**Chapter 2: Russia’s Conduct Toward the Ukrainian Population During the War**

[GRAPH]

**Russia’s Strategic Goals and Its General Approach Toward the Ukrainian Population**

President Putin’s personal worldview regarding the Ukrainian state and people played a pivotal role in his decision to go to war and in shaping Russia’s strategic goals and operational plan. Most of the Russian elite were surprised by the war, even feeling they had been dragged into it unwillingly. During the past decade, Putin has been obsessed with denying the existence of a Ukrainian people separate from the Russian people and with portraying Ukraine’s orientation toward the West as a Western effort to harm and weaken Russia.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Russia’s has three types of strategic goals concerning the Ukrainian population:

1. The dissolution of Ukraine as a sovereign state entity and its subjugation to Russia;
2. Weakening the West, limiting its involvement in the war, and securing support from the Global South;
3. Strengthening Russia’s ability to withstand external pressures and unifying the Russian public’s support for the war’s objectives.

The original Russian military plan included a lightning-fast seizure of Kiev, overthrowing the Ukrainian government, occupying most of the country within ten days, and completing the takeover, to the point of annexation, by August 2022. This plan relied on four pillars: speed to prevent Western intervention; toppling the central government to make it easier for pro-Russian elements in Ukraine to publicly support the Russian occupation; seizing control of the energy infrastructure and the financial system; and decisively defeating the Ukrainian military, which was considered vastly inferior to the Russian army.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In accordance with this approach, since 2014, the Ukrainian population has been subjected to combined pressure, including information warfare, economic warfare, diplomatic moves, cyber warfare, and subversive activities. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was supposed to be the successful – and brief – culmination of this continuous pressure campaign. The five-pronged invasion, the effort to seize Kiev with breakneck speed, missile strikes across the country, the use of collaborators, cyber-attacks, and digital and information warfare were all intended to create a systemic shock among the Ukrainian population (as part of the broader Ukrainian structure).[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Russia’s Toolkit against the Ukrainian Population**

This subchapter presents the various tools Russia employed in their efforts to influence the Ukrainian population. These are divided into four categories: information warfare, military force, political-diplomatic methods, and economic pressure. These categories will also underlie our analysis of Ukraine and the international actors involved.

**Information Warfare**

Russian thinking about **information warfare, or in Russian terminology, “information confrontation”** (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), has developed as a standalone concept; however, it is also an integral part of the new generation warfare approach. It is conducted continuously with the aim of influencing the perceptions of reality among the rival system’s leadership and public alike.[[4]](#footnote-4) The centrality of information warfare in the Russian “toolbox” derives from it effectively serving as the “glue” between other tools.[[5]](#footnote-5) Among other things, Russia’s information warfare engages in amplifying the impact of is use of military force, diplomatic or economic pressure, and humanitarian efforts.

The Ukrainian population played three roles in Russia’s information warfare:

* As the target for influence: Russia sought to influence the Ukrainians’ behavior with the goals of having the Ukrainians adopt Russia’s narratives regarding the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, casting doubt among Ukrainians on the need for an independent Ukrainian state, showing the West in a negative light, and eliminating opposition to the occupation.
* As a tool for weakening the Ukrainian state, overthrowing its government, and undermining its public legitimacy.
* As a space for action: This involves recruiting collaborators, intelligence sources, and promoting the operational needs of the Russian military.

In the past decade, and particularly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has developed a sophisticated mechanism for conducting information warfare against Ukraine. Some of the components of this mechanism are generic in the sense that they can serve any Russian operational arena and goal. For example, Russia’s central state-controlled media outlets – television channels, news websites, and news agencies – broadcast anti-Ukrainian narratives in the years leading up to and during the invasion. Alongside these outlets, dedicated communication and media tools were directed toward Ukraine for the purpose of filling the Ukrainian “information space” with Russian messages.

The most prominent dedicated mechanism for the Ukrainian arena is the Fifth Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Originally, this was the division responsible for gathering intelligence from outside Russia and the former Soviet republics, but over the past decade, it has become responsible for transferring information and situational assessments about Ukraine to the Kremlin and initiating influence campaigns in the Ukrainian arena.[[6]](#footnote-6) The Fifth Service worked to recruit an extensive network of collaborators in all Ukrainian political, security, and economic systems. These collaborators provided Moscow with inside information and were supposed to assist Russian forces in taking control of Ukraine by providing confidential information and deliberately creating vulnerabilities.

Since 2014 and prior to the war in 2022, Russian units targeted the Ukrainian cyber space in operations, some of which were unprecedented, breaking global taboos regarding target selection.[[7]](#footnote-7) Russia disabled public services (government institutions, banks, power stations) in order to undermine the resilience and cohesiveness of Ukrainian society and drive a wedge between the government and the public, ostensibly demonstrating the Ukrainian government’s failure to handle the challenges of managing the state.

Certain conceptions about the Ukrainian population took a central place **in the strategic narratives President Putin used to justify the invasion of Ukraine**. He presented a revisionist historical narrative that denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation separate from the Russian one.[[8]](#footnote-8) The idea of Ukrainian independence was portrayed as a historical “fiction” established by the “collective West” in order to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian platform.[[9]](#footnote-9) Putin justified the invasion by claiming that the government in Kiev had allegedly conducted a “genocide” against Russian speakers in the Donbass region. He created a narrative that the Ukrainian population as a whole had fallen victim to “Nazi” and Russophobic government policies that served the West as a tool for weakening Russia.

The colossal efforts the Russians invested in “preparing the Ukrainian information space” for the invasion were characterized by a deep failure in understanding the population. The Russians did not grasp the strength of the political changes that had taken place in Ukrainian society since 2014, nor did they properly assess its ability to resist Russian aggression. The FSB manipulated data and spread misleading reports to support the invasion plan, which was based on the assumption that the Ukrainian population lacked the will and ability to resist.[[10]](#footnote-10) It is unclear whether Putin was informed of the survey results that, just a few weeks before the invasion, showed that 48% of Ukrainians intended to fight for their country, and only 2% of them said they would consider a Russian invasion an act of “liberation.”[[11]](#footnote-11)

At the beginning of the war, the Russian propaganda campaign tried to convince the Ukrainian public that the operation was meant to bring justice to the Ukrainian people, who were facing a dual internal-external threat from a hostile “puppet regime” controlled by the West. The campaign particularly emphasized reassuring messages, claiming that Russian forces were exercising the utmost caution in dealing with the innocent civilian population. In reality, interrogations of Russian war prisoners captured by the Ukrainians since February 25 revealed that Russian soldiers were not even aware they were being sent to fight in Ukraine, and that they had not been prepared about how to behave when encountering the civilian population.[[12]](#footnote-12) On the other hand, the Russians accused Ukraine of cynically exploiting the civilian population and turning them into “human shields” for its soldiers.[[13]](#footnote-13) Labelling the data published by Ukraine that indicated widespread harm to civilians as a result of Russian military operations as “fake news,”[[14]](#footnote-14) Russia accused the Ukrainians of deliberately harming noncombatants to create provocations and cast responsibility on Russia. Notably, a significant part of Russia’s propaganda activities regarding its army’s treatment of the Ukrainian population was directed at the Russian public itself.

**Using Military Force**

Russian military thinkers and leaders understand that excessive violence against civilians could trigger popular resistance, international and domestic criticism, and political and economic pressure. Therefore, they sought to avoid it in the context of the war in Ukraine. However, in general, they have no principled-ethical objection to the disproportionate use of force against civilians. With the exception of a set of information warfare tools available to some in the military, the Russian army as a whole and the average Russian soldier lack the understanding, weapons, and training designed to deal with the population without resorting to harming it.[[15]](#footnote-15) A prominent example of this is the Russian army’s unpreparedness for urban warfare missions[[16]](#footnote-16) and its excessive reliance on statistically accurate artillery and rockets without making contact with the residents.

In the kinetic aspects, the new generation warfare approach was directed toward a synchronized and continuous military advance deep into enemy territory, in which precision weapons systems and special forces would be used alongside “traditional” conventional means, based on accurate and continuous intelligence.[[17]](#footnote-17) However, there is a significant gap between this concept and the reality of the Russian military’s force buildup. The months of the war in Ukraine have shown that the Russian army did not manage to produce accurate firepower capabilities, had difficulty integrating real-time intelligence with the target selection process, and did not develop an extensive system of special forces.

In an attempt to bridge the gap in the Russian military’s ability to deal with masses of civilians, new or reorganized **military and paramilitary frameworks have been established** in recent years **specifically for dealing with civilian populations** (as the primary mission or as one of the primary missions). For example, in 2012, a military police force was established, its tasks including producing capabilities for dealing with civilian populations during military conflicts and the “restoration of peace” phase. Alongside the military, the National Guard, the Rosgvardia (which includes Chechen units known for their brutality and actually functioning independently), FSB units, and paramilitary forces, including Wagner Group mercenaries and various volunteer units, entered Ukraine. Although all of these mechanisms were apparently modified to operate with less intensity than the military, their pre-war activity did not demonstrate a “soft” attitude toward civilians. On the contrary, mercenary and “volunteer” units were able to exercise excessive violence against civilians, while their extra-governmental status allowed the Russian regime to evade responsibility for their activities.

The Kremlin’s flawed assumptions regarding Ukrainian national identity and the weakness of the country’s political institutions influenced the military planning of the invasion. In the early days of the war, Russian commanders were instructed to be careful not to harm civilians and to minimize damage to economic infrastructure. The Russians sought to maximize the territory they occupied in the first days of the war and bypass urban centers without delay. However, Ukrainian resistance, logistical difficulties, coordination problems between forces, and the overextension of the attack halted the rapid progress. The Russian army soon found itself in state of intense friction with the Ukrainian population, resulting in the erosion of restraints against harming civilians.

From the beginning of the invasion, some Russian military moves were designed to disorient the public in an aim to reduce its resistance to the occupation. The missile barrage in the first hours of the war was intended to create the psychological effect of terror by striking targets throughout the country, so that a significant part of the population would directly experience the war even if it was far from the main invasion axes.[[18]](#footnote-18) In addition, military convoys that crossed the border from many directions were meant to frighten the population and create the impression that the Ukrainian government and its army were incompetent and that the Russian takeover would be completed in a short time. The dissemination of reports on the arrival of Chechen fighters, renown for being ruthless, was intended to instill fear in the public that the continuation of the war could become even more violent if the Ukrainians did not cooperate.[[19]](#footnote-19) The military pressure on the population (and through it, on the leadership) escalated in the fall of 2022, when Russia began systematically targeting Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure in order to intensify the public’s fear about its ability to safely survive the winter.[[20]](#footnote-20)

[IMAGE]

***Blackout in Ukraine following a Russian attack on its electrical infrastructure in the fall of 2022.***

<https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/blackout-ukraine-ukraines-mass-power-outage-2236753175>

**Is causing severe harm to civilians part of the Russian military strategy?**

Russia’s military history over the last decades involved inflicting widespread harm to civilians, and in the current war, the Ukrainian side has also described Russia as a “terror state,” accusing it of committing war crimes.[[21]](#footnote-21) In light of this, the question arises as to whether brutality is a deliberate component of the Russian military strategy or whether it is perceived as an inevitable evil accompanying any war.

Despite numerous and severe incidents of violence committed by the Russian military, including some that can be defined as war crimes,[[22]](#footnote-22) a comprehensive view of the situation suggests that the UN’s data regarding the number of civilians harmed could support the claim that the Russian military is not doing everything required to prevent widespread harm to the population, rather than the claim that it is systematically and indiscriminately targeting Ukrainian civilians. Since the beginning of the war until November 21st, 2022, the UN identified 6,595 civilians killed and 10,189 civilians injured – a figure that includes casualties in Ukrainian territories that were under Russian control prior to the conflict.[[23]](#footnote-23) The number of civilian casualties in the war is relatively low (in absolute terms) compared to other violent conflicts, such as the war in Syria (2012–2022: about 30,000 civilians killed per year),[[24]](#footnote-24) Iraq (2003–2016: about 15,000 civilians killed per year and almost 30,000 at the peak), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995: about 7,500 civilians killed per year, and more than 20,000 at the peak of the war).

The ethos of the Russian military is based on myths from the “Great Patriotic War,” according to which the Russian-Soviet soldier is the “liberator” who cares for the needs of the occupied population, as opposed to the Nazi soldier who is uncontrollably violent. Although this is the spirit in which soldiers are educated in the Russian army, evidence from the battlefield shows that incidents of violence against civilians are quite common and are either encouraged or covered up by commanders.[[25]](#footnote-25) Preventing such acts is left up to the soldiers and officers’ personal judgment.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Significant harm to the population and evidence of war crimes committed by Russia began to emerge in the early days of the invasion. However, for the Russian military and its political leadership, these are not a goal in and of themselves, but rather an ugly yet inevitable byproduct of the war. First, tools that can prevent harm to civilians are either lacking or non-existent in the Russian military. The Russian military does not have a combat doctrine designed to prevent harm to civilians and lacks accurate munition and intelligence systems as well as specialized forces trained for fighting in urban areas. As a result, it tends to rely on inaccurate artillery systems as a central means of achieving its goals, even if the collateral damage includes infrastructure destruction and harm to civilians. The pressure to deliver military achievements from both the Kremlin on the military and from senior military ranks on the lower ranks have led to a high number of casualties in populated areas since the early days of the invasion.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Second, previous conflicts of the Russian army demonstrate that the difficulty of achieving military and political objectives on the battlefield leads to **attacks on national and civilian infrastructure** and the destruction of residential neighborhoods as a means for putting pressure on the enemy.[[28]](#footnote-28) In the war in Ukraine, Russia has systematically attacked energy infrastructure, dams, and industrial plants in order to harm civilians and use them to exert heavy pressure on the government to submit and comply with its demands.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Third, a culture of disregard for human life, **intimidation, and punishment** has taken root in the Russian security system. Soldiers are subjected to pressure from their commanders to complete their missions at any cost and are threatened with personal punishment if they fail. An organization that does not prioritize the well-being of its soldiers is unlikely to make a concerted effort to avoid harming civilians and their rights. Such a culture leads to acts of aggression by individual soldiers toward civilians in the field.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Fourth, the security and political establishment in Russia has displayed **tolerance** toward violent acts and war crimes committed by Russian forces against the Ukrainian population, including many documented cases of systematic sexual violence committed during the war. Russian security and propaganda agencies categorically deny that any wrongdoing has been committed toward civilians and there have been no documented cases of punishment or prosecution of Russian soldiers following violent events. In addition, the Russian government publicly supports military units accused by Ukraine and the West of committing war crimes.[[31]](#footnote-31) De facto approval and ex post facto whitewashing of war crimes legitimize the use of violence against the civilian population; this stems from the Red Army’s long-standing culture accepting that “war is war.”

**Political and Diplomatic Mechanisms**

**Ukrainian collaborators** were meant to serve as a key component in the Russian invasion plan in February 2022. Collaborators in government and lower ranks were supposed to assist Russia in occupying territories and subsequently managing them. Areas that were occupied for long periods of time illustrate how Ukrainian collaborators helped the Russians take over by providing sensitive insider information and promoting operational decisions on the Ukrainian side that assisted the Russians. While in most cases the collaborators failed to secure a Russian takeover – their failure in Kyiv is particularly salient in this context – according to some estimates, in the early days of the invasion, there was a real danger of Kyiv falling and the entire Russian plan succeeding.[[32]](#footnote-32) Had the other components of the Russian invasion plan materialized, the collaborators might have been more helpful.

Kherson, the only regional city the Russians temporarily succeeded in occupying, represents a good example of how Russia sought to gain control over the territories it occupied. Up to 75% of Kherson’s residents left the city following the occupation.[[33]](#footnote-33) The mayor, who was loyal to Kyiv, was replaced by pro-Russian leadership that encouraged residents to obtain Russian citizenship, cut off access to Ukrainian media and internet connections and replaced them with Russian media and internet connections. The forced referendums on annexing Kherson to Russia were staged to provide a legal “stamp of approval” for the takeover.[[34]](#footnote-34)

The extensive and rapid Russian invasion was intended from the outset to accelerate the transition from the kinetic phase to the diplomatic-political phase of the operation. The goal was to paralyze the attacked country and elicit concessions around the negotiating table regarding its territorial sovereignty (the “15-Point Plan,” which includes securing Ukraine’s neutral status and recognition of the special status of Donbas) and achieve a ceasefire on terms that were favorable to Russia.[[35]](#footnote-35) In the early days of the war, the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were framed asymmetrically (with relatively low-ranking Russian representatives as opposed to senior Ukrainian officials) and were intended to put pressure on Ukraine, both directly and through Western countries, to lay down its arms and accept humiliating Russian dictates.

Russia **exploited humanitarian issues and population movements to advance its military goals in the war**. This was driven by three main motives: military, demographic, and psychological. On the military front, Russia used the issue of humanitarian corridors for an operational-tactical purpose: evacuating the population from the battlefield in order to remove restrictions on the use of force.[[36]](#footnote-36) In the first weeks of the war, Russian-Ukrainian talks regarding humanitarian corridors, the evacuation of civilians, and prisoner and body exchanges were held at the same time as talks on a ceasefire and through similar channels.

In order to maintain control over Ukrainian civilians, Russia established **sorting and separation mechanisms** (“filtration,” as Russia defined it), including physical camps in near the Russia-Ukraine border before the start of the war.[[37]](#footnote-37) These mechanisms were intended to help the Russians interrogate millions of Ukrainians and neutralize those who were considered “challenging” (by interrogating, arresting, torturing, and deporting them to penal colonies).[[38]](#footnote-38)

**On the demographic front, Russia sought to increase the Russian population through forced displacement of the population** to territories in the “Russian world” (the Russian Federation, Belarus, and the occupied territories in Ukraine), in order to hinder Ukraine’s recovery and to address, at least in part, the demographic crisis from which Russia is suffering.

**The demographic changes in Ukraine are one of Russia’s main achievements in the war to date.** As of January 2023, it is estimated that about 33% of Ukraine’s population (about 14 million out of approximately 41 million[[39]](#footnote-39)) have become displaced persons and refugees. Around 8 million Ukrainian refugees currently reside in Europe (about 7.7 million[[40]](#footnote-40)) and in the United States (220,000[[41]](#footnote-41)), and another 5.6 million are internally displaced persons (a decrease from about 8 million in May 2022[[42]](#footnote-42)).

[IMAGE]

***Ukrainian refugees, Lviv, March 2022***

In terms of propaganda, Moscow sought to use its humanitarian activities as a basis for gaining legitimacy regarding the use of Russian force and its collateral damage. Similar to Russian humanitarian activity during the war in Syria,[[43]](#footnote-43) Russian humanitarianism in Ukraine was largely hollow: symbolic displays of humanitarian efforts, which, given their limited scope, were not intended to significantly improve the plight of the population.[[44]](#footnote-44)

**Mechanisms for Applying Economic Pressure**

Russian economic warfare is intended to undermine Ukraine’s ability to manage a sustainable economy separate from Russia in the long term and to put pressure on the government in Kiev in the hopes of persuading it to be more flexible toward Russian demands to end the war.

In the spirit of new generation warfare, economic pressures began long before the war, with an emphasis on the use of energy as a weapon. For many years now, Russia has been building a network of oil and gas pipelines that bypass Ukraine in order to exert pressure on it. Moscow exploited the pre-war tension to disrupt economic activity in Ukraine: the fear of war drove away existing investments and deterred new ones.

The Russian invasion plan was based, among other things, on economic logic, driven by the goals of obtaining control of energy infrastructure, controlling Ukraine’s access to the Azov and Black Seas,[[45]](#footnote-45) and occupying industrial areas and quarries in the east. Russia employed a variety of means to put economic pressure on the population, both nationally and locally.

At the national level, the weaponization of key economic sectors such as energy, food, and water was salient. Russia cut off gas and oil flows to areas controlled by the Ukrainian government, took control of a nuclear power plant in Zaporizhia (and other infrastructure for energy production and transmission) in order to control energy supply in areas it failed to occupy. Russia was in no rush to destroy industrial infrastructure, as it hoped to seize it in the future. It was only the series of failures it suffered in the fall of 2022 that led to concentrated bombings of electricity and energy infrastructure. These affected over 40% of Ukraine’s electricity production capacity just as a cold winter was approaching. Failure to occupy the entire coastline led Moscow to impose a naval blockade on the Black Sea. This severely damaged Ukraine’s trade activity, particularly in the port cities of Odessa and Mykolaiv, and made it difficult for Ukraine to export agricultural produce (the country’s main export). Although Russia consented to a deal brokered by Turkey for the export of grain from Ukraine, it retained the right to shut down this channel if needed to increase pressure on the Ukrainian population. The systemic damage to Ukraine’s economy caused by the fighting, energy disruptions, shortages of basic products, refugee movement, and reduced investments led to an estimated 30% decline in Ukraine’s GDP in 2022.[[46]](#footnote-46) This resulted in severe economic damage to Ukrainian citizens, while Russian propaganda was attempting to convince them that the government in Kiev was to blame.

On a local level, siege, starvation, and water deprivation techniques were noticeable in the areas Russia sought to occupy. During the months-long siege of Mariupol, there was a shortage of food and water in the city, and in Mykolaiv, attacks on electricity and water systems led to severe disruptions in the supply of potable water.

1. Vladimir Putin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,’” *President of Russia*, July 12, 2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> [accessed: October 30, 2022]; Domańska Maria and Żochowski Piotr, “Putin’s article: ‘On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians’," *OSW*, July 13, 2022. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2021-07-13/putins-article-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians> [accessed: November 22, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow’s Use of Overwhelming Force Against Ukraine,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 22, 2022. <https://tinyurl.com/49j985h3> [accessed: October 30, 2022].

פרטי התוכנית האופרטיבית הרוסית המקורית התפרסמו ע”י מכון RUSI בדו"ח מיוחד המבוסס על נתונים מבצעיים שנצברו ע”י המטה הכללי האוקראיני:

Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds. “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022," *RUSI*, November 30, 2022. <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022> [accessed: January 23, 2023], 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. דניאל ראקוב, אסף הלר, שרה פיינברג, איתמר הלר, "Boo or Boom? התקיפות של צבא רוסיה באוקראינה ביממה הראשונה למלחמה בראי הרעיון המערכתי הרוסי," עדכון מחקרי 1, *מרכז אלרום לחקר מדיניות ואסטרטגיית אוויר וחלל*, אוניברסיטת תל אביב, אפריל 2022 <https://social-sciences.tau.ac.il/sites/socsci.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/social/poli-heb/elrom/Aspire.pdf> [accessed: November 28, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Keir Giles, *Handbook of Russian Information Warfare*, Rome: NATO Defence College Research Division, 2016. <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=995> [accessed: November 28, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Maggie Smith, “Russia Has Been at War with Ukraine for Years – in Cyberspace,” *The Conversation*, February 7, 2022. <https://theconversation.com/russia-has-been-at-war-with-ukraine-for-years-in-cyberspace-176221> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Marlene Laruelle and Ivan Grek, “Decoding Putin’s Speeches: The Three Ideological Lines of Russia’s Military Intervention in Ukraine,” *Russia Matters*, February 25, 2022. <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/decoding-putins-speeches-three-ideological-lines-russias-military-intervention-ukraine> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. לפי הצהרות פוטין ערב הפלישה, תכליתו העיקרית של המבצע היא "לתקן" את התפיסה ההיסטורית שהצדיקה הקמת ישות מדינית פוליטית אוקראינית אשר גובשה בשנות ה-20 במדיניות הלאומים של לנין, ובעיקר את הפיכת אוקראינה לפלטפורמה אנטי-רוסית, בעידן הפוסט-סובייטי. הנחת יסוד זו אינה טריוויאלית משום שהיא מהווה ציר בסיסי בחשיבה האסטרטגית ובלגיטימציה של הנשיא פוטין בנוגע לפלישה. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Catherine Belton and Greg Miller, “Russia's Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed,” *Washington Post*, August 19, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. על פי סקר שנערך בינואר 2022 ע”י חברת הסקרים האוקראיניתResearch and Branding , שהזמין אחד מעוזריו של הנשיא הפרו-רוסי לשעבר ויקטור ינוקוביץ', כ-48% מהנשאלים הביעו נכונות להילחם נגד הכוחות הרוסיים במקרה של פלישה, בעוד שרק 2% היו מוכנים לאפיין את הפלישה האפשרית כאקט של "שחרור". ראה:

Catherine Belton and Greg Miller, “Russia's Spies Misread Ukraine and Misled Kremlin as War Loomed”. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Video of a Russian POW*, *Рыбарь Rybarʹ*, February 25, 2022. <https://t.me/rybar/24972> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Maksym Levin and Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine and Russia Agree on Evacuation Corridors as U.S. Punishes Oligarchs,” *Reuters*, March 4, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/top-wrap-10-ukraine-seeks-ceasefire-humanitarian-corridors-talks-with-russia-2022-03-03/> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. לעיתים מדגיש משרד ההגנה הרוסי כי הוא עצמו יצר קשר עם משפחותיהם של "הקורבנות" לכאורה כדי להוקיע את ה"פייק ניוז" ולמנוע "פרובוקציות" עתידיות. כך למשל, ב-24 בפברואר 2022 דיווח משרד ההגנה כי יצר קשר ישיר עם תושבי העיר צ'והייב, ועל סמך ראיות ניתן לקבוע כי מותו של ילד בעיר הוא שקרי:

"Sročno Razoblačën Fejk IPSO SSO VSU. My Svjazalisʹ S Žitelem Čugueva Dlja Verifikacii Gibeli Malʹčika Срочно Разоблачён Фейк ИПСО ССО ВСУ. Мы Связались С Жителем Чугуева Для Верификации Гибели Мальчика," [A Fake of the Informational and Psychological Operations of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Was Urgently Dismissed. We Contacted a Resident of Chuguyev to Verify the Death of the Boy], *Rybar’ Рыбарь*, February 24, 2022. <https://t.me/rybar/24612> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. מסקנה זו מתבססת על חיפוש חומרים בנושא האזרחים בלחימה במהדורות השנים האחרונות של כתב העת המוביל למחשבה צבאית של משרד ההגנה הרוסי – *Voennaja myslʹ Военная мысль.* [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Gary Anderson, “Russia Doesn't Train Troops for Urban Warfare. It's about to Learn the Consequences in Ukraine,” *Military.com*, March 8, 2022.<https://www.military.com/daily-news/opinions/2022/03/08/russia-doesnt-train-troops-urban-warfare-its-about-learn-consequences-ukraine.html> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Jānis Bērziņš, “Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare". [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. דניאל ראקוב, אסף הלר, שרה פיינברג, איתמר הלר, "Boo or Boom? התקיפות של צבא רוסיה באוקראינה ביממה הראשונה למלחמה בראי הרעיון המערכתי הרוסי". [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Justin Ling, “Russia Tries to Terrorize Ukraine with Images of Chechen Soldiers,” *Foreign Policy*, February 26, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/26/russia-chechen-propaganda-ukraine/> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. פירוט נוסף על תקיפת תשתיות אנרגיה באוקראינה, ראה בתת-פרק על לחץ כלכלי, בהמשך פרק זה, ובנוסף כאן:

Aura Sabadus, “Ukraine needs urgent help to counter Putin’s energy infrastructure attacks," *Atlantic Council*, November 14, 2022. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-needs-urgent-help-to-counter-putins-energy-infrastructure-attacks/> [accessed: November 20, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. תיעוד פשעי מלחמה שביצעו כוחות רוסיים באוקראינה הוא סוגיה מורכבת, הנחקרת בהרחבה ע”י גופים רשמיים ובחברה האזרחית. אין מטרתו של המחקר לחקור נושא זה. המחברים השתכנעו כי אכן מדובר בתופעה רחבה על בסיס אוסף עדויות של אזרחיות ואזרחים אוקראינים ברשת האינטרנט ודו"חות של האו"ם, כגון:

OHCHR, “A/77/533: Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine - Note by the Secretary-General,” October 18, 2022. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a77533-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-note-secretary> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. על היקף פשעי מלחמה של הכוחות הרוסיים באוקראינה והקטגוריות השונות שלהם, ראה:

## UN, “Killings of civilians: summary executions and attacks on individual civilians in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions in the context of the Russian Federation’s armed attack against Ukraine," December 7, 2022.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/killings-civilians-summary-executions-and-attacks-individual-civilians> [accessed: January 17, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. מספר האזרחים ההרוגים באוקראינה אינו ידוע, שכן ניתוח מהימן אורך זמן, ושליטה של צדדים יריבים בחלקיה של אוקראינה אינה מאפשרת לאף גורם לבנות נתונים מהימנים. עם זאת, הנתונים המתפרסמים ע”י נציב האו"ם לזכויות אדם יכולים לרמז על סדר גודל של אזרחים אוקראינים הרוגים.

United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Ukraine: civilian casualty update 10 October 2022",” October 10, 2022.<https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/11/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-21-november-2022> [accessed: November 26, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. לפי הערכת נציב זכויות האדם של האו"ם מקיץ 2022, במהלך עשר שנות מלחמת האזרחים בסוריה נהרגו 306,000 אזרחים.

United Nations,” UN Human Rights Office estimates more than 306,000 civilians were killed over 10 years in Syria conflict," *Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, June 22, 2022*.* <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/un-human-rights-office-estimates-more-306000-civilians-were-killed-over-10> [accessed: November 20, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Gall Carlotta, “‘Fear Still Remains’: Ukraine Finds Sexual Crimes Where Russian Troops Ruled," *New Your Times*, January 5, 2023. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/05/world/europe/ukraine-sexual-violence-russia.html> [accessed: January 5, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. חייל הצנחנים פאבל פילטייב, שכתב ספר על חוויותיו בחודשי המלחמה הראשונים בו היה ביקורתי מאוד כלפי צבא רוסיה, התעקש כי עבורו ועבור חבריו היה בלתי לגיטימי לחלוטין להוציא להורג אזרח בגלל סיוע מודיעיני לאויב. ראה:

Dima Shvets [Дима Швец](file:///C%3A%5C%5CUsers%5C%5Cdanie%5C%5CDownloads%5C%5C%D0%94%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0%C2%A0%D0%A8%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%86), “Nas naebali prostite Нас наебали, простите [We were fucked up, sorry], Mediazona, August 19, 2022. <https://zona.media/article/2022/08/19/filatyev> [accessed February 2, 2023]. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “Cluster Bombs Dropped in the Ukraine City of Kharkiv: 7NEWS,” *YouTube*, March 1, 2022. <https://tinyurl.com/3upbb2ms> [accessed: October 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Mona Yacoubian, “How Russia May Reprise Its Syrian Playbook in Ukraine”.

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31. “Putin Honors 64th Brigade Accused of Bucha Massacre,” *Ukrinform*, April 18, 2022. <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3461024-putin-honors-64th-brigade-accused-of-bucha-massacre.html>[accessed: October 30, 2022]*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
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“Demographics of Ukraine," *Wikipedia*. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\_of\_Ukraine#cite\_note-ukrstat\_population-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Ukraine%22%20%5Cl%20%22cite_note-ukrstat_population-2) [accessed: December 30, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
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Matthew Page and Paul Stronski, “How Russia’s Hollow Humanitarianism Hurt Its Vaccine Policy in Africa,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 28, 2022. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/28/how-russia-s-hollow-humanitarianism-hurt-its-vaccine-diplomacy-in-africa-pub-87004> [accessed: November 28, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
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