**Chapter I - Rabbinate and politics**

*Introduction*

The eighth day of Hanukkah, known as "Zot Hanukkah", is the culmination of the days of Hanukkah, and is known as the final sealing of the judgements (which began on Rosh Hashana). On "Zot Hanukkah" of the year 2022, an era was sealed in the world of Religious Zionism: Rabbi Haim Druckman, the elder statesman of the Religious Zionist rabbis, was laid to rest in the cemetery at Masuot Yitzhak. Rabbi Druckman was a rabbinical figure who dramatically influenced the political and ideological course of religious Zionism. A member of the Knesset for the Mafdal (National Religious Party), rosh yeshiva, leader of the Bnei Akiva Yeshivot national organization, head of the conversion system, and a host of other public positions, Rabbi Druckman symbolized the power of religious Zionism in many crucial crossroads in the history of the State of Israel. In an era when religious Zionism was split, Rabbi Druckman was a rabbinical figure promoting unity in the religious-national sector, perhaps the last one who can be defined as such.

At the funeral, many paid tribute to Rabbi Druckman. The most prominent of them was Bezalel Smotrich, the political leader of the 'Religious Zionist' party. It was fascinating to see how a political leader relates to a religious leader, and the complexity of his words expresses the eternal relationship between the rabbinate and politics in religious Zionism:

*What will we do, Rabbi? Without your great love, without the smile, without the hug, without the warm handshake, without the encouragement, without the support? What will we do without the scolding, the rebuke offered out of a deep love? What will we do without the broad shoulders, without the dedication , the sense of responsibility in carrying the burden? Is there any substitute for our Rabbi, with his attitude of seeing the good, with his unerring view of reality, with an accurate perspective of events. How many reprimands have I received from you in the last year and a half… [[1]](#footnote-1)*

Smotrich's words reflect the uniqueness of the Mafdal as a movement that has an Orthodox religious commitment on the one hand, and a Zionist commitment in the modern sense, on the other.[[2]](#footnote-2) One of the fundamental issues that expresses this internal tension throughout the course of religious Zionism is the position of the religious leadership in the movement. Unlike the secular parties, which have no religious leadership at all, and unlike the ultra-Orthodox parties where the unchallenged position of the religious leadership does not create any conflict, religious Zionism finds itself in a constant dilemma over this issue. The manifestations of this tension are many and varied, and this issue is often on the agenda.

This study aims to examine the tensions surrounding the function and status of religious leadership within the framework of a religious-modern political movement. The core issue of the research will examine the status of the *Hever HaRabbanim*  (Board of Rabbis) - a body that was established within the HaPoel HaMizrachi party in 1948 and ceased to function over the years. It will examine the influence of the rabbis on religious Zionism in a historical perspective even in the years after the Hever HaRabbanim ceased its activity.

The Hever HaRabbanim was an organization that brought together the rabbis of religious Zionism, from a variety of rabbinical positions: city rabbis and local councils, neighborhood rabbis, rabbinical judges and rabbis in yeshivot. Its unique character was evident in the fact that it was the largest rabbinical body in Israel, and although it had no official state status, it had considerable power in the Israeli public, and in the religious public in particular. Its influence was notable in regular annual meetings where its activity was reviewed and new methods of action were tested; in setting up steering committees for specific issues; in regular publications of the *HaTorah veHaMedina* and the '*Shvilin*' compilations, in accompanying the activity of the Chief Rabbinate, and in safeguarding the rights of the rabbis. As we will show in the book, it was precisely its authority within the party as a "*da'at Torah*" that was minor compared to the other areas in which it operated.

The singularity of the Hever HaRabbanim as a subject for research stems from several key factors.

**First** , the very existence of a religious leadership within a political movement creates a focus of tension. Religious leadership is naturally committed to religion, whereas a political party operates in a modern framework that does not always accord with the needs of religion and functions under various constraints which do not constrain the religious leadership. Moreover, the Hever HaRabbanim operates within the framework of a national religious movement with two simultaneous commitments, religious and modern-pragmatic. This will predispose the party to an inherent dilemma in its attitude towards the religious leadership. In this context, it is important to clarify that the Hever HaRabbanim was a singular phenomenon, with a formal religious leadership within the Hapoel HaMizrachi, and later in the Mafdal.

**Second,** the Hever HaRabbanim served as religious leadership along with another religious leadership: the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, to which Religious Zionism is committed. Therefore, the Hever HaRabbanim is a case study for a unique phenomenon of "one religious leadership operating alongside another religious leadership".

**And third,** Hever HaRabbanim, as an organization within Religious Zionism, also stood against the ultra-Orthodox camp, which represents a different ideological worldview, and consequently, another focus of tension was created.

The main purpose of the book is to examine the ways in which religious leadership within a modern political framework deals with the difficulties and dilemmas involved.

The research topic we have undertaken requires a consideration of several related theoretical issues. First, we will discuss the essential and practical complexity of religious leadership operating within a political movement, then we will focus on the subject of 'da'at Torah' which is one of the main linchpins of the book. After that, we will focus on the phenomenon of 'da'at Torah' in religious Zionism and the various trends within it. The next topic will be the Chief Rabbinate of Israel which embodies the central religious authority in the State of Israel in general and religious Zionism in particular (at least on the declarative level). From here we will come to the subject of our study – Hever HaRabbanim.

*Religious authority and political authority*

The problematic nature of the status of religious authority began to emerge chiefly in the modern era. In the pre-modern world, religious tradition enjoyed exclusivity. Consequently, the development of modern society, the Enlightenment, and the phenomenon of secularization were a threat to the uncontested position of religion and as a matter of course, the status of religious authority began to decline, as tension emerged with the political authority.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Peter Berger describes in the "market model" the status of religion in the modern age, when it is forced to face the market of different ideologies and the religious leaders have to "market" religion. According to the market model, the religious leaders will give new meanings to the religious tradition, which should make religion more relevant.[[4]](#footnote-4) This trend, of religion facing a struggle in the age of modernity, is also identified by Clifford Geertz, who defines the engagement with questions of religion and state as religious factors grappling with a given political reality that is not under their control.[[5]](#footnote-5) Stuart Cohen and Daniel Elazar describe the struggle between religious authority and political authority in a modern state as a tension between "the Divine" and "the ruler.”[[6]](#footnote-6)

One of the main manifestations of modernity is the growth of political parties. Lapalombara and Weiner link the development of parties to modernization and claim that the modernization process in modern times is the key factor and the common denominator to explain the growth of political parties. In this way, the conflict inherent in the existence of religious authority within a political framework can be understood: the party as a political framework is a distinct product of modernity, and since in modern society the position of religious authority has been declining, the very existence of religious authority within a party is a source of friction.[[7]](#footnote-7)

However, if we focus on this issue more sharply, we will realize that the problem actually lies with the religious parties. In non-religious parties, where there is no religious authority, the conflict, naturally, does not exist. Donald Smith points out that the very phenomenon of religious parties creates a new focus of tension in the realm of ​​authority, as the party has two sources of power operating in parallel: the religious authority and the political authority.[[8]](#footnote-8) It should be noted that the problem exists chiefly when modernity is a component of the party's values, like in religious Zionism, as we will see throughout the book.

Eliezer Don-Yehiya asserted that religious parties play a central role in the relationship between religious leadership and political leadership. In addition to this, Don Yehiya examines the contradictions inherent in the concepts of political leadership and religious leadership: the political leadership is directly involved in power struggles in the political system, stands for elections, and is subject to power relations, and therefore will take into account considerations of realpolitik, compared to religious leadership which is not directly involved in the political system.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Don-Yehiya distinguished between the two types of leadership, according to three criteria: the skills required, the resources available to the leadership, and the functions assigned to the leadership. The skills of the religious leadership will be Torah scholarship and mystical spiritual qualities, while the skills of the political leadership will be the ability to perform and influence. The resources of the religious leadership will be morality, and of the political leadership, political power. The function of the religious leadership will be spiritual matters "between man and God" and the functions of the political leadership will be pragmatic and social matters "between man and his fellowman".

Ido Rechnitz considers the complex relationship between rabbis and politicians, and the question of authority versus the responsibility that stems from it:

*The ambiguity regarding the question of the authority of the political leadership to decide on practical questions, vis-à-vis the Torah leadership, erodes the claim on the political leadership to take responsibility for failures. And correspondingly, the spiritual leadership becomes an equal partner in responsibility in relation to practical and tactical decisions, when this is sometimes a manipulative tactic by the political leadership that is afraid to take full responsibility for a decision.[[10]](#footnote-10)*

When the rabbinical leadership takes upon itself the dimension of authority, it is predictable that when there are failures, they will not be left in the domain of the politicians but will extend into the rabbinical sphere. In this one can see the difficulties arising from the existence of two parallel powers that seek to influence political and social policy, each in its own way.

*What is "Da'at Torah"?*

The discussion about the Hever HaRabbanim as it will be conducted in the book requires investigation of the pattern that became established during the twentieth century in Orthodox Jewish society, especially in ultra-Orthodox society, and which is a basic concept in understanding rabbinic authority.

There is no dispute in the Orthodox world, in its various denominations, about the authority of the rabbis to rule on matters of Halacha. The dispute is mainly about the limits of the authority of the rabbis in our times, as manifested, for example, in the unique case of the religious kibbutz.[[11]](#footnote-11) Since time immemorial, preeminent Torah scholars have issued halachic rulings that have taken root among the Jewish people. The term 'da'at Torah' contains the worldview of the rabbis, which is expressed in various topics that go beyond distinctly halachic areas, These issues concern political, ideological and ideological matters, sometimes even completely secular matters.

Benjamin Brown defines the concept of 'da'at Torah' as ​​"the intellectual ability and the normative authority of the greatest Torah scholars of every generation to decide on every question of life, whether halachic or otherwise, whether in the life of the individual or in the life of the community, whether from direct reliance on the sources of the Halacha or without it.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Yosef Ahituv distinguished between 'da'at Torah' and 'halachic ruling' and claims that "one of the clear signs of 'da'at Torah' is the lack of halachic sources and bypassing the accepted process of halachic ruling". His point is that, unlike in halachic ruling, where the rabbi is required to rely on sources, da'at Torah represents a pattern that frees the rabbi from relying on sources. In this way Ahituv claims: "'Da'at Torah' prevents the possibility of debate."[[13]](#footnote-13)

Ya'akov Katz discussed the inherently problematic nature of 'da'at Torah', in its very preoccupation with political matters that are not necessarily religious. According to Katz, the rabbis "might use their right to ensure religious interests and cause a double stumbling-block". Katz also emphasized the historical context of the expansion of rabbinic authority and points to two possible reasons for this: one is the objective need to ask halachic questions of a rabbi, much more than in previous generations, and this is due to the rapid pace of technological and other changes in recent generations. The second reason, in his opinion, lies in the psychological aspect, that is, the need of the Jew to see his rabbi as one who not only solves his personal problems but also strengthens his faith in the difficult times besetting his people and himself as an individual.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Lawrence Kaplan insists that 'da'at Torah' is a distinct product of modernity, in that it tries to curb modern Orthodox tendencies that emerged during the Enlightenment in Europe. There is an inherent paradox here: on the one hand 'da'at Torah' is a modern phenomenon, but on the other hand its purpose is to curb modern phenomena in religious society. Indeed, one cannot ignore the fact that the first organized institutional body to actually implement 'da'at Torah' was the 'Moetztet Gedolei HaTorah' [Council of Torah Sages] in Agudat Yisrael, which actually acted as a leading and decisive rabbinical authority on manifestly political questions.[[15]](#footnote-15) Gershon Bacon sees this as the crowning achievement of 'da'at Torah' which was used first and foremost as a political tool by Agudat Israel, and is still used that way to this day.[[16]](#footnote-16) Menachem Friedman describes in detail the power and influence of the Moetezet Gedolei HaTorah , to which was attributed a "charismatic, non-rational status of da'at Torah.". The influence of Moetezet Gedolei HaTorah in Agudat Yisrael is strong and powerful to this day, at least on the formal level. In effect it serves as the authority of the politicians on political issues. Various studies identify pragmatism in Agudat Israel's mode of dealing with the state and Zionism, and the influence of the Moetezet Gedolei HaTorah is prominent in this regard.[[17]](#footnote-17) A unique study by Zvi Weinman claimed that even Agudat Yisrael has demonstrated independence and resistance to its Torah leaders, although this is contrary to the popular image.[[18]](#footnote-18)

The unchallenged authority of Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach was conspicuous in the Lithuanian faction 'Degel HaTorah' and after his death, the influence of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Eliashiv and Rabbi Aharon Leib was unassailable. And as of this writing, it has been Rabbi Gershon Edelstein who is considered the most influential among Lithuanians. In Shas, the authority of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef served as the da'at Torah in the party, alongside the members of Moetezt Hachmei HaTorah ('Sephardic Council of Torah Sages)', which he chaired and which to this day is under the leadership of his successors.[[19]](#footnote-19)

*Religious leadership in religious Zionism*

The issue of religious leadership in Religious Zionism is largely different from that of ultra-Orthodox society. Since it was founded in 1902 as a political movement, it has positioned at the heart of its ideology the combination of Zionism and the Torah of Israel. The slogan that accompanied it from the beginning of its establishment was "The Land of Israel for the People of Israel according to the Torah of Israel." Despite the ideological differences between the approach of Rabbi Reines and Rabbi Kook regarding the perception of Zionism as a factor of religious and cultural significance, the different approach of Religious Zionism to the state is clearly evident when compared to the approach of the ultra-Orthodox who opposed participation within the framework of secular Zionism.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Already at the beginning of the discussion, the perpetual dilemma of Religious Zionism was mentioned, which is committed both to religion and to modernity, both to the Torah and to Zionism. In almost every field, historical or current, one many detect the irresoluteness that characterizes religious Zionism. Unlike in ultra-Orthodox society where the path is much clearer, religious Zionism is divided on this question. This stems from the problematic nature of trying to combine two commitments at the same time, which have the potential for contradictions and clashes.[[21]](#footnote-21)

A test event demonstrating this phenomenon revolved around the vision of the Torah state. Religious Zionism – as part of its national and religious ideology – aims to shape the State of Israel as a Torah state based on Halacha. In other words: Religious Zionism was faced with two simultaneous obligations which it wanted to realize at the same time: both its commitment to religion and its commitment to modern nationalism. Events gave a tough reality check to religious Zionism, which had to settle for religious legislation as a way of preserving the religious character of the state – very far from the original vision. According to Cohen, the reason for this lies in the tensions between the two value systems, and not only because of political power relations. [[22]](#footnote-22)

The attitude of religious Zionism to the religious leadership was different from that of ultra-Orthodox society. Religious Zionism never saw the rabbis as having absolute authority, and the phenomenon of 'da'at Torah' – which was at its height among the ultra-Orthodox – was not expressed in its ranks. Don Yehiya emphasizes that unlike Agudat Yisrael, the religious Zionist parties "did not establish a definite and explicit position and did not adopt a consistent policy on the question of to what extent the authority of the Chief Rabbinate should be accepted even in problems that are not of an essentially halachic nature.”[[23]](#footnote-23) At the same time, Goldberg points out the fact that the authority of the rabbis is nevertheless natural in a religious society and that the opinion of the rabbis also has plays a role in the Mafdal.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Benjamin Brown, in a comprehensive work on the topic of da'at Torah, examined the approach of the religious Zionist rabbis to da'at Torah. Brown points out that while in the ultra-Orthodox world, there is manifest allegiance to *emunat hachamim* (faith in the sages to make correct rulings), in religious Zionism there are differences of opinion on the subject, which expresses the fluctuations in religious Zionism in the last generation.[[25]](#footnote-25)

According to his findings, Rabbi Shlomo Dechovski (who serves as a judge at the Great Rabbinical Court) limits the authority of the Torah scholars of the generation to intervene in halachic or semi-halachic questions, but believes that it would be desirable and useful to receive their guidance in matters that are also extra-halachic..This is not the sweeping ultra-Orthodox position but a more reserved approach which highlights a propensity to expand the authority of the rabbis but as a voluntary matter.

Rabbi Avraham Shapira also agreed that there is room for preferring the authority of sages in non-halachic matters but he adds a democratic dimension to da'at Torah. In other words, sometimes the opinion of *klal Yisrael*[[26]](#footnote-26) can be as decisive as a da'at Torah. Rabbi Shapira qualified this, due to the fact that the majority of the people are not religiously observant, but in any case the difference in this approach from the prevailing ultra-Orthodox opinion is evident. A position close to this is that of Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, who in principle views obedience to da'at Torah as a positive value. In contrast, Rabbi Haim David Halevi took the approach that the concrete application of 'da'at Torah' should be reduced to a minimum, and left at the level of an ideal.

In any case, the attitude among the religious Zionist rabbis – according to whom there is room to accept adherence to da'at Torah – is a more limited approach and is still different from the ultra-Orthodox approach that advocates full obedience to da'at Torah. Ahituv emphasized that even while in the ultra-Orthodox world da'at Torah " is attributed to every great Torah scholar, in religious Zionism the requirement is to obey only the instructions of the rabbis of stature who are able to see reality and interpret it.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Over the years, two currents have emerged in religious Zionism: the religious-national-Torani (Torah-centered) current, and the religious-national-modern current. The Torani current is characterized, among other things, by strict observance of mitzvot, a certain reservation regarding modernity, a tendency to separatism - and in our case – obedience to the rabbis on a variety of subjects.[[28]](#footnote-28) Eliezer Don-Yehiya discussed the expansion of the rabbinic leadership in religious Zionism which increased with the growth of the Zionist yeshivot.[[29]](#footnote-29) This was expressed mainly in ideological issues, especially after the Six Day War.[[30]](#footnote-30)

The modern current advocates the combination of religion and modernity, greater openness, and a bolder approach to making innovative rulings. For our purposes, this current also disapproves of expanding the 'da'at Torah' phenomenon that spread in religious Zionism.[[31]](#footnote-31) Yitzhak Geiger reviews the phenomenon of 'the new religious Zionism' as manifested in the last generation. Geiger claims that there are several principles underlying the phenomenon, among them: a historicist approach to halachic law, the inclusion of external considerations in halachic rulings, and a willingness to criticize the authority of the rabbis. These principles call into question the existence of the continuum between classical Orthodoxy and parts of the new religious Zionism. In his opinion, this has the potential to split religious Zionism.[[32]](#footnote-32)

On the relationship between Judaism and democracy, Moshe Hellinger distinguishes between two models represented by the various currents in religious Zionism. One model is 'democratic Judaism'. This approach, represented by the modern current, internalizes liberal democratic concepts and does not see a contradiction between them and Judaism. The second model is 'Jewish democracy'.This approach, which is associated with the conservative current, finds it difficult to accept the liberal principles in liberal democracy.[[33]](#footnote-33)

In this context, it is worth noting the analysis of Yeshayahu Liebman, who identifies two ways of responding to the encounter between Jewish tradition and modernity. One way is called 'neo-traditional', which expresses an attitude of rejecting the values ​​of modernity and can be attributed to the ultra-Orthodox camp. The second way is 'Modern Orthodoxy', which is divided into three types: 1. Adaptation: adapting Jewish values ​​to modern values; 2.Compartmentalization: separating Jewish and modern domains; 3 . Expansion and takeover: viewing and perceiving each field through the lens of religious tradition.[[34]](#footnote-34)

Yehuda Brandes proposes three paths in the discussion about containing the state within the religious world: revival, continuity, and renewal. The revival approach highlights the renewal of sovereign reality after the long period of exile. The continuity approach sees the State of Israel as a continuation of Jewish sovereignty in previous ages. The renewal approach sees Israel as a new creation that is different from the previous kingdoms of the people of Israel.[[35]](#footnote-35)

Yitzhak Geiger points out in his work on the attitude of religious Zionism rabbis to the challenge of Jewish sovereignty that although there are differences between them various issues, nevertheless there are points of agreement among them. These relate to principles such as the religious meaning of the State of Israel, support for the idea of ​​the Jewish nation-state, the connection of the state to religion, recognizing the legitimacy of the government, and the rules of democracy. At the same time, the disagreement between the different approaches of the rabbis cannot be ignored.[[36]](#footnote-36)

The subject of this book will require discussing the various streams of thought within religious Zionism. Recently, attention has been called to a number of significant controversies in religious Zionism between the Torani stream and the modern stream. Among the issues are the status of women in the modern era, the question of recruiting religious girls to the IDF, the approaches to studying the Bible, and for our purposes – the place of rabbis in the political system.[[37]](#footnote-37)

*The Chief Rabbinate of Israel as a central authority*

The establishment of the Chief Rabbinate in the Land of Israel in 1921 by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook was the most significant expression of the establishment of religious leadership in the twentieth century.[[38]](#footnote-38) On the one hand, this was a 'step up' in terms of the status of the religious authority, but on the other hand, the Chief Rabbinate was subordinate to the British mandatory government, which aroused the ire of ultra-Orthodox circles, who considered the Chief Rabbinate a "*rabbanut mita'am*" i.e, a "crown rabbi."[[39]](#footnote-39) The main criticism revolved around the fact that non-rabbinic elements took part in the electoral body. In contrast, Rabbi Kook saw importance in the Chief Rabbinate being an official state institution. Rabbi Kook saw the chief rabbinate as a sublime value, which would boost the prestige of religious authority in Eretz Israel in preparation for the establishment of the State of Israel, which at that time was still a distant vision.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Dov Schwartz lists a number of factors contributing to the establishment of the Chief Rabbinate: the multiplicity of semi-institutional rabbinic bodies in Eretz Israel, the precarious financial situation of many rabbis, and the abased status of "Hachim Bashi" as a representative of the non-Muslim religion under the Ottoman rule.[[41]](#footnote-41) Despite the fact that the Chief Rabbinate is a state authority that is not connected to any particular political party, all researchers link the Chief Rabbinate to religious Zionism, and its political organizations.

Shulamit Eliash describes in detail the dialectical relations between the Mizrachi movement and the Chief Rabbinate during the Mandate period, relations that express the connection between religious Zionism and the Chief Rabbinate. Eliash underscores the economic dependence of the chief rabbinate on the Mizrachi movement, which evinces the technical dimension of the reciprocal relations, as well as the fact that the chief rabbis were in principle identified with the religious Zionist ideology (with the exception of Rabbi Yaakov Meir), which evinces the ideological dimension of these relations.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Giora Goldberg asserts that the Chief Rabbinate was the ideological and spiritual leadership in the Mafdal, based on the premise that the spiritual authority of rabbis is natural in religious society.[[43]](#footnote-43) Elaborating on this, Eliezer Don Yehiya contended that "the involvement of the Mafdal in the affairs of the Chief Rabbinate, and its function in establishing the Chief Rabbinate and validating its authority brought the party to a sense of custodianship of this institution. This was expressed in attempts to determine the composition of the Moetzet HaRabbanut [Chief Rabbinical Council] and influence its policy-making." Don Yehyia even compares the authority of the Chief Rabbinate in the Mafdal to the authority of the *Moetztet Gedloei HaTorah* in Agudat Yisrael,(a comparison worthy of a study in itself), due to the fact that the Chief Rabbinate, at least officially, is not related to the Mafdal like the Moetztet Gedloei HaTorah is to Agudat Yisrael.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Menachem Friedman related more to the state side of the Chief Rabbinate, and argued that the fact that the Chief Rabbinate is subject to traditional law will never satisfy the secular in the country, who aspire to a more liberal rabbinate. For this reason, Friedman claims that the crisis of the Chief Rabbinate is an "insoluble dilemma.”[[45]](#footnote-45) Contesting Friedman, Don Yehyia claims that the evaluation of the status of the Chief Rabbinate should be not made from a social perspective, but from a structural one–that is, the very fact that the Chief Rabbinate has official authority in the country, in parallel to authority from religious Zionist circles - is no reason to conclude that the crisis is insoluble.[[46]](#footnote-46)

Yehezkel Cohen distinguished between two periods in the development of the Chief Rabbinate. One is the pre-state mandate period, and the second period refers to the period after the state was established. The difference, according to Cohen, lies in the interrelationship between the Chief Rabbinate and the political leadership of religious Zionism. During the mandate period, the independence of the political leadership vis-à-vis the Chief Rabbinate is evident, as manifested in two major cases: one is the polemic surrounding women's right to vote, and the other is the issue of dairy milking on Shabbat. In both cases, Rabbi Kook took a strict approach: Rabbi Kook opposed women's participation in the elections for Yishuv, and also opposed milking on Shabbat. The political leadership disregarded these rulings and thereby expressed an independent position.[[47]](#footnote-47) Friedman points out that during this period, Rabbinate needed the support of the Mizrachi more than the Mizrachi leadership needed legitimacy from the Chief Rabbinate. This description indicates the extent of the Chief Rabbinate's dependence on the political echelons, which brought in its wake to noncompliance by the political leadership.[[48]](#footnote-48)

In the period after the state was established, Yehezkel Cohen pointed to three laws where the movement obeyed the position of the Chief Rabbinate: conscription of women to the IDF, national service for women, and the law of Who Is a Jew. On the issue of conscription of women to the IDF, the movement accepted the position of the Chief Rabbinate, which opposed it. The Religious Kibbutz movement that opposed this ruling remained a minority in the movement. Unna and Cohen, describing this, point out that the position of the Religious Kibbutz was seen as a marginal position in the movement, even in relation to the moderate elements within it.[[49]](#footnote-49)

The Chief Rabbinate's support for national service for women naturally attracted the support of the religious Zionist movement, and on the issue of 'Who Is a Jew', the party obeyed the ruling of the Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Goren not to join the Rabin government in 1974 until the law was changed. Only later did it join, in spite of Rabbi Goren's position.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Yehezkel Cohen listed a number of key reasons that can explain the change between the mandate period and the state period: (1) The fact that it was the Mizrachi leaders who established the Chief Rabbinate, and for that reason their power was greater compared to the state period when the Chief Rabbinate was strengthened vis a vis the political leadership. (2) The Mizrachi leaders during the mandate period were Torah scholars, and therefore considered themselves exempt from obedience to the rabbinate, in contrast to the leaders during the State period.(3) The questions that arose during the mandate period related to their very political existence, compared to the state period, when the questions were less existential in terms of the political leadership. (4) The religious strengthening of the religious Zionist public in the preceding generation that sees the Chief Rabbinate as a religious authority. (5) Involvement of the chief rabbis in the affairs of the Mafdal during the state period.

For our purposes, one basic point is important, namely, that the Chief Rabbinate of Israel is recognized as *the* religious authority in religious Zionism. It seems that in light of the various cases where the Chief Rabbinate had some influence on religious Zionism, this point cannot be disputed. Asher Cohen describes in detail the interrelationship between religious Zionism and the Chief Rabbinate during the period of where the state was taking shape regarding the possibility of creating a concrete plan for the vision of a Torah state, which was then at its peak. Cohen presents three approaches to this stage: the innovative approach, which challenges the authority of the rabbis; the traditional approach, which justifies the authority of the rabbinate; and an intermediate approach of the political leadership, which critiques the rabbinate to a degree but recognizes its authority. Indeed, over the years, the views of the Chief Rabbinate and the Mafdal have intersected on various issues.[[51]](#footnote-51)

However, at the same time, it would be a mistake to create the impression that the Chief Rabbinate was the only rabbinic authority in the Mafdal especially considering the fact that the Chief Rabbinate is essentially a state body that should not be officially connected to any political party. Moreover, the very connection between the Chief Rabbinate and religious Zionism raises the question of the place and status of the 'Hever HaRabbanim' which is the focus of this book .

*The Hever HaRabbanim of Hapoel HaMizrachi*

The discussion of the "Hever HaRabbanim" is important because it was an official body within the national religious party. Hever HaRabbanim was established in 1948 as part of the Hapoel HaMizrachi movement. In the early years of the state, religious Zionism was represented by two movements: "HaMizrachi" and "HaPoel HaMizrachi. "[[52]](#footnote-52) The "Mizrachi" movement was founded in 1902 by religious Zionists and was in fact the first party in the Zionist Congress. The establishment of the "Mizrachi" expressed a protest against the decision of the Fifth Zionist Congress to include education within the scope of activity of the Zionist Organization. This decision inevitably inspired apprehension among "Mizrachi" that this educational activity would focus on the secular interpretation. The activity of "Mizrachi" in Eretz Israel began after the First World War and it represented bourgeois/civil/right-wing character regarding economic and social issues as well as activist on foreign and security matters.

The Hapoel HaMizrachi movement was founded in 1922 and had a socialist, proletarian cast; it emphasized the working class, and the organizational/institutional dimension was dominant in its activity. In 1949 "HaPoel Hamizrachi" had eight mandates compared to only two for "Mizrahi". [[53]](#footnote-53) This shows the power of the HaPoel Hamizrachi, which is relevant to the subject of this study–Hever HaRabbanim, since this body was established precisely within the political framework of Hapoel HaMizrachi.

In order to delve deeper into the political aspect of the establishment of the Hever HaRabbanim, we will focus on the factionalism that characterized Hapoel HaMizrachi. The affiliation of the founder of Hever Rabbinim, Rabbi Katriel Tchorsh, with one of the factions is relevant to this issue.

Don-Yehiya characterized the Mafdal as a party with "institutionalized factionalism.”[[54]](#footnote-54) The beginning of the factionalism in the Mafdal originates from HaPoel HaMizrahi which had several factions, the most prominent of which are:

1. The Lamifne faction, which included members of the religious kibbutz movement, the HaPoel HaMizrachi Moshav Association, as well as members from the cities. This faction advocated breaking away from the Mizrachi and in close cooperation with the general labor movement, pioneering, and political and religious moderation.

2. The El HaMakor faction, which was less compromising in matters of religion, less socialist in matters of society and economy, and activist in matters of security.[[55]](#footnote-55) In addition, it was close to Agudat Yisrael in religious matters. This faction was close to "Mizrahi" and advocated unification with it. Among the members of the faction was Rabbi Katriel Fishel Tchorsh who established the Hever HaRabbanim.[[56]](#footnote-56)

3. The central faction, which was the cohesive glue of HaPoel HaMizrachi and in fact had an important and dominant role, between the LaMifne and El HaMakor factions.[[57]](#footnote-57)

For our purposes, the important point is that the founder of the Rabbinical Council, Rabbi Tchorsh, was from the El HaMakor faction. His views on strengthening the religious dimension in the party and his strong desire to establish an organization of rabbis within it only prove this point. Later, in 1955 with the unification of HaMizrachi and HaPoel HaMizrachi, the Hever Rabbinim constituted a framework for both.

The establishment of Hever HaRabbanim created a new model of rabbinical authority in religious Zionism except for the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. The research literature dealing with the "Hever HaRabbanim" is extremely scarce. There is no comprehensive systematic research on Hever HaRabbanim apart from brief references.

Asher Cohen noted the establishment of the Hever HaRabbanim as part of an attempt to realize the vision of a Torah state and the disappointment that was related to the Chief Rabbinate of Israel. In this work, Asher Cohen deals only with the founding period and the specific context of the Torah state.[[58]](#footnote-58) A similar trend in this spirit can also be seen in Dov Schwartz, who connects the Hever HaRabbanim with the 'Torah Law', as a vision that many wanted to realize, without success.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Giora Goldberg also refers to the "Hever HaRabbanim" as a rabbinical authority in the Mafdal and claims that "its influence has always been limited.[[60]](#footnote-60) The references to Hever HaRabbanim are general and do not encompass all of its activity: one gets the impression that there have been no changes in the status and the function of the Hever HaRabbanim over the years; there is no reference to the totality of its activities and to the cases where it exercised its authority, if such existed. In this context, the impression created is though the main concern of the Hever HaRabbanim was the issue of authority within the party; there is no reference to the subject of activity at the national level or to its internal organizational activity. There is no reference to relationships *within* Hever HaRabbanim. The impression can be created that the rabbinical group was monolithic, there is no reference to different approaches regarding its activities. There is no reference in the research literature to the decline of Hever HaRabbanim and the reasons for it. Against this background, one can understand the importance of this study, whose main purpose is to examine the status and function of religious leadership within a political framework.

*The research method and the structure of the book*

The beginning of the period which the research addresses is the year 1948, when the Hever HaRabbanim was officially established. The end of the period is 1980. After the death of the leader of the Hever HaRabbanim, Rabbi Katriel Tchorsh, in 1979, a significant decline is marked in the function and status of the Hever HaRabbanim, despite its official survival to this very day. The most prominent expression of this is the cessation of publication of the 'Shvilin' compilations, which were the "flagship" publication of the Rabbinate for about twenty years. In addition to this, other religious authorities began emerge during this period within the framework of the national religious movement

The premise of the research is based on the fact that besides the death of Rabbi Tchorsh, there were other factors that influenced the decline of the Hever HaRabbanim. The research questions will be derived from here: How did the Hever HaRabbanim assume its role at the beginning? Have there been any changes in the fields of activity of the Hever HaRabbanim over the years? In light of the fact that the Hever HaRabbanim functioned alongside the Chief Rabbinate– What were the relations between the two leaderships? Did the Hever HaRabbanim perceive itself as a binding authority in the party? And how did the party view the position of the Hever HaRabbanim? Did all the rabbis see eye to eye on the performance of the Hever HaRabbanim ? And finally, why did Hever HaRabbanim decline? Did external factors cause it decline or is the decline related to the Hever HaRabbanim itself?

**The research method** in the book will be a qualitative content analysis of primary sources relating to the research subject, such as the " HaTorah VeHaMedina " and the "Shvilin" compilations; the press (such as: *Davar, Ma'ariv, HaTzofe*), minutes of the meetings of the Hever HaRabbanim from the Religious Zionist Archives at Bar Ilan University, interviews, documents, articles by religious Zionist figures, articles in the press, all of this combined with research material dealing with our case.

**The structure of the book** is based on a timeline division and on the topics that the rabbis of the Mafdal dealt with in the first generation of the state.

**The second chapter** will deal with the founding period of the Hever HaRabbanim, particular the first two conventions where the Hever HaRabbanim's path was charted.

**The third chapter** will compare the publications of the Hever HaRabbanim: "HaTorah VeHaMedina" and "Shvilin", and the similarities and differences between them.

**The fourth chapter** will focus on a number of halachic initiatives of the Hever HaRabbanim: the composition of the Independence Day prayer, the preparations for the Shmittah year, the *Yarhei Kalla* project and the project of adopting the settlement movement.?

**The fifth chapter** will analyze the ups and downs in the relationship between the Hever HaRabbanim and the Chief Rabbinate.

**The sixth chapter** will reveal the internal differences of opinion between the rabbis of Hapoel HaMizrachi and their significance.

**The seventh chapter** will examine the relationship between the rabbinical leadership and the political leadership under circumstances where the rabbis do not receive formal authority to guide the political echelon on how to conduct political matters and the politicians do not feel obligated to obey them.

**The eighth chapter** will review the moves that led to the decline of the Hever HaRabbanim in the early seventies against the background of the "brother and sister affair".

**The ninth chapter** will be devoted to the growth of the new leaderships that arose in religious Zionism and largely replaced the Hever HaRabbanim.

**In the last chapter,** a summary of the findings and the conclusions arising from them will be presented. In addition, we will discuss the place of religious leadership in religious Zionism since the decline of Hever HaRabbanim until today, in an attempt to understand the basic dilemma in this context, and in the broader context of the status of religious Zionism in the contemporary political reality.

1. Ben-Zion Rubin, “Smotrich bekol shavur mibekhi: Ma naaseh bli haḥiyuḥ vehaḥibuk” [“Smotrich, His Voice Breaking with Tears: What Will We Do Without the Smile and Hug?”] *SrugimNews*, December 26, 2022 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Over time, various parties have been part of this movement including: Hapoel HaMizrachi, Mizrachi, the National Religious Party (known by the acronym Mafdal for Miflaga Datit Leumit), The Jewish Home (HaBayit HaYehudi) and the Religious Zionist Party (Miflagat HaZionit HaDatit). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The rabbinic world has faced a wide range of dilemmas, as described in the collection of articles: Yedidia Z. Stern and Shuki Friedman, eds., *Rabbanut: Haetgar* [Rabbis and Rabbinate: The Challenge] (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute and Am Oved, 2011) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Peter Berger, “A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity,” *Social Research* 30 (1963): 77–93. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Stuart Cohen and Daniel Elazar, *Edat Bnei Yisrael* [*The Jewish Polity]* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Center Public Affairs and Reuven Mass Publishing, 1997) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jospeh LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 42–43. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Donald Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little & Brown, 1970), 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Manhigut datit vemanhigut politit” [“Religious Leadership and Political Leadership,”] in *Manhigut ruḥanit beYisrael: Morasha veyaad* [*Jewish Spiritual Leadership in Our Time]* ed. Ella Belfer (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Dvir, 1982), 106 [Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ido Rechnitz, “Mikoman shel Harabbanim baasiyah haẓiborit-politit” [“The Place of the Rabbis in the Public-Political Action,”] *Shm‘atin* 178 (2011): 212 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For more on the ideology of the religious kibbutz movement, see Aryeh Fishman, *Bein daat leideologia* [Between Religion and Ideology] (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1990) [in Hebrew]. The religious kibbutz movement is the most prominent representative of this innovative approach to religious Zionism. Some people, particularly rabbinic authorities, see this approach as straying too far on various halachic issues. Notably, Moshe Unna, a philosopher and founding member of the religious kibbutz movement asserted that religious leaders are only one component of religious authority, and that the status of the second component, the community, is equivalent to rabbinic authorities. See also Asher Cohen, *Hatallit vehadegel: Haẓiunut hadatit veḥazon midinat hatorah beyamei reishit hamedina* [The Tallit and the Flag: Religious Zionism and the Vision of the Torah State in the Early Days of the State] (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1998), 162 [in Hebrew] [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Benjamin Brown, “Daat torah veemunah ḥakhamim bahagut haḥaredit” [“Daat Torah and Faith in the Sages in Haredi Thought”] (MA diss., The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1996), 213-223 [Hebrew]; Benjamin Brown, “Daat torah baẓionut hadatit” [“Daat Torah in Religious Zionism”] in *Haẓionut hadatit: Idan hatemurot* [Religious Zionism: The Era of Change], eds. Asher Cohen and Israel Harel (Jerusalem, 2004), 475–532 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Yosef Aḥituv, “Metachim vetemurot bamanhigut hadatit” [“Tensions and Transitions in Religious Leadership”] in *Bein samkhut leideiologia* [*Between Authority and Autonomy in Jewish Tradition]*, eds. Z. Safrai and A. Sagi (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1997), 56–75 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jacob Katz, *Halakha bemaẓor* [Halakha in Straits], (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 20 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Lawrence Kaplan, “Da’at Torah: A Modern Conception of Halakhic Authority,” in *Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy*, ed. Moshe Sokol (Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc, 1997), 104–145. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Gershon Bacon, “Daat torah veḥevlei mashiah: Leshealat haideologia shel agudat yisrael bepolin” [“Daat Torah and the Birth Pangs of the Messiah: On the Ideology of Agudat Yisrael in Poland”] *Tarbiz* 52 (1983), 497–508 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Menachem Friedman, *Haḥevra ha**ḥaredit* [Ultra-Orthodox Society] (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, 1991), 104–112 [in Hebrew]; Yosef Fund, *Pirud o hishtatfut: Agudat Yisrael mul haẓionut vemedinat Yisrael* *[*Separation or Participation: Agudat Yisrael Confronting Zionism and the State of Israel] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999), 29–48 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Zvi Vinman, *M’katoviẓ ad hey beiyar* [From Katovitz to the 5th of Iyar] (Jerusalem: Vatikin Publishing, 1995), 65–83 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Anat Feldman, “Gormim beẓmiḥat miflaga politit: Hitaḥdut hasefaradim shomrei torah—Shas,” [“Factors in the Growth of a Political Party: The Association of Sefardi Guardians of the Torah – Shas”]. (PhD. diss., Bar-Ilan University, 2001), 135-156 [in Hebrew]; Eliav Taub, *Gedolim bapolitika: Hanhagatam shel harabanim Ovadiah Yosef veEliezer Shakh* [Religious Leaders in Politics: The Leadership of Rabbis Ovadia Yosef and Eliezer Shakh] (Jerusalem: Resling, 2013); Nissim Leon, *Hamiẓnefet vehadegel: Leumiyut shekeneged baḥarediyut hamizraḥit [*The Turban and the Flag: Nationalism Versus Mizrachi Ultra-Orthodoxy] (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 2016) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Tefisot shel haẓionut bahagut haẓionit haortodoksit,” [“Perceptions of Zionism in Orthodox Zionist Thought”] *Haẓionut* 9, (1984): 55–93 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Dov Schwartz, *Meaḥdut leribui: Sipora shel hatodaa haẓionit hadatit* [From Unity to Multiplicity: The Story of the Religious-Zionist Mindset] (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 2018), 171 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Cohen *Hatallit vehadegel.* [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Mashber vetemurah bemedina ḥadasha:* *Ḥinukh, dat vepolitica bamaavak al haaliyah hagedola* [Crisis and Change in a New State: Education, Religion and Politics in the Struggle over the Great Immigration](Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 2008), 55 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Giora Goldberg, *Hamiflagot beyisrael: Memiflagot hamon lemiflagot electoriot* [Political Parties in Israel: From Mass Parties to Electoral Parties](Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1992), 176 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Brown, *Daat torah veemunah* [Daat Torah and Faith]; Brown, “Daat torah baẓionut hadatit” [“Daat Torah in Religious Zionism”]. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The Jewish collective whose identity is based on the Torah. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Yosef Ahituv, “Haẓionut hadatit bein ideologia lehalakha,” [“Religious Zionism between Ideology and Halakha,”] in *Sugiot beḥeker haẓionut hadatit: Hitpatḥuyot vetmurot ledorotehen* [Studies in Religious Zionism: Developments and Changes]*,* Yishai Arnon, Yehuda Friedlander and Dov Schwartz, eds. (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2012), 169–192 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Asher Cohen and Baruch Zisser, *Mehashalom lehaslamah: Hashesa hadati-ḥiloni bepetaḥ hameah haesrim veeḥad* [From Acceptance to Escalation: The Religious-Secular Rift at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century] (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 2003), 128–129 [in Hebrew]; Moshe Hellinger, *Haẓionut hadatit bepetaḥ hameah ha-21: Bein gesisah levein teḥiya efsharit* [Religious Zionism at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Between Extinction and Possible Resurrection], (Ramat Gan: Argov Center, Bar Ilan University) [in Hebrew]; Yair Sheleg, *Hadatiyim haḥadashim: Mabat akhshavi al haḥevra hadatit beyisrael* [The New Observant Jews: Recent Developments among Observant Jews in Israel]*,* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000) [in Hebrew]; Yair Sheleg, *Haḥardalim: Hahistoriya, ideologia, noḥekhut* [Zionist Ultra-Orthodox: History, Ideology, Presence],(Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute for Democracy, 2020) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Fundamentalism dati veradicalism politi: Hayeshivot haleumiyot beyisrael,” [“Religious Fundamentalism and Political Radicalism: The Nationalist Yeshivot in Israel,”] in *Aẓmaut:* *Ḥamishim hashnim harishonot* [Independence: The First Fifty Years],ed. Anita Shapira (Jerusalem: Shazar Center for Israel History, 1998), 431–470. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Avi Sagi and Dov Schwartz, *Merealism lemeshiḥiyut: Haẓionut hadatit vemilḥemat sheshet hayamim* [From Realism to Messianism: Religious Zionism and the Six Day War] (Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing and Shalom Hartman Institute, 2017); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Miẓukot beutopia: Yisrael hevra beomes yeter* [Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1990), 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Yehezkel Cohen, *Nashim behanhagat haẓibur* [Women in Public Leadership] (Jerusalem: Hakibbutz Hadati, 1991), 62 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Yitzhak Geiger, “Haẓionut hadatit haḥadasha: Sekira, iyun vebikoret”[“The New Religious Zionism: Overview, Study and Criticism”], *Akdamot: A Journal of Jewish Thought* (2001): 51-77 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Moshe Hellinger, *Medinat yisrael, lean?: Etgarim lezehutah hayehudit vehademokratit shel medinat yisrael vemitveh lehitmodidut imam* [Where is Israel Going? Inner Challenges Facing the Jewish and Democratic Identity of the State of Israel and an Outline for Confronting Them] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2019), 281-282 [in Hebrew]; Moshe Hellinger, “Degem hademokratia hayehudit mul degem hayahadut hademokratit bahagut haortodoksit hamodernit bameah haesrim,” [“The Model of Jewish Democracy Versus the Model of Democratic Judaism in Modern-Zionist Orthodox Thought of the Twentieth Century,”] (PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 2002) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Isaiah Liebman, “Hitpatḥuthaneo-masortiut bekerev yehudim ortodoksim beyisrael,” [“Development of Neo-traditionalism among Orthodox Jews in Israel,”] *Megamot* 27 (1982), 231-239 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Yehuda Brandes, *Hamakaf vehaelipsah: Haarakhim vehaizunim shel haẓionut hadatit* [The Hyphen and the Ellipse: Religious Zionism, Values and Balance] Rishon Letzion: Yedioth Ahronoth and Hamed Books, 2021), 120-121 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Yitzhak Geiger, *Hayeẓiah mehashtetl: Rabbanei haẓionut hadatit el mul etgar haribonut hayehudit,* [Leaving the Shtetl: Religious Zionist Rabbis and the Challenge of Jewish Sovereignty] (Alon Shvut: Herzog College, 2006), 450 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Yair Ettinger, Perumim: Hamaḥlokot shemefaẓlot et haẓionut hadatit [Unraveled: The disputes that divide Religious Zionism] (Kinneret, Zamora Beitan-Dvir, 2019) [in Hebrew]; Tamar Herman et al., *Datiyim? Leumiyim! Hamaḥaneh hadati leumi beyisrael 2014 Doḥ meḥkar* [Religious? Nationalist!: The National Religious Sector in Israel 2014, Research Report](Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2014); Hanan Mozes, “Miẓionut datit ledatiyut post-modernit: Megamot vetahalikhim baẓionut hadatit meaz reẓaḥ Rabin,” [“From Religious Zionism to Postmodern Religiosity: Trends and Processes in Religious Zionism Since Rabin's Assassination,”] (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. On the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, see Itamar Wahrhaftig and Shmuel Katz, *Harabbanut haroshit leyisrael: Shivim shana leyesod* [The Chief Rabbinate of Israel: Seventy Years Since Its Establishment,] (Jerusalem: Heikhal Shlomo, 2002). On the establishment of the Chief Rabbinate, see Aryeh Morgenstern, *Harabbanut haroshit leYisrael: Yesoda veirguna* [The Chief Rabbinate of Eretz Yisrael - Its Establishment and Organization] (Jerusalem: Shorashim, 1973). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. # Term used for member of the Jewish community appointed for the benefit of the governing state, usually no more than a lower-level bureaucrat without specialized Torah scholarship.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Menachem Friedman, *Ḥevra vedat: Haortodoksiah halo ẓionit bereẓ yisrael* [Society and Religion: Non-Zionist Orthodoxy in the Land of Israel], (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1978), 128-187 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Dov Schwartz, *Haẓionut hadatit – toledot vepirkei ideoligiya* [Religious Zionism: History and Ideology](Ministry of Defense, 2003), 52-53 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Shulamit Eliash, *Hayaḥasim bein harabbanut haroshit leereẓ yisrael vehashilton hamandatori* [The Relationship Between the Chief Rabbinate and the Land of Israel and the Mandatory Government]*,* (PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 1986), 90-122; Shulamit Eliash, “The Chief Rabbinate and the Mizrachi during the Mandate Period,” *Catedra* 37 (1986): 123-148. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Goldberg, *Hamiflagot beyisrael*, 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Don-Yehiya, “Manhigut datit,” 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Menachem Friedman “Harabbanut haroshit – dilemma lelo pitaron,” [“The Chief Rabbinate – Dilemma Without a Solution,”] *Medina, Mimshal, veYaḥbal* 3 (1973): 118-127 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Don-Yehiya, ““Manhigut datit,” 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Cohen, *Nashim behanhagat haẓibur*, 59-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Friedman, *Ḥevra vedat*, 385-388. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Moshe Unna, *Bederakhim nifradot: Hamiflagot hadatiyot beyisrael [On Separate Paths, The Religious Parties in Israel,]* (Alon Shvut Gush Etzion, Yad Shapira, 1983), 256-280; Cohen, *Hatalit vehadegel*, 107-108. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Aharon Kempinsky, “Minister Zevulun Hammer’s Stance on the “Who is a Jew?” Issue,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* 31 no. 1-2 (2020): 146-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Cohen, *Hatalit vehadegel*, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Meyishuv lemedinah* [From Settlement to State] (Jerusalem: Am Oved, 1977), 119 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. On the distinctions between the Mizrachi and HaPoel HaMizrachi parties, see for example, Moshe Unna, *Bederakhim nifradot*, chapter four; Naomi Cohen, “Ẓionut datit: Mashber vetemurah,” [“Religious Zionism – Crisis and Change,”] in *Koveẓ haẓionut hadatit* [The Religious Zionist Anthology]*,* Simcha Raz, ed. (Jerusalem, The World Center, 1997), 323-331. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Yeẓivut vetemurot bemiflagot mahaneh: Hamafdal vemahapakhat haẓeirim,” [“Stability and Transformations in Sectoral Parties: The Mafdal and the Youth Revolution,”] *Medina, Mimshal, veYaḥbal*, 14 (2015): 25-52. [in Hebrew] [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. This faction defined its path as: “The organized expression of dissatisfaction felt among the members of the HaPoel HaMizrahi with the movement's spiritual direction.” As quoted in: “Siyat elhamakor bapoel hamizrahi,” [“The El-HaMakor Faction in HaPoel HaMizrachi,”] *HaYarden*, (November 11, 1934): 4 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Eliezer Don-Yehiya has shown in his research that Rabbi Tchorsh consistently took activist positions on foreign and security issues. See: Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Bein shalom leshleimut haareẓ* [Between Peace and the Wholeness of the Land]*,* (Ben Gurion Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 2019) [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. For more on the differences between these factions see: Benjamin Neuberger, *Dat, medinah vepolitica* [State, Religion and Politics in Israel] (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 1997), 142 [in Hebrew]. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Cohen, *Hatalit vehadegel*, 104-107. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Dov Schwartz, “Mireishit haẓemiḥah lehagshamah,” [“From the Beginning of Growth to its Realization,”] in *Haẓiunut hadatit: Idan hatemurot* [Religious Zionism: The Era of Change], eds. Asher Cohen and Israel Harel (Jerusalem, 2004), 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Goldberg, *Hamiflagot beyisrael*, 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)