**Chapter 1**

**The Education of a Strategist**

Moshe Dayan was born on May 20, 1915, in Kibbutz Degania Alef, the first child of Shmuel Dayan and Devorah, née Zlotovsky, who had arrived in Israel during the Second Aliyah.[[1]](#footnote-1) He was named for Moshe Barsky, a member of the kibbutz who was murdered by Bedouins while riding his mule to bring medication for Shmuel. Moshe Dayan had two younger siblings: Zohar (Zorik) and Aviva.

Born in the Ukraine, Moshe Dayan’s father Shmuel joined the Zionist movement at a very young age and immigrated to Palestine in 1908. For several years, he worked as an itinerant farmhand in different settlements to prepare himself for work in agriculture. In 1911, he joined Kibbutz Degania Alef, which had been established a year earlier.

Shmuel was an engaged, active participant in debates over the way the kibbutz would best fulfill the ideal vision of Zionism. Devorah, also from the Ukraine, was a young idealist from a wealthy family. Disappointed by the failure of the 1905 revolution, she decided to seek a new homeland in the historic land of the Jewish people, where she worked as a laborer to fulfill her socialist vision.

Arriving in Degania in February 1913, Devorah got to know Shmuel, and they married in September 1914, shortly after the outbreak of World War I. At that time, not only were living conditions in Degania difficult, but the couple and their infant child Moshe suffered from ill health. With the added burden of a deep ideological disagreement over the way of life in Degania hovering over them, the young family decided to move to Nahalal. Group members, including Shmuel, who had reservations about Degania’s life of total communalism, wanted to found a communal settlement that still maintained the traditional nuclear family and household. These dissidents claimed that the kibbutz structure limited their personal freedom and that the new form of settlement they were proposing – the moshav – was right both for the nation and the individual.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In the summer of 1920, Shmuel, Devorah, and Moshe temporarily moved to Tel Aviv to wait for Nahalal, the first labor moshav, to get organized. The Jewish National Fund was busy buying the lands for Nahalal, as well as other plots in the Jezre’el Valleye, from the Arab land owners. The site designated for the first moshav was a large marsh. Nahalal’s first settlers, including Shmuel and Devorah, arrived there in September 1921 via a convoy of wagons and began the work of building the settlement. Nahalal was home to Moshe Dayan throughout his childhood and adolescence.[[3]](#footnote-3)

From an early age, Dayan had the values of practical Zionism inculcated in him.[[4]](#footnote-4) From his father, he learned that he must realize Zionism by conquering the actual soil of the land. The 1917 Balfour Declaration was a victory for political Zionism, but Shmuel still emphasized the importance of the actual land: “And here, my darling, is where we began to conquer the land, not by war but by the plow and by labor. Thus, the land will stay ours and we will never leave it.”[[5]](#footnote-5) He maintained that Arabs were inferior, “and that was the doctrine I grew up with and believed in – that Arabs are inferior, robbers, murderers, and prone to rioting.”[[6]](#footnote-6)

As a child, Moshe was close to his mother and he spent more time with her than with his father. Devorah read him Russian literature, which he came to love,[[7]](#footnote-7) and he became familiar with the writings of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Pushkin, and Gorky.[[8]](#footnote-8) In his biography of Dayan, the historian Shabtai Tevet describes him as a sensitive child who cried often, albeit silently.[[9]](#footnote-9) On the other hand, he also showed a great deal of independence and, from an early age, roamed alone between Deganya and Nahalal.

He considered his mother a wise and intelligent woman, and respected her greatly. He respected his father less. While he felt he could talk and discuss issues with his mother, his father would issue categorical declarations that no one was allowed to question. Dayan felt his mother was a more open individual, and described her as being “on the verge of liberalism.” This attitude was manifested also vis-à-vis Arabs: while Dayan’s father was suspicious and kept his distance, his mother hosted them in the family home.[[10]](#footnote-10)

From an early age, Dayan began identifying with independent, nonconformist ideas that challenged the status quo. He would speak with Shulamit, his cousin, about his plans for the future. Contrary to his father, who saw his son’s future in farming, and unlike the prevalent attitude in Nahalal, which considered an academic education to be less important than training for agricultural labor, Dayan expressed a desire to continue going to school, and to make sure that his own children received a better education that he had.

In addition to Russian literature, Dayan read the Hebrew writings of Avraham Shlonksy and Natan Alterman, as well as classical literature in Hebrew translation, including Johann Goethe, Heinrich Heine, and Jack London. Thanks to his reading, Dayan broadened his cultural horizons beyond those of his cohort in Nahalal and developed a level of sophistication unusal among his friends and acquaintances. According to Tevet, this sophistication resulted in a complex view of the world in which there was room for shades of gray, unlike the black-and-white world of many of his contemporaries.[[11]](#footnote-11) As a youth, Dayan was active in a group called “The Hut,” to which he invited guest speakers and organized debates. Dayan loved ideological arguments. Even then, he tended to organize lectures on security, and he invited speakers to address the group on Arab politics and culture.[[12]](#footnote-12)

**The Development of Dayan’s Attitudes toward the Arab Enemy**

For his entire life as a soldier, military leader, and statesman, Dayan stood at the forefront of the Jewish people’s struggle against the Arabs: Palestinian city dwellers and rural *fellahin*, nomadic Bedouins, Arab inhabitants of neighboring Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt – they were all part of the Arab *ummah*, speakers of Arabic, with a shared religion and ethos.

Sun Tzu, the Chinese military philosopher of the 6th century BCE, said “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”[[13]](#footnote-13) Having grown up close to Arabs, and having been in contact with them throughout his adolescence, his attitudes toward them developed in an unmediated fashion – from his experiences and human contact with them in various contexts. Thus, during the years when his worldview was being shaped, Dayan developed an understanding of the Arab perspective in the conflict as well as empathy for them. Unlike many Jews of his day who viewed Arabs as uncivilized barbarians, Dayan respected their connection to the land, even seeing in them a contemporary version of how the Jewish people must have lived in Biblical times.

As a child, Dayan came into contact with the Arabs his mother hosted. Growing up, his father would take him along when he to traveled to the Arab village of Majdal on the Sea of Galilee where his wheat was ground. For the child, this was a magical journey. While his father negotiated with the flourmill owner, he kept watch over their bags on the cart while devouring halvah and figs his father had bought in the village. During the journey, the father would explain to the son that the Arabs were hired farm laborers who had not evolved for hundreds of years, that their villages had no services or infrastructures, and everybody was dirt poor. He added his explanation that they were to a large extent responsible for their sorry state because they were lazy. But his harangues fell on deaf ears. Dayan was captivated by the Arab figures he saw and impressed by the Arabs’ ability to survive in this poverty and their ability to make do with little.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Even when it was time to plow the field, running after his father’s plow, Dayan met Arabs and Bedouins. One was a child named Wahash Hanhana from the Arab al-Mazarib tribe. The two became friends and would plow the field together – as long as Shmuel allowed it.[[15]](#footnote-15) When the young Dayan went on hikes with his classmates around Nahalal, he would encounter local Arabs in orchards and at springs. His friends recalled, “Moshe socialized with Arab kids more than others… In particular, he liked the *fellahin*, the Arabs who labor and sweat. All of us were full of love for the laborers, but Moshe had a special attitude to them.”[[16]](#footnote-16)

Dayan read literature romanticizing the life of Arabs in the desert, including the book *Sons of Arabia* by Moshe Smilansky, written under the pen name Khawaja Moussa.[[17]](#footnote-17) He even wrote a short story that was published in the Nahalal newsletter. The heroes of his tale were Ali and Mustafa, and he and his friends joined them on their desert adventures. They rode mares, wore Bedouin clothing, and adopted Bedouin customs.

In his memoirs, Dayan noted that during the time he lived in Deganiya, relations with the Arab neighbors were generally good overall, despite the murders of Moshe Barsky on November 22, 1913, and Yosef Saltzman on November 24, 1913. He wrote:

A bond was forged between those who worked the land. Group members shared knowledge with their neighbors, there were courtesy visits back and forth, two families even made close friendships. The attacks, robberies, and murders of Jewish laborers were not nationalistic in nature. The Arab gangs robbed and stole also from the Arab *fellahin* (peasants), and the police didn’t lift a finger to protect them…[[18]](#footnote-18) As for the children of our Arab neighbors – we saw them mostly in the field… We learned how to chat in Arabic, we knew them by name, and in some cases, real friendships formed.

But there were also violent incidents between the Jews and the local Arabs. The violence escalated on December 22, 1932, after a bomb was thrown into the shed of Yosef Yaakobi, a Nahalal member, killing him and his 8-year old son, David. The murder marked a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations because the motive was nationalistic: the murderers, from the Galilean town of Sfuriya (in 1949, the moshav Zippori would be established nearby), belonged to the Qassamiya movement.

The ever-curious Dayan, unable to accept his father’s assertions at face value, wanted to investigate what was happening with the Arabs from a closer vantage point, so he went to Sfuriya to interview the movement’s members. “They are humble idealists; they pray often and operate on the basis of profound religious and national feeling,” he wrote.[[19]](#footnote-19) When he better understood the Arabs’ motives, he recognized the secret of their strength (many years before the rise of Hamas and other Islamic movements in Israel), and his optimism about the possibility of coexistence immediately turned to pessimism. Of this, he wrote, “The Qassamiya phenomenon shed light on the national, religious, and emotional chasm between those living to realize the Zionist vision and the Arabs; this chasm separates them even when it is concealed from the eye.”[[20]](#footnote-20)

The visits to Sfuriya were typical of Dayan’s conduct throughout his life. His great curiosity and extreme audacity led him to risk his life over and over again; some considered his conduct reckless and foolhardy. Another aspect of his character, expressed in both in his visits to Sfuriya and throughout his illustrious career in many official capacities, was that he was never satisfied with second-hand reports and accounts; he always sought to come as close as possible to the scene and see things for himself.[[21]](#footnote-21)

At this point, an unbridgeable gap opened up between Dayan and his father in their views of the Arabs. The father saw the Arabs who had murdered Yaakobi as nothing but “despicable murderers,” arguing that, “We are bringing them progress, and they murder us in return.” By contrast, the younger Dayan had a complex appreciation of the Arabs. He based his view on the idea that the Arabs’ actions were not motivated by robbery as they had been during the days of the Hashomer self-defense organization, but rather nationalism.[[22]](#footnote-22) In their own eyes and the eyes of their people, the Qassamiya movement was idealistic, reflecting the sentiments of the well-known saying that, “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”

Relations with the Bedouin tribes living near Nahalal were also complex. At times, there were good neighborly relations, while at other times, the two sides clashed. Their confrontations were actually much like the conflicts of premodern societies, the types of existential quarrels described in the Bible: between the Jewish farmers and Bedouin herders.

The realization that the conflict was primal, premodern, in which each side holds a position that is, in its own view, right, accompanied Dayan also in the famous altercation with the neighboring al-Mazarib Bedouin tribe on December 20, 1934, in which he was involved. This was one of many quarrels between Nahalal’s inhabitants and the tribe herders who allowed their flocks to roam the fields of the expanding moshav. While the land had been purchased by the settlers, this meant very little to the Bedouins who were used to herding their flocks in the fields around the moshav. On this December 20th, a particularly violent brawl broke out between the Bedouins and a group from Nahalal that was trying to move the flocks out; a Bedouin clubbed Dayan over the head, wounding him badly. Despite being hurt, Dayan continued what he had been doing – seeding the field – until falling to the ground. Eye witnesses said that it had been Wahash, Dayan’s childhood friend, who had struck him from behind. Others pointed the finger at a different tribesman.[[23]](#footnote-23) Dayan himself understood the tribe’s feelings and motives:

I did not bear Wahash or the al-Mazarib tribe any ill will. Generations have been accustomed to herding in the *wadis* of Shimron and watering their flocks at the springs that have now become our possession. From my perspective, the Jewish National Fund is redeeming the land, but for Wahash and Abd al-Majid, these activities look and feel different. They’ve been told to get their tents out of the *wadi* where they and their ancestors have always lived. Six months later, I invited them to my wedding celebration. My invitation was gladly accepted; the Mazarib came in throngs.[[24]](#footnote-24)

In fact, Dayan wed his bride Ruth on July 12, 1935, with members of the al-Mazarib tribe among the guests.[[25]](#footnote-25)

The Arabs’ closeness to nature and simplicity of life in that part of the land charmed Dayan. At this time, he was still optimistic about the two nations’ ability to live together in peace. “My feelings about our Arab neighbors was positive. I liked their way of life and I respected them for their hard work, connection to the land, and immersion in the landscape around me. I had no doubt that it was possible to live with them in peace – they in their settlements and with their way of life and we in ours.”[[26]](#footnote-26) This attitude toward the Arabs was strengthened by a trip he took in the Beit She’an region during which Bedouin hosted him and his friends at their encampment – not the first time Dayan had been graciously hosted and protected by village elders – and it made a powerful impression on him. Dayan and his friends had their picture taken with the local emir (Emir Diab) who had extended his protection to them. Years later, Dayan made a point of looking him up and sending him copies of the photos from the visit.[[27]](#footnote-27)

On October 5, 1939, Dayan was apprehended by the British along with 42 others, all members of the Haganah, for illegal possession of firearms. The arrest shocked the Yishuv. The 43 were locked up in the jail in Acre housing also Arabs with whom Dayan felt a kinship of destiny. In a letter he wrote to his siblings Zohar and Aviva, he noted:

In practice, most of the Arab inmates are prisoners of the events, i.e. they represent the Arabs’ current attitude to us. And every day, this parade goes around and around as a British officer and sergeant “supervise” it. The personal relations between us and the Revisionists, on the one hand, and the Arabs on the other are very good (I am writing this letter with a pencil I borrowed from one of the al-Qassam gang). Most of the gang members are idealists and religious believers, not mercenaries. And the personal suffering unifies us.[[28]](#footnote-28)

At the outset, relations between the Arab and Jewish inmates were very tense, but over time, the ice was broken and the two side came to respect one another. Dayan saw this as an opportunity to learn more about the Arab perspective and deepen his understanding of their motives. He wrote:

What goes on in the mind of the Arab who suddenly riots in Jaffa? I don’t think I have reached a conclusion, but I have begun to understand them. Something’s going on here, and it’s not the bad guy versus the good guy. I’ve expressed this in my everyday life, in which I felt no antagonism towards Arabs as individuals. I’ve had friendships with many Arabs, from those I got to know around Nahalal to the inmates in jail. I told you – two peoples on two sides of an issue without any personal enmity, neither murderer nor persecuted. Isn’t that the case?[[29]](#footnote-29)

Evidence of the personal bonds Dayan forged came in 1942, after he was released from jail, and he was invited as the guest of honor at the wedding of Abed Abeidat, a member of one of the gangs. After the War of Independence broke out, Dayan recruited Abeidat as his intelligence agent.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Another of Dayan’s connections was with Rashid Tahar, a Bedouin tracker, who had previously been a gang leader. Tahar was very well acquainted with the Syrian and Lebanese countryside and had a reputation as a brave fighter. Despite the concerns of those around him about Tahar’s trustworthiness, Dayan decided to take him on as tracker for the force that embarked on the operation to Syria in which Dayan lost his eye. This affair will be discussed separately below, but it should be noted here that Rashid fought effectively and bravely with the front line. Furthermore, he stayed by Dayan’s side during the long evacuation to Hadassah Hospital in Haifa.[[31]](#footnote-31) In this case, Taher proved his loyalty to his brothers in arms, quite the contrast to the popular notion that Arabs are treacherous.

**The Young Fighter**

Already as a young child, Dayan had learned to handle weapons and participated in defense and guard duty as a matter of course.

From as far back as I can remember myself, I remember there being a loaded rifle in the house. [My] familiarity with with weapons was no different than my familiarity with the farm. Just as I don’t remember when I started milking, I don’t remember when I started caring for Father’s carbine.[[32]](#footnote-32)

The German carbine was kept in a sack. At first, Dayan got permission to watch as his father cleaned it and the bullets. Afterwards, he was allowed to clean it himself, and later to load it. At 10, he practiced target shooting on bottles and such, but he received his own gun only when he was older. From the age of 14, in 1929, when the men of Nahalal were called out, which would happen whenever someone in the settlement was threatened, Dayan would always be among the first to arrive on the scene, despite his young age.[[33]](#footnote-33)

Following the 1929 riots, Nahalal’s residents joined the Haganah, which provided both training and weapons.[[34]](#footnote-34) A group of adolescents, including Dayan, also joined up. Their mission was to guard the training grounds and warn of approaching British troops. The second stage of the young group’s involvement was self-defense and hand-to-hand combat training, an early form of Krav Maga, and weapons training.[[35]](#footnote-35) In 1931, Dayan was one of a group of young people on horseback who patrolled the fields of Nahalal. The youths were trained to ride like Cossacks by Nahum Habinsky and Yosef Dromi, who had served in Russian tsar’s army. Dayan was enchanted by their stories, imagining himself as a horseback-riding Cossack.[[36]](#footnote-36) (Years later, this image came to haunt him, as his political rival then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sneeringly referred to him as a Cossack.)[[37]](#footnote-37) The riders would attack Bedouins who were herding their flocks on the settlement’s fields to scatter them. In these incidents, Dayan demonstrated courage and a fighting spirit, and his comrades testified that he had a gift for “battlefield leadership.” While s neither the strongest nor the fastest, yet he still stood out and set the tone.[[38]](#footnote-38)

In 1933, Dayan took his first course with the Haganah on operating the Morse code key and a heliograph device (a semaphore system that signal by flashes of sunlight projected by mirrors).[[39]](#footnote-39) Not long afterward, Dayan joined a construction team that was leaving to work in Tel Aviv. During his time doing manual labor in the big city, he also went to the theater and attended concerts to enrich his cultural knowledge.

In 1934, after returning to Nahalal, the altercation with the al-Mazarib tribe mentioned above occurred. The fact that he continued to seed the field even as he was surrounded by Bedouins who were throwing rocks and clubbing him till he collapsed made a powerful impression on everyone there.[[40]](#footnote-40) The story even made it into the newspaper, marking this as probably the first time in which Dayan was at the center of a news item. In any case, there is no doubt that, thanks to this incident, he became a local Nahalal hero.

**Enlisting in the Notrim**

On July 12, 1935, Moshe Dayan married Ruth. After the wedding, the young couple traveled to London and stayed there six months to get to know the world beyond Nahalal, all paid for by Ruth’s parents.[[41]](#footnote-41) Unlike his wife, Dayan deeply missed Palestine and felt uncomfortable throughout their stay in London. They returned in February 1936, and joined a group from Nahalal that was getting ready to form the nucleus of those settling Shimron, a new moshav in the north of the country. Some from this group later went on to found the Kibbutz Hanita in 1938.[[42]](#footnote-42)

In April of 1936, the Arab Revolt broke out. This coincided with a new chapter in Dayan’s military education as he enlisted in the Notrim (the Hebrew word means “guard,” but also bears the connotation of “payback”), a new Jewish security force established by the British. In his diary, Dayan noted that these were his first steps in military activity. The Notrim were recruited as an auxiliary force to help the British police, but one unit of the Notrim – called the Hebrew Settlements Police – was subordinate to the Haganah and its members were recruited via the organization, although the salaries, weapons, and uniforms were all British.[[43]](#footnote-43) The first Notrim enlisted in May 1936 and were sent to defend the Jordan Valley and Jezre’el Valley settlements. In 1937, as the severity of the riots worsened, the British recruited more men, with the number of forces reaching some 15,000. They were divided into 10 regional regiments. Dayan was recruited to the regiment responsible for Nahalal, at which point the Notrim were already patrolling beyond urban center in rural areas and fields. While they were formally under British command, in practice, these men were under Haganah control.[[44]](#footnote-44)

The units, equipped with pickup trucks, were meant to patrol and provide a rapid response to security issues. The British, needing local guides, chose Dayan as one of them, as he was familiar with the valley and its surroundings. The company’s main mission was to prevent sabotage to the oil pipeline that ran from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to Haifa. While the oil was Iraqi, but under British ownership. The Arab fighters would puncture the pipeline, let the oil flow out, and then set fire to it, causing prolonged fires. This caused tremendous financial losses and disrupted the supply of oil to Britain.

To protect the pipeline, the British deployed the Royal Scots and the Yorkshire Rifleman Regiments, and Dayan used the English he had learned at school and during his recent stay in London to communicate with them. For Dayan, who had been raised as a farmer-fighter and had brawled with local Arabs, this was his first encounter with a professional, hierarchic, disciplined army operating according to drills and procedures and maintaining a routine of formations and duty rosters. Dayan was not very impressed by the British ability to confront Arab saboteurs. He told friends that the British were untrained in field skills and were not fit for missions of this type. He claimed they were apathetic, loud, and clumsy, relying mostly on their very presence in the area to maintain order.[[45]](#footnote-45) Dayan learned clear tactical lessons on irregular guerrilla warfare, mostly by proof of contradiction from this experience with the British. In his diary, he noted:

In the eight months of operating with His Royal Highness’s army, I’ve seen the impotence of a regular army operating on the basis of established plans and procedures in confronting saboteurs who know the area, move on foot, are assimilated and involved with the local population, and choose the place and time that are convenient for them to strike. It was clear that they way to fight the gangs was by seizing the initiative. It is necessary to strike first and attack them in their bases and ambush them as they move.[[46]](#footnote-46)

These were Dayan's first experiences in dealing with irregular warfare, a major and very palpable issue he had to confront in the course of his duties and throughout his life.

In 1937, Moshe Dayan was sent to a British Army sergeants’ course taught in English at the Tzrifin Camp by the 2nd Battalion Black Watch Regiment. He quickly realized that the shoe polishing and parade drills aspects of the military were not for him. His rebellious, individualistic, free spirit was badly suited to the routine, which entailed a of wasted time. Nonetheless, he understood the need the British Empire’s army had for “this bullshit,” as he called it, because no large entity can be managed without uniformity, discipline, and order.[[47]](#footnote-47) But this particular course contributed nothing to helping him confront the military challenges he faced in the valley any better than before.

In the spring of 1937, Dayan was appointed commander of the mobile guard of the Notrim unit in Nahalal. In that position, he was noted for seizing the initiative and going on the offensive. Although this approach was not coordinated among them, it was shared by other prominent commanders, including Yitzhak Sadeh and Yaakov Dori.[[48]](#footnote-48) Later on, this approach would be named “leaving the fence,” and was most closely identified with Sadeh.[[49]](#footnote-49)

During his service in the Notrim, Dayan wrote a booklet he entitled “Fieldcraft,” dealing with with various aspects of the subject, such as knowing the terrain and exploiting it for guerrilla warfare, setting up ambushes, sneaking into enemy territory, and patrolling. Dayan sent the booklet, which was used as lesson plans, to Yaakov Dori, then the Haganah commander of the northern sector as well as head of the Haganah’s training division. Dori was highly impressed with the booklet, and even though it was never published as an official handbook, it certainly influenced the Haganah’s training plans.

The handbook criticized the rigidity of any regular army, and offered instead, knowledge and skills required in situations that change on the ground, an approach that Dayan applied throughout his long career. Dayan himself ran drills using his methods with quiet raids with his men into protected Haganah compounds. One day he infiltrated the Haganah’s Jo’ara base where most of the organization’s courses were taught until the establishment of the IDF. The base guards claimed that this penetration was not a real achievement because it was accomplished by breaking the rules. Dayan dismissed this claim, retorting that in reality there were no rules of warfare; it was necessary to operate on the basis of conditions on the ground. He added that the only thing that mattered was the outcome.[[50]](#footnote-50)

**Commanders’ Course and Introduction to Yitzhak Sadeh**

The next stage in Dayan’s military development was taking the Haganah’s six-week long platoon commanders’ course, the first to be defined explicitly as a platoon commanders’ course.[[51]](#footnote-51) Dayan considered it superior to the course he had undergone with the British army, and, indeed, many of the participants would eventually form the backbone of the IDF command.[[52]](#footnote-52) Most of the training consisted of daytime and nighttime field exercises. The course’s unique character was the fact that it was entirely devoted to combat exercises, the focus being on routing training of units and mobile troops, because of the experience that the Haganah’s field platoons had accrued during the Arab Revolt. Drilling was focused mainly on the platoon and infantry squad structures. Sometimes, several platoons operated simultaneously, which was something of an innovation. Special emphasis was placed on the indirect approach: exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses, for example, and attacking from the flank. Moreover, the course stressed the platoon commander’s character and role. At the academic level, the trainees studied the doctrines of the classical thinkers, including Carl von Clausewitz, and influential contemporaries, such as John Frederick Fuller and Basil Henry Liddell Hart. They also took a course on the German army’s tactics and structure after World War I.[[53]](#footnote-53)

It was in this course that Moshe Dayan first met Yitzhak Sadeh, who would go on to build the Palmach, the Haganah’s elite fighting unit.[[54]](#footnote-54) Dayan was profoundly impressed by the “old man,”, his courage, élan, and originality. Dayan also met Yigal Alon for the first time during the course; Alon was one of the young, promising leaders, but he and Dayan had very different personalities and they were to become lifelong rivals.[[55]](#footnote-55)

The next significant milestone in Dayan’s development was his move to Hanita on the Lebanese border on March 21, 1938. Against the background of the Arab Revolt, the establishment of Hanita represented a kind of record in the establishment of some 50 “wall and tower” settlements constructed employing a rapid method of settlement that placed modular structures in an area so that a new settlement could be made ready overnight. The settlements were surrounded by a wall with an observation and communications tower for, with tents for living and a communal mess hall. Special forces of field platoons and Notrim, stationed in different concentrations around Palestine, would defend the “wall and tower” settlements. Yaakov Dori led the settlement of Hanita, while Yitzhak Sadeh and his deputies Moshe Dayan and Yigal Alon commanded the defense force. They came under fierce attack already on their first night there, right after they completed setting up the settlement; this was probably first significant baptism by fire.

The attack on Hanita began at midnight. A large Arab force in captivity and a different force approached, getting within 30 meters of the new settlement. The defenders had 120 rifles, and succeeded in fending off the Arabs at the cost of two dead. Dayan reported that Sadeh not satisfied with simply defending Hanita, wanted to order a unit to go out on an offensive action and, but Dori would not authorize such an action, considering it too dangerous.[[56]](#footnote-56) The second act of violence happened four days later when an Arab gang attacked a group of laborers who were paving a road to the settlement. A platoon commanded by Sadeh overwhelmed them and drove them away. Sadeh praised Dayan and Alon for their performance.[[57]](#footnote-57)

Hanita’s founding was commemorated in a famous photograph of Yitzhak Sadeh embracing the two young, uniformed Notrim sergeants – Moshe Dayan on his right and Yigal Alon on his left. On the back of the photograph, Israel’s future first president, Haim Weizmann, then President of the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Agency, inscribed the prescient words: “The General Staff.”[[58]](#footnote-58)

**Orde Charles Wingate and His Influence**

Dov Yermiya, a Haganah commander, recalled the arrival of Captain Orde Wingate to Hanita: “One night, a taxicab came to Hanita and a very strange figure emerged. He carried two rifles, a dictionary, and a few Hebrew newspapers. We looked at him with astonishment. We wondered how he had dared come here alone at night. This made a tremendous impression on us.”[[59]](#footnote-59) Wingate reproached the settlement’s defenders for not going past the wall and not initiating attacks on the enemy.[[60]](#footnote-60) Wingate, who combined the professional authority of an experienced British officer with extraordinary personal charisma, succeeded in encouraging Dayan to seize the initiative and go on the offense.

In fact, Orde Charles Wingate (1903–1944) was a British army officer who specialized in guerrilla warfare. He arrived in Palestine in 1936 after having served in Sudan and Ethiopia. In Palestine, he initiated the establishment of the Special Night Squads within the Haganah, which earned him the nickname “The Friend.” Wingate spent only about two and a half years in Palestine, leaving in May 1939, but he left a vast mark on the Jewish settlement in general and the Haganah in particular. As a military man, he was original, daring, and visionary. His methods of action and way of thinking about military matters served as an important foundation for the construction of a Hebrew defense force, which would become the Israel Defense Force about a decade later. His military approach included collecting accurate intelligence before an operation, seizing the initiative, going on the offense, exploiting the advantage of night, using small, selected units, and shifting the fighting as rapidly as possible to enemy ground. These rules became fundamental components of the IDF’s early doctrine of warfare. This approach was radically different from its predecessor, which entailed passive defense of the settlements and ambushed. In World War II, he served in the Burma campaign and was killed in an airplane crash in March 1944. To this day, the IDF considers him one of the people who had the most influential on its establishment and philosophy.

Wingate was of Scottish extraction and his family belonged to the Plymouth Brethren, a small church that had broken off from the Anglican church. This church attributed a great deal of importance to the so-called Old Testament, i.e. the Hebrew Bible, viewed the Jews as the chosen people, and believed in the prophecy of the Day of Judgment. Wingate supported the Zionist enterprise for religious reasons. He believed the war of the day of judgment would take place in Megiddo, and that the Jewish people had to prepare for it. He was trained as an artillery officer and later served in intelligence. Wingate, who always favored the offense, was stationed in Sudan and Libya where he specialized in guerrilla warfare and developed new methods for ambushes and raids. He was an extrovert and his unconventional military approach matched his uninhibited personality, which at times made him seem like a madman.

Wingate arrived in Israel in September 1936, and was stationed as an intelligence officer in Lt. Gen. John Dill’s staff. In 1937, Lt. Gen. Dill was replaced by Lt. Gen. Archibald Wavell, who accepted Wingate’s recommendations on how to confront the Arab enemy in the land of Israel. However, only Wavell’s own replacement, Lt. Gen. Robert Haining, supported the conscription of Jews to British units. Subsequent to a comprehensive study Wingate undertook on the modus operandi of the Arab gangs, a study that included discussions with the Haganah’s leaders, Wingate formed strong relationships with the leadership of the Yishuv and his belief in the Zionist cause grew even more intense.

On June 5, 1938, Wingate submitted a report in which he recommended the formation of special night squads that he would lead, whose purpose would be to crush the terrorism in the land of Israel’s northern region using methods of warfare that had not been tried before. Many of the fighters in the first three excursions were Dayan’s comrades from Hanita.[[61]](#footnote-61) The squad’s base, commanded by Wingate, was located in Ein Harod; its objective was protecting the oil pipeline – the same mission that the Royal Scots and the Yorkshire Rifleman – the same brigades Dayan had joined two years earlier – had carried out with little success. r. Wingate’s immediate task, was to have his squad take control of nighttime activities, which was a condition for securing the region. Until that time, only the Arab gangs operated at night.

Wingate impressed his Jewish partners, including Dayan, with his familiarity with the terrain, daring, and great resourcefulness. Unlike other British officers, and similar to Dayan, he abhorred formations, criticism, salutes, and parades – all the hallmarks of a regular army. But he was meticulous about his weapons’ cleanliness and carefully plotted his operations, conduct that was adopted by IDF commanders for generations to come.

Wingate’s doctrine was based on maximal mobility, initiative and offense, intelligence, ruses, secrecy (deflection, misleading the enemy, infiltration, and surprise)[[62]](#footnote-62) – principles that suited a small army with few resources, and were therefore enthusiastically adopted by the founders of the IDF. Very soon, the Special Night Squads seized control of the night and succeeded in stopping the attacks on the pipeline.

Dayan met Wingate in 1938 near Nahalal just when Wingate was undertaking his study of the Arab gangs. In fractured Hebrew, Wingate lectured to the Shimron group, of which Dayan was then a member, on his method of ambush. Wingate’s mastery of navigation and fieldcraft deeply impressed Dayan. He said that Wingate “is a groundbreaking military genius rebelling against conventions.”[[63]](#footnote-63) Wingate became a role model and he and Dayan formed a relatively close relationship. The way Wingate led men, such as his habit of eating and drinking in the field only after making sure that his soldiers had eaten and drunk before him, or his insistence on being at the head of a raid formation rather than sending scouts before the forward line, demonstrated to Dayan combat leadership at its best.

One of Wingate’s best-known successful operations was one his unit carried out with Dayan and the Mobile Defense. It was an attack on a Bedouin encampment near the village of al-Awadin, which was a transit station for delivering weapons to Shomron/the Samaria region and a jumping-off point for the Arab gangs’ assault and robbery raids. The gang’s head was Yusouf Abu Dura, one of the men of Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who would command the Iraqi Society for the Defense of Palestine, which gained particular notoriety as a result of its battles against the Jewish settlement during the 1936 to 1939 riots and the War of Independence.

The plan that Wingate devised was based on a ruse: a truck stopped about 1 km before the village, near the railroad tracks, and men disguised as railroad workers disembarked. In reality, this was a squad of Dayan’s men who served as bait. Still inside the truck were Wingate’s men, armed with two Lewis machine guns. The Arabs, who considered the laborers easy prey, hurried to attack them, but were then cut down by fire from the guns hidden in the truck. Panic overtook the Arabs who scattered in every direction, but then they fell into the ambushes Wingate had put in place all along the intersections to the village. In this operation, 14 Arabs were killed, three were taken captive, and 10, most of them wounded, managed to escape.

Tzvi Brenner, who participated in the operation as a commander, was close with Wingate and testified that the ruse of camouflaging the men as railroad workers was actually Dayan’s idea. Wingate’s appreciation and respect for Dayan was greatly enhanced in wake of this operation. He identified in Dayan qualities he particularly appreciated, such as daring and creativity. As for the daring: in the operation, Dayan was one of the men disguised as a railroad worker, a role that exposed him to considerable danger.[[64]](#footnote-64)

As noted, Wingate had a profound influence on Dayan and paved the way for organizing units specially trained for guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare, which operate on the basis of guerrilla principles but enjoy the advantages offered by a large military body with equipment and training. He closely analyzed the terrain before every action and insisted on operating by night. Furthermore, he often operated in the raid and ambush format, battle methods that would characterize the IDF’s conduct many years later when it faced guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Wingate also influenced Dayan when it came to acts of retaliation. Even then, it was clear that it would not always be possible to prevent the next Arab attack. This was true of the awful massacre in Tiberias on October 2, 1938. While Wingate and his men were concentrated elsewhere because of misleading information, the Arabs managed to attack and kill 19 Jews in the city, 11 of them children.

In response, Wingate carried out retaliatory operations in the Arab villages of Dabouriya, Lubiya, and Hittin. Dayan, too, initiated several retaliations: in one, he and his fellow fighters dressed as British soldiers, entered the heart of the village, and detonated a bomb in the Mukhtar’s house. Later on, Dayan would initiate actions on his own without getting the prior approval from his superiors.[[65]](#footnote-65) In these operations, those who had been directly responsible for the attacks were not the only ones to get hurt, but a consensus emerged: because it was impossible to prevent gang attacks everywhere, the only possible solution was to do as much as possible to create deterrence. Dayan further developed this approach in the years when he was helping to shape the IDF and Israel’s security doctrine. The problematic side of the principle of initiative could be seen in local actions not approved by a higher authority. In later years, Dayan would show understanding of subordinates who took local initiative and did not always ask for their commanders’ authorization.

**In British Prison**

The period between October 1939 and June 1941 was crucial in shaping Dayan’s personality and worldview.[[66]](#footnote-66) During this time he was imprisoned for illegal possession of arms, for which he was sentenced to a 10-year term. While in prison, Dayan and his fellow Haganah members experienced a dramatic role reversal: during the riots, he had been a member of a legal force that fought the Arab subversion. Now overnight, he and his comrades had themselves become a subversive force. The hunter had become the hunted. Thus, Dayan experienced the sense of persecution and the need to try to hide that had until then been the enemy’s: the Arabs on the one hand, as well as the members of the splinter groups – Etzel and Lehi – on the other.

The background to all this was the outbreak of World War II in 1939 Although it was playing out far from Mandatory Palestine, it made its mark there too. The British, who controlled the region, had to focus on the tremendous challenge of ending the war. On May 19, 1939, the British issued the White Paper, limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine and forbidding Jews from buying land from Arabs in many parts of the region. Enmity and suspicion replaced cooperation between the Haganah and the British security forces, as the British began arresting Haganah members for illegal arms possession.

As a result of these developments and based on the fear the British would raid the training camp where illegal arms were kept, the Haganah moved its commanders’ courses from Jo’ara to Yavne’el, renaming the course a “Commanding Officers’ Course.” This was the first time an officers’ course was given in a large-scale format and it covered many topics, including artillery, which until then had not been taught. The course was led by Dr. Raphael Lev, who had earlier served in the Austrian army. Among the first six course instructors, very carefully hand-picked by Yaakov Dori, were Moshe Dayan and Yigal Alon.[[67]](#footnote-67)

The courses in Yavne’el,[[68]](#footnote-68) gradually developed on the basis of the Haganah’s original command course, are considered the first Haganah courses and they were fully adapted to platoon commanders, like comparable courses in other advanced armies.[[69]](#footnote-69) The objective was not just to train officers for the position of platoon commander, but also to cultivate the commanders’ independent thinking. Indeed, the course stressed in-depth independent thought. The instructors encouraged their students to acquire military education, gather information, plan, and seize the initiative.[[70]](#footnote-70)

Lev, who had fought in World War I, incorporated materials customarily studied in regular armies, and his contribution made an impact on the students and instructors. However, the materials were not suited to the unique circumstances of the land of Israel, and it was therefore very important that his approach be balanced by the other instructors. Among other things, they stressed that warfare had no single established solution. “Every act is based on the situation; use your head, guys, your head,” said Yosef Avidar.[[71]](#footnote-71) The instructors from Wingate’s Special Night Squads, with their combat experience, made a unique contribution to the course.

After the British inspected the course site in Yavne’el where illegal weapons were discovered, it was decided by the Haganah not to take any risks and to move the course to Ein Hashofet. The students and commanders were divided into several groups. The core group was commanded by Lev and Moshe Carmel, and its main mission was to carry unlicensed weapons to Ein Hashofet on foot at night. Dayan was in this group of 43 men, which ever since has been nicknamed the “Mem-Gimmel” (the two Hebrew letters whose alphanumeric coding adds up to 43). En route, the group was discovered by a patrol of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force and its members were arrested and sent to the British prison in Acre.

In Acre Prison, the detainees were interrogated and beaten. During their questioning, the British would remind their subjects that bearing illegal weapons was punishable by death under the emergency regulations in force. At first, Dayan – unlike the other detainees – cooperated with his interrogators, but when they continued to beat him, he threatened that his comrades on the outside would seek vengeance. The beatings stopped. On his own, Dayan decided to provide certain innocuous information, such as their membership in the Haganah, while trying to explain to the British that the Haganah was not their enemy.

Dayan found the experience of a narrow, locked cell difficult. His free spirit was used to the open vistas of the rural areas and fields of the Jezre’el Valley. In his diary, he wrote, “Our state of mind changed when the iron gates of the prison clanged shut behind us.”[[72]](#footnote-72)

The detainees became pawns between the British, who demanded that the Haganah fully give up its arms, and the Jewish Agency that played the naïf, claiming that there was no such thing as a national armed organization like the Haganah. It was the detainees’ bad luck that Lt. Gen. Wavell had been replaced by Gen. Evelyn Hugh Barker, who would later reveal himself as a viral anti-Semite. The trial of the men lasted a few days, and during it, British officers who had served with Dayan served as character witnesses for him. However, the verdict was brutal: one life sentence (for Avshalom Tau) and 10 years imprisonment for all the rest.

This was a difficult blow to the detainees’ morale. After the verdict, they were moved to the prison, where they were held as every other prisoner, under severe restrictions, in an Ottoman-era structure that had undergone only minor repairs during the British Mandate. Within the walls of the prison, the group organized and elected its officers. Dayan was elected to maintain external contact with the prison authorities and he submitted the group members’ demands. His letters from that period show that he maintained his equanimity and did not give in to depression. He even managed to find some positive points in his situation, especially when it came to the relationships he formed with Arab gang members suffering the same fate as he. “Usually, life here is interesting,” he wrote, “and we celebrated and enjoyed the three days of the holiday [the Eid al-Fitr marking the end of the month of Ramadan]. The Arabs’ attitude towards us is very good, even though most of them are gang members.”[[73]](#footnote-73) Close relationships even burgeoned between the Haganah members and their the imprisoned Revisionists, their former nemesis[[74]](#footnote-74)

Unlike the other inmates, the prison’s physical conditions and food were a matter of indifference to Dayan. He attributed his steeliness to the way his mother had raised him and to her personality.[[75]](#footnote-75) Nonetheless, after his release, Dayan worried about going to prison again, and for the duration of the British mandate, he did everything in his power not to be caught in a situation where he might again be imprisoned. There is no doubt that his stay there made a mark on him. He emerged a different man than the one who had entered.[[76]](#footnote-76)

**The Injury**

Dayan and his fellow fighters were released from prison because of another strategic global shift, namely the threat that the forces of Gen. Erwin Rommel, commander of the Afrika Korps, posed to Egypt and the Middle East, along with the Vichy regime’s seizure of control of Syria and Lebanon in early 1941. Now feeling besieged, the British felt that they needed the cooperation of the Jewish population in Palestine. This reversal led to the release of the Mem-Gimmel almost overnight after 18 months on the inside. Dayan even managed to go on a brief vacation with his wife Ruth and young daughter Yael, who had been born in February 1939, just a few months before her father’s imprisonment.

In response to security events, the Haganah decided to establish a national force to be on high alert to defend the Yishuv. The first two companies were commanded by Yitzhak Sadeh.[[77]](#footnote-77) The men considered the most audacious and promising were appointed company commanders, including Dayan and Alon, whose promotion was parallel to Dayan’s. The British approached the Haganah asking for scouts and sappers to help the British force invading Lebanon, which was under Vichy regime control. Dayan and some 30 of his men were sent to operate together with an Australian force in Lebanon’s western sector. Most of the men were not familiar with the terrain and were inexperienced in war. Some, in fact, had never even had basic weapons training.

Dayan crossed deep into territory held by the Vichy soldiers to scout it out. Because he did not know it very well, Dayan recruited the help of Rashid Taher, a former commander of an Arab gang during the great revolt. Despite the hesitations of those around him, Dayan decided it was possible to count on Taher, a decision that proved itself in practice. These incursions –usually initiated by Dayan rather than by the British – produced several useful reports on the conditions of the terrain, axes, and the location of the French forces.

About these incursions, Dayan wrote:

None of us knew Syria, the terrain where we were supposed to be the guides. Only one of us was highly proficient in Arabic,[[78]](#footnote-78) yet according to the plan, we were supposed to impersonate and act like Arabs. Among the guys were some who had had no experience ever shooting with live ammunition. Most had no experience operating a machine or sub-machine gun, we’d been given no maps, and within a few days, we had to get these people ready to function as scouts familiar with the terrain. As for the problem of trust – we overcame that with the help of two experienced commanders. Illegal weapons – those came from the Haganah’s storage. The most important question remained: knowing the terrain.[[79]](#footnote-79)

The British invasion of Vichy-controlled Lebanon began on June 8, 1942. The night before, Dayan entered enemy territory with a spearheading force of 16 – 10 Australians, five Israelis, and the Arab guide Rashid Taher. Their missions were to cut the telephone line located near the coastal road that made communication in and out of Tyre possible, and to block the road about 5 km north of the border. Both were successfully completed. The third mission was to seize control of two bridges over the Askendron? River, which crossed the Lebanese coastal road before spilling into the Mediterranean.

The Israeli column was led by Dayan, Taher, and Dayan’s friend Zalman Mart, a commander in the Notrim who would later be Dayan’s subordinate as battalion commander in the Jerusalem sector during the War of Independence.[[80]](#footnote-80) The force’s mission was to prevent the bridges from being demolished so that they could be used by the invaders. When the unit came to the bridges, the men found that they were not rigged with explosives and all they had to do was to wait for the main British invading force. When that failed to arrive – due to a delay at the border crossings where the French had laid many mines, which Dayan and his men could not have known about – Dayan and the Australian officers decided to advance southwards and situate themselves in a building that served as a local police station near the bridges, a decision they made because they did not know that the building served as the forward headquarters of the French force.

The French identified the force as it advanced and a firefight erupted. According to testimonies, Dayan threw a grenade from a distance of about 25 m, thereby stopping the machine gun on the building’s roof. Then he and Mart rushed ahead and captured the structure. Four French soldiers died in the battle and 10 or so surrendered. In Dayan’s force, one Australian died and several were wounded. Their main problem was that the unit was cut off and surrounded by the enemy and under enemy fire. Dayan organized the defense of the building and his fellow fighters operated the machine gun and mortar they seized from the French.[[81]](#footnote-81) While Dayan was observing events around them with binoculars he took from a French officer, a bullet hit the binocular lens, causing his left eye to shatter. He lay wounded there for about six hours, never losing consciousness, but without the ability to see, only hear. Dayan was wounded at 7 AM; the British invading force reached the building only at 1 PM. Dayan was evacuated by a British truck to Hadassah Hospital in Haifa. Before being taken in for treatment, he told Mart, “Never mind. I lived with two eyes for 26 years. It’s not so bad – one can live with just one eye too.” The story of Dayan’s injury was covered by the Hebrew press, which presented him as a hero. The Australian officers also expressed deep admiration for his functioning in battle.[[82]](#footnote-82)

In this action, Dayan’s future command qualities already came to the fore: courage, risking his life while seizing the lead, cool-headedness combined with an instinct for adventurism, a desire for audacious action, and improvisational abilities.[[83]](#footnote-83)

Dayan was optimistic and thought he would recover quickly, but his injury turned out to be quite severe. Dayan and Ruth moved in with Ruth’s parents in Jerusalem so that he could get daily treatment at the hospital. He suffered greatly because of embedded shards, causing him headaches. His arm, full of shrapnel, became partly paralyzed. Some of these medical issues stayed with him throughout his life. Attempts to reconstruct the eye socket so that he could be fitted with a glass eye failed, and Dayan was forced to wear a patch, which would become his trademark.

Soon, all this began to cloud his mood. He wrote, “I didn’t think I’d be able to get back to military fitness, and sank into sad thoughts about the future – the life of cripple without a profession or financial foundation.”[[84]](#footnote-84)

Indeed, while his friends were rising through ranks and positions, Dayan was left behind because of his severe injury – or that, at least, was how he felt. Would he have joined the Palmach had he not been wounded? While the question remains open, it is doubtful that he would have found his place in the newly founded organization. The reason for that, according to Tevet, is that the Palmach reflected the ethos of the kibbutz movement, whereas Dayan was a “moshavnik,” the owner of an independent farm in Nahalal. Furthermore, his individualism was ill suited to the ideological conformity that the Palmach demanded.[[85]](#footnote-85) Moreover, Yigal Alon, Dayan’s prominent and constant rival, was appointed the Palmach’s deputy commander and then its commander. It is unlikely the two would have found a place together at the top of so small an organization. Most of the members of the Palmach, who were from the kibbutz movement, were totally loyal to Alon. In fact, the only one who championed and supported Dayan was Yitzhak Sadeh.

**Intelligence, Negotiations, Party Politics, and Political-Security Issues**

As a result of his injury, Dayan was sidelined from operational command activity, which is key in every military endeavor. However, what seemed at the time to constitute a disaster would later turn out to be a blessing, as he acquired experience in areas that would serve him well in the future and prepare him for the rest of his life. At first, he joined the political department of the Jewish Agency with the help of Reuven Shilo’ah, who was close to Ruth Dayan’s parents and knew Dayan from the time he had worked on behalf of the Mem-Gimmel in Acre Prison. The Jewish Agency then was in touch with British intelligence in its attempt to prepare for the possibility that Palestine would be conquered by the Germans. In the middle of 1941, Dayan proposed the establishment of an espionage network, called the Moshe Dayan Network. The plan included building a network of broadcasting stations that would broadcast news about events in the conquered areas to the British. In September, a course was held for station operators, and with the help of its graduates, Dayan set up six stations.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Dayan came up with other ideas he proposed to the British: setting up an undercover department with Jews impersonating Arabs, and a German department with German-speaking Jews who would impersonate Germans in the event that Mandatory Palestine was occupied by the Nazis. The British accepted the proposal but, in the end, the it was left to the Palmach to execute it. The German department project was halted after the threat to Mandatory Palestine was removed following the defeat of Rommel’s forces at al-Alamein in the fall of 1942.

Before leaving Jerusalem and his parents-in-law’s apartment to go back to Nahalal, where he hoped to lead a quiet farmer’s life, Dayan got caught up in another adventure. On the instructions of the Haganah, Dayan embarked on a trip to Baghdad in August 1942 as part of a convoy of British trucks driven by Jews from the Yishuv. Dayan was asked to smuggle suitcases full of weapons meant for the self-defense of the Jews of Baghdad who had, a year previously been the targets of the Farhoud – anti-Semitic riots against the Jewish community. To elude the British police in Baghdad on June 1 and 2, 1941. Dayan removed his eyepatch and thus avoided identification. He joined up with Enzo Sereni, the Jewish Agency’s emissary there, contacted the local Haganah activists, and delivered the weapons to them. On the way back, he smuggled in two Jews who had fled Poland, one of whom was David Azrieli, who would one day be a major real estate tycoon, renowned architect, developer, designer and philanthropist, well-known for owning a large chain of malls in Israel after building the country’s first shopping mall.

For several years, Dayan lived with his family on the farm he had bought in Nahalal and worked to develop it. He also spent time with his family that was growing, with the birth of his sons Udi and Assaf were born in 1942 and 1945, respectively. However, because of the turbulent events of the time, he was again called on to undertake missions in the ranks of the Haganah.

The Yishuv’s struggle against the British resumed in the summer of 1945, after the end of World War II. That fall, the Haganah started to coordinate its activities with Etzel and Lehi. The umbrella organization of the Jewish underground was called the Rebel Movement, and their activities were manifested in illegal immigration and attacks on British targets. In October 1945, the Atlit detention camp was attacked; in November, the Palmach sabotaged trains and blew up British coast guard ships in the Gulf of Haifa; on June 17, 1946, the Palmach blew up 11 bridges linking Israel with its neighbors, thus cutting its land mass off for a time. All these actions were led by Yigal Alon, who had in the meantime become the Palmach’s commander, as well as other colleagues of Dayan who participated in the activity.

Nonetheless, Dayan wasn’t completely forgotten by the Haganah command. On February 1, 1944, Menachem Begin, the Etzel’s commander, declared a revolt against the British. This flew in the face of the Jewish Agency’s policy for the Yishuv to cooperate with the British effort, including the recruitment of an independent Jewish regiment as part of the British army (known as the Brigade, founded in July 1944). After two Lehi fighters killed Lord Moyne (Walter Guinness), the senior British representative to the Middle East, the Haganah leadership decided to eliminate these more radical organizations. A Haganah unit began actions against them that were named the Saison, French for “season” and an abbreviation for “saison de chasse” – hunting season. Dayan was recruited to the task by the Haganah, even though – or perhaps because – he had shown a positive attitude towards the Revisionists in Acre Prison and did not resent them for their ideology, the way many Palmach members did.[[87]](#footnote-87) For obvious reasons, Dayan spoke little about his part in this affair, but we do know that he met and spoke with the leaders of the various organizations. Menachem Begin, the Etzel commander, wrote the following in his memoirs: “Dayan spoke warm words of encouragement… [saying] that he respected our actions.”[[88]](#footnote-88) Dayan earned Begin’s trust and Begin never bore Dayan any ill will. Indeed, many years later, Begin appointed Dayan foreign minister in his government, an appointment many viewed as an inconceivable crossing of political lines.

Dayan succeeded in establishing relations and building trust even with Lehi, which was a more militant and dangerous organization than Etzel. One Lehi senior member who was held captive by the Palmach wrote to Dayan saying that he had to be present in a meeting between Lehi and the Haganah: “You have already gained a reasonable degree of trust already … You do understand that one of the guarantees of success for any negotiations is that spirit of personal sacrifice that creates a background for deep mutual understanding.”[[89]](#footnote-89) This was Dayan’s first experience with negotiations between stubborn rivals and he soon proved his talent. Tevet drew an interesting comparison between Alon’s approach and that of Dayan. Alon detested the path chosen by Etzel fighters and felt they caused a great deal of damage, but had conscientious objections and resigned his position as commander of the Saison. By contrast, Dayan did not hesitate to fulfill the mission entrusted to him, even though he felt no animosity towards the splinter organizations and even showed a certain amount of respect for their activities. In this, he hewed to Ben-Gurion’s approach that the best interests of *memlechtiut* – the state-in-formation (and, later, the state as an established democracy built on Zionist ideals) outweighed all else. Dayan was consistent in this approach, including during the more consequential affair – the sinking of the *Altalena*.

Over the next few years, the dominant factions of the Palmach – made up of kibbutz members and members of the United Labor Movement (a splinter of Mapai, the Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel, a democratic socialist party dominant in Israeli politics for many years) – kept Dayan at arm’s length from operational activity. A vacuum was created when the Labor Unity Movement, known as Faction 2, broke off from Mapai, and was filled by young people, including Dayan, who had already participated in the Young Turks forum, established by Israel Galili in 1939. That forum was designed for open debate of various issues in a free atmosphere, where the participants’ established ranks and hierarchies were of little importance. The forum discussed the establishment of a national General Staff and changes in the Haganah’s structure.[[90]](#footnote-90)

Dayan first became involved with party politics in the fall of 1944, focusing focused primarily on his own election. In the course of this involvement, he got to know another young, ambitious politician, Shimon Persky, later known as Shimon Peres.[[91]](#footnote-91) In the winter of 1946, after being embroiled in the young party members’ struggle with its elders at the sixth Mapai convention, held on September 5, 1946, where Dayan was a delegate, he and Peres traveled to Basel to be observers at the 22nd World Zionist Congress. The core issue of the Congress was the struggle between Ben-Gurion and Haim Weizmann. This was both a personal struggle and a struggle of the path the country should take. Weizmann was conciliatory towards the British, while Ben-Gurion, who was already courting the Americans, had a more combative attitude to the British and their policies. Dayan was more activist than even Ben-Gurion, and demanded decisive action against the British – more action and less talk, especially on the question of illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine.[[92]](#footnote-92) Dayan got up to speak and summed it up as follows: “I don’t understand this argument, because this land is ours. And if someone tries to harm it, we will have to strike… This is a war.”[[93]](#footnote-93)

At the Zionist General Council meeting after the Congress, Ben-Gurion – having given the gloomy forecast that, almost certainly, an all-out war with the Arabs would begin very soon – declared that he was assuming the security portfolio on the Jewish Agency Executive Board. He also asked Yaakov Dori, who had resigned as the Haganah’s chief of staff, to come to Basel and convinced him to resume the position. Dori met with Dayan in Basel and told him that he considered him one of the most senior leadership members who would lead the nation into the future and confront the enormous security challenges facing it.[[94]](#footnote-94)

Indeed, in the first part of the War of Independence, which started in November 1947, Dayan found himself a major whereas his cohort – Yigal Alon, Shimon Avidan, and Yigal Yadin – and even those younger than he, including Yitzhak Rabin, had attained much higher ranks (Rabin, for example, was a lieutenant colonel).[[95]](#footnote-95) The fact that he had not been clearly identified with the IDF’s constituent groups – neither former British army and Jewish Brigades members nor members of the Palmach with their fealty to the kibbutz movement – came to haunt him. Dayan belonged to the group loyal to Ben-Gurion, but even there, he was not part of the inner circle.[[96]](#footnote-96) When the battles erupted, he made do with a staff position as an Arab affairs officer with the mission to recruit agents to infiltrate the enemy’s ranks and bring back intelligence,[[97]](#footnote-97) a field in which he already had experience. Nonetheless, it turned out that this position had important, perhaps critical benefits for Dayan’s future.

The position he assumed meant that Dayan was in constant touch with Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori, the head of the Haganah National Command Center Israel Galili, and Ben-Gurion, who had assumed the security portfolio as of December 1946. On January 1, Ben-Gurion gathered the army and intelligence heads for a consultation on policy toward the Palestinian Arabs, a meeting to which Dayan was invited. He was appointed to a position on a small committee that consisted of the heads of intelligence and the Jewish Agency’s political department, whose function was to coordinate policy on the Arabs in the land of Israel. As a result of these events, Dayan accumulated considerable experience working with the top political and security cadres and was able to view their concerns and moves from up close. No less importantly, he became a familiar figure and established his status. In particular, he built relationship of mutual trust and respect with Ben-Gurion – the most important leader of the state-building years.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to end the British Mandate and partition the land of Israel. Arab attacks against the Yishuv started the next day, opening the first part of the War of Independence (the second part began once statehood was declared on May 14, 1948, and the invasion of Arab nations the following day), and it involved a brutal, uncompromising struggle over the control of the land at a time the British were still in nominal charge. The struggle was led by the Haganah, flanked by Etzel and Lehi. The fighting consisted mostly of guerrilla and terrorist acts and military operations of limited scope designed to achieve control of the central cities, strategic roads, and the rural region. Until April 1948, the Yishuv had focused on defense, but at that point, it transitioned to an organized, widespread offensive. It completely vanquished the Arab-Palestinian side and stopped the invading Arab armies beginning in May 1948 and ending with the first ceasefire in July, 1949, thus creating a territorial and demographic continuum of Jewish settlements.[[98]](#footnote-98)

On April 22, 1948, the Carmeli Brigade seized control of Haifa, and Ben-Gurion appointed Dayan to regulate abandoned Arab property. This was his first experience with a military government. Dayan ordered that food and other goods be moved to IDF storage so that looters not be tempted, in particular by wheat seeds that could have served the Jewish settlements. Some felt that this was a justified move given the damage the war had done to the settlements; others considered this act immoral.[[99]](#footnote-99)

At this time, Dayan suffered a severe personal loss. In April 1948, his younger brother, Zohar (Zorik), fell in battle in Ramat Yohanan against a Druze battalion fighting alongside the Arabs. Shortly thereafter, Giora Zaid[[100]](#footnote-100) conducted negotiations with the Druze to get them to switch their allegiance to the Israeli side. He worried about Dayan’s reactions, but when he raised the issue with him, Dayan almost instantaneously responded with support, a testament to his pragmatic nature. Zaid remembered that after broaching the topic with him, Dayan thought about it for a second and then said, “*Yallah* - let’s do it.”[[101]](#footnote-101) At a meeting of the Druze leader Ismail Kabalan, Giora Zaid, and Moshe Dayan in Kiryat Amal, Dayan displayed an extraordinary personal ability to influence his interlocutor. He succeeded in convincing Kabalan that there was no conflict between the Druze and the Jews, and, in any case, the Jews were going to win the war.[[102]](#footnote-102) This was the start of the alliance with the Druze in Israel, as a result of which they began to serve in the IDF and in other state entities.

The state was established on May 14, 1948, and the IDF on May 26. Dayan was 32 years old. After the establishment of the state, Dayan’s position as Arab affairs officer lost all meaning. Although he wanted a combat position, he wasn’t offered one. A frustrated Dayan wrote of this period:

I wandered around underfoot. I had no work and I felt bad. I wanted to join one of the units. The emphasis then was on doing the war, not managing or planning it. I wanted to be in a fighting unit, and it didn’t matter to me if it was as a brigade or platoon commander.[[103]](#footnote-103)

**The Education of a Strategist: Summary**

The literature dealing with the characteristics of strategist leaders and their training points to several important dimensions of effective leadership.[[104]](#footnote-104) The first, charisma – the meaning of which is “the gift of God” – is innate. It is a talent, a personality-based ability to lead and affect people in various ways, which cannot be learned or simulated. Still, leaders ought to be equipped with knowledge and skills acquired in the early stages of their development that can prepare them for diverse challenges, have professional knowledge of their fields of endeavor, while at the same time have extensive knowledge of world affairs. Leaders who experience and know the difficulties on the ground and the challenges simple soldiers in the trenches must face have a clear advantage, because they know the practical significance of their fateful decisions on the people who are supposed to execute them. The preferable method of learning should combine academic studies with diverse practical experiences and trials. Personal mentoring by significant figures is key to the success of a strategist leader.

In the case of Dayan, all of this was fulfilled. All his experiences and life events were instructive because of his curiosity, ability to adapt to different situations, and unique capacity for holding complex, sometimes even contradictory opinions, and yet continue to function effectively.

He was only a child when he got to know Arabs and their culture and religion up close. He did not view them as one monolithic enemy, but as a stubborn and diversified rival fighting for what was right in their eyes. He was involved in conflicts between herders and farmers, echoing the most ancient struggle since the dawn of human civilization; and despite the complexity of international diplomacy, he always remembered that the fight over land was the source of everything else. Beyond this, Dayan considered Arabs an inseparable part of the landscape. Just as he accepted the sometimes brutal climate of the land, he saw the Arabs – for good and for ill – as part of the package deal called the land of Israel.

During his period of incarceration, Dayan developed a measure of empathy towards the Arab side, which was using various means, including terrorism, to fight a foreign rule. He shared the prison space with Arabs and with Jews from the splinter groups, which were then considered beyond the pale by most Haganah personnel, and he developed a liking for both the Jews and the Arabs. While their goals differed from his, the path of struggle and sacrifice was shared. Later on, these realizations would affect him greatly.

Dayan learned to handle weapons and fight at an early age. He was blessed with outstanding instructors and mentors who taught him guerrilla tactics but mostly leadership. Wingate and Sadeh were the most prominent, but there were others. Other Haganah commanders, including Raphael Lev and Yaakov Dori, helped him along his path. Furthermore, Dayan received formal military education through the British army sergeants’ course and the Haganah’s platoon commanders’ course in Yavne’el, which taught him how a formal army conducts itself. He led ambushes and patrols and, until his injury, participated in many guerrilla actions in which he proved his cool-headedness. For Dayan, the shattered eye was a curse, as it ended his operational promotions. The rapid promotions of his friendly rival Yigal Alon, who started out together with Dayan and quickly became deputy commander, and then commander of the Palmach, was the proof. However, the curse came with its blessing, because as a result of the injury, Dayan was afforded the opportunity to gain different types of experience, enabling him to develop the skills required of a leader at the strategic level. The first time Dayan conducted negotiations was when he represented the Mem-Gimmel before the Acre Prison authorities. After his injury, his negotiating skills were used when the Haganah reached out to the underground splinter groups – Etzel and Lehi. He also gained experience with the field of intelligence when he planned and set up an intelligence gathering network and trained its personnel.

Just as important was the political experience he gained due to the relationship with Ben-Gurion and various Mapai politicos. Finally, he gained experience with political and security issues when he participated in the Young Turks forum and conversed with senior personnel, including Haganah Chief of Staff Dori. The special relationship that started to form with Ben-Gurion paved Dayan’s future path.

The first stages of Dayan’s path were a rare melding of learning and various experiences with combat leadership, staff work, and intelligence in special positions, complex negotiations with enemies, and exposure to the considerations of the political echelon for which the military consideration is only part of a set of broader considerations. In addition, Dayan also gained his first experience with party politics. All of these constituted an excellent preparation for the challenges of the future and the key positions he would come to hold.

1. The Second Aliyah was the wave of immigration of Jews to Palestine who arrived between 1904 and 1914, when the Ottoman Empire was still in power. This immigration wave was ended by the outbreak of World War I. During the Second Aliyah decade, some 35,000 Jews from mostly Eastern European coutnries came to the land of Israel. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Tevet, 1971, p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid, pp. 40-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Dayan, 1976, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Tevet, 1971, p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Naphtali Lau Lavie, *Moshe* *Dayan*, Valentine Mitchell, London, 1968, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Tevet, 1971, p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid, p. 99 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid, pp. 85-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ibid, pp. 123-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Sun Tzu, *On the Art of War*, translated from the Chinese by Lionel Giles, Allandale Online Publishing, Leicester, 2000, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Tevet, 1971, p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid, pp. 51-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Tevet, 1971, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Dayan, 1976, p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid, p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Tevet, 1971, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Tevet, 1971, p. 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Dayan, 1976, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Nowadays, the members of this tribe live in Zarzir near Nahalal and many of them serve in the armed forces. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Dayan, 1976, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Tevet, 1971, p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid, p. 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid, p. 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid, p. 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Dayan, 1976, p. 52 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Tevet, 1971, p. 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid, p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Bar-On, 2014, p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid, p. 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid, p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid, p. 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Mordechai Naor (ed.), *Mikh’tevei ahava – Moshe Dayan* (*Moshe Dayan: Love Letters*) (Hebrew), Miskal, Tel Aviv, 2016, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Tevet, 1971, pp. 137–138. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Bar-On, 2014, 0. 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The group settled temporarily at Givat Shimron near Nahalal while waiting for the kibbutz movement institutions to arrange for them to get the land on which they would build the new kibbutz (Bar-On, 2014, p. 38). Dayan and Ruth were members of the Shimron group for about two two years, but left it about two months before the group settled at Hanita in November 1938 (Tevet, 1971, p. 154). Dayan took part in the founding of Hanita a few months before the Shimron group arrived on the site in March 1938. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Bar-On, 2014, p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Gershon Rivlin, *La’esh velamagen: Toldot hanotrut ha’ivrit* (*Into the Fire and Defense: The History of the Hebrew Guards*) (Hebrew), Maarakhot, Tel Aviv, 1962. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Tevet, 1971, p. 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Dayan, 1976, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Dayan, 1976, p. 37. This is precisely how psychologist and military historian Dixon described military rituals in his book. Cf.: Norman Dixon, *Hapsikhologiya shel hashmlumi’eliyut batsava* (*On the Psychology of the Military Incompetence*) (in Hebrew translation), Maarakhot, Tel Aviv, 2003. Dixon claimed that these rituals become the be-all and end-all of the military, seize control of it, and damage the creativity and originality needed to confront new challenges on the battlefield. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Yaakov Dori (1899–1973), the IDF’s first chief of staff. He immigrated to Palestine with his family in 1906, and enlisted in the British army towards the end of World War I, serving in the Jewish Brigades. In 1939, he was appointed chief of staff of the Haganah, and he was responsible for preparing it for war in 1947. After the establishment of the state, he was appointed chief of staff of the IDF, a position he held until 1949. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Tevet, 1971, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Yigal Sheffy, *Sikat mem-mem: Hamahshava hats’va’it bakursim l’k’tsinim bahaganah* (*The Platoon Commanders’ Pin: The Military Thought in the Officers’ Courses in the Haganah*) (Hebrew), Ministry of Defense Publishing, Tel Aviv, 1991, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Bar-On, 2014, p. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Sheffy, 1991, pp. 63–66. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Yitzhak Sadeh (1890–1952), an IDF general, commander, strategist, educator and writer [why יהודי?]. He immigrated to Palestine in 1920 and cofounded the Yosef Trumpeldor Labor and Defense Battalion (colloquially known as Gdud Ha’avoda). Sadeh served in the Haganah and founded the Field Platoons and the Special Operations Units. In 1941, he founded the Palmach (Strike Forces), which he commanded until 1945. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Bar-On, 2014, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Dayan, 1976, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Tevet, 1971, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Yigal Alon (1918–1980), Israeli military man and politician, commander of the Palmach, an IDF commander in the War of Independence, an MK, and an Israeli government minister. For many years, Alon and Dayan, two promising, native-born Israelis who followed a similar trajectory from the army to politics, competed with one another, whether overtly of covertly. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Tevet, 1971, p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid, p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Wingate’s squad in Ein Harod consisted of 18 British men and 24 Jewish men, mostly from Hanita. Tevet, 1971, p. 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Shlomi Shetrit, *Plagot halayla hameyuhadot (SNS) bamered ha’aravi: Me’afyenim shel hayehidot vetorat halehima shela bemivhan hape’ilut hatsva’it* (*The Special Night Squads (SNS) in the Arab Revolt: Features of the Units and Their Military Doctrine in the Test of Military Activity*) (Hebrew), MA thesis, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 2013, p. 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Tevet, 1971, p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Tevet, 1971, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Bar-On, 2014, p. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Tevet, 1971, p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Tevet, 1971, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Two courses were given twice. The second came to an earlier end than planned because of the arrest of the 43 men. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Sheffy, 1991, pp. 75–76. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Ibid, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Ibid, p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Dayan, 1976, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Tevet, 1971, p. 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid, p. 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid, p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Naor, 2016, p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. On May 15, 1941, two companies were set up under the command of Yitzhak Sadeh, consequent to a decision to establish a national force both to protect the Yishuv and also to serve as reserves for cooperation with the British army. This force was the core from which the Palmach developed. Dayan thus served in the Palmach for a short time before the organization got its name. Although he adopted its marked social and political features, this made it possible for Dayan to claim that he never served in the Palmach. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Dayan’s knowledge of the language was limited to basic conversational Arabic. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Dayan, 1976, p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Bar-On, 2014, pp. 50-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. The Australians and the Israelis told somewhat different versions about who seized command of the unit, but there is no doubt that Dayan and Mart led the fighting and the rush. Tevet, 1971. p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Bar-On, 2014, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Tevet, 1971, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Dayan, 1976, p. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Tevet, 1971, p. 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Bar-On, 2014, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Tevet, 1971, p. 234. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Menachem Begin, *Hamered: Zikhronotav shel mefaked ha’irgun hatsva’I haleumi be’erets yisrael* (*The Revolt: The Memoirs of the Commander of the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel*) (Hebrew), Ahi’asasf, Jerusalem, 1950, p. 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Tevet, 1971, p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Yehuda Harel, *Halohem: Hayav ve’alilotav shel Moshe Dayan* (*The Fighter: The Life and Times of Moshe Dayan*) (Hebrew), Moked, Tel Aviv, 1967, p. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Shimon Peres (1923-2016), politician and public figure who serves as MK, minister, prime minister, and president of the State of Israel. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Tevet, 1971, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Tevet, 1971, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid, p. 243. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. The rank of colonel was introduced into the IDF in 1950 and the rank of brigadier only in 1968, so that the rank of lieutenant colonel was very senior, just a step below major general, a rank that was subordinate only to the chief of staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Bar-On, 2014, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Dayan recruited his agents primarily from the al-Mazarib tribe with whom he had grown up. At least one of them, Abd Abeidat, had been a gang member during the Arab Revolt. Tevet, 1971, p. 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Benny Morris, *1948: Toldot hamilhama ha’aravit-yisraelit harishona* (*1948: The History of the First Arab-Israeli War*) (Hebrew), Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Tevet, 1971, p. 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Giora Zaid (1914[not 1941]-2005), the son of Hashomer members Zipporah and Alexander Zaid. The father was murdered in 1938 by a Bedouin. Giora grew up surrounded by Bedouin neighbors, spoke fluent Arabic, and was closely familiar with the customs of the Arab world. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Tevet, 1971, p. 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. “A Druze officer in Israel’s service: The story of Ismail Kabalan” (Hebrew), *Davar*, December 8, 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Tevet, 1971, p, 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Yakov Ben Haim, “What Strategic Planners Need to Know”, *Workshop on Strategic Uncertainty in National Security Samuel Neaman Institute*, Technion Haifa, June 26, 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)