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The Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and the Holocaust in Kyiv, 1941–1943[[1]](#footnote-1)

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A certain paradox is inherent in the historiography of the complicity of local perpetrators in the Holocaust. Researchers often focus on tendentious methodological currents, thus neglecting less studied but fundamental aspects of the organization and the personnel of the local auxiliary police and other militarized units under German control. The example of the Ukrainian police in Kyiv is quite revealing in this context. While at first glance this issue appears to have been repeatedly investigated through the prism of the infamous tragedy of the mass shootings at Babyn Yar, it remains unresolved. We know little about the activities of the Kyiv police between 1942 and 1943, and almost nothing is known about the biographies of its leaders and the specifics of its operations. The role of each police structural unit remains unclear. Therefore, the author of this article has endeavored to determine the level of complicity of the local auxiliary police in the extermination of the Jews and other “political” victims of the Third Reich. This research aims to outline the role of the three most important branches of the Kyiv auxiliary police: the security and criminal police as well as the police battalions. The chronological framework of the article includes the operations of the city police throughout the entire period of German occupation.

**Keywords**: World War II, Ukraine, Kyiv, Holocaust, Collaboration, Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, *Schutzmannschaft*

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| Returning home one February day in 1943, Zakhar Trubakov had a bad premonition. For more than a year, he had concealed his Jewish identity from the world, constantly risking being exposed. As Zakhar approached his apartment, a stranger in civilian clothes opened the door and asked him to enter; another stranger was waiting inside. Zakhar realized that the uninvited visitors worked for the Ukrainian Criminal Police. Later, the circumstances behind this incident became clear: Zakhar’s comrade, a member of the Soviet resistance movement, had been arrested and forced under torture to reveal the addresses of his communist and Jewish acquaintances. Zakhar, aware of the precariousness of what lay ahead for him, asked the police officers if he could have one final meal at home and invited them to drink with him. The officers granted Zakhar’s request but refused to sit at the same table as him: “We don’t drink with [your kind].” The policemen soon led Zakhar outside, pulled out their pistols, and escorted him to their headquarters, warning him: “[take just] one step and it’s a bullet in the back.”[[2]](#footnote-2) Over the next several months, Zakhar was forced to endure beatings and interrogations, first by the Ukrainian auxiliary police and then by the German security service, after which he wound up in the Syrets concentration camp. In September 1943, Zakhar, along with other Jewish captives, was assigned to the so-called *Sonderkommando* 1005, created by the Nazis to destroy evidence of their own crimes. The prisoners dug up those who had been gunned down at Babyn Yar, collecting valuables and tearing out gold teeth before burning the bodies. Following the end of the operation, the Germans planned to murder all the captives; however, a small number of them managed to escape and survive.[[3]](#footnote-3)  Zakhar Trubakov was among those Jews arrested by the Ukrainian auxiliary police considerably after the mass shootings at Babyn Yar took place. As in other regions of Ukraine, police officers in Kyiv turned Jews over to the German authorities for eventual extermination. This fact, in particular, underscores the importance of conducting detailed research on the activities of the auxiliary police, since many research questions remain unresolved. Additionally, one encounters a certain paradox in existing literature, as Jan Grabowski has noted in the example of the General Government. Although researchers have examined the so-called Blue Police (*Polnishe Polizei*) multiple times, the Polish Criminal Police (*Polnische Kriminalpolizei*), whose activities are closely related to the annihilation of the Jewish population in the General Government, lacks adequate historiographical coverage.[[4]](#footnote-4) Such tendencies are inherent in research on the Ukrainian auxiliary police, as it is sometimes difficult to determine to which agencies police officers belonged and what their duties were. For example, based on Zakhar Trubakov’s description of the strangers who arrested him (wearing civilian clothing and armed with pistols), it could be determined that the officers worked for the Ukrainian Criminal Police. However, no specific research has been dedicated to them.[[5]](#footnote-5)  The history of the Ukrainian auxiliary police is primarily studied within the field of Holocaust studies. Among the existing works is a monograph by British historian Martin Dean that is now considered a classic.[[6]](#footnote-6) Although many of his conclusions are based on the example of Belorussia, Dean conducts a comprehensive review of comparable processes that occurred during the involvement of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in the mass shootings in Ukraine. Dean’s central thesis is that the Germans could not have exterminated so many people without the participation of local collaborators in the form of auxiliary forces in this case. The authors of subsequent research on the local level largely confirm Dean’s main arguments.[[7]](#footnote-7) Moreover, they often employ the methodological concepts advanced during the famous debate between Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen.[[8]](#footnote-8) As a result, the authors of regional and local research raise the issue of a wide spectrum of motives of police officers, which, they conclude, ranged from a survival strategy and conformism to ideological collaborationism. Each region had its own specificities and context that must also be considered in the analysis. |

Some historians have chosen a different methodological focus, examining the no less important questions of the institutional arrangement of military-police auxiliary structures, the collective profile of officers, and more.[[9]](#footnote-9) The authors of these works present comprehensive facts and statistics that enable us to trace the structural and personnel patterns in the formation and activities of the Ukrainian auxiliary police.

The literature on the Ukrainian auxiliary police in *Generalbezirk Kiew*—the General District of Kyiv— (the Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Poltava Oblasts —regions) reflects a high level of scholarly interest in the issue. Most historians have focused their attention on the complicity of local police in the Holocaust, while others examine the issue of institutional formation.[[10]](#footnote-10) Some discussions revolve around police involvement in the mass shootings at Babyn Yar and in the probably involvement in the so-called “Bukovina Battalion,” a partially militarized group of OUN-M members.[[11]](#footnote-11) All the authors mentioned in the references reveal important aspects of the formation and activities of local police, but frequently select a wide geographic range (a general region) or limit their research chronologically (the first six months of the occupation). Therefore, the function of the Kyiv auxiliary police over the entire period of the German occupation remains a compelling lacuna for further scholarly development. Even now, the names of the management personnel, the main activities of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, and the course of the Holocaust after the mass executions of September 29–30, 1941, remain unknown.

The source base for my article is primarily built on a body of unpublished materials from the State Archive Branch of the Security Service of Ukraine (GDA—SAB SSU). Over 100 archived criminal files on former members of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in the fifth (“non-rehabilitated parties”) and sixth (“rehabilitated parties”) archival collections have been processed and can now be studied. The files contain several shortcomings as sources, as Soviet special forces deployed the entire toolkit of interrogation techniques (including physical violence) during pre-trial investigations, while former police officers attempted to conceal as many “undesirable” details about themselves and their actions as possible. Accordingly, the investigations and the records of them turned into a mixture of sincere confessions, half-truths, and coercions, through which the historian must sift to answer the research questions posed.[[12]](#footnote-12) Another important collection of unpublished materials is maintained in the State Archive of Kyiv Oblast (SAKO). For example, the archival groups R-2320 and R-2726 contain internal documentation from the headquarters of the German city police, which partially controlled the activities of local auxiliary forces. Important research materials on the record-keeping of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in individual neighborhoods of the city are maintained in the archival groups R-2394, R-4436, and R-4437. They cover a wide array of diverse sources, from the “grassroots” requests of rank-and-file officers to instructions and orders from above.

Other types of sources include video testimonies by Jewish survivors and witnesses of the German occupation from the collections of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, as well as the memoirs of former officers in the Ukrainian auxiliary police.[[13]](#footnote-13) However, one must assess all these sources critically. For example, some Ukrainian nationalists have stressed that the Ukrainian auxiliary police could not have been in areas where there were mass shootings at Babyn Yar since it was only just forming at the time.[[14]](#footnote-14) Memoirs, like any other type of source, require additional verification and critical evaluation. Neglecting these fundamental principles leads to incorrect assessments and false conclusions, as historians have repeatedly pointed out.[[15]](#footnote-15) This is why scholarly research must rely on a wide selection of diverse, trustworthy, and verified sources.

**Formation and structure of the Ukrainian auxiliary police**

Throughout the 1930s, several negotiations took place between Ukrainian nationalist circles and various authorities of the Third Reich. Both sides primarily acted pragmatically: the Nazis were interested in intelligence, while the nationalists sought material and political support for the Ukrainian independence struggle. In the summer of 1939, German intelligence officers and a group of nationalists reached an agreement on temporary military collaboration, which resulted in the creation of the Nationalist Military Units under the command of Roman Sushko. This unit was eventually disbanded, yet several of its members were transferred to form the first Ukrainian auxiliary police stations in the General Government. Active collaboration resumed on the eve of the German-Soviet War, and with the start of Operation Barbarossa, members of both OUN factions followed advanced units of the German army deep into Soviet territory. Their goal was to establish local administrations and military-police units that, according to the plans of the nationalists, were intended to become the backbone of the future army of an independent Ukraine. At the same time, the Nazi reaction to the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State, announced by members of OUN-B, definitively demonstrated that they would not support any aspirations of independence from the local Slavs. Therefore, along with the success of organizing paramilitary units (“militias,” or *Miliz*), OUN-B members were arrested en masse in the summer and autumn of 1941. The management of OUN-M, on the contrary, collaborated with the Germans in moderation, allowing its members to avoid repression and to seize the initiative in forming administrations in the Zhytomyr and Kyiv Oblasts.[[16]](#footnote-16)

The Ukrainian auxiliary police force in Kyiv was officially established on October 1, 1941, but its organization began much earlier. The first OUN-M members to establish the auxiliary police headquarters on the site of the former Main Directorate of the Militia of Workers and Peasants entered the city with the German army on September 19. Up to 150 former prisoners of war (POWs), recruited from captives in the Zhytomyr concentration camp, entered the city in several groups led by the OUN-M.[[17]](#footnote-17) In fact, in September of that same year, the OUN-M had firmly secured its own positions in Zhytomyr, thereby converting the city into a coordination center for the nationalist movement for a period of time. A local prison camp for Red Army POWs became the personnel base for the future Ukrainian auxiliary police.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Besides nationalists, the number of whom steadily increased, representatives of various émigré political forces arrived in Kyiv throughout the autumn. It should be mentioned that many former participants in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 and their descendants awaited a good opportunity to return to Ukraine to renew the independence struggle. The German aggression against the Soviet Union seemed to provide such an opportunity. On June 29, 1941, émigré military-political forces established the Ukrainian General Council of Combatants to coordinate and further dispatch volunteers deep into the Ukrainian occupied territory. As a result, pro-Ukrainian forces (nationalists, émigrés, and largely anti-Soviet locals) quickly monopolized administrative authority.[[19]](#footnote-19)

At the same time, the German civilian administration, which gradually took control of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, began reestablishing itself in Kyiv in the autumn of 1941. Repressing the most prominent pro-Ukrainian figures, the Nazis transformed the auxiliary police according to the German system (modeled on other Eastern European police forces).[[20]](#footnote-20) The changes also affected the conditions for recruitment: while the nationalists preferred candidates of Ukrainian origin without a Soviet “political” past, under the Germans, restrictions were related solely to physical abilities. In practice, people of various cultural, ethnic, and socio-political origins joined the ranks of the auxiliary police. The entire overhaul process was completed in the first half of 1942 and was marked by the division of the single “Ukrainian auxiliary police” into several separate organizations.[[21]](#footnote-21)

The first was the Ukrainian Protective Police (*Schutzmannschaft-Einzeldienst*, UOP), controlled by the German city police (*Schutzpolizei*). It is the UOP that researchers usually refer to when discussing the Ukrainian auxiliary police. This is not surprising since it soon became the largest branch of the auxiliary police, with its members patrolling the city and in contact with the population around the clock. As of September 1942, the UOP was composed of its headquarters (located at 5a Chekistiv Street), four divisions, and two sections (*Abschnitt*), each of which oversaw the activities of five or six district police forces. Personnel continually rotated throughout the auxiliary police, resulting in officers from various districts being sent to form “covert units” in the city (discussed further below): initially the field engineer (*Pionierzug*) and anti-tank (*Pakzug*) groups, and later the heavy weapons (*Schwerekompanie*) and headquarters groups (*Stabskompanie*). In early 1943, the UOP employed approximately 1,800 people, making it the largest auxiliary police department in Kyiv.[[22]](#footnote-22)

To better understand the UPP at the grassroots level, it is worthwhile to describe the characteristics of a single district police force. The central office of the Zaliznychnyi District Police (6th *Schutzmannschaftsrevier*) was located at 33 Vokzal’ny Street and oversaw the territory south of the central train station. Luka Vasylenko served as the district’s Ukrainian commander from January 1942 to September 1943. As of June 24, 1943, there were 96 full-time and rank-and-file officers in the district. Police spent most of their working hours providing protection and patrolling the city streets. Sometimes they were involved in mass raids and arrests of the civilian population before deporting them to Germany for forced labor. The activities of the local auxiliary police were inspected by German personnel comprising the district head (*Revierführer*) Loman, two police chiefs, and one service dog caretaker. The district’s arsenal included two pistols, 56 Soviet-model rifles, and 1,680 rounds of ammunition.[[23]](#footnote-23) The personnel and weapons of the Zaliznychnyi District Police can be considered representative of the other ten districts.

The second organization was first called the “investigative division” and later the Ukrainian Security Police (*Sicherheitsschutzmannschaft*) or the Ukrainian Criminal Police (UCP). For a while, the UCP operated under the command of the German city police, but it was later integrated into the regional division of the German security service (*Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst*, *SiPo/SD*) led by SS *Obersturmbannführer* Erich Erlinger at 33 Korolenka Street. Within the structure of the *SiPo/SD* was the fifth office (*Amt V*), the “criminal police,” whose personnel investigated relevant offenses committed by Germans. In March 1942, the “investigative division” of the Ukrainian auxiliary police became incorporated into the fifth office and was known as *Referat V/d* (that is, sub-office “d” of the fifth office). One of its responsibilities was investigating criminal and administrative offenses committed by the local German population. In March 1943, a political division (*Referat V/d/4*), sometimes referred to as the “Ukrainian Gestapo,” was formed under the fourth office of the *SiPo/SD*: the secret state police (*Geheime Staatspolizei*). From that point, the UCP de jurereceived carte blanche to investigate any crimes committed by the local population, including by individuals of a “political” character: Jews, Soviet activists, and nationalists.[[24]](#footnote-24) Yet, de facto, it returned to the rights and obligations it possessed in the autumn of 1941, when the “investigative division” under OUN-M had practically unlimited discretion.

The UCP headquarters were located at 15 Korolenka Street throughout the entire occupation. According to the standard principle of duplicating positions in auxiliary military-police formations, the German boss (first *SS-Oberscharführer* Kurt Zypli and later *SS-Untersturmführer* Jakob Huber, a Galician *Volksdeutscher*) inspected the work of the Ukrainian boss (starting with Roman Bida and ending with Vadym Maikovskyi). The headquarters was divided into a number of departments, specifically: criminal investigation, secret intelligence, politics, and administration. The criminal investigation unit was further divided into eight commissariats: murder, banditry, major robbery, minor theft, and malfeasance.[[25]](#footnote-25) The other three commissariats were called “investigative groups” (or “search groups”), and were embedded in several police districts simultaneously and conducted relevant agent and investigative work on the ground (investigating crimes committed in the district). Each commissariat was headed by a commissar, a deputy, and a certain number of agents and detectives.[[26]](#footnote-26) As of August 1943, there were approximately 190 employees in the UCP.[[27]](#footnote-27)

The third organization included the so-called “covert units,” particularly the 114th, 115th, and 118th auxiliary police battalions (*Schutzmannschaftsbatallionen*). The battalions initially operated under the German city police and later under the regional Order Police (*Ordnungspolizei*). Unlike the city or village patrol police, battalion members were situated in barracks since they functioned as rapid response units that could be instantly transferred anywhere. Their responsibilities included anti-partisan activities, as well as protection and punishment. The first such unit, *Schutzmannschaftsbatallion Kiew*, was organized out of OUN-M members and POWs. As early as February 16, 1942, *Schutzmannschaftsbatallion Kiew* was renamed to the 115th *Schutzmannschaftbattalion*, while some idle POWs and members of the “Bukovina battalion” were enlisted in the 118th *Schutzmannschaftbattalion* in early March.[[28]](#footnote-28) Each battalion contained between 300 and 500 officers. After the transformation to numbered militarized groups, battalion personnel were almost never involved in raids in the city and were directed instead to fight partisans in southern Kyiv and later in Byelorussia and France.[[29]](#footnote-29) Additionally, in the summer of 1942, the occupation authorities decided to organize another battalion: the 114th *Schutzmannschaftbattalion*. Its personnel, with no fewer than 300 officers, was mainly composed of penalized members of the city police or those suspected of disloyalty.[[30]](#footnote-30) .[[31]](#footnote-31)

In the spring of 1942, the *SiPo/SD* created another “covert unit”: the 23rd *Schutzmannschaftbattalion*. Many young people from across *Generalbezirk Kiew*, facing a choice between working in the police and being deported to Germany for forced labor,joined the battalion. A special unit (totaling up to 700 officers) of the 23rd *Schutzmannschaftbattalion* was involved in guarding the Syrets concentration camp, and since 1943, like the other “covert units,” was sent outside Kyiv for anti-partisan activities.[[32]](#footnote-32)

Thus, it can be seen that these three organizations initially possessed a unified, but eventually different, German leadership. Accordingly, their rights, duties, and specific activities varied, resulting in some groups participating in the Holocaust more intensively than others.

**Mass executions and *Judenjagd* (fall–winter 1941)**

Historians have long established that the mass executions of September 29–30, 1941 were carried out by firing squads composed exclusively of Germans, primarily *Sonderkommando* 4a (under the command of Paul Blobel), Army Group South (composed of the 45th reserve police battalion and the 303rd reserve police battalion), and employees of Friedrich Jeckeln, commander-in-chief of the SS and “Southern Russia” police.[[33]](#footnote-33) But was the Ukrainian auxiliary police involved in the mass executions? The headquarters of the Kyiv auxiliary police was already operational in late September.[[34]](#footnote-34) The exact number of officers that the Germans could have managed is not entirely clear. At the time, according to the estimates of an unidentified OUN-M member, there were up to 200 officers in total in the city.[[35]](#footnote-35) This information appears entirely reasonable, since the chronologically closest discovered document, dated October 15, features a slightly larger figure of 230 officers.[[36]](#footnote-36)

It is known from archived criminal files that at the end of September, around 40 police POWs were directed to the location of the executions, where they sorted the clothing of murdered Jews. Eyewitnesses and victims distinguished between Germans and their local assistants, occasionally identifying them based on the “non-local” dialect of Ukrainian that they spoke (hinting at the presence of nationalists).[[37]](#footnote-37) Eventually, it was the OUN-M members that admitted that some of them, particularly the head of the “investigative division” Roman Bida (“Gordon”), were at Babyn Yar.[[38]](#footnote-38) Meanwhile, no mention of the presence of the Ukrainian auxiliary police at Babyn Yar could be found in the famous body of sources “Reports from the Occupied Territories of the USSR.” These “reports” usually contain information about the aftermath of the German-led mass executions and recollections of the participation of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Russian, and other auxiliary police forces in transporting and sometimes executing, the local population.[[39]](#footnote-39) For example, these documents show that on September 6, 1941, “1,107 adult Jews were executed by *Sonderkommando* 4a” in Radomyshl, “while 561 Jewish children were executed by the Ukrainian auxiliary police.”[[40]](#footnote-40) Thus, the absence of any recollections from the period of September 29–30, in both the “reports” from Kyiv and the mentioned testimonies, leads us to conclude that a certain contingent of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, mostly former prisoners of war, was present at the shooting sites and performed solely auxiliary functions.

The term “hunt for the Jews” (*Judenjagd*), proposed by the renowned Holocaust researcher Christopher Browning,[[41]](#footnote-41) most successfully conveys the atmosphere of the first weeks after the mass executions at Babyn Yar. Let us recall the announcement issued on the eve of the executions regarding the gathering of all Jews at the corner of Dehtiarivska and Melnyka Streets, with the threat of death for noncompliance. In practical terms, the announcement meant that Jewish life gradually became outlawed from the moment the first shots were fired at Babyn Yar the next day. Unregistered Soviet political activists—members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKPB), the Komsomol (VLKSM), and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)—were later added to the list of official “enemies” of the Third Reich that were subject to extermination. Their chances of survival were considerably reduced due to the investigative measures taken with the support of local assistants.

Unlike in several large cities in Ukraine,[[42]](#footnote-42) the process of involving the Kyiv auxiliary police in “hunting Jews” is not recorded in police documents. It is practically impossible to precisely establish the participants in these operations, yet based exclusively on available sources, it appears that POW units assembled by OUN-M members, and shortly thereafter the “Bukovina battalion,” were almost the only suitable auxiliary units for mass roundups during the first months of the occupation. One can assume that the Germans might have used them during the “hunt” at the same time, since the recollections of nationalists and German police documents reveal that they had a joint command structure and acted as a single unit—*Schutzmannschaftbattalion Kiew* (the Kyiv Battalion)—for some time.[[43]](#footnote-43)

Based on the testimony of POW Ivan Sova, it is known that the nationalist command of the battalion regularly delivered political lectures, explaining the basic responsibilities and tasks of the police, particularly “catching Communists, Komsomol members, partisans, and Jews hiding from execution.”[[44]](#footnote-44) Another member of the battalion, nationalist Kost’ Himmelreich, assured compliance with the guidelines of the management. Since officers lived in barracks, Himmelreich was present in October or November 1941, when most of his colleagues were “catching” Jews (I note the use of the same term by both). Himmelreich also explained the details of mass arrests: “Those [officers] who returned emptyhanded were reprimanded and went out to look again.”[[45]](#footnote-45)

It did not really matter whether the police were local because they had lists of the addresses of victims. The fact is that according to an order from Anatoliy Konkel (“Orlyk”), commander of the auxiliary police headquarters, on October 18, 1941, building superintendents and janitors were required to inform occupation authorities about all known Jews and Soviet activists or face the death penalty.[[46]](#footnote-46) Control over implementation fell to the district police officers, who explained the responsibilities and inspected the work of orderlies.[[47]](#footnote-47) In the end, it was the police that confirmed compliance with Konkel’s order. In most cases, superintendents or janitors provided lists of residents, although they often independently brought unregistered members of the VKPB, and mainly Jews, to police districts.[[48]](#footnote-48) It is generally clear that the threat of death had a much stronger impact on their motivation to fulfill orders than the usual “reprimand” of police as recalled by Himmelreich.

The actual activities of on-duty members of the UPP began in October, after the division of the city into 13, and later 11, police districts. Since that point, the full-time personnel steadily increased thanks to an inflow of residents to the city and region. One Kyivan living in Darnytskyi District recalled that at the start of the occupation:

[M]any young men expressed their readiness to join the police [...] almost all of them very enthusiastically told the German SS about their Jewish [neighbors] and where they were hiding so that they would find and [...] exterminate them.[[49]](#footnote-49)

At the start of the German occupation, the rights and responsibilities of police were not clearly defined. Unlike battalion officers, whose service more resembled that of a soldier under the supervision of superiors, UOP officers had greater scope for their own initiatives. In other words, in the words of the compilers of the history of the Yaroslavskyi District Police, “We worked according to our conscience, as Ukrainians were supposed to: without Jews.”[[50]](#footnote-50) Some, like Mykhailo Serdiuk, a former Soviet officer and the commander of the Volodymyrskyi District Police, actively carried out educational work “to raise the moral and ideological condition” of the full-time personnel, even if it required individual conversations. Transcripts of weekly meetings of the district council contain many expressions of his anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic views: “There are many saboteurs, NKVD members, and Jews who need to be caught.”[[51]](#footnote-51) According to Serdiuk, “some people with a Jewish-Bolshevik upbringing” even joined the special police unit “for easy profit or pecuniary requirements.”[[52]](#footnote-52) It is significant that none of the others present at the meetings, particularly OUN-M members, used such language.

One observes a similar situation in district police forces. Oleksiy Furta joined the service on October 28, 1941, and was almost immediately appointed deputy commander of the Shevchenkivskyi District Police. Furta’s lack of experience working in such institutions did not prevent him from independently recruiting a former NKVD employee and, threatening him with arrest, compelled him to denounce Jews and Communists that he knew.[[53]](#footnote-53) The fate of others depended on the deputy commander of the Podilskyi District Police, Viktor Sukharenko. At the turn of November–December 1941, police arrested a Jewish woman, and soon thereafter, her husband and son soon. All the detainees were brought to Sukharenko for interrogation, during which they tried to disown accusations of their Jewish identity. Sukharenko did not believe them, noting that “their appearance alone gave it away,” and sent them all to the police headquarters.[[54]](#footnote-54) German supervising officers were not present at either police district, meaning the fate of the detainees fell on the leadership of the Ukrainian auxiliary police.

Among all the inherited features of the Soviet conformist society, denunciation became the most common form of complicity of the urban population in the Holocaust.[[55]](#footnote-55) Even at the beginning of the occupation, German special forces reported that “the total cleansing of localities of Bolsheviks, Jews, and associated elements was achieved thanks to denunciations.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Kyiv was no different from the general context, which can be learned, in particular, from *SiPo/SD* employees:

Many claims about Jews being discovered reached the SD from various informants. Sometimes informants included their surnames and addresses in their claims, and sometimes there were only individual letters [...] All denunciations regarding Jews were maintained by Gestapo officer [Friedrich] Gainz.[[57]](#footnote-57)

There was also a corpus of denunciations in Ukrainian auxiliary police districts. These were either handwritten notes or oral messages from citizens that police officers recorded during an individual appointment. For example, a note containing the following information was discovered in the personal belongings of a police officer: “Jewish woman [surname] at 21/18 Fundukliivska Street,” or “Jew Pogrebetsky [address].”[[58]](#footnote-58) Once the necessary information had been obtained, a group of police officers was sent to the indicated address. The process was made easier by the fact Jewish apartments, unlike all others, could be searched without a corresponding warrant or order . For example, detective Oleksandr Naumenko of the Shevchenivskyi District Police arrested several Jews based on denunciations. He independently arrested at least two suspects, including a convert who was first sent to headquarters but soon released (as a Jew who “was baptized 27 years ago”).[[59]](#footnote-59)

It should be explained that every police district had agents and investigators for criminal and political matters. Unlike other members of the UOP, they were subordinated to the commissars and the head of the Ukrainian Communist Party (KPU). The guidelines issued by the nationalists directed criminal detectives to investigate both criminal and administrative offenses. Political detectives were tasked with combatting: “a) the remnants of Jewish communes; b) espionage; c) Ukrainian anarchist elements.”[[60]](#footnote-60) Although any police officer could arrest a suspected communist or Jew, Ukrainian Communist Party workers were responsible for carrying out direct intelligence and investigative activities. Their duties generally remained the same until the end of the occupation.

The execution—or non-execution— of tasks depended entirely on the initiative of rank-and-file agents and detectives, as there was practically no control over their work. The head of the UCP issued orders in oral form only, while subordinates assumed sole responsibility for further operational choices. For example, several UCP workers demanded the passport of a suspect “whose nationality was corrected from Jewish to German, [because of which] we detained and sent [him] to Chief Gordon [Roman Bida – translator note] .”[[61]](#footnote-61) Detainees awaited interrogation, which, prior to the German takeover of local police, could last for an unlimited time until the suspect confessed. For example, detective Mykola Halushko (a former NKVD worker) interrogated a Jewish man for almost 35 days. Moreover, some UCP officers decided independently to verify whether men suspected of being Jews were circumcised (beginning in the first half of 1942, only a *SiPo/SD* doctor could conduct a physical examination of Jews).[[62]](#footnote-62) The total number of arrests in the fall of 1941 was presumably so high that Chief Bida decided to send the following petition to the city commissar Colonel Muss:

The investigative division of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Kyiv, in view of the Jewish-Bolshevik danger in the city, considers it necessary to establish a prison and concentration camp to isolate certain elements and combat sabotage and danger in the city. The investigative division requests the assistance of the commissar in Kyiv in transferring the Lukyanivska prison into the custody of the investigative division and in organizing a concentration camp near this prison.[[63]](#footnote-63)

It is known from historical literature and sources that the auxiliary police were directly involved in executions in certain areas of *Generalbezirk Kiew*.[[64]](#footnote-64) Did these executions occur in the city itself? In one interrogation, former detective Vasyl’ Pokotylo (originally from Kyiv) confirmed that, together with several colleagues, he had executed Jews. One such incident occurred in October 1941, when:

[Chief Bida] asked a group of police officers, including me, to bring 20 arrested Jews to the “SD.” When we arrived with the detainees, they ordered us to shoot them. We took our victims to Babyn Yar. There [the detainees] were directed to dig a pit, and when it was ready, we took off their shirts, lined them up, and shot them. There were 10 officers, each of whom had to shoot two people.[[65]](#footnote-65)

The credibility of this testimony is undermined by the fact that Pokotylo recanted his his own statements in successive interviews, claiming that he had been pressured by Soviet detectives. Although his personal participation in the murders remains in question, Pokotylo’s colleagues confirmed that throughout the first months of the occupation, individual UCP officers indeed “found abandoned Jewish families in Kyiv, drove them to the Lukyanivska cemetery, and shot them, waging a struggle against people they deemed a security risk.”[[66]](#footnote-66) Local residents also claimed that some officers in the Darnytskyi District Police had participated in executing district party activists in December 1941.[[67]](#footnote-67) It should be noted that there are few of such testimonies claiming that Kyiv police officers directly participated in murders, and the available documents are often limited to the first six months of the occupation. Theoretically, the transitional state and the lack of strict regulation of responsibilities allowed police to participate in, or even independently carry out, executions. Yet this question requires additional sources to confirm. It is certain that the *SiPo/SD* carried out most of the executions of detained Jews and Communists throughout 1942–1943. Yet even among them one can find auxiliary police officers—exclusively ethnic Germans—from the local population.[[68]](#footnote-68)

**Further arrests and violence (1942–43)**

The beginning of 1942 was marked by large special operations involving some local police officers, especially members of *Schutzmannschaftbattalion Kiew*. In late January, officers surrounded the Jewish market and arrested around 250 people. Among them were Jews who were first escorted to German institutions and later to the concentration camp on Kerosynna Street (Dulag 201).[[69]](#footnote-69) February saw the beginning of a large-scale operation in which the German and Ukrainian police, having divided into groups of several people, joined forces and swept the city. They were given lists of addresses that they were to visit, arresting those who were unregistered and residing there illegally. Three officers in *Schutzmannschaftbattalion Kiew*, including Serhiy Orlov, had to verify the documents of three residents of houses on Kurenivska Street, resulting in the arrests of two Jews.[[70]](#footnote-70) Operations of this scale concluded in May 1942, while the total number of arrests reached several thousand people (mainly Communists).[[71]](#footnote-71)

From the first half of 1942, a reduction in the number of “political” arrests conducted by UPP officers can be seen. For example, between March and December of that year, police in the Volodymyrskyi District Police detained eight individuals “suspected of Jewishness” and one who was hiding Jews.[[72]](#footnote-72) This trend is attributable to several factors, the main one being the scale of violence in the first six months of the German occupation, as only a small number of Jews managed to survive this period. Another factor was the redistribution of labor between branches of the auxiliary police. Beginning in April 1942, one of the top priorities of the UOP was complying with officially established norms regarding the shipment of able-bodied (mainly Ukrainian) people to Germany for forced labor. In this way, the circle of people involved in carrying out the Holocaust was limited to the most proactive employees.

Yet in early autumn 1942, there was a certain revival of anti-Jewish sentiment within the Kyiv auxiliary police. This is primarily evidenced by an unusual remark by the commander of the UOP headquarters, Anatoliy Kabayda: “We have recently noted the emergence of Jews. They must be detained and immediately transferred to the SD.”[[73]](#footnote-73) Additionally, the largest structural reorganization of the auxiliary police occurred no later than September. The extent to which this was a coincidence is unknown, yet several important events that indirectly affected the situation occurred throughout this period. For example, in Directive No. 46 of August 18, 1942, Hitler authorized expanding the full-time personnel of the auxiliary police (a reaction to increasing partisan activity in the occupied territories of the USSR).[[74]](#footnote-74) Additionally, between August and September of the same year, *Reichsführer-SS* Himmler led several meetings of the senior management of the German police in the occupied Ukrainian territories at the *Werwolf* headquarters in Vinnytsia. At one of these meetings, citing the *Schutzmannschaftbattalion Kiew* as an example, Himmler offered recommendations regarding the selection of the most suitable police officers from a “racial point of view” and their subsequent integration into the force.. During another meeting, Himmler expressed unease about the revival of the partisan movement and the fact that the extermination of the Jews was incomplete.[[75]](#footnote-75) Among those present at the meetings was Higher SS and Police Leader in Ukraine Hans-Adolf Prützmann, who quite likely conveyed Himmler’s general thoughts to his own subordinates on the ground, particularly in *Generalbezirk Kiew*.

An outbreak of anti-Jewish activity can also be seen at the local level. For example, in August 1942, Iosyp Kirichok, an officer in the Volodymyrskyi police district, detained a Jew while off duty. His route to work ran through the Volodymyrskyi market, which he decided to inspect. Such venues were a “gold mine” for police officers, as they could obtain any item for free through illegal confiscation. At the market, Kirichok noticed two suspicious individuals whom he decided to detain and bring to the police station. One of the detainees turned out to be a Jew, for which Kirichok received a reward in the form of food.[[76]](#footnote-76) At the same time as Kirichok’s incident, Vasyl Stratenko, captain of police in the Pushcha-Vodytsya subdistrict, found a Jewish man, brought him to the police station, and interrogated him using physical force.[[77]](#footnote-77) Interestingly, interrogation was not among the duties of UOP officers, so the leadership was constantly trying to put an end to such practices, threatening severe punishment.[[78]](#footnote-78) It is likely that Stratenko was not punished due to his close friendly relationship with Wiese, the German commander of the Pushcha-Vodytsya police, whose “word” carried more weight than that of the Ukrainian leadership.

In practice, not only Pushcha-Vodytsya, but every district turned out to be an island of unregulated violence with its own rules. The right to physical interrogation and other forms of assault were initially held by the Germans, who quite clearly could share it with local police without official sanction from above.[[79]](#footnote-79) For example, in July 1943, Makiyevskyi (a former NKVD employee), deputy commander of the Yaroslavskyi District Police, beat a detained Jewish woman in front of a German officer. During the interrogation, Makiyevskyi threatened the woman that if they eventually learned the truth of her Jewish origins, “[I will] shoot you personally.”[[80]](#footnote-80) Demych, an agent in the Sofiivskyi District Police, used a rubber baton to beat those who did not confess to “political crimes” in interrogations. Demych himself said that he was engaged in “physical education.”[[81]](#footnote-81) Leliukh, a guard in a *SiPo/SD* prison who worked in a similar environment before the war—the convoy department in the NKVD—beat captives and once shot an escaped prisoner while off duty. Leliukh was awarded a Medal for Gallantry and Merit for Members of the Eastern Peoples for his conscientious fulfillment of his duties.[[82]](#footnote-82)

The normalization of violent practices among police officers affected their behavior outside their work. Even in those cases where they left the police, their actions explicitly revealed that they belonged to were part of a the community of those who had the right to use violence. Once, a former deputy commander of the Shevchenkivsyi District Police, who had already been dismissed, went with friends to a restaurant, where a conflict arose between them and a group of people. One of the latter was deliberately “suspected” of having Jewish origins, so the former police officer, possessing certain skills acquired from working in occupation authorities, detained the man, led him to the restroom, and conducted a bodily inspection for circumcision. Although the man did not turn out to be a Jew, the former deputy commander had no official authority to conduct such an inspection.[[83]](#footnote-83) In another instance, Zakhar Trubakov, the aforementioned prisoner in the Syrets concentration camp, recognized a guard as his pre-war colleague, Yuriy Pavlovskyi. Surprised at seeing Trubakov, Pavlovskyi exclaimed: “How did you end up here? Aren’t you a Jew and a Communist?”[[84]](#footnote-84) It turned out that had Pavlovskyi had joined the administrative branch of the UOP under the Germans, but he was arrested in the autumn of 1942 for bribery and sent to the concentration camp. Unlike other prisoners, he enjoyed several privileges that allowed him to avoid working in grueling jobs and to beat and ridicule other captives. In April 1943, Pavlovskyi was released and reinstated with the police, where he continued to engage in bribery.[[85]](#footnote-85)

It is worth explaining that the Syrets concentration camp, along with the Darnytskyi and forced labor camps on Kerosynna Street, was one of the largest venues in the city for forced detention of soldiers and civilians. The camps had a separate section designated for “political criminals,” yet most of the prisoners in the Syrets concentration camp, established no later than June 1942, were communists and Jews. This is due to the fact that, unlike the other two camps (managed by a military administration), Syrets was subordinated to the regional command of the *SiPo/SD* and was active until the end of the occupation. The guarding of the camp was entrusted to Germans and local fighters in the 23rd *Schutzmannschaftbattalion*, who humiliated and murdered prisoners. For example, in May 1943, a guard named Volodymyr Brystov, in the presence of a German commander, “chopped down a Jew and a Russian with an axe […] he killed the Jew for working poorly.” Brystov executed a group of captives a few months later.[[86]](#footnote-86) The total number of victims in the Syrets concentration camp alone is estimated at approximately 25,000 people.[[87]](#footnote-87)

UOP agents and investigators employed tactics of ambush and sudden searches of buildings and private apartments. However, unlike everyone else, investigators could be involved in several or more cases at the same time, so the lives of many people depended on their decisions. Throughout his entire service, the investigator Pokotylo, previously mentioned several times, arrested at least six Jews and 13 Soviet activists on his own. His colleague Naumenko asserted that in nine months, he had investigated around 10 “political” cases resulting in escorting detainees to police headquarters. Other rank-and-file officers in the UOP were not always so “successful” and were limited to a few arrests. However, one commissariat alone could reach over 100 completed cases in total.[[88]](#footnote-88) Therefore, comparing the average number of detainees with the number of UOP officers allows us to assume that agents and investigators carried out dozens to hundreds of “political” arrests throughout 1942–1943.

The Holocaust was not limited to the physical extermination of Jews, as tens of thousands of pieces of clothing, thousands of pieces of real estate, and tons of valuables turned out to be a “trophy” not only for Germans. As is already known, local police officers helped to sort clothing during the executions at Babyn Yar, but their duties did not end there. Testimonies exist about officers systematically removing property from the apartments of those who had been shot dead. The first months of chaos under the occupation effectively allowed officers to personally appropriate some of the property of an arrested Jew or to occupy almost any empty apartment.[[89]](#footnote-89) Ivan Dobrovolskyi, commander of the Kurenivskyi District Police, temporarily resided in one such Jewish apartment. After being dismissed from the police, he was forced to move, which he eventually did after taking some furniture from the apartment with him (a piano, sofa, wardrobe, cupboard, and more).[[90]](#footnote-90) Cases of exceeding the scope of one’s police duties began to be harshly punished after the Germans nationalized the property of murdered Jews and took control of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, leading to one officer being executed.[[91]](#footnote-91)

**Personnel and motivation**

Researching the personnel of the auxiliary police can shed light on several questions related to their complicity in the Holocaust. At the same time, biographical details about the Kyiv auxiliary police only appear as scattered mentions and are usually from the first months of the occupation. This is why I propose to briefly dwell on the collective portrait of each agency.

Despite repression by the Germans, as of September 1942, around 70% of all management positions in the UOP were held by OUN-M members, Petliurivtsi, and other pro-Ukrainian locals.[[92]](#footnote-92) All the commanders in its headquarters—Anatoliy Konkel, Hrihoriy Zakhvalynskyi, Volodymyr Butkevych,[[93]](#footnote-93) Anatoliy Kabayda—were OUN members. Moreover, they continued collaborating with the Germans after the latter retreated from Kyiv. For example, commander Konkel and head of the second department Arseniy Mel’nychuk ended up in the 14th SS “Galicia” Grenadier Division, which reorganized as the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army (UD UNA) in April 1945. Volodymyr Hladych, head of the Kyiv police school, and Arkadiy Arseniv, commander of the Svyatoshinskyi District Police, continued serving within the “Free Ukraine” anti-tank brigade, which joined the 2nd UD UNA.[[94]](#footnote-94) The fighters in the latter were largely Ukrainian police officers who evacuated to the West and joined the air raid protection (*Luftschutzpolizei*) and fire protection (*Feuerschutzpolizei*) services. One of these units in the city of Metz (France) was headed by Stepan Zyn’,[[95]](#footnote-95) an adjutant of the UOP headquarters. Headquarters commander Kabayda initially worked in the fire protection squad in the city of Beeskow (Germany) but transferred to the so-called “parachute brigade” (which also joined the UNA), led by Taras Bulba-Borovets, in the spring of 1945.[[96]](#footnote-96)

OUN members and émigrés could not exist outside the context of the interwar period, so they at least partially professed far-right views (radical nationalism, anti-Bolshevism, and anti-Semitism). Therefore, the independence struggle was closely intertwined with the elimination of real and imagined enemies of Ukrainian statehood. Soon after the mass executions at Babyn Yar, OUN-M member Ivan Kediulych, deputy commander of the city police, blackmailed a detained Jew. Another police officer attempted to stand up for the Jew, to which Kediulych replied: “Can you feel sorry for those Kaganoviches that wiped out millions of our people?”[[97]](#footnote-97) At the same time, in dinner conversations, nationalist commanders like Konkel or Bida expressed their view that “Ukraine should remain a nation for Ukrainians only.”[[98]](#footnote-98) The most recent research on the biographies of individual OUN-M members support the existence of such a worldview until the end of the war.[[99]](#footnote-99) However, the place of Ukrainian nationalism during the Holocaust in Kyiv should not be overestimated, as most perpetrators of crimes were local residents of Soviet Ukraine.[[100]](#footnote-100)

The motivation of ordinary UOP officers—mainly married young men (up to 28 years old) from the city or region—was generally far from stable ideological collaborationism. Depending on the period, it ranged from active backing of the Nazi regime to cases of mass resistance. Some decided to join the police under threat of being sent to Germany for forced labor, yet there was also no shortage of volunteers. This description refers mainly to the first year of the occupation, the apogee of anti-Soviet and pro-German sentiment. When visiting his native village in the fall of 1942, a Kyiv police officer announced at a meeting with local residents that: “We will destroy the Jews; such a nation should not exist.”[[101]](#footnote-101) There is no doubt that the conditions for him and many of his colleagues at the time were ideal for encouraging them to want to collaborate with the German administration. New opportunities (especially for those previously repressed and deprived of their rights), decent material incentives, and an exaggerated sense of one’s own power motivated officers to diligently fulfill their duties. Additionally, the politics of economic exploitation and terror envisaged by the leadership of the Third Reich did not disturb officers, as they were the ones implementing it at the local level. With the change in the military situation—unfavorable for the Germans—even the most active officers experienced an upheaval in the loyalty system by resorting to mass desertion. For example, during an interrogation of a local man in the autumn of 1941, Mykola Shelest, an officer in the Darnytskyi District Police, shouted: “Bolshevik! We should have shot you a long time ago, Bolshevik whelps.” Two years later, as the Red Army was approaching Kyiv and the auxiliary police were forced to evacuate the city, the same Shelest and a group of colleagues stole a truck with weapons and went over to the Soviet partisans.[[102]](#footnote-102) Attempts to adapt to new political realities and to reintegrate themselves into Soviet society thanks to their combat achievements once again demonstrated the “fragile loyalty” of the local population.

The personnel of most auxiliary police battalions were composed of two categories of officers: forced recruits and volunteers. Among the latter were ideologically motivated nationalists and locals. Forced recruits included not only those who, since 1942, had attempted to evade deportation to Germany for forced labor, but also POWs. Because of this, up to two million Red Army soldiers died or had been killed in German camps by February 1942 alone.[[103]](#footnote-103) In these conditions, serving in the police could indeed emerge as the only salvation, so many who consented to join were purely motivated by survival. However, as historian David Rich has indicated, men were effectively freed from captivity after joining the police, so “the question of whether or not to stay, and how to serve further, depended entirely on a captive’s personal will.”[[104]](#footnote-104) In February 1942, the Germans offered POWs to sign a two-year contract enlisting them in the 115th *Schutzmannschaftsbatallion*. At least 10 explicitly refused, after which they were sent to the Darnytski camp (but were soon released).[[105]](#footnote-105) The other several hundred decided to continue their service within the newly formed battalion.

While the collective portrait of the UOP and “closed battalions” remained almost unchanged throughout the occupation, the regular personnel of the UCP, in contrast, underwent the largest reconfiguration. This process began following mass arrests of OUN-M members, particularly Chief Bida. Since then, the nationalists were gradually eliminated from the UCP, causing a personnel vacuum that the Germans decided to fill through more professional and loyal officers. Starting in February 1942, the employment office and other institutions steered people with a higher education toward serving in the UCP.[[106]](#footnote-106) Professional Soviet lawyers, who to some extent in no way identified themselves with the pro-Ukrainian camp, later rose to senior police positions even outside Kyiv. Additionally, older people with a higher education level or more experience working in relevant bodies aspired to work as investigators, while energetic youth without the appropriate education and experience became agents.[[107]](#footnote-107) The archival criminal files available to me reveal that the average UCP officers were former Soviet militiamen and communists, as well as Russians and *Volksdeutsche*. Additionally, the specific nature of the personnel of the UCP, as a structural entity of the German security service, was in the concentration of careerists who were more loyal to the Nazis, people with anti-Soviet views, and others.

From the summer of 1942 to the end of the occupation, all instances of mass raids of Jews, Communists, and Soviet undergrounders were inspected by the new UCP chief Vadym Maikovskyi, a lawyer in Kyiv before the war and later an agent in German special services. According to the description of his deputy, Maikovskyi “did not avoid dreaming of becoming the dictator of the ‘New’ Russia.”[[108]](#footnote-108) “Exemplary” fulfillment of his duties helped Maykovskyi continue his meteoric career following the German retreat from Kyiv. Around May–June 1944, *Hauptsturmführer-SS* Walter Ebeling, former deputy chief of the Kyiv *SiPo/SD*, wrote a letter to Maykovskyi stating that he had recently obtained a high position in Berlin. Ebeling confessed that he greatly needed Maykovskyi and asked him to take over his role as head of the “Russian group” (the so-called “Comet Group”) of the information subdivision of the Berlin Gestapo (IV/n). Since then, the former Kyiv lawyer was engaged in investigating “high profile” cases, particularly of members of the infamous Russian far-right organization National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Additionally, Maykovskiy was directly involved in the supervision of Andriy Vlasov by the Berlin Gestapo, so he concurrently served as part of the leadership of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.[[109]](#footnote-109)

The administrative division of the UCP was one of the most active in “catching” Jews and Communists, in no small measure thanks to its commissar Oleksiy Horbachevskyi. Horbachevskyi was born and raised in Kyiv Region, where he was sentenced in 1930 to three years in prison for belonging to a group of individuals who opposed collectivization and dekulakization. After his release, Horbachevskyi moved to Kyiv and took a job in the Darnytskyi District depot, where he worked until the beginning of the Soviet-German War. On October 9, 1941, Horbachevskyi became an agent in the local police and quickly became commissar of the agential division. His stunning career success is related to his activities in the police, as many party activists in the city were arrested under his leadership. Horbachevskyi once even detained and handed over his own Jewish comrade to the Germans, who soon executed him.[[110]](#footnote-110)

Another paradoxical condition for the activities of the agential division is that most of its employees turned out to be former Communists, Komsomol members, and militiamen; one of its agents was even a deputy on the Kyiv city council. In October 1941, the occupation authorities issued an order on the registration of all OUN-B members in the city. Some were immediately arrested and executed, while others were used for the goals of the authorities. The fact is that the Germans quickly realized the facade of party membership in the USSR, which was more of a tool for career opportunities and security than a reflection of commitment to Communist ideals. Thus, it was decided to attract former Communists to collaborate with the occupation authorities. Some were summoned to the UCP for interrogation, where Horbachevskyi personally recruited those who were most suitable for service.[[111]](#footnote-111) In total, the agential division employed between 30–70 people, making it the largest structure in the UCP.

Investigating cases of local party activism and Soviet and nationalist underground activity, as well as searching for and arresting Jews, was the direct responsibility of the political division. Its commissar, Vasyl Tsalovanskyi (or Tselovanskyi), also a native of Kyiv Region, was not selected by chance. He worked in the Soviet police in the early 1920s but left the service under unclear circumstances.[[112]](#footnote-112) At the beginning of the German occupation, Tsalovanskyi took a position in the so-called “personnel office” (*Personalamt*), a secret German counterintelligence body under the general commissariat in Kyiv, where he divided his time between the covert and agential-information divisions. Employees of the former inspected all non-German employees in the occupation administration, tracked local party activism, and so on. In total, the division indexed approximately 2,000 local Communists and 6,000 Komsomol members. The monitoring of those registered was carried about by 24 full-time and 220 part-time employees in the administrative-information division, also headed by Tsalovanskyi. As Artur Boss, chief of the *Personalamt*, said:

The significance of this division is undoubtedly enormous in conditions where the Bolsheviks, while retreating, left a dense network of its own agents with sabotage and espionage tasks [...] The main task entrusted to the administrative-information division has been reduced to encompass, via agential surveillance, the majority of the population and assist the German police in detecting and preventing all anti-state activities, no matter what form they take.[[113]](#footnote-113)

There is also a theory that the information in Boss’s unit became the catalyst for the arrest of OUN-M members Olena Teliha, Ivan Rohach, and others. No earlier than March 1942, the *Personalamt* was liquidated, because of which Tsalovanskyi, his deputy Viktor Hlukhov, and some representatives of the department went to work for the UCP.[[114]](#footnote-114)

Tsalovanskyi’s abilities and experience were soon needed once again, as in March 1943 he headed the newly established political division of the UCP, which had recruited the most “successful” agents and detectives from across the auxiliary police. A illustrative case that characterizes German trust in the political and agential divisions occurred in October 1943. At the time, the entire personnel of the Kyiv auxiliary police had evacuated to the East, yet a small group headed by Chief Maykovskyi remained in the so-called *Einsatz* to destroy what remained of the resistance movement, Communists, and Jews.[[115]](#footnote-115) These men were the most distinguished officers in both the political and agential divisions of the UCP that previously worked in the Berlin Gestapo under Maykovskyi. Additionally, it was Horbachevskyi, Tsalovanskyi, and Maykovskyi, as the most active German assistants, who were to become the main casualties of the underground Sukhoverskyi group that was discovered in March 1943.

Finally, research on the Ukrainian auxiliary police and the Holocaust would be incomplete without mentioning salvation. A neighbor of Ivan Kharchenko, a guard in the Pecherskyi District Police, verbally reported to him about Jews living in their building. Instead of arresting these individuals, Kharchenko decided to warn them of possible reprisals. Kharchenko later destroyed a denunciation against a member of the VKPB and returned his documents. Witnesses confirmed that he saved many arrested Jews, Communists, and those sent to forced labor in Germany.[[116]](#footnote-116) Another police officer, Mykyta Omelianenko, also helped detainees, which was confirmed by eyewitnesses at the trial: “They wanted to send us to Babyn Yar because my husband is Jewish, but Omelianenko helped us escape.”[[117]](#footnote-117) Additionally, within the UCP, there was a Soviet underground organization headed by former chief Boris Sukhoverskyid. One of its members, investigator Stepan Katerynenko, and his wife, hid several Jews and Communists and helped them evade death. In early March 1943, the underground organization was exposed by pro-German agents (one of whom was Heorhiy Puzenko), resulting in the execution of its members and their families.[[118]](#footnote-118) Thus, although most officers were fulfilling orders, sometimes passively, there were also those who risked their own lives to save others.

**Conclusions**

Based on the estimates of historian Alexander Kruglov, up to 53,000 civilians, the absolute majority of whom were Jews, were murdered throughout the German occupation in Kyiv. Around 30% of this figure accounts for victims in other categories, which Kruglov divides into: non-Jewish civilians, including those “suspected” of certain crimes (several thousand); representatives of Soviet activism and the underground (over 2,000); psychiatric patients in the city (485); and members of the national liberation movement (approximately several dozen). POWs in the three concentration camps in the city—up to 40,000 people—were also among a separate large group of those who died or were killed.[[119]](#footnote-119) The example of the Holocaust in Kyiv demonstrates the intertwined fate of these groups, as repression against them frequently occurred in identical spatial-temporal conditions. Moreover, during the destruction of “political enemies” like Soviet activists and Jews, German and non-German representatives of the occupation authorities frequently employed the stereotypical image of “Jewish Bolshevism.”

While explicit murders occurred only with the insignificant, indirect assistance of the Kyiv auxiliary police, local law enforcement was an important pillar when it came to identifying and arresting future victims. Most of the above examples of police participation in acts of mass violence concern the beginning of the occupation, when the police functioned under a single (OUN-M) management. The prospect of linking this to the ideological collaborationism of Ukrainian nationalists is tempting in its simplicity, yet an analysis of the sources available to me tends toward a slightly different interpretation. First, at the turn of 1941–1942, after the arrest of OUN-M members, there was a consolidation of responsibilities and a redistribution of roles, as a result of which the right to repression was subjected to clear regulation. Since then, police battalions went to fight partisans outside Kyiv, the UOP engaged in protective and patrol work and detained locals for further deportation to Germany for forced labor, and the UCP searched for “political” enemies. Second, most Communists and Jews were eradicated throughout the first six months of the occupation. In other words, the new non-nationalist management of the UCP and partially the UPP simply did not have time to “tarnish” its reputation by participating in mass arrests and murders. Third, the difference in ethnic origin, biographies, and motives of officers leveled off upon joining the police force. The example of the UCP clearly shows that violence also continued after the arrests of pro-Ukrainian forces. Fourth, the extensive network of police informers lowered the possibility of resisting any kind of order. The uncovering and tragic death of the Sukhoversky group demonstrates that the most active and pro-German employees were concentrated in the administrative and political divisions of the UCP.

The specific circumstances of the German occupation joined people of various, sometimes opposite origins within a single “community of violence.”[[120]](#footnote-120) At first glance, the ideological opponents—OUN-M members in the UPP and Soviet careerists and Communists in the UCP—often actively collaborated when implementing Nazi policies. None of the sides, including local “non-party” employees, were less radical than the other. Thus, the results of this research lead to conclusions about the predominance of opportunistic, conformist, careerist, and survivalist motives among police officers over ideological ones. There were few cases of resisting orders, while the available cells of the resistance movement in the police were quickly suppressed. Ultimately, over practically two years, only those ideological guidelines that were not denied by the local occupation authorities (for example, anti-Bolshevism, but not Ukrainian nationalism) could exist within the “Ukrainian” auxiliary police. Those who disagreed with such policies were dismissed at best and harshly repressed at worst. All the mentioned factors contributed to the crystallization of the auxiliary police as an element of the repressive apparatus of the Third Reich.

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2. Zakhar Trubakov, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Oral History, 1995. A.1272.158, RG-50.120.0158, 01:29:00–01:35:00, accessed September 13, 2021, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn502882. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid., 02:27:58–02:47:00, accessed September 13, 2021, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn502882. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Jan Grabowski, *Na posterunku. Udział polskiej policji granatowej i kryminalnej w zagładzie Żydów* (Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2020), 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For brief references, see Alexander Prusin, “A Community of Violence: The SiPo/SD and Its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiew,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21 (2007), 4; Ivan Dereiko, *Mist͡sevi formuvanni͡a nimet͡s’koï armiï ta polit͡siï u Raǐkhskomisariati “Ukraïna,” 1941–1944 roky* (Kyiv: Instytut istoriï Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny, 2012), 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See Gabriel Finder and Alexander Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian police and the Holocaust,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 34 (2004), 95–118; John-Paul Himka, “The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,” *Canadian Slavonic papers* 53 (2011), 209–43; Yuri Radchenko, “‘We Emptied our Magazines into Them’: The Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and the Holocaust in Generalbezirk Charkow, 1941–1943,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 41, 1 (2013), 63–98; David Rich, “Armed Ukrainians in L’viv: Ukrainian Militia, Ukrainian Police, 1941 to 1942,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 3 (2014), 271–87; Martin Dean, “Soviet Ethnic Germans and the Holocaust in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, 1941-1944” in *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*,ed. R. Brandon and W. Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 248–71; Roman Shliakhtych, “Uchast’ mist͡sevoï dopomiz͡hnoï polit͡siï u Holokosti na Kryvoriz͡hz͡hi (1941–1942 rr.),” *Holokost i suchasnist’* 14 (2016), 75–88; Yuri Radchenko, “Ukraïns’ka polit͡sii͡a ta Holokost na Donbasi,” *Ukraina moderna* 24 (2017), 64–121. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For an overview of the discussion, see Tom Lawson, *Debates on the Holocaust* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 208–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Andriy Bolianovskyi, *Ukraïns’ki viǐs’kovi formuvanni͡a v zbroǐnykh sylakh Nimechchyny, 1939–1945* (Lviv, 2003); Dereiko, *Mist͡sevi formuvanni͡a*; Taras Martynenko, “Ukraïns’ka Dopomiz͡hna Polit͡sii͡a v okruzi L’viv-misto: shtrykhy do sot͡sial’noho portreta,” *Visnyk L’vivs’koho universytetu*. Serii͡a istorychna 48 (2013), 152–67. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Ivan Dereiko, “Ukraïns’ki dopomiz͡hni formuvanni͡a Zbroǐnykh syl Nimechchyny u Kyi͡evi v 1941–1943 rr.: struktura, chysel’nist’, dii͡al’nist,’” *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB* 22/23 (2004), 340–353.; Vitaliy Nakhmanovych, “Do pytanni͡a pro sklad uchasnykiv karal’nykh akt͡siï v okupovanomu Kyi͡evi (1941–1943),” in *Druha svitova viǐna i doli͡a narodiv Ukraïny: Materialy* *2-ï Vseukraïns’koï naukovoï konferent͡siï*, Kyiv, October 30–31, 2006 (Kyiv: Zovnishtorhvydav, 2007), 227–62; Aleksandr Prusin, “Ukrainskai͡a polit͡sii͡a i Kholokost v general’nom okruge Kiev, 1941–1943: deǐstvii͡a i motivat͡sii,” *Holokost і suchasnіst’. Studії v Ukraїnі і svіtі* 2 (2007), 31–59; Oleksiy Goncharenko, Oleksandr Potylchak, “Povsi͡akdenne z͡hytti͡a prat͡sivnykiv mist͡sevoï polit͡siï Kyiïvshchyny v umovakh nat͡systs’koї okupat͡siї (1941–1943 rr.): pobutovi ta sot͡sial’no-profesiǐni aspekty,” *Universum Historiae et Archeologiae* 3, 28 (2020), 77–94. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Vitaliy Nakhmanovych, “Bukovyns’kyǐ kurin’ i masovi rozstrily i͡evreiv Kyi͡eva voseny 1941 r.,” *Ukraïns’kyǐ istorychnyǐ z͡hurnal* 474 (2007), 76–96; Karel Berkhoff, “Babyn Yar: mist͡se naǐmasshtabnishoho rozstrilu i͡evreiv nat͡systamy v Radi͡ans’komu Soi͡uzi,” in *Babyn Iar: masove ubyvstvo i pam’i͡at’ pro n’oho*: Materialy miz͡hnarodnoї naukovoї konferent͡siї, Kyiv, October 24–25, 2011, ed. V. Nakhmanovych, A. Podolskyi, M. Tiahlyi (Kyiv: Ukraїns’kyǐ t͡sentr vyvchenni͡a istoriї Holokostu, 2017), 8–20; Yuri Radchenko, “‘Niemcy znaleźli u nich zrabowane żydowskie rzeczy i dlatego ich rozstrzelali’: Kureń Bukowiński, Holokaust w Kijowie i świadectwo Marty Zybaczynskiej,” *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały* 14 (2018), 580–617. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For the most recent comprehensive description and specificities of the archived criminal files, see Roman Shliakhtych, “Arkhivno-slidchi spravy polit͡saїv i͡ak dz͡herelo vyvchenni͡a istoriї Holokostu na terytoriї Kryvoriz͡hz͡hi͡a v roky nimet͡s’koї okupat͡siї,” *Holokost i suchasnist’* 17 (2019), 115–33. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Several of the memoirs used include Yuri Pasichnyk, “Ukraїns’ki 115 i 118 kureni v borot’bi z sovi͡ets’koi͡u dyversii͡ei͡u (Uryvky iz shchodennyka z 1941–1944 rr.).” *Visti Bratstva kol. voi͡akiv 1 UD UNA 7–10* (1957), 9–12; *Na zov Kyi͡eva. Ukraїns’kyǐ nat͡sionalizm u II Svitoviǐ viǐni: zbirnyk statteǐ, spohadiv i dokumentiv*, ed. K. Melnyk, O. Lashchenko, V. Veryha (Toronto: *Novyi Shli͡akh* [Seems to be a newspaper, so I italicized. Can we confirm?], 1985); Konstantyn Himmelreich [Seems to be the author’s full name], *Spohady komandyra viddilu osoblyvoho pryznachenni͡a “UPA-Skhid”* (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1987); Anatoliy Kabayda, “1941,” in *Kalendar-al’manakh “Novoho shliakhu*,*”* ed. P. Dorozynskyi [Correct transliteration?] (Toronto, 1991), 31–57; Yaroslav Haivas, “Osin’ 1941 u Kyi͡evi,” *Ukraїns’kyǐ istoryk.* Z͡H*urnal istoriї i ukraїnoznavstva* 114–146 (2000), 244–55. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. K. Radzevych, “Persha Kyїvs’ka Pokhidna Hrupa OUN,” in Melnyk, Lashchenko, and Veryha, *Na zov Kyi͡eva,* 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Andriy Usach, “Problematychnyǐ martyroloh: z͡hertvy OUN(m) u Babynomu I͡Aru.” *Ukraina moderna*, May 6, 2017, accessed September 13, 2021, https://uamoderna.com/blogy/usach-andr/problematic-martyrology. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For a comprehensive review of German-Ukrainian relations, see: Frank Golczewski, “Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine,” in *Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im ostlichen Europa, 1939–1945*, ed. Christoph Dieckmann, Christian Gerlach, and Wolf Gruner(Gottingen: Wallstein, 2003), 153–82. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. September 23 is listed in documents from the police chancery: SAKO, f. R-2412, op. 2, spr. 227, ark. 2 (“Brief description of the organization of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Kyiv”). September 28 and 29 are listed in an order of the 195th field commander’s office [Correct translation?]: Radchenko, “Niemcy,” 596. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. John Armstrong, *Ukrainskiǐ nat͡sionalizm. Fakty i issledovanii͡a, 1939–1945* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2008), 100–03. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Daniil Sytnyk, “Formuvanni͡a ukraїns’koї polit͡siї v Kyi͡evi (1941–1943),” *Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA: Istorychni nauky* 3 (2020), 41–43. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. On cases of complicity in the Holocaust by the Russian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and other auxiliary police forces, see the corresponding sections in Yitzhak Arad, *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Other auxiliary agencies like the Ukrainian fire police and the Ukrainian water police [Correct translation?] are not considered in this article. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. For more details on the formation, structure, and training of the UPP, see Sytnyk, “Formuvanni͡a,” 40–48. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Compiled based on: SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 26748, ark. 164; SAB SSU, f. 11, spr. 768, t. 8, ark. 1–2; SAB SSU, f. 11, spr. 769, t. 18, ark. 31; SAKO, f. R-2320, op. 1, spr. 10, ark. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 64486, ark. 30–31; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 59056, ark. 43–44 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The Lithuanian security police in Kaunas and Vilnius had a similar structure. See Petras Stankeras, *Litovskie polit͡se**ǐskie batal’ony, 1941–1945 gg.* (Moscow: Veche, 2009), 74–75. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. SAB SSU, f. 65, spr. S-6898 [Cyrillic С or Latin C?], ark. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Calculated based on: SAB SSU, f. 11, spr. 769, t. 14, ark. 127–133 (“Employee rations list of the Security Police, Criminal Department of the city of Kyiv, August 1-10, 1943”). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. SAKO, f. Р-2726, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 20 zv. (“Kommandobefehl Nr. 8 vom 19.02.1942”); ibid., ark. 28 (“Kommandobefehl Nr. 11 vom 13.03.1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Pasichnyk, “Ukrains’ki 115 i 118 kureni,” 10. For more details on the activities of the 115th and 118th battalions outside Kyiv, see Ivan Dereiko, “Vid kolaborat͡siї do rezystansu: dii͡al’nist’ 115/62-ho ukraїns’koho

    batal’ionu shut͡smanshaftu na terenakh Bilorusi i Frant͡siї u 1942–1944 rr.,” *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB* 20 (2003), 179–93; Per Anders Rudling, “Terror i kollaborat͡sionizm vo vremia Vtoroǐ mirovoǐ voǐny: sluchaǐ 118-go batal’ona okhrannoǐ polit͡siǐ v okkupirovannoǐ Belorussii.” *Forum noveǐsheǐ vostochnoevropeǐskoǐ istoriǐ i kul’tury. Russkoe izdanie* 1(2016), 274–310. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Dereiko, “Ukraïns’ki dopomiz͡hni formuvanni͡a,” 345. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Bundesarchiv (BArch), RH 22/116, Bl. 17 (“Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht uber Osttruppen vom 9.09.1943”). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Dereiko, *Mist͡sevi formuvanni͡a*, 80–81. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Alexander Kruglov, Andrei Umansky, *Babiǐ Iar: zhertvy, spasiteli, palachi* (Dnipro: Ukrainskiǐ institut izuchenii͡a Kholokosta “Tkuma,” 2019), 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. The headquarters at 15 Korolenka Street was active until the beginning of the executions at Babyn Yar, since in late September 1941, a group of Kyivans decided to independently arrest 15 Jews and take them to the indicated address: Nakhmanovych, “Do pytanni͡a,” 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Oleksandr Kucheruk, “The early period of activity of the Ukrainian police in Kyiv from September-December 1941,” Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, October 10, 2016, accessed September 13, 2021, http://kmoun.info/2016/10/10/o-kucheruk-pochatkoviy-perioddiyalnosti-

    ukrayinskoyi-politsiyi-kiyeva-u-veresni-grudni-1941r/. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. “Report by Captain H. Koch, authorized representative of the Reich Ministry for the occupied territories under the South group of troops, on the situation in Kyiv after the entry of German troops there and on measures aimed at countering the activities of the OUN,” in O. Dzyuban, upor. [Unfamiliar with this appreviation], *Ukraїns’ke derz͡havotvorenn*i͡a*. Akt 30 chervn*i͡a *1941: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (L’viv: Literaturna ahent͡sii͡a “Piramida,” 2001), 419. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Nakhmanovych, “Do pytanni͡a,” 257–61. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Haivas, “Osin’,” 255. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. For a thorough review and critique of *Ereignismeldung* as a source, see Martin Dean, “The German Gendarmerie, the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the “Second Wave” of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941–1944,” *German History* 2 (1996): 172–76. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), T-175, roll 233, frame 2722434 (“Ereignismeldung UdSSR. Nr. 88 vom 19. Sept. 1941”). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See his most famous work, which I also used while writing this article: Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. On Lviv, see Gabriel Finder and Alexander Prusin, “Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian police and the Holocaust,” 107–08. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Berkhoff, “Babyn Iar,” 14–16; Kabayda, “1941,” 54; SAKO, f. R-2726, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 20 zv. (“Kommandobefehl Nr. 8 vom 19.02.1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 59660, ark. 10 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Himmelreich, *Spohady*, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. “Diary of a Kyiv woman. Part II,” accessed: September 13, 2021, https://gordonua.com/specprojects/khoroshunova2.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 58293, ark. 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid., spr. 60916, ark. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Alex Krasheninnikow, USHMM, Oral History, 1997. A.0441.111, File RG-50.462.0111, 17:15–17:48, accessed: September 13, 2021, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn515630. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. SAKO, f. R-2412, op. 2, spr. 224, ark. 3 (“Brief description of the organization of the Yaroslav District Police in Kyiv and its status on January 1, 1942, and July 1, 1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. SAKO, f. R-2412, op. 2, spr. 76, ark. 9 zv. (“Report No. 5 of the Volodyrmyskyi District Council meeting in Kyiv on October 31, 1941”). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., ark. 14 (“Report No. 8 of the Volodyrmyskyi District Council meeting on November 28, 1941”) [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 26183, ark. 43–46. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid, spr. 39791, ark. 87–88. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. For a thorough investigation of this, see Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule*, translated from English by T. Tsymbal (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 63–68. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. NARA, T-175, roll 233, frame 2722381 (“Ereignismeldung UdSSR. Nr. 86 vom 17. Sept. 1941”). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 39664, ark. 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 26183, ark. 180а. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid, f. 5, spr. 60916, ark. 15 zv.–16. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. SAKO, f. R-2320, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 4–5 (“Temporary instructions for district commissars and city and village stations of the Ukrainian auxiliary police”). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 43555, ark. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid., ark. 46; “From the report of the interrogation by the NKVD of S. Berliant, an eyewitness participant in the burning of bodies at Babyn Yar, on November 16, 1943,” in *Kn. 1: Istoricheskai͡a topografii͡a. Khronologii͡a sobytiǐ. Babiǐ Iar: chelovek, vlast’ istorii͡a: dokumenty i materialy. V 5 kn.,* ed. Tatiana Evstafieva et al. (Kyiv: Veshtorgizdat Ukrainy, 2004), 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. SAKO, f. R-2356, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 11 (“To the commissar in Kyiv, November 13, 1941”). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Prusin, “Ukrainskai͡a polit͡sii͡a,” 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 43555, ark. 48 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid., ark. 79; SAB SSU, f. 6, spr. 69330fp, ark. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 59155, t. 2, ark. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. One of them, Friedrich Krull, a descendent of the German colonizers in Zhytomyr, was a laborer in Kyiv before the war. While serving in the *SiPo/SD*, beginning in March 1942, he arrested around 100 Jews, some of which he executed personally. For more details, see SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 39664, ark. 60–63. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 66434, ark. 27, 29, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Ibid., spr. 66434, ark. 25–27. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Ibid., spr. 55663, t. 1, ark. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Calculated based on: SAKO, f. R-4437, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 1–34 (“Book of detained and arrested Soviet citizens [Correct translation?] by the Volodymyrskyi District Police in Kyiv”). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. SAKO, f. R-4437, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 209 (“Headquarters Order, part 52 [Correct translation of ч.?] of September 27, 1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk, Leonid Rein, Andriy Bolianovskyi, and Oleg Romanko, “Eastern Europe: Belarusian auxiliaries, Ukrainian Waffen-SS soldiers and the special case of the Polish ‘Blue Police’,” in *The Waffen-SS: A European History*, ed. R. Gerwarth and J. Bohler(Oxford University Press, 2017), 183. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. NARA, T-175, roll 103, frames 2624976–2624978 (“Rede des Reichsfuhrer-SS am 16. September in der Feldkommandostelle vor den Teilnehmern an der SS- und Polizeifuhrer-Tagung, einberufen von SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Prutzmann, Hoherer SS- und Polizeifuhrer Ru.land-Sud”); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine*, trans. S. Kolomiyets (Kyiv: Zovnishtorhvydav, 2010), 204–05. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Prusin, “Ukrainskai͡a polit͡sii͡a,” 39; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 28787, ark. 22–22 zv., 86–86 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 61301, ark. 15–22. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. SAKO, f. Р-4437, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 232 zv. (“Headquarters Order part 54 of October 16, 1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 59410, ark. 10 зв. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Ibid., spr. 51178, ark. 28–29. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 62683, ark. 46–47, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 43368, ark. 17–17 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 26183, ark. 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Zachar Trubakov, USHMM, Oral History, 1995.A.1272.158, RG-50.120.0158, 01:55:00–01:56:20, accessed: September 13, 2021, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn502882. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 58819, ark. 27–29, 74–77. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. “From the report of the interrogation by the NKVD of B. Bystrov, an accused former captive of the Syrets concentration camp, on November 22, 1943,” in Evstafieva, *Babiǐ Iar*, 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. For more details on all the camps, see Tetiana Pastushenko, “Tabory dli͡a radi͡ans’kykh viǐs’kovopolonenykh u Kyi͡evi, 1941–1943 rr.,” *Historians*, September 26, 2014, accessed: September 13, 2021, http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/zabuti-zertvy-viyny/1275-tetianapastushenko-tabory-dlia-radianskykh-viiskovopolonenykh-u-kyievi-1941-1943-rr. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 43555, ark. 123–126; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 60916, ark. 15; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 46829, ark. 103 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Dean, *Collaboration*, 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. SAKO, f. R-2356, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 74–75 (“Memorandum from January 21, 1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Ibid., f. R-4437, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 149 zv. (“Personal order from May 30, 1942”). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. For example, of the commanders of the 11 district police forces, Andryi Dzen, Oleksa Berezovskyi, Hrihoryi Zhykivskyi, Valentyn Kashtelianiv, and Anatoliy Odarchenko lived in the USSR before the war. At least Odarchenko and Kashtelianiv had some connection to the OUN. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. In a previous article, I erroneously identified Hryhoriy Zakhvalynskyi and Volodymyr Butkevych with participants in the Battle of Kruty (1918) Serhiy Zakhvalynskyi (Hrihoryi’s brother) and Yaroslav Butkevych. In fact, Zakhvalynskyi, an OUN-M member, was a veteran of the Ukrainian Revolution and lived in France prior to World War II. Before the war, Volodymyr Butkevych likely lived in Poland, and in the autumn of 1941, he returned to his native Zolotonosha and headed the so-called “Ukrainian Hundred.” The Germans arrested him in December (since he turned out to be an OUN-B member) but released him under unclear circumstances, after which he moved to Kyiv, where he first headed the Pecherskyi District Police and later the UPP headquarters. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 26748, ark. 52–53; Vasyl Veryha, *Pid sont͡sem Italiï* (Toronto: Vydavnytstvo Bratstva kolyshnikh Voi͡akiv 1-oï UD UNA, 1984), 148; Ivan Burtyk, *Ternystyǐ shli͡akh druhoï dyviziï UNA* (New York: Clifton, 1994), 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 26639, ark. 50–51. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Bolianovskyi, *Ukraïns’ki viǐs’kovi formuvanni͡a*, 508–09; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 64530, ark. 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Himmelreich, *Spohady*, 115–17. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. SAB SSU, f. 6, spr. 69330fp, ark. 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. For more details, see Yuri Radchenko, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Mel’nyk Faction) and the Holocaust: The Case of Ivan Iuriiv,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2 (2017): 215–39. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Prusin, “Ukrainskai͡a polit͡sii͡a,” 46–47. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Archival Division of the SSU in Zhytomyr Oblast, spr. 31003of, ark. 53 [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 59155, t. 2, ark. 11–12, 65, 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Kristian Shtrait, *“Oni nam ne tovarishchi...”: Vermakht i sovetskie voennoplennye v 1941–1945 gg* (Moscow: “Russkaia panorama”, 2009), 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. David Alan Rich, “Podviǐna viktimizat͡sii͡a? Vidpovidal’nist’ radi͡ans’kych viǐs’kovopolonenykh za polon ta kolaborat͡sii͡u u povoi͡ennyy chas,” *Storinky voi͡ennoï istoriï Ukraïny* 21 (2019): 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 66434, ark. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Ibid., spr. 64486, ark. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Ibid, spr. 27204, ark. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 64486, ark. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Ibid., ark. 211–215; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 64530, ark. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. SAB SSU, f. 65, spr. S-6898, ark. 19; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 2799, ark. 15–16. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Ibid., spr. 2799, ark. 13–13 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 10344, ark. 23–24; SAKO, f. R-2320, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 19 (“Employee register of the Investigative Division of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Kyiv”). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Police security bodies and the SD, which were active on the Eastern Front and in the temporarily occupied Soviet territory, accessed September 13, 2021, http://istmat.info/node/28461. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 10344, ark. 31, 68–69. Recollections of the arrest initiated by Boss: SAB SSU, f. 11, spr. 776, ch. 2, ark. 82-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 43555, ark. 50–52; SAB SSU, f. 5, spr. 64486, ark. 43–44. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Ibid., f. 6, spr. 70029fp, ark. 123–27. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 56693, ark. 157 zv. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Ibid., f. 5, spr. 46829, ark. 110–113. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Alexander Kruglov, “Neevreǐskie zhertvy nat͡sizma v Kieve v 1941–1943 gg.,” *Problemy іstorії Holokostu: ukraїns’kiǐ vymіr* 12 (2020), 56–88. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. During a famous experiment, social psychologist Stanley Milgram concluded that most people were capable of violent actions, having ended up in certain circumstances and situations. For more details, see Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)