics in a contemporary scope are barely hermeneutics at all” and, at some point, their diachronic “horizon collapsed into apparently the simpler figure of the chain”.[[92]](#footnote-92) Discursive subjectivity networks and translates, Pinchevski, argues, “writing down systems” in an ultimate appeal for communicative intent.[[93]](#footnote-93) This correlates, in a nutshell, the discovery of the unconscious with technical formality, screening outward “data and noise” vis-à-vis the literal historiography of actual holocaust testimonial.[[94]](#footnote-94) “Modernity” now specifically hedges reproduction, or what Pinchevski refers to as the “mechanism for the inscription of traces,” on the contemporariness of zooming out “the mechanization of nonsense’ from, for example, botanical economy in this indiscriminatory manner of “re-indifference”.[[95]](#footnote-95) Hyperbolic saturation and quintessential productivity arguably “sacrificially introduce” what Pinchevski presupposes is “monopoly script,” a literature pertaining to the story about writing the story, in a study that brings together the new world, over in America.[[96]](#footnote-96) Prophetic paternity subpoenas literature addressable to intelligibility, and remains a crouching knowledge, if you wish, that typifies profound transformative “symbolic mediation”.[[97]](#footnote-97)

Kamuf, in “Composition Displacement,” argues that the nature of composition lies not in decomposition, but rather in displacement. Compositional techniques, she notes, “are disconcerting in the use of the singular first person in general, rather than particular sense which is often a way of testing or extending an argument, trying it out within the grammatical guise of an I, any I.”[[98]](#footnote-98) The question of “double temporality,” as Pinchevski suggests, Auschwitz, and now ellipses “reversable continuity” in the “audio visual archive,” is a paradigmatic holding but foreign to the externalization of medium-intention.[[99]](#footnote-99) “The réquisitoire” to “composer avec” are the diacritical principle of samploké. “If truth is the presence of the eidos, it must always come to terms with (“composer avec”) relation, non-presence, and thus with non-truth.”[[100]](#footnote-100) An “assented” commencement, a dialogue speaking to Egyptian myth, the invention of writing, explicating a valuable and presiding juridical steering commandment on, now, Plato’s Pharmacy. The reversibility of oppositional forces in a court setting are accelerate-attributes safeguarding “contaminated repetition in pure ideality,” ideally, re-naming the *Pharmakon*. A reversal of declared intention, a broader scope on interpretive methods set as violent as they may be on pre-established geopolitical grounds, considering no comparable hyphenated Moses-Jewish identity, is a manifold of “a host nation” cemented in the act of sec-territory-realized Zionism, *Phaedrus* as a dialogue molded in the general apprehensiveness from the state of being rigorously contemporary. On this topic of re-naming presence, Kamuf writes that “Platonism must come to terms with the general space of writing that it does not command, oversee, regulate, and more importantly cannot put under ban”.[[101]](#footnote-101) The place of “exterior mastery” is arguably within the parameters of parricidal réquistioire, dismissive of “the composition avec.” In “Composition Displacement,” the thresholds of duality Kamuf points out are “in-yields” of the imperceptible “parricide”.[[102]](#footnote-102) The “composer avec” surrogate’s disregard for metaphoric actuality, however, portrays a coviding-out situation in the wake of a traumatic holocaust legacy, a psychological principle to the effect of a germ germinating normalcy.[[103]](#footnote-103) From a more imperative perspective, this indispensability argues for, as Pinchevski puts it, an immanent regard to a metaphorical order not in crisis.[[104]](#footnote-104)

I opened the first section of this piece with my proper name, in absolute obliviousness to the “biodegradable” nature of the signature of one’s proper name. Audacious hardly describes my naivety here in assuming that I, in conclusion, admit to amnesia in signing a proper name to this monstrous exergue. But so is the case in the “time of the King” a formulated delirium on amnesia, forgetfulness, and all that can be appropriated to the raspatory signature. Speak of anything except the gift. This is perhaps how writing writes monstrosity. The destiny for departure, signature, commands, the partition, the gift, homesickness, nostalgia, the invisibility of the circle, the particular, the commendable, the indispensable, the unassigned, the apprehension, the shock and “ah” and all the associated forgetfulness. There is no ontological horizon without the absoluteness of the now. This “quadridimensionality” implies the circle, is employed by the circle, the interlacing of a *Geflecht* of the circle, superstitiously ordered, as Derrida argues, by Heidegger. This meta-ethnology, forgetting the state of being forgetful, serves as a pretext to the annulled signature to “signature,” an old-fashioned sign of a disengaged signature.

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