Book Proposal

## Title: Should States Trust their Citizens?

**Subtitle**: An Analysis of the Individual, Situational, Cultural, and Regulatory Factors Affecting Why and When People Voluntarily Cooperate with Governments

To what extent states can trust their citizens to cooperate with laws and regulations with the least possible use of coercive measures? This book will address this fundamental question that arises in nearly every aspect of legal and social policy making and that affects a wide range of issues, including compliance with tax laws, environmental regulations, traffic and driving laws, and, today, COVID-19 regulations.

The idea of citizens’ voluntary compliance and cooperative behavior is discussed from different perspectives in nearly all of the social sciences (psychology, sociology economics, political science, criminology, and more) as well as in the literature of law and even philosophy. It is clear that obtaining voluntary compliance from citizens is the most desirable form of governance. However, the perception of policy makers is that in order to trust the public and uphold their commitment to protect the public interest, they need strong indications that those regulated will indeed behave according to the law.

To date, the empirical basis of our understanding of when people can be trusted in a given situation is weak. As a result, risk-averse policy makers resort to monitoring and coercive measures, simply because it is very challenging and complicated to identify in advance the proportion of people in the population who will engage in more voluntary forms of cooperation in a given situation.[[1]](#footnote-1) The current COVID-19 pandemic crisis led some countries to resort to sanctions and fear-based rhetoric to gain public cooperation, and offers an excellent example of how the more coercive process occurs. These coercive measures were employed despite the overwhelming and recognized evidence of the short-term and long-term advantages of softer, less coercive regulatory measures, which have been shown to motivate people to engage in better quality compliance even in areas and contexts in which monitoring is impossible.

Better insights into voluntary compliance can help advance the theoretical understanding of the nature of the interaction between countries and their residents, as well as improve policy making in cases where the quality of voluntary cooperation is superior to enforced compliance or when the means policy makers could employ to coerce cooperation are limited or too costly. To address these issues, this book will analyze the existing literature on the subject and will offer a new paradigm on the cultural, organizational, situational and individual context of voluntary compliance. This book will demonstrate the extent to which voluntary cooperation could and should be sought and the optimal ways to achieve it. The different costs of voluntary compliance in areas such as equality, communication, uncertainty, and increased risk to the public, as well as the benefits of voluntary compliance in terms of its effect on autonomy, resilience, quality of compliance and enhanced trust relationships will also be explored in this book.[[2]](#footnote-2) The new paradigm presented here will enable researchers and policy makers to make more informed decisions about when, how and to what extent states *could* resort to less coercive measures when trying to change the behavior of the public. The behavioral analysis on when states can trust members of the public will be accompanied by a normative discussion on when and to what extent, states *should* do so, given the behavioral advantages and disadvantages of each regulatory and enforcement approach examined in the book.

## Background

This book focuses on issues emerging from the intersection of intellectual advances in a number of fields, specifically, research on regulation, compliance motivation, behavioral ethics, and trust. After briefly reviewing some of the developments in each of these fields, this book will proceed to show how the connections between them have created a new set of highly central research questions, some of which will be addressed analytically in the book.

**Regulation literature** has recently begun studying a number of softer approaches to compliance which recognize the value of a regulation which doesn’t coerce people’s behavior. The first and best-known of these approaches is responsive regulation,[[3]](#footnote-3) a widely discussed paradigm that advances a more flexible and customized approach whereby smarter, less coercive regulatory measures are targeted at those parts of the population for which coercive measures are not needed. Another emerging area is that of self-regulation,[[4]](#footnote-4) which focuses on transferring responsibility for the creation of standards and their enforcement to the regulated parties or businesses. In this context, a distinction can be made between large global corporations, that not only tend to invest significant resources in meeting state-imposed regulatory requirements, but also self-regulate, setting standards for themselves not required by law,[[5]](#footnote-5) and small- to medium-sized enterprises that face more challenges in meeting regulatory requirements.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Incorporating behavioral approaches, a new and growing body of regulation literature has made an increased variety of regulatory tools available to policy makers (e.g., nudges, framing, pledges, etc.). While the greater number of tools available render the instrument choice dilemma more difficult, they do offer concrete, quantitative means to measure and compare their efficacy.[[7]](#footnote-7) The nudge approach, based on the influential work of Thaler and Sunstein,[[8]](#footnote-8) represents an important addition to the regulatory choice dilemma, leading numerous scholars to examine when nudges can be relied upon to replace more mandatory rules.[[9]](#footnote-9)

**Compliance motivation literature,** another evolving area of study on the issue of regulatory compliance,[[10]](#footnote-10) has emphasized how voluntary compliance and its importance have been recognized across a number of dimensions.[[11]](#footnote-11) Voluntary compliance, especially if driven by intrinsic motivation,[[12]](#footnote-12) is usually considered preferable and more sustainable than coerced compliance, which tends to be short-term and sensitive to the existence of sanctions.[[13]](#footnote-13) In addition, reliance on voluntary compliance is more likely to increase trust among regulatees,[[14]](#footnote-14) entails lower enforcement costs,[[15]](#footnote-15) and is likely to result in a higher quality of cooperation.[[16]](#footnote-16) Factors related to fairness, morality, duty to obey, and trust have been acknowledged as playing an important role in compliance in areas from environmental and health regulations (including COVID-19 measures)[[17]](#footnote-17) to traffic and tax laws. This focus on voluntary compliance has also been highly relevant to the growing recognition of the importance of intrinsic motivations[[18]](#footnote-18) and supports the preference for shifting the focus of compliance to that of individuals’ motivations.[[19]](#footnote-19) Concomitant with this change in approach, it has been shown that extrinsic motivators, such as deterrence, are not only less effective than was once assumed, but that they also undermine the ability of intrinsic motivation to function properly.[[20]](#footnote-20)

**Behavioral ethics** is another relatively new field exploring peoples’ ethical decision-making processes.[[21]](#footnote-21) My recent book,[[22]](#footnote-22) *The Law of Good People*, examined the challenges faced by governments that need to regulate people who don’t view themselves as needing regulation in view of their ethical and legal perception, or, more accurately, misperception, of their own behavior. It is increasingly recognized that most of what can be considered acts of ordinary unethicality are performed by people who view themselves as “good” people. This kind of unethicality is the most likely to be remedied and curbed by lenient approaches that focus on awareness and motivating the exercise of morality which could result in voluntary compliance. Nonetheless, behavioral ethics literature has suggested an important caveat related to the fact that in many situations, the majority of those who usually view themselves as normative people nonetheless violate the law because of unawareness, biased interpretation of the law, and other justifications which enable them to perceive themselves as cooperative individuals while still not complying with a particular law. According to this approach, if even moral people cannot be completely trusted, given their ability to misperceive their own behavior, how can states trust the entirety of the public? In related works, I have endeavored to create a taxonomy of the situations in which government should be more concerned about the likelihood of non-deliberative and unintended unethicality.[[23]](#footnote-23) In other works, I have explored both various ways in which a design aimed at inducing people to self-deceive themselves might work,[[24]](#footnote-24) and the “self-imposed red lines” that people adopt for their own self-serving interpretations of the law.[[25]](#footnote-25)

**Trust in Institutions, Interpersonal Trust and Social Capital.** The fourth body of literature involves the growing recognition of the importance of trust and legitimacy in achieving voluntary compliance. Numerous studies across almost all the social sciences have sought to understand what builds trust[[26]](#footnote-26) and how trust contributes to the creation of a just and functioning society.[[27]](#footnote-27) However, most of this literature focuses on the ways by which people can trust public and legal institutions,[[28]](#footnote-28) and overlooks the mechanisms state institutions need in order to trust the public. A prime example of the importance of trust and reputation in commercial transactions can be found in classic studies of the diamond industry, which has long relied on the extralegal enforcement of its business norms.[[29]](#footnote-29) Similar situations can be found in the cotton industry,[[30]](#footnote-30) and among farmers in Shasta County.[[31]](#footnote-31) While clearly there are some reciprocal relationship in places, many of the mechanisms related to the ability of states to trust its own citizens[[32]](#footnote-32) involve concepts such as social capital[[33]](#footnote-33) and interpersonal trust.[[34]](#footnote-34)

## Cross-Cultural Studies

To better clarify the issue of compliance, it is critical to understand how trust, social diversity, social inclusiveness, solidarity, and helpfulness affect the different levels of cohesion and solidarity in European countries. Generally, countries with a higher value of social cohesion are more likely to have a higher level of innovation and social progress.[[35]](#footnote-35)

### What Current Literature Does Not Explain about Voluntary Compliance

As described above, relevant literature has emerged that identifies voluntary compliance and self-regulation as the optimal guiding principles of regulatory governance. However, these concepts can be elusive and thus difficult to fully understand conceptually and practically on both the individual level and the aggregate level, which is of interest for the regulatory state. Part of the argument to be developed in the proposed book is that many of the studies on voluntary compliance were carried out in very contextualized circumstances, thus limiting the possibility of generalizing from them to the realm of broader policies.

### Legal vs. Social Norms

When discussing the concept of voluntary compliance, an outstanding study is that related to the emergence of social norms as governing the behavior of people with limited involvement of the state, either in the later stages of regulation (as in cases such as using children’s car seats, where voluntary compliance was achieved by applying reason and science),[[36]](#footnote-36) or even in initial stages, where the social norms emerged without any state involvement (such as in the case of the farmers in Shasta County[[37]](#footnote-37)). However, it is impossible to generalize from the few well-known examples, such as that of people learning not to pick wild flowers,[[38]](#footnote-38) and apply them to other contexts. These few cases do not enable us to build a comprehensive account of when monitoring and sanctioning are not needed. Nor do they help us understand the mechanisms of why voluntary compliance succeeded in these cases. In fact, these few cases have provided a very limited view of the social norm of voluntary compliance. According to Bernstein, who conducted studies in the diamond[[39]](#footnote-39) and the cotton industries,[[40]](#footnote-40) close social groups with shared values could function with only limited formal legal intervention. Even when discussing approaches beyond command and control, it should be recognized that there are different, sometimes competing, approaches which could lead to voluntary compliance, such as nudges, internalization, social norms, moral persuasion, procedural fairness, and self-regulation mechanisms. These beyond-compliance mechanisms, which differ significantly, are likely to lead to different behaviors. Consequently, it is important to understand which non-coercive measure is more effective in enhancing voluntary compliance. Can people who are nudged to behave a certain way be considered as complying voluntarily? given that compliance nudges could result in what could be termed m can the resulting behavior be viewed as voluntary? Even in cases where the law successfully changes people’s attitudes and preferences, it is questionable how stable this change is. Finally, it needs to be examined to what extent sanctions are or are not part of a process which might create voluntary compliance.

## What is Non-Voluntary Compliance

Clearly, when people comply to avoid sanctions, they do not do so voluntarily. The effect of sanctions becomes even more complicated when we move from a behavioral perspective to a sociological one (e.g., Durkheim), according to which punishment is viewed as solidarity producing mechanism,[[41]](#footnote-41) although the punishment effect is more indirect. However, what is not fully clear from the literature is whether voluntary compliance includes situations where people react to positive incentives or when people are nudged to behave in a pro-social manner. Although coercion is usually considered the opposite of voluntary compliance, such is not always the case. For example, if a reputational mechanism is put in place which will increase the reputational cost that people will pay for not cooperating with a certain norm, can their ensuing compliance be considered voluntary? In essence, can compliance be considered voluntary only when people *want* to cooperate? Or is compliance voluntary also when people are not being coerced, but, rather, incentivized to act in a certain way directly through incentives, or indirectly, through reputational mechanisms? Similarly, when non-voluntary interventions are used to induce voluntary compliance, how long do they successfully affect people’s choices to cooperate?

## The Proportion of Voluntary Cooperators and Regulators’ Dilemma

In light of these dilemmas about non-voluntary interventions, other issues to be examined at the group level are the proportion of people who are likely to cooperate and their characteristics relative to the group: whether they are part of the weaker or stronger parts of the group.[[42]](#footnote-42) In addition, how can regulators determine in advance whether or not the advantages from voluntary compliance will be outperformed by a complete lack of compliance? How likely it is that people will hold moral views that reflect those of the state? Are there people who are more likely to engage in voluntary compliance across all disciplines? These issues become important at the level of the regulatory toolbox, where there are numerous barriers to reliance on regulatory tools aimed at enhancing voluntary compliance with respect to creating an effect of compliance cultures and with respect to the emergence of trust within states.

### Situational Analysis of Voluntary Compliance

A continuation of the good people argument mentioned above, whereby people who considered themselves as good can nonetheless act unethically, is that voluntary compliance may not depend on who the particular individual is, but on the environment in which that individual is operating.[[43]](#footnote-43) Behavioral ethics research indicates that most people are capable of engaging in ordinary unethicality if they are able to deceive themselves, either deliberately by finding a justification for non-compliance, or with limited deliberation, that is, engaging in motivated reasoning in ambiguous situations. Thus, according to this approach, when policy makers are interested in understanding when can they trust people to exhibit a greater likelihood of cooperation, they need to pay special attention to the situational characteristics which might enhance the likelihood that more people will cooperate voluntarily with the government’s approach. These characteristics include lack of ambiguity, clear victims, the logic behind the regulation, and visible compliance behavior.[[44]](#footnote-44)

### The Lack of Research on Contextual Factors

While the literature on voluntary compliance is vast, it fails dramatically in its ability to generalize beyond the specific context being studied. There are indeed quite a number of predictors indicating that in a given regulatory context, more lenient regulatory measures are likely to be at least as effective as more coercive ones. It is known that the efficacy of voluntary compliance is based upon numerous indicators, such as cultural and social norms, personality, institutions, characteristics of the regulatory environment, and more. However, there is limited data about how these factors interact, which thus limits the ability of regulators to identify the situations in which less coercive measures are more likely to be effective. For example, it is known that in certain countries, people can be trusted to pay their public transportation fares without coercion.[[45]](#footnote-45) However, these findings offer little to no evidence about what mechanisms drive the success of this voluntary compliance, and thus offer no guidance as to how similar trust-based systems might work in other countries or contexts.

## Responsive Regulation[[46]](#footnote-46) and the Challenge of the Heterogeneity of Intrinsic Motivation

An important paradigm with which the book will grapple revolves around responsive regulation, which represents the broadest interpretation of a regulatory approach, and which is sensitive to the characteristics of the people and organizations requiring regulation. This expansive paradigm is balanced with the recognition of the need to understand that incentives and deterrence are still needed. This kind of analysis can help advance the understanding of the advantages of non-coercive regulation and can underscore the fact that states cannot use identical regulatory measures to deal with different types of people. According to this analysis, states must instead rely on a sequential approach. This book will examine all aspects of the responsive regulation paradigm in order to identify and classify the factors that need to be addressed when determining how to reach a level of voluntary compliance which will be sensitive to the risks associated with different regulatory settings.

## Healthy Compliance and Therapeutic Jurisprudence

Part of the potential advantage of voluntary compliance involves not just increased commitment by people and the perception of better compliance by the public. Another possible advantage of voluntary compliance relates to the claim that if people are given the choice to comply, they will have better cognitive and emotional capacities to deal with uncertainties, to adapt, and to demonstrate greater resilience. This aspect of the book’s examination of voluntary compliance will draw on the literature about therapeutic jurisprudence,[[47]](#footnote-47) as well on the data accumulated in research on happiness,[[48]](#footnote-48) to try to improve our understanding of the intellectual advantages of having people comply voluntarily and not as a response to external pressure. Understanding the causal relationships is highly complicated given that the government’s ability to rely upon non-coercive mechanisms is highly connected to the type of society in which such mechanisms are likely to work, as well to policymakers’ heavy reliance on expectations that people are more likely to benefit from being able to cooperate voluntarily.

## Can Corporations be Trusted?

Another important issue to be discussed in the book is whether corporations can be trusted, as much of the debate on self-regulation involves businesses and corporations. Their ethical behavior has come to be considered an aspect of their performance,[[49]](#footnote-49) and, as a result, has been subject to increasing interest. Some aspects of my research indicate that corporations might be hotbeds for unethicality.[[50]](#footnote-50) Nonetheless, there are many reasons to believe that the bureaucratic and transparent nature of corporations, especially the larger ones, as well as their greater sensitivity to reputational mechanisms,[[51]](#footnote-51) might make them more likely to adhere to self-regulation. Another aspect of the focus on the corporate culture involves examining data about corporate behavior with regard to trusting their clients.[[52]](#footnote-52) This book will analyze various case studies on this issue dealing with the prevalence of dishonesty in the relationship between corporations and their clients. For example, what can be learned from the success of the Lemonade insurance company’s trust-based approach and possibly applied to the ability of states to trust their publics?

## The Normative Dilemma

This book will present a new conceptual paradigm which will advance the theoretical and empirical understanding of the concept of voluntary compliance. This will involve addressing issues such as what could induce voluntary compliance, what could undermine it, and what needs to be done to better understand the interaction between individual, situational, regulatory, and cultural dimensions in order to maintain it. In addition, the book will suggest methods for considering how to balance the risk to the public of reduced coercion with the advantages to the public deriving from regulatees who feel trustworthy. The nature of this analysis inevitably changes when discussing more extensive types of regulations where the target population includes broad layers of the public. Some of the questions to be raised include: What are the contextual factors which would help regulators and experts decide what approach to adopt? How do these factors influence the responsive regulation approach? In addition, how do the current empirical data and theories on how voluntary compliance might enhance people’s mental well-being intersect with the therapeutic jurisprudence literature?

# List of Chapters and their Main Points

## Chapter 1. Conceptual Level

What are the characteristic of voluntary compliance? What is the relationship between factors such cooperative behavior, honest behavior, pro-social behavior, moral behavior, and beyond-compliance behavior? When does voluntary compliance stop being seen as such?

## Chapter 2. Behavioral Level

In what situations, such as ambiguity, the corporate context, lack of victims, will we see higher levels of voluntary compliance? How can it be determined in advance the proportion of people who will engage in voluntary compliance? What is the durability or erosion of voluntary compliance over time?

## Chapter 3. The Regulatory Analysis

What characterizes the type of regulatory instruments that are likely to lead to voluntary compliance, both in the short term and in the long term? What can be gleaned from current research about which types of regulatory instruments (e.g., reminders, pledges, technological interventions, etc.) are likely to lead to crowding out effects? Does voluntary compliance occur every time sanctions are used?

## Chapter 4. Internalization and Preference Change

To what extent is the law able to lead to preference change? What is unique in such cases as not smoking in public places, or picking wild flowers, or buckling children into car seats, or even sexual harassment, where the law led to situations where people behaved better even in contexts where they were less likely to be detected? Could this effect be related to the fact that other people were involved and hence social norms were more likely to function? Or could it be related to a situation where neither of the parties benefits from any violation? Why does this effect not operate in cases relating to building code violations? What is unique in those cases where a norm of voluntary compliance has emerged?

This chapter will also review some of the caveats regarding internalization. For example, opinions about the reasons for compliance were widely discussed regarding situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic context. How is this debate related to factors such as trust in science, where the science is contested? We will also examine in what contexts coercive measures can create the greatest damage to intrinsic motivation and what type of intrinsic motivation is most likely to be inhibited by coercive measures.

## **Chapter 5. What are the Perils of Voluntary Compliance?**

This chapter will discusses some of the potential disadvantages of voluntary compliance. For example, when relying on voluntary compliance with limited enforcement, harm could arise due to an increase in inequality between good and bad people, as many people will continue to obey while others might not. This could lead to a situation where there is a growing gap between the formal law and social norms. Consequently, states will still need to employ monitoring mechanisms in order to determine if they can continue with the “hands-off” approach. Furthermore, voluntary compliance could lead to situations where there could be what is termed a “chilling effect,” where some people might be unsure of what is expected of them and so would comply to a greater extent than that required.[[53]](#footnote-53) Finally, this chapter will examine to what extent the reduction in the usage of sanctions by states will not be replaced by non-formal sanctions which could, in some contexts, be more problematic than formal sanctions (e.g., reliance on reputation might be more harmful to some people than to others).

## **Chapter 6. Cross-Cultural Level**

## The role of culture is an important component of the considerations needed to be examined when determining how states can ascertain when the public can be trusted. The variations among states regarding the relationship between culture and the components of voluntary compliance is dramatic.[[54]](#footnote-54) This chapter will seek to explain what can be learned from the comparative effect of culture in countries where voluntary compliance is high, moderate or low, how it is related to other predictors of voluntary compliance, various measures of trust[[55]](#footnote-55) in these countries, and how it is related to perception of the rule of law in these countries. In this chapter, we aim to gather and compare all the comparative rankings on possible predictors of voluntary compliance, such as pro-social behavior,[[56]](#footnote-56) rule of law,[[57]](#footnote-57) values,[[58]](#footnote-58) and culture.[[59]](#footnote-59)

## **Chapter 7.Technology, Nudges, Reputation and Voluntary Compliance**

This chapter will focus on understanding whether technology could be used to enhance non-coercive compliance by creating better reputational mechanisms and better technological nudges. These, together with research about personalization[[60]](#footnote-60) and technology-based enforcement,[[61]](#footnote-61) could possibly reduce some of the need for reliance on the good will of people. This could then potentially facilitate more types of cooperation by people, reducing or eliminating the need for state monitoring or the use of sanctions. We will also examine the potential pitfalls of using technology as a substitute for state enforcement.

The next three chapters involve three case studies analyzing the dilemma of how to enhance citizens’ cooperation with requests from the state.

## **Chapter 8. Case Study I: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic**

This chapter on COVID-19 regulations will begin by documenting the quality of voluntary and coercive compliance. Analyzing the quite extensive comparative data that has been gathered across many countries in the world with regard to adherence to relatively similar COVID-19 regulations, could lead to an enhanced understanding of the potential of voluntary cooperation.

Focusing on data on how different countries which differed in their level of strictness, and taking advantage of the existence of Google data on compliance with COVID-19 regulations across these countries, it can also be determined whether people avoided places prior to or after restrictions were imposed, as well as whether there was a counterreaction to stricter COVID-19 restrictions. We will use an analysis of government rhetoric across different countries and their measured impact on behavior, and there are important data sources about this aspect of the COVID-19 regulations. A number of debates will be examined, such as whether face masks should be mandatory or voluntary, and whether certain tracing apps should be voluntary or mandatory in different countries.[[62]](#footnote-62) Another important lesson from the COVID-19 period refers to the suggestion that female leaders enjoyed greater success in fighting the corona virus in their countries.[[63]](#footnote-63) In some countries, this result was associated with a greater focus on solidarity and empathy, concepts related to voluntary cooperation of residents.

## **Chapter 9. Case Study II: Tax Compliance**

One of the areas in which the relative efficacy of voluntary compliance vs. monitoring has been widely and deeply studied is that of taxation.[[64]](#footnote-64) What can be learned from the type of studies that focus on different framings of texts sent to people? What can be learned from the research on procedural justice and taxations? What can be learned from the various studies focusing on ethical nudges, such as signing at the beginning of tax forms,[[65]](#footnote-65) as well as on various pledges which might reduce the need of states to monitor the ethicality of the people?[[66]](#footnote-66) As in the previous chapter, much of the discussion in these case studies will focus on gathering and analyzing data on what were the best practices for enhancing compliance and what can be generalized from them to other contexts.

## **Chapter 10. Case Study III: Environmental Regulation**

The environmental regulation field is considered one of the most advanced areas where different types of innovative regulatory choices have been extensively examined and studied empirically.[[67]](#footnote-67) A number of non-coercive approaches have been applied in the environmental field, with softer types of regulatory measures being tested and compared.[[68]](#footnote-68) Studying the data gathered in this field, this chapter will try identify and clarify what approaches have worked in this field, what were the best practices with regard to both corporate environmental compliance,[[69]](#footnote-69) and recycling norms.[[70]](#footnote-70)

## **Chapter 11. The Normative Discussion**

The last chapter will seek to answer the following questions: How can the factors from all levels be better understood when thinking about the regulatory toolbox dilemma? What are the normative considerations that need to be taken into account when facing these dilemmas? How can the costs from mistakes about voluntary compliance relative to command and control approaches be compared and evaluated? Based on the answers to these questions, this chapter will conclude by presenting a road map about how to think about the likelihood of voluntary compliance working properly across different contexts and cultures.

# Target Audiences and Expected Impact of the Book

The target audience of this book includes both researchers and policy makers at both the state and the organizational level who are interested in various forms of compliance. The expected impact of the book is the advancement of the theoretical understanding of the full array of factors responsible for the rise of ordinary unethicality and the contexts in which voluntary cooperation might emerge to curb these types of unethicality and replace them with more cooperative measures.

This book will provide researchers working on the broader issue of state influence on behavior a conceptual map that connects the different components of voluntary compliance on different levels (individual, group, culture, and state) with the emerging field of behavioral regulation research.

In addition, this book will enable policy makers who are interested in considering the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary compliance to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the interrelations between the different factors responsible for successful implementation of voluntary compliance.

# What is Covered in Related Books

### *The* *Law of Good People* by Yuval Friedman[[71]](#footnote-71)

My own book, focused primarily on introducing behavioral ethics into the legal scholarship, did not focus on the concept of voluntary compliance as a broad phenomenon.

### *The Impact of Law* by W. A. Bogart[[72]](#footnote-72)

In this book, Bogart focuses on the impact of countries’ growing dependence on law and legal systems after World War II, mainly in the United Stated as the center for legal culture. By comparing different legal systems in other western countries, Bogart demonstrates the enhanced influence of the growing dependence on law and its outcomes on different aspects of the countries. However, the book does not refer to different patterns of voluntary compliance among residents, nor to the potential behavioral motives that cause compliance.

### *Peer Pressure* by Robert H. Frank[[73]](#footnote-73)

Frank focuses mostly on social norms and not on other motivations and does not focus on regulation or compliance. Frank is most interested in examining how social environments shape human behavior, while claiming that the environments themselves are products of human behavior. Frank demonstrates that people tend to adopt mostly bad social norms from their social environment. However, there is no reference to the impact of regulation nor its influence on behavior in this book. Moreover, the book does not focus on compliance or what factors can enhance it.

### *Order without Law* by Robert Ellickson[[74]](#footnote-74)

Ellickson demonstrates that people tend to act by means of informal rules―social norms―that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. However, he does not focus on voluntary compliance or the impact of regulation on human behavior.

### *Impact* by Lawrence Friedman[[75]](#footnote-75)

In this book, Friedman examines how laws changes people’s behavior, focusing on the different mechanisms through which the law can change behavior, prices, social norms, and internalization. However, it does not consider the concept of voluntary compliance or it relationship with different regulatory paradigms across the contexts presented in this book proposal.

About the Author:

Yuval Feldman is The Mori Lazarof Professor of Legal Research at Bar-Ilan University’s Faculty of Law. He received his PhD from the University of California in Berkeley in 2004.

His areas of research include Behavioral Analysis of Law, Experimental Law and Economics, Ethical Decision-Making, Regulatory Impact and Social Norms, Compliance, Formal and Non-Formal Enforcement Strategies. From 2011 to 2013, he was a fellow in the Edmond J. Safra Institutional Corruption Lab at Harvard Law School and the Implicit Social Cognition Lab in Harvard Psychology. Since 2014, he has served as a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, advising various governmental bodies on behavioral and experimental informed policies in areas related to corruption, regulatory design and enforcement. Between 2016 and 2020, he was a member of Israel’s Young Academy. Feldman has received various national fellowships, including Rothschild, Fulbright, and Alon Fellowships, and his awards include the Zeltner Award from Tel Aviv University (2008), the Chesin Award from Hebrew University in 2019 as a Senior Researcher, and the Bruno Award in 2020. He is also the recipient of over 25 competitive research grants from foundations such as Olin, GIF, Marie Curie, and the Israel Science Foundation. He has co-authored approximately 60 papers which have been published in some of the top journals of law, management and psychology. He is on the editorial board of *Regulation and Governance*, *Law & Policy* and *The* *European Journal of Law and Economics*. He is also among the founders of ComplianceNet, an interdisciplinary and global network of compliance researchers. Some of his research on how behavioral ethics could inform regulation, enforcement, and compliance appeared in his book, *The Law of Good People*, which was published by Cambridge University Press in June 2018.

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