Intelligence is an important aspect in any organization that uses military force to meet its needs, and constintutes an essential infrastructure for the fulfillment of its operations. In recent decades Hizballah and Hamas are the two most prominent organizations that have been carrying out an ongoing onslaught of terror assualts and guerrilla attacks, aimed against the State of Israel, and undertaken for the advancement of their ideological and political goals. Throughout their years of confrontation with Israel, these organizations have been evolving steadily, and the nature of their warfare against Israel has changed as well. Their intelligence activity has developed commensurably, both in gathering operations and the resources used to perform them and in the nature of the research, analysis, and use of the information collected. Concurrently, since their inception, the organizations have been emphasizing counterintelligence for the purposes of preventing Israel from penetrating its ranks, maintaining their secrecy, and thwarting attacks targeting their operatives and assets.

From their inception, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) has been the easiest way for Hizballah and Hamas to collect operational-tactical intelligence, as a basis for attacks against Israel. Prime among these methods are the use of observation posts that allow the organizations to identify a suitable place for an attack, and to detect the target’s pattern of activity. During the 1990s, Hizballah developed intelligence services that carried out observations along the entire Security Zone, mapped the activities of IDF and SLA (South Lebanon Army) forces, and studied their characteristics. After the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, Hizballah solidified its observation array along the Israel-Lebanon border, equipping itself with thermal devices, including long-range ones. These observation forces were also active in the course of the Second Lebanon War (summer 2006), where they help the organization to attack IDF forces that were operating in Southern Lebanon. After the war, Hizballah was forced to desist from overt operations along the border. Consequently, it developed ways of carrying out seemingly innocuous camouflaged observations against Israel, using ostensible shepherds and journalists, and operating from sites of environmental-protection organizations.

In the course of the first and second intifadas, and during the interval between them, Hamas’ gathering of GEOINT was tactical in nature, and served as a basis for terror attacks on Israeli civilians and security forces. Ahead of Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip (summer 2005), Hamas began to set up an institutional array of field observations along the fence (the “Mourabitoun”) for early-warning purposes. Subsequently, it also installed a special-purpose observation unit that gathered systematic information for use in profiling the activity of IDF forces in the Gaza perimeter area.

Both organizations even developed arrays of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence-gathering, with Iranian assistance—Hizballah from the early “aughts” and Hamas several years later. Both organizations carried out a number of UAV sorties in the direction of Israel territory, including some in which the craft were intercepted. While Hizballah deployed its UAVs in warfare that it conducted in Syria as part of its assistance to Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, Hamas has not amassed meaningful operational experience in their use. Notably, both organizations consider the use of these craft, beyond their potential contribution to intelligence, an important achievement in the realm of psychology warfare.

Concerning the collection of HUMINT, the population from which Hizballah and Hamas chose most of their resources over the years is that of Israel’s minorities. This is due to their ability to sense the motivation to collaborate on the basis of ideological identification, and to their potential ability to make contact and establish communication, given visits by members of these minorities to Muslim countries among others, such as while carrying out the Hajj. Primarily during the 1990s, Hizballah operated assests within the Security Zone, including some among the ranks of the SLA. After the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, a “drugs for intelligence” channel developed steadily and with growing intensity. Here, Hizballah recruited Israel residents, including some in IDF service, whose duties gave them access to valuable information, and traded drugs across the Lebanese border for intelligence about sensitive sites in Israel and even information associated with the IDF. After the Second Lebanon War, the HUMINT activity continued on a large scale, and was extended to the identification of targets deep in Israeli territory, and the gathering of information about important Israelis such as the Chief of General Staff at the time, Gabi Ashkenazi. Hamas began to operate human assets at the very beginning of its activity, mostly in East Jerusalem, and for tactical purposes. As its activity evolved, Hamas began to recruit Israel residents and to ask them to gather information about air-defense systems, defense sites, and so on. It is evident that one of the principal goals of both organizations’ daily operations in the 2000s was to expand their pool of objectives and targets by amassing a collection of sites in Israeli territory.

Over the years, both organizations carried out operations in which they developed double agents, using flushed-out collaborators to gather information about Israel, pass on tendentious information, attack Israeli security forces, and counteract their operations. As social networks developed, both organizations used these platforms, too, to locate, recruit, and operate resources, sometimes hiding behind false identities.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has been an important element in the intelligence activity of Hizballah and Hamas for many years. The fact that Israel is a democracy where relatively the free media concerns its extensively with security matters has given these organizations abundant access to high-quality information at various intelligence levels. During the 1990s, Hizballah used OSINT to study the Israeli discourse about the legitimacy of the IDF’s continued presence in the Security Zone, relations between the IDF and the SLA, and the effect of its own operations on the IDF and Israel. Later, the organization used OSINT to learn about Israel’s weaponry, the structure and units of the IDF, and even, during the Second Lebanon War, the expected course of the battle, thanks to Israel’s permissive media policy during the war. Hamas has also obtained voluminous information from OSINT. In its early days, the organization learned from publicly available sources and judicial proceedings about information divulged by its operatives while under interrogation; these sources also disclosed many Israeli interrogation methods. The Israeli media helped the organization to learn from its operations, and to improve its performance in anticipation of future attacks. After Hamas institutionalized its military wing and took over the Gaza Strip (2007), its OSINT became more systematic. However, The media was almost the only source from which Hamas could assess the probability of large-scale Israeli operations. This was to Hamas’ disadvantage, and even served Israel as a platform for deception operations that caused the organization to be taken by surprise at the beginning of Operation Cast Lead (December 2008), and facilitated the elimination of Ahmad al-Ja'abari at the outset of Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012).

Hizballah ventured into SIGINT activity in the second half of the 1990s, intercepting IDF forces’ open tactical communications, and managing to intercept overt UAV signals, as happened in the discovery of IDF Special Force 13 commandos in the Ansariya operation (September 1997). After the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, Hizballah, with Iranian assistance, developed an extensive intelligence array that listened in on IDF forces’ tactical communication transmissions, transcribed the exchanges systematically, and put them to use. These operations continued during the Second Lebanon War. During this period and afterwards, Hizballah even seemed to have acquired the ability to eavesdrop on cellular telephone communication. Hamas also conducted SIGINT activity during the 2000s, which included, at the very least, the interception of overt IDF's UAV signals, eavesdropping on tactical communication, and perhaps a limited-scale interception of cellphone signals. Notably, both organizations rely on members who can read and understand Hebrew at a high level to carry out SIGINT.

In the second decade of the new century both Hizballah and Hamas launched their cyber activity. Hizballah cyber operatives have been extensively active in cyberspace, where they made use of homegrown, invasive malware. Thus they managed to breach servers and, through them, target carefully selected users, activities which continued for several years, until information-security companies discovered the breach. In addition, Hizballah set up an array of fake profiles on social networks, through whom it establish relations with elements in Israel on the basis of cover stories that prompted them to download invasive malware to their computers or cellphones.

Hamas has also been extensively active in cyberspace in the past decade. A Hamas intelligence gathering infrastructure evidently began to operate back in 2012, carrying out false-identity attacks on the email addresses of various elements in the Middle East, including some in Israel, for the purpose of luring the users into downloading the organization’s malware. Simultaneously, Hamas developed a ramified network of fake members of social networks, most of them disguised as women, who develop virtual relationships with Israeli men, causing them to download the malware. Some of the organizations’ malware is homegrown, and the rest is purchased ready-made in the civilian market. Once installed, it establishes effective control over the attacked device, instructing it to carry out a range of operations. It also intercepts the users’ content, including contact persons, correspondence, visits to websites, keystrokes, locations, and so on.

In addition to intelligence operations that seek to collect information about Israel, Hizballah and Hamas act to counter Israeli intelligence efforts to penetrate their ranks. To defeat Israel’s daily information-gathering activities, both organizations make maximum efforts to screen those wishing to join them. Here, the extent of devotion to Islam, and identification with the organization’s ideology figures, is meaningfull in assessing candidates’ reliability. The organizations also diligently act to detect and snare collaborators with Israel, both within their ranks and among the society in which they operate. Suspects are interrogated and subjected to violence including resulting in injury and, at times, death. Furthermore, both organizations apply internal compartmentalization, so that even if operatives are arrested or betray the organization, they will only have been exposed to the minimum of necessary information, both qualitatively and quantitatively. To keep Israel’s SIGINT activity in check, the organizations have, from the outset, tried to avoid the use of advanced communication methods, and to prefer more primitive ones. They also use encryption, both in telephone communication and in correspondence. To keep their communication traffic secure, they developed over time an internal communication system, that is separate from the national system.

To defeat Israel’s GEOINT efforts, Hamas and Hizballah try to conceal their doings to the greatest extent possible. They mask their activities in various ways, focusing on sites that are camouflaged, or assimilate into the civilian surroundings. An important stratum of this concealment effort is the use of subterranean spaces. Each organization has developed an underground system that it uses, among other purposes, to safely launch rockets and store munitions, manage warfare as IDF forces enter, and cross the perimeter fence to attack Israel on Israeli territory. Notably, even when dealing with open-source media publications, there is an awareness, both in Hamas and in Hizballah, of the need to impose censorship, and hide certain characteristics of their activity. This is evident both when outside media cover the organizations and in their own media releases.

From a comprehensive perspective, one may say that both organizations have been successful in hiding their activities from Israeli eyes in many cases, as in Hizballah’s ability to keep Israel from assessinating high-ranking officials in the course of the Second Lebanon War. In other cases, however, Israeli intelligence has been able to surmount the organizations’ counterintelligence efforts, as in the elimination of the senior Hizballah operative Imad Mughniyeh in Syria; the exposure of, and the attack on, Hizballah’s Fajr missile array, at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War; and the targeted elimination of Hamas ranking operatives, including some who had spared no effort to avoid this fate, such as “the Engineer,” Yahya Ayyash. It is also noteworthy that the organizations always accompany counterintelligence with the analisys of Israel's intelligence methods, such as—deploying aerial vehicles to gather information and eavesdropping on telephone conversations. This allows them to learn how Israeli intelligence works, to improve their conduct and their security instructions to operatives, and to increase the awareness of the local population to Israeli intelligence, by disseminating information, thereby revealing the nature of the threat and its significance.

The intelligence array that Hizballah and Hamas bring to bear against Israel, both to gather information and to counter Israeli information gathering efforts against them, is the infrastructure upon which organizations base their operations, and their assessment of Israel for decision-making purposes. On the tactical level, one can see how the combination of successful intelligence and successful surreptitious behavior? has had the practical outcome of high-quality operations against Israel, as, for example, in the organizations’ abduction attacks in 2006: Hamas’ capture of the soldier Gilad Shalit, and its ability to keep him hidden for years, despite Israel’s efforts to find and rescue him in the tiny Gaza Strip, and Hizballah’s capture of the IDF reservists Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev—the incident that triggered the Second Lebanon War. In addition, their intelligence-gathering efforts led to the creation of a bank of targets that they have been using to fire rockets at Israel. Even when the rockets used cannot be guided to any exact location, they are aimed at a strategic target and are intended to strike it just the same.

After Israel withdrew from Lebanon and, later on, from the Gaza Strip, Hizballah and Hamas, each in its own territory, began to engage in intelligence for anticipation of large-scale Israeli attack against them. They gathered information about weaponry in Israeli’s possession, IDF units, warfare doctrines, training and exercises, including maneuvers and so on, and assessed how the IDF would proceed in a future incursion into Lebanon or the Gaza Strip. Special emphasis was placed in collecting information about Israel’s armor and tank capabilities, in order to inform their use of antitank weaponry. Furthermore, both organizations have begun to deal with intelligence also on the strategic level, analyzing the Israeli political and social situation, and following the public mood, as a basis for assessing the possibility that Israel will launch a large-scale military action against them. Here the organizations’ weakness in obtaining intimate information from the Israeli decision-making processes becomes evident. Their attempt to estimate Israel’s future moves is based mainly on OSINT, the analysis of past cases, and situation assessments based on logic. This has led to several blunders, such as the failure to appreciate the possibility that Israel would respond as forcefully as it did after its two soldiers were abducted by Hizballah in July 2006, the failure to uncover Israel’s plan to hit Hamas hard at the outset of Operation Cast Lead (December 2008), and to eliminate Ahmad al-Jaabari at the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012).

One may see that, over the years, Hizballah and Hamas have managed to develop intelligence capabilities commensurate with their needs, and the resources available to them as nonstate actors, in order to offset Israel’s significant intelligence edge in their asymmetric standoff. The more the organizations evolved, gaining prominence and importance in their areas of operation, and institutionalizing their organizational and military apparatuses—the more they tailored their intelligence activities to their changing needs. Both organizations continually analyze and study the Israeli side, on the basis of the information in their possession and their previous views, realizing that information and knowledge are the keys to effective action against Israel. For example, it is evident that the organizations have managed to exploit Israel’s condition as a democratic state, for open-source collection activity that gives them access to valuable and inexpensive information, and by exploiting IDF’s nature as an army of young people with smartphones, in order to obtain information through HUMINT activity or cyber attacks.

Nevertheless, there are several differences between the organizations in their intelligence activity. First, Hizballah has more latitude than Hamas, which is besieged in the Gaza Strip, and benefits much more from Iran’s close support, which is much sparser in Hamas’ case. This has helped Hizballah attain more significant capabilities in some respects, among them its SIGINT capacities. Furthermore, Hizballah’s much greater extent of activity in other countries, furthered, among other things, by the help of Iranian envoys stationed in those countries, has led to much more foreign activity conducted by Hizballah than by Hamas, both in intelligence gathering for attacks abroad, and in using HUMINT assets. Conversely, Hamas appears to be more active in cyberspace, probably because it identifies this as an area of activity where much can be done at a relatively low cost, and without dependency on freedom of action and geographical location.

The study shows that to carry out a full analysis of nonstate organizations generally, and of terror organizations particularly, one must meaningfully take account of the intelligence component of their activity. Intelligence, even if sometimes less institutionalized and organized than would be customary among state actors, is integrated into these organizations’ activity at the various levels: tactical, operational, and even strategic decision-making. These organizations have managed to achieve considerable intelligence achievements suited to their limited objectives as nonstate participants in an asymmetrical struggle. While this has not closed the intelligence gap between the two sides, as is always the case in asymmetrical confrontations of this kind, the fact that the weaker party has not lost is tantamount to a victory. These organizations’ intelligence achievements, both in gathering information and revealing the state actor’s secrets, and in countering the state actor’s efforts to discover their own secrets, are meaningful assets in their favor.