**Bilateral Agreements on Migration**

**Analysis of Bilateral Agreements Signed by Israel**

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7. **Background**

In the early 1990s, Israel officially began recruiting migrant workers for specific low-skilled economic sectors that were experiencing growing demands for additional workers.[[1]](#footnote-1) Since that time, the management of temporary migration for the purpose of meeting labor force needs has become a key policy issue.

According to data from the Israeli Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA), in June 2019, there were 117,798 migrant workers in Israel. Among them, 100,987 were regular and 16,811 were irregular, although the latter had initially entered with a permit. Approximately 86% of the total number of migrant workers had work permits and were employed in caregiving (57%), agriculture (21%) and construction (14%) (PIBA, 2019a).[[2]](#footnote-2) The Israeli government sets a maximum quota of migrant workers for the construction and agriculture sectors. In the caregiving sector, however, there is no pre-determined quota, and the number is determined by the number of caregivers needed in Israel.

Over the last decades, labor migration in Israel has had a significant impact on Israel’s workforce composition, economy and society.[[3]](#footnote-3) By the end of 2018, out of the total civilian workforce , estimated at 4.117 million participants (The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019), the proportion of regular and irregular migrant workers was approximately 2.8%.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Before Israel began entering into bilateral agreements with migrant workers' countries of origin (hereafter BLAs), worker recruitment had been carried out by private agencies in Israel and in the countries of origin. Although a maximum legal recruitment fee of approximately $1,000 had been set for collection from potential migrant workers,[[5]](#footnote-5) private companies in the countries of origin and in Israel collected exorbitant illegal fees from aspiring migrants seeking to work in Israel, sometimes reaching tens of thousands of U.S. dollars for an individual migrant (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2012). This created an industry of profit-driven recruitment; in essence, a "revolving door" encouraging the entrance of migrants regardless of the need or actual match with an employer. These unconscionable fee practices also led to irregular entries and stays of migrants and even served as a convenient breeding ground for human trafficking and modern slavery.

Against this background, a government decision first taken in 2005 regarding signing BLAs[[6]](#footnote-6) was aimed at putting an end to the exploitation of migrant workers and eliminating the profit incentive in the recruitment process. To accomplish these goals, the recruitment process was restricted to governments, public agencies and non-profit NGOs only.

The first BLAs were signed with Thailand for the agricultural sector in 2010[[7]](#footnote-7) (implemented in 2012). These were followed by BLAs in the construction sector with Bulgaria (2011), Moldova (2012), Romania (2014),[[8]](#footnote-8) the Ukraine (2016, implemented in 2018), and China (2017).[[9]](#footnote-9) In addition, beginning in 2010, seasonal agricultural workers from Sri Lanka arrived in Israel as part of a BLA.[[10]](#footnote-10) In the caregiving sector, special pilot agreements were signed and implemented with Nepal (2015) and Sri Lanka (2016).[[11]](#footnote-11) In September 2018, the first complete BLA in the caregiving sector was signed with the Philippines, the main sending country in the sector in Israel. The agreement was ratified and awaits implementation. Meanwhile, the recruitment of migrant workers for this sector continues from several sending countries using the existing path and carried out by private recruitment companies.

*Migrant Workers Arriving as Part of the BLAs by the End of 2018: Sectors and Countries of Origin (CIMI and PIBA, 2019)[[12]](#footnote-12);[[13]](#footnote-13)*

1. **Objectives of BLAs**

The official main objectives of the BLAS are: 1. to ensure fairness and transparency in the recruitment process; 2. to eliminate exorbitant agency fees through government supervision and control of the process of labor migration in the country of origin and in Israel; and 3. to bring to Israel skilled and professional workers who are aware of their obligations and rights (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019, 7; PIBA, 2017, p. 2).

# The agreements also serve as an effective instrument in regulating and managing inflows of migrant workers while reducing their vulnerability. As indicated in the previous section, once the incentive of profiting from the arrival of new migrants is eliminated, it is easier for the government to reduce the entrance of migrants who are not needed or who are not matched with a specific employer, as well as to reduce the illegal stays of migrants. When migrants no longer need to repay large debts, there is no longer any pressure to overstay their visas and continue working in Israel even after their permits have expired. The number of migrant workers who overstay their visas is significantly higher in the caregiving sector, which is still not covered by a BLA (PIBA, 2019a).

1. **The Structure and Elements of BLAs**

Within the framework of the BLAs, recruitment of foreign workers is carried out solely by governments and public or non-governmental agencies (hereafter "implementing partner"). There is no involvement of private agencies in the country of origin, and only limited and monitored involvement of authorized private agencies in Israel, with their main responsibility being the placement of workers. One exception to this general rule is the agreement that was signed with China for the arrival of construction workers. (see below in subsection 3.1 Examples of the Institutional Structure of BLAs).

**The Logistical Process**

The implementing partner in the sending country organizes the logistics of advertisements, professional exams and medical tests, as well as pre-departure orientation and flight arrangements. At the outset of the process, the implementing partner publicizes the availability of work in Israel, along with the work conditions, rights and obligations of workers. All content must be officially approved by the Israeli government. Applicants for work who meet the criteria and pass the screening process are then randomly selected in a lottery. The Israeli employers are not involved in contacting candidates but do participate in setting the professional requirements for screening and testing workers before arrival in the construction sector.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Workers who are selected in the lottery pay only the fees permitted by Israeli law, up to a maximum of approximately $1,000, to the public or non-governmental agency for the recruitment process in the country of origin.[[15]](#footnote-15) In addition, depending on the sector and structure of the implementing partner, workers may pay the costs of medical tests and professional exams, passport and visa fees, and flight tickets.

Workers are matched with employers through PIBA before the workers leave for Israel. When they arrive in Israel, their contracts signed by their designated employers await them at the airport. Having the contracts signed prior to their arrival ensures that they will have legal employment immediately upon arrival, thus minimizing incentives for recruiting migrants through illegal channels and thereby profiting from illegal fees.

Finally, all workers participate in the pre-departure orientation run by the implementing partner and receive material with information that will assist them during their stay in Israel.

**Follow-up on the Condition of Workers and Intervention**

In July 2012, in the context of the BLAs, the Center for International Migration and Integration (CIMI), in collaboration with PIBA, founded a telephone call centerfor migrant workers in Israel, providing a resource for workers in their native languages. This call center is operated by CIMI, which registers calls to the center as inquiries or complaints and transfers them to PIBA. PIBA then refers the inquiry or complaint to the relevant unit(s) in the authorized government ministries. The call data is compiled by a computerized system that directs the calls to their appropriate destinations and allows for the systematic collection of call data and its analysis. Published annually, this data has been found to be effective in increasing the authorities’ capacity to handle complaints, making authorities aware of the issues concerning workers and communicating the condition of workers who arrive as part of the BLAs with various stakeholders and researchers.

Finally, a vital component of the BLAs is the systematic *monitoring and evaluation of the condition of workers*. Since the signing of the first agreement with Thailand, CIMI, in collaboration with PIBA, has been conducting a follow-up study, interviewing samples from each targeted group of migrants about the costs of arrival, working and living conditions, and their lives in Israel in general. The findings are published once every two years in Hebrew and English and are distributed among all relevant government offices as well as other stakeholders. The published reports are also discussed in roundtables, actively involving officials and encouraging an ongoing constructive but critical examination of the implementation and impact of the agreements.

**Setting Up the Operation and Financing**

Once an agreement is signed, the next step in the implementation is setting up the operation. This phase, which takes about one year, involves contacting and carefully screening local partners for implementation, finding an existing infrastructure or establishing a new one, conducting a needs assessment of the costs, recruiting call center representatives in the language of sending county, and including the new group of migrants in the planning of bi-annual assessments of workers' condition. Once the operation is put into motion, time resources are invested mostly in frequent communications with the implementing partner, periodic meetings between governments and partners, assessments of numbers of workers who enter, call center activity, and data management.

In terms of budgeting and financial costs, to date, the Israeli government has covered most of the costs of human and material resources needed for the operation and management of the arrival of workers as well as the call center.[[16]](#footnote-16) These costs include managerial staff, venue and logistics of professional exams, office equipment, service providers and periodic visits of the sites the operation. The expenses of the follow-up evaluation study are covered in part the Israeli government and in part by CIMI.

**3.1 Examples of the** i**nstitutional structure of BLAs**[[17]](#footnote-17)

***Agriculture***

By the end of 2017, all Thai workers in agriculture in Israel arrived under the auspices of a BLA between Israel and Thailand. The Israel-Thailand BLA covering agricultural workers is implemented by the TIC Project (Thailand-Israel Cooperation on the Placement of Workers) run by PIBA and the Thai Ministry of Labor, and supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Thailand and by CIMI in Israel. A limited number of authorized Israeli manpower agencies are responsible for the placement of workers after their arrival who choose to change employers during their stay in Israel. As with all the other BLAs, individual migrants are matched with an agricultural employer in Israel before their arrival. The authorized agencies are permitted to collect a predetermined fixed fee for this placement service and for additional services, such as translation.[[18]](#footnote-18)

***Construction***

Migrant workers in the construction sector are recruited mainly from Moldova and China. A limited number of corporations are the official employers of the workers and are responsible for migrants’ work and living conditions while in Israel. However, as in the agriculture sector, these employers are not allowed to contact candidates directly prior to their arrival in Israel. By mid-2018, 14,291 migrants were employed in construction in Israel (PIBAc, 2018), out of which 12,810 arrived under a BLA (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019, p.35).

The BLAs with Moldova and the Ukraine on the arrival of construction workers are implemented in a very similar manner by governmental public agencies: the Ministry of Labor in Moldova; the Employment Services in the Ukraine; non-governmental organizations in the source countries; and by PIBA and CIMI in Israel.

Since there is no government employment service in China that deals with the recruitment of workers to Israel, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce authorized the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA) to manage the agreement with PIBA. CHINCA publicizes the recruitment announcements.[[19]](#footnote-19) Additionally, several authorized Chinese manpower companies locate the candidates and refer them to the CHINCA website to make an application. Once candidates apply, the process for Chinese workers is the same as that for workers from other BLA countries.

***Caregiving***

Following implementation of the small-scale pilot agreements with Nepal and Sri Lanka, changes were made in the recruitment process for caregivers. Originally, under the terms of the pilot agreements, recruitment was the responsibility of PIBA and the Departments of Labor and Employment in Nepal and in Sri Lanka. Manpower companies in Israel were forbidden to contact the applicants prior to their arrival in Israel. PIBA sent anonymous videotaped interviews with the applicants to the Israeli manpower companies. Those applicants found suitable by the agencies were then asked to complete forms and submit them to PIBA.

However, these pilot agreements with Nepal and Sri Lanka were not defined as an exclusive system and recruitment by manpower companies continued. At the end of 2018, Israel had 55,425 migrant workers with valid permits in the caregiving sector and 11,434 without valid permits. Approximately 60% of the migrant caregivers are from Southeast Asia (the Philippines, India and Sri Lanka) and 40% arrived from Eastern Europe (Moldova, Uzbekistan and the Ukraine) (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019, p. 59). The high number of migrants without legal status is associated with the absence of a BLA. In countries with no BLA with Israel, individual migrants go into debt in order to pay thousands of U.S. dollars to come to work in Israel. They then must repay these debts, even if it means working in other, unauthorized jobs, or overstaying their visas.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the BLA with the Philippines, the country from which the largest number of migrant workers comes to Israel, still awaits implementation.

1. **Strengths and Challenges of Cooperation Based on BLAs**

Several factors in the design of BLAs contribute to how well they are implemented. These factors are mainly related to: removing profit considerations; benefiting from various points of view of multi-level partnerships; enjoying a good climate of international relations; and allowing close monitoring of the conditions of workers. However, as the following will demonstrate, these very advantages create the challenges that need to be met and overcome by the governments and implementing partners.

**Removing the Private Sector from the Process**

Excluding profit oriented actors from the migrant worker process is not simple, and experience shows that doing so requires a strong commitment and an uncompromising approach by governments, as well as constant monitoring of what is taking place on the ground. An additional challenge is the complexity of finding a reliable and stable non-governmental partner on the sending end. The BLAs are never completely secure from outside pressures and the implementing partners need to be able to overcome a variety of direct and indirect private sector pressures.[[20]](#footnote-20) Finally, because the government is the main implementing actor according to the current design of BLAs, it needs to bear most of the costs of the process.

However, research has shown that as long as the BLAs are resistant to outside private sector pressures, their design allows for close monitoring of the payments and costs for working in Israel (see the following section on the outcomes of the BLAs). In addition, separating profit oriented actors from the process of the professional examination enables the government to control and maintain satisfactory and reliable professional standards.

**Integrative Process of Several Partners at Different Levels and Locations**

An additional advantage of the structure of BLAs is that they integrate the experience and input of several partners from the governmental and non-governmental sectors. The variety of sources and the exchange of knowledge contribute to finding solutions and constantly improving the components of the implementation process. Incorporating several points of view at times requires close coordination of the work of governmental and non-governmental agencies at local and international levels. The government of the receiving country may face challenges that affect the process. These governments often depend on remote factors they cannot entirely control, such as effective local media for advertisement, or difficult flight logistics which can slow down the arrival of workers and harm the trust of employers in the process.

**BLAs and International Relations**

The BLAs are signed between governments, and the wider context of the bilateral relations between sending and receiving governments can strengthen the commitment to and the effectiveness of BLAs’ implementation. However, changes in foreign relationships have the potential to negatively affect the agreements. Because the Israeli government depends on a limited number of sending countries, it must be able to foresee changes, maintain flexibility and constantly be prepared for alternatives.

**Commitment to Migrant Worker Populations**

Finally, successfully managing the process of receiving and integrating tens of thousands of workers requires earning the trust of the workers over long periods of time and with respect to a number of issues, including the costs of arrival, the conditions in which they live and work in the receiving country, and how the receiving society treats them. This issue of trust is probably one of the most sensitive elements in the operation of BLAs, and errors and inattentiveness can negatively affect vulnerable populations as well as the process itself. Protection mechanisms for these workers include phone lines for complaints, close monitoring of their living and working conditions, and any initiative that can improve their wellbeing while in Israel. If the safety nets are carefully maintained, the movement of large populations for the purpose of work and personal financial enrichment serves not only these individuals but their entire societies.

**Ensuring that the Receiving Country is an Attractive Destination as a Factor of BLA Success**

Given this background, a clearly important factor for the success of BLAs is ensuring that the receiving country is an attractive destination for workers. For example, Israel was no longer relevant for potential workers from Romania and Bulgaria after these countries joined the EU. Working and living conditions also contribute to the attractiveness of the destination country. Even when the working conditions are reasonable, high costs of living may reduce the motivation to stay and work in the destination country, as Chinese construction workers reported in the follow-up study (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019, p. 54).

1. **Outcomes and Factors Influencing Negative and Positive Effects of BLAs**

The BLAs have significantly reduced the collection of illegal recruitment fees and, as a result, the cost of arriving in Israel has dropped from tens of thousands of dollars to several hundred dollars, paid legally. As a result of these agreements, to date, nearly $297,385,300 has been saved in the sectors covered by the BLAs (agriculture and construction) and in the pilot agreement of the caregiving sector.[[21]](#footnote-21) The BLAs have also significantly improved the workers’ awareness of their rights and have empowered them to make complaints when warranted. However, the living and working conditions of the workers have not necessarily improved during the period that the BLAs have been in effect, nor are regulations regarding these matters better enforced.

The labor laws in Israel apply to citizens and non-citizens, as long as they work in Israel. However, employers’ compliance with this legal obligation on the ground is far from satisfactory. In addition, the BLAs do not incorporate additional legal means of enforcement. Instead, there are constant efforts among governmental bodies responsible for enforcement to correct procedures and thereby improve their ability to protect migrant workers. Improved enforcement tools and resources are essential to fully achieve the goals of the BLAs.

According to the follow-up study on the implementation of the BLAs conducted since 2011 (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019), to date, there has been consistent involvement of authorized actors only, and a significant decrease in the costs of arrival and in the loans needed to return sums of money. Consequently, workers arriving in Israel under the rubric of a BLA are more free from debts and better able to focus on understanding their legal rights and obligations. Such workers can more easily leave an employer who does not comply with their contract and are in a better position to start saving their income much earlier during their stay in Israel. The main findings of the study are the following:

* One hundred percent of the migrant workers that were interviewed arrived through governmental and non-profit non-governmental agencies only, with the exception of workers arriving under the BLA with China, who were recruited and sent by the authorized manpower agencies under the supervision of the public agency.
* One hundred percent of the migrant workers that were interviewed did not report having made illegal payments.
* The costs of arrival after BLAs were entered into decreased by 85% in the agricultural sector among workers from Thailand, 93% in the construction sector among workers from China,[[22]](#footnote-22) and, under the pilot BLAs in the caregiving sector, 80% and 89% from Sri Lanka and Nepal respectively.
* Out of the 63 months of permitted stay in Israel, the time needed to repay the costs of arrival dropped from 17 to 9 months in the agricultural sector (Thailand), from 15 to 1 months in the construction sector (China), and under the pilot BLAs in the caregiving sector, from 27 to 5 months (Sri Lanka) and 22 to 8 months (Nepal).

However, there is no consistent or clear evidence that the BLAs improved the living and working conditions of workers, and the results can vary among sectors:

* The minimum wage requirement is not entirely met across all sectors. Not all respondents in the agricultural sector (Thailand) reported receiving the minimum wage. Respondents from the construction sector reported receiving the minimum wage, but complained that it was now lower than before the BLA. Finally, respondents who arrived as caregivers as part of the pilot BLAs with Nepal and Sri Lanka reported receiving wage in accordance with the minimum wage.
* A minimum number of days of rest is required by law. In the agricultural and construction sectors, respondents reported receiving a reasonable number of days of rest. However, respondents in the caregiving sector reported irregularities in this area.
* Following implementation of the BLAs, there has been a deterioration in overtime and sick leave payments in agriculture (Thailand) and construction (China and Moldova). This finding may be attributed to raised awareness as well as to a genuine worsening of conditions.
* Unlike respondents in the caregiving sector, who live in their employers’ homes, respondents in the agricultural and construction sectors reported problems with respect to their accommodations.
* Safety instructions in the agricultural and construction sectors were not clear enough to 48% and 22% of respondents, respectively.

Another reliable tool of measuring the condition of workers under BLAs is the data collected from the call center (CIMI and PIBA, 2019). It gives a picture of approximately 5,700 workers out of the total migrant worker population of 42,000 who actively turned to the call center to date to register a complaint. This data also provides a picture of the status of the treatment of complaints by enforcement units. In 2018:

* Complaints regarding wage problems made up 30% of the total number of complaints, followed by 28% of complaints regarding treatment by an employer.[[23]](#footnote-23)
* The number of complaints about safety issues was low, numbering only 4% of the total number of complaints in 2018. This may indicate a low level of awareness rather than a low number of safety problems. Out of the total number of complaints about safety, 61% were submitted by workers in the agricultural sector.
* Out of the 2,657 inquiries and complaints submitted to the call center in 2018, 60% were addressed and closed by the call center representatives, 25% were addressed and closed by the responsible bodies at PIBA, and 15% were transferred to the Ministry of Labor, Welfare, and Social Services, out of which 60% were being investigated in the beginning of 2019 and 40% were closed. The length of time needed to address the complaints varies in accordance with its contents and circumstances.

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1. The escalation of the political and security tensions following the 1987 Intifada, or Palestinian uprising (the term is from Arabic), created an acute shortage of workers in these sectors, in which mainly Palestinian workers had been employed since the early 1970s (Kemp and Raijman, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The remaining percentage of workers are employed under the category of "experts" (6%) or the category of "industry and services," which is no longer a sector open for recruitment of foreign citizens (2%, who are without permits). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In addition to regular and irregular migrant workers, the larger category of the officially recruited foreign workforce in Israel includes 67,997 Palestinian and 1,800 Jordanian workers. The total number of migrant workers in Israel from all these populations stood at 187,595 by the end of 2018 (PIBA 2019b). Tourists who overstay their visas may also possibly work without a permit (PIBA, 2019a). In addition, there are 32,604 migrants and asylum seekers ("infiltrators" in Israeli legal terminology) from Eritrea and Sudan (PIBA, 2019a), who entered Israel illegally through the border with Egypt. They are under group protection and are permitted to work and participate in the labor market, but are not regarded as officially recruited labor force members. For further reading on foreign populations in Israel also see: Hercowitz-Amir (2016) and Nathan (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. When the population of tourists who overstayed their visas is factored in, the percentage of foreign citizens out of the total civilian workforce in 2019 exceeds 5%. For further reading on the percentage of migrant workers in the total civilian workforce in the recent years, see Eckstein (2007) and Kemp (2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See: The Employment Service regulations (fees from work applicant for work mediation), 2006 (in Hebrew): <https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/999_625.htm>. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See the Israel government Decision No. 4024, "Permits to Employ Foreign Workers", Article 6: <https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2005_des4024> (in Hebrew). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Signing the BLA in 2010 was made possible in the context of external and internal events, such as Israel’s joining the OECD, which required Israel to account for its management of labor migration; the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons annual report; and pressures by Israeli civil society. For more information and analysis of the context of signing the agreement with Thailand, see also Kurlander (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The recruitment from Bulgaria and Romania is no longer active. Once these countries joined the EU in 2017, the migration flows of these groups of workers shifted to patterns of internal EU migration. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Some elements in the BLA with China are structured differently; see further information in the next section. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Seasonal workers arrive for a period of four to eight months in order to serve the needs of seasonal work in many crops in the agricultural sector. At the end of the season, the worker is supposed to return to his or her country of origin. This is in contrast to the situation of permanent workers, for whom employers must find alternative employment with other farmers at the end of the season. Moreover, with seasonal workers, the employer may invite the same workers trained on his or her farm in the previous year for work in the following year. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The caregiving sector in Israel, being the largest one without a set quota, requires a large-scale solution. The recruitment through the pilot agreements from Nepal and Sri Lanka did notresolve the problem and is currently inactive. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The data regarding the number of workers arriving as part of the BLAs is cumulative. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. By the end of 2018, 1,882 entries of Sri Lankan seasonal agricultural workers were registered. Since in some cases workers enter the country more than once, it is not possible to extrapolate the actual number of Sri Lankan workers in Israel based on this information. Therefore, this data was not included in the graph. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. PIBA 9.7.0003 procedure (in Hebrew, June, 13th, 2017) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The payment of legal recruitment fees varies across sectors mostly due to their different employment systems as well as to the structure of implementing partner, but it should never exceed $1,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The TIC project has been an exception due to the partnership with IOM. The collection of recruitment fees from workers served as a basis for funding the program componenets and for establishing best practices for subsequent BLAs that were signed. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. For more information about the structure, procedures of agreements and populations that arrive as part of the agreements in each sector see: Raijman and Kushnirovich (2019) and Hercowitz-Amir (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. To date, the fee amounts to approximately $889. See The Employment Service regulations (fees from work applicant for work mediation), 2006 (in Hebrew): <https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/999_625.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. PIBA, Procedure for Inviting and Employing Foreign Workers from China in Israel in the Construction Sector, number 9.7.003, June 2017 p. 2. <https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/inviting_chinese_workers_for_constructions_procedure/he/9.7.0003_with_form.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Threats to the stability of the BLA can also come from less obvious directions. There are approximately 3,000 trainees with student visas from developing countries working in Israel as part of an agricultural work-study program. They can undertake agricultural work only within the framework of their program, but there is evidence that some of them are being exploited and serve as an informal labor force for employers (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2019, p. 10; Kav LaOved, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See estimation of the sums saved in illegal recruitment fees in each of the sectors in: Raijman and Kushnirovich (2017; 2019). For regulations on the sums that can be legally collected from migrant workers, see regulations on the website of the Israeli Employment Service, <https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/500_818.htm>. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. There was no information about the costs of recruitment fees in Moldova prior to BLAs. The costs of arrival after the BLA stands at $336 (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Most prominent among the calls are requests for information, which constitute 51% of the total number of inquiries and complaints. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)