**Nation, Empire, and the Jew in 19th-Century Britain**

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# Introduction

The various intersections of colonialism and the nation state are by now well established. The Jewish question, in multiple aspects, is also woven into this discourse. The relationship between Jews and empires, including the British Empire, also has been probed quite closely,[[1]](#endnote-1) with some scholars emphasizing both Jewish contributions to and gains from the empire. A book recently published on this triple intersection claims, in relation to the British Empire, that,

British Jewry exuded imperial pride, enhanced, perhaps, by recognition that Jews were more easily accepted as British in the ethnically heterogeneous dominions than in the metropolis.[[2]](#endnote-2)

In contrast, the threat embedded in the nation state is outlined a page later:

*The modern nation-state represents a paradox. The political idea of the nation, emerging from the French Revolution, made Jewish emancipation and citizenship possible, even necessary, but …[f]or a century and a half, European-Jewry existed precariously between assimilation and exclusion, its survival dependent on nationalism’s inability to drive the logic of national unity to its end.[[3]](#endnote-3)*

*Whereas the empire held out the promise, in the nation state lurked a hidden or open threat. And the Jewish Question highlights the nation-state’s dilemmas.* The British Empire held out a promise as a “mix of identities that melded together to produce these imperialist citizens of the empire,” as it was an identity superimposed on other particular identities, as Chasin puts it. But, similarly to Hacohen, Chasin clearly distinguishes English national identity from Britishness, which is bound to the empire.[[4]](#endnote-4)

In my paper, I would like to discuss these dilemmas as they play out in the English case. I will look expressly at the last quarter of the 19th century until the outbreak of WWI, a period that was considered “a moment of Englishness.”[[5]](#endnote-5) It was the heyday of empire and the age of liberalism, but it also coincided with recurring virulent, albeit mostly nonviolent, antisemitic attacks on the small Jewish community as aliens.[[6]](#endnote-6) The parallel between the moment of empire, “Englishness,” and antisemitic upheavals begs the question of connectedness. In Britain, unlike the Austro-Hungarian Empire and post-World War I Austria, the nation state and the empire did not follow one another but rather coexisted and indeed converged. Nevertheless, it was a very uneasy convergence that both affected attitudes toward Jews and was reflected by it.

In the first part of my paper, I will examine the nation-empire relationship as a vehicle that helped Jews attain civil rights and a sense of belonging. In the second part, I will show how clashes between nation and empire were reflected in antisemitic disturbances.

# Jews in a Liberal Nation and a Humanistic Empire

As a basis for our exploration, it is imperative to remember that liberalism, religion, and empire share a prominence in English identity, so much so that David Cesarani believes that,

The nature of liberalism as a political philosophy cannot be disentangled from Englishness, national identity or Protestantism.

From the 17th–18th centuries onward, Protestantism gave "to the majority of men and women a sense of their place in history and a sense of worth... It gave them identity." [[7]](#endnote-7) In spite of the growing secularization in the 19th century, identity and culture were still strongly connected to Protestantism.[[8]](#endnote-8) Above all, the political diversity of Protestantism was seen as a common denominator vs. the religious other, particularly Catholicism. [[9]](#endnote-9) [[10]](#endnote-10) [[11]](#endnote-11)[[12]](#endnote-12)[[13]](#endnote-13)[[14]](#endnote-14) Alongside, Protestantism and almost part of it grew the National myth has identified the fight for civil and religious liberties and the centrality of parliament since the 17th century as the source and reason behind the flourishing of England.

Part of the Protestant component of the English identity was the contrast with Catholic absolutism.[[15]](#endnote-15)[[16]](#endnote-16)[[17]](#endnote-17)[[18]](#endnote-18) The national myth identified the fight for civil and religious liberties and the centrality of parliament as the source and reason behind the flourishing of English economic and political power since the 17th century.[[19]](#endnote-19)

Empire was the third component tied up with the other two. According to the national myth, the Glorious Revolution had freed Britain from Catholicism and slavery and given all its territories the freedom of trade, thus providing a trio of religious freedom, civil liberty, and empire.[[20]](#endnote-20)[[21]](#endnote-21)[[22]](#endnote-22)[[23]](#endnote-23) At the end of the 19th century, the empire had reached its zenith in British culture, namely, ideas about the empire and its importance were at their most enthusiastic and most widespread. [[24]](#endnote-24) The imperial spirit was connected to a religious sense of duty or a secularized Puritan sense of "social conscience."[[25]](#endnote-25) [[26]](#endnote-26) [[27]](#endnote-27) [[28]](#endnote-28) Mission stories were central in Sunday schools providing a platform for both

Mission stories were central in Sunday schools, providing a platform for both national pride and religious fervor. [[29]](#endnote-29)[[30]](#endnote-30) Missionaries even when critical of the culture they left behind were proud

Missionaries, even when critical of the culture they had left behind, were proud to carry the

flag and sometimes deliberately promoted imperial expansion.[[31]](#endnote-31)

This threesome is, indeed, the foundation for the perception that “Jewish intellectuals, including émigrés, imagined a liberally reformed British Commonwealth as the largest free community on earth.”[[32]](#endnote-32) Because even as an empire, the English discourse on national identity incorporated the ideals of liberty and individual rights at its very core. Thus, the Jewish question is also deeply entangled with all three dimensions of English identity.

Abigail Green, like Hacohen, points to the positive role the empire had on the treatment of the Jews. In the Palmerstonian era, Britain emerged as the champion of Jewish rights in Muslim lands. This role was closely linked to the part played by the Jews as proxies for British imperial interests. The proliferation of Jewish communities in North Africa and the Middle East meant that the agents of 19th-century British informal imperialism—merchants, missionaries, and intelligence officers—could find local assistance and partnerships. The assistance accorded to these communities occasionally proved to be mechanisms of imperialism, as in Montefiore’s plan for a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem. In fact, the Jewish community’s organs, including the Office of the Chief Rabbi, the Board of Deputies, and the Anglo Jewish Press, were endowed with real authority over all Jewish communities in the empire and worked to ensure that they behaved in a manner complementary to British rule. In return, the Jews were treated as British subjects well before Anglo-Jewish emancipation in 1858.[[33]](#endnote-33)

The empire was not devoid of Protestant identification, even under Palmerston. In his case, it was part of a general tendency to combine interests with Whig ideas and ideals, characterized by E. D. Steele as “righteous and aggressive Protestant nationalism.”[[34]](#endnote-34) In 1841, he played an important role in the project to establish, jointly with the Prussians, an Anglican-Lutheran bishopric in Jerusalem, an act considered as a signpost in Victorian Christian Zionism.[[35]](#endnote-35) Although Palmerston had no part in the evangelical groups that proposed the project, he did perceive it as an instrument for strengthening British influence and as a means of allaying fanaticism and hostility against Protestants in Palestine.[[36]](#endnote-36) Even the secularized imperial spirit of “social conscience” was connected in the 19th century to a religious sense of duty or a secularized Puritan sense of social diligence.[[37]](#endnote-37)

But as American historian (now deceased) R. W. Davis sums up, the Jews’ greatest debt was to liberalism:

It had given Jews great and small – not only peers of the realm and MPs, but also those of lesser fame, such as the Jewish electors of London – a place in a great British institution, the Liberal party. They fought for it, and it fought for them.[[38]](#endnote-38)

Reverend A. A. Green (1865–1933), minister of Hampstead Synagogue, reminisced in 1908 that when he was young, to be a Liberal was one of the tenets of Judaism as that party had supported Jewish emancipation.[[39]](#endnote-39) Furthermore, even the imperial role of the Jews served to legitimize imperialism and was a sign that Britain stood for Commerce, Christianity, and Civilization; the Jews often stood for at least two out of the three, and for the evangelicals, they had the potential for the third as well. By presenting Jewish relief in the same idealistic line as anti-slavery and Christian humanitarian activism, they provided the platform for a humanistic imperialism.[[40]](#endnote-40) Naturally, it wasn’t just the Jews; British officials throughout the Ottoman Empire demonstrated a genuine commitment to the wider principles of “civil and religious liberty.”[[41]](#endnote-41) The scientific face of this political situation was the attitude toward the Jews in anthropological studies. Up until the mid-19th century, British anthropology was characterized by the “humanitarian-religious-philanthropic triad,” with roots as far back as the 17th century.[[42]](#endnote-42)

The assistance of the Jews and assistance to the Jews furthered imperial interests while symbolizing what was perceived as the best of the nation state, as the epitome of liberal ideals of commerce, civil liberty, and as the hand of Providence, the upholder of Christian interests and mission. The case of the Jews in India is a case in point. Article 87 in the 1833 East India Company Charter Act opened all positions and employment to people of any “religion, place of birth, decent, colour.” The more liberal features of the empire were to inspire an equally liberal granting of commensurate civil rights in the metropole.[[43]](#endnote-43) Thus, an 1847 Jewish Chronicle article author argued that, “if we entrust the defense of the empire to the Jew, why should he not take his share in the legislation of the empire? He helps to support the state, why should he not enjoy the power and honours it has to bestow?”[[44]](#endnote-44) The article, written by a Christian, was referring to the laudatory military service of Bene Israel Jews in the Bombay army as soldiers and officers. The service was used in the article, as well as in parliamentary debates, to project an image of the Jew that could dispel the antisemitic accusations of Jewish exploitative and nonproductive occupations.[[45]](#endnote-45) The equality of occupation in India was to inform and influence the status of the Jew in Britain.

Jews sensed the opening the empire gave them into Englishness. Joseph Wolff, a converted Jew who became a missionary to the Jews and one of the most traveled missionaries of his time, was precursor to the connection between mission and empire. He conceived both Protestantism and empire as interchangeable with Englishness. Through his efforts in the service of both, he imagined himself an Englishman and was reportedly recognized as such by the non-English other: “[t]he rumour prevailed that Mr. Wolff was the prince royal of England, and that he had been sent by his royal father to watch the movements of the Russians, and then to assist the Turkomans against them.”[[46]](#endnote-46) At the end of the century, some Jewish authors, such as Israel Zangwill and even more so Julia Frankau, made Englishness dependent not on conversion, which prevalent racial thinking almost undermined, or even habit, but rather upon loyalty to empire.[[47]](#endnote-47)

And yet, at best, the empire afforded only limited admission into English society. When Joseph Wolff returned to England, his “world-wide reputation” and his having become a “household word to many people” brought no preferment. He was recognized as a representative of Englishness while acting as an imperial agent and as a promoter of Protestantism, but not enough to be fully accepted at home.[[48]](#endnote-48) The very humble living he was given in Isle Brewers (60 pounds annum) was arranged by private friends, and he still sensed anti-Jewish feelings toward himself despite his conversion.[[49]](#endnote-49) However, while conversion was a wished-for outcome, it was, at the same time, perceived as a threat to Protestant culture; even radical assimilation did not ensure full acceptance.[[50]](#endnote-50)

Baghdadi Jews believed that they were “British,” going to English schools, “speaking English habitually,” adopting English and imperial patriotism, and fighting for King and Country. British protection promised maximum social capital for this community, and they, in turn, were allied with Britain aspirationally, politically, and linguistically.[[51]](#endnote-51) They felt like “Englishmen-in-Exile,” whether or not the empire considered them as “British Protected-Persons” or British subjects. Yet, they were not admitted to the Gymkhana Club, a snub that rankled deeply not because it was the only sign of exclusion but because it was so flagrant.[[52]](#endnote-52) As Eitan Bar-Yosef, following Homi Bhabha, sums it up, the Jews were “‘white but not quite’; sufficiently white to settle East Africa for King and Country, but not white enough to settle in the East End.”[[53]](#endnote-53)

# The Jewish Question as Imperial Strife and National Relief

The end of the century represented not only a turn to more prevalent racial thinking about Jewishness; it also presented changes in the relationship between empire and the inclusion of Jews in the sense of Englishness. Zygmunt Bauman and others have sought to explain the ambivalent responses to Jews in modern Europe as “a result of their capacity to disturb categories of identity, particularly the boundaries of nation.”[[54]](#endnote-54) In the following section, it is the Jewish question that provides a means for the troubled categories of identity to express themselves. The Jews are used as a construct for expressing a rupture in the discourse of national identity. Left and right converged in their hateful disparagement of the Jews, jointly utilizing antisemitic attacks to paint an ideal of the Nation.[[55]](#endnote-55)

In fact, the empire could have been as much a vehicle of exclusion as it was of inclusion, and not only for Jews. While Francophobia receded in the 19th century along with the waning of France’s threat to British imperial dominance, hatred of the Italians rose expressly when the Axis powers emerged as such a threat.[[56]](#endnote-56) The Germans went from insiders to “others,” in parallel with the tensions between Germany and the British Empire.[[57]](#endnote-57) Apparently, the enmity that followed the imperial rivalry was stronger than anti-Catholicism; otherwise, it is hard to understand the lack of opposition to 200,000 Belgians who arrived within less than a year after the beginning of the First World War. Judging simply by numbers and religion, their arrival should have at least led to an outcry resembling the reaction to Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe a few decades earlier.[[58]](#endnote-58)

The crisis of the end of the century would seem to contradict this form. The Jew was not an obvious imperial rival, and in most of the following cases, was rather identified **with** the empire, not an **enemy** of it. And yet, as we will see, the waves of hostility toward English Jews and Jewish immigrants were closely tied to empire and its proposed or opposed place in the English/British identity discourse.

The Bulgarian Atrocities marked a sea change in the happy marriage between Jews and the empire.[[59]](#endnote-59) The major political disputes that had produced antisemitic upheavals since the 1870s largely swirled around imperial issues but also touched on liberty and religion.[[60]](#endnote-60) In all cases, as the political discord toned down, so did the antisemitic attacks. I am referring to the **Bulgarian Atrocities** (after 1876), the public argument about the **Boer Wars** (1880–1881 and 1899–1902), **the clamor for the Aliens Act,** especially after 1900, and the **Indian Silver and Marconi Scandal**s that followed each other in 1911–1913. In the following section, I intend to show the interplay between the tensions—not to say rift—between liberal ideals, Protestantism, and empire and their reflection in two of these antisemitic convulsions.

## Bulgarian Atrocities

The attacks against Disraeli's pro-Ottoman policy following what came to be called the Bulgarian Atrocities after 1876, provoked an onslaught of antisemitic sentiment that threatened to turn violent. [[61]](#endnote-61)Even when the attacks were specifically aimed at Disraeli, he was depicted as

When the attacks were aimed at Disraeli himself, he was depicted as the loyal representative of the interests of a Jewish community, not of Britain's Christian ethos. The confrontation with Disraeli was led by Liberals and radicals. The threat of Gladstone’s campaign to the imperial facet of the national identity almost gave heightened importance to the religious layer by force of circumstances. The argument around Disraeli's foreign policy not only juxtaposed what Disraeli called imperial interests with what his denouncers considered moral issues, but it also, in effect, brought up a more basic question of what was more British: Christianity or imperialism.[[62]](#endnote-62)

But the crisis came after the advent of liberal ideals in the 19th century, which can also be read as the advent of the secularization of the British state. The threat of Gladstone's campaign to the imperial dimension came *after* undercutting the Christian legal definition of Englishness. The only "religious" basis that was broad enough to include all and sundry was antisemitism. Thus, the antisemitic upheaval surrounding the Eastern Question of the 1870s appeared as a religious protest that provided a wide denominator for the Liberals and was potent enough to recruit the public at large around a mythic enemy. Without a basis that tied English nationalism to a Christian mythology of a British chosen people, the Sir Galahad of History, this tactic could never work.[[63]](#endnote-63) Antisemitism served as a pseudo-religious expression for an anti-imperial stand. Gladstone considered the public uproar a “Christian Revolution.”[[64]](#endnote-64) Indeed, the attack against Disraeli and the Jews gave the aggressors the respectability of religious moralists.[[65]](#endnote-65) The confrontation with Disraeli created curious bed-fellows of Evangelicals, High Church Anglicans, and historians who had turned into "secular missionaries." Also prominent in the struggle were radical atheists.[[66]](#endnote-66)

Seldom had the public at large been so involved in a matter of foreign policy as it was in January 1878. But then, it was as much an issue of what patriotism and national identity meant.[[67]](#endnote-67) Making Disraeli's alleged Jewishness the epicenter of the criticism against him provided the religious character of the crisis. Originally, the conflict was between Christianity and Islam, and the outcry was more against the Turks than for the Bulgarians.[[68]](#endnote-68) In a conflict involving the need to define Christian morality, imperial greatness, and the English character, when the three appeared to clash, antisemitism bridged the stormy waters. [[69]](#endnote-69)

## The Boer Wars

The antisemitic attacks utilized by the opponents of the Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902) also played out within the discourse of national identity. The real question wasn't pro-Boer or not; it was pro-England—but what kind of England? [[70]](#endnote-70) The Boer War brought forth a

The Boer War brought forth a question quite similar to that raised during the Bulgarian crisis: was it a war for African and political equality, as the supporters contended, or was it a war for the capitalists who supported it, as the opposers asserted? Many of those who were against the government’s policy during the Bulgarian crisis now supported the government of the day in a patriotic outpouring. This war upturned the usual political divide between moralists and realists. Until then, the imperialists claimed to work in the service of high moral ideals—bringing civilization and Christianity to new lands. Before the Boer War, liberal writers had believed patriotism encompassed empire and was a characteristic of liberalism.[[71]](#endnote-71) Therefore, the real question wasn’t pro-Boer or not, it was pro-England—but what kind of England?[[72]](#endnote-72)

The criticism of the government during the Boer Wars brought together, again, a compound of political positions. Some socialists were supporting the war out of patriotism, but others were bitterly critical. The opposition could be taken as a threat to the empire and its unity but it mostly emphasized the tension between imperial rule and freedom. This is obvious when taken to mean the freedom of the Boers, but it was then understood as pertaining to the freedom of the home country as well. Britain’s freedom was circumvented when capitalists deceived them and tricked them into the war, thereby thwarting the very essence of a free political choice, of political liberty. The capitalists were standing to gain from the war. Some of the capitalists were Jews; ergo the Jews were the instigators of the war and robbers of the English people’s free political choice.[[73]](#endnote-73) In 1900, The Trade Union Congress [TUC] passed a resolution condemning the war as one “to secure the goldfields of South Africa for cosmopolitan Jews most of whom have no patriotism and no country.” Likewise, *Justice*, the newspaper of the Social Democratic Federation, blamed the war on “unscrupulous Jewish financiers” and the “Semitic-capitalist press.”[[74]](#endnote-74) These attacks were not necessarily anti-modernist or anti-democratic; there were among them those who attacked the empire itself as a threat to the liberal–democratic order.[[75]](#endnote-75) Thus, A. R. Wallace of the South African Conciliation Committee believed that “every triumph of expansionism is a rebuff to democratic liberalism. Expansionist imperialism means more despotism abroad and more aristocratic recrudescence at home.” Early socialists, in general, tended to two characteristics: they commended the national character for its deep connection to freedom and were deeply tainted by racist-antisemitic perceptions.[[76]](#endnote-76)

The political crisis around the war showed the contention between political liberty and empire. The dissent could have been taken as a threat to the empire and its unity. It allowed traditional opponents of empire to seize eagerly upon the existence of a Jewish factor in South Africa as irrefutable proof of the inherent hypocrisy and corruption of the much-vaunted imperial mission.[[77]](#endnote-77) But above all, it emphasized the tension between imperial rule and freedom, calling into question the liberal character of England itself. Supporters of the government saw no clash: it was a war for Africa and political equality and, thus, equated the rights of the African population with England's rule.[[78]](#endnote-78) For them, the war was in line with England's stand for liberal ideals. The opponents of the war contended that in the name of a “liberal mode of power,” the Boers should not be coerced. Furthermore, the freedom of the home country was also threatened. Left-leaning Liberal J. A. Hobson posed the question clearly:

Does anyone seriously suppose that a great war could be undertaken by any European State, or a great State loan subscribed, if the house of Rothschild and its connexions set their face against it?[[79]](#endnote-79)

British freedom was being circumvented by capitalists who deceived them and tricked them into the war, thereby thwarting the very essence of a free political choice, of political liberty. The upsurge of patriotism in the khaki election of 1900 signaled the end of the concern about English identity and called off most of the Jew-baiting.

The head-on clash between the major loyalties—empire and liberalism—might explain why antisemitism assumed such a central role in the discourse. The main blame for involving the government in the Boer War fell on the capitalists who most stood to gain from the campaign. Since some of the capitalists were Jews, the accusation against “The Jews” as instigators of the war followed “logically.” They were the robbers who had stolen from the English people their political free choice.[[80]](#endnote-80) The criticism that pitched empire against liberal ideals tore at the core of “Englishness” but was mollified by revealing itself as an act of alien elements.

## The Aliens Act

The Aliens Act intended to limit immigration yet started out as an imperial issue. The first proposals to restrict immigration were a response to the unemployment and riots of the winters of the mid-1880s, and the first to propose it were those who supported immigration from the empire. The subject of immigration had disappeared in the 1890s but was resurrected during the housing emergency in East London and the imperial crisis of 1900. The suggestion was partly based on the understanding that British soldiers were of poor physical fitness as a result of urbanization, and the arrival of feeble immigrants was only making matters worse. However, the arguments of those in favor of unchecked immigration also involved the imperial issue: Jewish parents were fulfilling their designated gender roles by bringing up sons who were fitter and, therefore, represented a gain from the point of view of imperial defense. The campaign against immigration intensified and gained real force only as the new dimension of imperial tariffs was added, which called for the restriction of imports from outside the empire. This issue was about fundamentally redefining the empire and its administration.[[81]](#endnote-81) Free trade had been a core feature of the empire as it had been known for many decades, and open borders were considered as safeguarding social cohesion and national health. The radical conservatives proposed a system of benefits for the middle and working classes as part of a more centralized empire through a system of tariffs that was cloaked in patriotic language. A system that barred cheap foreign products was easily connected to the barring of cheap labor and of Jewish immigrants. Thus, blocking cheap labor sweetened the pill of restrictions on trade.[[82]](#endnote-82)

The significance of the discourse around the Aliens Act is that it constituted an attempt to construct a racial-imperial identity. This was most manifest with two men considered the major anti-immigration figures: Arnold White (1848–1925) in the earlier years and Sir William Evans-Gordon (1857–1913) in the later period.[[83]](#endnote-83) Evans-Gordon, the moderate and more influential of the two, was probably largely responsible for the Aliens Act.[[84]](#endnote-84) The White Empire was an emanation of the English character. The purpose was the renewal of imperial vitality while he was ridden with worries about the degeneration of the national character in a time of growing uncertainty and ambivalence. His struggle against Jewish immigration was a struggle in the service of national and imperial revitalization.[[85]](#endnote-85) It is highly significant that the question of Jewish migration is treated in his *The English Democracy*, which deals with the problems of the polity and “the conflicting currents” that troubled the state of parliamentary rule, empire, and religion.[[86]](#endnote-86) White is counting “the infusion of Jewish mind and thrift” as a hopeful sign in a chapter about Jewish influence on the English democracy. By attributing them with making significant contributions, far exceeding their small number (120,000), balancing English insularity with their cosmopolitanism (152), and possessing “proverbial mastery of economic truth” (156), he bases his compliments on highly antisemitic characteristics. The main thrust of the chapter is the need to curb Jewish immigration: “it is true, England has received a few victims of religious and civil tyranny (possibly ten percent of recent immigrants) but in following our traditions we have also sheltered some of the champion scoundrels in Europe” (157). The full list of Jewish influences, both good and bad, shows them as being against religion (being materialistic socialists), commerce (having no thrift and no honesty), and national freedom (trespassing upon the principle of equality before the law).[[87]](#endnote-87) In short, the antithesis of Englishness.

## The Marconi and Indian Silver Scandals

A far less serious outburst occurred with regard to the back-to-back Indian Silver scandal and Marconi scandal of 1911–1912, both of which had imperial significance.

The Marconi scandal was first coined in August 1912 by the *Eye–Witness,* a paper founded to oppose the corruption of party politics by Hilaire Belloc and that became known as the New Witness after October 1912.[[88]](#endnote-88) The “scandal” was a political‐financial controversy that started with the acceptance of the English Marconi Company’s tender for the construction of a chain of wireless stations “to link up the British Empire.” Ministers, including then Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George, were charged with corruption for using inside information in purchasing shares of the American Marconi Company shortly before the tender, despite the tender having no bearing on the American company’s financial success. Although Lloyd George gave the Unionists the incentive to make the affair into a scandal, it was the presence of Godfrey Isaacs, general manager of the English Marconi company and brother of Rufus Isaacs (1860–1935), and Herbert Samuel (1870–1953), head of the Post Office committee, who provided the justification for the allegations of a “semitic” conspiracy.[[89]](#endnote-89) Cecil Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc (1870–1953) had been writing antisemitic attacks before they instigated the Marconi scandal, yet the malice in this scandal was considered egregious by most standards, even though the most virulent attacks in the New Witness and the Eye–Witness were of a small circulation.[[90]](#endnote-90) But the accusations gained a hearing in much more respectable quarters that claimed it “cannot be put aside as a voice too small to be listened to.”[[91]](#endnote-91) Kipling’s Gehazi, which was written upon Sir Rufus Isaacs’ appointment as Lord Chief Justice on October 21, 1913, was evidence enough that antisemitism went far beyond the Eye-Witness and its readership. If the Witness boasted of being the only journal to discuss the matter in 1912, it had lost the basis for such a claim by the following year. The examples cited in this study have shown the increasing discussion of the “Jewish Question,” with papers showing growing hostility toward Jews in the years before 1914.[[92]](#endnote-92)

The scandal dominated the papers for eighteen months, but it was only in May and June of 1913 that a general outcry of corruption erupted when it was discovered that Alexander Murray had purchased American Marconi shares for the account of the Liberal Party, although at this point the matter had little, if anything, to do with Jews. Indeed, Belloc claimed that the incentive was anti-corruption, not anti-Jewish, pointing to the allegations against Lloyd George, even though the campaign on charges of corruption had been started against Sir Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel. But, as in former cases, “The Jew” symbolized the empire. For Belloc and Chesterton, the call against corruption was a call against Parliamentary democracy, accusing it of being ruled by the “establishment,” or what was generally conceived as the liberal political order.[[93]](#endnote-93) The antisemitic character of the attacks on the Jewish ministers was repulsed; as G. K Chesterton wrote years later in 1918, the real issue at heart was “the qualities of our own country,” which would not be allowed to die through such acts of corruption.[[94]](#endnote-94)

Parallel with the Marconi scandal was the Indian Silver scandal—“the little Marconi case”—at the beginning of November 1912. It was alleged that the bullion brokerage firm of Samuel Montague was misusing its family ties in political circles to receive government contracts in which they had financial interests. Bullion transactions were conducted on behalf of the Indian Government in accord with its usual business. Also involved were the firm’s partner Stuart Samuel, Herbert Samuel’s younger brother, who was at the time MP and Undersecretary of State for India, and Edwin Montague, cousin of Herbert Samuel, whose brother was one of the partners of Montague’s firm and nephew of Lord Swaythling, another firm partner. The purchase was conducted secretly to avoid speculation but was presented as a swindle against the British people, “a gambling hell” that “aliens were making of the British Empire.”[[95]](#endnote-95) Leading conservative journals pointed to the similarity with the Marconi scandal in connection to “Radical Semitic plutocrats” and noted the close relationship between the Montague family and the India Office.[[96]](#endnote-96) Keynes felt the purchase was sound and justified on financial grounds because the small silver market meant that buying openly would result in paying an inflated price. But the decision was politically naive, and the risk of “charges of venality from anyone who might have an interest in discrediting the government” should have been foreseen and averted.[[97]](#endnote-97)

In either case, allegations of corruption and dishonesty were brought against members of the Liberal government, whose Jewish origins were pure chance. Still, the drive against the government utilized the antisemitic stereotype of the “Jewish financier.” Both the Indian money and the Marconi scandal were economic questions that aroused public interest only from the point of view of the corruption of public officials and, although deeply entangled with imperial issues, did not involve deep arguments about British identity as had the other cases. [[98]](#endnote-98)

However, it is necessary to view these scandals within the context of the Conservative Party’s aggravating struggle against Liberal dominance between 1910 and 1914, following the change in the status of the House of Lords. In Bonar Law's campaign to convince the king to grant the dissolution of parliament and call a general election against the advice of his own Liberal prime minister, Asquith, the Conservative’s claimed that the Constitution had been changed unilaterally and irrevocably. The general struggle between the parties created the impression of a crisis of the liberal system, enough to cause a threat of civil war over the question of Ireland.[[99]](#endnote-99) The general crisis of multiple problems gave the impression that “[t]he authority of the state seemed to be collapsing.”[[100]](#endnote-100) In this case, deflecting the problem of corruption to the Jewish financiers perhaps blunted the allegations against the liberal order.

These scandals also represented a “high-water mark” for “rich-Jew anti-Semitism.”[[101]](#endnote-101) This particular brand of antisemitism was especially characteristic of the socialists and the ultra-conservative circles around Cecil, G. K. Chesterton, and Hilaire Belloc at the Eye-Witness. In both cases, financial capitalism went strongly against the ideal view of society they envisioned for Britain: socialist for the first and corporatist for the latter. For both ideals, liberal Parliamentarism was to give way. For neither ideal was the empire part of their vision.[[102]](#endnote-102) Making “The Jew” a symbol of Liberal Party corruption, as well as imperial corruption, lowered the heat of the attack on matters of central identity and allowed a much wider consensus than otherwise would have been achieved.

# Antisemitism and Empire

In her analysis of the conversion of Karl in *pigs of clover* to Englishness through finding his place in the empire, Sara Gracombe wonders: “Do Jews serve as extreme versions of empire’s failures? As exemplars of the path to imperial Englishness that could apply to all English subjects? Or both?” Grascombe alludes to the depiction of Jews in orientalist terms as “dark-skinned,” depicting racial otherness.[[103]](#endnote-103) Indeed, it was a widespread and longstanding practice of using the Jews as ready biblical imagery for explicating unknown people to a European audience.[[104]](#endnote-104) At the time that Julia Frankau was imagining the empire as an inclusionary factor for Jews, however, the empire as a focal point of Englishness was being increasingly problematized and expressed through antisemitic attacks, as we have seen above.

When the Jew provides a vehicle for reflecting “true” Englishness, the outcome is philosemitic; and when he reflects a contradiction to that ideal image, the Jew is painted with an antisemitic brush. No one exemplifies this better than Rudyard Kipling. When at pains to utilize the power of the “Jewish Financier” for the good of the empire, he portrayed Kadmiel in “The Sword, the Treasure and the Law” as the ultimate symbol of the Jew as a facilitator of Englishness.[[105]](#endnote-105) Indeed, during the Boer crisis, Kipling’s effort was to show the irrelevance of the “’Ebrew financier” to the public argument. But during the Indian Silver and Marconi scandals, he depicted the Jew as the mercenary Gehazi, having his lie exposed in a curse of leprosy on himself and on all his seed forever.[[106]](#endnote-106) Thus, for Kipling, treating issues of empire in terms of an interest in petty financial gains instead of as an ideal to be served with an ascetic missionary zeal was symbolized by the Jew acting like Gehazi.[[107]](#endnote-107)

Jews were an almost predictable choice for reflections on Englishness. This was in part traced to the problematic inheritance from medieval Christianity, where “the Jew” was divorced from any real material Jew.[[108]](#endnote-108) The Reformation, and especially Calvin’s new reading of the Old Testament that appropriated the story of the Israelites for the Reformed Church, made the Israelites into a blueprint for modern individualism and nationalism. In England, this meant that since the 17th century, political and poetic versions imagined the English, or at least some purified subset of them, as modern-day Israelites who had inherited the promises and responsibilities of Ancient Israel.[[109]](#endnote-109) Such self-identification brought forth the tradition of philosemitism, but also hostility by displacing the historical Jews from that role, which was quite often accompanied by missionary zeal.[[110]](#endnote-110) In 1822, Richard Brothers (1757–1824) published a book showing “the English Nation to be Descendants of the Lost Ten Tribes.” Similar ideas grew into the British–Israel movement through the efforts and publication of John Wilson (?–1871). In 1845, he published his book on “Our Israelitish Origin,” giving the idea a genealogical twist at the very time when new notions of the biological racial superiority of the Germanic peoples appeared.[[111]](#endnote-111) The movement’s ideas reached wide circulation through its publications, such as Edward Hine’s “Identification of the British Nation with Lost Israel” in 1871 and *The Banner of Israel*, first published in 1877. Although not accepted by conventional Protestantism, the movement was popular among the middle class, including some aristocrats and high military officers, such as Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, who exclaimed: “Let us thank God that we are the lost Ten Tribes of Israel!”[[112]](#endnote-112) The movement was thus assured of “resources and visibility out of all proportion to its size.”[[113]](#endnote-113)

Ideas of English biblical self-identification had spatial-imperial ramifications. Wilson believed that England had had “intercourse” “with the coast of Palestine ages before the Anglo-Saxons found their way hither” as “’the children of Judah and the children of Jerusalem’ were brought to market.” This was to have had practical outcomes of going forth to the Land of Israel to promote “the cause of the Redeemer in that Land” and, indeed, agitating for the “reoccupation” of Palestine.[[114]](#endnote-114) Similarly, for Hine’s British-Israelism, which was more attuned to a period of imperial rivalry with Germany, the idea that the British were the only descendants of the Ten Tribes, while the Jews were the descendants of the two other tribes, meant the propagation of an enterprise of resettlement of the Jews in Palestine. But Britain had full rights to Palestine even besides her Israel identity: “thrice have we shed our blood for the cause of Palestine” and, because of “our commercial instincts,” would never let the country fall into the hands of another power if the “protectorate” of the Ottoman Empire failed.[[115]](#endnote-115)

But the notion of Palestine’s special connection to Britain went beyond the public reach of British-Israelism. The search for the Ten Tribes of Israel was influenced by the advent of colonialism and encouraged it at the same time.[[116]](#endnote-116) Some aspects of the evangelical tradition converged with millenarian notions of a realization of an ideal Jerusalem in England and of England’s rule in Jerusalem. The Holy Land was central to English Protestant culture, and Palestine aroused in England a sense of possession unequaled by any other colonial province. On June 22, 1865, the Archbishop of York referred to Palestine as the country that “belongs to you and to me, it is essentially ours…to which we may look with as true a patriotism as we do to this dear old England.” British travelers to Palestine felt that the Holy Land evoked something intimately connected with the idea of England and Englishness. As Bar-Yosef writes in his research on the image of the Holy Land in English culture, “it is impossible to perceive the distinct British imperial interests in Jerusalem without taking into account the millenarian image of Jerusalem in England.” [[117]](#endnote-117) And yet, The East End/West End divide was imagined as a “Jerusalem” or “a second Palestine,” as a sign of foreignness. Evans-Gordon, who in his book considers the Zionist movement’s proposed restricted immigration policy to Palestine as a possible legitimation for the British equivalent, uses the biblical image of The Israelite conquest of Palestine and the expropriation of the Canaanites to describe the dislocation of Christians in the East End.[[118]](#endnote-118)

So, the “Jew” played a double role in British Imperialism: used to legitimate a self-celebratory human rights imperialism but also as a symbol of the derogation of English morals and as a danger to English freedom that were threatened by the empire. In the same vein, it seems striking that the imagery of the Holy Land in general and of Jerusalem in particular had a double edge: just as this imagery facilitated imperialism, it has also been used to prophesize against the empire. Nor was it necessarily benevolent to “the Jew” or to Jews. Quite often, the longing for the Holy Land as image as well as imperial task was accompanied by a drive for the conversion of the Jews.[[119]](#endnote-119) In Blake's writing, there is no philosemitic strand, of course. In the hymn *Jerusalem* from the preface to *Milton*, Albion and Jerusalem are one, but he sometimes links Judaism to Satanism.[[120]](#endnote-120) William Blake perceived Jerusalem as the symbolic residence of a humanity freed of the chains of commerce, imperialism, and war. In *Jerusalem*, Blake refers to “dark, Satanic Mills,” which represent “mills that produce dark metal, iron and steel, for diabolic purposes.” He is critical of London, which “was a war arsenal and the hub of the machinery of war.”[[121]](#endnote-121) So, his Jerusalem both represented imperial rule and negated it.[[122]](#endnote-122) Written at the beginning of the 19th century, Blake's Jerusalem falls outside the scope of this study. But, in view of Blake's significance and popularity, it may not be too far-fetched to see his *Jerusalem* as a powerful symbol for the attitude toward the Jews, who, like Jerusalem, played a double role in British imperialism, evoking both hatred and affinity.

The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th was a time of heightened debate on the place of the empire and its relationship with other accepted characteristics of Englishness. During the last decades of the 19th century, the period of the rise of antisemitic attacks, the empire was at its most glorious. Yet, the empire has always had an ambivalent side to its relationship with both liberal thought and Protestant fervor.[[123]](#endnote-123) From its inception, the empire was viewed suspiciously as a force that would lead to a loss of freedom.[[124]](#endnote-124) By the turn of the 19th century, the clash was a reality that had redefined political camps. Home rule for Ireland divided the Liberals and turned the Conservatives into the Unionist party. The debates around free trade and home rule viewed these issues as reflecting on an English character, both strengthening and threatening its identity while keeping the empire at the center of the discourse.[[125]](#endnote-125) It was not only because “the age of imperialism” brought with it an endless string of crises, but because the main characteristics of Englishness—Protestantism, liberal ideals of parliamentary freedom, and the empire—were seen as inherently contradictory. These three were the main topoi of the English identity discourse, although, from the very start, they had a strong potential for inner contradictions that only grew as the 19th century unfolded.

The advent of liberal ideals in the 19th century ushered in a growing inclusiveness of British citizenship, which was also the means by which the Anglican Church and the British state traveled further apart. [[126]](#endnote-126) Thereby, the religious component that allowed the exclusion of the religious “other,” and the Liberal model, which was increasingly inclusive thereof, were heading for a clash. Jews and Catholics, emancipation notwithstanding, retained the position of "the other" both culturally and socially.[[127]](#endnote-127) However, antisemitism, as well as anti-Catholicism, was limited by liberal institutions and attitudes, which provided political means of combating its influence. [[128]](#endnote-128)Tolerance and intolerance were conflicting trends living side by side that left the contradiction between the religious and liberal components of Englishness intact.[[129]](#endnote-129)

Tolerance and intolerance lived side by side, leaving the contradictions between the religions and the liberal components of Englishness intact.

The relationship of the missions with the empire was also challenging. The religious zeal that drove the missionaries also fed the anti-slavery movement at the beginning of the 19th century.[[130]](#endnote-130) Later, Protestant missionaries, even when succumbing to racial discrimination, were always committed to racial equality, at least in principle. [[131]](#endnote-131)By providing interpretations to local cultures, enhancing education they sometimes supported national movements and anti-imperialist activities.[[132]](#endnote-132)

By providing interpretations to local cultures and enhancing education, they sometimes supported national movements and anti-imperialist activities.

The empire could have provided a common “other” had it not become a point of contention and contradiction with one or both of the other topoi of the identity discourse. [[133]](#endnote-133) At a time of a growing perception of “disintegration,” as Salisbury called the inner contradictions that ruined a sense of “Englishness,” “the Jew” could—and to a large extent did—play the role of the ready “dumping ground for all new varieties of Ambivalence” and the most obvious of effigies to burn.[[134]](#endnote-134)

However, research on the nature and origins of antisemitism in Britain is as varied as it is wide-ranging. At one end, we have David Cannadine's well-known disparaging remark on the insignificance of the entire phenomenon. At the other end, we have critical views that expose the failure of the liberal system toward minorities in general and the Jewish minority in particular. [[135]](#endnote-135) Mostly, research ties the rise in antisemitism to deep and substantial social changes or, as it has been dubbed, “the interactionist model of antisemitism.”[[136]](#endnote-136) These changes threatened social security and stability and were accompanied by collectivist ideologies from the right and the left. [[137]](#endnote-137)The turn of the 19th century is marked by rapid urbanization. England was transformed

The turn of the 19th century was marked by rapid urbanization, transforming England from a predominantly rural society into an urban one within two decades and into a country where internal migration turned citizens into strangers of a sort. As real acquaintanceship within a community was disappearing, so arose the necessity of imagination and ceremonies to foster a feeling of a common identity.[[138]](#endnote-138) Furthermore, a greater involvement of the government made the issue of citizen rights and obligations more acute as people developed greater rights to call on public services. Defining the “public” and how that definition could be modified had immediate and pressing consequences. A feeling of crisis and a need to find a unifying common denominator that was not dependent on familiarity gave rise to racist and illiberal perceptions of the nation. Antisemitism, likewise, was undergoing a racist turn within a racist world of imagery in the second half of the 19th century. In literature since Disraeli, and even in philosemitic writings such as those of Buchan, Jews were creatures of primeval impulses and an inescapable biological heritage. [[139]](#endnote-139)The recurrence of international and internal crises gave rise to recurring

The recurrence of international and internal crises gave rise to repeated upsurges of antisemitism.

[[140]](#endnote-140)Since the 1880s it was also the time of a sizeable immigration to Britain of destitute Jewish

Since the 1880s, there had also been sizeable immigration to Britain of destitute Jewish people from Eastern Europe; both their “semi-barbaric” state and their involvement in world conspiracy were viewed as a threat to English civilization and power.[[141]](#endnote-141)

The concurrence of the social and economic whirlwind and rising antisemitism brought several researchers to understand antisemitism within the anti-modernist protest. Indeed, one explanation tries to put English antisemitism in a wider context that includes both empire and modernity. The thesis, in a nutshell, is that a robust empire was a valve against a strong antisemitic movement, hence the relative weakness of the phenomenon in Britain. The rise of anti-imperialism also engendered antisemitism—a course of events that grew stronger with the advent of anti-imperialism in Britain.[[142]](#endnote-142) Nevertheless, as appealing as such an explanation is, especially in tying different phenomena together, antisemitism emanated from both sides of the attitudes toward modernism and empire.[[143]](#endnote-143)

Linking the debates about Jews to the identity discourse gives it significance beyond the number of articles written or persons targeted. The uncertainty expressed in the identity discourse led to “the temptation to ‘de-ambivalentize’ the ambivalence by condensing it or focusing on one obvious and tangible object and then burning it down in this effigy.”[[144]](#endnote-144) This was particularly clear in the case of focusing all the anxiety on Jewish immigrants at the end of the century.

Pointing to the connection between the rise of antisemitism and the discourse on national identity led to a discussion in the wider context of European antisemitism, even while preserving the awareness of the differences. In fact, it has been suggested that the developments of both emancipation and antisemitism in Britain and Germany had much in common.[[145]](#endnote-145) But one of the more important differences was the lack of an English antisemitic political party; before the appearance of Mosley's Fascists, they had remained a marginal group.

It is possible, therefore, to see antisemitism as a healing of the rift that the empire caused with the other two layers of national identity: Protestantism and liberalism. Antisemitism provided a common solution for the contradictions between denominators competing with each other with growing force.[[146]](#endnote-146) The exclusion of the Jew, derived from Christian tradition but not based on it, bridged the secularization demanded by liberalism and religious identity. In the Middle Ages, the Jew remained constant as a symbol of religious otherness, even as anti-Christ, long after his physical absence. In the second half of the 19th century, he was transformed into a secular and even racist vehicle of exclusion, even though the Jewish community was practically insignificant numerically.[[147]](#endnote-147) Thus, the cultural exclusion of the Jew was a deeply ingrained tradition even when drained of a specific religious antipathy, providing continuity with a religious identity that had been weakened. It was, so to speak, the remnant of a religion that permeated people’s minds even though they disbelieved it.[[148]](#endnote-148) It could have been an expression of the growing social significance of religion as a signifier in reaction to the rise in religious pluralism.[[149]](#endnote-149)

The exclusion of the Jew, derived from a Christian tradition, bridged the secularization demanded by liberalism and the religious component. The cultural exclusion of the Jew was deeply ingrained, so even when drained of specifically religious content, it still provided an allusion of Christian heritage. [[150]](#endnote-150)It was so to speak the remnant of a religion that saturated people's

It was, so to speak, the remnant of a religion that permeated people’s minds, even though they disbelieved it.[[151]](#endnote-151) A depiction of the Jew as alien on racial grounds was actually providing a secular language for a religious exclusionist icon.

But antisemitism—and indeed ethnonationalism—was limited by the liberal perception of the nation. At the very time that antisemitic turmoil was taking place, Jewish emancipation was rightly celebrated with the appointment of the first practicing Jew to the cabinet and with the number of Jewish MPs far exceeding their proportion in the population.[[152]](#endnote-152) Furthermore, Jew baiters were not necessarily calling to abrogate the liberal political system that enabled emancipation. Edward A. Freeman, regius professor of modern history at Oxford who attacked Disraeli as “the Jew in his drunken insolence,”[[153]](#endnote-153) included Jews in his model of Teutonic cultural identity. His private hatred of Disraeli included deep prejudice against the Jews but is considered more of a reaffirmation of Christian principle. The racist Robert Knox, an anti-imperial anthropologist, in his 1850 *The Races of Men* denies Jewish assimilability but does not deny their ability to integrate into the nation and assume its characteristics.[[154]](#endnote-154)

Similarly, John Stuart Mill's secularism was also tinged by a Christian sense of superiority. His depiction of the Jews was unsympathetic, and although he did not object to the alleviation of legal discrimination, he did object to changing the oath in such a way that would admit Jews to the parliament while exclusing atheists. [[155]](#endnote-155)Kipling used biblical symbolism, and referred to himself as “a

Kipling used biblical symbolism and referred to himself as “a god-fearing atheist,”[[156]](#endnote-156) but his religiosity was eclectic.[[157]](#endnote-157) Said argued that for Kipling, religion was not a real interest, whether he was adding it to inject local color into an orientalist narrative or out of some respect for the local religion.[[158]](#endnote-158) Before World War I, Kipling’s antisemitism was bounded by a “national culture, and a backward-looking form of Englishness.”[[159]](#endnote-159)

The Jew as alien provided an allusion of unity with Christian heritage. A depiction of the Jew as alien on racial grounds was actually providing a secular language for a religious exclusionist icon.

At a time when religion was declining as a clear-cut component in the national identity and as a definitive test of who belonged to the nation and who didn’t, the empire could have taken on greater importance. But the end of the 19th century, despite it being the heyday of the empire, also brought to the fore the empire’s religious contradictions *vis-a-vis* the Catholics in Ireland, the Muslims in Africa, and Muslims and Hindus in India. Even after the eschatological fervor of the turn of the century faded away, the ambivalence between the missions and the pragmatic needs or ideological positions of the secular administrators of the empire persisted. Criticism of the empire, while blaming the Jews, diminished the importance of that criticism within the discourse of identity. The fact that radical objections to the empire came from within the Liberal Party, which was the party of the secularization of the state, meant that they were operating on a line of double jeopardy: attacking both the religious and the imperial dimensions of national identity. They advocated for freedom—the third and no less central axis of the same discourse—proving their need, consciously or unconsciously, for antisemitism as a common denominator which, while depending on the religious tradition for acceptance, had little political implication.

Consciously or unconsciously, antisemitism became a common denominator that depended on the religious tradition for acceptance but that had little political implication, bound as it was by important political boundaries.[[160]](#endnote-160) It was the political means put at their disposal by the liberal polity. It was not a hallmark of tolerance and acceptance of religious minorities, but rather a conflicting trend that coexisted and blended in a most unsystematic manner.[[161]](#endnote-161)

# Conclusion

The second half of the 19th century was a period of rapid and deep transformation that called for self-definition and stability in a changing world. It also saw a repetition of crises in which the discourses on English identity and antisemitism converged. These crises were not singular cases, however, but rather the crystallizations of a more general ongoing problem of self-identification. All but one were also connected to the empire. It was a time of burgeoning nationalisms everywhere, including in Britain. The growing tension between competing and perhaps contradictory components of national identity, at a time of political disagreement, threatened the continuance of this coexistence. Antisemitic language and symbols, as well as the relative weakness of antisemitism, expressed this tension and, perhaps, provided a solution of sorts.

Todd Endelman stated that “Jews are foils for forging English and British identities.” But as Dana Rabin has shown in the public uproar against the Jew Bill of 1753 (p. 168), this national identity was deeply entangled with imperial dilemmas, which the Jews somehow seemed to embody: “the task of empire necessitated some change in… older perceptions of those defined as others. The controversy … The incorporation and assimilation of England’s small Jewish population would imply the possibility of all other Christians… and perhaps others including ‘Infidels, Hereticks and Turks.’”[[162]](#endnote-162) Jewish agency, and providing help to Jews, was a validation of the English liberal character and allowed Jews a veneer of Englishness. When the empire itself came under fire, antisemitism performed the same service for liberal and religious self-perceptions. Nation and empire were reflected in the Jewish question, and their contradictions were soothed by it.

1. There are studies that look at the general picture like: David Feldman, “Jews and the British Empire, c. 1900,” *History Workshop Journal* 63, no. 1 (2007): 70–89; Abigail Green, “The British Empire and the Jews: An Imperialism of Human Rights?” *Past & Present* 199, no. 1 (2008): 175–205. Stephanie Chasin Citizens of Empire: Jews in the Service of the British Empire, 1906-1940, (Diss. University of California Los Angeles, 2008); James Renton, “The British Empire’s Jewish Question and the Post-Ottoman Future”, D.J. Wertheim (ed.), *The Jew as Legitimation*: *Jewish-Gentile Relations Beyond Antisemitism and Philosemitism* (Macmillan Palgrave 2017): 135-152. Besides that there are several works on specific areas, such as Ruth Fredman Cernea, *Almost Englishmen: Baghdadi Jews in British Burma* (Lanham, Md., 2007), Sarah Abrevaya Stein, “Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the Persistence of Empire”, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 80-108 [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Hacohen 31 [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Hacohen 32 meaning mainly ethno-nationalism. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Stephanie Chasin, Citizens of Empire: Jews in the Service of the British Empire, 1906-1940 (University of California Los Angeles PhD thesis 2008), p. 31. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Krishnan Kumar,” The Moment of Englishness”, *The Making of English National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), pp. 175-225. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. [a mere 60,000 in the 1880s it rose to about 245,000 before 1914, with an influx of immigrants, many from Russia] [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Linda Coley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837, New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1992, p. 53. לעומת זאת יש הרואים בפרוטסטנטיות רובד שונה של זהות שהיא כוללנית יותר ואפילו אוניברסאלית: Colls, The Identity of England, p. 18. על ההזדהות הלאומית של מסיונרים – גם קתולים ואפילו בניגוד להוראות האפיפיור במאה ה-20: Adrian Hastings, " The Clash of Nationalism and Universalism within Twentieth-Century Missionary Christianity,Missions, Nationalism and the End of Empire, Brian Stanley (ed.) (Grand Rapids Michigan, Cambridge UK: William B. Eedermans, 2003, pp. 15-33 [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Timothy Larsen, Crisis of Doubt: Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 229-238. His thesis doesn't go unchallenged: Thomas Albert Howard, "Review of Crisis of Doubt: Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England by Timothy Larsen (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, March 2008; 76: [205 – 207], p. 207. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", in S. Hall et al. Modernity and its Futurs, Cambridge, 1992, p. 292. Anthony D. Smith would see areligious elemnt to all nationalisms but particularly for Protestant nations: Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, pp. 76-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. הטענה של קרישן קומר Kumar, "Nation and Empire", pp.590, 605 note 69 כי ה"האומה הפרוטסטנטית" איבדה משמעות בסוף המאה ה-19 בשל העובדה שהאתגרים שהאימפריה האנגלית עמדה מולם הפסיקו להיות קתולים – קשה להוכחה. גם במאה ה-17-18 נאבקו נגד הולנדים ושבדים ולא רק נגד צרפתים. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s ( Oxford : Oxford U.P. , 2007), p. 17 [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. John Wolffe, "Anglicanism, Presbyterianism and the Religious Identities of the United Kingdom", World Christianities, c. 1815-1914, Sheridan Gilley, Brian Stanley (eds.), Cambridge UK, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), [301-322],p. 321. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. John Wolffe, "Anglicanism, Presbyterianism and the Religious Identities of the United Kingdom", World Christianities, c. 1815-1914, Sheridan Gilley, Brian Stanley (eds.), Cambridge UK, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), [301-322],pp. 321-2. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Colley, "Britishness and Otherness", p. 317 [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Krishan Kumar**,** "Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective",*Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), [pp. 575-608], p. 589. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Colls, *The Identity of England*, pp.23-30. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Citation of Hague. W. (2001). Speech by the Rt Hon William Hague MP, Leader of the Conservative Party, the Spring Forum in Harrogate, 4 March in Ben Wellings, "Rump Britain: Englishness and Britishness, 1992-2001", *National Identities*, 9: 4, (2007) [395 – 412], p. 402. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992), Cambridge Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 81 מנגיד את הגישה באנגליה לצרפת ולגרמניה שבשתיהן יש מרכיב יותר גדול של jus sanguinis. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Jonathan Parry. The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 45. Liah Greenfeld contends that already during the reign of the Tudors English nationalism was republican – although during Elisabeth's reign it was mostly muted.Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 71-74 [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 142-169. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Linda Colley, "Britishness and Otherness", p. 316. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Arthur Balfour, *House of Commons Debates*, 13 June 1910, vol. 17 cols. 1143-4 [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. חדווה בן-ישראל, "הייעוד של האדם הלבן באימפריאליזם הבריטי", עמ' Blair Worden, "The Victorians and Oliver Cromwell", in *History, Religion and Culture. British Intellectual History 1750-1950*, Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, Brian Young (eds.), Cambridge UK, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000, [pp. 112-135], pp. 115, 122-135.262 [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Colley, "Britishness and Otherness", pp. 327-8. Kumar, "Nation and Empire", p. 589, Although Kumar contends that English Nationalism actually appeared at the hay day of empire as a response to continental nationalist ideology, p. 592 and that the Empire was part of an identity of "mission" which entirely suppressed nationalism, Krishan Kumar, "English and French national identity: comparisons and contrasts", Nations and Nationalism 12 (3), 2006, [pp. 413–432], pp. 427. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Martin, *Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion*, p. 60. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Bishop Samuel Wilberforce speaking in Leeds on behalf of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa in May 1860 cit in Andrew Porter, "'Commerce and Christianity': The Rise and Fall of a Nineteenth-Century Missionary Slogan", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 28, no. 3 (Sep., 1985), [pp. 597-621]' p. 597., [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. B. Stanley, "'Commerce and Christianity': Providence Theory, the Missionary Movement, and the Imperialism of Free Trade, I842-I860", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 26 (I983), [pp. 71-94], p. 73. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. B. Stanley, '"Commerce and Christianity", pp. 75, 79, 81-91; Andrew Porter, "'Commerce and Christianity'", p. 598. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. McLeod, *Religion and Society in England*, pp. 145-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Susan Thorne, "Religion and Empire at Home", *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*, Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (eds.) (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2006), [143-165], p. 146. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Williams, "Mission and Empire", pp. 395-7. ראויים לציון דבריו של Temple Gardiner מיסיונר שהשווה את התהלוכה לרגל יובל היהלום של ויקטוריה תהלוכה של ישו וראה בנשיאת הבשורה לאימפריה שרות למלכה, עמ' 396. דגש גדול על האמביוולנטיות של סוף המאה בגלל נטיות אסכטולוגיות בין המיסיונרים אצל : Andrew Porter, *Religion Versus Empire?*,pp. 283-315. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Hacohen, 31 [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Green, “The British Empire and the Jews”, pp. 178-192. Heather Miller Rubens, “Rebellious Jews on the Edge of Empire: The Judæo-Irish Home Rule Association”, Irish Questions and Jewish Questions, Corssovers in Culture, Aidan Beatty and Dan O’Brian (New York: Syracuse University Press 2018), p. 104. The imperial commitments of Jewish high finance, were an even more prominent feature a phenomenon of the later part of the century and Edwardian England David Feldman, “Jews and the British Empire, c.1900”, *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 63 (2007), 74–6. On Central Asia: ‘Azaria Levi, “Yehudei Mashhad be-reshit ha-mea ha-‘esrim”, [The Jews of Mashhad at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, in *The Jews of Mashhad* – in Hebrew], in *Yehudei Mashhad,* (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. a/4-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. E. D. Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, I8SS-I86S,(Cambridge 1991), p. 56 [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Isaiah Friedman, ‘Lord Palmerston and the Protection of Jews in Palestine, 1839–1851’, *Jewish Social Studies*, xxx (1968), 40. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Lord Palmerston and Religion: A Reappraisal Author(s): John Wolffe Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 120, No. 488 (Sep., 2005), p. 911 [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. חדווה בן-ישראל, "הייעוד של האדם הלבן באימפריאליזם הבריטי", עמ'. McLeod, *Religion and Society in England*, pp. 145-6. Susan Thorne, "Religion and Empire at Home", *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*, Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (eds.) (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2006), [143-165], p. 146. David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 142-169. Colley, "Britishness and Otherness", pp. 327-8. Kumar, "Nation and Empire", p. 589, Although Kumar contends that English Nationalism actually appeared at the hay day of empire as a response to continental nationalist ideology, p. 592 and that the Empire was part of an identity of "mission" which entirely suppressed nationalism, Krishan Kumar, "English and French national identity: comparisons and contrasts", Nations and Nationalism 12 (3), 2006, [pp. 413–432], pp. 427. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. R. W. Davis, “Disraeli, the Rothschilds, and Anti-Semitism”, *Jewish History*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1996), [pp. 9-19] p. 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. By the end of the century Jews were more equally divided in their political support, Chasin, *Citizens of Empire*, pp. 28-9. On his Zionist activity see Stuart A. Cohen, “Anglo Zionism: The Initial Confrontation, 1895-1900”, *Michael: On the History of the Jews in the Diaspora* vol. 10 (1986), p. 69 [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Green, “The British Empire and the Jews:” , 178 -190. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Green, “The British Empire and the Jews:” p. 192. Antisemitism can be viewed as closely tied up and deeply ingrained in British liberalism, Feldman's book shows the problematic relationship between Liberalism and Antisemitism as part of the discourse of English identity, Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, esp. pp. 3-42, Cesarani, sees the outbursts of Antisemitism as crisis of Liberalism and the Jews as definers of the limits of Liberalism Cesarani, "The Study of Antisemitism in Britain", p. 264. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. John M. Efron, Defenders of the Race: Book Subtitle: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-De-Siècle Europe New Haven and London:Yale University Press 1994) [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Mitch Numark, “Perspectives from the Periphery: The East India Company’s Jewish Sepoys, Anglo-Jewry and the Image of the ‘Jew’”, On the Word of a Jew: Religion Reliability and the dynamics of Trust, Nina Caputo and Mitchel B Hart (eds)( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019), p. 260. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. A Christian, ”The Herald and the Jew”, Jewish Chronicle, 10.12.1847, p. 343 although the gist of the article is a call against making opinions a test for civil rights. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Numark, “Perspectives from the Periphery”, pp. 257, 261, 266. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. “Asiatic Intelligencer -- Calcutta -- Purwanah from Maha Raja Runjeet Singh to his Vakeel, Lalln Kishern Chund,” in *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India China and Australasia*, Vol. 10 (February, 1833), p. 63, see Hilda Nissimi, “Joseph Wolff (1795--1862)—The Making of an Englishman”, *Modern Judaism* 39(1) (2019), pp. 18-41 esp. 25-29. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Sarah Grascombe, “Imperial Englishness in Julia Frankau's ‘Book of the Jew’”, *Prooftexts*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 147-179, pp. 159-160, 166, 171. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. First quote from “ART. IX.--Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843--1845, to Ascertain the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly,” The New Quarterly Review: Or, Home, Foreign and Colonial Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1846), p. 420. On hathitrust.org, accessed October 10, 2016. Second quote from a long review of Wolff’s autobiography: “Joseph Wolff,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. 90 (July--December 1861), August 1861 (No. 550), [pp. 135--53] p. 138. Accessed September 1, 2015, on hathitrust.org, accessed January 31, 2016 [English

    edition at Harvard University]. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Letter IX to Sir Thomas Baring, J. Wolff, Journal, p. 28. Denouncing the smallness and insignificance of the living that Wolff received “ART. VII--Narrative of the Mission of Dr. Wolff to Bokhara,” The New Quarterly Review: Or, Home, Foreign and Colonial Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1845)], p. 205 on Hathitrust.org. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Kushner and Endelman claim that even converted Jews were treated as Jews by Jews and by non-Jews; Todd M. Endelman and Tony Kushner, “Introduction,” *Disraeli’s Jewishness*, Todd M. Endelman and Tony Kushner (eds.) (London and Portland: Valentine Mitchell 2002), pp. 3-4. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Maisie J. Meyer, *From the Rivers of Babylon to the Whangpoo: A Century of Sephardi Jewish Life in Shanghai*, (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2003); ch. 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Ruth Fredman Cernea, *Almost Englishmen: Baghdadi Jews in British Burma* (London, New York: Lexington books 2006), pp. 42-47. Except rich persons – after their death when the state stood to gain from estate tax, Sarah Abrevaya Stein, “Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the Persistence of Empire”, *American Historical Review* vol. 116 no. 1 (2011), p. 86. The status of British Protected Person appears to have been interpreted as potentially coterminous with naturalization, Abrevaya Stein, “Protected Persons?”, p. 91 [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Eitan Bar-Yosef, “Between the East End and East Africa: Rethinking Images of ‘the Jew’ in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture*”, ‘The Jew’ in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture* *Between the East End and East Africa*, Eitan Bar Yosef & Nadia Valman (New York: Macmillan Palgrave 2009), p. 3 [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Bar-Yosef, “Between the East End”, p. 5 [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Bar-Yosef, “Between the East End”, pp. 10-11. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. The Italian community was miniscule, a mere 4,600 in the 1861 census and 25,000 50 years later. They were no competitive threat to the English labour force. According to Lucio Sponza's research on this immigrant community Victorian opinion developed “from romantic idealization and compassion ... to an obsessive outcry and alarm” Lucio Sponza, *Italian Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Realities and Images* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), p. 140 the book stops at 1914, but only the World War II brought up feelings of enmity: Lucio Sponza, "Italian Immigrants in Britain", pp. 59, 6870. Although sympathy existed along the enmity. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Tabili, “A Homogeneous Society?”, pp. 62, 68-76. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Tabili, “A Homogeneous Society?”, p. 67. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Green, “The British Empire and the Jews”, p. 191 referring to the Bulgarian Atrocities as the sign post. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Anthony Julius, "Anti-Semitism and the English Intelligentsia", Old Demons, New Debates. Anti-Semitism in the Wes, David I. Kertzer (ed.), Teaneck NJ: Holmes &Meier, 2005), [pp. 53-79], p. 65. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Wohl, "Representations of Disraeli's Jewishness", p. 140. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Porter, *Religion Versus Empire?*, p. 221. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Anthony S. Wohl, "'Dizzi ben Dizzi' Disraeli as Alien", *The Journal of British Studies*, vol. 34 no.3 (1995), p. 402, John Burns cit in David Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire c.1900", *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 63 (2007), p. 75 see also on the High Church ritualists' support of the Orthodox Church in the crisis: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers, Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939*, (1957) Harmondsworth Middex: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 74. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Wohl, "Disraeli as Alien", pp. 396-7, Taylor, *The Trouble Makers,* p. 383 Gladstone: p. 385. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Anthony S. Wohl, "'Dizzi ben Dizzi' Disraeli as Alien", *The Journal of British Studies*, vol. 34 no.3 (1995), p. 402, John Burns cit in David Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire c.1900", *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 63 (2007), p. 75 see also on the High Church ritualists' support of the Orthodox Church in the crisis: A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers, Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939*, (1957) Harmondsworth Middex: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 74. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, pp. 77-8 [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, p. 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Jews also, were presented as "Anti-Christian", Wohl, "Representations of Disraeli's Jewishness", pp. 113, 126-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, p. 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Stephen M. Miller, "In Support of the "Imperial Mission"? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902", *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), p. 695; Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, p. 107. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Andrew S. Thompson, "The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914", *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Apr., 1997), [pp. 147-177] p. 155 [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Stephen M. Miller, "In Support of the "Imperial Mission"? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902", *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), p. 695; Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, p. 107. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", pp. 74-5, Gutwein, "Imperialism and anti-Semitism", pp.74-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", p. 75. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. In fact, the identification of imperialism with the Jew was favorite with *Justice*. Antisemitism on the Left in Britain already had some history since Chartism Claire Hirshfield, “The British Left and the ‘Jewish Conspiracy’: A Case Study of Modern Antisemitism”, *Jewish Social Studies* vol. 43, no. 2 (Spring, 1981), p. 97. See also Satnam Virdee, “Socialist antisemitism and its discontents in England, 1884–98”, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 51 3-4 (2017), pp. 356-373. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Cit in Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", p. 75. Bob Blatchford, George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, H. M. Hyndman among others: Richard Lawson, "Nationalism, Racialism and Early British Socialism", *The Journal of Historical Review*, vol. 1 no. 4 (1980), p. 355 <http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v01/v01p355_Lawson.html>. However, it is worth noting that socialist antisemitism was challenged by a minority current of English Marxists whose conceptions of socialism were universalist Satnam Virdee, “Socialist Antisemitism and its Discontents in England1884–98”, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 51:3-4 ((2017),pp. 356-373. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Claire Hirshfield, "The Anglo-Boer War and the Issue of Jewish Culpability", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), [pp. 619-631] p. 620 [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Thorne, Congregational Missions, pp. 164-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (NY 1902),p. 45 <http://oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/127/Hobson_0052_EBk_v6.0.pdf> accessed 06.01.2020 [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", pp. 74-5, Gutwein, "Imperialism and anti-Semitism", pp.74-5 [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Gutwein, "Imperialism and anti-Semitism", p. 75; Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", p. 78. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, p. 264. Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire", 78-9. Cesarani, "The Study of Antisemitism in Britain", p. 258. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848–c.1918* (Cambridge:

    Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 215. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Cecil Bloom, “Arnold White and Sir William Evans-Gordon: their involvement in immigration in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain”, *Jewish Historical Studies* , Vol. 39 (2004), pp. 153-166 [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Daniel Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 118-119, 124-129. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. Arnold White, The English Democracy: Its Promises and Perils (London: Swan Sonnenschein 1894), p. vii. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. White, The English Democracy, pp. 150-170. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Kenneth Lunn, THE MARCONI SCANDAL AND RELATED ASPECTS OF BRITISH ANTI-SEMITISM, 1911-1914 [PhD], p. 11 [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Bentley Brinkerhopp Gilbert, “David Lloyd George and the Great Marconi Scandal”, Historical Research, Volume 62, Issue 149, (1989), p. 296. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Donaldson, location 782 Kindle edition – the low circulation of the Eye-Witness [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. 19.10.1912 cit in Donaldson location 815. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Lunn 313 [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Donaldson, location 921-922, Cheyette, “Hilaire Belloc”, p. 135 [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. The sign of the world’s end: Open letter to Lord Reading by G. K. Chesterton, New Witness in 1918,Donaldson, location 3915. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. The New Witness, 26 February 1914 cit in Lunn p. 219. Colin Holmes, pp. 70-82, Anand Chandavarkar, Keynes and India: A Study in Economics and Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 63-64. Stuart Samuel was disqualified from sitting in the Commons but was re-elected a few months later, [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. The Thorne 19 April 1913 cit in Lunn, p. 309. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. J.M. Keynes, Indian Currency and Finance, (London, 1913 - 2012 edition), p. 101 [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, p. 267, Gutwein, "Imperialism and anti-Semitism", pp. 57-68, The serious part of the Marconi scandal, which nearly toppled the Liberal government may have had more to do with mendacity in parliament than any other issue, Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert, "David Lloyd George and the Great Marconi Scandal" *Historical Research*, 62, 149 (Oct. 1989), pp. 295-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. Jeremy Smith, "Bluff, Bluster and Brinkmanship: Andrew Bonar Law and the Third Home Rule Bill", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 36, no. 1 (Mar., 1993), p. 168. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. Keith Robbins, *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness* (London, New York, 1998), p. 198. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. Which thrived already during the Boer Wars, Geoffrey Alderman, Modern British Jewry, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), p. 193 [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Colin Holmes, 70-82. Vaninskaya, A 2008, ''My Mother, Drunk or Sober': G. K. Chesterton and Patriotic Anti-Imperialism', History of European Ideas, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 535-47. G. K. Chesterton had other points on common with socialism Vaninskaya, p. 542. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
103. Grascombe, “Imperial Englishness”, pp. 151-153. [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
104. Tudor Parfitt, “The Use of the Jew in Colonial Discourse”, *Orientalism and the Jews* Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek Penslar )Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2004), for the British empire see pp. 55-79 [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
105. Or as passing on his “choseness” to the English people, Bryan Cheyette, “ ‘A Race to Leave Alone’: Kipling and the Jews”, *In Time's Eye : Essays on Rudyard Kipling,* Jan Montefiore (ed.)(Manchester: Manchester University Press 2016) on Kipling p. 259 following Arendt on Disraeli, Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* ( New York: Harcourt 1973), pp. 74-5, 180, 182. [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
106. It was pointed specifically against Rufus Isaacs, the Attorney General as a reaction to the rumors he would be appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1913, although he could not find a venue for publication John Walker and John Radcliffe, “Gehazi”, *Kipling Society*, <http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/rg_gehazi1.htm> accessed 24 July 2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
107. A treatment of Kipling’s antisemitism as metaphorical see Elliott L. Gilbert, *The Good Kipling: Studies*

     *in the Short Story* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), pp. 118–27. [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
108. Bauman, “Allosemitism”, p. 148 [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
109. Achsah Guibbory, “The Reformation of Hebrew Scripture: Chosen People, Chosen Nations, and Exceptionalism”, *Reformation*, 23:1, (2018), pp. 104-106. [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
110. Guibbory, “The Reformation”, p. 111. Similarly see, Jasmine Donahaye, "'By Whom Shall She Arise? For She Is Small': The Wales-Israel tradition in the Edwardian Period", in 'The Jew' in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture, [pp. 161-182] p. 168. Bar-Yosef also pointed out that English Hebraism excludes Jews [and over-zealous Evangelicals] whose imagery they appropriated, Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture*, p. 2 [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
111. Michael Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: Book Subtitle: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1997), p. 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
112. John Fisher, Memories (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1919), p. 223 [https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-Adm\_Fisher-Memories.htm accessed 30 august 2020](https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-Adm_Fisher-Memories.htm%20accessed%2030%20august%202020), he also hoped that after the conquest of Palestine a “Federal House of Commons of the future will meet at Jerusalem, the capital of the lost Ten Tribes of Israel.” queen Victoria had her children circumcised and her father was deeply involved with London Jewish Society, Guibbory, “The Reformation”, p. [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
113. Barkun, *Religion*, p. 15.Guibbory, “The Reformation”, p. 109. It was not acceptable to conventional protestants, see Roy L. Aldrich, “Anglo-Israelism Refuted”, *Bibliotheca sacra,* 93 no 369 Jan - Mar 1936, p 41-63. For its current expression <http://www.britishisrael.co.uk/history.php> accessed 30.08.2020. [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
114. John Wilson, *Lectures on Our Israelitish Origin, Revised and Enlarged* (London: James Nisbet, 5th edition, 1876), pp. 157, 403, 438 repctively. [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
115. Barkun, p. 11. Hine, *Forty-seven Identifications of the Anglo-Saxons with the Lost Ten Tribesof Israel, Founded upon Five Hundred Scripture Proofs*, new ed. (New York: James Huggins 1878 <https://babel.hathitrust.org/> accessed 1.09.2020), pp. 253-254, 256. [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
116. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Ten Lost Tribes: A World History* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 5, 203-204, 213. [↑](#endnote-ref-116)
117. Eitan Bar-Yosef, "England and the Holy Land", in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and Empire 1660-1840*, Cathleen Wilson (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 156, 170 [citation from p. 170]. Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English Culture*, p. 88. In fact, the visit awakened a sense of home-coming, ibid, pp. 85-87. on the Balfour declaration pp. 243-246

     Protestant religious discourse as background for the Balfour declaration: Donald M. Lewis, *The Origins of Christian Zionism: Lord Shaftesbury and Evangelical Support for a Jewish Homeland*(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),pp. 1-23 [↑](#endnote-ref-117)
118. Bar-Yosef, p. 15. William Eden Evans Gordon, The Alien as Immigrant (1903) (London: Adamant Media 2006), pp. 13-14, 293. [↑](#endnote-ref-118)
119. Bar-Yosef, ibid, pp. 10, 147-8, 192-4, 224-5. Also Nissimi, “Joseph Wolff”. [↑](#endnote-ref-119)
120. Karen Shabetai, "The Question of Blake's Hostility toward the Jews", *English Literary History*, vol. 62 (1995) 139-152 [↑](#endnote-ref-120)
121. David V. Erdman, *Prophet against Empire: A Poet's Interpretation of the History of His Own Times* (1954), Mineola NY: Dover Publications, 1977), p. 396. [↑](#endnote-ref-121)
122. Erdman, *ibid,* pp. 319-20. [↑](#endnote-ref-122)
123. Andrew Porter, "'Commerce and Christianity'", pp. 597-9. [↑](#endnote-ref-123)
124. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins*, pp. 126-139. [↑](#endnote-ref-124)
125. Mandler מציין שתפיסה של לאומיות בכלל הייתה בלתי מקובלת בגלל החשש מפני השפעתה המפוררת על האימפריה Peter Mandler, "'Race' and 'Nation' in Mid Victorian Thought", p. 237, וכן – Kumar, "Nation and Empire ", pp. 575-608; Julia Stapelton, Liberalism, Democracy, and the State in Britain: Five Essays 1862-1891, Bristol UK, Dulles, Virginia: Theommes, 1997, p. 36. [↑](#endnote-ref-125)
126. Krishan Kumar**,** "Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective",*Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), [pp. 575-608], p. 589. Colls, *The Identity of England*, pp.23-30. Jonathan Parry. The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 45 Alan Sykes, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 1776-1988*, London and New York: Longman, 1997, pp. 23-4 [↑](#endnote-ref-126)
127. By the final decade of the 19th century they were more easily accepted. But apparently for more conflicting reasons which did not include greater of acceptance of Catholicism per see Erik Sidenvall, *After anti-Catholicism*, pp. 174-5. Alan Sykes, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 1776-1988*, London and New York: Longman, 1997, pp. 23-4; David Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840-1914* (New Haven and London, 1994, p. 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-127)
128. Todd Endelman, "English Jewish History", p. 103, Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, esp. pp. 102, 120, 380, 387. Colin Holmes*, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939*, London: Edward Arnold, 1979, pp. 104-5. Wohl, "Representations of Disraeli's Jewishness", p. 161; R. W. Davis, "Disraeli, the Rothschilds and Antisemitism", in *Disraeli's Jewishness*, [pp. 161-178], p. 178. [↑](#endnote-ref-128)
129. Steven Fielding. *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholicsim in England, 1880-1939* (Themes in the Twentieth Century) Philadelphia: Open University Press. 1993. Endelman, "English Jewish History", p. 103. David Feldman, "Was Modernity Good for the Jews?", *Modernity, Culture and 'The Jew'*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, [pp. 171-187], p. 178. Michael Ragussis, *Figures of Conversion "The Jewish Question" and English National Identity*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, pp. 176-210, esp. in Trollope's novels pp. 236-249. [↑](#endnote-ref-129)
130. C. Peter Williams, "British Religion and the Wider World: Mission and Empire. 1800-1940", in *A History of Religion in Britain, Practice and Belief from Pre-Roman Times to the Present*, Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1994, [pp. 381-405], pp. 382-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-130)
131. Andrew Porter, "'Commerce and Christianity'", pp. 617-8. סטאנלי לעו"ז רואה את הקשר בין המיסיון לציביליזציה ולסחר כמרכזי יותר גם אח"כ. גישות שונות בנושא: Williams, "Mission and Empire", pp. 389-90. [↑](#endnote-ref-131)
132. Andrew Porter, *Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700-1914*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 283-315. [↑](#endnote-ref-132)
133. Stephen Howe, "Empire and Ideology", The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, Sarah Stockwell (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008) [pp. 157-177], p. 160 and he then strongly qualifies the assessment – reviewing literature which casts doubt on the centrality of empire and calls for differentiation between formal and informal empire, jingoism, Britain foreign policy in general, and support of naval expansion. pp. 160-164. [↑](#endnote-ref-133)
134. Salisbury, “Disintegration”, esp. pp. 242-3. Bauman, “Allosemitism”, pp. 153-4 [↑](#endnote-ref-134)
135. David Cannadine, “Cousinhood”, *London Review of Books*, 27 July 1989, vol. 11 no. 14 , [pp. 10-12] p. 10. Many cite and reject Cannadine for instance: Todd Endelman, “English Jewish History”, *Modern Judaism*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1991), [pp. 91-109] p. 91; Anthony S. Wohl, “'Ben JuJu': Representations of Disraeli's Jewishness in Victorian Political Cartoon”, *Disraeli's Jewishness*, Todd Endelman & Tony Kushner (eds), Vallentine Mitchell: London, Portland, 2002),[pp. 105-161], p. 139. Similarly Kushner cites a German-Jewish poet, Humbert wolfe, who in 1933 rejected the existence of Antisemitism in Britain – compared to France, Germany, Hungary, and Rumania, Tony Kushner, “Comparing Antisemitisms: A Useful Exercise?”, pp. 93-4. Endelman cites Kushner's claim that if Britain had been occupied by Germany during WWII the Jews would not have fared any better than in France and Germany. Todd M. Endelman, "Review Article: Jews, Aliens and Other Outsiders in British History", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 37, no. 4 (Dec., 1994), p. 963. See also David Cesarani, “The Study of Antisemitism in Britain: Trends and Perspectives”, *Approaches to Antisemitism: Context and Curriculum*, Michael Brown (ed.) (New York: The American Jewish Committee & The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, 1994), pp. 93-4. [↑](#endnote-ref-135)
136. Cheyette 1989 “Hilaire belloc and the ‘Marconi scandal’ 1900–1914: A reassessment of the interactionist model of racial hatred”, Immigrants & Minorities: Historical Studies in Ethnicity, Migration and Diaspora, 8:1-2, 130-142, Cheyette forcefully rejects the notion that causes for antisemitism should be looked for in Jewish behavior or actions. Anti-semitism: A History and Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Hatred By Avner Falk, pp. 27-28. [↑](#endnote-ref-136)
137. Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews*, pp. 262-4. Stapelton, “Political Thought and National Identity in England”, pp. 252-3, 257-8. An overview of the research of Antisemitism in Britain by historiographical schools: Daniel Gutwein, “Imperialism and anti-Semitism: 'the Indian Silver Scandal' (1912-1914) and the *Sonderweg* of British anti-Semitism as ‘Accompanying anti-Semitism’”, *Dapim Studies on the Shoah* [Hebrew], vol. 20 (1996) [pp. 39-79], pp. 40-44. [↑](#endnote-ref-137)
138. Bryan Cheyette, *Constructions of 'the Jew' in English Literature and Society. Racial Representations, 1875-1945* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, 1993), pp. 56-159. Comparisons to Germany in an array of essays: Michael Brenner, Rainer Liedtke, David Rechter (eds.), *Two Nations: British and German Jews in Comparative Perspective* (London, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), esp.: Reinhard Rürup, “Jewish Emancipation in Britain and Germany”, pp. 49-61; Comment by David Cesarani, pp. 63-66; Tony Kushner “Comparing Antisemitisms: A Useful Exercise?” pp. 91-109, Comment by Till Van Rahden, pp. 111-115; Feldman, “Jews and the State in Britain”, pp. 141-161; Christopher Clark, “The Jews and the German State in the Wilhelmine Era”, pp. 163-184 Combined Comment by Christopher Hoffmann, pp. 185-192, Niall Ferguson, “’The Caucasian Royal Family’: The Rothschilds in National Context”, pp. 295-327 Comment by Wolfgang J. Mommsen. [↑](#endnote-ref-138)
139. Referring to the Jews as “nation” or “Race” was prevalent already at the beginning of the century, Donald M. Lewis, The *Origins of Christian Zionism: Lord Shaftesbury and Evangelical Support for a Jewish Homeland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 4-5; Cheyette, *Constructions Of 'The Jew',* pp. 58-68 [↑](#endnote-ref-139)
140. Cesarani, “The Study of Antisemitism in Britain”, p. 258. [↑](#endnote-ref-140)
141. Mike Cole, *Racism: A Critical Analysis* (London: Pluto Press 2016), p. 46 [↑](#endnote-ref-141)
142. Gutwein, "Imperialism and anti-Semitism", pp. 78-9. but on p. 76 he recognizes the fact that there was opposition to the dominant ethos from the left *as well as* from the right. "the role of the description of the Jews as financiers and as aliens was part of their inclusion in the hegemonic ethos, rather than their exclusion from it. This stereotype was considered negative only among the groups that opposed this ethos – whether on principal against the bourgeois order, usually from the Left, or by those that failed to fit in the modern order, usually from the right…" thus he characterizes the hegemonic ethos as modern and bourgeois. Ipso facto, he characterizes the Antisemites as anti-modernist. Endelman also believes that countries where the modern order was widely accepted, like the United States and Britain Antisemitism was weaker, Cesarani, "The Study of Antisemitism in Britain", p. 262. Researchers who looked for Antisemitism in the special character of British Liberalism usually did so from a critical point of view, Cesarani, *op.cit*, p. 263. [↑](#endnote-ref-142)
143. Although it thrived in countries with a strong political anti-modernism, which included the rejection of bourgeois liberalism. Endelman, "Comparative Perspectives", p. 105. [↑](#endnote-ref-143)
144. Bauman, “Allosemitism”, p. 149. [↑](#endnote-ref-144)
145. Tony Kushner, *The Persistence of Prejudice. Antisemitism in British Society during the Second World War* (Manchester &NY: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 12 [↑](#endnote-ref-145)
146. This is particularly pertinent if indeed there was no attempt to recruit the support of the working class for the empire and if the empire was not important culturally outside the elite. The thesis in a short and provocative article: Bernard Porter, "'Empire, What Empire?' Or, Why 80% of Early- and Mid-Victorians Were Deliberately Kept in Ignorance of It", *Victorian Studies*, vol. 46 no. 2 (2004), pp. 256-263 but an opposite opinion: John Mackenzie, "Empire and Metropolitan Cultures", *Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Andrew Porter (ed.), vol. 3 (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 273-292 esp. 282-292 on the last decades and the great proliferation of imperial and jingoistic culture. See also Idem, "The Popular Culture of Empire in Britain", *Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century*, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) vol. 4 (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 211-214, 222. [↑](#endnote-ref-146)
147. Anthony Julius, *Trials of the Diaspora*, pp. xxi-xxv, xxxvi-xli. Anti-Semitism as "Englishness" in the Middle Ages, and the persistence of Antisemitism after the expulsion: Colin Richmond, "Englishness and Medieval Anglo-Jewry", *The Jewish Heritage in British History: Englishness and Jewishness*, pp. 55-57. Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society*, p. 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-147)
148. Based on a citation of Joyce's from *A Portrait of a Artist as a Young Man* (1904-1914): "your mind is supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve". Cit in Jonathan Rose, *The Edwardian Temperament 1895-1919* (Athens Ohio, London: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 13. Compare with Steven Schwarzschild, ‘‘The Theologico-Political Basis of Liberal Christian-Jewish Relations in Modernity,’’ in *German Jewry and Liberalism* (Sankt Augustin, 1987), p. 75 cit in GeorgeY. Kohler, "German Spirit and Holy Ghost", p. 176 whereby the depiction of Germanness as the highest expression of Protestantism ipso facto excluded the Jews as long as they did not convert. [↑](#endnote-ref-148)
149. David Hempton, Established Churches and the Growth of Religious Pluralism: A Case Study of Christianisation and Secularisation in England Since 1700", The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000, Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.) (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), [81-98], p. 81. [↑](#endnote-ref-149)
150. Anthony Julius, *Trials of the Diaspora*, pp. xxi-xxv, xxxvi-xli. Anti-Semitism as "Englishness" in the Middle Ages, and the persistence of Antisemitism after the expulsion: Colin Richmond, "Englishness and Medieval Anglo-Jewry", *The Jewish Heritage in British History: Englishness and Jewishness*, pp. 55-57. Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society*, p. 115 [↑](#endnote-ref-150)
151. Based on a citation of Joyce's from *A Portrait of a Artist as a Young Man* (1904-1914): "your mind is supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve". Cit in Jonathan Rose, *The Edwardian Temperament 1895-1919* (Athens Ohio, London: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 13. Compare with Steven Schwarzschild, ‘‘The Theologico-Political Basis of Liberal Christian-Jewish Relations in Modernity,’’ in *German Jewry and Liberalism* (Sankt Augustin, 1987), p. 75 cit in George Y. Kohler, "German Spirit and Holy Ghost", p. 176 whereby the depiction of Germanness as the highest expression of Protestantism ipso facto excluded the Jews as long as they did not convert. [↑](#endnote-ref-151)
152. Chasin, *Citizens of Empire*, pp. 59-60. [↑](#endnote-ref-152)
153. Davis, “Disraeli, the Rothschilds”, p. 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-153)
154. Efron, *Defenders of the Race*, pp. 45-53. [↑](#endnote-ref-154)
155. Alexander, "John Stuart Mill and the Jews", pp. 90-94 [↑](#endnote-ref-155)
156. Bary Jones, Kipling Rudyard, *Dictionary of World Biography* (Acton: Australian National University Press 2019), p. 484. [↑](#endnote-ref-156)
157. Serdar Öztürk, “Kipling’s Eclectic Religious Identity”, Epiphany 3 (2009), pp. 66-80. Clark claimed his set of beliefs was very close to what was “at the heart of Chrisianity”, but even he admits that he was eclectic and “unorthodox” Charles Gordon Clark, “Christianity in Kipling’s Verse”, Theology, vol. 85 no. 703, (1982), pp. 27-37. [↑](#endnote-ref-157)
158. Edward Said, "Introduction," to Rudiyad Kipling, Kim, (Penguin books 1987), p. 15; David Scott, “Kipling, the Orient, and Orientals: "Orientalism" Reoriented?”, *Journal of World History* , vol. 22, no. 2 (June 2011), p. 325. [↑](#endnote-ref-158)
159. Cheyette, “‘A Race to Leave Alone’”, p. 277. [↑](#endnote-ref-159)
160. Steven Fielding. *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholics in England, 1880-1939* (Themes in the Twentieth Century) (Philadelphia: Open University Press. 1993). Altholz, "The Political Behavior", pp. 102-3. Endelman, "English Jewish History", p. 103. [↑](#endnote-ref-160)
161. Sidenvall, *After Anti-Catholicism*, pp. 175-6 [↑](#endnote-ref-161)
162. Dana Rabin, “The Jew Bill Of 1753: Masculinity, Virility, and the Nation”, *Eighteenth Century Studies* 39, 2 (2006), p. 168. [↑](#endnote-ref-162)