**The Discourse of Power and Truth in Poetic Works (Literature and Art):**

**An Elementary Access**

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So injustices may not be perceived as injustices, even by those who suffer them, until somebody invents a previously unplayed role. Only if somebody has a dream, and a voice to describe that dream, does what looked like nature begin to look like culture, what looked like fate begin to look like a moral abomination. For until then only the language of the oppressor is available, and most oppressors have had the wit to teach the oppressed a language in which the oppressed will sound crazy - *even to themselves* - if they describe themselves *as* oppressed (Rorty, 1995: 126).

Fredrick Nietzsche (1844-1900), the philosopher who opened the wide gate to postmodernism, argued that truth is nothing but “a mobile army of metaphors and metonyms” and that knowledge is one of the forms of “the will to power.”[[1]](#footnote-2) From this perspective, truth seems to be a prisoner of rhetoric. Truth is caged by language (precisely like everything else, including this paper). Knowledge also seems structural and infinite in terms of concepts, situations, and interpretations. The only spine that holds it upright is the ideology of the ambition for domination. Therefore, the idea of pure knowledge, according to Nietzsche, is discounted since what is “right” and “true” is nothing but “the expediency of a certain race and species – their utility alone is their truth. Truth is what is considered true if reinforced by the discourse of power.”[[2]](#footnote-3)

Indebted to Nietzsche, Michel Foucault (1926-1924) created his archaeology out of this specific point. According to cultural studies, power is the ability to accomplish one’s goals and serve one’s own interests (individually or collectively) regardless of others. On the other hand, truth is a social creation, or it is what becomes “true” through the activation of power, i.e., “the systems of power” as Foucault called them.

For the romantic, revolutionary, liberal, and idealistic philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007), truth is high esteem, approval, and “social commendation.” That is, truth is a social construct that lacks any obligation or necessity that might be inherent in the nature of things.[[3]](#footnote-4)

Therefore, it can be concluded that whomever does not exercise power or authority does not possess the truth either. In addition, Rorty’s pragmatist philosophy, similar to that espoused by Nietzsche and Foucault, does not uphold the marginalized until one of them “invents a role that has not been played before” and stops referring to him/herself as oppressed (Rorty, 1995:126) within the framework of socialization or conversability—thus, establishing a reasonably relative balance between social cooperation and private beatitude, following the example of wise philosophers such as Socrates (399 – 469 BC) and Spinoza (1632 – 1677).[[4]](#footnote-5)

However, examining power relations as a comprehensive network that encompasses all aspects of human activity leads the pragmatist to strip the ethical distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed of its meaning. This is because every individual’s will is subsumed under the will to power. Although initially we will follow Rorty’s model—which replaces objectivity with two methods, ironism versus solidarity, i.e., espousing concepts and values through individuation through free will—we still insist on posing the following question: What about the truth that is, in its essence, an absolute rejection of the will to power?

Since we concur with Derrida (Jacques Derrida, 1930-2007), who concurs with Saussure (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1857-1913), that meaning emerges from the relationships of difference among signifiers rather than from an objective, independent reality,[[5]](#footnote-6) then the aesthetic truth we are seeking in the creative work may become clearer and clearer the more it opposes whatever appears in the text as an oppressive act by one of the forces of power and domination.[[6]](#footnote-7)

Foucault, relying upon Nietzsche, elaborates on the definition of power and power relationships, which include knowledge, by illuminating their manifestations in different regimes and institutions. However, he places truth on (or outside) the margins of discourse in the disentangled self because it is an epistemological concern.[[7]](#footnote-8) In our view, the discourse of truth in this context is among the aesthetics of protest, rejection, rejection, insubordination, criticism, and resistance to the living conditions and the intellectual, political, and economic hierarchies that do not appeal to the critic or the artist because they are governed, in his/her perspective, by the relationships of oppression that lack the moral drive to alleviate suffering and injustice for the individuals and groups controlled by these relationships. This discourse always develops within a culture of critique, which stems from a commitment to live for truth, or at least to write about it. This culture would contain every intellectual, creative, oppositional, denunciative, insubordinate, and resisting impulse. The arts, not as a copy but as a unique rhetorical representation of reality, create aesthetic strategies to construct a specific understanding of the world. Every true art is nothing but an innovation that simultaneously builds and destroys. This is why the history of art is the history of breaking down normalized and legitimized conventions as well as exposing the cultural formations and structures that support power and domination. This innovation essentially comes into being through doubting, investigating, and interrogating truths; through uncovering implicit meanings; and through criticizing the aesthetic formations and mechanisms of controlling, directing, repressing, and policing the cultural discourse. These norms and structures activate a set of rules for banning, excluding, marginalizing, and silencing other public formations and mechanisms (whether aesthetic, political, social, or economic). But what are the means used by the arts to break down and investigate? How does oppositional art unpack normalized and common discourses? How can we arrive at definitions of power —including its functions and its rise as well as its decline and emasculation? Is truth, as explained above, solely the outcome of power relations, which is the thrust of the Foucauldian position that derives from Nietzsche? Or is it a problematic that is hard to explain except within its emotional rejection of these relations and its rebellion against a history that keeps repeating itself? Also, who grants power to whom? What are the connections between “power” and “truth” that emerge within the creative work?

Parody, satire, irony, paradox, oxymoron, caricature, antithesis, the grotesque, ambivalence or ambiguity, humor, allegory, symbolism, implication, and all other literary and rhetorical devices have been and still are, through their binary oppositions, rhetorical strategies essential to inventing new interpretations by breaking apart old cultural texts, hierarchies, and systems, and erecting new ones over their ruins.[[8]](#footnote-9) The Russian critic Mikail Bakhtin identified techniques to place texts under the microscope and to analyze them according to postmodern principles that have been in practice since the age of medieval carnivals.[[9]](#footnote-10) As a fertile ground for destroying discourse, the carnival provided elements of duality and ambivalence, such as crowning and overthrowing, mixing races and ethnicities, replacing the center with the margin, desecrating the holy, showing intimacy, uniting opposites, and using multivocality. All of these phenomena are canivalesque forms activating the process of breaking down and overturning the power sites within the images of the world, as depicted in the different fields of discourse. In other words, the carnivalesque act relocates to the margins what is presumed to be central, and what is supposed to be marginal to the center, at least for a short while.[[10]](#footnote-11) In this respect, one of the most powerful definitions of culture, according to Cultural Studies, is a field of knowledge where meaning is infinitely contested. In the carnival, the marginal meaning wins over the meanings that the center has worked so tirelessly to establish as truth. But this victory is not absolute; it is a temporary comedic relief or a short-lived victory. But it is not a victory among equals, even if the short-lived victory unleashes an overwhelming sense of a symbolic triumph. In the case of art, which is a central representative practice and an indispensable and vastly significant aspect of culture, this definition gains more support and strength in a unique way. Thus, art functions as an aesthetic theater because it displays on its “stage” texts constantly battling over meaning. Within artistic discourse, these texts appear as a space for generating meaning.

But where are power and truth in this discourse?

From the Foucauldian point of view, discourse is the language of power and oppression. In this respect, Foucault states that “discourse itself is the site where knowledge and power shape each other. Discourse produces power and transmits it. It strengthens it, but weakens its status. It exposes it and uncovers its weaknesses and makes its confinement achievable.”[[11]](#footnote-12) Here Foucault emphasizes power and knowledge as codependent and inseparable. But he does not leave room for the notion of truth to emerge within this construct. There is no truth there, only “systems of truth,” that is, what the person who controls the discourse declares to be the truth. “Foucault believes that the true world is beyond human comprehension. Whatever we know about it is limited and subject to our arbitrary linguistic formations”[[12]](#footnote-13) and “he who possesses power decides on the knowledge he needs to protect his power. He who does not have power, needs an alternative knowledge with which to resist. Therefore, each society has its own system of power determined by the dominant discourse.”[[13]](#footnote-14) However, if the true world is beyond human comprehension, then how can we consider power a truth that we can comprehend?

Nonetheless, Foucault still refers to truth in his discussion of the Fool: “It also happens . . . that special skills are attributed to him and not to everyone else, that is, the ability to reveal a hidden truth . . . It is strange to notice that the words of the Fool have remained unheard for several centuries in Europe. But if these words were heard, they were regarded as an expression of truth.”[[14]](#footnote-15)

The language Foucault describes is the language of repressive “rational” discourse. It plays a critical, ideological role in shaping the images of the past, the present, and the future by producing tyrannical meanings to serve the interests of the dominant discourses and groups that seek to establish their hegemony over the oppressed masses.[[15]](#footnote-16) Foucault builds his project on a semi-fictitious balance between the oppressor and the oppressed. To a certain extent, he overlooks the weight each one can deploy in the arena of conflict; he focuses more on the foundational network of power relations within this arena and on the rules that govern it than on the position of the “players” themselves. He tends to recommend looking at discourse as a multiplicity of elements employing different strategies of perceiving the world and its objects. These elements are so interwoven that the line between the discourse of the dominant and the dominated, or between acceptable (imposed) and unacceptable discourse, is blurred.[[16]](#footnote-17) In this sense, truth becomes a “rare commodity” but worthless wisdom nonetheless, left to rot in the mouths of fools.

Homi K. Bhabha (1949 - ) makes a nearly similar move when he describes the “hybridity” that emerges from cross-cultural interbreeding.[[17]](#footnote-18) Bhabha overlooks the significant role played by the inequality between the colonizer and the colonized (even in post-colonialism) in shaping and designing this “hybridity.” It is as if inequality is not a significant factor in determining how “hybridity” becomes the “third space” that enables a noble negotiation and exchange among the cultures at the center and marginalized ones. Thus, the difference between deploying and resisting power may be lost in the Foucauldian power relations network. It is also possible for centralization and marginalization to become blurred in the “mixture” of Bhabha’s hybridity. All of this leads to the following question: What then becomes of the “alternative knowledge,” in Foucault’s words, or of the discourses of the single individuals and of the oppressed masses?

Here, we suggest reconsidering Foucault’s approach. The discourse of the oppressed rejects power as a matter of principle: not out of weakness, but out of absolute rejection, and not just for the time being. In its downtrodden position this discourse becomes the language of power and the oppression of the oppression. Even if these individuals and groups (nationalities, beliefs, classes, or any other categories) use the same language, they take a contrary direction and deploy new creative tools so that they can create their own visions of their past, present, and future. Thus, through emasculating and destroying the authoritarian meanings and unmasking “the systems of truth” that hide behind the face of truth, the discourse of oppressing oppression tries to shatter the hegemony that weaponizes these masking meanings and lurks behind.

In the end, the truth whose definition we seek may ultimately be “the system of truth” adopted by the downtrodden who do not wish to control others, but rather to be completely free of being controlled by them. On the other hand, the Foucauldian “system of truth” may be evoked only when it applies to the person who controls truth and wishes to maintain his control as well as to the weak who wish to replace the oppressor. As for truth, it may indeed be attained by the oppressed who wish to resist power without trying to possess it, or by the oppressor who voluntarily gives up power (not as a favor, but as a rejection the idea of favoritism altogether). In other words, truth should be pursued neither as a “system of truth” within power relations nor as a foundational strategy to legitimize domination, but as a moral and existential rejection of the power that rests on oppression. Nevertheless, as Rorty indicates, truth is inseparable from culture. Therefore, truth is simultaneously positional, temporal, and spatial.[[18]](#footnote-19) The same applies to meanings, which can only be expressed within specific historical contexts. As a result, they are relative, subjective, and ideologized. In addition, the text, the event, and the practice are not the primary sources of meaning, but only the spaces where ever-changing meanings take shape. Given the relativity of what produces different interpretations of the same text, event, or practice, meanings are always contested sites. Accordingly, ideology is one of the most prominent and important areas in the field of cultural studies.[[19]](#footnote-20) Ideology is what brings dry objectivity down from its high throne by exposing its main focus on falsifying balance, distance, and neutrality, and thereby, obfuscating the nature and roots of dispute. The field of culture, on the other hand, is the main site for ideological struggle, where acceptance and resistance take place, where hegemony wins or loses, and where the fiery dots of subjectivity fall on the dry letters of objectivity.

Meaning is, thus, the outcome of the conflict and the process of negotiation both among competing frameworks of various referentialities and among different motives and experiments conducted by individuals belonging to diverse cultures across time and to different racial, class, educational, ethnic, and national groups. Examining creative discourse of dissent requires defining the nature of the conflict and its parties, and their motives, actions, and positions in the equation of power and truth. If the will to power is the desire to dominate the Other and to subsume them in one’s own ego, then the will to truth is in the existential and emotional act of confronting this desire. Thus, meaning may emerge as sparks our eyes can see despite “cultural hegemony” or “the ideological state apparatus,” emerging out of the friction between the “body” of power and the “soul” of truth. Yet, truth is always like a fish. As long as it is never exposed to the air of submission and acquiescence, it survives in the water of rejection and in the sea of “oppositional critical awareness.”[[20]](#footnote-21)

“Critical awareness” and especially “oppositional critical awareness,” which Edward Said emphasizes in his grand project, may be an effective mechanism not only to deconstruct western narrative texts and expose their connections to the desire for control and expansion, but also to highlight the rejection of all forms of control. In other words, oppositional critical awareness can be used as a technique of rebelling against all efforts to obfuscate oppression whether they come from outside or from within any social structure, since control, repression, and exclusivity are general human traits and not just western political tools.[[21]](#footnote-22)

The Arab dictatorial regimes, with which we have been familiar for decades, have been repressing their citizens in the name of nationalism since their so-called independence. Today, we see them locked in a deadly struggle against a new/old machine of brutality that is vying for their place. But as oil-producing, self-serving institutions that operate under a Salafist-*takfiri* guise with complete ease, these regimes have maintained the language and practice of repression under the name of religion.[[22]](#footnote-23) For this reason, analyzing Arab creative work should prioritize creative writing that rebels against oppression specifically within the Arab establishment and its dangerous ties to the western repressive machine. As for the “contrapuntal reading” developed by Said, which takes into account the imperialist operation and its resistance, it would be better to broaden its scope so as to trace the trajectory of power and the trajectory of resistance as common phenomena regardless of time and place.[[23]](#footnote-24)

“The intellectual has to remain faithful to the principles of justice in relation to human misery and persecution” (Representations of the Intellectual, 1997: 14). That is how Said describes what we have been referring here to as the discourse of truth in the aesthetics of “cultural criticism,” in both its creative and its methodological aspects:

The central fact for me is, I think, that the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public, in public. And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place it is to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations . . . someone whose whole being is staked on a critical sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made cliches, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating confirmations of what the powerful or conventional have to say, and what they do. Not just passively unwilling, but actively willing to say so in public.

(*Representations of the Intellectual*: 28, 37)

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1. Nietzsche, F. (1968) "*On Truth and Lies in an Extra Moral Sense*", in W. Kaufman (ed.) The Portable Nietzsche. London: Viking Penguin. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Nietzshe, F. (1967) *The Will to Power*. New York: Random House, 515. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. See Rorty, R. *"Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism"* in Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982: pp. 160-175; Barker, 2012: 508, 512. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Rorty, R, Truth, Politics and 'Post-modernism' (1997): 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. See Derrida, J. (1976), *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. This argument does not deny the fact that meaning is only available within the context of representation or that truth is not an accurate representation of a natural order. See Rorty, R. *Truth, Politics, and ‘Post-modernism’* (1997): 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. See Sayid wild-Abah (1994), *History and Truth in Michel Foucault.* Beirut: Dar el-Montakhab el-Arabi: 90 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Parody, in addition to song, is the sarcastic distortion of the original text. The text may be literary or it may reflect reality as long as it is familiar or recognized by the recipients. Satire is a carnivalesque mixing of the serious and the humorous or the prosaic and the poetic, a criticism of values and social norms, and an attack on corrupt political systems. Irony expresses the opposite of what is presented, so as to create sarcasm in order to deepen dislike or contempt. Paradox is a statement that initially seems irrational but, after some consideration and contemplation, reveals a level of truth and accuracy (For example, “You marvel at my illness/It is my health that is the marvel” (Abu Nuwas, 130 – 198 Hijri). Oxymoron is an explicit contradiction between two statements to create admiration (in the original Greek: “that which is intentionally meaningless”). That is, explicit contradiction is an attempt to reveal a profound truth, such as “he is a hostile friend.” Caricature is the exaggerated distortion or magnification of the flaws in someone or something so as to evoke laughter. Antithesis is the combination of two or more opposites (as in, “You would think them awake, while they are asleep” [Quran, Al-Kahf 18:18]). The grotesque is the ambiguous and humorous mixing of two oppositional elements to create a strangeness outside the normal, the expected, and the perfect and to present states of horror. Ambivalence or ambiguity means the word’s potential for more than one meaning. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Bakhtin is considered the pioneer of a new school of criticism called aesthetic history. In his examination of literary genres, Bakhtin deployed a sociological perspective. At the core of his analysis is an emphasis on the strong link between the carnival as a historical phenomenon and literature. Specifically, Bakhtin reveals how carnivalesque principles made their way into the structure of the European novel in his study of Rabelais (1494 – 1553), Cervantes (1547 – 1616), and Dostoevsky (1821 – 1881). He distinguished two main trends in the historical development of the literary tradition in Europe: the first is the poetic literary types that developed at the center of intellectual, ideological, linguistic, official, and monolithic life. The second is the narrative prose types that took an alternative course in the margins of that life, such as public markets and traveling theater companies where the language of jest and multivocality emerged, completely aware of the role it played as a satire and parody of the monolithic center.

   For more information, see: Bakhtin, M. M. Rabelais and his World. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968; Bakhtin, M. M. & Medvedev, P. N. The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics. Trans. Albert J. Wehrle. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978; Bakhtin, M. M. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. C. Emerson & M. Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: Texas Univ. Press, 1981; Bakhtin, M. M. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. & trans. Caryl Emerson, introd. Wayne C. Booth. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984 [Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 8]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. See: Bakhtin, M. *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics Minneapolis*: University of Minnesota Press, 1989  [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Foucault, 1984: 100, 101. In a different context, Foucault expresses the opinion that the production of truth is grasped through power relations and that the strategies of power are impressed by the desire for knowledge. These strategies are the “political economy” of this desire. See *The History of Sexuality 1: The Desire to Know*, particularly the fourth chapter “The Deployment of Sexuality,” Foucault, 1978-1988. Also: “We have to apprehend discourse as violence that we operate on things, and as practice that we force on them; from this practice the principle of the regularity of events is derived” (Foucault, 1981: p. 67). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. See: Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970: pp. 303-387). Qais Fru, *Historical Knowledge in the West*, 2013: 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. See: Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, 1972-1977, Edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): p. 52, 131. Qais Fru, *Historical Knowledge in the West*, 2013: 90. Foucault, 1984. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Foucault, *The Order of Discourse*, 1984: 10 (trans. Muhammed Sabila). A provocative application of this timid confession can be found in the discourse on madness in Arabic culture. See: El-Samman, 1993. On the other hand, it is important not to forget Foucault’s spontaneous sympathy towards “writers, artists, and poets’ protest against a world that tries to domesticate madness” as stated by Jean Lacroix in *The Meaning of Madness according to Michel Foucault* (From *The Order of Discourse*: 77). There is also Foucault’s fondness for the Greek model characterized by plurality rather than exclusion, which existed before the split between the ontic and the ontological and the self and the subject: “His Nietzscheism reveals a sense of tragedy that is read in all his work” (ibid: 80) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. For truth as power relations according to Foucault, see Idris Hawari, “The Genealogy of Truth” (madarat thakafya: http://madaratthakafya.blogspot.co.il/2014/05/blog-post.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. See: Foucault, 1984: 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Here it is crucial to refer to what Kamal Abu Deeb writes in his introduction to *Culture and Imperialism According to Edward Said* about Bhabha’s use of the term “hybridity”: “When writers like Bhabha use this term, in my opinion, they overlook the danger implicit in the word’s close connection to animal breeding. With such pride and admiration, they describe entire cultures as “hybrid”. I believe that this produces a contemptuous reaction among (pure) whites and gives them a weapon to fight against these studies and this cultural concept by arguing that it defines itself in a way that is degrading, low, and animalistic.” Said, 1997: 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. See: Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. The most commonly accepted definitions of ideology is the one provided by Stuart Hall. Hall, S. (1985) "The Rediscovery of Ideology: The Return of the Repressed in Media Studies", in V. Beechey and J. Donald (eds) *Subjectivity and Social Relations,* Milton Keynes: Open University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Regarding “the ideological state apparatuses,” see Althusser, L. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays* (1971), translated by Ben Brewster, pp. 121-176.

    It is important here to mention the distinction Althusser makes between the repressive state apparatuses (the state, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, and the prisons) and the ideological state apparatuses (religious, educational, familial, legal, political—the political system and its parties—and the ones related to workers’ unions, to the media, and to the culture). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. The western penchant for hegemony has led to the formation of different literary experiments whose authors descend from various geographies within the colonized world. These experiments have taken the shape of counter journeys or counter invasions of the western world by contesting the biased theses and distortions it has inflicted on the histories of these colonies and the identities of their peoples. This counter-narrative is what Edward Said calls “cultural resistance” and what Bill Ashcroft has termed *The Empire Writes Back*, which is the title of a book he authored along with other critics. Cultural resistance enables the colonized nation to restore its identity and reconstruct its status by reviving the nationalist elements that were dismissed by the colonizer in the first place because contribute to preserving and upholding its collective memory. Cultural resistance is not simply a reaction to imperialism. It is much larger than imperialism can ever contain because it emerges from cultural interaction, hybridity, and investment in other cultures to undermine the structures of control within its own culture and within its narratives of self, history, and identity (Idris El-Khadrawi, “Narrative as a Topic in Cultural Studies: Towards Understanding the Relationship between the Novel and the Dialectics of Cultural Control and Resistance” *Tabayyun*, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Volume 7. 2 Winter 2014: 129.) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. In the introduction to his book *Savage Texts,* El-Deery writes: “In this book I try to provide a historical reading of the texts of *takfir* within three political environments that have used *takfir* against their enemies. The environment of the Seljuc Empire (fifth century Hijri) through the texts of Al-Ghazaly; the environment of the Almohad Caliphate (sixth century Hijri) through the texts of Ibn Tumart; and the environment of the Mamluk Sultanate (eighth century Hijri) through the texts of Ibn Taymiyyah.” See: El-Deery, Ali Ahmed, *Savage Texts: Takfir from the Orthodoxy of the Seljucs to the Salafism of Ibn Taymiyyah*, Awal Center for Studies and Documentation, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Said’s contrapuntal reading explores the dialectic of control and resistance embedded in narrative structures, within the context of the imperialist system. It combines “breaking down the mechanisms of control within the cultural imperialist discourse with reading the patriotic resistance to imperialism and its reflection on culture” (El-Khadrawy, 2014: 107). For more on contrapuntal reading, see also: Ezz-el-Din Al-Munasarah, "Edward Said and the Comparative Cultural Criticism: A Contrapuntal Reading,” Fusol, 64, Summer 2004: 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)