BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

**THE IMPACT OF THE LABEL 'FEMINIST' ON ATTITUDES**

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE (M.A)

MORAN DANGOOR

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF: DR. YOAV BAR-ANAN

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Signature of student: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

 Signature of supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Signature of chairperson of the

Committee for graduate studies: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Abstract

Social identity is an aspect of self-perception. It emerges from the reflexive activity of self-categorization as a member of a social group or as filling a role within a group. Social identity often shapes people’s attitudes and ideologies. People tend to conform to what they perceive as the normative attitudes of the social group with which they identify. In the current research, I investigate whether people avoid endorsing attitudes that they perceive as normative of an undesired social identity. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that in order to distance themselves from a feminist identity they perceive as undesirable, people express non-feminist attitudes.

The research consists of two experiments. In Experiment 1 (*N* = 1,006), participants completed a questionnaire on gender-related attitudes. One group completed it after a manipulation in which they were asked, before completing the questionnaire, whether they identify as feminists. The control group completed the questionnaire without this manipulation; that is, before being asked to identify as feminist or not. In Experiment 2 (*N* = 978), the manipulation consisted of framing the questionnaire as measuring feminist attitudes (or not).

I hypothesized that framing the attitudes in the questionnaire as feminist would decrease self-reported endorsement of those attitudes among people who do not identify as feminists and would increase self-reported endorsement among self-identified feminists. In contrast to my hypothesis, in both experiments, the salience of feminist identity had no influence on endorsement of feminist attitudes.

These results suggest that attitudes on feminist issues are too strong to change due to a desire to avoid the label of being a feminist. However, these conclusions are limited by the overall liberal orientation of the sample population. This might have made it difficult to detect the effect of avoidance of feminist identity. Perhaps pre-selection of non-feminist subjects would confirm the hypothesized effect.

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**Introduction**

People hold diverse perceptions and ideas about themselves. Cumulatively, these contribute to the formation of an identity and self-perception that emerges from the reflexive activity of self-categorization or identification as a member of a group or with a role within that group (Stets & Burke, 2000). Identity and group membership are primary factors that shape attitudes and ideologies (Diehl, 1990; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014; Tajfel, 1982; Terry & Hogg, 2000). People tend to hold attitudes similar to those held by other members of their group. This includes social groups based on gender (Jones, Howe, & Rua, 2000; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), race (Katz, 2013; Lewis, 2003), age (Czaja & Sharit, 1998), or nationality (Henderson, Jeffery, & Liñeira, 2015; Sherif, 2015).

When a social group is based on ideology (e.g., a political group), it is reasonable to assume that attitudes are formed prior to identification as a member of the group. For example, people are expected to have adopted liberal attitudes before they identify themselves as liberals. In reality, however, political ideology might operate similarly to other social categories, influencing attitudes rather than being “chosen” based on the person’s attitudes (Campbell, 1980; Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1989). As with other types of social groups, people might adopt or abandon specific attitudes as means to re-affirm their membership in a political or ideological group.

The main goal of the present research is to add to our knowledge about political identity and its impact on attitudes. It specifically addresses feminist identity and how the desire to identify as a feminist, or to avoid that identification, influences attitudes.

**Social Identity Theory and Group Influence**

One of the most important works addressing intergroup relations is the “minimal group studies” (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). In a series of experiments, it was demonstrated that individuals displayed high levels of ingroup favoritism. They tended to give more points or money to unidentified ingroup members than to unidentified outgroup members (Reicher, Spear, & Haslam, 2010). These studies suggest that merely being labeled as a member of a group evokes behavior favoring one’s own group members and discriminating against members of other groups. However, this observation does not explain the mechanism driving people to act this way. It does not consider the social context of behavior and group influence on it. Social Identity Theory was developed in response to these limitations.

According to Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), allocation to allegedly meaningless groups affects behavior only when people define their selves in terms of membership with that group (Reicher et al., 2010). In other words, individuals define themselves in relation to other individuals, and, in some circumstances, define themselves through the groups to which they belong (Deschamps & Devos, 1998). Thus, group behavior is based on social identity (Tajfel, 1978).

According to SIT, social identity is defined as an “individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” (Tajfel, et al., 1971). Social groups provide their members with a shared identity that prescribes and evaluates who they are, what they should believe, and how they should behave (Hogg, 2016). Social identity is simultaneously individual and social. On the one hand, my social identities such as “I am a woman” or “I am an Israeli” refer deeply to who I am in the world. On the other hand, a gender or national identity (or any other social identity) has historical, cultural, and social roots. Therefore, social identity provides the connection between society and the subject. The theory explains how large numbers of people can act in coherent and meaningful ways, by reference to shared group norms, values, and understandings, rather than idiosyncratic beliefs (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).

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An important implication of SIT is that categorization produces conformity to ingroup norms in terms of behavior and attitudes, because the self assimilates to the ingroup prototype (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Social identity protects self-esteem and reduces uncertainty by serving people’s need to know who they are, how to behave, and what to think (Hogg, 2016). In that respect, conformity is not only behavioral compliance, but also a process of internalization of the group’s prototype (Abrams Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). For example, people express stronger race-compatible attitudes about inequality after being reminded of their race (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). After receiving support from people of the same gender, people tend to report more prototypical attitudes of their gender and demonstrate greater attitude–behavior consistency (White, Hogg, & Terry, 2002).

**Categorization Process and Self-Categorization Theory**

Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) addresses a limitation of SIT by defining and explaining the concept of social identity. SCT elaborates upon the operation of the categorization process as the cognitive basis of group behavior. Through the process of categorization, perceived similarities between stimuli (physical objects or people, including the self) belonging to the same category are stressed, as are perceived differences between stimuli belonging to different categories. This effect occurs on dimensions that the categorizer believes are relevant to the categorization. Categorization of self and others into an ingroup and outgroup defines social identity and emphasizes perceived similarities to cognitive representations of the defining features of the group (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).

According to SCT, people cognitively represent social groups in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a subjective representation of the defining attributes (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, behaviors) of a social category. The prototype is constructed from relevant social information in the immediate or extended interactive context (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Because members of the same group are generally exposed to similar information from the same perspective, their prototypes are usually similar and shared. People are essentially perceived as the relevant ingroup prototype, rather than as unique individuals. This process is practically a contextual change in the level of identity; from unique individual to group member. Self-categorization brings self-perception and behavior into line with the contextually relevant ingroup prototype. Thus, it transforms individuals into group members and individuality into group behavior (Reicher et al., 2010).

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**Political Identity**

Because SIT and SCT are general theories of social behavior, these theories and their implications are also relevant to the case of political affiliation and political identification (Oakes, 2002). Political identity is a self-concept formed in relation to a set of beliefs associated with a political party (e.g., Democrats or Republicans) and/or ideology (e.g., socialist, liberal, conservative) (Greene, 2004; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981). It is reasonable to assume that in the case of political identity, people endorse certain beliefs and attitudes in order to identify with a specific political party or to see oneself as a member of a political group. Other social identities are generally not perceived as being chosen, and people identify as such because they are born into that group (race, gender, nationality) or otherwise involuntarily belong to that group (i.e., age cohort). In contrast, people tend to see their political identity or party affiliation as being freely chosen based on a logical and rational process resulting in a political affiliation (Huddy, 2001). For example, before I see myself as a socialist, I must hold socialist attitudes and beliefs. However, it is possible that once a political identity is acquired, that identity impacts people’s attitudes and beliefs, and not the opposite. In other words, political identity is not different from other types of social identity. Once people perceive themselves as members of a certain political group, membership influences their behavior and affects their attitudes (Oakes, 2002).

Previous research has found that political identity influences judgment about political ingroup members and political outgroup members and can also affect ideology and political attitudes (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995; Huddy, 2001). Political identity can also influence the formation of new attitudes. In one set of studies, people based their support of a new policy on the party affiliation of the politicians who supported it, rather than on the ideology that the policy promoted. Democrat [Republican] participants supported the plan supported by Democrat [Republican] politicians even if it was compatible with conservative [liberal] ideology (Cohen, 2003). These results suggest that party membership and political identity influences attitudes and attitude formation, not the opposite.

**The Feminist Label and Identity**

Feminism is a set of beliefs and ideas based on the perception that there are structured relationships of power between men and women, which create a system of male dominance. From a feminist point of view, generally speaking, this system is flawed and there should be equality between the sexes (Henley, Meng, O’Brien, McCarthy, & Sockloskie, 1998; Morgan, 1996). Like other ideologies, feminism functions as a political-social identity. Therefore, it can shape attitudes, and not only serve as a reflection of existing attitudes.

One interesting aspect of feminist identity is that many people wish to avoid it (Griffin, 1989; Misciagno, 1997; Percy & Kremer, 1995). There is evidence that while many people support the goals of feminism and hold feminist values, relatively few are willing to identify as feminists (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; McCabe, 2005; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Some research on feminist identity has found that those who do not label themselves feminists (“non-labelers”) are similar to feminists in their support for gender equality (Liss, O’Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Quinn & Radtke, 2006). Other research has found that non-labelers occupy a middle ground between feminists and non-feminists with regard to some gender-related attitudes (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999). Although these results are inconsistent, they suggest that people can hold feminist attitudes but refrain from identifying as feminists. A likely reason for this avoidance is the negative stereotype associated with feminists, who are often attributed with having traits such as being unattractive, lesbians, aggressive, men-hating, stubborn, and angry (Berryman‐Fink & Verderber, 1985; Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Kamen, 1991; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Twenge & Zucker, 1999).

**The Current Research**

Although there are previous studies that tested the influence of political identity on group behavior and attitudes, there is a lack of research specifically addressing the influence of political identity on attitudes ideologically related to that identity. Furthermore, most of the prior research focuses on political party identification. There is almost no research addressing ideology-based identity, such as feminist identity, that is not represented by a political party.

In the current study, I test the effect of feminist identity on feminist attitudes. Drawing on SIT and SCT, the current research proposes that feminist identity, as a political identity, influences attitudes, rather than merely reflecting them.

I examine the hypothesis that in a situation in which feminist identity is socially relevant or salient, people will form their opinion about a particular gender-related attitude according to their identity, not according to the actual content of the attitude. Since a prevalent finding in research on feminist identity is that many people wish to avoid it, in the current research I test whether the desire to avoid a political identity influences attitude formation. Previous studies of political identity address relations between two defined groups (e.g. Republicans and Democrats). Thus, participants have a defined ingroup and a defined outgroup. In contrast, in this research, I examine the influence of a political identity people wish to avoid, rather than to reaffirm their ingroup identity.

I hypothesize that when feminist identity is made salient, people who do not identify as feminists will be less likely to agree with feminist attitudes, and that those who do identity as feminist will be more likely to agree with these attitudes. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two studies. In Experiment 1, I tested whether asking people to identify as feminist or non-feminist increased the correspondence between their identity and the attitudes they endorsed. Specifically, I tested whether feminist identity would be a better predictor of gender-related attitudes when people are explicitly required to identity as a feminist or a non-feminist before they report their attitudes. I examined whether people who identify as feminists express stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, while people who avoid that identity show weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists.

 In Experiment 2, I tested the same hypothesis by explicitly framing the attitude questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes. That is, I examined whether feminist identity is a stronger predictor of endorsed gender-related attitudes when the attitude measure is explicitly presented as measuring feminism, as compared to when no such framing occurs.

In addition to the main hypothesis, I also tested whether, in general, people report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. If so, this would support previous evidence that people agree with feminist attitudes even if they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). It would also support the main research hypothesis that social identity, in this case feminism, influences attitudes. Finally, I tested whether there are gender differences in feminist identification and in the influence of feminist identity on attitudes.

**Experiment 1**

Experiment 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that people express stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, or conversely, show weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists. In one group, participants first reported their identification as feminist or not, then completed a feminist attitude questionnaire; the other group completed the questionnaire first. The manipulation was the order in which the measures were completed. I assume that identification as feminist is a rather stable construct that would not be affected by the attitudes people report before they identify. On the other hand, attitudes might be malleable, and sensitive to explicit identification as feminist or non-feminist, if identity is reported before the attitude survey. Therefore, I examine whether the correlation between identification and attitudes is stronger when people report their identity before the attitude survey. If so, that would provide evidence that identification as a feminist identity (or avoidance of that identity) influences gender-related attitudes.

In addition to this correlation, I also test whether, in general, people report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. If so, that would support previous evidence that people tend to support feminist attitudes even if they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). It will also support the main research hypothesis that social identity, in this case feminism, influences attitudes.

**Method**

**Participants**

 Participants were volunteers in the Project Implicit website (Nosek, 2005). Of the 1,377 who began the study, 1,006 (652 females, *Mage* = 33.01, *SDage =* 13.76) completed all the tasks. A final population of 940 participants (610 females, *Mage* =33.11, *SDage =*13.72) were included in the analysis, after excluding 66 participants who seemed to use the same key for most of their responses in the feminist attitudes questionnaire (had a standard deviation of 0 in that questionnaire).

**Procedure**

Participants were assigned randomly to the two experiment conditions. They completed the surveys online. Participants in the “identification-first” condition completed the measures in the following order: (1) a binary feminist identification question; (2) a feminist attitude questionnaire; (3) self-reported identification with and evaluation of a social categories questionnaire; and (4) a Single Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT). Participants in the “attitudes-first” condition completed the tasks in the following order: (a) feminist attitude questionnaire; (b) binary feminist identification question; (c) self-reported identification with and evaluation of social categories questionnaire; (d) and the ST-IAT. At the end of the study, participants read the debriefing, including an interpretation of their ST-IAT results.

**Measures**

**Feminist identification.** I manipulated the salience of the feminist identity by asking the participants, “Do you consider yourself a feminist?” with two responses: yes and no. I used only these options to pressure participants to “take a side”, which might increase their need to re-affirm this identity and answer accordingly in the feminist attitudes questionnaire. The manipulation was the location of this question in the sequence of measures: half the participants reported their identification before answering the questionnaire (“identification-first”) and half reported it after (“attitudes-first”).

**Feminist attitude questionnaire.** Participants reported the degree to which they agreed with 12 statements taken from the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS) (Morgan, 1996; see Appendix A for the list of statements used in the study). The LFAIS reflects three general themes: discrimination against and subordination of women, collective action for women’s equality, and sisterhood. The LFAIS has good convergent, divergent, and known-groups validity and demonstrated reliability (Morgan, 1996). The LFAIS appears to be a subtle measure of feminism. It does not use the words “feminist” or “women’s movement”. Therefore it represents a covert type of feminism. I chose statements that were not overtly or radically feminist in order to increase the likelihood that people would support them.

The response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree). The instructions given before participants completed the questionnaire were phrased as follows: “We will show you several statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions”.

 **Identification with and evaluation of social categories.** Participants responded to the question, “Do you identify with the following social category?” for each of the following categories: Americans, White people, students, men, women, feminists, Republicans, and Democrats. The scale included the response options: not at all, very slightly, slightly, moderately, quite a lot, very much, and extremely. The responses were coded from 1 to 7.

Afterwards, participants reported their evaluation of each social category on a 7-point Likert scale 1 (strongly dislike) to 7 (strongly like). I used this questionnaire to gauge the sample’s general identification with and evaluation of feminists in comparison to other groups. In addition, it enabled use of the feminist identification question as a continuous variable.

**Implicit measure (ST-IAT).** The ST-IAT (Bluemke & Friese, 2008) is a variation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is an indirect measure of social cognition (attitudes, stereotypes, and self-concept). The ST-IAT variant is used to measure the evaluation of a single category rather than a prefrence between two categories. I used the ST-IAT to test the implicit self-concept of participants with feminism. In other words, I measured participants’ implicit feminist identification (the association of feminism and self versus feminism and not self). This measure was not directly related to the research hypothesis. I explored similarities and discrepancies between the indirectly measured and directly measured identification with feminism. Because it is not relevant to the present research, I will not refer to this measure further.

**Results**

The score of the feminist attitude questionnaire was computed as the mean of the responses to all 12 items in the questionnaire. Higher scores indicate stronger feminist attitudes.

**Feminist Identification**

Of all the participants, 48% (58% of the women and 28% of the men) responded “yes” to the binary question of whether they considered themselves feminists. The rest responded “no”. A Chi-square test for association of sex and feminist identification was significant ( (1) = 73.71, *p* < .001), indicating that more women than men identified as feminist. The percentage of women who identified as feminists was higher than expected. This may attest to the characteristics of participants who visit the Project Implicit website, creating a relatively liberal-Democrat sample. These characteristics can also be seen in the reported identification with and evaluation of social categories in this study.

Among the participants who reported their identification before completing the questionnaire, 51% identified as feminist. In comparison, 43% of those who reported their identification after completing the questionnaire identified as feminist, (1) = 5.68, *p* = .017. I examined whether that effect was moderated by the participants’ gender with a logistic regression with 2 (Gender) X 2 (Condition). In accordance with the previous analysis, there was a significant association between sex and feminist identification: women were more likely to identify as feminist, *OR* (1) = 63%, *p* < .001. The association between experiment condition and identification as a feminist was not significant, (1) = 14%, *p* = .063. The interaction of experiment condition and sex was also not significant, (1) = 6%, *p* = .47 indicates that the proportion of identification between the genders did not differ as functions of experiment condition.

There was a significant correlation between the response to the binary feminist identification question and the continuous feminist identification question presented later in the study, *r*(893) = .74, *p* < .001. I tested whether the manipulation influenced the continuous measure with a 2 (Condition) X 2 (Gender) ANOVA on the continuous feminist identification. The ANOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,926) = 103.03, *p* < .001, *ηp²* = .1, reflecting stronger identification as feminist among women (*M* = 4.18, *SD* = 1.80), compared to men (*M* = 2.92, *SD* = 1.77). There was no main effect for condition, *F*(1,926) = 0.47, *p* =.49, nor interaction, *F*(1, 926) = 0.01, *p* = .93. Importantly, participants always responded to the continuous measure after completing the feminist attitudes questionnaire. Therefore, in both conditions, the response to the continuous measure might reflect the effect of completing the feminist attitudes questionnaire on identification as a feminist.

**Feminist Attitudes**

The main issue of interest was the effect of the feminist identity question on responses to the feminist attitudes questionnaire. The internal consistency of the items in the feminist attitudes questionnaire was somewhat low (α Chronbach = .72). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the score in that questionnaire, by (and beyond) experimental condition and participants’ gender.

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| Table 1*Experiment 1:**Means and Standard Deviations of the Feminist Attitude Questionnaire, by Gender and Experiment Condition*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Women | Men | Total |
|  | *Mean* | *SD* | *Mean* | *SD* | *Mean* | *SD* |
| Identity-first | 5.49 | (0.79) | 4.94 | (0.93) | 5.30 | (0.88) |
| Attitudes-first  | 5.51 | (0.79) | 5.11 | (0.83) | 5.37 | (0.83) |
| Total | 5.50 | (0.79) | 5.02 | (0.89) | 5.33 | (0.86) |

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To test my hypotheses that responding to the feminist identity question would influence self-reported feminist attitudes, I conducted two General Linear Model (GLM) analyses to determine whether having to commit to or reject feminist identity before reporting gender attitudes increased the correlation between participants’ feminist identity and their reported attitudes. The first GLM analysis used the factors: experiment condition (the manipulation), self-reported gender, and self-reported feminist identity as assessed in the continuous measure.

In the second analysis, I replaced self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity, measured on a 7-point scale from extremely conservative (1) to extremely liberal (7). This was completed by a large subset of the participants when they first registered to complete studies in the Project Implicit website. I explored the effect of that factor because it was measured before the manipulation and had a positive correlation with the continuous feminist identity, *r*(875) = .41, *p* <.001. In other words, unlike the self-reported feminist identity (continuous measure), it could not have been affected by the manipulation or by completing the feminist attitudes measure.

First, I conducted a 2 (Condition: identification-first/attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male/female) ANOVA analysis on self-reported feminist attitudes. The result did not support my hypothesis. The only significant effect found was a main effect for gender, *F*(1, 936) = 70.32, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.07. Therefore, I added to the analysis the continuous feminist identification to test whether the experiment condition influenced the correlation between participants’ feminist identity and their reported attitudes regarding feminism. The results of the 2 (Condition: identification-first/attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male/ female) X feminist identification (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis on self-reported feminist attitudes did not support my hypothesis either. The interaction between experiment condition and feminist identification was non-significant, *F*(1, 922) = 1.95 , *p* =.16, *ηp2* = .002. The effect of requesting participants to support or reject feminist identity before reporting their gender attitudes was not moderated by their identification with feminist identity. In other words, I found no evidence that the correspondence between participants’ reported attitudes and their identification as feminists (as reflected in the continuous identification score) was stronger if they embraced or rejected feminist identity before completing the gender attitudes questionnaire than if they were not asked the binary question regarding feminist identity before completing the questionnaire. The ANCOVA found the expected large main effect for feminist identification, *F*(1,922) = 248.75, *p* < .001, *ηp²* = .21.

I also found a significant and small main effect for condition, *F*(1,922) = 4.87, *p* = .027, *ηp²* = .005. Participants reported stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly requested to identify with or reject feminist identity (*M* = 5.37, *SD* = 0.83), than when requested to identify or reject the identity (*M* = 5.30, *SD* = 0.88). This effect might reflect a negative effect of the identification question on all participants, when controlling for the participants’ feminist identity. However, because the effect size is small and barely reached the level of significance despite the large sample, it would be highly speculative to make any inference based on this finding alone.

The results of the 2 (Condition: identification-first/attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male/ female) X self-reported political identity (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis on self-reported feminist attitudes did not find different patterns. The interaction between condition and political identity was non-significant, *F*(1, 875) = 0.08 , *p* =.781, *ηp2* = 0.00. The effect of requesting participants to embrace or reject feminist identity before reporting their gender-related attitudes was not moderated by their political identity. The ANCOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,875) = 48.22, *p* < .001, *ηp2* = 0.052. Women reported stronger feminist attitudes (*M* = 5.44, *SD* = 0.76), than did men (*M* = 5.02, *SD* = 0.86). There was also large main effect for political identification, *F*(1,875) = 204.2, *p* < .001, *ηp²* = .19. Stronger liberal identity predicted stronger feminist attitudes. All other effects were found to be non-significant.

**Identification with and Evaluation of Social Categories**

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the identification with and evaluation of various social categories. The table also shows correlations between evaluation and identification. As expected, there was consistently a positive correlation between identification and evaluation of each category. The correlations were small for the gender categories (male/female), probably reflecting the fact that heterosexuals often identify with their gender but are fond of people from the other gender. The correlations were strong for political categories (feminist, Democrat, and Republican), which is compatible with the assumptions of Social Identity Theory.

More participants identified as Democrats (*M* = 3.83, *SD* = 1.80) than as Republicans (*M* = 2.71, *SD* = 1.73), *t*(924)= 64.85, *p* <.001, *d* = .63. Identification as a feminist correlated positively with identification as a Democrat, *r*(921) = .34, *p* < .001, and negatively with identification as a Republican, *r*(921)= -.23, *p* < .001. Thus, the sample was relatively liberal and Democrat, which might explain the large proportion of participants who identified as feminists (compared to the proportion I expected).

|  |
| --- |
| Table 2*Experiment 1:**Means, Standard Deviations (in parentheses) and Correlations of Identification with and Evaluation of Social Categories* |
| **Identification:**  | Americans | Whites | Students | Men | Women | Feminists | Republicans | Democrats |
|  | 5.19(1.86) | 4.81(1.86) | 5.34(1.79) | 3.74(2.21) | 5.10(2.12) | 3.74(1.89) | 2.71(1.73) | 3.83(1.80) |
| **Evaluation:** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Americans | 5.39(1.46) |

|  |
| --- |
| **.53\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| .27\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .16\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
|  .12\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .04 |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| -.15\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .3\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| -.05 |

 |
| Whites | 5.16(1.36) |

|  |
| --- |
| .31\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| **.37\*\*** |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .12\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .11\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .1\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.17\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .29\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| -.08\* |

 |
| Students | 5.73(1.20) |

|  |
| --- |
| .24\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .13\*\* |

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| --- |
| **.33\*\*** |

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| --- |
| .02 |

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| --- |
| .09\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .03 |

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|  |
| --- |
| .06\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .1\* |

 |
| Men | 5.43(1.36) |

|  |
| --- |
| .22\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .22\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .1\* |

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| --- |
| **.07\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| .13\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.05 |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .12\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .08\* |

 |
| Women | 5.96(1.17) |

|  |
| --- |
| .21\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .17\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .09\* |

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| --- |
| .09\* |

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| --- |
| **.11\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| .08\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .03 |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .13\*\* |

 |
| Feminists | 4.75(1.60) |

|  |
| --- |
| -.06\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.02 |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.01 |

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| --- |
| -.26\*\* |

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| --- |
| .29\*\* |

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| --- |
| **.69\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.26\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .31\*\* |

 |
| Republicans | 3.70(1.65) |

|  |
| --- |
| .22\*\* |

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| --- |
| .24\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .11\* |

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| --- |
| .11\* |

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| --- |
| -.06 |

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| --- |
| -.28\*\* |

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| --- |
| **.67\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.4\*\* |

 |
| Democrats | 4.66(1.53) |

|  |
| --- |
| .02 |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.08\* |

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| --- |
| .01 |

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| --- |
| -.08\* |

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| --- |
| .18\*\* |

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| --- |
| .23\*\* |

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| --- |
| -.39\*\* |

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| --- |
| **.7\*\*** |

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| Note: \**p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .001. |

**Discussion**

Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people who identify as feminists express stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, whereas people who avoid that identity express weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists. In contrast to my hypothesis, I found no evidence that the correspondence between reported attitudes and identification as feminists was stronger when they embraced or rejected feminist identity before completing the gender attitudes questionnaire than when they were not asked about feminist identity before completing the questionnaire. A significant and small main effect for experiment condition was found reflecting a negative effect of the identification question on all participants, when controlling for participants’ feminist identity. However, because the effect size is small and hardly reached the level of significance despite the large sample, it would be highly speculative to make any inference based on this finding alone.

I conducted a second analysis, in which I replaced the self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity, because the latter was measured before the experiment, and thus could not have been affected by the manipulation or by completing the feminist attitudes measure. Self-reported political identity had a positive correlation with self-reported feminist identity.

The analysis did not support my hypothesis. It demonstrated only a large main effect of political identity on feminist attitudes. A small main effect for gender was found, indicating that more women than men agree with feminist attitudes. Taken together, in both analyses, identification as a feminist explains the gender difference regarding feminist attitudes (as compared to political identity), since it was shown that more women than men identify as feminists.

These results might suggest that attitudes on feminist issues are too stable to change only out of desire to avoid the feminist label. On the other hand, these conclusions are limited by the overall liberal orientation of the sample, which might have made it difficult to detect the effect of avoidance of feminist identity.

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 was designed to test the same hypothesis as Experiment 1 with a different manipulation. This time, I manipulated the relevance of feminist identity to feminist attitudes by either framing the attitudes questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes, or not explicitly framing it as such. I examined the hypothesis that the correlation between feminist identification and self-reported feminist attitudes would be stronger when the questionnaire was framed as a measure of feminist attitudes. That would suggest that feminist identity (or avoidance of that identity) influences gender-related attitudes. As in Experiment 1, in addition to the correlation, I also tested whether, in general, people reported stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism, and whether any of these possible effects were moderated by participants’ gender.

**Method**

**Participants**

 Participants were volunteers in the Project Implicit website (Nosek, 2005). Of the 1,360 who began the study, 978 (684 females, *Mage* = 32.65, *SDage*= 13.91) completed the surveys. Of the 978 participants who completed the study, 918 (644 females, *Mage* = 32.75, *SDage*= 13.77) were included in the analysis, after excluding 60 participants whose responses in the feminist attitude questionnaire showed hardly any variability (*SD* = 0).

**Measures**

The measures were identical to Experiment 1, except for the following modifications. In Experiment 2, I did not use the binary feminist identification question. All participants reported their feminist identity after the questionnaire was completed, as part of the identification with social categories, on the same 7-point scale as in Experiment 1.

**Questionnaire instruction (manipulation).** The instructions for the feminist attitudes questionnaire framed the questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes (feminist-framing condition), or without such explicit framing (control condition). In the control condition, the instructions phrased as follows: “We will show you several statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions.”

In the feminist-framing condition, instructions were: “You will answer a questionnaire that will measure whether you endorse feminist attitudes. We will use that questionnaire to measure how feminist you are. The questionnaire includes statements that most feminists support, and statements that most feminists reject. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions.”

**Procedure**

Participants were assigned randomly to the two groups in the study. They completed the survey online. Participants completed the tasks in the following order: (1) feminist attitude questionnaire; (2) identification with and evaluation of social categories questionnaire, and (3) the ST-IAT (not discussed further in the present report). At the end of the study, participants read a debriefing, which included an interpretation of their ST-IAT results.

**Results**

**Feminist Identification**

Figure1 presents a histogram of the responses to the feminist identification question, by self-reported gender. It shows relatively high identification with feminist identity, especially among women. As in Experiment 1, these results differ from what I expected. This conflicts with an underlying premise of the present research, namely that women prefer to distance themselves from a feminist identity. However, it is difficult to make a broad inference from this non-representative sample.

A t-test found that more women identified with feminist identity (*M* = 4.07, *SD* = 1.76) than men (*M* = 2.99, *SD* = 1.73), *t*(912) = 8.51, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.62. Another t-test found no effect of the manipulation on self-reported identification (feminist-framing condition: *M* = 3.79, *SD* = 1.75, control condition: *M* = 3.70, *SD* = 1.88), *t*(912) = 0.8 , *p* = .425, *d* = 0.05.

*Figure 1.* Histogram of responses to feminist identification question, by self-reported gender.

**Feminist Attitudes**

The score of the feminist attitude questionnaire was computed as in Experiment 1 (α Chronbach = .71). Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of the feminist attitude questionnaire.

To test my main hypotheses, that the salience of feminist identity (manipulated by the questionnaire framing) would influence self-reported feminist attitudes, I tested whether feminist identity would be a stronger predictor of endorsed gender-related attitudes when the attitude measure is explicitly presented as measuring feminism than when no such framing occurs. As in Experiment 1, to test that question, I conducted two ANCOVA analyses. The first used the factors: experiment condition (the manipulation), self-reported gender, and self-reported feminist identity. In the second analysis, I replaced self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity (same variable as in Experiment 1, that was measured before the manipulation and could not have been affected by it). There was a positive correlation between self-reported political identity and self-reported feminist identity, *r*(869) = .48, *p* < .001.

First, I conducted a 2 (Condition: framing/control) X 2 (Gender: male/ female) ANOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes. The result did not support my prediction. The only significant effect found was a main effect for gender, *F*(1, 914) = 44.44, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.05. I added to the analysis the continuous feminist identification variable, to test whether the condition influenced the relation between participants’ feminist identity and their reported attitudes regarding feminist identity. The results of the 2 (Condition: framing/control) X 2 (Gender: male/ female) X feminist identification (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not support my prediction. The interaction between experiment condition and feminist identification was non-significant, *F*(1, 906) = 0.91 , *p* =.341, *ηp2* = .001. The effect of explicitly presenting the questionnaire as measuring feminism was not moderated by the participants’ identification with feminist identity. In other words, I found no evidence that the correspondence between reported attitudes and feminist identification (as reflected in the continuous identification score) was stronger when the questionnaire was framed as measuring feminist attitudes than without such explicit framing. The ANCOVA found a tiny main effect for gender, *F*(1,906) = 3.95, *p* =.046, *ηp2* = 0.004. Women reported slightly stronger feminist attitudes (*M* = 5.47, *SD* = 0.78), than men (*M* = 5.08, *SD* = 0.89). There was also the predicted large main effect for feminist identification, *F*(1,906) = 304.12, *p* < .001, *ηp²* = .25.

The results of the 2 (Condition: framing/control) X 2 (Gender: male/ female) X self-reported political identity (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not find different patterns. The interaction between condition and political identity was non-significant, *F*(1, 865) = 0.86 , *p* = .353, *ηp2* = 0.00. The effect of explicitly presenting the questionnaire as measuring feminism was not moderated by the participants’ political identity. The ANCOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,865) = 41.16, *p* < .001, *ηp2* = 0.045. There was also large main effect for political identification, *F*(1,865) = 224.72, *p* < .001, *ηp²* = .21. Stronger liberal identity predicted stronger feminist attitudes. All other effects were found to be non-significant.

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| Table 3*Experiment 2:**Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of the Feminist Attitude Questionnaire, by Gender and Experiment Condition*  |
|   | Women  | Men | Total |
| Feminist-Framing Condition |  |  |  |
| 5.47 (0.80) | 5.06 (0.91) | 5.34 (0.86) |
| Control Condition |  |  |  |
| 5.48 (0.76) | 5.10 (0.87) | 5.37 (0.82) |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 5.47 (0.78) | 5.08 (0.89) | 5.35 (0.84) |
|   |   |   |   |

**Identification with and Evaluation of Social Categories**

The correlations between identification with and evaluation of each category, as well as means and standard deviations of each of those variables, are presented in Table 4. In regard to the sample characteristic, as in Experiment 1, more participants identified as Democrats (*M* = 3.81, *SD* = 1.79) than as Republicans (*M* = 2.66, *SD* = 1.74), *t*(902) = 63.66, *p* < .001, *d* = .65. As predicted, feminist identification was positively correlated with identification as a Democrat, *r*(900) = .39, *p* < .001, and negatively with identification as a Republican, *r*(899) = -.27, *p* < .001. Again, these results show that the people in the present research samples tended to be liberal.

|  |
| --- |
| Table 4*Experiment 2:**Means, Standard Deviations (in parentheses) and Correlations of Identification with and Evaluation of Social Categories* |
| **Identification:**  | Americans | Whites | Students | Men | Women | Feminists | Republicans | Democrats |
|  | 5.22(1.79) | 4.74(1.87) | 5.30(1.79) | 3.52(2.12) | 5.32(2.02) | 3.75(1.82) | 2.66(1.74) | 3.81(1.80) |
| **Evaluation:** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Americans | 5.38(1.46) |

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| --- |
| **.56\*\*** |

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| --- |
| .21\*\* |

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| --- |
| .13\* |

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| --- |
| .04 |

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| --- |
| .15\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.12\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| .27\*\* |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| -.04 |

 |
| Whites | 5.17(1.37) |

|  |
| --- |
| .30\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| **.36\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| .1\* |

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| --- |
| .1\* |

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| --- |
| .08\* |

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| --- |
| -.11\* |

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| --- |
| .24\*\* |

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| --- |
| .00 |

 |
| Students | 5.71(1.22) |

|  |
| --- |
| .16\*\* |

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| --- |
| .04 |

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| --- |
| **.31\*\*** |

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| --- |
| -.06 |

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| --- |
| .19\*\* |

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| --- |
| .11\* |

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| --- |
| -.01 |

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|  |
| --- |
| .16\*\* |

 |
| Men | 5.48(1.35) |

|  |
| --- |
| .23\*\* |

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| --- |
| .19\*\* |

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| --- |
| .08\* |

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| **.03** |

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| --- |
| .17\*\* |

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| --- |
| -.05 |

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| --- |
| .17\*\* |

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| --- |
| .01 |

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| Women | 6.03(1.18) |

|  |
| --- |
| .15\*\* |

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| --- |
| .04 |

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| --- |
| .06\* |

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| --- |
| .00 |

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| --- |
| **.12\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| .12\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.02 |

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|  |
| --- |
| .13\* |

 |
| Feminists | 4.75(1.58) |

|  |
| --- |
| -.04 |

 |

|  |
| --- |
| -.1\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.02 |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.25\*\* |

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| --- |
| .28\*\* |

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| --- |
| **.7\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.3\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .35\*\* |

 |
| Republicans | 3.68(1.62) |

|  |
| --- |
| .26\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .21\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .12\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .1\* |

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| --- |
| .00 |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.31\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| **.67\*\*** |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.39\*\* |

 |
| Democrats | 4.76(1.42) |

|  |
| --- |
| -.02 |

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|  |
| --- |
| -.14\*\* |

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|  |
| --- |
| .01 |

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| --- |
| -.07\* |

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| .16\*\* |

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| --- |
| .27\*\* |

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| --- |
| -.36\*\* |

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| **.66\*\*** |

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| Note: \* *p*< .05, \*\* *p* < .001. |

**General Discussion**

 Social identity and group membership are primary factors that shape people’s attitudes and ideologies (Diehl, 1990; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014; Tajfel, 1982; Terry & Hogg, 2000). This study addresses feminist identity, and examines how the desire to identify as a feminist, or to avoid that identification, influences feminist attitudes. Drawing on SIT and SCT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), the hypothesis of the current research is that feminist identity, as a political identity, influences attitudes, rather than only reflecting them. My assumption was that in order to re-affirm feminist (or non-feminist) identity, participants will tend to agree (or disagree) with feminist attitudes according to the identity prototype, when this identity is salient.

 I conducted two experiments, in both of which I manipulated the salience of feminist identity. In Experiment 1, I asked participants to identify as feminist before answering a feminist attitude questionnaire (in comparison to a control group of participants who were asked to identify as feminist or not after completing the questionnaire). In Experiment 2, to one sub-group I framed an attitude questionnaire explicitly as a measure of feminist attitudes (in comparison to a control group who received no such explicit framing).

 Both studies tested the same main hypothesis, that when feminist identity (or non-feminist identity) is salient, people who identified as feminists would show stronger feminist attitudes, whereas people who avoided that identity would show weaker feminist attitudes. The results of both studies showed almost identical patterns (and also means and correlations). Therefore, I will discuss the results from both experiments together.

The results did not support the main hypothesis. They indicate a non-significant interaction between experiment condition and feminist identification. In other words, salience of feminist identity did not result in a stronger correlation between feminist identification and feminist attitudes. Furthermore, in both studies the results revealed a large effect of feminist identification, such that stronger feminist identification predicated stronger feminist attitudes. Feminist identification emerges as the factor that explains the greatest part of variance in feminist attitude. The lack of significant differences in feminist attitudes resulting from identity salience may be attributed to characteristics of feminist identity, as operated in this research.

First, empirical evidence for SIT and SCT shows that there are several conditions necessary for ingroup prototype behavior to occur. The main condition is that social identity must be salient and accepted in the relevant context. However, it is also necessary that ingroup members choose to compare themselves with an outgroup and seek to differentiate themselves along dimensions that lead to anti-social behaviors (e.g. “We are intelligent and hence we exclude them, since they are stupid”) (Reicher et al., 2010). It is possible that in the current research, although I manipulated the salience of feminist identity, the manipulation did not address participants’ need to differentiate themselves from outgroup members (feminist or not-feminist). Thus, the need to apply social identity and present the ingroup prototype attitudes was not aroused. The fact that I choose to present feminist identity as unipolar (e.g., feminist or non-feminist) and not bipolar (e.g., feminist or chauvinist), might be related to this explanation. I assumed that most people will not identify as chauvinist, because of the negative view of this identity (regardless of whether I personally consider non-feminist identity to be synonymous with chauvinist identity). Thus, there is no logic in the salience of this category. However, perhaps only referring to feminist (or non-feminist) identity was not enough to arouse an ingroup – outgroup relationship.

Another explanation that can shed light on this result is based on research regarding consensus formation (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998). When people self-categorize as members of a social group, they express a need to understand who they are, how they should behave, and what should they think, in terms of the characteristics that they share with other group members (Turner et al., 1994). However, those who identify with the same group do not immediately and automatically achieve consensus. Rather, there is a process of consensus formation through which the expectation of agreement between group members shifts group discussion and dispute towards a consensus (Haslam et al., 1998). People subscribing to feminist ideology and theory are diverse (Henley et al., 1998). Thus, it is possible that feminist identity does not share one agreed upon prototype, and that members have not obtained attitude consensus. This may result in weaker demand to re-affirm the feminist identity, because there is no single shared prototype of a “feminist”. In addition, this explanation might be even more relevant to someone who identifies as “not-feminist”. It is reasonable to assume the non-feminist identity, that is identification by way of negation, has no defined prototype, or consensus regarding attitudes or behavior for group members.

In light of past research indicating that people tend to support feminist attitudes even if they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997), another hypothesis in this research was that people, in general, would report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. Therefore, I predicted that the participants in Experiment 1 who answered the binary identification question after completing the attitudes questionnaire (“attitudes-first”) and those in the control condition in Experiment 2, who did not receive explicit framing of the questionnaire as feminists, would show stronger feminist attitudes compared to participants in the “identification-first” condition and “feminist-framing” conditions, respectively.

The results did not support this predication. Although Experiment 1 found a significant effect for experiment condition in the direction of my assumption, the effect size is extremely small (*ηp²* = .005). Therefore, apparently, the source of the significance is due to the relatively large sample in the study, and does not indicate on any essential differences. In addition, Experiment 2 revealed a non-significant effect for condition (*ηp ²* = .003).

One explanation is that these results can be attributed to the sample characteristics. In both studies, the proportion of participants identifying as feminist was larger than expected, and the individuals in the sample were relatively likely to identify as a Democrat and politically liberal, categories that correlate with stronger feminist attitudes (Liss et al., 2001; Berryman‐Fink & Verderber, 1985). Thus, it is possible that in this sample, the feminist label was not perceived in a negative way, and therefore explicitly evoking feminism did not result in a need to reject feminist characteristics or attitudes.

This explanation is also relevant to the lack of significant results for my main hypothesis, as mentioned above. If feminist identity is not perceived negatively, the need for conformity of behavior according to the ingroup prototype is reduced, because it is less relevant to protecting self-esteem (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Hogg, 2016). Together with the theoretical explanation mentioned above, it seems that the operationalization used to evoke participants’ need to re-affirm their feminist or non-feminist identity was rather weak. In other words, it might not have been sufficient for group behavior to occur, in this specific context.

I also tested whether feminist identification and feminist attitudes differ according to gender. Regarding feminist identification, significantly more women than men identified as feminist. This difference is intuitively understandable, since women are more likely than men are to identify with an ideology and movement that seeks to undermine male dominance and end women’s oppression (Hooks, 2000; Robnett & Anderson, 2017). There was also significant difference in feminist attitudes according to gender. More women than men agreed with feminist attitudes, but the effect size was very small. Feminist identification explains much more of the variance in feminist attitudes, than does gender.

For exploratory purposes, I used the ST-IAT to test participants’ implicit feminist identification. The results revealed a weak but positive and significant correlation between implicit and explicit feminist identification. This implies that the ST-IAT did address participants’ implicit self-conception as feminist, and that explicit feminist identification explained part of the variance regarding implicit feminist identification (*ηp²* = .05 in both studies). Experiment 1 also revealed a small but significant two-way interaction of gender and experiment condition. Women presented stronger implicit identification compared to men in the “attitudes-first” condition, while there was no significant difference for gender in the “identification-first” condition. There is no obvious explanation for this finding. Furthermore, the fact that effect size was very small and that this interaction was not significant in Experiment 2, suggests that this is a random difference.

The current research has several limitations, in addition to those already mentioned. First, the feminist attitude questionnaire used in this research had a quite low internal consistency, which probably indicates low validity. Apparently, the changes I made in the short form of LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) are the cause for this. This may have contributed to the lack of significant results. Future research should use a more reliable and valid measure for feminist attitudes.

Second, to measure participants’ feminist identity I used the feminist identification that participants reported later in the study. Although I presented the feminist identification along with other categories of identification, it is reasonable to assume that reporting the feminist attitude previously in the study could have influenced the identification, or at least it was not a clear measure of feminist identity. As in previous research in the field of political identity (Cohen, 2003), it is probably preferable to measure political identity in a separate study.

Third, the fact that the study used only online volunteer participants, and taking into regard the specific political and feminist characteristics of this population (compared to what I expected in a general population), may have contributed to the fact that salience of feminist identity had almost no influence on participants’ agreement with feminist attitudes.

In conclusion, this research indicates that feminist identification reflects feminist attitudes and ideology. In contrast to the research hypothesis, there was no evidence that salience of feminist identity influenced feminist attitudes. Because the findings of previous research regarding political and social identity influencing attitudes are robust, future research needs to further investigate the feminist identity construct and its influence on group behavior.

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Appendix A

*Feminist attitude questionnaire***-** 12-item questionnaire, taken from the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (Morgan, 1996).

1. (5 [in the original scale]) Both husband and wife should be equally responsible for the care of young children.

2. (6) The first duty of a woman with young children is to home and family. (R)

3. (7) A man who has chosen to stay at home and be a house-husband is not less masculine than a man who is employed full-time.

4. (10) Women should be more concerned with clothing and appearance than men. (R)

5. (13) Although women can be good leaders, men make better leaders. (R)

6. (19). Men and women should be able to freely make choices about their lives without being restricted by their gender.

7. (21). There are circumstances in which women should be paid less than men for equal work. (R)

8. (27). A woman should not have to get permission from important people in her life in order to get an abortion.

9. (29). If men were the sex who got pregnant, more reliable and convenient birth control would be available.

10. (40). A woman who has many sexual partners is not necessarily a slut.

11. (42). Women have been treated unfairly on the basis of their gender throughout most of human history.

12. (45). People who complain that pornography treats women like objects are overreacting. (R)

13. (47). Women are already given equal opportunities with men in all important sectors of their lives. (R).

14. (49). Women in the U.S. are treated as second-class citizens.

15. (50). All men receive economic, sexual, and psychological benefits from male domination.

16. (54). A radical restructuring of society is needed to overcome status inequalities between the sexes.

17. (55) Women can best overcome discrimination by doing the best that they can at their jobs, not by wasting time with political activity. (R)

Appendix B

*Implicit measure (ST-IAT)*

I used two different formats of the ST-IAT:

**1:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Right key** | **Left Key** | **No. of trails** | **Block** |
| Not self | Self | 20 | 1 |
| Not self | Self + feminism | 20 | 2 |
| Not self | Self + feminism | 40 | **3** |
| Not self + feminism | Self | **20** | **4** |
| Not self + feminism | Self | **40** | **5** |

**2:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Right key** | **Left Key** | **No. of trials** | **Block** |
| Not self | Self | 20 | 1 |
| Not self | Self + feminism | 30 | 2-or-3 |
| Not self + feminism | Self | 30 | **3**-or-2 |
| Not self  | Self + feminism | 30 | 4-or-5 |
| Not self + feminism | Self | 30 | 5-or-4 |

Stimulus list for each category:

**Self:** me, myself, I, mine

**Not-self:** it, that, them, people

**Feminism:** Gloria Steinem, Women’s Rights

   

תוכן עניינים

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**זהות פוליטית............................................................................................ 5**

**תווית וזהות פמיניסטית.............................................................................. 6**

**מחקר נוכחי............................................................................................... 7**

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**תקציר**

**זהות חברתית הינה תפיסה עצמית שמתעצבת מתהליכים של קטגוריזציה והזדהות במונחים של חברות בקבוצה או תפקיד. זהות חברתית פעמים רבות מעצבת ומשפיעה על עמדות וערכים של אנשים. אנשים נוטים להתיישר בהתאם למה שהם תופסים כעמדות הנורמטיביות והמקובלות בקבוצה החברתית שלהם. במחקר הנוכחי, בדקתי האם אנשים נמנעים מלהחזיק בעמדות אותם הם תופסים כעמדות הנורמטיביות של קבוצה חברתית בלתי רצויה. באופן ספציפי, בדקתי את ההשערה כי אנשים נוטים לבטא עמדות לא-פמיניסטיות במטרה להרחיק עצמם מהזהות הפמיניסטית שנתפסת כבלתי רצויה.**

בשני ניסויים, נבדקים השלימו שאלון עמדות פמיניסטיות או לאחר מניפולציה שמסגרה עמדות אלה כמקושרות לזהות פמיניסטית, או ללא מניפולציה זו. בניסוי 1 (*N*=1,006), המניפולציה תפעלה את בולטות הזהות הפמיניסטית בכך שהנבדקים נשאלו לפני מענה על השאלון האם הם מזדהים כפמיניסטיים. בניסוי 2 *N*=978)), המניפולציה הציגה באופן ישיר את השאלון כשאלון המודד עמדות פמיניסטיות (לעומת ללא כל מסגור ספציפי). שיערתי שמסגור העמדות כפמיניסטיות יוביל לירידה בדיווח עצמי של הסכמה עם עמדות אלה בקרב נבדקים שלא הזדהו כפמיניסטיים, ולעומת זאת יוביל לעלייה בדיווח העצמי על הסכמה עם עמדות אלה. בניגוד להשערתי, בשני הניסויים בולטות הזהות הפמיניסטית לא השפיעה על העמדות הפמיניסטיות.

תוצאות אלה מציעות כי עמדות של אנשים בנוגע לנושאים פמיניסטיים חזקות מכדי להשתנות רק על ידי הרצון להימנע מהזהות הפמיניסטית. עם זאת, מסקנה זו מוגבלת משום שהמדגם הנוכחי בעל נטייה ליברלית כללית, מה שיכול להיות הקשה לזהות אפקט של הימנעות מזהות הפמיניסטית. ייתכן ובחירה מקדימה למחקר של נבדקים שאינם מזדהים כפמיניסטיים תמצא את האפקט המשוער.

**אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב**

**הפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה**

**המחלקה לפסיכולוגיה**

השפעת התווית 'פמיניזם' על עמדות

**חיבור זה מהווה חלק מהדרישות לקבלת התואר "מוסמך למדעי הרוח והחברה" (**M.A**)**

**מאת: מורן דנגור**

**בהנחיית: ד"ר יואב בר-ענן**

**חתימת הסטודנטית: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**חתימת המנחה: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**חתימת יו"ר הועדה המחלקתית: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

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