**Practices of Loyalty to the Empire:**

**The Ottomanization Movement as a Test Case**

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On December 7, 1914, about two months after the Ottoman Empire’s declaration abrogating the Capitulations—the extraordinary rights granted to foreign nationals—in the wake of its entry into World War I, David Ben-Gurion published an enthusiastic article in the newspaper *Ha-Aḥdut*.[[1]](#footnote-1) In his article, entitled “*Hakhshara Ezraḥit*” (“Civil Preparedness” or “Training for Citizenship”), Ben-Gurion related to the outbreak of the war, the crisis embroiling the Yishuv (the Jewish community of Palestine), and the abrogation of the Capitulations, explaining why foreign nationals in the Yishuv should become Ottoman subjects and what the meaning of naturalization would be for their lives in that country. In his opinion, the foreignness of the Jews in Palestine who held foreign citizenship did not enable them to integrate into the country and the imperial realm, and that had consequences for the status of the Yishuv, its participation (or non-participation) in the institutions of the central government, and on their relations with the “natives,” the Arabs. Ben-Gurion therefore called for the naturalization of members of the Yishuv who help foreign nationality, writing:

Our foreignness in this country—this was distorted not outwardly but primarily and especially inwardly. Well-known are the various obstacles and impediments placed on the path to naturalization and attaining citizenship in the era of the Capitulations and privileges for foreigners, and stalling by the consuls and government officials. These reasons did not escape notice by the government, and it had no reason to approach us with complaints about our foreign nationality. Aside from that, the government well knew that even while remaining foreign nationals, the Jews of this country were loyal and devoted to the country and to the Ottoman Empire, fulfilling their obligations to the state. This foreignness is an offense committed by the Yishuv against itself and its future. […]

The political crisis that occurred now has revealed to everyone the Yishuv’s faults and made evident all the abnormality of our foreignness. Just as the Yishuv will not be built by tourists, so will it not be sustained by foreigners. Only a Yishuv that is rooted tightly in the soil and the land with every fiber of its being can withstand every wind that might come along without being shaken from its place. The fate of the Yishuv and the fate of the country must adhere and be bound together inextricably. […] A large part of our Yishuv faces the danger of expulsion or exile, and the only correction to this would be naturalization. However—and this must be fully emphasized—this correction is sufficient only outwardly. In order to cease being foreign to the land, its surroundings, and its civil and political life and everything that takes place within it—accepting Ottoman nationality is insufficient. Naturalization may protect us from expulsion from the country as enemies, but it will not save us from the expulsion to which we have subjected our own selves from all the political institutions of the country, from all the legislatures and the institutions of self-government […] Naturalization—that is just the first step, or more correctly, the prior condition for our civil and political preparation and fortification.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Ben-Gurion’s article should be read against the background of the events then taking place in Palestine, especially the Ottoman government’s threat to expel foreign nationals from the country at the outbreak of the war. The expulsion of foreign nationals among the Yishuv was a real danger to the continued existence of the Jewish community and its future, which led to the great haste concerning the necessity of adopting Ottoman citizenship by naturalization. However, this was not the first time that the question of naturalization and the adoption of local nationality had been on the agenda. In fact, it had already been discussed in many contexts for some years even before the outbreak of war, especially after the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 and the changes that consequently took place in the Empire’s provinces. It is important to note in this context that at its outset, the 1908 revolt harbored a promise (one not ultimately realized) of a new Ottoman imperial model, more inclusive and pluralistic, and created a broad discourse about loyalty to the Empire, the demands of citizenship, and the meaning of national awakening and revival among the various groups across the Empire. Discussion of the Ottomanization of Palestinian Jews, too, took place in the shadow of those promises, but the call for Ottomanization had been heard even before the 1908 revolt and continued even past the disappointment of the centralized policies adopted by the Empire.

By focusing on the Ottomanization movement, which was born of distress and a pressing need to preserve the Yishuv, I propose to explore here the question of citizenship and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire as it was expressed in the years preceding World War I and the first years of the war. The issue of Ottomanization as proof of loyalty to the Empire arose, as noted above, before the war, with Eliezer Ben-Yehuda’s early appeal, “Jews, Be Ottomans!”[[3]](#footnote-3) Additional calls for Ottomanization were heard from representatives of the Sephardi and North African community in Palestine, all of them Ottoman subjects, who perceived Ottoman nationality and loyalty to the Empire to be essential for strengthening the status of Jews in Palestine and proving their connection to the land, its inhabitants (the Arabs), and imperial rule. I hope to demonstrate, though, that the motives for Ottomanization, its details in practice, and the expression of loyalty to the Empire, as these were expressed by Ben-Yehuda, the Sephardi leaders, and some of the leaders of the Second Aliyah, were not identical, and that each of them had different interests and a different vision or imagining of the land, the Jews’ place in it, and the connection between them and the other locals (the Arabs) and of the Jews’ legal status in the Ottoman realm. In this context, as I will demonstrate at length below, I discern two different Zionist approaches to relations with the Arabs of Palestine: “inclusive Zionism” and “exclusionary Zionism.” The first approach, represented by the Sephardi leadership, attributes great importance to the important central position of the Arabs in the country and to the growing national conflict, seeing the Arabs as potential partners in Palestine. The other approach, represented by the Ashkenazi leadership of the Second Aliyah, in many senses excluded the Arabs from any imagined shared life in that country. By examining the different motives for Ottomanization and its different practical aspects at the end of the Ottoman period, we can gain insight into the historical options that existed then for future relations of the Yishuv (and the Zionist movement) with the Ottoman Empire and with the Palestinian Arabs.

A discussion of the Ottomanization movement opens the door to a wider discussion about understanding the complex relations between nationalism and empire, between being a citizen and being a subject, and between national and ethnic minorities, and about how those minorities imagined their status in a multi-national empire. Dealing with those questions was made possible, in many senses, in the wake of the Young Turks’ revolution and the new concepts that it brought into the imperial discourse, concepts such as citizenship, loyalty, and nationality. Using this test case, I suggest examining the complexity of the question of being a subject and being loyal to the Empire during a period of a marked heightening of the national tension in Palestine and the rise of national movements (in other areas of the Empire) that endangered, or were likely to endanger, the Ottoman multi-national project.

**Urgent Naturalization: The Ottomanization Movement during World War I**

The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire on October 30, 1914. Even before its official entry into the war, the Empire proclaimed the immediate abrogation of the Capitulations—the extra rights given to foreign nationals—that had enabled citizens of other countries to live under the protection of their mother countries (through the consuls) across the Empire and to enjoy a variety of commercial rights. The Capitulations regime allowed Jews, too, who immigrated to Palestine at the end of the Ottoman period to continue to hold foreign nationalities and not to adopt the local Ottoman citizenship. And in fact many of those who arrived with the Second Aliyah, between 1904 and 1914, mostly from Eastern Europe, continued to hold foreign nationality (primarily Russian; about 50,000 Russian nationals, according to estimates). In contrast, many of those who arrived in the First Aliyah had become Ottoman subjects and given up their original nationality. Becoming Ottoman nationals during the period before World War I enabled them to participate in political life and in the public sphere of the Empire—among other things, the right to vote and be elected to the Parliament and the institutions of local rule such as municipalities (*majlis baladiyyah*) and various administrative bodies, such as the general council (*majlis ‘umumi*) and the district council (*majlis idara*). However, as we shall see, no less important was that becoming an Ottoman subject was perceived as a way to express loyalty to the Empire and to prove true integration into the country and events there.

One of the immediate effects of the renunciation of the Capitulations was the departure— sometimes forced departure—of the foreign consuls stationed in Palestine. During the war years, only two consuls remained in the country: the American consul, Dr. Otis Glazebrook, who remained in Jerusalem until the American entry into the war in 1917, and the Spanish consul, Conde de Ballobar.[[4]](#footnote-4) More relevant to our inquiry, though, is the Ottoman Empire’s explicit threat, expressed through the local governors, to expel the foreign nationals in Palestine if they did not immediately take on Ottoman nationality. The Empire’s state of war with Russia, whose nationality was held by many of the Jews in Palestine who were foreign nationals, added to the urgency, of course. Thus, in the face of the immediate threat and the actual fear of expulsion and its implications for the future of the Yishuv, the Jewish community’s leadership began to organize to urge foreign nationals to accept Ottoman nationality, and Ottomanization councils were set up (the central ones were in Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa) to organize the process of naturalization. As early as October 30, 1914, the governor of Jaffa, the Kaiminam Baha ad-Din, published instructions to those newly Ottomanizing: those who wish to become Ottoman nationals should present their travel documents (passports) or “the red note” (a temporary visa, valid for three months). If those documents are not at hand, they must prove their foreign citizenship by means of other official papers. Upon delivery of the documents and payment of the Ottomanization tax of 163.50 kuruş, they would be informed whether their request for naturalization and listing in the *nofos* (citizenship) books had been accepted.[[5]](#footnote-5) According to the Ottomanization Order, the law requiring local residency for five years did not apply to nationals of enemy states in Palestine, who were allowed to take Ottoman nationality even if they had not resided in the country for over five years. Heads of families could have their wives sign the Ottomanization request and include in it their minor children, but adult children would have to Ottomanize independently and even pay the tax separately. Regarding non-Jews wishing to Ottomanize, the police would have to investigate whether they were eligible for receiving Ottoman status before their request would be approved.[[6]](#footnote-6)

There were two main impediments in the way of those seeking naturalization: payment of the Ottomanization tax and the requirement that 18-to-45-year-olds do army service. The burdensome tax made it difficult for many to undergo naturalization, and the requirement to serve in the army caused many people to hesitate before adopting Ottoman nationality. For one thing, army service could mean finding oneself fighting against the army of one’s country of origin, such as Russia. Activists in the Ottomanization movement approached both imperial officials and external actors to request an easing of the conditions for Ottomanization. So, for example, a letter to the U.S. ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, from November 27, 1914, states that many people cannot meet the demand to pay the high Ottomanization fee. About 10,000 people are interested in nationalization, and a large sum of money must be raised to assist them. The problematic nature of fighting against Russia is discussed in the letter as well. Morgenthau was thus asked to use his influence on the central authorities in Istanbul to get the tax lowered and the conscription rule relaxed.[[7]](#footnote-7) The appeal to the American ambassador and the request for assistance from him is interesting, but not surprising. During the war, the United States, and especially its Jewish community and the Joint Distribution Committee, became very involved in events in Palestine, acquired much influence, and granted substantial assistance to residents of Palestine of every religion. The American consul, Glazebrook, served as a liaison between the Yishuv and the Americans and helped a great deal in aid distribution as well. The American involvement in events in the region, the aid it provided during the crisis of the war, and its role as the mediator between the people of Palestine and the Ottoman rulers, can all be seen as the start of a process of the United States becoming a new provider of imperial protection whose influence would find expression both during the war and for many years afterward.

Initiatives aimed at aiding those seeking to Ottomanize were undertaken within the Zionist Movement as well. A meeting at the organization’s Palestine office in Jaffa on June 11, 1914, took up the question on Ottomanization and the need to increase the number of those seeking to Ottomanize. Among other topics raised were the idea of establishing a “Fund for Army Work” that would collect funds for the Zionist institutions both for “redeeming” young men seeking to avoid conscription (the payment for exemption, the *badal ‘askari*, was quite high at 43 Turkish liras, but it enabled non-Muslims to exempt themselves from labor in the army) and for support for those conscripted. The meeting also discussed difficulties placed before those seeking naturalization, among them a dearth of manpower and clerks at the *nofos* (Ottoman citizenship) committee and complaints about the length of the process of naturalization, during which the applicant was, for practical purposes, stateless.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The threat of expulsion was actualized for the first time, and by surprise, on November 17, 1917, when the governor of Jaffa, Baha ad-Din, published an order for all nationals of enemy states residing in Palestine who had not yet adopted local nationality to leave the country immediately. That very night, about 500 persons were expelled to Alexandria. The authorities employed a great deal of force in that expulsion, and family members were separated from each other.[[9]](#footnote-9) The expulsion provoked agitated responses and protests in the Yishuv and among American Jews, and brought in its wake a second, accelerated wave of Ottomanization. Following a request to the local authorities, extensions were granted for the process of Ottomanization, and these were publicized mostly through advertisements in the local press. In an advertisement on January 3, 1915, for example, the Ottomanization committee announced the granting of an extension of one month for the naturalization of foreign nationals, an exemption from the Ottomanization tax for poor applicants, and an exemption from one year of military service.[[10]](#footnote-10) In an article they published on December 30, 1914, the members of the Ottomanization Committee in Jerusalem, which numbered Albert Antébi, David Yellin, Boris Schatz, David Ben-Gurion, and Itzhak Ben-Zvi among its members, addressed all those hesitating to become Ottoman subjects. The number of those undergoing Ottomanization was falling off, they wrote, and the decree of expulsion was at hand. “The Jerusalem community faces disaster and destruction […] The expulsion is not a temporary edict, for the duration of the war, but a permanent dispersion beyond Turkey’s borders.” Instructions for seeking Ottoman nationality were appended to the article.

During the first year of the war, through August 1915, about 10,000 people left Palestine, while some 10,000 to 15,000 took on Ottoman nationality.[[11]](#footnote-11) The Ottomanization movement failed to achieve the success it had hoped for and, as we have noted, encountered many difficulties. Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi themselves were expelled from Palestine to the United States in March of 1915, and the *nofos* documents certifying their Ottoman citizenship, which they had received a short time earlier, were rescinded. The reasons for their expulsion are related to the increasingly severe actions of Jamal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army, who reached Palestine in December 1914, against the Zionist movement and its central activists, such as Ben-Gurion, Israel and Manya Shochat, Ben-Zvi, and others.[[12]](#footnote-12)

**The Motives for Ottomanization: Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi as Test Cases**

As we have seen, the Ottomanization movement during the beginning of the war was founded because of an urgent need and out of a sense of mission, to save the Yishuv and prevent the expulsion of nationals of hostile countries by the Ottoman authorities, a goal that was achieved, as we have seen, only in part. Two of the central activists in that movement, who had devoted much attention to the question of Ottomanization even before the outbreak of war, were David Ben-Gurion and Itzhak Ben-Zvi. As two of the central leaders of the Poale Zion movement and among the Second Aliyah arrivals, it is interesting to examine how they related to the question of naturalization and the adoption of Ottoman nationality.

Ben-Gurion’s and Ben-Zvi’s decision to study law in Istanbul stemmed from, among other things, the importance they attributed to Ottoman nationality for strengthening the Yishuv. Ben-Gurion even aspired to becoming the Jewish Palestinian representative in the Ottoman parliament and to represent the Yishuv’s interest in that body:

After I am elected as a representative in the parliament, I will be able to attain the role of the Jewish member of the Ottoman government. […] I have come to think that I will be very close to the focus of power, so that I can advance the development and progress of the Jews in Palestine. At the same time, I will be able, in various ways, to assist the movement for Jewish liberation, which is likely at first to attain a certain autonomy and, in the end, complete independence.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The adoption of Ottoman nationality stemmed from Ben-Gurion’s and Ben-Zvi’s desire to break their connections with their Russian past and tie their fate to that of the Empire. As Ben-Zvi remarked, “A firm decision formed within me to sever my ties with the *golah* [the lands of “exile”] in a formal way too and to tie my fate to the state with which my country’s fate was bound up.”[[14]](#footnote-14) That state is the Empire; the country is the Land of Israel. The changes that took place in the Empire in the wake of the constitutional changes after the 1908 revolution—the loss of Libya in 1911–1912, the Balkan wars of 1912–1913, the loss of most of the Christian provinces and their population in Europe, and the transformation of the Empire into a more homogenous realm in relation to religion—all only increased those men’s faith in the openness of the Empire toward its minorities and in the Empire’s strength and resilience. They hoped that the new constitutional regime would facilitate the expression of national sentiments by the Empire’s national minorities, on the condition, of course, that those minorities would be loyal Ottoman nationals. In Israel Bartal’s analysis, they combined the autonomist elements in their Zionist conception with the territorialist elements, hoping that the communal autonomy that Ottoman Jews had enjoyed in the Empire could become territorial autonomy for the Yishuv in the context of the Ottoman Empire.[[15]](#footnote-15) As it became clear, this hope of encouraging the participation of minorities in the life of the Empire came too early, because the centralizing trends, under the leadership of the ministers Anwar, Tal‘at, and Jamal, are what dictated, in the end, Ottoman policy toward the minorities during the last years of the Empire.

The manner in which Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi perceived the need for Ottomanization is clear: it was essential, in their opinion, for strengthening the Yishuv and putting it on a solid footing, for expanding its political representation in the institutions of the Empire, and for striking root in the Empire. Only through political involvement in the Empire could the Yishuv struggle for its rights in Palestine, such as the rescinding of the restrictions on immigration and the limitations of land acquisition. The abrogation of the Capitulations contributed, as we have said, to that conception: “The Empire is emerging from servitude to freedom, liberating itself from the yoke of foreign control, both financial and legal, and becoming master of itself. […] The privileges for foreigners have been cancelled, and all residents of the realm have become equal. There is one rule, one law for both the alien and the native-born,” wrote Ben-Gurion in *Ha-aḥdut* in September 1914.[[16]](#footnote-16) They themselves, it should be noted, adopted Ottoman nationality at a relatively late stage. In fact, when they sat on the Ottomanization Committee, they were the only ones among its members who did not hold Ottoman nationality. Their *nofos* documents were rescinded, as noted above, with their expulsion from Palestine in 1915.

It is interesting to examine the advantages of Ottomanization in their eyes from the aspect of the attitude toward the local Arabs. Foreign citizenship influences relations with the local Arabs as well, Ben-Gurion argued. Lack of knowledge of Turkish and Arabic and lack of involvement in public life and local politics prevent any negotiation or contact with the Arabs living in Palestine. Moreover, Ben-Gurion derided the community officials living in Palestine for decades for not speaking the local language:

The language of the land, local customs, the life of the country’s folk are foreign not only to the masses but to our intelligentsia as well. Officials living in the country for decades cannot speak the local language properly and none of them knows how to write it. Only an exceptional few know how to read Arabic. […] Our lack of preparation for participation in civil life—our foreignness and ignorance—influences our relations with the locals. Since we are unable and unprepared to take part in the local public and political life, we do not come into contact and negotiation with our neighbors, we do not know the winds that blow among them, and we cannot draw close to them and draw them close to us. We are, simply put, lacking the public platform upon which to be able to meet and come together, meaning local politics, which would grant us the possibility of working side-by-side for the benefit of the country, to raise it up and cause it to flourish, and which would create a commonality of interests and mutual understanding between us. The lack of such constant contact based on shared effort robs us of any possibility of influencing public opinion and the Arabic press and increasing mutual understanding.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Ben-Gurion’s conception stands out in light of his public activity in the Poale Zion party. His attitude toward politicians who do not know the local language is interesting, since not long before then, he was one of them. Similarly interesting is his general attitude to the question of relations with the Arabs in the face of the policy toward Arabs of the Zionists of the Second Aliyah, especially regarding the question of Jewish labor and a preference for national separateness over the Socialist concept of the unity of workers. Was it only lack of knowledge of the language and lack of involvement in local politics that prevented mutual understanding? We will return to this topic later.

The question of attitude toward the local Arabs and the connection between that attitude and the question of citizenship was given extensive attention by the Sephardi leadership in Jerusalem in the period preceding World War I. The way in which the Sephardi leadership conceived of loyalty to the Empire, the importance of citizenship, and connection to the Arabs is worth comparing to Ben-Zvi’s and Ben-Gurion’s concept.

The Zionist movement was perceived as a movement contributing to the development and advancement of Palestine, and being a foreign national was perceived as an impediment to recognition by the local Arabs of the Jews’ contribution to the country. For example, a series of articles from September 1913 argues that economic and cultural life in Palestine had completely changed since the arrival of the Jewish settlers at the end of the nineteenth century. Not only had the Jews and the local Arabs derived benefit from developments in various fields, but the Empire itself gained from their contribution, because of the tax revenue and the integration of Jews into the various bureaucracies. Jews are presented here as agents of modernization for Palestine, contributing both to the local population and to the Empire, to which they were loyal.[[18]](#footnote-18)

The trend toward instrumental Ottomanization began with the outbreak of the war and the abrogation of the Capitulations, expressing feelings similar to those expressed in the *Ha-aḥdut* newspaper, as described above. Thus, for example, on May 3, 1915, two members of the Ottomanization Committee in Jerusalem, Albert Antébi and David Yellin, published an article in *Ha-ḥerut* entitled “To Our Jewish Brethren!” trying to encourage those who had not yet become Ottoman to do so:

Please become Ottomans, then, or leave the country! But know this: that departure will be total […] This is not exile for a while, or temporary expulsion, but total expulsion and eternal exile, and there is no way to reverse the decree. […] Brothers! Do not destroy in an instant what we have built over many years! Tear up the disgraceful Russian paper in order to accept the good certificate of our dear Turkey. […] Yes, brothers! Remember the past! Leaf through the chronicles of recent years and you’ll see how many sorrows and persecutions we have suffered, how many victims have been sacrificed to safeguard our religion, our race, and our language! […] Only free and patient Turkey allows us to live according to our own spirit, as Jews. How can we, then, be ungrateful to her?! In another place you can be only Frenchmen, Englishmen, Austrians, or Americans, but here we are able to be Ottoman Jews. Can you refuse and remain foreigners?! Become naturalized, brothers! Ottomanize! This is your obligation—perform it! The Yishuv’s need demands this of you, and the obligation of your religion, your history, and Jewry itself. And the obligation of humankind demands this of you, since international law demands equality of rights and responsibilities, the fusion of the individual within the collective that lives in one country, under one flag, under one sky, under one set of laws, and in one homeland. Let us show, then, to our dear, beloved Turkey, which opened its doors to our ancestors exiled from Spain, and which will accept with open arms those harassed and persecuted and which treats us with goodness and mercy, with fairness and justice, that we have a heart that beats and a conscience that is alert. […] Let us give this honest and reliable homeland our feelings of obligation, our hearts, not with mere words but with actions.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The urgency of the need for naturalization can be easily discerned in Yellin and Antébi’s article. The way in which they marshal the Jewish past as a catalyst for naturalization and weave into their writing concepts of democracy and equal rights is interesting. They actually believe quite sincerely that it is the Empire, or “our dear, beloved Turkey,” that will provide safe haven for the persecuted Jews. Naturalization, we should note, is not presented as a process of assimilation. In this period, many other articles in this spirit appeared, denouncing the phenomenon of the departure of foreign nationals from Palestine and urging foreigners to adopt Ottoman nationality.[[20]](#footnote-20)

The two Ottomanization trends described here in brief, the idyllic Ottomanization of the pre-war years and the instrumental Ottomanization of the war years, express a recognition by the Sephardim of the changing reality in the region. Their recognition within the Empire, which was even in this crisis period the organizing and unifying factor in the Yishuv, remained in effect, as did their belief in loyalty to the Empire that had, in the past, demonstrated its ability to protect the Jews within its realm.

**“Jews, Be Ottomans!” – Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and Early Ottomanization**

The Sephardim were not the first to call for Ottomanization. Before them was Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who, on January 12, 1909, published on the front page of his Jerusalem newspaper *Ha-Zvi*, an article entitled “Jews, Be Ottomans!”[[21]](#footnote-21) In that article, Ben-Yehuda lashed out against what he called the “poverty” of the Jews and their lack of representation in the Ottoman parliament or other local representative institutions. The reason for the lack of representation is that so many of the members of the Yishuv in Jerusalem were not Ottomans and were ineligible to vote or to be elected to the Empire’s institutions. The only way to influence events in the Empire and the live of the Yishuv would be through becoming involved in taking part in political life, which was particularly turbulent after the revolt of the Young Turks. Ben-Yehuda issued an emotionally charged call to the Jews to adopt Ottoman nationality:

Jews, be Ottomans!

Be Ottomans, remember and be very mindful that the Ottomans today are free, no less liberated perhaps than the French, the English, the Americans themselves! Today the Ottoman does not need to bow his head before everyone who has some sort of brass button on his clothing, before every police officer, before every *effendi*. Every Ottoman can go about standing erect, every Ottoman can insist on his right, and all the government officials, even the highest among them, even the Grand Vizier himself, are only public servants who are there for the public and its benefit!

The Ottomans are free now! The Ottoman kingdom is now a kingdom of freedom. But in a kingdom of freedom, everything goes according to the majority of the public, the majority of the community. And now the great day has arrived, the beginning of the reign of true freedom today, as each and every district will govern itself, and it is thus understood that that public will have the power to decide and determine who will hold the majority in the local representative assembly. Shall we, at least now, open our eyes?

Jews, be Ottomans![[22]](#footnote-22)

Ben-Yehuda himself Ottomanized immediately after coming to Palestine in 1881 and changed his name from Eliezer Yitzhak Perlman to Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. He had made the decision to become an Ottoman national even before coming to Palestine, out of a desire not to be a foreigner there. In his autobiography he reports his decision to Ottomanize despite the many advantages held by foreign nationals, who at that time still enjoyed the protection of their foreign governments and the privileges of the Capitulations. By adopting the name “Ben-Yehuda,” he felt he officially became a citizen of Jerusalem.[[23]](#footnote-23) Ottoman citizenship came with some advantages as well, according to Ben-Yehuda. First, it would enable the Jews in Palestine to benefit from equal rights with non-Jewish Ottoman citizens, in the spirit of the reforms in the Empire that promised equality of rights to Muslims and non-Muslims. Among other information that he provided for his readers in a series of articles that appeared in *Ha-Zvi* in 1885–1886, he provides quotations from the Sultan’s edict (*hatt-i humayun*) of 1856 promising equal rights to all subjects of the Empire and explanations of the laws related to land ownership, inheritance, and more.[[24]](#footnote-24) However, not only the legal argument served Ben-Gurion’s efforts regarding naturalization. He, too, like many after him, argued that the importance of Ottomanization is related to the need to convince the Ottoman authorities and the Sultan that Zionism assists the Empire through the progress and development that the Zionist immigrants were bringing to the land. The argument that Ottomanization was essential for attaining proper representation for the Jews in the parliament and in such representative institutions as municipalities, district councils (the *majlis idara*), and others had already been presented by Ben-Yehuda on several occasions in 1891–1892, to assist negotiations with the Imperial authorities over the future of the Yishuv and especially over issues of immigration and land.[[25]](#footnote-25) The Young Turk Revolution in July 1908, the promises regarding freedom and liberty for the Empire’s nationals and freedom of expression, the renewed parliamentary activity, and the early promises regarding trends toward openness on the part of the Ottoman leadership—all these engendered in Ben-Yehuda, as among the Sephardim, great hopes. As we saw above, the elections for the Ottoman parliament and representative bodies and the question of the Jews’ involvement in political life very much occupied the attention of Ben-Yehuda and those who wrote for *Ha-Zvi*. So, for example, in an article on October 2, 1908, the author complains that there are not enough Jews who speak Ottoman Turkish, the country’s language, who can serve in the government. The dearth of Ottoman Turkish speakers was most pronounced among the members of the “new generation,” many of whom were educated in the schools of the Alliance Israelite Universelle and learned French: “Our schools must be first of all Jewish and Ottoman. If we do not strive to join together those two concepts, we may come to bitter regret. Let us learn Hebrew! Let us learn Turkish! […] Without those languages, we are foreign to the rest of the country’s residents, and foreign to the rest of our brethren who live in other countries.”[[26]](#footnote-26) The election of the Palestinian public figures Hafiz Bey, Ruhi al-Khalidi, and Said al-Husseini to the Ottoman parliament and the Yishuv’s inability to come together and elect a Jewish Palestinian to the parliament only strengthened Ben-Yehuda’s belief in the importance of adopting local nationality to strengthen the Yishuv. To increase the number of Ottoman Jews in the country, he even suggested in that period bringing the Jews of Yemen to Palestine.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The opening of the Ottoman parliament in December 1908 was featured prominently on the pages of *Ha-Zvi*. The absence of Jewish representatives from Palestine was discussed at length, of course, and hope was expressed that the four Jewish representatives from around the Empire would be “true Jewish delegates, like the delegates of other peoples in the government, and staunchly defend their people’s interests just as the other delegates will defend their own peoples’ interests.”[[28]](#footnote-28) The excitement in Jerusalem and Jaffa at the opening of the Parliament is also described, accompanied by expressions of affection and appreciation for the Empire: “Very great and complete is our joy. Yes, we love Turkey! Yes, we want to defend her; yes, we stand by the constitution and for it we would shed our blood. Let us be Turks, all of us, whether Arabs or Jews.”[[29]](#footnote-29) Together with the excitement about parliamentary life, though, one could already begin to hear, in the pages of the newspaper, concerns about the tension between the Turkish direction and direction of multi-national Ottomanism, the Empire, which was perceived as vital: “It was not the Young Turks alone who made the well-known revolution, but rather, and especially, the Armenians, the Jews, the Albanians, and the Greeks with their people and their money. And why would they sacrifice their own rights on behalf of a regime of Turks who are currently in power?”[[30]](#footnote-30)

Along with the calls for Ottomanization and the insistence upon the importance of the multinational character of the Empire, Ben-Yehuda spoke out vehemently against discrimination against Jews in entry to Palestine, and he demanded that the Jewish delegates in the parliament raise the matter for discussion. Equality between all Ottoman nationals only appears to be equality, argued Ben-Yehuda, for only Jews are, upon arrival, issued a “red note” limiting their stay to only three months, while other foreign nationals who arrive in the country may roam free there without restriction. As an Ottoman Jew, Ben-Yehuda protested against that discrimination on religio-national grounds, not out of a fear that the Zionist Jews would not succeed in settling in Palestine, since anyone who wanted to do so eventually did, but on principle: “For us, the Ottoman Jews, this decree is an indignity, and in the name of our own honor and in the name of the danger that threatens us from its implementation, we demand its cancellation. […] You must see to it that we are equal to all other Ottomans not only in theory but in practice as well, and that the government remove from us the shame of this decree.”[[31]](#footnote-31) The question of the “red note” continued to occupy Ben-Yehuda’s attention; he even received from Subhi Bey, the governor of the Jerusalem District, a promise to cancel it immediately, but that promise was not fulfilled.

Even so, and perhaps precisely for that reason, Ben-Yehuda was an enthusiastic supporter of Ottomanization. On January 12, 1909, his famous article, “Jews, Be Ottomans!” appeared, and in its wake, other articles were published on the question of Ottomanization, its meaning, and the connection between it and Zionism. What is the meaning of the term “Ottoman” and what is the connection between citizenship and the Zionist movement? In response to criticism of his call to Jews to Ottomanize and concerns that the was encouraging the Jews to assimilate, Ben-Yehuda wrote on January 21, 1909:

For what is the meaning of the adjective “Ottoman”?

[…]

This is not the name of a nation [*le’om*], nor or a race, nor of an *umah* [ethnic group] in the natural sense of the word. “Ottoman” is not a synonym for “Turkish.” No! Heaven forfend! It is a political term, and no more than that.

[…]

The call: “Jews, be Ottomans!”

does not mean: “Jews, be Turks! Jews, be Arabs! […]”

Its simple meaning in Hebrew is:

Jews, be citizens of the state in which you live! Jews, prepare yourselves to enjoy the political rights of a free country in which you reside and in which you want to a live a national Jewish life, without giving up any of your nationhood!

For here, in this country, no one asks of you, no one can ask of you, that you erase even a single jot or tittle of your national being […]

The meaning of the call:

“Jews, be Ottomans” is:

Jews, be like the Arabs, like the Greeks, like the Armenians in the Ottoman realm!

[…]

Jews, be Ottomans! Be subjects of the Ottoman domain, so that you continue to be Jews in the land of your fathers.”[[32]](#footnote-32)

Ottomanization is not, then, a contradiction of the Zionist national project in Palestine, but rather it grants the Jews a framework for their national expression. Ben-Yehuda imagined the multi-ethnic, multi-national Empire as the protector of Jewish nationhood in the Jews’ historical homeland. It could be that the inspiration for that model came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which comprised several national groups who conducted their affairs with a high degree of autonomy and preserved their identity and uniqueness within the imperial framework.[[33]](#footnote-33) Relating to the gathering strength of the Arab national movement and the rise in criticism of the Zionist movement, Ben-Yehuda argued that in this context too, Imperial citizenship was vital, since the Empire could serve as a mediator among the nations within it and could foster compromise in times of friction among the various national groups. [[34]](#footnote-34) The Jews’ Ottoman loyalty would even set them apart, in Ben-Yehuda’s view, from the Arabs and their separatist notions.[[35]](#footnote-35)

What were the goals of the Zionist movement and Zionist activity, according to Ben-Yehuda? According to his claim, one could not speak about the Yishuv in political terms, and one should not demand of the Ottoman parliament to recognize it as a separate political entity. He sought to limit the discussion in Parliament about the Jewish community, since any such open discussion would arouse suspicion regarding Zionist activity. The goal of the Zionist movement, he thought, was to assist the Jews of Palestine in making desolate land bloom and developing the country for the benefit of the Ottoman Empire, under whose protection they lived. As an extension of this idea, calling on the Yishuv’s leadership to take action for Ottomanization, the writer Yehoshua Barlizai described the Ottoman Zionist vision well:

This [i.e., Ottomanization] is in and of itself positive, since one cannot become at home in Palestine and become a permanent resident without being a national of its government. – True, we have national hopes for the land of our fathers, and we hope for the fulfillment of the Zionist idea in our generation, in our own time, but even then, won’t we be Ottoman subjects? A Jewish state will stand entirely under the general Ottoman government, and we will have only approved and established local rule. And so we should, we must, desire as well to be Ottoman subjects.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Let us return to the crisis of World War I and the urgent call for Ottomanization. It is interesting to note that just then, at the beginning of the war, Ben-Yehuda left Palestine because of his ill health and emigrated to the United States, due among other reasons to fear that the authorities would deport him because of his Zionist activity. His departure garnered attention in the newspaper *Ha-Aḥdut*, in the context of criticism levelled against “the Jerusalem community functionaries, who arrive with hues and cries and depart in secrecy,” and against its functioning during the crisis of war. Ben-Yehuda, first among those who called for Ottomanization, was thus regarded by the newspaper almost as a traitor against the Yishuv in its hour of difficulty and against the Zionist project on behalf of which he had been active for many years:

Typical and characteristic, in this sense, of the Jerusalem communal functionaries is Eliezer Ben-Yehuda’s sudden departure for America. That man, who years ago issued the cry, “Jews, be Ottomans,” the head of the Ottomanization Committee, who would go and speak with the government in these difficult hours, which regarded him as the designated representative of the Jewish community in Jerusalem, who stood each day and portrayed, in bold colors, all the misfortunes and tribulations that were, in truth, bound up with foreign nationality—the chief of the Jerusalem communal activists and eldest of the Ottomans suddenly takes up his bags and flees to America with his Turkish fez on his head![[37]](#footnote-37)

For Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the Arab question and the attacks on Zionism in the Arabic press became a central concern, especially after the 1908 revolution. For him, the nationalist tension, as it found expression in the Arabic newspapers *Falastin* and *al-Karmel*, relegated the Yishuv’s other struggles, including the struggle between the “Old Yishuv” and the “New Yishuv,” to the shadows.[[38]](#footnote-38) In this conceptual reality, in which the Arabs, he claimed, took advantage of every opportunity to attack the Jews under the guide of attacks on the Zionist movement, it was the Ottoman Empire that had to be the mediator among the nations under its aegis. Ben-Yehuda tried to present Arab activism as separatist activity that endangered the integrity of the Empire, and he argued, as we have seen, that only by demonstrating the Jews’ loyalty to the Empire can the suspicions that Zionists harbor separatist intent be dissipated. He argued that despite the expressions of hostility from the Arabs, and perhaps precisely because of them, there was a need to arrange for good relations with the country’s Arabs and to strive for understanding and compromise with them. He too, like the Sephardim, distinguished between Muslims and Christians and argued that the Muslims were not really enemies of the Jews. Furthermore, he initiated some meetings of Jews and Arabs and took part in them himself. Those encounters even matured into a public meeting between representatives of the two communities in November 1914, but that unusual meeting, which included discussion of Jewish­-Arab relations and the importance of Ottomanization as a key to rapprochement, had no continuation because of the outbreak of war.[[39]](#footnote-39)

In this context, we should take note of Ben-Yehuda’s critique of the policy of the Zionist movement and the people of the Second Aliyah, who, in his view, disparaged the importance of Ottomanization and military service, thus feeding the Arabs’ arguments about the Zionist movement’s anti-patriotism. Like the Sephardi leadership, Ben-Yehuda argued that the centrality of the principle of the “conquest of labor”—granting preference to Jewish workers—also contributed to heightening the national tension between Jews and Arabs in Palestine.[[40]](#footnote-40) The arrows of Ben-Yehuda’s criticism were also aimed at parts of the Sephardic leadership, however, especially regarding the question of the establishment of a Jewish-Arab newspaper and the establishment of the “Ha-magen” association mentioned above. Ben-Yehuda claimed that Moyal, Melul, and their friends preached a Sephardi-Jewish romantic nationalism that would contribute to the Sephardi Jews’ assimilation into Arab society.[[41]](#footnote-41) It is evident, then, how the questions about Ottomanization, Zionism, and attitudes toward the Arabs are bound together and reveal the tensions and divisions among various groups in the Yishuv in the last days of the Ottoman period.

**Ottomanization, Zionism, and the Empire**

The three Ottomanization trends surveyed above, with all their similarities and differences, emerged from an assumption that in the historical conditions created after the 1908 revolution, the Ottoman Empire was the best organizing framework for fulfilling the national aspirations of the Jewish community in Palestine. The calls for Ottomanization, which resulted from different motives and different historical moments (urgent naturalization with the outbreak of war versus the early calls for Ottomanization by Ben-Yehuda and the Sephardi leadership), emphasized the vital importance of Ottoman citizenship for creating a solid basis for the Yishuv. However, not all of these trends offered a precise plan for actualizing Jewish nationalism in Palestine. Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi perceived the Yishuv as part of the Ottoman Empire, a loyal part that fulfilled its civil obligations in a multi-national empire. The essence of Palestine’s Jewish community was indeed Jewish national activity, and all Jewish settlement in Palestine bore a national stamp, but, Ben-Gurion argued, that does not conflict with Imperial interests, because from a political perspective, the Yishuv was an Ottoman civilian collective and an integral part of Turkey.[[42]](#footnote-42) As Yisrael Bartal has maintained, for Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi, the future of the Yishuv was tied to the existence of a multi-national state. Their concept of the Yishuv as essentially a national entity striving for territorial autonomy within the context of the Empire integrates the autonomistic Zionist idea with the Territorialist idea.[[43]](#footnote-43) The Ottoman Empire was central, of course, in the view of the Sephardim as well, but they did not present an elaborated plan and vision for the political future of Palestine.[[44]](#footnote-44) It is almost certain that they too regarded the imperial regime as an overall framework that would make it possible to sustain the Jewish community in Palestine. Ben-Yehuda thought that the Yishuv (the Jewish entity) must integrate politically within the Arab sphere and live there alongside similar entities under imperial dominance, with protection for its national rights.[[45]](#footnote-45)

What, then, would become of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, who were the majority of the country’s population, according to these approaches? In Ben-Gurion’s conception, even though the Arabs were a majority of the country’s inhabitants (according to Ben-Gurion, in 1915 500,000 Muslims lived in Palestine, 100,000 Christians, and 90,000 Jews), “Palestine is at present is semi-desolate and in ruins, and the small Arab element is unable to revive the country and raise it from its destruction. […] The Arab is not trained for proper labor and does not know how to produce from his work the full possible advantage. […] The country still awaits a cultured people, hardworking, rich in material and spiritual strengths, armed with science and modern technology, to come take hold of it.”[[46]](#footnote-46) The Jewish community’s intentions and goals were not opposed to those of the Arab community. The Jewish community did not intend to wrest the Arabs’ land from them or force them off it, but rather to revive the country, to realize its potential for habitation and produce a maximum of economic benefit from it. Jewish settlement would thus revive the land and its inhabitants, Jews and Arabs as one, and “rescue the Arab community from economic hardship, lift it up from its low social level, and free it from its bodily and moral degeneracy.” [[47]](#footnote-47) The land would be conquered by building it, says Ben-Gurion in conclusion.[[48]](#footnote-48) Despite his denial of the dispossession entailed by the Zionist project, the colonialist tone in his words is blatant. The Sephardim, as noted above, presented a more conciliatory and inclusive perception of the Arabs. The haughty, condescending tone that characterizes Ben-Gurion’s writing did not pass them by, as we have stated, but in my opinion they still attributed greater valence to the centrality of the question of relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and to the urgent need to set them in order. The same conciliatory tone can be found in Ben-Yehuda as well.

The question of Ottomanization and loyalty to the Empire opens up a window to a wider discussion, which extends beyond the bounds of the Palestinian test case. It is interesting to note in this context that in the same period, the question of naturalization was on the agenda in other national contexts as well. In 1912, in the wake of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, “the Italian question” came to the fore in the Empire, and residents who were Italian nationals, many of them Jews, were expelled. The way to avoid expulsion was to adopt Ottoman nationality, a solution that could have been relevant to Italian Jews in particular.[[49]](#footnote-49) A very different instance is that of the Levantines, Catholics of several nations (among them Italians, French, Greeks, Germans, and Britons) who had lived for centuries in Istanbul and Izmir. They were not Ottoman nationals, but enjoyed the Capitulation privileges and the protection of various states even though they were not their citizens. With the abrogation of the Capitulations in 1914, they were given the choice of becoming Ottomans or leaving the Empire. Few chose the former option; most adopted French or Italian citizenship and left the Imperial realm.[[50]](#footnote-50)

In the context of Palestine, the question of Ottomanization serves as a concrete example of the complexity of relations between the Empire and the Zionist movement and the multiple Zionist concepts that were current in the Yishuv at that time. This question connects the topic of imperial citizenship to the question of national existence in the framework of a multi-national empire, distinguishes between citizenship and national identity, and sharpens the distinctions between different parts of the Jewish community in regard to the future of relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. In addition, through the discussion of this question one can locate additional tensions in the matrix of the complex relations among the groups that lived and were active in Palestine, as they were expressed in the critical writing of some of the Sephardic authors and of Ben-Yehuda about the Zionist leadership, the “communal functionaries of Jaffa,” and their stance on the question of Ottomanization and relations with the local Arabs.

In summary, despite the appearance of total loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, in the crisis period of World War I as well, it is interesting to see even then the first buds of another imperial involvement, that of the United States, in events in Palestine. That involvement began to be noticeable as early as the war years, in aid efforts led by the American consul, Dr. Otis Glazebrook, and others (mentioned above), aid that was intended in part for the Jewish community and in part for the general population of Palestine. American involvement in the realm of politics and diplomacy finds expression immediately after the end of the war in the form of the King-Crane Committee, which came to the region in the summer of 1919 at the behest of President Wilson and sought to examine the alternatives and the various political ambitions of the variety of communities in the former Ottoman Arab provinces.[[51]](#footnote-51) This juncture at the end of the Ottoman era, before the beginning of British colonial involvement in our region, affords us a more complex look at this range of questions.

1. *Ha-Aḥdut* was the newspaper of the *Po‘alei Zion* party. It was published in Jerusalem from 1910 until December 1914, when it was closed by order of the Ottoman authorities. Among its writers and editorial board members were David Ben-Gurion, Itzhak Ben-Zvi, Rachel Yanait Ben-Zvi, and Yaakov Zerubavel. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ben-Gurion, “*Hakhshara Ezraḥit*,” *Ha-Aḥdut* 8–9, September 20, 1914, 1, 3–4. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, “Jews, Be Ottomans!”, *Ha-Zvi*, January 12, 1909, 1–2 [Heb.]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. His journal of those years has been published: Antonio de la Cierva Lewita, conde de Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, ed. Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza (London: IB Tauris, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “Announcement to Those Accepting Ottoman Nationality,” Central Zionist Archive [CZA], L2/170. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ottomanization Order, 24 Tishrin Sani *[??]* 1330 (December 7, 1914), CZA L2/120. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Letter to the U.S. ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, November 27, 1914, CZA, L2/48-225. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. “On Ottomanization,” Protocol of the Meeting of the Palestine Office in Jaffa, June 11, 1914, CZA, L2/170. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The next wave of expulsion, more severe, occurred in April 1917, on the eve of Passover, when five to ten thousand Jews who were foreign nationals were expelled, mostly from Jaffa, to Jerusalem, the center of the country, and the Galilee. *[Since this is internal expulsion, it would be good to rebuild the sentence to place “from Jaffa” or “mostly from Jaffa” right after “the next wave of expulsion.”]* [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. “Announcement of the Ottomanization Committee” published in *Ha-Aḥdut*, January 3, 1915, CZA L2/48-140. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Itzhak Ben-Zvi, *Po‘alei Tziyyon Ba-‘aliyah Ha-sheniyah* (Tel Aviv: Mifleget Po‘alei Eretz Yisrael, 1950), 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Shabtai Teveth, *Kin’at David: Hayyei David Ben-Gurion* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1977), 271–288. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Cited in Michael Bar-Zohar*, Ben-Gurion: Biografiyah* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1975), 54–55. *הציטUט אינו מופיע במהדורה באנגלית. (בדקתי רק במהדורת 2000.)* Shabtai Teveth makes it clear that Ben-Gurion’s aspiration was impossible, because of the composition of the Yishuv, the division of Palestine into three electoral districts, and the fact that most Jews in the Jerusalem district were foreign nationals and thus ineligible to vote for or be elected to the parliament. Ben-Gurion’s chances of being elected to the centers of decision-making were very slight, and indeed it was representatives of the central Arab families who were elected. See Teveth, *Kin’at David*, 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ben-Zvi, *Po‘alei Tziyyon Ba-‘aliyah Ha-sheniyah*, 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Israel Bartal, *Kozak U-bedwi: “‘Am” Va-“Aretz” Ba-le’umiyut Ha-yehudit* [*Cossack and Beduin: Land and People in Jewish Nationalism*] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2007). [הלא מן הראוי לציין מספר/י עמוד/ים לרעיון הזה?] [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. David Ben-Gurion, “The Cancellation of the Capitulations” [Heb.], *Ha-aḥdut* 44–45, September 20, 1914, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ben-Gurion, “*Hakhshara Ezraḥit*,” 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. “The Jewish Community in Palestine” [Heb.], *Ha-Ḥerut*, September 17–19, 1913. *[Anonymous opinion piece? Editorial?]* [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Albert Antébi and David Yellin, “To Our Jewish Brethren!” *Ha-ḥerut*, May 3, 1915, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See, for example, the articles *[editorials?]* “We Are Ashamed at Having Left the Country” [Heb.], *Ha-ḥerut*, January 3, 1915, and “Don’t Miss the Moment” [Heb.], *Ha-ḥerut*, May 17, 1915. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, “Jews, Be Ottomans!” [Heb.], *Ha-zvi* January 12, 1909, 1–2. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ben-Yehuda, “Jews, Be Ottomans!” [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, *Ha-ḥalom Ve-shivro* [A Dream and Its Fulfillment] [Kol Kitvei Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, vol.1] (Jerusalem: Ben-Yehuda, 1943), 48–56. *[In principle, this should be cited instead:* Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. *A Dream Come True*, trans. T. Muraoka, ed. George Mandel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993)*,* ??–87. *(On p. 87 is the statement about being a citizen of Jerusalem, but I was unable to view the preceding pages online.)]* [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Avshalom Rubin, *Jewish Nationalist, Ottoman Citizen: Zionism, Ottomanism, and Modernity in the Writings of Eliezer Ben-Yehudah, 1881–1914*, (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 2005), 25–31. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Rubin, *Jewish Nationalist, Ottoman Citizen*, 28–29. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Y. Freeman, “The Question of Elections to the Parliament” [Heb.], *Ha-Zvi*, October 2, 1908, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Yosef Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit! Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda* [Speak Hebrew! The Life of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda], vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2008), 614–617. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. “The Great Day” [Heb.], *Ha-Zvi*, December 17, 1908. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. “Day by Day: The Great Day” [Heb.], Ha-Zvi, December 18, 1908. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. “Before the Opening” [Heb.], Ha-Zvi, December 23, 1908. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, “In Theory and in Practice” [Heb.], *Ha-Zvi*, January, 5 1909, 1-2 (here, 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, “Ottomans” (“Three Things”) [Heb.], *Ha-Zvi*, January 21, 1909, 1–2. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. In the view of Yuval Ben-Bassat, the Empire itself gains as well from the protection it gives to various national groups within it, since doing so strengthens the connection between it and its citizens: Yuval Ben-Bassat, “Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,” Middle Eastern Studies 45 (2009), 461–475. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Rubin, *Jewish Nationalist, Ottoman Citizen*, 54–59. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit! Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda*, 609. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. [Yehoshua] Barzilai, “A Little Moderation” [Heb.], *Ha-Zvi*, January 27, 1909, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. “Local Outlook” [Heb.], Ha-*Aḥdut*, December 7, 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Rubin, *Jewish Nationalist, Ottoman Citizen*, 57–58. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit! Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda*, 626–629. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit!* *Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda*, 623–624, 659–668. The “conquest of labor” principle also contributed, of course, to antagonism between the workers of the Second Aliyah and the people in the *moshavot*, the towns established earlier by First Aliyah arrivals. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit!* *Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda*, 624–625. Note in this regard that despite his criticism of Moyal and Melul, Ben-Yehuda himself supported the establishment of a Jewish newspaper in Arabic. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. David Ben-Gurion, *Anaḥnu U-shekhenenu* [We and Our Neighbors] (Tel Aviv: Davar, 1931), 6–7. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Bartal, *Kozak U-bedwi*, 165–169. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Itzhak Bezalel, *Noladtem Tziyyonim: Ha-Sephardim Be-Eretz Yisra’el Ba-Tziyyonut U-va-teḥiyyah Ha-‘Ivrit Ba-tekufah Ha-‘Othmanit*  [You Were Born Zionists: The Sephardim in Eretz Israel in Zionism and the Hebrew Revival during the Ottoman Period] (Jerusalem: Yad Ishak Ben-Zvi, 2007), 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Lang, *Dabber ‘Ivrit! Ḥayyei Eli‘ezer Ben-Yehuda*, 626. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ben-Gurion, *Anaḥnu U-shekhenenu*, 7–8. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ben-Gurion, *Anaḥnu U-shekhenenu*, 8–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ben-Gurion, *Anaḥnu U-shekhenenu*, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. An article in Ha-Ahdut, June 4, 1912, 6–8. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Oliver Schmitt, Oliver, *Levantiner: Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im osmanischen Reich im “langen 19. Jahrhundert,”* (München: Oldenburg, 2005). [הלא מן הראוי לציין מספר(י) עמוד(ים)?] [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Abigail Jacobson, “American ‘Welfare Politicsʼ: American Involvement in Jerusalem during World War I,” *Israel Studies* 18 (Spring 2013), 56–76. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)