**Method**

*Sample*

Sampling was conducted in two stages: sampling of communities, and then sampling of decision-makers in each community.

First, a sample list of 23 local authorities in Israel with a majority of Jewish residents was compiled. There are 255 local authorities in Israel (excluding two industrial local councils), which include 76 municipalities and 125 local councils[[1]](#footnote-1) with elected local government, and 54 regional councils, whose local government consists of representatives of a number of rural and cooperative communities in a particular geographical area. Approximately 74.4% of the population in Israel resides in municipal areas, the rest residing in local councils (14.9%) and regional councils (10%).[[2]](#footnote-2) Sample authorities were drawn from municipalities and local (rather than regional) councils, due to both the greater representation of the population in Israel in most of these authorities, as well as the possibility of sampling more decision makers in each.

The authorities included in the general sample were selected by mapping various sociodemographic characteristics, including number of residents (CBS, 2013),[[3]](#footnote-3) socio-economic cleavage (CBS, 2008),[[4]](#footnote-4) and municipal property tax rates (CBS, 2015).[[5]](#footnote-5) The religiosity of each authority was determined based on enrolment percentages for schools according to track (secular/religious/ultra-Orthodox).[[6]](#footnote-6) These statistical classifications were used to formulate a list of community samples, each one including a wide range of authorities in terms of size (expressed in the number of residents and the number of elected officials[[7]](#footnote-7)), religious characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics (expressed in the socio-economic cluster and municipal property tax rates).

At the same time, preliminary research was conducted about decision-makers in positions of political authority, as well as authority supervisors, as detailed in Table 1. As can be seen, 12 municipalities and 11 local councils have populations between 244-3,900 people, represented by 8-27 council members. Of these authorities, 11 are secular, 5 religious and 7 ultra-Orthodox. Both the socio-economic cleavage and the extent to which they are geographically peripheral are markedly diverse.

*Table Number 1. Sampled Authorities and their Characteristics.*

Second, a sample list of elected and appointed decision-makers was compiled for the communities described. Of the 2423 council members[[8]](#footnote-8) currently serving in Israel, all council members serving in the authorities included in the sample were added to the sampling list. As much as possible, a similar number of senior managers from the same authority[[9]](#footnote-9) as the council members were also included, out of the approximately 137,000 workers currently employed in the local authorities in Israel.[[10]](#footnote-10) Supervisors were included in the sample according to their level of seniority, and in line with the relevant ranking of the authority’s size (the director general of the authority and/or the secretary, administrative/division/department managers). This was done to create comparable senior groups between political and supervisory echelons (a high seniority group including the heads and management of local authorities [CEO / Treasurer / Secretary]; a medium seniority group including deputy mayors, deputy directors and division managers; and a low seniority group including council members and middle managers).

The details of those belonging to political and administrative echelons who were included in the sample were collected through internet searches, on the Ministry of Interior website and on the authorities’ own websites. Information not found on these sites has been completed as much as possible by searching for names on Google, and in local community and/or personal Facebook pages, when they exist. For example, heterogeneous information about members of the Even Yehuda Council[[11]](#footnote-11) taken from the authority website was used to find those members, and the missing details (phone numbers, job descriptions, etc.) were filled in as needed by searching for their names on Google and / or Facebook. Locations of senior officials at the same authority were found using a similar method.[[12]](#footnote-12) It should be noted that the amount information available on authorities’ websites about council members and senior managers is quite diverse: while on some sites it is relatively easy to find orderly lists containing names, job descriptions and contact details (sometimes one can even find resumes, pictures and other details), on other websites information is incomplete, and is sometimes scattered between departments and divisions (rather than appearing in a centralised list). Often, the information contains few to no details (job titles listed without the job holders’ names, missing contact details, etc.).

When the sampling list was completed, a total of 121 relevant subjects were identified by telephone in the 17 communities sampled, of which 93 decision-makers responded to the questionnaire. 31 were from local councils (77.4% council members and 22.6% administrative supervisors) and 62 from cities (87% council members and 13% administrative supervisors). Among the decision-makers, the sample included 2 (2.1%) senior officials at the supervisor level only (CEO and secretary); nine moderately senior officials (9.7%), of which eight were authority and department heads/deputies; 77 junior division heads (88.2%), including 65 council members and 12 department heads; and five elected representatives whose level of seniority was unknown.

The percentage of respondents to the telephone survey was 77% (Of the 121 people contacted, 93 responded to the survey), nine of whom did not complete the questionnaire in full.[[13]](#footnote-13) The average respondent age was 48.02, while 62 (66%) were decision-makers in cities (the rest from local councils), 23 (24%) were women, 20 (21.5%) ultra-Orthodox.[[14]](#footnote-14) The figures differed slightly among council members (80.4% answered, 23% were women, the average age was 47.16, 29.4% were ultra-Orthodox) compared to authority employees (62.5% response rate; 38.4% women; average age – 53; 0% ultra-Orthodox).

**Participation by religion and location**

The average number of interviewees in each of the 23 selected communities is shown in Figure 1. The average number of interviewees per community is 13 (with 4 being the lowest, and 27 the highest). Overall, 53% of the interviewees were chosen from secular communities and 47% from religious (17%), or ultra-Orthodox (30%) communities. Because the religious communities chosen were smaller (as many religious Jews live in mixed cities, there are not many unambiguously religious cities; the ultra-Orthodox, by contrast, tend to reside in more homogenous cities), the average number of interviewees in religious cities is lower, with an average of 10 interviewees per community compared to an average of 13 interviewees in ultra-Orthodox communities and 14 in secular communities. More secular communities were chosen because we matched a secular community to each of the ultra-Orthodox and religious communities. Nevertheless, in terms of response rates ranked by type of community, [].

Chart 1: Number of interviewees by city

Another way of showing the graph, according to community type. [Also worth inserting response rates here]:

the participation of decision-makers at different religious levels was similar (secular, 33%; traditional, 21%; religious, 21%; ultra-Orthodox, 25%). Figure 3 shows the religiosity of the decision-makers, ranked by type of community. (285 of 300 interviewees answered the question on religious observance.) As expected, there is a very strong correlation between the level of religiosity of the community where decision-makers live, and the extent to which homogeneity increases with the level of religiosity. Thus, 54% of the interviewees in secular areas declared themselves secular, 65% of the interviewees in religious communities stated that they were religious, and 75% of the interviewees in ultra-Orthodox communities called themselves ultra-Orthodox. However, there is some variation in the degree of religiosity of decision-makers in each of type of community. (For example, 8 of the 88 decision-makers from ultra-Orthodox communities reported that they are not ultra-Orthodox or religious, but “only” secular or traditional, and 14 additional interviewees reported that they are religious but not ultra-Orthodox).

Diagram 3. Distribution of the degree of religiosity amongst decision-makers according to the religiosity of communities, in percentages

**Questionnaire Description**

Researchers telephoned the decision-makers in the sample for 12 weeks, between May 31, 2016 and August 17, 2016. To ensure anonymity, the survey was completed using identification numbers given to the subjects only, and the data were analyzed without identifying details.

The questionnaire used in the survey was designed to simulate realistic possible conflicts of interest that decision-makers could encounter. The questionnaire adheres to ethical rules and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Hebrew University. After providing details about the study (for example, the background of the survey, the researchers’ names, length of the survey, and an explanation regarding the right to skip questions or stop at any stage), interviewees were told that “the survey is about setting up a new technological center in the area” for “Israeli technology companies”. In the first part of the questionnaire, those surveyed were told of the center’s activity in broad terms, and then asked how suitable it would be to establish the center in their community, and to what extent it would benefit the community.

In the second part, questions were included regarding the interviewees’ willingness to assist in the center’s establishment. In order to measure the interviewees’ disposition to corruption when conflicts of interest arise, three common ways of reacting to a conflict of interest are examined:

1. **Nepotism** – preferring to hire relatives or close friends because of personal connection, as opposed to skills. Nepotism has been banned in the Israeli public sector,[[15]](#footnote-15) but the phenomenon continues to be widespread (Drayshpitz, 2011). For example, over 200 political appointments were recorded in the State Comptroller’s reports between 1984 and 2005 (Navot, 2012). Local authorities also witnessed the phenomenon – between 2000 and 2011, the Gedera local council employed 29 workers without a tender (even though this was a condition of employment), with the head of the council participating as a member in some of the examination committees without declaring their personal affiliations with the candidates.[[16]](#footnote-16) In order to examine this tendency, the willingness of decision-makers to recommend particular candidates to manage the center was examined and compared to the candidates’ suitability for the position (details below).
2. **Conflict-of-interests** - a situation in which someone in an official capacity has a personal interest that is likely to impact his decisions and constitute a secondary consideration in decision making:

Family ties, companies and businesses of senior officials are liable to influence, and sometimes do influence, the decisions they make, and cast a long shadow on the trust others place in these decisions […] The basic legal position precludes decision-making by those who have a secondary interest in the subject beyond their affiliation to the subject of the decision as an authority with decision making responsibilities (Barak-Erez, Navot and Kremnitzer, 2009).

According to a High Court of Justice ruling,[[17]](#footnote-17) this refers to situations in which a civil servant has two simultaneous interests: one being the natural, desirable and proper interest to correctly fulfil their duties; and the other a personal interest, one liable to affect decision making. A civil servant with a conflict-of-interest may find him or herself in breach of trust and /or bribery laws. Situations in which elected officials and civil servants have conflicts-of-interest are frequently the subject of public controversy, and even come to the attention of the judicial system (Barak-Erez et. al, 2009). Nevertheless, the issue is still relatively new, and the Israeli legal system’s measures against the phenomenon are still taking shape. In 2004, for the first time in Israeli history, a civil servant was convicted of fraudulent transfer and breach of trust after making decisions with a conflict-of-interest in aggravating circumstances.[[18]](#footnote-18) The disposition to act in conflict-of-interest situations was examined by the proposal made to decision-makers participating in the study to serve as a paid consultant at the technology center.

**3. Willingness to receive prohibited gifts and benefits**

The issue of receiving gifts and benefits by public officials is regulated by the Public Service Law (Gifts),[[19]](#footnote-19) the Civil Service Law (Discipline),[[20]](#footnote-20) in the Civil Service Regulations (known in Hebrew as the “*Takshir*”),[[21]](#footnote-21) in the rules of ethics of civil servants, in the ruling of the Disciplinary Court and the directives of the Civil Service Commissioner.[[22]](#footnote-22) Gifts are defined in the law as “bestowing property for no recompense or the rendering of a service or other benefit for no recompense,” this definition applies to any benefit, whether desirable or not.

The underlying assumption of these rules is the principle that civil servants are the trustee of the public and must act in the public interest. In a long series of judgments, the Supreme Court reiterated the great importance of the trust that the public holds for civil servants, and further stated:[[23]](#footnote-23)

The purpose of the Gifts Law is to ensure integrity in public service, and it aims to strengthen the public interest in government authorities. It aims to prevent the public feeling that civil servants receive things that they do not ‘deserve’. It aims to pre-empt damage and prevent rumors of gift-giving with the aim of swaying the judgment of civil servants, not just because of their status as a civil servant but in the context of specific action pertaining to their position. The basis of the Gifts Law is the desire to determine rules of conduct for civil servants which are broader than those covered by bribery or breach of trust offenses.

Two Israeli prime ministers have been questioned over prohibited receipt of gifts. Prime minister Ehud Olmert was questioned over an affair centering on a house on Cremieux Street, after the State Comptroller discovered the house was bought with a discount of $320,000 in return for helping to accelerate a real estate project while he served as the Economy minister.[[24]](#footnote-24) In the recently-published findings of the State Comptroller’s report on the ‘Bibi-tours’ affair, foreign funding of trips by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his family during his tenure as finance minister, worth tens of thousands of dollars, was mentioned. The report states that the comptroller saw the funding as constituting receipt of a prohibited gift and a violation of integrity, and that it creates a possible conflict-of-interests and may constitute a form of benefit.[[25]](#footnote-25)

In this study, the interviewees’ willingness to receive prohibited gifts was examined by proposing to receive monetary compensation for the center receiving a new manager in accordance with their recommendation.

In order to protect the interviewees, the questions were formulated so that positive answers did not incriminate them in any way but would still indicate a disposition to act in a conflict-of-interests situation. The questionnaire was formulated with maximal separation between questions whose juxtaposition could raise suspicion and prevent the completion of the response: for example, the request to recommend a manager to the technology center was separated from the question about willingness to receive monetary compensation for such. The questionnaire was formulated in this manner based on the assumption that a real company that would have acted in a similar manner in order to locate decision-makers willing to advance its agenda by acting with a conflict-of-interests in exchange for the appointment of associates and/or monetary compensation would do so in a similar manner (spread over the course of many months).

In the third part, demographic questions were posed in order to test the research hypotheses regarding the impact of personal characteristics on individuals’ disposition to corruption at the various levels described.

**Measurements**

**Explanatory variables**

**Religiosity**

**On an individual level**, measurement of subjects by self-determination as either: secular; traditional but not religious; traditional and religious;[[26]](#footnote-26) religious; ultra-Orthodox.

**On a community level**, [incomplete]

**Background variables**

**Individual level**. *Receipt of salary* 1 = Receives a salary, 0 = does not receive a salary; Elected officials 1 = elected, 0 = supervisor; *Education*, high school, vocational, advanced religious education, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or higher. *Age* in years; *Sex* 1 = woman, 0 = man; *Marital Status* 1 = Married, 0 = Other. (24.7%). As mentioned earlier, people with advanced religious education and those with a first degree were combined for the purposes of analysis. **Community level**. [Incomplete]

**Explanatory Variables**

**Disposition to corrupt behavior**

The dependent variable, disposition to corrupt behavior, is measured by three measures (descriptive statistics are presented below). The original answers were scaled from 0-6 for a disposition to nepotism, and 0-3 for a tendency to act with a conflict-of-interests and a willingness to receive prohibited gifts. The indices were normalized between 0-1 for the analyses presented below in order to allow easy comparison of effect sizes.

**1. Disposition** **to nepotism** was measured by the question: “In order to establish a high-tech center in the area, a candidate must be identified to fill the position of director of activities, who will be responsible for initiating local collaborations, budget planning, and developing strategies. The current candidate holds a Masters in business administration, has four years’ experience in managerial positions in a technological organization and lives in a central location. We are considering recruiting a local candidate for a position that will help assimilate the organization in the community. Would you be able to suggest a relevant candidate from the community? What’s their name?”

If the interviewees had difficulty or refused to give a name, they were offered the opportunity to think about suitable candidates for the position and answer a few questions about them, and were told that if necessary, they would be contacted for further details later on. After interviewees thought of a name (whether they gave it or not), they were asked about 1) the candidate’s suitability for the position: i. Their education, ii. Their experience; 2) Familiarity with the proposed candidate: i. Number of years, ii. Their shared background. The proposed candidate’s suitability was determined by comparing against the fictitious candidate’s details – the proposed candidate’s level of education and level of managerial experience, while the degree of their closeness to the interviewees was examined by means of the number of years of acquaintance and strength of acquaintance (1. No personal connection 2. Professional acquaintance 3. Friendship. 4. Close friendship. 5. Relative). Additionally, if the candidate proposed themselves to receive the job, this was also coded.

A scale representing the disposition of participants to offer the position to unsuitable candidates who are close to them. In constructing the variable, 99 interviewees who recommended a candidate (constituting 33% of the total number of interviewees) were included, whether or not they mentioned their candidate’s name (52 out of 99) or not.[[27]](#footnote-27) These interviewees were asked about the degree of suitability (education and experience) and personal connection to the candidate they proposed, while accumulating points for each indication of candidate incompatibility. Participants who gave a name or thought of a candidate without giving their name but refused to answer questions about them were encoded as a missing value. Values ​​0-6 in figure 1 above relate to the degree of professional suitability and / or the degree of personal closeness to the candidate of the 96 interviewees who answered at least one question regarding the professional suitability and / or the degree of personal closeness to the candidate. Interviewees accumulated points for each indication of candidate incompatibility. Education: interviewees scored one point for a candidate who did not suit the position in terms of their level of education (lower than a masters’ degree); Experience: One point for lack of experience or little experience; Personal closeness: zero points awarded for being “professional acquaintances”, one point for candidates with whom the interviewees was on “friendly” terms, two points for “close friends”, three points for relatives, four points if they put themselves forward.[[28]](#footnote-28) Accordingly, the scale ranged from zero for those who suggested a candidate with an appropriate level of education, experience and closeness, up to the hypothetical maximum of six (category left empty), for those who suggested themselves, while reporting unsuitability for the position in terms of both education and experience.

2. **Disposition** **to act with a conflict of interest** was measured by the question: “In the community where the branch is to be established, we will establish a think tank of outside consultants to formulate the construction strategy. In the event that the branch is set up in your area, would you be interested in being hired part-time as an external consultant?”. The answer scale, which was not read to the interviewees, included the following possibilities: a. Ready, b. Not ready, c. Do not know, d. Refuse to answer, e. Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

All interviewees were asked this question, regardless of which candidate they recommended, and the distribution of answers is shown in Figure 2. In the coding, a distinction was made between interviewees who explicitly agreed to serve as consultants to the center of activity (“I’m willing” = 3, 126 interviewees) explicitly refused (“I’m unwilling” = 0, 112 interviewees, including 8 interviewees who refused to answer the question), or gave “another” answer (an option not presented to the interviewees in the questionnaire). Interviewees who answered “other” were asked a verbal follow-up question, and their responses were encoded as more closely related to refusal (1) for responses “dependent on receiving approval” or “if there is no conflict of interest”, or closer to willingness (2) for responses such as “I don’t know/I’m unsure”, “I’m busy/Talk to me later/This is not my domain”, or “I’m willing but I will donate the money”. A scale from 0 (unwillingness to act in conflict of interest) to 3 (explicit willingness) was created.

**3. Willingness to receive prohibited gifts** was measured by the question: “In the technology industry, it is customary to financially compensate people who recommend candidates who are eventually selected to be hired. We are interested to know if we can contact you via email or phone if one of the candidates you recommended is chosen, in order to offer you such a reward.” The answer scale, which was not made known to the interviewees, included the following possibilities: a. Ready, b. Not ready, c. Do not know, d. Refusal to answer.

As in the disposition to nepotism index, the question about the interviewees’ willingness to receive monetary compensation for recommending successful candidates was presented only to those interviewees who proposed a candidate, whether or not they mentioned his name, and irrespective of whether they answered questions about the candidate or not.[[29]](#footnote-29) Similar to the coding for conflicts of interest, a distinction was made between interviewees who explicitly agreed to receive a monetary reward if their candidate was chosen for the job (“I’m willing” = 3), explicitly refused to receive monetary compensation (“I’m unwilling” =0), or gave some other answer (an option not presented to the subject in the questionnaire). Interviewees who gave “other” answers were asked a verbal follow-up question, and responses were encoded as more closely related to refusal (1), for responses like “dependent on receipt of approval” or “if there is no conflict of interest” or closer to willingness (2) for responses such as “I don’t know/I’m unsure”, “I’m busy/Talk to me later/This is not my domain” or “I’m willing but will donate the money”. A scale was thereby created that ranged from 0 (refusal) to 3 (willingness).

The descriptive statistics of these measures are presented in the results section.

**Results**

A. Degree of dispostion to corruption in the sample: descriptive measures and statistics

One of the aims of this study is to fill the lacuna in scholarship on the extent of corruption among civil servants. Indicators based on public opinion surveys, media coverage, investigations or convictions, subjective perceptions of judges, or positions of decision makers about corruption, all suffer from validity problems as measures of corruption, and do not accurately reflect reality.

First, offenses of public corruption, as is the case with the majority of fraud offenses, can be termed “exposed” offenses. Therefore, investigation files, convictions, or media coverage do not provide a real gauge of the extent of the phenomenon. If anything, these reflect the work of the police, media and the courts at most.

In the same way, reliance on media exposure or public perceptions is misleading because...

Other measures are based on the measurement of “visible corruption” reflecting the subjective attitudes of citizens or experts in the field and are based on how people perceive government corruption and its severity, and not on the true scope of government corruption.

Indicators of corruption in local government are particularly biased. The criminal and legal systems and the media typically focus on the central government and are less bothered with local government (offenses such as receiving cigars, for example, the subject of prime minister Netanyahu’s investigation, are unlikely to be investigated at the level of local government).

Since one of the goals of this study is to fill the lacuna in the literature regarding the extent of civil servants’ disposition to corruption, the degree of disposition to corruption in the entire sample will be shown first. As earlier stated, three dependent variables were used in order to empirically test the extent of decision-makers’ disposition to corruption, which are presented below. It should be noted that the response scales in these measures were normalized to 0-1 for analyses later on.

**1. Disposition to nepotism**

Figure 1 shows the disposition to nepotism in the sample according to the suitability of candidates recommended for the center’s management. Of the 96 interviewees who answered at least one question about their recommended candidate, 76 (79%) recommended a candidate who did not meet at least one of the professional requirements of education, experience,[[30]](#footnote-30) or professional relations (i.e., 21% had zero points); 43% recommended candidates who were found unsuitable for at least two reasons (for example, they recommended a candidate with whom they are on friendly terms who also had an inappropriate level of education or experience, or recommend a close friend); 18% recommended candidates so unsuitable that it suggests demonstrable nepotism (category 3, for example, a family member or a close friend who does not meet a professional requirement); 7% showed a very high level of nepotism by recommending candidates who were exceptionally unqualified (for example, they recommended a family member who was not suitable, or themselves). A total of 14 interviewees recommended a close friend (15%), 4 recommended family members (4%), and 5 interviewees recommended themselves (5%).

Figure 1. Disposition to nepotism by the suitability of candidates recommended to manage the center

Entries in this figure are frequencies. In all latter analyses, the scale was normalized to vary between 0-1.

**2. Disposition to conflict of interests**

Figure 3 shows the disposition to a conflict-of-interests according to the interviewees’ consent to serve as advisors to the technology center. As shown in Figure 2, approximately two-thirds (63%) of the decision-makers did not refuse to serve as part-time consultants for the center (categories 1-3), while 42% explicitly agreed to serve in a salaried position which conflicts with their public position’s interests.

Diagram 2. Disposition to a conflict-of-interests according to the interviewees’ consent to serve as advisors to the technology center

Entries in this figure are frequencies. In all subsequent analyses, the scale was normalized to vary from 0-1.

**Willingness to receive illegal gifts -**

As shown in Figure 3, approximately two-thirds (64%) of the 94 decision-makers who responded to the question did not refuse monetary compensation if their recommended candidate was selected to manage the technology center (categories 1-3), and about one third (36%) of decision-makers who answered this question explicitly agreed to receive forbidden gifts (category 3).

*Figure 3. Willingness to receive prohibited gifts according to the* interviewees’ *consent to receive monetary compensation*

Entries in this figure are frequencies. In all subsequent analyses, the scale was normalized to vary from 0-1.

Pad out the analysis? Summary of this part?

**Bivariate relationships**

In the first stage, the hypotheses about the relationship between religion and disposition to corruption were examined initially through bivariate analysis, as a preliminary stage of multilevel multivariate analysis, in which constant background variables were maintained at the individual and community levels.

Community Religiosity

First, the effect of community religiosity on the interviewees’ tendency toward corruption was examined.

Figure 2, above, shows the t-tests (including a 95% confidence interval) for the difference according to the religiosity of the community with regard to nepotism, the disposition to a conflict-of-interests (the degree of consent to serve as an advisor), and the willingness to receive prohibited gifts (financial reward for recommending a hired candidate), according to the level of religiosity of the community they serve. The three profiles on the left show the difference between the averages of the secular and ultra-Orthodox communities, while the three profiles on the right demonstrate the average difference between the secular and religious communities.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Figure 2: T-tests to compare the extent of the disposition to corruption according to the degree of religiosity of the community (secular versus religious versus ultra-Orthodox) and the type of corruption

Entries are differences between means in a two-sample t-test and 95% CIs. All scales were normalized to vary from 0-1.

In general, the fact that all the points denoting the difference of the averages are situated above the 0-line indicates that in all cases, decision-makers from religious or ultra-Orthodox communities demonstrated an increased disposition to corruption on average compared to interviewees from secular communities. The significance tests show that decision-makers from ultra-Orthodox communities showed a greater disposition to nepotism (p=.001) and to receiving prohibited gifts (p=0.52) than decision-makers from secular communities and to receive prohibited gifts, but did not exhibit a significant difference in disposition to a conflict-of-interests (p=.211). The difference between decision-makers from secular and religious communities is smaller. Decision-makers from religious communities showed a greater tendency than their secular counterparts to receive prohibited gifts (p = .015), but not to engage in nepotism (p=.655) or countenance a conflict-of-interests (p=.966).

MOVE TO APPENDIX?:

Figure 3: T-tests to compare the level of disposition to corruption according to the degree of religiosity of the community (secular versus religious versus ultra-Orthodox) and the type of corruption on the community level

ADD:

The seven communities on the left are the matches between the ultra-Orthodox and secular communities, and the five on the right are between religious and secular communities. Draw a line between them. Add information to the graph, maybe a few interviewees, at least comparisons of what’s ultra-Orthodox and what’s religious. Add a few words of interpretation - for example, most of the comparisons between ultra-Orthodox and secular communities over 0 (calculate the percentage) but this is not the case for religious-secular communities. Explain that the lack of significance is also a function of statistical power. Points without confidence intervals are those where in at least one of the equalizing groups there’s only one observation and therefore the confidence interval cannot be calculated.

Individual Religiosity

Figure 3 shows the t-tests (including a 95% confidence interval) for the relationship between reported religiosity and the disposition to nepotism, disposition to a conflict-of-interests (the degree of consent to act as consultants), and willingness to receive prohibited gifts (monetary rewards for nominating candidates who were later hired). The three profiles on the left show the average difference between secular and ultra-Orthodox decision-makers, the three profiles in the center represent the difference between secular and religious decision-makers, and the three profiles on the right are the difference between secular and traditional decision-makers

Figure 3: T-tests comparing degree of disposition to corruption according to the degree of the interviewees’ religiosity (secular versus traditional, religious, ultra-Orthodox) and the type of corruption

Entries are differences between means in a two-sample t test and 95% CIs. All scales were normalized to vary between 0-1

The significance tests show that the ultra-Orthodox decision-makers exhibited a greater disposition to nepotism (p=.000) and a conflict-of-interests (p = .010) than decision-makers from secular communities but did not show a significant difference in terms of willingness to receive prohibited gifts (p = .172). Five of the six differences between religious and traditional decision-makers and their secular counterparts are not significant; the exception is a greater tendency to nepotism by traditional decision-makers than their secular colleagues, (p = .012).

Three general conclusions emerge from these comparisons. First, the most significant difference with reference to religion are between ultra-Orthodox and secular people. Second, in the majority of cases, traditional, religious or ultra-Orthodox decision-makers generally showed an increased tendency to corruption on average when compared to secular decision-makers, although these differences are not always significant (except in two of the nine comparisons, which aren’t significant: p=.177, p=.825) Third, of the three types of corruption to be examined, the level of religiosity is most significant in connection to nepotism. Thus, both the ultra-Orthodox and the traditional interviewees showed a markedly increased level of received confidence in comparison to the secular interviewees, while the religious interviewees exhibited here the greatest difference in relation to the secular population, approaching marginal significance (p=.115).[[32]](#footnote-32)

1. Local councils typically include multiple communities [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Central Bureau of Statistics (2014). Local Government in Israel – 2014. Jerusalem: CBS[www.cbs.gov.il/publications16/local\_authorities14\_1642/pdf/intro\_h.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications16/local_authorities14_1642/pdf/intro_h.pdf) (accessed 19.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Central Bureau of Statistics (2013). Local Government in Ascending Order of the 2013 Socio-Economic Index – index value, cleavage ranking and classification, cleavage change compared to 2008. Jerusalem: CBS[www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2016n/24\_16\_330t1.xls](http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2016n/24_16_330t1.xls) (accessed 26.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Central Bureau of Statistics (2008). Specification of Geographical Units and their Classification by the Population’s Socio-Economic Level in 2008. Jerusalem: CBS [www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/1530/pdf/tab01\_01.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/1530/pdf/tab01_01.pdf) (accessed 26.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Refer to footnote 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Educational Institution Location System [apps.education.gov.il/imsnet/itur.aspx](http://apps.education.gov.il/imsnet/itur.aspx(נצפה) (accessed 26.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Israeli Local Government Election Results in 2013. [moin.gov.il/SUBJECTS/BCHIROT/Pages/election-muni2.aspx](http://moin.gov.il/SUBJECTS/BCHIROT/Pages/election-muni2.aspx) (accessed 23.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Refer to footnote 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. In order to test the effect of the difference between council members and appointed officials with respect to the degree of disposition to corruption. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Human Capital Management in Local Government [www.moin.gov.il/SUBJECTS/HUMANPOWERANDSALARY/Pages/default2.aspx](http://www.moin.gov.il/SUBJECTS/HUMANPOWERANDSALARY/Pages/default2.aspx) (accessed 23.11.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For example: Even Yehuda – Council Members. [www.even-yehuda.muni.il/?CategoryID=218](http://www.even-yehuda.muni.il/?CategoryID=218) (accessed 13.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For example: The Even Yehuda Local Council –Council Departments [www.even-yehuda.muni.il/?CategoryID=201](http://www.even-yehuda.muni.il/?CategoryID=201) (accessed 13.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The relevant sample size for each variable for each analysis will be stated. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. No data were found to compare the characteristics of decision-makers in local authorities in Israel, except for the percentage of women (14.7%) serving as council members (see footnote no. 24), and the percentage of ultra-Orthodox adults (about 9%) in the population - the Central Bureau of Statistics (2013). Social Survey 2011 - Distribution by Attitude to Religion. Jerusalem: CBS. [www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/seker\_hevrati11/pdf/intro\_h.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/seker_hevrati11/pdf/intro_h.pdf) (accessed 13.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Such as: The Civil Service Law (Appointments), 1959, and the Government Companies Law, 1975 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Avital, T. “Rampant Corruption in Local Authorities”. Calcalist” (8.5.13) [www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3602063,00.html](http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3602063,00.html) (accessed: 13.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. HCJ 531/79 **The Likud Party in the Municipality of Petach Tikva v. Petach Tikvah Municipality Council and Others**, Court ruling, Volume 34(2), 566, p. 5699 (1980) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Interview with Doron Navot on the occasion of the publication of the book Conflict of Interests in the Public Sphere: Law, Culture, Ethics and Politics (13.4.2010) goo.gl/A2uNma (accessed 13.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Public Service Law (Gifts), 1970 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Public Service Law (Discipline), 1963 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Civil Service Regulations, Seventh Edition (prohibitions and duties imposed on employees - prizes, gifts and benefits), 42.7, 608 (2004) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The Civil Service Commission reiterates prohibitions on receipt of gifts and benefits by public officials - including celebrations and family events” (23.2.14) goo.gl/4IMlty (accessed 20.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. HCJ 93/7074 Meir Suissa v. The Attorney General, Court Ruling, Volume 48(2), 748 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Weiss, A. “After 5 hours, Olmert Investigated, His Spouse Testified”. Ynet (29.8.08) [www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3589381,00.html](http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3589381,00.html) (accessed 15.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Amsterdamsky, S. and Singer, R. “State Comptroller: Suspicion of criminal behavior in Netanyahu’s handling and funding of his and family’s overseas travel expenses “. Calcalist (24.5.16) www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3688811,00.html (accessed 15.12.16) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. For simplicity’s sake, the two “traditional” categories were merged for the analysis. Table 4 in the online appendix shows the main models in the full distribution, with very similar results. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. A multi-level model with the same specification as in Table 1 indicates a number of characteristics associated with a candidate’s recommendation. On a personal level, elected officials (as opposed to supervisors) and receipt of wages were positively related, and marital status was negatively married, to candidate recommendation, when everything else remained constant. On the community level, belonging to an ultra-Orthodox community, location in the country’s periphery areas, and a high percentage of municipal taxes, were positively associated with candidate recommendation. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. It should be noted that the person who suggested himself was questioned about his education and experience, but was not asked about closeness to the recommended candidate for obvious reasons. Similarly, those who answered “other” on the closeness question were asked a follow-up question: “Overall, do you know each other more from personal or professional circumstances?” (1-5 scale). Those replying “personal alone” or “mainly personal” were encoded as “close friends”, while those answering “both personal and professional” or “mainly professional” were encoded as “friendly”, and those who replied “professional alone” were encoded as “professional acquaintances”. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Two of the interviewers chose not to ask a candidate who recommended themselves whether they were interested in receiving remuneration for a recommending a hired applicant, on the basis that they would not seek or receive additional compensation for having recommended themselves. As a result, 4 of the 5 interviewees who proposed themselves were not posed the question regarding prohibited gifts and are not included in this sample. The third interviewer chose to ask the question even in the case of a self-recommending interviewee, so one participant who recommended himself was asked this question. This participant, by the way, agreed to receive a reward for the “successful” recommendation of himself, which raises the possibility that the withdrawal from the index of these four interviewees led to a slightly more conservative result in the index. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. It should be noted that only two of the proposed candidates were reported as having very little to no experience, and therefore only twice did interviewees score a point in the inappropriate experience category. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. The full averages by community and by the community religiosity category, together with standard deviations (when produced), and the number of subjects that received any value in the variable, including one- and two-tailed t-tests, appear in Table X in the Appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Note that the size of the differences themselves are not an indication of the size of the effect, as they are a function of the wider index in this variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)