**Epilogue: The World in which We Live**

The claim that religion and religious influence have returned to the center stage of society, culture, and politics has dominated academic discussions over the past two decades. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, who belonged to the “second generation” of the Frankfurt School, was one of the first to suggest that the return of religion to the public sphere is to be recognized by a “post-secular” society, which must “adjust itself to the continued existence of religious communities.”[[1]](#footnote-2) Charles Taylor concludes his book, *A Secular Age*, with the claim (and perhaps, for him, the hope) that we are at the beginning of “a new age of religious seeking.”[[2]](#footnote-3) In a similar vein, the sociologist Brian Turner points out that instead of a version of Weber’s increasingly disenchanted secular world, we are witnessing a “religious turn,” which means that “public space has been resecralized insofar that public religions play a major role in political life.”[[3]](#footnote-4) Likewise, philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues that we are witnessing the return, “with a vengeance,” of the theologically repressed, a view largely shared by Hent de Vries, who brought to the fore what he conceptualized as the “reenchantment, if not outright remythologization,” of the secular modern world.[[4]](#footnote-5)

These scholars and many others who debate the return of religion remain, to a large extent, divided as to the nature of the “new era,” its major characteristics, the variety of phenomena associated with it, or its (more or less) dark materials. Is the issue the return of orthodox and institutionalized religions or the emergence of new spiritual paradigms? Is the phenomenon limited to what Habermas calls “affluent western societies,” that is, the western version of secularized Christianity, or is it relevant, even if in different ways, to additional societies, cultures, and religions? To what extent can we speak about the blurring of boundaries between “the secular” and “the religious,” or the redrawing of these boundaries? How do theological arguments reshape the political contours of conflicts around the world? These are issues that remain controversial even today; indeed, the relevance of these questions has increased since the recent pandemic. Thus, Agata Bielik-Robson has given an overview of the different contemporary approaches, some even contradictory, related to the “return” of religion and theology to the social and political center of attention.[[5]](#footnote-6)

However, despite the many differences between them, it appears that these approaches share at least one common denominator. They all postulate both the narrative of the waning, or perhaps even disappearance, of religion in the framework of secular modern life, and its apparent re-emergence in recent decades in philosophy, society, and politics. To speak about the “return” of religion, to argue that it constitutes a “re-enchantment” of a formerly secular and disenchanted world, or to distinguish between secular and “post-secular society” – where the latter ostensibly replaces and succeeds the former – means to assume that there is a contradiction between the secular world and its religious “other.” There is the overarching idea that religion somehow lost its place from the modern social and political domains, only to “magically” reappear.

The presence of theology in the writings of such major and influential modern thinkers as Freud, Benjamin, Adorno, and Arendt challenges precisely this arc of assumptions and distinctions. These modern thinkers are indubitably secular, perhaps the most secular of their time. Nonetheless, their writings reveal four different composites of the secular modern position containing a vibrant inventory of theological terms. In these cases, the relation between the “secular” and the “religious” does not point to a contradiction, as one may assume, but rather to what can be called a secular-religious continuum. It is within the framework of such a continuum that the critical concept relevant to each thinker is expressed. On the one hand, for these thinkers, criticism constitutes the essence of secular heroism. On the other hand, their works, which were explored in this book, point to the broad spectrum of ways in which the analysis of the content, validity, and boundaries of concepts, as well as “critical narratives of modernity,” touch upon Jewish and Christian traditions, corporeal and divine law, mysticism, and negative or tripartite theology. To speak of a secular-religious continuum implies that critique of theological traditions concurrently emerges from them and can in many ways be traced back to them. Thus, these thinkers not only explore religious concepts using the disciplinary tools available to them, but they also visit the world of religious thought in an intimate fashion.[[6]](#footnote-7) For them, critique of theology is therefore a visitation of criticism in theological domains, even if occasionally –to paraphrase Arendt – this happens against their better judgment. Indeed, each one of these thinkers articulates a different conception of critique, relates to a different religious tradition and expresses the ways in which they intersect differently. Still, in all of these cases, critique does not allow its theological “other” “simply to be reduced, falsified, naturalized, or secularized, once and for all.”[[7]](#footnote-8)

Thus, in addressing distinctively different disciplines – psychoanalysis, social and educational thought, and political theory – as well as the various personal and historical contexts of the figures discussed – this book offers an important contribution to the extensive research on the place of the “Judeo-Christian” legacy in the intellectual world of German-speaking central Europe between the two world wars.[[8]](#footnote-9) No less importantly, it casts doubt on the distinction between the aforementioned secular and “post-secular” worlds and consequently challenges the division between “criticism” and “postcritique,” which has also attained a more central status in recent years.[[9]](#footnote-10) There is essentially a reversal of thought here: arguments concerning the disappearance and subsequent return of a religious “other” can only be understood within a framework of secular criticism where theology occupies a central position. The current focus in research on the place of religion in today’s world can be perceived, therefore, not as a reaction to the “return” of religion, but as proof that theology is implicated in the very structure of criticism. This is also the case in regard to the crystallization of the “postcritique” approach, which strives, for example, to “blend analysis and attachment, criticism, and love.”[[10]](#footnote-11) This endeavor may be anchored in the way in which the hermeneutics of suspicion, associated with modern criticism, enables or rescues non-suspicion.[[11]](#footnote-12)

Even though the scope of the discussion in this book is limited – in terms of the thinkers, historical periods, and texts upon which it focuses – its purpose is somewhat ambitious given that it attempts to reinterpret the complex relationships between the secular modern world and religion. Thus, its aim is to demonstrate that despite these scholars’ repeated secular emphasis on critique, religion loses neither its place nor its influence. Likewise, within the framework of the present discussion, I have not attempted to put forward a normative argument that gives preference to one approach over another or to demonstrate which critique of theology is better established. However, the reader will no doubt sense a certain partiality for the array of complexities, inner tensions, incompatibilities, contradictions, and refractions which characterize these thinkers’ discontent in regard to religious traditions – discontent that echoes, perhaps, the implied defiance in the words found in Ecclesiastes: “It is good that thou holdest fast to the one and withdrawest not thine hand from the other” (7:18).

What appears to be particularly prominent in this sense is that the modern thinkers’ critiques of theology are focused on the world in which we live. Certainly, this attention is given to what Horkheimer called the realm of immanence, and this emphasizes the secular dimension in their thinking.[[12]](#footnote-13) Still, in all of these cases, secularization does not point, in any simplistic way, to liberation from religious thinking, but rather to the translation or transformation of theological concepts, often for the stated purpose of rescuing them.

For Freud, for instance, the critical role of jokes expresses what Eric Santner described as the “eternal within the earthly,” given that Freud secularizes the religious dilemma concerning violation of the law while immersing it in his discussion on the rules, codes, and social norms that shape the psychology of the individual.[[13]](#footnote-14) These are the “laws and judgments” that criticism preserves both from within and through their defiance. Freud’s focus on the “normative universe” in which we live does not indicate detachment from theology, but rather the way in which he superimposes a psychological argument, which focuses on the individual’s relationships with society and religious modes of critique. In this framework, criticism plays a double role: it enables an outburst of opposition to the law, but does so within the terms of the law, in accordance with the idiom of a law that turns upon itself.

A similar dialectic, involving opposition to the very thing one seeks to save, is reflected in the “theology of worldliness” that characterizes philosophers of critical theory.[[14]](#footnote-15) Benjamin’s early theory of youth, for example, highlights the “mysticism of this world,” that is, the reformulation of theological concepts within the framework of social criticism. In this context, the “nothingness” of a purely transcendent God informs the liberation of mankind from all social and political enslaving circumstances. Benjamin adopts the mystical concept of a transcendental God in such an absolute manner that it can only be represented, as a result, by the concept of “nothingness.” However, in the final account, his interest lies in the way in which this field anchors the very prospect of social criticism. Benjamin’s theory of youth, in particular, can therefore be considered as an initial experimental field in which he forms the concept of criticism that he will use throughout his life. It cannot be denied that the social criticism proposed by the young Benjamin involves the secularization of theology. However, it speaks, to the same degree, of the taking hold (or rescuing) of a spiritual investment in the world, without which criticism is not possible. Here, too, criticism is immanent – it does not come from outside the world of religious concepts with the purpose of emancipation, but rather from within this sphere against which it simultaneously acts.

In my opinion, it is important to understand Adorno’s perception of education because it continues Benjamin’s line of thought into the second half of the twentieth century, and in doing so exposes how critical theory constitutes critical theology, at least in the context of education. On the one hand, critical self-reflection, which Adorno attributes to education, is focused upon this world because the single objective of criticism is liberation from enslaving social conditions. In this capacity, the criticism that education is meant to express is distinguished from the withdrawal into “pure inwardness” which is central to Kierkegaard’s critical theology. On the other hand, such criticism does not constitute liberation from theology, but rather a model for the reconceptualization of theological concepts, which, for Adorno, is the only way left for us to rescue the theology that criticism aims to replace. In particular, Adorno’s critical concept based on “the nothingness of revelation” (as Gershom Scholem called it) is realized by not being realized. This is, once again, the secularization of theology and its retention in one. I agree with Adorno’s claim that religious concepts undergo transformation within the framework in which they are “evacuated of all metaphysical authority.”[[15]](#footnote-16) However, it seems to me that it is no less accurate to say that Adorno’s purpose is to discover in this manner the only possible way of not losing sight of such authority. When he proposes the “migration into the profane” (*Einwanderung ins Profane*), he is not only proposing to relinquish the divine domain, but also to protect it under the circumstances of its disappearance. This complexity – in the process of relinquishing the substance of theology in order to rescue it – defines the critical dimension in education; it is the only way left for us to hold onto the unholdable divine object, which was also central for Benjamin, and which Eliot Wolfson identified with the Jewish messianic “passion for the impossible.”[[16]](#footnote-17)

With regard to focusing on this world, the critique of theology that emanates from Arendt’s political writings is perhaps the most unique. Considered the most secular thinker of her time and one who ostensibly had no interest in the theological aura that shrouded the scholarship and writing of her generation, Arendt nonetheless bases both the concept of criticism and of a new order of the world on the Roman theological tradition. But this also bears testament to her utterly unique stance vis-à-vis her contemporaries, since she objects to one theological tradition (centered around a transcendental God and absolute truth) for the purpose of revealing, or returning to, another “hidden” theological tradition. This is the hidden theological tradition that is focused, from Arendt’s point of view, on the modern world which forms the basis for her political concepts. This does not mean to say that Arendt has a special interest in pantheism, and, in my view, it would be a mistake to assume that she proposes a modern return to paganism. Arendt, I suggest, offers a distinctive version of return to the theology of this world, a subject which engaged the attention of many of her contemporaries, as we have seen. In other words, she saw in the “reconceptualization of theological concepts” the only way to protect tradition under the circumstances of its complete disappearance.

It could be said that Arendt’s political writing makes her a sort of outlier, atypical of the intellectuals and texts reviewed in this book. However, it seems to me that something in the traditionalism reflected in Arendt’s position, despite or perhaps because of its unique texture, projects upon the thinking of the others to a great extent. Debates on the concept of tradition, on the possibility of distinguishing it from the concept of “conservatism,” as well as questions about its relevance today, perhaps call for a separate task, which exceeds the limits of the present book.[[17]](#footnote-18) Yet, the point here is that the criticism of these thinkers enables what Hans-George Gadamer called the “happening of tradition” (*UberlieferungsgeschehenI*), that is, the “prior condition of understanding” which mediates “between the known of knowledge and the unknown that powers it, in which neither remains unaffected.”[[18]](#footnote-19) This kind of “happening” nurtures these thinkers in their obligation to repair the world; they do not seek to seclude theology or detach it from the world.

Is the Jewishness of these thinkers also expressed in their commitment to the world? David Biale has argued that the tradition of Jewish thought centers on the notion that the purpose of theology is about assuming responsibility for the world. It seems that this kind of argument may also be relevant to the focus these modern thinkers place on social and political issues.[[19]](#footnote-20) Indeed, it would be accurate to say that for them, Judaism or Jewishness (a term Arendt preferred) “had become hard to parse.”[[20]](#footnote-21) Judith Butler’s question, “What is finally Jewish about Arendt’s thought?,” is thus relevant, in different ways, to the other thinkers whose openly expressed attitudes toward Jewish religious practices range between apathy and hostility.[[21]](#footnote-22) Even so, it appears that the difficulty that Butler and others have raised is focused on the way in which these secular thinkers had limited access to the content and practices of traditional Judaism, which was not a major part of their education or way of life, and did not shape the formal knowledge they acquired (Freud, in this sense, is perhaps an exception). On the other hand, for them, their Jewish identity, which none of them denied, was not so much linked to religious content. It was expressed in their critical perspective on the issues they dealt with, including the possibility to “envision a place for Jews in the polity.”[[22]](#footnote-23) This seems significant to me because it can shed light on the importance of critique, particularly for these thinkers. For instance, what Paul Franks referred to as “Kant’s appeal to Jewish philosophers” (which according to Franks digressed beyond the domain of the Neo-Kantian school) can perhaps be understood, with minor modification, as the importance of criticism for these intellectuals.[[23]](#footnote-24) It is in this sense, as Habermas suggested, that Jewish thought “has remained critique.”[[24]](#footnote-25) I do not mean to say, however, that the concept of critique was relevant only for Jewish thinkers at that time, or for all modern Jewish thinkers. Yet it is possible that for many of them, precisely because in their eyes Judaism is “something created, not given,” this religion constitutes a driving force of critical observation in the world in which they have always felt, as Paul Mendes-Flohr so accurately put it, not as “cognitive insiders” but “axionormative outsiders.”[[25]](#footnote-26) Calling attention to such a possible connection between Jewish identity and criticism may perhaps explain why Horkheimer claimed that critical theory was for him and his peers “Judaism undercover,” and why this recognition can be projected upon a wide range of Jewish thinkers of the period.[[26]](#footnote-27)

I have argued throughout this work in favor of a radical change in the way in which we think about criticism. I return to this point because it gives rise to such questions as: Why is there any need to separate critical thought from religion or theology? The answer, in part, is possibly embedded in a refusal to recognize the fallibility that may hide behind the veneer of scientific rationality, and in part, it is related to the political meanings derived from it. It seems to me, however, that now is the time for such a transformation, given our collective responsibility to democracy in times of crisis. At the time of writing, the crisis seems particularly acute. Even so, I wish to propose a position that differs from the contemporary political fault line, situated ostensibly between those who “adhere to the principle of secular reason and those who are ready to embrace the temptations of theocracy.”[[27]](#footnote-28)

This rather rigid dichotomic division was recently expressed by Peter Gordon, who, in his latest book distinguishes between religious logic seemingly based on dominance and control and secular critical logic devoted to rejecting such “fantasies.” Naturally, one cannot diminish the importance of Gordon’s attempt to oppose the “pathologies” from which we suffer today, manifested in the constant, disturbing, and certainly dangerous departures from the values identified with liberal democracy. In this regard, one can assume that social reality in the post-Corona era will only continue to intensify these processes around the world. At the same time, it appears to me that this way of thinking, which in dichotomic terms distinguishes between a worthy secular approach and dangerous religious logic, suffers from a “secularist” bias – in Habermas’s terms – which continues to justify the former’s hegemony over the latter in the public space; within such a framework only “translated,” i.e. secular, contributions may pass as relevant.[[28]](#footnote-29) Not only does this approach remain deeply suspicious of all things related to the religion external to it, but it also insists that theological concepts have meaning only when they are fully dissolved within their secular “translation.” It is unclear, therefore, how it is possible to evade the way in which such a dichotomic approach holds onto the “fantasy” of the dominance and control of one tradition over another, and sketches once again, even if against its will, the conflictual lines between them.

The problem with such a bias, from my viewpoint, is not merely grounded in the fact that the joining of the “adherents of a religion” to the public sphere cannot, in any case, leave the “preexisting” secular discursive structure intact, as Talal Asad has demonstrated.[[29]](#footnote-30) Neither does the problem lie in the claim that it is only a western secularist point of view which transforms religion into a “closed set of ideals and values” and which therefore perceives it as “antithetical to democracy.”[[30]](#footnote-31) Instead, it relates to the fact that the binary division between the “secular” and the “religious” upon which it leans does not correlate with the richness, complexity, and perhaps even fluidity of the secular spectrum. This spectrum contains all of this because of its ongoing relationship with its inherent religious origins and with the new forms of dialogue with these sources that it can offer, especially “in our present moment of political crisis around the world.”[[31]](#footnote-32)

Therefore, it seems there is a more fruitful distinction to be made than that between the secular and the religious – a distinction between those who continue to dogmatically hold onto this dichotomy (regardless of which side of the fence they are on) and those who reject these types of divisions in an attempt to point to the existence of a wide secular-religious spectrum as part of secular self-perception. This, it seems to me, is the conclusion that can be derived from critical theory. Especially with Adorno, one can see how secularization, which is the denial of the possibility to maintain the absolute of religion, is important because it constitutes the only way to rescue it. Here there is certainly decisive opposition to any form of messianic realization in the world, but the objective is not to end messianism in the world, but rather to resuscitate it. To wit: there is no doubt that Adorno’s criticism negates any positive theological meaning, but at the same time, this negation is important simply because it is the only way to continue to hold onto this possibility. We are dealing here, therefore, with an act of amalgamation which does not set criticism against the theological traditions that nurture it, but generates between them a sort of covenant “in time of need.”[[32]](#footnote-33)

Is it possible, then, that instead of, on the one hand, the darkness descending upon us from forms of fundamentalist religiosity or, on the other, an increasingly critical loathing of any religious matter, to choose an alternative which acknowledges the tension, or continuum, between critique and theology? I am not particularly optimistic regarding the realization of this possibility in the world in which we live today. However, I dare say that to acknowledge the existence of this type of continuum is to invite a fruitful discussion (as opposed to opposition, mutual hostility, hegemony, or violent struggle) between traditions of thought and worldviews, which, to echo Kant’s *Handmaid’s Tale*, may carry the torch for one another, and in any case will not demand exclusivity for themselves in the world of human beings.

1. Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on a Post-Secular Society,” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2008): 13. See also Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, *Dialektik der Säkularisierung: Über Vernunft und Religion* (Freiburg: Herder, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge MA.: Harvard UP, 2007), 534-535. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Brian Turner, *The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 652. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 129-156. See also Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Salvoj Zizek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 4; Hent de Vries, ed., *Religion beyond a Concept: The Future of the Religious Past* (New York: Fordham University Press, xiii). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Agata Bielik-Robson, “The Post-Secular Turn: Enlightenment, Tradition, Revolution,” *Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture* 3, no. 9 (2019): 57-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. On the concept of “visitation” see: Immanuel Levinas, *“The Trace of the Other,”* in *Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 345–59 in which he seems to be aware of the etymological proximity in the Hebrew language between critique (*Biqoret*) and visitation (*Biqur*). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Hent de Vries, *Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)*,* 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. For example, David Marshall, *The Weimar Origins of Rhetorical Inquiry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020); Benjamin Lazier, *God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008); Peter Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2003); [Ari Joskowicz and Ethan Katz](https://haifa-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/primo-explore/fulldisplay?docid=972HAI_MAIN_ALMA51183621230002791&context=L&vid=HAU&lang=iw_IL&search_scope=books_and_more&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=default_tab&query=any,contains,hannah%20Arendt,AND&mode=advanced&pfilter=lang,exact,eng,AND&pfilter=creationdate,exact,10-YEAR,AND&offset=0), eds., *Secularism in Question: Jews and Judaism in Modern Times* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 2 (2004): 225-248; Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); Rita Felski, *The Limits of Critique* (University of Chicago Press, 2015); Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski, eds., *Critique and Postcritique* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. The term “hermeneutics of suspicion” was suggested by Paul Ricour, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1970), 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Bielik-Robson, “The Post-Secular”. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Santner, *Psychoanalysis,* 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Bielik-Robson, “The Post-Secular,” 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Gordon, *Migrants,* 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Wolfson, *Poetic*, 180-182. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. See e.g. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 1 (2000): 19-51; Yaacov Yadgar, *Secularism and Religion in Jewish-Israeli Politics: Traditionists and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 358-361. Andrew Bowie, “Gadamar and Romanticism,” in Gadamer's Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. Bruce Krajewski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 69; Theodor Kisiel, “The Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger,” *Man and World* 2 (1969): 358-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Devid Biale, *Not in Heaven: The Tradition of Jewish Secular Thought* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Paul North, *The Yield*: *Kafka’s Atheological Reformation* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2015), 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Judith Butler, *Parting Ways. Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Rose Sven Erick, *Jewish Philosophical Politics in Germany 1789-1848* (Waltham Mass.: Brandeis UP, 2014), 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Paul Franks, “Jewish Philosophy after Kant: The Legacy of Salomon Maimon,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Jewish Philosophy*, eds. Michael L. Morgan and Peter Eli Gordon(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 53-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Jürgen Habermas, “The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers,” in idem., *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 42. Gordon, *Migrants,* 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Peter Eli Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy* (PLACE: *University of California Press*, 2003), 3; Paul Mendes-Flohr, *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Max Horkheimer, “Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen (Gespräch mit Helmut Gumnior 1970),” in *Gesammelte Schriften in 19 Bände*, vol. 7: 385–404. See also Agata Bielik-Robson, *Jewish Cryptotheologies of Late Modernity: Philosophical Marranos* (London: Routledge, 2014), 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Peter E. Gordon, *Migrants in the Profane: Critical Theory and the Question of Secularization* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2020), 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Habermas, “Notes,” 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Talal Asad, *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. See Asad, *Formations,* 2; James Arthur, Liam Gearon, and Alan Sears, *Education, Politics and Religion: Reconciling the Civil and the Sacred in Education* (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), 98. See also the point made in Ayman. K. Agbaria and Muhanad Mustafa, “The case of Palestinian civil society in Israel: Islam, civil society and educational activism,” *Critical Studies in Education* 55, no. 1 (2014): 44-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Gordon, *Migrants,* 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Bielik-Robson, “The Post-Secular,” 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)