**Metaphors in the Political Discourse of Arab Politicians in the State of Israel**

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***Abstract***

This article shows how Arab politicians in the State of Israel rely on metaphor as an important rhetorical tool for conveying their message, with the goal of advancing their ideological positions and criticizing the policies of the Israeli government, which discriminates against and disenfranchises Arab-Israelis and the Palestinian people.

This article is based on the hypothesis that the way that Arab politicians in the State of Israel use metaphor in their political discourse has unique rhetorical aspects that contribute to sharpening their message, as part of the larger goal of emphasizing the suffering of the Palestinian people and Arab-Israelis, and changing for the better the Israeli government’s discriminatory patterns of action against them.

**1. Introduction**

This article deals with metaphors in the political discourse of Arab leaders in the State of Israel, and its goal is to shed light on the characteristics of the metaphors as tools of argument in Arab political discourse in the State of Israel. The article underlines the use of metaphor as a tool of argument in this discourse. This article is based on the hypothesis that the use of metaphor in the political discourse of Arab politicians in the State of Israel has unique, identifiable rhetorical characteristics that have the power to elucidate the ways in which the Palestinian people and Arab-Israelis suffer from the discriminatory action patterns of the Israeli government. Conveying this message through a reliance on metaphor as a rhetorical tool can contribute to the structuring of their message and to social change, reflected in a change for the better of the Israeli government’s treatment of the Palestinian people and Arab-Israelis.

The article makes use of the tradition of critical discourse analysis (CDA), and shows how this approach can be applied to the analysis of metaphors in the political discourse of Arab politicians in the State of Israel, and how they work to construct their messages, contribute to social change, advance their ideological agendas, influence the Israeli government’s discriminatory actions and discourse and change how it relates to Arab-Israelis and the Palestinian people, and oppose the social inequality evident in the lack of rights of the Palestinian people and Arabs in Israel. In addition, the article also considers the classification of speech acts, according to the categories proposed by John Searle, and emphasizes the importance of this classification scheme for deciphering the messages that arise from the metaphors.

The basic hypothesis of this article is that Arab politicians have a clear tendency to weave metaphors expressing semantic power into their political discourse as a rhetorical strategy that serves their message, such as military metaphors, animal metaphors, and others. Additionally, the article assumes that these politicians rely on metaphors connected to events from Jewish history, such as the Holocaust, in order to admonish Jews on their lack of morality and to constantly remind them that they, in particular, need to be attentive to the suffering of the Palestinian people and to Arab-Israelis’ just demands for equality, because they themselves suffered brutality, discrimination, and racism at the hands of the Nazis.

The corpus is taken from examples of the written and oral political discourse of Arab politicians, in particular from speeches in the Israeli Parliament. For the most part, the corpus is made up of examples in Hebrew.

We have gathered examples of metaphors from different fields. The metaphors were classified by field, such as military metaphors, metaphors of daily life, metaphors connected to Jewish history, and others. Following the classification, we have attempted to create a complete outline of metaphors and to determine their rhetorical characteristics.

**2. The Holocaust in Israeli Political Discourse**

Prior to the 1967 war, the Holocaust was not part of the everyday reality in Israel. It was not taught in schools and was rarely mentioned in survivors’ homes. The decision by Egyptian ruler Gamal Abed al Nasser to close the Suez Canal and blockade the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, coupled with the feeling that the country’s survival was in jeopardy, led to tensions, mainly among the families of survivors. However, Israel’s decisive and total victory in the war offered certain proof that the only way of ensuring the Jewish people’s survival in Israel was a strong army. Israel would guarantee that there would never be another Shoah (Holocaust). Since then, almost every politician repeatedly uses the Holocaust in demands regarding the borders of Israel and its enemies, and in all negotiations over the occupied territories under Israeli army control (Keren 2015: 173).

In the period between 1967 and the 1973 war, Israelis’ sense of security regarding the country’s future and their feeling that Israel was morally in the right grew stronger. The threat posed to Israel’s existence by these two wars only reinforced the belief held by many, including Holocaust survivors and the soldiers who fought in these wars, that Israel had a right to hold the occupied territories and to control their populations (Keren 2015: 174).

In the wake of these wars, the subject of the Holocaust arose whenever there were discussions or arguments about the control of the territories. For example, plans to enter into negotiations were termed, ‘boarding the train to Auschwitz’. At the same time, strong criticism developed regarding the conduct of IDF soldiers towards Palestinian populations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz even compared their behavior to that of German soldiers during the Nazi era (Keren 2015: 174).

The most important event, in terms of the everyday use of the images and symbols of the Holocaust, at the beginning of the twenty-first century was the removal of Jewish settlers from their homes in the Gaza Strip during the Disengagement from Gaza in 2007. During this contentious event, Jewish settlers employed symbols from the Holocaust, such as yellow stars, and the security forces were referred to by Holocaust-era terms, including ‘Nazis’ and ‘*kalgasim*’ (a derogatory Hebrew word meaning ‘troopers’, cruel soldiers of an oppressive regime). The settlers also stated that they were Holocaust survivors or the children of Holocaust survivors, and sought to use this aspect of their identity as a reason for halting the Disengagement. Since then, the use of the Holocaust for every political purpose has proceeding unstoppably. This includes Israeli diplomacy, ranging from taking all high-ranking foreign diplomats to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum as the preamble to policy discussions with Israeli leaders, to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speeches to the United Nations.

Many on Israel’s left have criticized Israeli political culture’s emphasis on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as excessively focusing on Jewish victimhood. They believe that it has been exploited to justify Israel’s aggressive policies towards the Arab world, and Israelis’ moral blindness to the wrongs carried out against the Palestinians in their name (Margalit 1998: 61). In this context, the *Syrian Times* argued that ‘a country that continually uses, and too often manipulates, Holocaust imagery to justify its policies of self-defense and “never again”, cannot complain when the rest of the world uses those same standards to make judgments concerning its own policies’ (Litvak and Webman 2009: 325).

Renowned Israeli Holocaust scholar Yehuda Bauer contends that the term ‘Holocaust’ has become flattened in the public mind because any evil that befalls anyone anywhere becomes a Holocaust: Vietnamese, Soviet Jews, African-Americans in American ghettoes, women suffering inequality, and so on (Litvak and Webman 2009: 325).

While no politician has based his or her entire campaign on Holocaust denial, a number have used it when it was in their interest to do so. Croatian president Franjo Tudjman wrote of the ‘biased testimonies and exaggerated data’ used to estimate the number of Holocaust victims, and in his book *Wastelands: Historical Truth*, he always places the word ‘Holocaust’ in quotation marks. Tudjman has good historical reasons for doing so: during World War II, Croatia was an ardent Nazi ally, and the vast majority of Croatian Jews and non-Jews were murdered by their fellow Croatians, not by the Germans. Tudjman obviously believes that one of the ways for his country to win public sympathy is to diminish the importance of the Holocaust (Lipstadt 1993: 7).

Van Dijk (1984: 13, 40) focuses on the ‘rationalization and justification of discriminatory acts against minority groups’. He designates the categories used to rationalize prejudice against minority groups as ‘the 7 D’s of Discrimination’. They are dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalization or destruction, and daily discrimination. These strategies serve in various ways to legitimize and reinforce the difference of ‘the other’: for example, by dominating minority groups, by excluding them from social activities, and even by destroying and murdering them (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 22).

Arab politicians believe that overtly or covertly identifying with the victims of the Holocaust serves their interests and can lead to change in the Israeli government’s treatment of Palestinians as shown later in the article.

**3. Conceptual Frame**

***3.1 Classifying Speech Acts***

The most famous classification of speech acts was proposed by philosopher John Searle.Searle classifies speech acts according five groups (Adam et al 2012: 3:259):

A. Assertive speech acts —the speaker is committing to the reality of something. Examples include: describing, arguing, concluding, denying, confirming.

B. Directive speech acts — the speaker tries to cause the addressee to do something. Examples include: ordering, demanding, recommending, warning, asking.

C. Commissive speech acts — commit the speaker to doing something in the future. Examples include: promising, threatening, proposing, agreeing.

D. Expressive speech acts — express the speaker’s psychological state. Examples include: apologizing, condemning, thanking, welcoming, offering condolence.

E. Declarative speech acts — the speaker causes an immediate change in the world. Examples include: declarations of war, names, court sentences, bans, marriages.

A sentence can contain more than one speech act, which can belong to different categories. For example, the sentence, ‘Study hard for your exam!’ might be an order, a piece of advice, or a threat. The sentence, ‘Excuse me, I didn’t hear your name’ might be an apology, a request to the addressee to repeat his name, or both acts combined.

John Austin identified three types of acts that are present in every utterance (Austin 2006: 127-128):

A. The locutionary act — this is the statement itself, producing certain sounds which have meaning. The locutionary act employs language to convey content.

B. The illocutionary act — the act that takes place when the utterance is said, namely an action with the power to perform a certain act. For example: warning, reporting, apologizing, etc. The speech act is expressed in the illocutionary act.

C. The perlocutionary act — when a locutionary act, and hence also an illocutionary act, takes place, our words often affect others’ emotions, thoughts, and actions as well as our own. An extra-linguistic result can be caused through speech. This result is called a perlocution.

It is known that we can distinguish between direct and indirect speech acts. Direct speech acts are acts wherein the locutionary act testifies directly to the illocutionary act. That is, the utterance content directly expresses the speaker’s intention. Conversely, in an indirect speech act, the utterance content only hints indirectly at the speaker’s intention and the action he wishes to perform through the utterance. For example, the utterance, ‘I want you to pass me the salt please’ is a direct speech act of request, while the utterance, ‘Can you pass me the salt?’ is an indirect speech act of request. Indirect speech acts reflect what Searle meant when he said that speakers often wish to express more than they say (Livnat 2014a: 2:169-173).

***3.2 Target Audience***

The new rhetoric defines the target audience of the argumentation process as everyone whom the speaker wishes to influence through his or her arguments (Perelman 1994: 17). The starting point is therefore the goal of the speaker and his intentions: every speaker thinks, either consciously or unconsciously, about those he wishes to persuade, and they in turn create the audience whom the speaker has in mind.

When the speaker assumes the task of persuading a certain audience, he builds a picture in his mind of the audience he will be addressing, and chooses his arguments accordingly. Naturally, it is very important for this picture to be as near to reality as possible, since an incorrect picture of the audience could produce undesirable consequences. We should also consider that a person’s views do not exist in isolation from his social environment, i.e., from the people around him, those with whom he is in contact. All social circles can be characterized by the dominant views of their members and their underlying beliefs and assumptions. Therefore, anyone wishing to persuade a given group must adapt their arguments to take these factors into account (Livnat 2009: 65-66; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 19-20).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 30) note three types of audiences, a division that can help us judge the rhetorical nature of arguments: the first type consists of the entire human race, or at least all ‘normal’ adults. They refer to this group as ‘the universal audience’. The second type is a single interlocutor whom the speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third type is the subject himself, when he engages in deliberation or gives himself reasons for his own actions.

Arab politicians in the State of Israel are addressing the Jewish Israeli audience, that is the particular audience. They are not expected to demonstrate good faith just because they are an Arabs member of the Israeli Parliament. They should do so only if they wishes to be heard by Jewish Israelis.They are speaking in a media situation in front of a Jewish audience.

As a target audience, Jews have a complex status. We see this from the two divergent discourse patterns used by Arab politicians in the State of Israel: the pattern of publically or implicitly recognizing the tragedy that the Jewish people suffered in the Holocaust, and the pattern of harshly criticizing the Israelis, which, as we will see, is reflected in the comparison of Israeli policy towards Palestinians to Nazi crimes against the Jews.

### 3.3 The Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) Approach

CDA is a multidisciplinary approach that is used in discourse analysis. It focuses on how social and political power is created and maintained through language. CDA seeks to expose a discourse’s biases and manipulations that serve political interests and advance controversial ideological positions, and highlights the methods or stratagems through which the discourse produces or maintains an unequal balance of power in a society. CDA aims to expose the linguistic, cultural, and historical roots that support the practices — the modes of action — that preserve the balance of power. The approach’s basic premise is that discourse has the capacity to shape social identities and establish relations between groups of people and individuals. Discourse can help maintain the social status quo, but it can also contribute to social change. The CDA approach focuses on the way in which social structures embody the existing balance of power and control in the society through discourse: how does the discourse produce them, approve them, challenge them, or legitimize them. CDA seeks to understand, expose, and ultimately oppose social inequality (Livnat 2014a: 2:361; Hart 2010: 13-14; Wodak 2001a: 10; van Dijk 2001: 352; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32; Meyer 2001: 15).

The term ‘power’ is the main concept in critical discourse analysis, the discourse mechanism being seen as a central way to actualize power in social contexts. This premise is nourished by the thinking of social philosophers such as Marx, Foucault, Gramsci, Habermas, Bourdieu, and others who drew attention to the central role of language in constructing social reality (Livnat 2014a: 2:361; Hart 2010: 13-14; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32; Meyer 2001: 15).

For Michel Foucault, discourse is a representation of knowledge about a certain subject. Discourse is linked to knowledge production through language. Foucault argues that the term ‘discourse’ not only relates to language, but also to action modes (practices), rules, and regulations. Discourse constructs and defines the objects of our knowledge. It controls how we talk about a subject or act towards it; it determines the accepted ways to talk about it, and thus also limits other possibilities for knowledge construction about the same subject. A discourse will never consist of one statement, one text, one act, or one source; it will appear in a variety of texts and different institutional contexts in the society (Livnat 2014a: 2:362).

According to Foucault, ‘words/things’ have meaning and can be called real only in a specific historical context. For example, ‘mental illness’ is not an ‘objective’ object with the same meaning in every era and every culture. Foucault and his followers argue that the connection between signifier and signified is far more complex than implied by semiotics: ‘a simple combination between an idea and the sequence of sounds that expresses it’. Thus the term ‘mental illness’ does not signify something objective in the world. The object it represents is an outcome of the construction of knowledge that occurs within a certain discourse. The object is constructed by all that is said about it in a certain culture and in a certain period, by the way it is described, explained, judged, classified, etc. (Livnat 2014a: 2:362; Meyer 2001: 15). In other words, discourse constructs objects, instilling them with significance and meaning in a particular social and cultural context. Discourse determines how people see things and creates a picture of their world and their outlooks, thus influencing their actions as well. According to Foucault, the discourse on mental illness during the Enlightenment led to people with mental illnesses being incarcerated in institutions and mistreated (Livnat 2014a: 2:362). According to van Dijk (1984: 13), prejudice is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions about social groups. Such ethnic attitudes have social functions, e.g., to protect the interests of the in-group. The cognitive structures of prejudice and the strategies of its use reflect these social functions (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 21-22).

CDA scholars regard themselves as ideologically motivated and committed, and their research is a kind of intervention in the life of society and social relations. Many researchers from this school are also active in movements against racism, feminist movements, peace movements, and so forth. They state their ideological intentions openly and stand with weaker social groups against more powerful ones. The quality of their research is not measured by ‘objectivity’ and academic remoteness, but by preserving the norms of systematic, rigorous, cautious analysis that are accepted in all scientific research (Livnat 2014a: 2:371; Meyer 2001: 15).

CDA is not a school of linguistics or discourse research. While the stated goal of traditional scholars of discourse is to reveal and describe the linguistic system’s structure and laws, critical discourse scholars tend to argue that the academic description they offer is sterile and has no social and ideological implications (Livnat 2014a: 2:371).

While analyzing texts and ‘linguistic events’ requires some analytical method, CDA on principle is neither based on nor prefers a single theory or a uniform analytical method. Instead, CDA offers a kind of tool box for the researcher, a list of linguistic and textual characteristics that can be examined when one wishes to analyze a text critically (Livnat 2014a: 2:366; Wodak 2001b: 64).

### 3.4 Ethos

According to Aristotle, the ethos (character, reliability, professionalism) of the speaker is the way that he presents himself, his intentions, and his beliefs to his audience. Character-driven persuasion entails speaking in a way that makes the speaker seem worthy of the audience’s trust. A speech without ethos will miss its mark. Character (ethos) is practically the strongest method of persuasion (Aristotle 1973: 1356a; Livnat 2009: 72; Gitay 2010: 132-133; McCormack 2014: 136-139). The discourse itself should reveal the speaker’s character. Often, it is not the speaker’s ideas that affect and change his audience, but rather the speaker’s character or image. In other words, the speaker’s qualities and reliability are key factors in persuasion that carry more weight than different rhetorical strategies. Persuasion by means of one’s character, says Aristotle, is effective when the speaker speaks in a manner that appears credible. We assume that the stronger the researcher’s ethos, the greater the chances that his arguments will be favorably accepted (Livnat 2014b: 2:126).

The definition of ethos varies in different disciplines. Following Aristotle, pragmatists such as Ducrot (1984) and Maingueneau (1999) view the image of the orator as being built by the discourse itself. For them, ethos ‘is constructed within verbal interaction and is purely internal to discourse’ (Amossy 2001: 5). In sociology, however, ethos is not considered a purely discursive construction. According to Bourdieu (1991), the power of language and its ability to ‘act’ are determined by social circumstances and power relations (Amossy 2001: 2). The force of discourse is not dependent on the image of the self that the orator produces in speech, but on his or her social position and ‘the access he [or she] can have to the language of the institution’ (Bourdieu 1991). Amossy thus proposes a distinction between ‘discursive ethos’ and ‘prior ethos’, the latter defined as the image the audience has of the speaker before he takes the floor.1

### 3.5 Topos

Topos is a term borrowed from classical Greek rhetoric that literally means ‘commonplace’, and refers to a standardized way of constructing an argument; an intellectual theme found in a ‘stockroom’ of topics. The speaker searches in the topos for persuasive rhetorical devices. The topos contains a treasury of social or ideological conventions that are meant to elicit the mental acceptance of a given topic by an audience. The topos is the ‘glue’ that creates a common denominator between the speaker and the target audience based on a social consensus (Aristotle 2002: 28-32). If a leader or speaker who wants to be particularly effective addresses the nation, he or she must base his or her statements and appeal on what is commonly accepted by that society; in other words, on ‘the truth’ of the society, its ideological narrative, collective memory, and cognitive patterns (Gitay 2010: 135-136).

A speaker who is concerned about the effectiveness of his or her speech must adopt the views of his or her audience (Gitay 2010: 137). According to Perelman, the speaker must not start with his or her own truth, but with the accepted consensus of the public he or she wishes to address. In other words, the speaker must make the consensus and accepted patterns of his or her audience the starting point, because if he does not he loses his audience (Perelman 1982: 21). According to Eco and van Dijk, it is advisable for the speaker to open by adjusting to the views of his or her audience, and obviously not to mock or annoy it. The speaker must aim to connect with the audience and present the subject in a positive, noncontroversial way. For example, it would be ineffective for Tibi to begin his address by calling his audience in the Parliament ‘fascists’ or ‘racists’ (Eco 2006: 44-65; van Dijk 2008: 189-190).

## 4. Analysis and discussion

### 4.1 Metaphor

Perelman (1994: 94-95) suggests that a metaphor is simply an analogy: Based on the analogy, ‘A is to B what C is to D’, the metaphor assumes one of the forms: ‘A of D’, ‘C of B’, or ‘A of C’. For example, from the analogy, ‘old age is to life what night is to day’, we obtain the metaphors: ‘old age of the day’, ‘the evening of life’, or ‘the night is old age’.

Berggren concludes that every truly creative and non-mythical thought, whether religious or metaphysical, will invariably be metaphorical in a manner that is unchanging and without other alternatives (Berggren 1962-1963: 237-258; 450-472).

Traditionally, metaphors were seen as ornaments: metaphors are words borrowed from one field and used in another field on the basis of similarities between referents.

In contrast to traditional linguists, cognitive linguists do not see metaphors as a rhetorical embellishment but as an essential part of human thought (Abadi 1998: 56-67). Metaphorical expressions are considered expressions that nourish our worldview, shape our thinking, and, hence, our actual behavior (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3-6; Mio 1997: 117-126; Koller 2012: 25). These are metaphors which capture conceptions from one domain — the ‘borrowing domain’ or ‘goal’ — using another, lending domain — the ‘source’. The names of the two domains create metaphoric identity. For example, the ‘time is money’ identity allows us to relate to time metaphorically in terms linked to money, such as, waste of time, investing time, time is valuable, etc.

According to Thompson (1996: 185), metaphor’s suggestive power is the driving force behind political discourse: for both politicians, image makers, and decision makers, and for the mass audience who view the discourse but are not directly involved in it. The manipulative power of metaphor can be seen in politicians’ ability to communicate emotionally on a certain issue and to stir their listeners’ emotions, spurring them to action or at least to accepting the message.

This article applies the cognitive theory of metaphor. One of the most influential works of the semantic cognitive school was George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s groundbreaking work on linguistics, which attracted world-wide attention, establishing the foundation for a cognitive theory of metaphors (2000). Lakoff and Johnson wanted to examine the metaphoric nature of human cognition by focusing on our common, habitual, consensual metaphors. Their work makes clear that metaphors are supremely efficient tools for shaping and creating thoughts. Metaphors frame the world for us. Without metaphors, we cannot really think (Livnat 2014a: 2:368; Gavriely-Nuri 2011: 91). Metaphorical linguistic usages reflect how we perceive reality. George Lakoff took this idea a step further and showed that metaphors not only reflect how we see reality, they also influence our perception of it. In January 1991, on the heels of the First Gulf War, he analyzed the US administration’s political discourse and showed how the Bush administration used metaphors to justify going to war. In other words, he demonstrated how metaphor analysis can be critical analysis exposing discourse manipulations and disclosing normally hidden ideologies (Livnat 2014a: 2:368-369).

Dalia Gavriely-Nuri (2009, 2011), who has studied metaphors in Israeli political discourse, shows how they help to portray war as a normal part of life. Such war-normalizing metaphors aim to naturalize and legitimate the use of military power by creating a systematic analogy between war and objects that are far from the battlefield.2 For example, the metaphoric phrase ‘Golda’s kitchen’ was the popular nickname for the most intimate circle of Prime Minister Golda Meir’s advisers. This metaphor conceals a secretive and undemocratic decision-making process, even about security matters and other central issues. In other words, the ‘kitchen’ metaphor hides what was, in fact, often a ‘war room’ where Israel’s burning security matters were decided. Similarly, the metaphoric phrase ‘surgical strike’ equates war with medicine, while the metaphoric phrase ‘target bank’ associates war with trade. From a critical perspective, it is clear that these metaphors encourage people to see war as normal, everyday, expected, and commonsensical, exactly like medicine or trade. Thus they conceal the real, terrible, violent nature of war. Such discourse patterns, which recur in statements by political and military leaders, academics, journalists, and internet response writers, normalize what is an inherently abnormal situation. At the same time, leaders use such metaphors to persuade the public of the logic and necessity of war.3

### 4.2 Classification of metaphors

Both single-word metaphors and metaphoric phrases were included when selecting metaphors. The metaphors were classified according to the field from which they were taken. The subjects that the speaker wished to address through the metaphors were examined, as were the metaphors’ rhetorical characteristics.

***4.2.1 Military metaphors***

1. ‘I began my address by relating to the pain, struggles, and hope of the Palestinians overall, and especially of those living under direct military rule, who are forced to contend with the American-Israeli **war machine**’ (Azmi Bishara, from a speech intended to be delivered in the plenum of the Israeli Parliament).

‘War machine’ is a compound metaphor that intensifies the suffering of the Palestinian people living under Israeli occupation. This metaphor emphasizes that neither Israel nor the United States are truly interested in peace and conflict resolution, and that they instead prefer to embrace the option of war as a continuous political strategy.

2. ‘What is the business of this government headed by Arik Sharon? Not searching for a way out of the cycle of violence, nor for an exit from the **killing fields**, nor in saving Israeli and Palestinian lives, but instead in a **witch hunt**, even against Hendel, a senior minister who spoke against him, because he met with the only person who can make peace, despite everything you say here’ (Issam Makhoul, Knesset Protocols, July 4, 2001).

‘Killing fields’ serves as a metaphor for the many instances of carnage and death. The metaphoric picture is stained dark red, and is thus emotionally loaded and intended to deter violence.

‘Witch hunt’ is a metaphor for exaggerated fear and the right’s recoiling from holding any negotiations or connections with the head of the Palestinian Authority. Any such connection with the Palestinian Authority will be met by persecution and the right’s attempt to undermine the process.

3. ‘… And the second is the **stoning** of the racist, nationalist Zionist parties with the vavs4 of the Arab front party at the polls, with the goal of strengthening the representation of the Arab front party with the largest possible number of Knesset members actively working for peace and justice’ (Emile Habibi, ‘Stone them with Vavs’).

Stoning is a method of capital punishment that entails pelting a bound person with stones until he or she dies. Compared to other methods, stoning is a slow, painful, and humiliating method of execution. It is performed by a group of people so that no single individual can be held responsible for the victim’s ultimate death.

Emile Habibi5 believes that the only way to confront racist, right-wing parties is to strengthen the representation of the Arab parties in the Knesset, in particular the Popular Front party.6 He advises the Arab population to go to the polls in droves in order the strengthen the Arab parties and to weaken the racist, right-wing parties. His borrowing of the metaphorical term ‘stoning’ from the political realm strengthens the Arab nationalist spirit, increases Arabs’ motivation, and urges them to vote in order to weaken and stifle the extreme right-wing parties that seem worthy in their eyes of being ‘stoned’ politically by means of Arabs going to the polls in droves. The metaphor ‘stoning’ casts a bitter political enemy, meaning the extreme right-wing parties, in a particularly negative light because execution by stoning is generally considered a fit punishment for adultery, and this creates intense feelings among the Arab population and propels them to vote.

4. ‘The truth that I am thinking of is that I was born here and the settlers have no reason to be there; they are a **bomb** and can endanger the peace process’ (Saleh Saleem, Knesset Protocols, December 25, 1995).

Bomb — a metaphor for the danger and threat posed to the peace process by Jewish settlers. The settlers threaten the peace process and could shatter any hope of its progress.

5. ‘The state jams the history of the Jewish people down the throats of the Arab education system — Bar Kokhba, the Hasmoneans, the Maccabees, the Hellenizers, and all the rest. It is good to know, but why are we forced to study it, but our history is not taught at the same time? Why do they **amputate** our national history’? (Taleb el-Sana, Protocols of the Fourteenth Knesset, December 23, 1996).

The metaphorical verb ‘to amputate’ signifies the brutality of the state’s policy to sever Arab-Israelis from their history and to graft the history of the Jewish people onto them. This policy of disconnection is described as an act of amputation, and thus Taleb el-Sana creates a rhetorically powerful picture that sharpens his message.

6. ‘Now they are **clearing out** (lit. ‘shaving’) houses there. Just destruction and desolation. And for what? This delight in destruction will never be satiated, never satisfied’ (Abdulmalik Dehamshe, Knesset Protocols, November 20, 2000).

Shaving — a metaphor for the brutality of the act of house demolition in the Palestinian territories. House demolition resembles an electric shaver that does not overlooks even innocent Palestinian civilians.

‘This law is anti-citizenship, anti-peace, anti-democracy. This is an **apartheid** law’ (Mohammad Barakeh, Knesset Protocols).

7. ‘The Expulsion Law that passed tonight in the Knesset, according to which a special majority can expel a member of Knesset if his behavior deviates from what is expected, is a patently anti-democratic law. Member of Knesset Dichter wants to create a **smokescreen**7so that people will talk about this and not about the central issue: the ongoing erosion of the democratic sphere’ (Ayman Odeh, Ynet news interview, Feburary 29, 2016).

A smokescreen is a combat tool that uses smoke deliberately released into the air in order to mask the movement, activity, or location of a military force such as ground troops, tanks, aircraft, or ships. This phrase has been borrowed as an idiom for an intentional diversion.

8. ‘The government is attempting to pass the Nation-State Law, which invalidates every Arab because of his identity and his affiliation. We are still **bleeding** from the Jewishness of this state’ (Masud Gnaim, Knesset Protocols, November 24, 2014).

The metaphoric verb ‘bleeding’ is a metaphor for discrimination, suffering, and the lack of the full equality enjoyed by Jews. The Nation-State Law can be seen as putting salt in the open wound of the Arab population of the State of Israel.

***4.2.2 Metaphors Connected to Historical Events***

9. ‘… Thirdly, raising the voter turnout among the Arabs, in order to ensure that the maximum number of Hadash represenatives enter the Knesset, and to ensure that the Arab parties will pass the election threshold, and to prevent the incineration of tens of thousands of votes in the **crematoria**’ (Emile Habibi, ‘Stone them with Vavs’).

**Crematoria**is a metaphor that emphasizes the magnitude of the damage that could result from the loss of tens of thousands of Arab votes if voter turnout is significantly low.

A portion of right-wing Jewish politicians in the State of Israel considered Emile Habibi to be a clearly anti-Zionist figure. The proof of this can be seen in the response to the Israel Prize committee’s 1992 decision to give Habibi the Israel Prize for fiction, a decision that raised the ire of many right-wing Jews. Turmoil erupted at the ceremony itself: Outside the auditorium, Kahanists were waiting for the judges, who were forced to enter through a back door under heavy security. Inside the auditorium, when Habibi was presented with the prize, Professor Yuvel Ne’eman and Member of Knesset Geulah Cohen erupted with cries of rage. The disturbances reached their height when Professor Ne’eman — an Israel Prize winner himself — threw his prize certificate on the stage towards Habibi.

10. ‘**A well-oiled machine**, based on the claim of the righteousness of the nation and its superiority to all civilian or human value, has overrun the loftiest of human values — the right to life of entire peoples’ (Ahmad Tibi, speech given on the anniversary of International Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 27, 2010).

In example 10, Ahmad Tibi8 used the phrase ‘a well-oiled machine’ as a metaphor for the brutality of the Nazi regime against the Jews. Ahmad Tibi identifies explicitly with the Jews as the victims of the Holocaust.

11. ‘This is the moment when a person has to take off his national or religious hat, shed any difference, and wear just **one form** (lit. **‘**cloak’): **that** **of** **humanity**’ (Ahmad Tibi, speech given on the anniversary of International Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 1, 2010).

The form (‘cloak’) of humanity is a metaphor for how people relate to themselves as human beings, removed from politics and religious, racial, and gender considerations.

In his references to the Holocaust in examples 10 and 11, Tibi uses keywords that reflect a style of *dugri* speech (‘straight talking’ in Hebrew) (Katriel 2016: 747).

12. ‘The second demand concerns Ikrit and Biram.9 While it has been announced in principle that they should be returned, the size of each village has been reduced by 600 *dunam* and each parent can only bring back two children. This means that the families will be broken up and return to **ghettos**’ (Taleb el-Sana, Knesset Protocols, December 25, 1995).

Knesset member Taleb el-Sana10 indirectly compares the government’s policy towards the residents of Ikrit and Biram to the Nazis’ treatment of Jews in the Holocaust. ‘Ghettos’ is a metaphor for the government policy to reduce the area of the villages of Ikrit and Biram and to break up the families of villagers from ‘Ikrit and Biram’, and to limit their movement.

In examples 9-12, Habibi, el-Sana and Tibi try to construct their ethos through a generally implied identification with the Jewish people as victims of the Holocaust. In order to persuade the universal audience that they identify with what happened to the Jews during the Holocaust, use words associated with the Holocaust, such as the words ‘cloak of humanity’, ‘well-oiled machine’, ‘crematoria’, and ‘ghettos’. In other words, the fact that they do not deny the Holocaust can rehabilitate their ethos in the eyes of the universal audience and soften their anti-Zionist image, even though this is only hinted at, without having recourse to overt declarations of empathy and identification. The main objective for Habibi and Tibi is not to express their identification with the Jewish audience but to lambast Israel for racism against the Palestinian people and the Arab population in Israel.

Habibi, el-Sana and Tibi use keywords (topics or commonplaces accepted by the audience) to establish strong feelings of identification in their Jewish audience, while at the same time endowing them with critical content. Their goal is to weaken their Jewish audience’s preconceived resistance to their militant anti-Zionist ethos.[[1]](#endnote-1) We should clarify that in using keywords, the speaker aims to connect with the audience and present his subject in a positive and noncontroversial way. For example, it would be ineffective for Habibi, el-Sana and Tibi to begin by calling their Jewish audience ‘fascists’ or ‘racists’. The metaphors in examples 9-12 show that Habibi, el-Sana and Tibi have a dual message: empathy and identification with Jews as victims of the Holocaust, coupled with harsh criticism for racism against and hatred of Palestinians.

The statements in sentences 9-12 are indirect speech acts. Their content indirectly hints at the goals of Arab politicians and the act that they aim to perform through them. The sentences reflect illocutionary speech acts that go beyond the utterance itself, and through which Arab politicians produce more than one speech act. Sentences 9-12 hint at assertive speech acts: the Arab politicians indirectly compare Nazi aggression towards the Jews and South Africa’s apartheid policies to the aggressive treatment of the Palestinians by the Israeli government. Additionally, sentence 11 reflects a committed speech act in which Tibi proposes to discard his political hat and to cloack himself in the human form.

CDA theory is reflected in sentences 9-12, insofar as Arab politicians construct their assertative meaning through these illocutionary speech acts and decide how they wants to perceive the behavior of the Israeli government towards the Palestinians, and their own opinion on the subject. They show how one should relate to the Israeli government’s behavior towards Palestinians, thus restricting alternatives for knowledge construction in this regard.

tries to influence the Israeli government’s treatment of the Palestinians through his illocutionary speech acts. He expects that Jews, who themselves suffered in the Holocaust, should show more compassion and sensitivity towards Palestinians and be considerate of the suffering of others. Arab politicians try to influence the Israeli government’s treatment of the Palestinians through their illocutionary speech acts. They expect that Jews, who themselves suffered in the Holocaust, should show more compassion and sensitivity towards Palestinians and be considerate of the suffering of others.

13. ‘Is it possible to conceive that the Israeli author Amos Oz would demand, justly, that the German government act against Neo-Nazis, and that the Israeli street would remain apathetic to the activities of **Israeli Neo-Nazis**?’ (Taleb el-Sana, 13th Knesset, November 18, 1992).

14. ‘Worst of all is that on the **Kristallnacht11** of the Palestinian village of Duma, perpetrated by **Neo-Nazis** who live in the settlements, the Prime Minister was not here to repent for the sin’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, August 4, 2015).

Jewish settlers’ arson attack on the house of the Dawabshe family in the Palestinian village of Duma is a horrendous act that resembles in its severity the crimes perpetrated against Jews by the Nazis. Ahmad Tibi brings the reader back to the historical events of Kristallnacht, and points out that the incident in Duma is no less serious than the events of Kristallnacht. The metaphoric description of the perpetrators of the horror in Duma as ‘Neo-Nazis’ is a direct appeal to the Jewish audience to remember the events of the Holocaust. Tibi does not deny the reality of the Holocaust, and he mentions historical events related to the Holocaust. Tibi directly compares the settlers to Neo-Nazis, and thus breaks the groundrules of the topos and slams his thesis in public. Mentioning the historical events of Kristallnacht is a metaphoric that advances the political idea at issue: learning lessons and justifying — or refusing to justify — certain behaviors on the basis of the past, because the truth hidden in historical events does not need substantiation.

15. ‘This law12 is anti-citizenship, anti-peace, anti-democracy. This is an **apartheid**13 law’ (Muhammad Baraka, Knesset Protocols).

The metaphoric description of the Nation-State Law as an apartheid law is meant to uncover the true purpose behind it. Muhammad Baraka14 compares the Nation-State Law to apartheid laws in so far as it is based the principles of racism against the Arab population in the State of Israel.

In examples 12-15, Taleb el-Sana, Muhammad Baraka, and Ahmad Tibi use the metaphoric phrase ‘Israeli Neo-Nazis’ and ‘Kristallnacht’ in order to emphasize the threat that Kahanists and settlers pose to the lives and property of the Arab population in the occupied territories. Moreover, Tibi compares the murder in the village of Duma to Kristallnacht. These metaphoric phrases catch the audience’s attention and raise awareness of the need to take more harsh measures against Kahanists and extremists and to act against them with an iron fist.

In the metaphors connected with historical events (in examples 9-12), the topos of Arab politicians in the State of Israel is characterized by the fact that they sometimes avoid direct comparison between Israel’s treatment of Arabs in Israel and the Nazis’ treatment of Jews, although this is his allusive intention. When Tibi says, ‘This is the moment when a person has to take off his national or religious hat, shed any difference, and wear just one form: that of humanity’, he is ostensibly speaking as a human being and not as a politician. But his intention is to convey his view that the lesson of the Holocaust is that Jews must assume the values of humanity and stand beside the weak and the downtrodden, the depressed and the exiled; in other words, beside Arabs, the victim of the victims.

On occasion, Arab politicians make very direct and bald comparisons between Israel’s behavior towards Palestinians and that of the Nazis during the Holocaust and of the apartheid regime in South Africa (examples 13-15), saying that Israel believes Jewish victimhood gives it the right to harm the Palestinian population in the territories.

***4.2.3 Animal Metaphors***

16. ‘…and for social justice and the struggle against those **yellow, sharp teeth**, bared and ready to carry out their fascist, racist, aggressive policy against the Arabs and democracy…’ (Emile Habibi, ‘Stone them with Vavs’).

Yellow teeth as a metaphoric identification of the extreme right-wing parties. This metaphor conveys themes of aggression, racism, and fascism against Arabs, themes that characterize the extremist right-wing parties. Moreover, this metaphor paints the racist policy of these parties against Arabs as resembling a wild predator with dangerous teeth. Yellow teeth are a symbol of impurity, something that in Habibi’s eyes characterizes the impure policy of the right-wing, reflect in its adoption of racism against Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians as one of the guiding lines of its policy.

17. ‘An American intelligence source says: Iran has not yet decided whether it will develop chemical weapons. So what is all this “Iranophobia”? What is this **horse** that the prime minister is riding out of some divine inspiration, some mission; has become prime minister only in order to save the People of Israel from Ahmadinejad, the Hitler of the 21st century’? (Masud Ghnaim, Knesset Protocols, March 19, 2012).

Former member of Knesset Masud Ghnaim15 compares the prime minister’s fervor and compulsion to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and his unwillingness to listen to other opinions on the topic, to an untamed, runaway horse.

18. ‘Smiling artistically, member of Knesset Benny Elon is responsible for harsh incitement. Your proposed law — one cannot capture a fine, cultured, smiling, and quiet **shark** of incitement like this’ (Abdulmalik Dehamshe, Knesset Protocols, July 9, 2001).

Former Member of Knesset Abdulmalik Dehamshe16 compares Benny Elon and others who incite against Arabs to sharks because they are strong and others do not dare demand that they pay for their racist behavior. The proposed law was intended to punish those whom it is convenient to punish.

19. ‘It is impossible to be against racism and at the same time to be in favor of another racism. The values are the same values. There is no permitted racism and no forbidden racism. Racism is **the vermin of humanity**’ (Muhammad Barka, Knesset Protocols, January 11, 2012).

The aim of the metaphor ‘vermin of humanity’ is to warn against racism and its destructive consequences. Vermin is a symbol of impurity, something that, in Muhammad Barka’s eyes, characterizes the impure policies of the right-wing parties and reflects their adoption of racism against Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians as one of the guiding lines of their policy.

***4.2.4 Musical metaphors***

20. ‘The uproar in Israel in the wake of my speech in Syria was a huge surprise for me. What shocked me, and greatly saddened me, was that part of the “left” joined the **chorus of incitement and distortion**’ (Azmi Bishara, from a planned speech to the Knesset plenum).

Bishara17 heightens the exaggeration of those who incite the public against him and distort his words by his use of the phrase ‘the chorus of incitement and distortion’. This phrase puts Bishara in the position of one who is unjustly attacked, and emphasizes the unbridled aggression against him and his attackers’ desire to excoriate and cast him as an enemy, rather than on the content of his words — thus heightening the addressees’’ identification with his position. This metaphoric phrase emphasizes the fact that those who incite and distort are acting in concert, in an organized fashion, against Bishara with the aim of removing him from office.

21. ‘We are not talking about rogue elements (lit. ‘weeds’),18 this **broken record** of rogue acts, we are talking about a whole botanical garden, we are talking about rainforests of hilltop youth who have political and conceptual backing from the government’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, August 4, 2015).

A broken record—as a metaphor for the fact that Arab-Israelis have become tired of hearing this excuse, which is offered again and again, as if every moral crime by settlers is defined as the act of a marginal, extremist group. The believability of this claim has become worn-out in the eyes of the Arab public, and the metaphoric phrase ‘broken record’ rejects it out of hand.

22. ‘When the prime minister condemns, takes a phone call, and then two days later returns pre-determined **refrain** — again to attack the Palestinians — this strengthens the suspicions of all those who have a conscience that this is not the last crime’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, August 4, 2015).

The refrain is a metaphor for the repeated attacks by Benjamin Netanyahu against Palestinians and his shirking of responsibility for those attacks. Benjamin Netanayhu’s attacks against Palestinians have become a foreboding pre-determined refrain.

***4.2.5 Metaphors from Daily Life***

23. ‘Tomorrow is Tuesday, the day of decision and settling accounts with the Zionist parties of exploitation and racism for the crimes they have committed against our people, and against the **crushed** cooperative societies of the workers and poor pensioners, and against the **dearly departed** who went by the name of social justice and who has for years been cut off from the reality of modernization in our country’ (Emile Habibi, ‘Stone them with Vavs’, March 27, 2006).

The metaphoric descriptions ‘crushed’ and ‘dearly departed’ emphasize the suffering of the Arab Palestinian minority and the trampling of their rights as a result of the destructive Israeli policy. This description is a metaphor for the lack of social justice and the impossibility of its realization.

24. ‘The time has come for the Israeli public to uncover the ugly truth that the security of the Palestinian people and the security of the Israeli people are **Siamese twins**, one of them cannot be without the other, and peace with the Palestinians is the only guarantee of peace for Israel’ (Issam Makhoul,19 Knesset Protocols, July 4, 2001).

Siamese twins as a metaphor for the close connection between the security of the Palestinian people and the security of the Israeli people. Both feed each other as one body, and both nurture each other.

25. ‘I have said before and still say now when we hold a march or a festival, we do so in order to revive the memory of the Nakba, but soon, God willing, we will hold marches and festivals not in order to revive the memory of the Nakba, but instead with the aim of reviving the **wedding** of the return of our Palestinian people, God willing’ (Sheikh Raed Salah, speech delivered at Tel Aviv University).

Wedding — as a metaphor for the celebration of the return of Palestinian refugees. Sheikh Raed Salah20 emphasizes through this metaphor that the dream of return of Palestinian refugees will soon be realized and will be a concrete fact.

26. ‘Only Avigdor Patputin understands Hebrew’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset speech, 2012).

The description ‘Patputin’ is a metaphor for the unstable political views of Member of Knesset Avigdor Liberman. His opinions are described as extreme, unstable, racist, and harmful to the Arab population of the State of Israel and to the Palestinian people.

27. ‘Palestinians have the right to oppose the Israeli occupation, but you want to strangle them’ (Taleb el-Sana, Knesset Protocols, October 20, 2000).

The metaphoric phrase ‘to strangle’ emphasizes the brutality of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian people. This occupation strangles the population and suppresses them, as if they were taking away their very breath.

28. ‘We will not allow you to sell us **damaged goods** that have been proven to be a failure’ (Masud Ghnaim, Knesset Protocols, November 24, 2014).

Damaged goods as a metaphor for the stench that arises from the proposed racist Nation-State Law, whose purpose is to discriminate against Arab-Israelis and to impinge on their rights.

29. ‘The final clause of the property tax law specifies which owners are exempt from paying property tax. **Through the back door**, they have added a clause that discriminates against the Arab sector, because it provides an exception to owners who are not Arabs’ (Knesset Protocol, year and date not indicated).

The phrase ‘through the back door’ is a metaphor for the indirect way that a clause discriminating against the Arab population was included in the property tax law. This clause was added secretly and was not publicly announced in order to prevent Arab politicians from responding to the discriminatory clause.

30. ‘In the State of Israel there are signs of a democracy, but this is a **sick** democracy that discriminates against twenty percent of the population’ (source unknown).

The State of Israel is defined as a democratic state, but its treatment of the Arab population does not reflect that of a true democracy, and, in fact, reflects racism and discrimination.

31. ‘Ms. Social Justice, member of Knesset Stav Shaffir, who has never spoken with me, not even to say hello. I am **transparent** to her; Arabs do not exist; a racist, **a racist of silence, a racist of quiet, of disregard**’ (Jamal Zahalka, Knesset speech, 2015).

Member of Knesset Jamal Zahalka21 addressed the Knesset during the debates that lead to the vote on the natural gas bill, and began attacking an individual whom most consider to be his natural partner in the opposition, the Labor party, and blamed her for distorting the position of Arab members of Knesset on the natural gas issue. Zahalka attacked member of Knesset Stav Shaffir and accused her in metaphoric terms of being ‘a racist of silence’, ‘a racist of quiet’, and ‘a racist of disregard’. Through these descriptions, Zahalka shines a spotlight on polite racism, which accepts you only under certain conditions, and makes clear that this kind of racism is no less disgusting than calls of ‘death to Arabs’, and in many cases is even more harmful and destructive.

Zahalka emphasizes the fact that Stav Shaffir does not greet him in the hallways of the Knesset. At first glance this is a minor issue, but in fact this is the heart of the matter. Stav Shaffir’s blatant disregard for a member of Knesset is racism and elitism, if polite racism.

Transparent — as a metaphor for the Arab members of Knesset whose existence is ignored and who do not receive any attention. Zahalka sharpens the point by repeating the synonyms: **transparent — not existent; silence — quiet**22 **— disregard**.

***4.2.6 Ironic metaphors***

According to the echoic view of irony, an expression (A) is ironic if it echoes another expression (B) — or the content of that expression, or its interpretation as the speaker of expression A understands it — and if it reflects the speaker’s distancing from expression B, its content, or the information that it reflects. The speaker’s distancing from expression B can range from light ridicule to bitter scorn (Weizman 2000: 238-240). For example, if it began raining while we were on our way to a picnic, and we were to say, ‘What nice weather for a picnic’, we would be echoing a norm of politeness and an incorrect weather forecast, and distancing ourselves from the statement. In other words, we would be presenting the information in the statement as absurd. The speaker in this case is strongly rather than mildly distancing himself from the statement, ‘What nice weather it is for a picnic’.

Dascal and Weizman (1987: 31-46) and Weizman and Dascal (1991: 18-30) suggest a model that aims to describe how indirect expressions are interpreted, which takes into account the fact that irony is an implicit expression. The model describes two types, or stages, of contextual information that are necessary for interpreting an indirect message: extra-linguistic information and meta-linguistic information. In the first stage, the listener must recognize that there is some kind of mismatch: he or she needs to understand that the explicit meaning of the utterance was not what was meant by the speaker. In other words, he or she must reject the explicit meaning of the utterance. In the second stage, the listener works out the alternative meaning of the speaker’s statement, which is, of course, its implied meaning.

Livnat emphasizes that this model serves as a general framework for analyzing ironic utterances. The model distinguishes between the functions of the contextual information. When that information is used for recognizing a ‘problem of interpretation’, it is called a ‘cue’, and when it is used to understand the speaker’s implied meaning, it is called a ‘clue’. When we want to describe how to interpret ironic utterances we need to identify both those cues that signal the presence of indirect meaning to the listener and those clues which can guide the listener towards the indirect meaning which the speaker intended, in other words, to fully interpret what the speaker meant (Livnat 2003: 141).

32. ‘We have heard here member of Knesset Israel Katz, who has transformed himself into the **chief rabbi of political *kashrut*** [Jewish dietary law]. He states here, at the podium, which Knesset members will be elected and which will not be elected according to his criteria’ (Taleb el-Sana, 15th Knesset Protocols, May 16, 2001).

The metaphoric phrase ‘chief rabbi of political *kashrut*’ in example 32 presents member of Knesset Israel Katz in an ironic light. The direct meaning of the metaphoric phrase ‘rabbi of political kashrut’ is not identical with the meaning of the speaker. The speaker is sharply critical of Katz, who appointed himself as the rabbi who determines the political fitness of other Knesset members according to his personal, racially inspired parameters. In the eyes of the speaker, the metaphoric phrase ‘political *kashrut*’ emphasizes Katz’s racist intentions, reflected in proposed racist laws that harm Arab members of Knesset.

33. ‘An American intelligence source says: Iran has not yet decided whether it will develop chemical weapons. So what is all this “Iranophobia”? What is this **horse** that the prime minister is riding out of some divine inspiration, some mission; has become prime minister only in order to save the People of Israel from Ahmadinejad, the **Hitler of the twenty-first century’**? (Masud Ghnaim, Knesset Protocols, March 19, 2012).

Masud Ghnaim sees the worries and anxiety of the Israeli prime minister regarding Iran’s development of nuclear weapons as exaggerated, irrational, and without foundation. In order to emphasize the point, Ghnaim uses the metaphoric phrase ‘Hitler of the twenty-first century’ to compare Ahmadinejad to Hitler, with the aim of presenting the prime minister’s behavior and anxiety in an ironic light. The meaning of the metaphoric phrase ‘Hitler of the twenty-first century’ is not identical with the speaker’s meaning, which is to criticize the prime minister’s anxiety over this issue.

34. ‘A month-long expulsion is too severe and heavy a punishment not for Anastassia, but for the Knesset, for all of us. What will you do without Anastassia the **spiller** (lit. ‘urethra’)?23 Anastassia **whose plumbing burst** grew up there, in the trash heaps of Yisrael Beiteinu.24 Anastassia, seized by *amuk* poured a cup (Heb. *kos*) of water on her colleague, and so I’m calling things as they are: *kos amuk*’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset speech).

The description ‘spiller’ and the phrases ‘whose plumbing burst’ and ‘*kos amuk*’25 are metaphors reflecting indirect speech acts. These phrases have sexual connotations that are meant to shame member of Knesset Anastassia Michaeli. The phrase ‘her plumbing burst’ emphasizes the Knesset member’s loss of control, reflected in her inappropriate and uninhibited behavior.

Tibi explained the phrase ‘*kos amuk*’ to the Knesset. ‘Amuk’ is the name, he said, of a region in Malasia in Southeast Asia, and anyone who contracts that mental illness begins to run an ‘amuk’ run. This is the origin of the name. ‘*Kos*’ is a plastic cup that usually holds 250 cubic centimeters of water for drinking or pouring’. The purpose of the metaphoric phrase ‘*kos amuk*’ is to describe Michaeli’s hysterical behavior, namely pouring a cup of water on member of Knesset Raleb Majadele, reflects that typical of the mentally ill.

The statements in sentences 32-34 are indirect speech acts. Their content indirectly hints at the intentions of Arab politicians and the act that they aim to perform through them. The sentences reflect illocutionary speech acts that go beyond the utterance itself, and through which Arab politicians produce more than one speech act. Sentence 32, 34 hint at assertive speech act. Sentence 33 hint at directive speech act in which Masud Ghnaim wonders at and warns against the anxieties of the prime minister regarding Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

**4*.2.7 Agricultural Metaphors***

35. ‘Anastassia, **whose plumbing burst,** grew up there, in the trash heaps of Yisrael Beiteinu, or should we say Russia Beiteinu’? (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, 2015).

The behavior of member of Knesset Anastassia Michaeli is not the act of rogue elements. This is the behavior of a politician who was groomed in the hotbeds of hate and racism. The metaphoric phrase ‘trash heaps’ emphasizes the fact that the Yisrael Beiteinu party is a hotbed for the nurturing of racist policies, a fact that is expressed in the proposed ‘muezzin law’.

36. ‘We are not talking about rogue elements (lit. ‘weeds’), this **broken record** of rogue acts, we are talking about a whole botanical garden, we are talking about rainforests of hilltop youth who have political and conceptual backing from the government’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, August 4, 2015).

The murderers of the Dawabshe family are not ‘rogue elements’, the literal translation of which is ‘weeds’. The function of the phrases ‘botanical garden’ and ‘rainforests’ is to dismiss at the outset the notion that the murders of the Dawabshe family are nothing more than rogue elements that do not represent the opinions of most Israeli settlers. The metaphoric phrases ‘botanical garden’ and ‘rainforests’ strengthen the speaker’s view that these murderers were nurtured in ideal conditions by their leaders, and they are constantly fed hate and racism against the Palestinians.

37. ‘The policy being promoted by this government and previous governments represents a **fertile ground** for the growth of these crimes. It is already clear to everyone — or perhaps to a large number of us — that these are not **rogue elements** (lit. ‘weeds’), these are not a marginal extremist group. **The weeds have taken over the entire field**. **The weeds have covered the main path** (Aida Touma-Sliman,27 Knesset Protocols, August 4, 2015).

The government is consistently lenient towards settler extremists, and does not take a hard line, and for this reason this policy is fertile ground, meaning the the ideal conditions for the flourishing of crime. The metaphoric phrases ‘the weeds have taken over the field’ and ‘the weeds have covered the main path’ reject the argument that the murderers of the Dawabshe family are rogue elements, part of a marginal, extremist group, because their extremist ideas are taking over a large group of settlers.

***4.2.8 Athletic metaphors***

38. ‘The prime minister is establishing a **Beitar state** that says “death to Arabs,” that disqualifies every Arab because of his identity and affiliation, and only views Jews as legitimate’ (Masud Ghnaim, Knesset Protocols, November 24, 2014).

Supporters of the Beitar Jerusalem football team are known to be racist and extremist fans, and this is reflected in their racist statements, such as ‘death to Arabs’. The phrase ‘Beitar state’ serves as a metaphor for what one can expect to happen after the passage of the Nation-State Law. If this does occur, the state will become a ‘Beitar state’, that is, a state that disqualifies every Arab because of his identity and affiliation.

***4.2.9 Natural Metaphors***

39. ‘Our sense of personal security has disappeared recently. People are afraid to go out. Guns have filled, **flooded** some of these communities’ (Ahmad Tibi, Knesset Protocols, March 19, 2012).

The verb ‘to flood’ serves as a metaphor for the loss of control over the phenomenon of illegal guns in the Arab sector, and for the ineffectiveness of the police in dealing with the problem.

40. ‘I believe that a nation that subjugates another nation cannot be a free nation. If you want to point to the **black hole** in Israeli democracy, I would tell you that it is the discrimination against the Arab population’ (Ayman Odeh, interview with Ynet News, Feburary 29, 2016).

Black hole — as a metaphor for the defect in Israeli democracy that discriminates against Arab Israelis and ignores their rights.

41. ‘A **march** of the stars of racism, which we have experienced recently, is expanding’ (Esawi Frej,28 Knesset Protocols, November 24, 2011).

Racism against Arab residents is expanding. The metaphoric description ‘march’ emphasizes the seriousness of the phenomenon and its dimensions.

**5. Conclusion**

Arab politicians in the State of Israel tend to weave metaphors into their political discourse, metaphors conveying semantic power and force as a rhetorical strategy that serves their message. These politicians see metaphor as a positive tool for argument. It is worth noting that all the metaphors analyzed in this article were intended to cast a spotlight on the suffering of the Palestinian people under a policy of occupation and settlement, and to emphasize that Israel does not truly desire peace, but rather an ongoing occupation and the violation of the rights of the Palestinian people. Additionally, these metaphors emphasize the ongoing disenfranchisement and discriminatory policies against Arab-Israelis. It is worth nothing that the use of military metaphors comes from an awareness of and familiarity with the power of such metaphors to sharpen the message: the Israeli government’s treatment of Palestinians and Arab-Israelis is a kind of war, with all that that implies.

Most of the metaphors gathered here relate to daily life, war, and history, especially the Holocaust. Arab politicians see Holocaust metaphors as possessing great persuasive power. By using metaphors like ‘ghetto’, ‘a well-oiled machine’, ‘crematoria’, and others, Arab politician convey a dual message: empathy and identification with Jews as victims of the Holocaust, coupled with harsh criticism for racism against and hatred of Palestinians.

Arab politicians sometimes use keywords (topics or commonplaces accepted by the audience) to establish strong feelings of identification in their Jewish audience and to persuade the universal audience that they identify with Holocaust, while at the same time endowing them with critical content (sentences 9-12). We should clarify that in using keywords, such as the words ‘ghetto’, ‘the human form’, ‘a well-oiled machine’, and ‘crematoria’, Arab politicians aim to connect with the audience and present their subject in a positive and noncontroversial way, even though this is only hinted at, without having recourse to overt declarations of empathy and identification. The main objective for Arab politicians is not to express their identification with the Jewish audience but to lambast Israel for racism against the Palestinian people and the Arab-Israeli population. At the same time, Arab politicians sometime make very direct and bald comparisons between Israel’s behavior towards Palestinians and that of the Nazis during the Holocaust (examples 13-15) and of South Africa during the apartheid regime, saying that Israel believes Jewish victimhood gives it the right to harm the Palestinian population in the territories.

Animal metaphors have considerable influence over the internalization of the message, for example, the metaphor ‘shark’ as a description of those who incite others against the Arab population and who are not forced to pay a price for their racist behavior. This influence lies in the fact that the emotional element in these metaphors and the descriptiveness of the message aid in convincing the listener of the speaker’s position.

The use of metaphors with a clear sexual connotation, such as the metaphors used by Ahmad Tibi in his verbal attacks of member of Knesset Anistasia Mikhalei (example 34) are rare and uncommon. Such metaphors are personally offensive, and, in essence, are aimed at all the politicians who share the racist views of member of Knesset Anistasia Mikhaeli.

Some of the metaphors express direct speech acts and some indirect speech acts, in which the utterance content only hints indirectly at the speaker’s intention and the action he wishes to perform through the utterance.

CDA theory is reflected in the metaphors discussed in this article in that all the metaphors, whether they express direct speech acts or indirect speech acts, aid in formulating the message and determine the way in which the speakers wish to characterize the behavior of the Israeli government towards Palestinians and Arab-Israelis and their personal views on the subject. Arab politicians show how one should relate to the behavior of the Israeli government towards the Palestinians, and thus they limit other possibilities of how knowledge of that topic is constructed. By means of the metaphors discussed in this article, Arab politicians attempt to influence the course of action of the Israeli government towards Palestinians and Arab-Israelis, and expect that a nation that suffered during the Holocaust should express more empathy and humanity towards Palestinians and be cognizant of the suffering of the other.

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Notes

1. For more information on discursive ethos and prior ethos, see Livnat 2014b: 128-129.

2. See further, Lakoff 1991: 25-32.

3. The effect of a language’s metaphoric structure on consciousness and opinion-shaping is the main theme of the CDA school (Livnat 2014a: 2:126, 369; Gavriely-Nuri 2009: 153-154; Gavriely-Nuri 2011: 91-92).

4. The Hebrew letter vav is the symbol of the Hadash party.

5. Habibi was one of the leaders of the Palestine Communist Party during the Mandate era. He served in the Knesset between 1951 and 1959, and again from 1961 until 1972.

6. The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, known by its acronym Hadash, is the movement of non-Zionist leftwing organizations in Israel. The party forms a socialist bloc in Israel and has stood as a list for the Knesset since the ninth Knesset elections in 1977.

7. A smokescreen is a tool of war that uses smoke that has been intentionally released into the air in order to mask the movement, activity, or location of military forces, such as ground troops, tanks, aircraft or ships. The phrase smokescreen has been borrowed as an idiom describing intentional incitement.

8. Ahmad Tibi is an Israeli Parliament member from the Joint Arab List.

9. The legal struggle of the dispossessed Arab residents of Ikrit and Biram has been ongoing since the 1950s, and touches on the right of the residents of those villages and their descendants to return to their homes from which they were removed during the 1948 war, after representatives of the State of Israel promised that they would be permitted to return.

10. A Bedouin-Israeli public figure who served as member of Knesset in the past.

11. Kristallnacht is the Nazi German term for the night of 9-10 November, 1938, which saw an anti-Jewish pogrom throughout the Third Reich (Germany and Austria). The Germans called the event by this name because of the many shards of glass that gathered on the ground as a result of the shattering of the windows of so many German-Jewish homes, public buildings, and businesses.

12. Meaning the Nation-State Law.

13. Apartheid is the name of the racist policy that was enacted by the white minority in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. This policy was racist and was based on a principle of racial segregation between whites, blacks and colored (mixed), and giving more rights to the white minority.

14. He is an Arab-Israeli leader who served in the past as a member of Knesset.

15. Ghnaim is a member of Knesset from the Joint Arab List.

16. Dehamshe is a former member of Knesset.

17. Bishara is a former member of Knesset.

18. The reference is to the murder of the Dawabshe family in Palestine.

19. Issam Makhoul is an Arab-Israeli public figure and former member of Knesset.

20. One of the leaders of the Islamic Movement in Israel.

21. He is a member of Knesset and a public figure.

22. Silence is a form of disregard.

23. The reference is to the incident in the Knesset when member of Knesset Anastassia Michaeli poured a cup of water on member of Knesset Raleb Majadele.

24. The name of a party in the Israeli parliament.

25. This expression is very similar to a well-known Arabic curse similar to the English ‘son of a bitch’.

26. This refers to the youths who murdered the Dawabshe family in Palestine, and who were referred to as ‘rogue elements’.

27. An Arab-Israeli politician, member of Knesset with the Joint List, feminist activist, and public figure in the Arab sector.

28. An Arab-Israeli politician who serves as a member of Knesset with the Meretz party and is a public figure in the Arab sector in Israel.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)