Therefore, the task of my research is to reconstruct the apparatus of persecution and to study the logic of approving decisions regarding the Roma minority in the occupied territories of Ukraine, primarily in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*. The key question is why and under the influence of which factors did the murderous actions of the Nazis—which previously, as a rule, targeted isolated nomadic Roma—erupt into the full-scale and almost total killing of the entire Roma population, both “nomadic” and “settled,” from Volyn to Poltava regions in the spring and summer of 1942?

Here it is worth adding a methodological explanation on why it is justified to divide an allegedly cohesive population that suffered persecution—Roma—into “nomadic” and “settled” subgroups. This distinction is rather conditional when applied to the real situation, but at the same time it is very important when reconstructing the mindset of the killers. “Nomadic” Roma did not actually exist: instead, they were groups that, prior to the war, moved along commercial routes in the warm seasons and remained in their own or rented houses in the winter. “Settled” Roma were both those who worked in cities, filling the ranks of the proletariat or the service industry during Soviet industrialization, and those who took advantage of Soviet measures introduced in the 1920s and 1930s to “productivize the gypsy population” by obtaining housing and farming plots. There are no statistics on the number of “nomadic” and “settled” Roma in Ukraine leading up to the Nazi invasion; one can only assume that both populations were approximately equal. The boundaries between them were also conditional: during the war, “settled” Roma quickly obtained the appearance of “nomads” while attempting to flee and save themselves from the Nazis.

However, to analyze the Nazi policy, it is not so much who Roma actually were, but how the Nazis perceived them, that is relevant.[[1]](#footnote-1) It is important that two images of “gypsies” in the Third Reich—as “asocial elements” or “racial enemies” (the latter gradually overtook the former in the second half of the 1930s and early 1940s) —intertwined, complemented, and contradicted each other in different ways. This combination led to the formation, in the words of historian Michael Zimmerman, of a “scientific-police hybrid”[[2]](#footnote-2) as a principle of “anti-gypsy” policy in the Reich. That is, pseudoscientific racist tools of categorizing Roma and state practices based on their alleged “asocial behavior,” as were traditional in the pre-Nazi period, were combined. The “gypsy policy” in the east, where local soldiers, civilians, and SS functionaries possessed neither detailed orders on the matter nor the resources to implement them, initially tended to either accept “the gypsy” as a homogenous mass (in this case, imagining all Roma as asocial nomads) or, in rare instances, differentiate them as “nomadic” and “settled.” As seen below, while the Nazi motivation to kill “nomadic” groups can be explained by their desire to rid their operation zone of “unstable elements,” “criminal groups,” “spies,” and “partisan supporters” (as such already considered a crime for civilians), the widening of the killing circle to include “settled” townspeople and peasants, who could not even be imagined as a threat, requires a different explanation and additional analytical tools, since it appears to be total destruction based on ethnicity, i.e., genocide. The circumstances surrounding and mechanisms of this escalation, as well as the transition from killing isolated mobile Roma to killing the entire Roma population in Ukraine, is the subject of this research.

According to the consensus established by Zimmerman, “there was no single central plan guiding the persecution of Roma; rather, it was determined by geographic region and administrative district. Conflicts of interest arose within the Nazi system, and politics occasionally led to bureaucratic deadlocks. As a result, persecution of Roma in both the Reich and the Nazi-occupied European territories was disjointed, marked by discrepancies and contradictions.”[[3]](#footnote-3) Therefore, to explain why Roma ended up marked for death in 1942, it is essential to consider several factors at different levels that influenced the events: (1) centralized initiatives from the Third Reich, especially agencies responsible for implementing the “eastern” policies of military (Wehrmacht), administrative (civilian government), and security (SS) bodies; (2) their subordinates, who directly realized this policy “on the ground,” yet did not only follow instructions from the center, but also, to a certain extent, formed them and thereby influenced the center.

Additionally, different branches of the occupying authorities did not act in isolation, but influenced one another, causing the ultimate situation to develop not only due to vertical, but also horizontal links between the military, government officials, and policemen.

It is worth noting an important methodological detail on why this research focuses on one region. On one hand, the Nazi attack on the USSR created a significant geographic area in which, as it would logically be assumed, there was a racial worldview that marked certain groups as “hostile” and informed the execution of military-political and administrative tasks pertaining to them. On the other hand, at the regional level, local government bodies and the functionaries heading them possessed a wide range of authority in realizing practical tasks that were not clearly defined by Berlin. Regarding the “gypsy question,” this meant that amid the negative attitude toward “gypsies” that was cultivated through both everyday prejudice and National Socialist propaganda, practical measures against Roma in individual military-political and administrative-territorial districts ranged from discrimination to outright murder. We will focus our attention on the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, the most seldom explored administrative-territorial unit in the historiography, in the period from 1941 to 1944. Yet due to the paucity of sources, we cannot avoid extrapolating, that is, attempting to explain events in this territory using similar, more well-described events that occurred in other areas of the occupied USSR. Additionally, the fate of the Roma minority cannot be examined in isolation from other of the most important elements of Nazi policy and its radicalization: “the final solution of the Jewish question,” the struggle against the resistance and the partisan movement, populist politics, the exploitation of captured territories, etc. Moreover, it is these aspects that allow us to better understand the issue at hand, to fill existing gaps, and to speculate on how these events developed.

**The Wehrmacht and “gypsies.” Background and progression of the “first wave” of killing and its victims: “nomadic” Roma**

After the eastern invasion in June 1941, Army Group Centre (the 11th Army in northern Ukraine) moved through Ukraine, accompanied by guard divisions, and established field and garrison command offices in the captured territory. Within the structure of the Wehrmacht, field gendarmerie and secret field police units were responsible for security.

There is much research on the escalation of violence by the Wehrmacht and the factors that contributed to it.[[4]](#footnote-4) Under the guise of self-defense and of effectively combating potential resistance, when soldiers in the occupied territories were ordered to act “according to military law” and to “mercilessly eliminate foreign and insidious elements,” primarily Jews, the radicalization of the war and mass killing necessarily accelerated. How legitimized violence broadened at the grassroots level must also not be forgotten. By employing social psychology methods, historians help to trace the trend of the brutal behavior of low-ranking soldiers and clarify the factors (“in-group conformity,” “male brotherhood,” “shame for refusing to be like others,” etc.) that eventually turned army units into professional killing squadrons. After one year, crimes considered unthinkable or accompanied by significant psychological shock became normal for ordinary soldiers. As historian Thomas Kune notes, “Wehrmacht soldiers were not simply victims of a command hierarchy and indoctrination, but also of independent functionaries.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

*The first step toward mass killing: perception of nomadic Roma as “spies” and “supporters of the enemy”*

Sources show that large groups of nomadic Roma that the Nazis encountered also became potential victims. The works of historian Martin Holler[[6]](#footnote-6) and Romologist Nikolai Bessonov[[7]](#footnote-7) include orders concerning Roma issued by the Wehrmacht and information on crimes committed against them in Belarus and Russia. In the autumn of 1941, Roma and Jews were subjected to violence in the Wehrmacht’s operation zone in occupied Belarus.

What attracted the attention of the Nazi military to Roma camps? Scarce documentary sources illuminating the attitude of Nazi commanders toward “gypsies” reveal that the treatment of Roma in Ukraine mirrored that of various armies in different periods of European history: Roma were mainly viewed as potential spies[[8]](#footnote-8) and were thus either executed by the SS itself or transferred to its nearest division for “special treatment.” As part of these “security measures,” settled Roma did not attract particular attention, while nomadic camps were very likely to be targeted.

Let us examine more closely the measures and orders concerning Roma issued by Nazi military commanders. On October 10 in Minsk, General Gustav Freiherr von Bechtolsheim, a Wehrmacht commander in Belarus, issued an order to “immediately execute gypsies on the spot while arresting them. Upon encountering any relatively large camps or groups of nomadic gypsies, this must be immediately communicated to the Wehrmacht commander or the head of the SS and with as much detailed information on the time and location as possible.”[[9]](#footnote-9) A month and a half later, von Bechtolsheim linked the fate of “gypsies” and Jews, ordering: “Jews must disappear from rural locations, and gypsies must also be eliminated.”[[10]](#footnote-10) Both orders show that while the October 10 order delineates only nomadic groups of Roma, the November order mentions Roma as an entire ethnic group. It is unlikely that von Bechtolsheim consciously decided to include settled Roma townspeople and peasants as potential victims; operating on the narrow concept of “gypsies,” he meant only the same groups as in the order a month and a half prior. However, nothing prevented the perpetrators who received this order from punishing all Roma that they encountered, creating the preconditions for the total killing of the community.

In early November of 1941, Unit 1с of the 339th Infantry Division in eastern Belarus issued a memorandum on the subordination, sphere of authority, and tasks of units in its zone of operation, from the secret field police and the field gendarmerie to local auxiliary units and the civilian administration. Among those units cited in the memorandum was also the *Зіскегкеіізйіепзі* (Security Service, SD) as a police unit. Along with Bolsheviks, Jews, and other groups, “gypsies” were included within the SD’s jurisdiction. Regarding Jews and “gypsies,” the document mentions:

soldiers may only shoot Jews and gypsies when it has been established that they are partisans or other accomplices. In all other cases, they must be sent to the Security Service (8.О.). If an army unit is located far from the nearest mission commander (*Einsatzkommando*)of the security service, Jews and gypsies must be delivered to the nearest POW camp or to the field or garrison commander. From there they shall be sent in an organized manner to the security service (8.В.).[[11]](#footnote-11)

Some Wehrmacht commanders were more cautious when handling the “gypsy question.” This is apparent in the area of activity of Army Group North and of territories under military administration. Roma communities were scattered between Lake Peipus and Lake Ilmen, where there were also written orders regarding the handling of local “gypsies.” On November 21, 1941, an order issued by General Franz von Roques, commander of Army Group North Rear Area, differentiated “nomadic gypsies,” who were to be “transferred to the nearest SD *Einsatzkommando,*” and “settled gypsies who had lived in their place of residence for two years,” who were “politically and criminally unsuspicious” and were to remain in their place of residence. However, as Martin Holler emphasizes, the task of assessing political trustworthiness granted the SD and the military considerable freedom, and the concept of “nomadic life” in wartime was also vague.[[12]](#footnote-12) Almost 18 months later, on March 24, 1943, Unit 1c of the 281st Security Division in the city of Ostriv, Pskov region [present-day Russian Federation], echoed von Roques’s November 21, 1941, order in response to a request from *Ortskommandatur* [local headquarters]No. 534. It was again ordered that “gypsies living in one location for two years without raising doubts about their political reliability” were to “remain” in place. It was also emphasized that “the duties of soldiers are limited to sending ‘gypsies’ to the SD, while participating in killing is not stipulated.”[[13]](#footnote-13) This order was apparently a reaction to the execution of the Jewish and Roma population in the city, which occurred earlier and in which, one can assume, soldiers in the unit directly participated and from which its commanders attempted to shy away.[[14]](#footnote-14) This testifies to the fact that there were still individual Wehrmacht commanders who viewed the crimes of their units against civilian populations—even those that were “inferior” in a racial sense—with disgust or reluctance. Such examples, however, are likely rare.

*The second step toward mass killing: replacing the concept of “nomadic gypsies” with “all gypsies,” and the threat to settled Roma*

Let us recall the activities of *8іскегип$$(1т$іоп*, the Wehrmacht divisions responsible for maintaining security in the nearest rear zone behind the front line. Historians commonly believe that for the commanders of these divisions, security and combating resistance served as pretexts and covers for race- and biology-based killing. Evidence of these commanders’ anti-Roma measures is scant, but available testimonies allow us to define their contribution in radicalizing the “gypsy policy.”

On October 8, 1941, Order No. 25 of Field Command No. 528 (V) in the zone of operation of the 221st Security Division of Army Group North in Rahachow, eastern Belarus, stipulated, referring to the command’s previously issued Order No. 14, that “gypsies” must face internment. The order continues: “If looted or stolen items are found, all gypsies involved in the theft shall be shot. All gypsies are to be interned in forced labor camps like Jews, yet they must be held separately from Jews.”[[15]](#footnote-15) This order shows that at least in the early stage, commanders of these units were still unprepared to kill the entire community en masse. However, two circumstances—the willingness to execute people for discovering allegedly “stolen” items, for which it was easy to incriminate them; and conceiving Roma as “all gypsies,” irrespective their way of life—might have encouraged the perpetration of mass killing. Order No. 25 also tied Roma to Jews, another persecuted group. Thus, Roma [in Belarus] shared the tragic fate of Jews as measures against the latter became increasingly brutal.

A similar situation developed in occupied Ukraine. In early November 1941, in the zone of activity of Army Group Centre, Lieutenant General Georg Hewelke, commander of the 339th Infantry Division, proposed to “liquidate all harmful and useless persons (fugitives, captured POWs, vagabonds, Jews, and gypsies).” Hewelke felt that this would be better than significantly reducing the rations allocated for auxiliary Ukrainian security divisions.[[16]](#footnote-16) Importantly, this order in no way differentiated “nomadic” and “settled” Roma, which also may have increased the willingness of perpetrators to kill any Roma they encountered.

*The third and final step toward mass killing: transformation of settled Roma into “asocial elements” and a “security threat”*

Testimony from the summer of 1942 presents a much more tragic picture of how even settled Roma, who in no way stood out from their surroundings (perhaps apart from their darker skin), ended up facing death. Historian Michael Burleigh offers the example of Bruno Scultetus, Major General of the 281st Security Division, who wrote in a letter to his commander on June 23, 1942, about the execution of 128 “gypsies” by the secret field police. Partisans were active in his area in the second half of May, and “gypsies” were also observed there in the same period. According to Scultetus’s report, these “gypsies” did not possess permanent residences, did not work, begged, and were “a burden in all respects.” To avoid his order resembling an arbitrary decision to execute the homeless, Scultetus rationalized his position as follows: based on “general experience,” which was once again confirmed in Russia (that is, in the occupied territory of the USSR), “gypsies” often acted as spies. Scultetus presented several indirect arguments to support this “general experience”: 1) many “gypsies” were men of conscription age; 2) one survey respondent said that older “gypsies” were discussing partisan activities; 3) “gypsies” had destroyed a camp near the location of a fight. Scultetus further noted that “all the gypsies made a very unfavorable and dubious impression and often contradicted each other during interrogation.” There was no indisputable evidence that Roma were assisting partisans, yet the suspicion was so great—and the potential danger to the army so significant—that Scultetus deemed their elimination necessary. Having thus interpreted the order on the origin of the order on the killing of “gypsies,” Scultetus attempted to defend his subordinates and noted that there were no more partisan attacks in the area following the executions.[[17]](#footnote-17) Martin Holler’s research reveals new and important details of this incident. Documents from the Soviet extraordinary commission in the town of Novorzhev, where the incident occurred, show that the Roma victims, of which the commission estimated there were twice as many as stated by Scultetus, were mainly settled. Holler concludes that to justify the killing of Roma, Scultetus and his subordinates initially “turned them into dangerous criminals living off of begging.”[[18]](#footnote-18) This important fact demonstrates the two-stage process in the killers’ thinking: they first presented settled Roma as “asocial elements” and then as an “asocial security threat.” Such was the schema used to achieve their killing.

Thus, one can identify the period from June 1941 to March 1942 as the first wave of murders of the Roma population in occupied Ukraine, in which most of the victims were nomadic Roma. At the same time, available sources cannot identify either the Wehrmacht’s leading role or direct participation in killing Roma (except for isolated incidents). Early evidence speaks instead of the leadership of SS units, whose activity is examined below, in killing the Roma population. However, we must not forget that *Einsatzgruppen* and other SS units operated in the rear of the Wehrmacht, with which they collaborated and coordinated their actions, while the above orders by army commanders on “gypsies” (separating Roma from the rest of the population) did not allow Roma to remain unaffected by the “security measures” implemented by the SS. Moreover, the regular army was willing to transfer Roma suspected of a security threat to the SS and acknowledged the prerogative of the latter in “solving” such cases. All of this, excluding the events of the second half of 1941 in southern Ukraine and Crimea, to which we will return in greater detail, enabled the “first wave” of mass killing of the civilian Roma population, particularly its nomadic members.

**The civilian administration and “gypsies.” Preconditions for the “second wave” of violence: mass killing based on ethnicity**

Due to the eastward advance of the regular army, beginning on September 1, 1941, the territories remaining in the rear were transferred to the civilian administration—the Кеіскзкоттіззагіаі Цкгаіпе(*Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, RKU)—which was subordinate to the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RM/OET) in Berlin.

*Initial steps by central bodies of the occupying civilian administration toward forming a “gypsy policy”*

It was believed for a long time that the RKU formed its “gypsy policy” “from scratch,” as it was not provided with relevant documentation from Berlin. However, recent archival findings demonstrate that this was not entirely true. This question has a certain prehistory. As early as December 8, 1938, *Reichsführer-SS* Himmler signed an order “on combating the gypsy threat” (*Векатр/ип$ йег 2і§еипегрІа§е*), which summarized attempts at racial profiling already undertaken by the Reich to solve the “gypsy question” and mainly viewed Roma in Germany not as a social problem, but as a racial one, and ordered it to be solved “based on the internal characteristics of this race.” Roma in the Reich were divided into “pure” and “mixed” (*Мі$скІіп$е*), the latter of which were considered more dangerous. This order confirmed the important role of the Center for Research on Racial Hygiene and Demographic Biology under Robert Ritter. From this point onward, their work on classifying the Roma population became official and was closely integrated into the duties of the police.[[19]](#footnote-19) On March 1, 1939, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), added an addendum to the order concretizing many of its provisions, especially the appointment of a specialist on “gypsy questions” at every local branch of the Criminal Police and the creation of a “gypsy questions” division at every regional one. It stipulated providing new identity cards of various colors after solving the racial question. On October 17, Heydrich signed another order regulating the resettlement and registration of nomadic “gypsies.” The 1938 order, and especially the 1939 addendum, contained many small regulations and instructions on identifying and registering individuals, transportation, citizenship, places of residence, professional activities, etc.

The set of documents containing both the December 8, 1938, order, and its revisions from March 1 and October 17, 1939, was recently discovered in the archival collection of one of the six general districts in the RKU, *Generalkommissariat Shitomir* [general district of Zhytomyr].[[20]](#footnote-20) Thus, we can confidently assume that the other general districts in the RKU were provided with similar documentation from the main RKU office in Rivne. The entire archival collection (which, besides the “gypsy question,” contains resolutions and instructions on many issues, including: procedure for issuing documents, fingerprinting, combating “homosexualism” and abortion, etc.) is entitled “Documents from the Criminal Police leadership.” That is, it was not adapted to the needs of the administration of the occupied territories in 1941, but was only intended for their leadership, likely as a model of those measures practiced in the Reich two years before the invasion of the USSR, albeit in a different agency that was not institutionally connected to the RM/OET.

It is possible that it was this, as well as the excessive detail of the measures that these documents ordered to apply to various categories of “gypsies”; the lack of an apparatus that might have realized these resolutions; and the completely different military and political reality in general, that led to the fact that these documents remained, figuratively speaking, in a desk drawer of RKU supervisors, while the RKU leadership had to seek its own, much simpler principles of “gypsy policy.” As we will see below, their own attempts still adhered to a fundamental principle outlined in Himmler’s order: the division of “gypsies” into “pure” and “mixed,” that is, racial categorization, which did not coincide with the traditional division of “gypsies” into “nomadic” and “settled” (although these concepts were involved as well).

The civilian administration attempted to introduce its own legal justification for the “gypsy question” as early as December 1941, although not in the RKU, but in its northern neighbor, the *Reichskommissariat Ostland* (RKO). In the autumn of 1941, Hinrich Lohse, *Reichskommissar Ostland*, brought Himmler’s attention to the idea that nomadic “gypsies” in the KKO were allegedly uninvolved in labor and responsible for spreading disease. On December 4, 1941, Lohse issued an order stating that “gypsies wandering the country” represented a double threat. Claiming that “gypsies” were harming Germans and sharing information with the enemy, Lohse concluded that “they needed to be treated like Jews.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

However, the RM/OET in Berlin only took up this issue after six months. In June 1942, Otto Bräutigam, an official in the *КмйіВО*, submitted an inquiry on the status of “gypsies” in the RKO: “Particularly, whether gypsies, in your view, should be treated in the same way as Jews. Information about the gypsy lifestyle, whether they are settled or nomadic, what their occupation is, and how many of them are mixed gypsies (*2І£еипегтізМіп£е*), is essential.” According to historian Guenter Lewy, the same inquiry was received in the RKU.[[22]](#footnote-22)

*Measures by mid-level bodies in the civilian administration: isolating “gypsies” and assigning them the same status as Jews, and how this was interpreted by lower institutions*

Archives demonstrate that the RKU administration—and above all the administration in the *Generalkommissariat Wolhynien-Podolien* [general district of Volhynia-Podolia]—became involved with the “gypsy question” even earlier than the corresponding inquiry arrived from Berlin. Let us examine two documents, specifically two copies of the same document. They were discovered in the state archives of present-day Volyn and Rivne regions, that is, the regions that constituted a significant segment of the general district of Volhynia-Podoliafrom 1941 to 1944.

Copy!

*Reichskommissar Ukraine*, Rivne, 8 May 1942

II а

To the *Generalkommissare* [general commissars] of Brest-Litovsk, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk

Subject: treatment of Jews

Gypsies shall generally be treated the same way as Jews. An order on accommodating them in the Ghetto shall be issued.

Acting *Regierungspräsident* [governing president]

Dargel

The first of the copies was found in the collection of the *Gebietskommissariat Luzk* [district commissariat Lutsk],[[23]](#footnote-23) one of the *Kreisgebiete* [district areas] in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia. An identical document was found in the archival holdings of the *Gebietskommissariat Rowno* [district commissariat Rivne].[[24]](#footnote-24) This indicates that the original RKU order was instead a circular document. Thus, we can assume that this same order was in fact received by the Generalkommissare in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zhytomyr, and was transferred to the relevant *Gebietskommissariate*. From November 1, 1941, Paul Dargel, who signed the document, was the head of the Second General Directorate (administration) of the RKU and the permanent deputy to Erich Koch, *Reichskommissar Ukraine*, beginning in 1942. Importantly, Dargel was responsible for the “Jewish question” in the RKU. Thus, the measures concerning gypsies [and Jews?] prescribed in this circular were the same.

First, the RKU did not differentiate “settled” and “nomadic” Roma like their colleagues in the RKO (recall that in December 1941, only “wandering gypsies” were equated with Jews in the area). Second, May 1942 clearly became the watershed in which Roma were separated from the rest of the population in the RKU. Previously, the civilian administration did not express interest in this category of the population. This same order created the foundations for a legal framework that the local authorities were ordered to follow. Third, this order unambiguously equates the status of “gypsies” to that of Jews in the RKU and testifies to the general direction of future policy toward them: imprisonment in ghettoes, clearly meaning not separate areas of isolation, but Jewish ghettos. Significantly, although the order contains information about measures related to Roma, its main topic is Jews. Irrespective of the bureaucratic level of this mistake (committed by either an official or a secretary), this testifies to how much representatives of the civilian administration felt that the policy concerning both groups—Jews and Roma—ought to be the same.

Archives in other regions that became part of the RKU in 1942 show that the above circular indeed reached the lowest levels of the RKU administration. This is evidenced by a document discovered in the State Archive of Zhytomyr Region (during the occupation, Zhytomyr was the center of the eponymous general district). It was issued on June 10, 1942, by the district administration in the town of Troyaniv and addressed to the village elder of Ryzhok, one of the settlements under the district council of Troyaniv. The document testifies to the fact that based on an order by the *Gebietskommissar Shitomir* [district commissar of Zhytomyr], “gypsies must be treated in the same way as Jews.” The document also obliged the village elder to report “gypsies” if they appeared in the village.[[25]](#footnote-25)

This finding allows us to assume that the RKU order of May 8 was distributed not only in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia, but also in the *Generalkommissariat Shitomir* and reached the lowest levels of the administration (as we will see, this circular’s path from the office of Erich Koch to the village elder of Ryzhok took just over a month). One can assume that all administrative bodies, down to village councils, received similar orders, and not only in the general districts of Volhynia-Podolia and Zhytomyr, but also in others—Mykolaiv, Kyiv, and Dnipropetrovsk—and possibly in the subdistrict of Taurien as well.

It is essential to recall the stage of anti-Jewish policy in the RKU at the time. Research indicates that after the first wave of Jewish killings, which occurred from July to autumn 1941 and was connected to the rapid eastward advance of mobile SS units in the rear of the army, between 1941 and April 1942, the district commissars in the RKU began creating a ghetto for those Jews, mainly in Volhynia, who were still alive.[[26]](#footnote-26) This could explain why the second sentence in the circular from the RKU administrative capital in Rivne concerned the planned transfer of “gypsies” to ghettos. It was these measures concerning the Jewish population that the civilian administration was implementing at the time.

In that case, why do we still not know (with rare exceptions) why Roma were indeed placed in Jewish ghettos in the RKU? There is almost no documented evidence of this across the RKU at large. However, there is at least one group of sources demonstrating that after the aforementioned May 8 order, the circumstances in at least one general district, Volhynia-Podolia, the center of which was Brest-Litovsk at the time, were more merciful for at least settled Roma.

On April 22, 1942, the administration of *Kreisgebiet Kostopol* informed the general commissar of Volhynia-Podolia that over the past few days, 92 “gypsies” were detained and placed in a labor camp in Lyudvipol. *Gebietskommissar Kostopol* Lonert reported that they are a “heavy burden” for the camp because there are “greatly ingrown” elderly people and children among them. Lonert appealed to the general commissar for instructions on how to handle these people.[[27]](#footnote-27) On May 9, 1942, the *Regierungsrat* [governing council] of Volhynia-Podolia replied that general instructions on the treatment of “gypsies” would be sent immediately.[[28]](#footnote-28) Already having the aforementioned May 8 order on the table, it is likely that Heinrich Schöne, Generalkommissar Wolhynien-Podolien and *Obergruppenführer-SA*, signed the following response on May 15: “All nomadic (*итЬеггіеЬепбеп*) gypsies in the general district shall be detained and secured in place (*Іезігизеігеп*). They shall be transferred for useful work as necessary. Their carts, horses, and other items shall be confiscated (*зіскеггизіеііеп*).”[[29]](#footnote-29) This document did not contain a recipient, so it is unclear whether it was intended only for the district commissar of Kostopil or all the district commissars in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia. As follows from this order, the arrest of settled “gypsies” was not stipulated. Apparently, measures regarding nomadic Roma did not prescribe their killing, but their usefulness for labor (which did not guarantee survival either).

On May 21, another order on “roaming merchants and gypsies” and signed by Schöne was sent from the general district of Volhynia-Podolia to all the district commissars and the city commissariat of Brest-Litovsk (likely to familiarize all subordinate authorities with the resolution). “... All roaming gypsies shall be immediately settled in place. Horses and carts must be confiscated and transferred for a useful purpose.”[[30]](#footnote-30) These orders show that the district authorities in at least one of the general districts in the RKU (documents from the other five general districts have not been located) concretized the central RKU resolution by narrowing the definition of “gypsy” to those who might be caught in the “nomadic” way of life. They did not plan to disturb settled Roma.[[31]](#footnote-31)

*New incentive to develop “gypsy policy” from above: gathering information on all “gypsies”*

However, a new initiative on “gypsies” was launched within six months. This was evidenced by several documents from practically the lowest level of RKU authority: the administration in the town of Vysotsk in *Kreisgebiet Stolin*, another district in Volhynia-Podolia. This correspondence, composed of ten documents—the first of which was an order from the head of the Vysotsk district council from July 10, 1942—was addressed to village councils subordinate to Vysotsk and concerned the provision of information on the presence of Roma in the villages, in accordance with the order from the district commissar several days earlier.[[32]](#footnote-32) The rest of the documents were responses by village elders to this request stating that there were no “gypsies” in the territories under their control.[[33]](#footnote-33) The request reads:

DISTRICT COUNCIL

in Vysotsk

org. division

10.УП. 1942

No. 9/42

To the heads of local councils

According to the resolution of the Honorable Gebietskommissar of 7.УІІ,1942, I now order you to send lists of gypsies located in your territory, temporarily or permanently, via a premeditated messenger. Present the forms in the following manner:

1. Name and surname.

2. Patronymic.

3. Year of birth.

4. Place of birth.

5. Time spent in the village.

6. Occupation (learned profession).

7. Amount of land owned.

8. Date of arrival in village.

9. Place of origin.

10. Real gypsy or mixed race.

If there are no gypsies in or around the village, this must also be reported to the district council.

Terminates on 15.УІІ

District Head

First, the document testifies to the fact that all “gypsies” were already of special interest to the occupation authorities (like the other category of the local population that awaited “special treatment,” Jews). Roma were not included in the general registration of the population. Typically, at the beginning of the occupation, village elders registered all residents in the settlement according to “instructions for village elders and mayors on registering the population and issuing identification cards.” Roma were not allocated a category during the first wave of the registration, so now, in July 1942, they had to be registered separately.

Second, one can assume that this document confirms that the June 1942 request by *КМД1ВО* to the RKO was indeed also sent to the RKU. This was indirectly evidenced by the similarity of questions in an inquiry by Otto Bräutigam to the district administration of Vysotsk: both the order and the inquiry contain a request for not only statistics on “gypsies,” but also information on their lifestyle (nomadic or settled), their professional occupation, and, most importantly, whether they were “pure” (that is, those fully descended from Roma ancestors) or “mixed.” This final point most clearly indicates that the registration in Vysotsk was not an initiative by the local administration, but the result of an inquiry from Berlin, since it clearly expresses the racial motives informing the implementation of “gypsy” policy in the Reich. A differential policy regarding the two groups of Ukrainian “gypsies,” “pure” and “mixed”—like that in the Reich itself—was likely planned.

Third and most importantly, the letter by the Vysotsk administration recalls the order from the district commissar (*Kreisgebiet Stolin*). No documents that would testify to the execution of such inquiries by other district administrations in *Kreisgebiet Stolin* or other *Kreisgebiete* in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia have yet been found. However, it is unlikely that the campaign to collect information on “gypsies” was only initiated in one district. The presence of only one certificate on the “district commissar–district administration–village administration” chain allows us to assume that a large-scale initiative to collect data on Roma was conducted within the RKU at large.

Moreover, there is a document that appeared in only one district of an entirely different administrative body in occupied Ukraine: present-day Chernihiv region, which at the time formed part of the rear area under the Wehrmacht (not the RKU), although practically bordered the *Generalkommissariat Kiew* [general district of Kyiv]. On October 7, 1942, the village elder of Bryhyntsi signed a letter addressed to the Nova Basan district council (to which the village was subordinate) reading: “The Bryhyntsi village council reports that there are no gypsies living in the village of Bryhyntsi.”[[34]](#footnote-34) Requests for similar information (to which the document from Bryhyntsi was a response) were seemingly sent from the Nova Basan district council not only to its subordinate villages, but also, likely, to villages in the wider area of the Nizhyn district council under the control of *Feldkommandatur* 197 in the corresponding rear area (*Когйск, Коттапбапігйсктагіі^ез Агтее§еЬіеі*) in the operative zone of the rear of the Wehrmacht’s Army Group South.

The above circulars from the civilian administration clearly reached the lower levels of management after a significant delay. In some instances, they were executed after almost a year. This apparently pertained to regions that were subordinated to the civilian administration later, with the goal of advancing the Wehrmacht eastward. For example, the village elder of Pavlivka, subordinated to the *Gebietskommissariat Khorol*, received an order on May 6, 1943: “Based on the Gebietskommissar’s order, the roaming gypsies that have emerged must be immediately detained and transferred to the police. Send [to the district council] lists of gypsies residing permanently on the territory of your village council.”[[35]](#footnote-35) As in the above cases, one can assume that the preservation of one document in only one village could suggest that such information was demanded not only from village administrations in Khorol district, but also from across the *Kreisgebiet Khorol* (prior to which there were only three other districts aside from Khorol) and possibly from all the 14 new Kreisgebiete in the general district of Kyiv that were created after part of left-bank Ukraine was transferred under the management of the civilian administration on September 1, 1942.

One can conclude that in the spring and summer of 1942, Roma were clearly allocated to the civilian authorities in a separate group, on which a separate policy began to be formed. Documents from at least one of the six RKU general districts testify to the fact that the civilian authorities initially did not intend to kill all Roma under their control. Settled Roma integrated into their environment were not mentioned at all. Regarding nomadic Roma, there were measures intend to isolate, but not kill them. One can assume that relatively similar principles of treating “gypsies” existed in the rest of the RKU. The path that the civilian administration took involved discriminating against, exploiting, and isolating Roma. However, radicalization and killing were one of its outcomes. Unfortunately, under the influence of another powerful factor, it was to this outcome that it soon returned.

**The SS and “gypsies.” Zealous perpetrators of both waves of killing**

While RKU officials were responsible for the economic exploitation and oversight of everyday lives, other bodies of the occupation had different tasks. This primarily concerned SS units (*8іро-8О*, *Огро*, and others) that were at least formally subordinated to corresponding structures of the *КМІсІВО*, but factually reported to the Reichsführer-SS and received instructions from him. No documents have been found that shed light on these units’ perception of “gypsies” and their process of making decisions concerning them (excluding the above documents of 1938-1939 for the criminal police). However, comparing instructions from the civilian administration on the “gypsy question” and the actual results of the occupation’s Roma policy can help reconstruct the deadly contribution of the SS apparatus.

According to available sources, we know today of over 140 cases of mass killing of Roma on the territory of present-day Ukraine.[[36]](#footnote-36) Of them, historical sources contain the approximate date, or at least the month, of 111 massacres. A diagram based on data about these 111 cases (Figure 1) allows us to form an idea about the trend of the mass killings. The diagram shows that the spring of 1942 was marked by a significant intensification of anti-Roma actions. This does not mean that such actions did not occur before the spring of 1942, yet it was at this time that they were the primary responsibility of Otto Ohlendorf, commander of *Einsatzgruppe* O in southern Ukraine and Crimea. *Einsatzgruppe* D was a mobile SS unit that was active in the second half of 1941 and embarked on its lethal path through the rear of the Nazi 11th Army and the Romanian military from present-day Moldova across southwestern Ukraine (Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions) and the Crimean Peninsula. Only a few testimonies in the operation zone of other SS units also document the killing of Roma. A report by *Einsatzgruppe* B from September 23 mentions that 13 “gypsy men” and 10 “gypsy women” were executed near Minsk for “committing numerous thefts and terrorizing the local population.”[[37]](#footnote-37) According to other reports dated several days later, six “gypsies” were executed as “asocial elements.” On September ЗО, six “gypsies” were executed for robbery. The “Russia-Center” headquarters of the *Н88РР* reported to the Reichsführer-SSthat over three days—October 12-14, A graph with numbers and a number of numbers

Description automatically generated with medium confidence1941—53 “gypsies” were among other executed victims.[[38]](#footnote-38)

*Figure 1: Trend of mass killing of Roma in the Nazi zone of occupation of Ukraine, 1941 -43*

Yet beginning in April 1942, Roma in the RKU —both nomadic and settled—became the object of systematic elimination. These events appear in the reports of Nazi agencies and Soviet post-war state bodies, as well as in the testimonies of survivors and witnesses of the mass killings. Thus, the period from April to December 1942 and the year 1943 was a deadly time for all Roma in Ukraine. Why? Their combination, which led to the almost total annihilation of the community, played a fatal role.

First was the fact that “gypsies,” as shown above, became the object of “special” interest to the civilian administration in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia, across the RKU, and at the RM/OET, the highest level of the system. The first steps in the escalation of violence were the separation of Roma from the local population, their registration, attempts to collect data about them, and their isolation. However, the situation developed in various directions, which is evidenced in a May 1942 letter in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia. The general district administration did not intend to eliminate Roma, but to use them as a labor force.

*“Gypsy policy” amid the radicalization of “Jewish policy”*

Why did the Nazi occupation prove fatal for Roma? To answer this question, it is not enough to consider the condition of Roma without the broader context; in this case, the escalation of policies concerning Jews, measures concerning which were determined after the Wannsee Conference of January 1942. As Holocaust research shows, the highest ranks of the RM/OET tended to kill qualified essential Jewish workers as quickly as possible rather than leave them in forced labor for even a short term. Additionally, the fatal result of the occupation policy toward “gypsies” should be explained not only and not so much by the position of the civilian administration in the RKU as by the interaction between certain of its units and the SS-police apparatus in the RKU.

Dieter Pohl believes that despite the desire of civilian officials to control the “Jewish question,” it became clear after the Wannsee Conference that Himmler and Heydrich were competing to “solve” it in the civilian administration zone. Aside from general circumstances, the radicalization of “Jewish policy” in the RKU obtained a local impulse thanks to the fact that there was a kind of tandem in solving the “Jewish question” between RKU accomplice Erich Koch (known for his harsh policy) and Hans-Adolf Prützmann, the SS commander (*Н88РЕ*) in the territory. Despite several differences that often emerged between Koch and Prützmann (although the latter was formally subordinated to the former, he actually carried out Himmler’s orders), Koch officially transferred authority on “Jewish issues” to Prützmann, who in turn delegated this responsibility, for security measures and mainly the “Jewish question,” to the *Sipo-SD* [security police] bodies that reported to him.[[39]](#footnote-39)

Pohl’s conclusions are illustrated by internal RKU documentation from March 1, 1942. *Reichskommissar Ukraine* Erich Koch signed a circular order addressed to the general districts (with copies for the district commissars. the SS commander in Ukraine, SS commanders subordinate to him (*88РЕ*), and law enforcers) determining the authority of the SS chief in Ukraine and structures subordinate to him. The order referred to a November 19, 1941, joint decision by Reichsführer-SS Himmler and Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and transferred “all political and criminal issues pertaining to the police” (including “Jewish” and “national” questions, in addition to “communism,” “sabotage,” and “resistance”) to the competence of the *Н88РР* in Ukraine. When performing his duties, the SS commander obtained the right to employ the broadest coercive measures, from concentration camps to taking hostages up to “pacifying the entire population of the occupied territory.”[[40]](#footnote-40) Is it necessary to state that this order bound the SS to solving any issue radically, even if not explicitly stated?

As a result of this order, Jews in the RKU faced a second wave of lethal violence. Beginning in the late spring of 1942, their situation became much more tragic than even imprisonment and ghettoization. Around May 20, a new wave of mass killing began in the general districts of Volhynia-Podolia and Zhytomyr that resulted in the total elimination of almost all Jews in the RKU by the end of the summer.[[41]](#footnote-41)

An additional impulse accelerating this process was the fact that in late August 1942, food quotas to the Reich were increased in the RKU. Accordingly, Koch, who received this task directly from Himmler, intended to achieve the stated goal by removing “extra” mouths and food burdens, even by eliminating the skilled Jewish labor force that the civilian administration needed.[[42]](#footnote-42) Within three days, the commander of the *SiPo-SD* in the general district of Volhynia-Podolia said to his subordinates:

The actions must be accelerated such that […] they will be completed over five weeks. At a conference of district commissars in Lutsk from August 29-31, 1942, it was explained that decisions must generally be fully carried out. The present deputy Reichskommissar—Reichspräsident Dargel—reported to the district commissars that these hundred-per-cent decisions [Вегеіпі§ип§еп] are also in accordance with the urgent desire of the Reichskommissar himself.[[43]](#footnote-43)

As a result of these actions, most Jews had already been killed by the summer and autumn of 1942. The most able-bodied Jews remained for labor exploitation but shared this tragic fate later in 1943.

As seen from the reports of occupying security forces and Soviet documentation, it was in this period that some Roma in the RKU, both nomadic and settled, were killed. It is noteworthy that “gypsies” were not named among the categories in Koch’s circular of March 1, 1942. Why did the SS include them among those victims subjected to “special treatment”? As already noted, to this day there has been no direct answer to this question in SS and police documents.

Yet one can assume that these documents did not exist in general since they were not necessary. When combined, factors like: (1) separating Roma from the general population and implementing special measures against them; (2) anti-Roma stereotypes and prejudices, spread to one degree or another by employees of the occupation apparatus; (3) the radicalization of cleansing the “racially inferior” community; (4) the broad authority of the SS; and (5) the coordinated (despite certain exceptions) work of the civilian administration with the SS to remove “undesirable” segments of the population; led to a broad campaign to annihilate all Roma that the occupiers could reach.

*Attempt to reconstruct the thought of the killers of “gypsies”: the example of* Einsatzgruppe *D commander Otto Ohlendorf*

Unlike his “colleagues” from other *Einsatzgruppen* and other SS commanders, Otto Ohlendorf proceeded to the total murder of Roma, both nomadic and settled, along with Jews, within his group’s operation zone in southern Ukraine and Crimea as early as autumn 1941.[[44]](#footnote-44) His story, more well documented than the leaders of other punitive bodies, allows us to imagine how exactly commanders on the ground like Ohlendorf perceived “gypsies.” This is important because in a situation of maximally wide authority and vague instructions, it was their personal perception of security issues that eventually determined the fate of one group or another. Based not only on Ohlendorf’s testimonies during the Nuremburg Trial, but also, more importantly, on his personal correspondence, historian Daniel Goldhagen has produced a productive attempt to analyze Ohlendorf’s thoughts. Goldhagen draws attention to Ohlendorf’s impressions from his travels to Romania (with its sizable Roma population[[45]](#footnote-45)), from which *Einsatzgruppe* D continued its path through Ukraine. Ohlendorf believed that despite the poverty of Ukraine, it was different from Romania: “There is no racial mixing here, there are no gypsies, the poor are not dirty and therefore not rude.” In Ohlendorf’s perception, “gypsies” symbolized two negative values: uncleanliness and disorder. Roma were “mixed,” which the Nazis and Ohlendorf (who held purity as the highest value) found horrifying…. For Ohlendorf, Germans were the antithesis of “gypsies,” because while the latter created filth and chaos, the former lived by different standards. Ohlendorf viewed the world through the prism of race. Germans were beautiful. Jews and gypsies were bad.”[[46]](#footnote-46) This clearly provides an answer to why Ohlendorf’s unit began killing Roma so zealously once they encountered them in the autumn of 1941 and advancing through southern Ukraine in the rear of the 11th Army.

Yet in the public sphere, Ohlendorf presented his motives differently, attempting to disclaim responsibility for murderous initiatives. Ohlendorf was presented with orders, instructions, and regulations concerning Roma. It seemed that the former commander of *Einsatzgruppe* D would have had to provide a concrete documentary basis defining his actions. Yet Ohlendorf showed otherwise. It is expedient to cite this fragment of his testimony with only small reductions, since it is important in reconstructing how the commander of a large punitive unit publicly rationalized his motives:

Question. For what reason did you kill gypsies? Simply because they were gypsies? Why did they present a threat to Wehrmacht security?

Answer. For the same reason as the Jews.

Q. Based on blood?

A. Here I can refer to my own knowledge on Jewish history: Jews always spied for both sides in wartime.

Q. I asked about gypsies, not Jews. I want to ask: for what reason did you determine that any gypsy in Russia must be destroyed? Because of their danger to the German army?

A. There was no difference between gypsies and Jews. The same order was in effect for Jews at the time. And I have already explained that we know from Jewish history that Jews always spied for both sides during wartime.

Q. We are now trying to understand what you will say about gypsies, but you always return to Jews. Have gypsies always participated in politics and military actions in Jewish history as well?

A. In spying activity during the war.

Q. Gypsies?

A. Gypsies, in particular. [...]

Q. Can you provide an example of such activity by groups of gypsies for the benefit of Russia in the previous war?

A. I can only speak about the Jews: that they actively participated in partisan activities. [...]

Q. As an example of when the gypsies were included among those who were subject to elimination, can you name an objective reason for their destruction?

A. In Russia I only know how the gypsy problem was solved in Simferopol. Apart from Simferopol, I do not know about other actions against gypsies. [...]

Q. Herr Ohlendorf, you say that gypsies are born spies? Is it not the case that representatives of any armed people are spies? Americans, Germans, Russians, when their country is at war?

A. The difference is that these people—Germans and Americans—have permanent homes, whereas gypsies do not have their own homes and are willing to quickly change residence to wherever the situation is more economically suitable.[[47]](#footnote-47)

Ohlendorf avoids direct answers and does not reference any orders or directives from above regarding “gypsies” or other “rational” grounds for their elimination, because they did not exist. Instead, he argues about their alleged spying inclinations and the lack of difference in this regard between “gypsies” and Jews (whose killing had already become routine by the autumn of 1941). The constant references to alleged “spying” by Roma demonstrate that the Wehrmacht’s position affected the decision to liquidate them. As mentioned above, the idea of “gypsies” as potentially hostile elements was widespread among German soldiers. Yet these circumstances were not so much reasons as additional factors that only helped Ohlendorf rationalize his decision to include “gypsies” among the victims. The real reason was mainly his anti-Roma bias, which he either himself did not fully realize (and thus hid from himself according to the senseless reasoning of the “spying” tendencies of “gypsies”) or felt it was better to express them vocally before the Nuremburg Trial, understanding how weak such arguments could be when concerning the killing of an entire group.

Another detail is just as important. If Ohlendorf perceived Roma as a security threat, then based on this understandably sick logic, would only nomadic Roma have faced persecution? The reality was different: throughout December 1941 to the spring of 1942, *Einsatzkommandos* and *Sonderkommandos* within *Einsatzgruppe* D killed all Roma in Crimea, and most of the victims were not intercepted in nomadic camps on the road or in forests but were settled collective farmers and urban dwellers.[[48]](#footnote-48) The only possible answer lies in Ohlendorf’s lack of information and stereotypically limited thinking, which was based on racial prejudice. Viewing mobile groups of Roma as a security threat, he did not account for nuances in the diverse way of life and economic structures of Roma, some of whom had been integrated—some for a decade and others for much longer—into local rural and urban life. It is entirely possible that when Ohlendorf thought of “gypsies,” his mind was filled with an image of marginalized Roma groups, as he saw in Romania, multiplied by racist ideas about how much what he saw did not correspond to his ideal of a proper “Aryan” way of life. Accordingly, the term “gypsy” was the only label used in his orders on the “special treatment” of this group. In turn, his subordinates, upon encountering settled Roma on the ground, diligently fulfilled orders on their liquidation because they were also “gypsies.” The racist stereotyping of Ohlendorf and the zeal of his subordinates led to the selective killing of Roma based on their “asociality” (as the killers themselves imagined it) to their total killing based on ethnicity.

It is also significant that Ohlendorf was active while the civilian administration was present in Crimea but lacked power. At the same time, according to a December 15, 1941, report by the civilian administration, Roma in Crimea “were, clearly, city dwellers.… 75% of Crimean gypsies live in cities, with 1,465 (the total in 1921 was 3,076) in Simferopol alone. They are carters, old merchants, blacksmiths, jewelers, and musicians.”[[49]](#footnote-49) The civilian administration in the subdistrict of Taurien clearly planned to maintain this group as a labor force, but its lack of influence did not interfere with Ohlendorf’s murderous intentions.

The fact that it was in southern Ukraine and Crimea that *Einsatzgruppe* D was the first to systematically kill settled Roma even prompted some researchers to cautiously assume that this practice could have been borrowed from SS units in other regions according to Ohlendorf’s example. Martin Holler believes that Ohlendorf might have gained a certain level of authority among the heads of the security police and the SD since he had served in this role for the longest of the four *Einsatzgruppe* commanders. The systematicity of his measures to combat “gypsies,” which appeared in the *Егеі^пізтеїйип^еп* (reports on the activity of the *Einsatzgruppen* to the RSHA) may have served as a roadmap for the novice commanders of *Einsatzgruppen* A, B, and C. Therefore, beginning in the spring of 1942, the security police across the occupied territories began treating all Soviet Roma *de facto* like Jews and attempted to fully eliminate them.[[50]](#footnote-50)

*Expansion of genocidal practices in the spring and summer of 1942 to other territories: “Ohlendorf as a source of the process” or “parallel escalation”?*

This assumption, in my view, is partially fair: although one cannot exclude the fact that commanders of other *Einsatzgruppen* and SS units borrowed the experience of their colleagues in solving one task or another, it is rather the case that a parallel development occurred, that is, a situation in which similar reasons and factors led to similar consequences in various regions, independent of each other but with a certain delay. Considering Ohlendorf’s positions as a model is important to understand the escalation of anti-Roma violence, yet isolated details on the contributions of low-level functionaries in the law enforcement apparatus in Germany and in the occupied territories have been preserved. It seems that each of them, guided by their own ideas about “gypsies” at their own level, contributed to the course of the violence. For example, from February to April 1942, Albert Rapp, commander of *Sonderkommando* 7a under *Einsatzgruppe* B, preached several times to his subordinates that “Jews and gypsies” are lowly, neglected, antisocial, sick, dirty people that deserve to be eliminated.” Therefore, his unit at this time systematically killed Roma along with Jews, POWs, communists, the mentally disabled, and those suspected of supporting the partisan movement.[[51]](#footnote-51) Rapp’s subordinates followed his example. In early summer 1942, Kurt Matschke commanded *Sonderkommando* 7a, which stayed in Klyntsi. As former members of the unit recalled, at the time they attacked a Roma family consisting of 10 or 15 people. On the pretext that they might have been spies, Matschke ordered them all immediately shot. A court in Essen in 1966 determined that Matschke did not even interrogate the victims. As he claimed in court, if he actually would not have agreed with Nazi rules on their destruction, he would not have let the “gypsies” go because there was no higher-ranking officer on the ground.[[52]](#footnote-52) In the post-war period, Wilhelm Wibbens, commander of *Sonderkommando* 9 under *Einsatzgruppe* B from February 1942 to January 1943, testified on the question of 20 nomadic Roma killed under his order in early April 1942 outside Vitebsk: “It is better to kill those who are innocent than let the guilty walk.” A West German investigation in 1966 established that it was from Wibbens that the initiative to execute Roma originated from, and was not the result of carrying out, an order from above.[[53]](#footnote-53)

Therefore, starting in the spring of 1942, this killing policy also became widespread among commanders of other SS units in the RKU (see Figure 1, in which the sharp increase in the number of anti-Roma actions since April 1942 depicts events not in Crimea, where killing Roma had already been completed at the time, but within the RKU and in the Wehrmacht zone). Evidence of anti-Roma actions appears in the documents of both stationary *SiPo-SD* units and the order police, as well as reports of police battalions that were sent eastward. As in the case of Ohlendorf, the spread of mass killings was facilitated, among other things, by anti-Roma stereotypes rooted in the mass imagination of low-ranking functionaries. Research by historian Edward Westerman aids in understanding why German order and security police were willing to include Roma in their circle of violence, even in the absence of orders to do so: “gypsies” did not occupy a central role in police indoctrination, yet mass police periodicals did not avoid this issue, painting “gypsies” in a maximally unattractive light. For example, the journal *German Policeman*,systematically employing racist terminology, published an article on October 1, 1941, entitled “Gypsy Transport” written by police sergeant Wilhelm Drexler. He described his involvement in transporting a group of 52 “gypsies” to a camp, the dirty “black fingers” of children, and a woman who cleaned herself with a rag wet with saliva. Drexler concluded: “The truth is that [the question] of gypsies concerns an asocial race or, putting it better, racial mixing. Being incapable of remaining in one place… [they] live a partisan existence, spreading the worst prejudices.”[[54]](#footnote-54) It is quite clear that such a perception of “gypsies,” in conjunction with other factors (the breadth of authority of occupation agencies, impunity, brutal behavior) condemned Roma to death.

It is not strange that several policemen who ended up in the east were willing to employ radical violence against those whom Nazi propaganda depicted as “monsters,” particularly Roma—although others still had to undergo such an evolution in the first months of the “eastern campaign.” “…We will not let up here. Three to four actions per week. Whether gypsies, Jews, partisans, and other rabble…”—wrote Fritz Jakob, gendarme commander in Kamianets-Podolia, who contentedly noted in passing that he had established “excellent working relations” with the local SD division.[[55]](#footnote-55) Police units from the Reich periodically and enthusiastically included themselves in killing operations at various stages of the “eastern campaign.” They not only acted in accordance with what they expected “from above,” but also willingly showed their own initiative in expanding the circle of their victims.

Even commanders sometimes turned out to be unprepared for the depraved initiatives of their subordinates. This is illustrated in the actions of the 133rd police battalion in western Ukraine, mobilized in the summer of 1942 from Nuremberg. A report covering the period from February 25 to August 1 provides the number of the battalion’s victims per week: nine “partisan accomplices,” 27 beggars, seven thieves, 13 vagrants, 64 Jews, two mentally ill, one accused of collecting weapons, and 24 “gypsies.”[[56]](#footnote-56) The killing of “gypsies” as such, without the accompanying stereotypical representation of them as “asocial elements” or “partisan accomplices,” was likely not arranged by the police leadership, since after August 13, Lieutenant General of Police Herbert sent a telegram to his subordinate police commanders: “The Reichsführer-SS believes that the police has no right to take measures against gypsies only because they are ‘gypsies.’”[[57]](#footnote-57) Becker, however, noted that this did not prevent “harsh actions” in cases related to crimes or supporting partisans. In the view of E. Westerman, the 1st Company clearly did not receive a signal that its task was to provide support for racial politics rather than dictating it, since the unit’s report for the period from August 16-22 only mentions the “arrest” of six “gypsies,” whose fate was transferred to the brigade headquarters for a final decision.[[58]](#footnote-58) This eventually meant the same lethal end for Roma and could not halt the desire of battalion members to give them further “special treatment”; it only prompted them to report them in a different way.

However, it is important to emphasize that the above examples of the motives and decisions of Ohlendorf, Rapp, Wibbens, Matschke, and possibly many others (about whom historians have not yet found information) do not mean that the responsibility for the decision to kill Roma falls on them and them alone. Typologically, this is related to the question, vividly discussed in Holocaust studies in recent decades, of what caused the anti-Jewish policy in the occupied Soviet territories to evolve from selective murders to total genocide throughout July and August 1941. Was the center of approving decisions on the “Jewish question” at the time in Berlin or “on the ground”? According to consensus among scholars established in recent years, both in Ukraine and abroad, the practice of killing Jews en masse formed instead through interactions between the center and the periphery. While the former tangibly sent signals on the desired radicalization of anti-Jewish policy to lower-ranking functionaries via verbal orders, the latter earnestly and zealously absorbed and implemented the most radical variations of “solving” the issue, which, in turn, was approved by the management and accordingly legitimized as the only proper practice.[[59]](#footnote-59) It seems that in a similar manner, albeit with a delay of six months or more, this process also affected Roma.

It is likely that sometime before July 1942, the RKU civilian administration began complying with the SS in viewing “gypsies” as a group that was to face “special treatment,” that is, killing. This might have been indirectly supported by legislation in the RKU that regulated the population. On May 1, 1942, an order signed by Erich Koch was issued defining the salary of Ukrainian employees in the event of illness.[[60]](#footnote-60) On July 18 of the same year, an addendum appeared clarifying to whom this resolution did not apply: along with foreign workers, POWs, and Jews, “gypsies” were excluded from the order.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Here is a fitting answer to the question of why, in this development of events, Roma were not imprisoned in ghettos as stipulated in the above RKU circular of May 8, 1942, but killed so quickly in most cases. Characterizing similar processes in Belarus and proceeding from the occupiers’ perception of “gypsies,” historian Erik Haberer believes that:

despite their scattered and nomadic lifestyle, it was easier to handle [“gypsies”] than Jews because there were fewer of them and because of their supposed economic futility [...] There was no need to select them. While the indispensable nature of the Jewish labor force, especially qualified workers and artisans, slowed the “final solution [of the Jewish question],” there was no delay in the “gypsy question.” This lack of restraint, combined with the traditionally ingrained “anti-gypsy” stereotypes, might explain their rapid killing by gendarmes and *Schutzmänner* [policemen].[[62]](#footnote-62)

However, in my view, it was rather because the dominant inclination of the occupying authorities at the time, even regarding Jews, was not imprisonment in ghettos but killing. One could say that anti-Roma policy “jumped” the phase of ghettoization, and SS units began realizing the “extermination” stage immediately.

At the same time, a final decision on what to do with Roma in the occupied eastern territories had not yet been approved at the highest level of the civilian administration in the *КМйіВО*. Within almost half a month, on July 31, 1942, a response to an inquiry from the Nazi army high command (*ОЬегкоттапйо сіез Неегез*) was sent by the RM/OET in Berlin regarding which “gypsy policy” the ministry was implementing. The response suggests that this issue was still under consideration and that a decision had not been made: “gypsies” were now “to be treated as Jews, yet it does not matter whether they are settled or nomadic. Mixed gypsies shall be equated with Jews.” The response prescribes that deciding whether one person or another was a “gypsy” would be approved based on said person’s self-identification or their social status. Investigating their origin was not excluded, and it was recommended to consider the external appearance of individuals or their relatives.[[63]](#footnote-63) It is noteworthy that this decision (likely prepared by the same Otto Bräutigam) was entirely composed using official language, as if written for the circumstances of the Third Reich and entirely ignored the realities of the occupied east, where the SS was not concerning itself with investigations and condemning tens and hundreds of thousands of people to death without delay.

Only on November 15, 1943, did the RM/OET issue an order “on the treatment of gypsies in the occupied eastern regions.” “Gypsies and *Mischlinge* living or possessing a permanent residence in the occupied eastern territories and living a settled lifestyle should be viewed as normal residents. All nomadic gypsies and *Mischlinge* should be equated to Jews and placed in concentration camps.”[[64]](#footnote-64) Yet the approvals from Berlin of the *КМйіВО* turned out to be detached from reality once again. For the RKU, this order no longer had any meaning, since almost all “gypsies” in the territory had already been killed before the autumn of 1943.

**Conclusion**

Unlike Jews, “gypsies” were not the antithesis of the Nazi worldview. Accordingly, at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, there were no separate instructions in either the regular army or SS structures that could constitute a Roma policy. Such a policy was formed “in the process” and “on the ground” (albeit in line with already accumulated racist ideological cliches and administrative-political practices in the Third Reich). However, in the situation that developed in the RKU in the spring of 1942, the Roma population in the territory was almost totally killed.

The following factors enabled the deployment of the genocidal policy against Roma in 1942:

1) In the first months of the occupation, in those locations where they were especially noticeable (particularly in the case of nomadic camps), Roma groups attracted the attention of the army command. At the same time, the latter were guided by ideas of Roma as spies and contributed—directly or via correspondence with the SS—to their murder. This enabled the “first wave” of killing Roma (second half of 1941 to the middle of spring 1942), in which the victims were mainly nomadic members of the community. Going forward, the anti-partisan war and the brutalization of the behavior of the occupying forces accompanying it, augmented by racist imaginations, contributed increasingly to the more active killing of mobile Roma.

2) At the same time, vague understandings of “gypsies,” racially motivated stereotyping, and the corresponding terminology in orders, in which “gypsies” appeared together with Jews and were sometimes directly equated with the latter, led to the fact that orders on “nomadic” Roma sometimes led to the killing of all “gypsies,” including settled Roma. Isolated examples of this are observed as early as late 1941 in the Wehrmacht operation zone, but a steady tendency toward this was manifested in the same period in ​​the operation zone of *Einsatzgruppe* D in southern Ukraine and Crimea.

3) Since the spring of 1942, similar processes started unfolding in the operation zone of other SS units, both mobile and stationary. One could assume that they occurred under the influence of similar independent factors, yet one cannot exclude that the practice of killing Roma only based on their ethnic identity was borrowed, to a certain extent, by the commanders of other SS units based on the experience of *Einsatzgruppe* D.

4) The civilian administration of the RKU, to which lands in the rear of the Wehrmacht were gradually transferred starting in the autumn of 1941, initially did not see Roma as a separate population category that merited “special treatment.” Yet a powerful impulse that eventually marked the Roma for death was the fact that starting in the spring of 1942, Roma became the subject of special consideration in the RM/OET, and data on their social status and collective behavior started to be collected. This situation created a basis for differentiating “nomadic” and “settled” Roma: while the former were regarded as an undesirable “asocial” element and faced isolation or transfer to SS-police bodies, the latter still had the chance to remain in place and were discriminated against, yet not killed, by the occupying authorities.

5) However, even this fragile possibility was eliminated by the activity of SS units, who *de facto* retained priority over the civilian administration in solving “security issues” and determining population categories that “presented a threat.” While the RKU civilian administration tended toward discriminatory measures against Roma (ghettoization, etc.), the second wave of the “final solution of the Jewish question” in the territory absorbed Roma as well, with a decision to eliminate them approved by SS units. This occurred not so much because of orders at the level of the *Н88РР* in the RKU (as in the case of the Jews), but due to a decision by low- and mid-level commanders using the same logic of events and the parallel evolution of punitive policy.

The final circumstance highlights the specifics of the Roma genocide in the eastern territories, and the peculiarities of how it was realized, with particular clarity. There was a key difference between this genocide and that of the Jews. While the administrative-bureaucratic impulse concerning Jews “from above” in Berlin—based on a strong racial-ideological attitude toward Jews as an “anti-race” and a “rod of the Bolshevik system”—was much stronger and granted local functionaries freedom only in the method and terms of its realization, the policy concerning “gypsies” instead developed in the periphery (albeit with some influence from the center), but with the indisputable predominance of initiatives by local officials and, above all, the commanders of security agencies, who, with rare exceptions, synchronously and under the influence of their own racially motivated stereotypes selected the most radical of possible measures: murder. Figuratively speaking, the SS only awaited the slightest hint from the military or civilian administration to identify someone as a target: as soon as at least some Roma (“nomads”) attracted the special attention of the latter, security authorities pounced on their victim and killed all “gypsies” they encountered.

This mechanism of the Roma genocide, in which both ideological impulses “from above” and the decisions of local authorities were crucial, attracts scholarly attention to the importance of grassroots bodies and their motivations in organizing mass persecution and not only serves as a call to researchers on the fate of Roma, but also brings new perspectives to the general theoretical study of genocide.

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1. This motivates the use in the article of two terms to designate the group: Roma, as an object of the author’s analysis; and “gypsies,” when discussing the perception of this group by the occupying authorities. Quotation marks are necessary in the latter as it refers to a category artificially invented by the authorities. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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4. For recent generalized studies on this topic, see А.Кау, І). 8іаЬе1, “Сгітез о£Йіе ІУеЬгтаскі:: А Ке-еуаіиаііоп,” *]оигпаІ о/Регреігаїог КезеагсИ* 3, по. 1 (2020): 95-127. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
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6. М. НоИег, “ТЬе Иагі регзесиїіоп оґКоша іп погДпуезіегп Киззіа. ТЬе орегаііопаї агеа о£ Діє Агту Сгоир МогДі, 1941-1944,” *Тке Пагі Сепосійе о/ (Не Сурзіез: Кееуаіиайоп апсі Соттетогаііоп,* А. ІУеізз-кУепДі:, еД. (Иєіу ¥огк, ВецфаЬп Воокз, 2013), 153-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. N. Bessonov, *The Gypsy Tragedy, 1941-1945: Facts, Documents, Recollections,* Vol. 1: The gypsy genocide during the Second World War (Moscow: De’Libri, 2020), 456; Иікоіа) Віеззопоу, “Магізіоигзкіе 1иДоЬо)з1луо Су^апоиг па Віаіогизі,” Зіисііа Котоіо^іса З (2010): 21-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For more on the formation of the “gypsies = spies” stereotype in European history from the late 15th century until the First World War, and the inheritance of these views by the political and military leadership of the Third Reich, see М. Хіттегтапп, “ТЬе \УеЬгтасЬі апД ДієМаііопаїЗосіаіізіРегзесиїіопо£ДієСурзіез,”*КотапіЗіисііез* 11,по. 2(2001): 112-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. ¥аД УазЬет АгсЬіуез (¥УА), О. 53-143. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. М. НоИег, “ЕхіепДіп^ Діє §епосіДа! рго§гат: ПіД Ойо ОЬ1епДог£ іпіііаіе Діє зузіетаііс ехіегтіпаііоп о£ Зоуіеі “сурзіез”?”, А.). Кау,). КиДіег£огД, П. 8іаЬе1, еДз., *Пагі Роїісу оп іке Еазіегп Ггопі, 1941: Тоіаі Мґаг, Сепосісіе, апсі Кайісаіігаііоп* (КосЬезіег, Н¥: Ііпіуегзііу о£КосЬезіег Ргезз, 2012), 277. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ¥УА, М.29РК-57. Див. також: IV. IV. Веот, *МагсИіп% іпіо Оагкпезз* (Нагуагй: Нагуаг4 ІІтуегзіїу Рге88, 2014), 107-08. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. ІЬИ.,275. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. ¥УА, М.29БК-222. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. A report by the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the German Fascist Invadersnotes that around 200 Jews and “gypsies” were executed in the summer of 1943 (State Archive of the Russian Federation (SARF), f. P-7021, on. ЗО, d. 1736, l. 2-4), yet this is an obvious error: the authorities could not have approved a decision to liquidate the city’s Jews so late. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. ¥УА, М.29.РК.-216.2. Див. також: СЕ. Нагішапп, *УУекгтаскі іт ОзікгіеРгопі ипсі тіїііагізскез Ніпіегіапсі 1941-42* (МйпсЬеп: ОМепЬоиг§ Уег1а§, 2009), 679. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. їй. Гбгяіег, “8есигіп§ “Ьіуіп^-врасе”, іп Сегшапу ап4 Йіе 8есоп4 ІУогкі ІУаг, е4. Ьу Йіе КеяеагсБ Іпзііїиіе £ог Мііііагу Ніяіогу, Роїзсіат, Сегшапу,” *уоі. IV: Тке Аііаск оп іке 8стеі ІМоп* (Ох£ог4: Сіагепсіоп Ргезз, 1998), 1207. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. М. ВигІеі^Ь, *Тке ТкМ Кеіск: а пеіу кізіогу* (Ьоіміоп: Рал Воокз, 2001), 411. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. М. НоИег, *Тке* Мах/ *регзесиііоп о/Кота іп погікшезіегп Киззіа...,* 162-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. МітяіегіаІЬІаіі без КеісЬя- шмі РгеиВізсіїеп Міпізіегз без Іппегп, 99, №. 51,14.12.1938, 2105-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. State Archive of Zhytomyr Region (DAZhO), f. 1151, on. 1, spr. 707, ark. 73-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. С. Ьеууу, Тке Нахі Регзесиііоп о/ іке Сурзіез (ОхГогй: Охґогй ІІпіуегзіїу Ргезз, 2000), 123-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. ЇМ., 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. State Archive of Volyn Region (DAVO), f. Р-2, on. 1, spr. 8-6, ark. 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. State Archive of Rivne Region (DARO), f. 23, on. 1, spr. З, ark. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. DAZhO, f. 1175, on. 1, spr. 1, ark. 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. І). РоЬІ, “ТЬе Мшхіег о£ Цкгаіпе’з ієууя шкіег Сегтап Міііїагу Асітіпізігаїіоп аімі іп Діє Кеіск Соттіввагіаі Цкгаіпе,” *8коак іп Цкгаіпе: кізіогу, іезіітопу, тетогіаіігаііоп* (Віоотіп^іоп: Іпсііапа Цпіуегвіїу Рге88, іп аввосіаііоп -тік Йіе Цпіїесі Зїаїев Ноіосаияї Метогіаі Мивеит, 2006), 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. DARO, f. 23, on. 1, spr. З, ark. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. DARO, f. 23, on. 1, spr. 3, арк. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. DARO, f. 23, on. 1, spr. 3, арк. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. DARO, f. 23, on. 1, spr. 3, арк. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Можливо, таке відносно “раціонально-ощадливе” ставлення до ромів, принаймні

    до осілої частини, можна пояснити консенсусом між ключовими функціонерами

    цивільної адміністрації та СС-поліції в крайгебіті Брест-Литовськ щодо єврейської

    робочої сили, щонайменше на певному етапі. Як показав Крістофер Браунінг, вони

    у 1942 р. намагалися зберегти частину єврейського Гетто, щоби надалі використо-

    вувати кваліфікованих єврейських ремісників. Коли в травні 1942 р. друга хвиля

    знищення євреїв докотилася до генерального округу Волинь-Поділля, штадткомісар

    Брест-Литовська Франц Бурат, гебітскомісар Курт Ролле і командир відділення СС-

    поліцїї Фрідріх Роде стали підкреслювати в своїх рапортах начальству надзвичайну

    цінність тих єврейських працівників у Гетто, які не становили небезпеки і виявля-

    ли бажання працювати, попри нікчемну продовольчу пайку. Тоді як штадткомісар

    Бурат мав намір зберегти лише працездатних євреїв, командир відділення СС-поліції

    Роде виступав за збереження всієї єврейської громади Гетто (СЬ. К. Вгогупіп§, Пагі

    роїісу, ]етзИ шогкегз, Сегтап кіііегз (СатЬгкІ^е/Меиг Уогк, СатЬгіЛ^е Ііпіуегзііу Ргезз,

    2000), 129-35). Безсумнівно, їхня мотивація ґрунтувалася не на гуманістичних моти-

    вах, а на розрахунках раціонального використання трудових ресурсів: коли через рік

    до Бреста було депортовано близько тисячі ромів з дистрикту Білосток, штадткомі-

    сар Бурат у червні 1943 р. рішуче виступив за їхню ліквідацію (іЬіЛ., 141). Детальніше

    див.: М. Ноііег, "Оеабіу ОЛуззеу: Базі: Ргиззіап Зіпіі іп Віаіузїок, Вгезї-Біїоузк, апЛ

    АизсЬууіїг-Вігкепаи,” іп Аіех ). Кау, Оауіб БїаЬеІ, еЛз., Мазз уіоіепсе іп Пагі-оссиріей

    Еигоре (Віоошіп^іоп: Іпсііапа Ііпіуегзііу Ргезз, 2018), 94-120. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. DARO, f. Р-57, on. 1, spr. 1, ark. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. DARO, f. Р-57, on. 1, spr. 1, арк. 5-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. State Archive of Chernihiv Region (DAChO), f. Р-4480, on. 1, spr. 1, ark. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. O. H. Perekhrest, *Ukrainske selo v 1941-1945 rr.: ekonomichne ta sotsialne stanovyshche* (Cherkasy: ChNU imeni B. Khmel’nyts’koho, 2011), 645. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. For a ману and table of mass killing sites, see M. Tyahlyy, *Kartohrafyvannya henotsydu romiv Ukrainy…, 123.* [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Егеі§пІ8те1<іип§ ІИ88К №. 92 іп КІаия-МісЬаеІ МаПтапп, Апсіге) Ап§гіск, )йг§еп Майкаия, Магііп Сйррегз, Н§., Віє “Егеі§пІ8теМип§еп ІИ88К” 1941, *Покитепіе йег Еітаіцхгирреп іп Лет 8оіУ]еіипіоп* (Вагтвіасії: ІУіяяепвскаЙІісЬе ВисІї^евеИвсІїаЙ, 2011), 547. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. ¥УА, О. 53-128. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. І). РоЬІ, *Тке Мигсіег о/ Цкгаіпез* .., 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. State Archive of Kyiv Region (DAKO), f. 2411, on. 1, spr. 23, ark. 4-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. І). РоЬІ, *ТкеМигйег о/икгаіпе’з]екз.*.., 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. СЕ. СегІасЬ, *Тке ехіегтіпаНоп о/ іке Еигореап ]ешз* (№иг ¥огк: СатЬгіД^е Ііпіуегзііу Рге88,2015), 249-50; також І). РоЬІ, *Тке Мигсіег о/ Цкгаіпез* /еи-5..., 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Цит. за: СЕ. СегІасЬ, *Тке ехіегтіпаНоп о/іке Еигореап }ешз,* 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. For more, see М. Туа§1уу, “ІУеге Діє “Сіііп^епе” Уісїітз о£ Діє Ноіосаизї? ТЬе Магі роїісу їоигагсі Діє Сгішеап Кота,” *Ноіосаизі апсі Сепосісіе Зіисііез* 23, по. 1 (2009): 26-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. A Romanian account calculated 262,501 Roma (1.5% of the population) in the country in 1930, which, in the view of researchers, was an underestimate. While Sinti and Roma in Germany constituted around 0.04% of the population in the late 1930s, Roma represented 0.03% of the Ukrainian population. Be that as it may, one can assume that the Roma population in Romania, a significant part of which was marginalized and occupied the lower levels of the social hierarchy, apparently left a significant impression on Ohlendorf, who reinterpreted what he saw in accordance with his racist worldview. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Е). 1. Со1<Иіа§еп, “ТЬе “Ьшпапізі” аз а тазе тшхіегег: ТЬе Мігмі аімі Веесіз о£ 88 Сепегаї Ойо ОЬІеп4ог£? *Ап Еззау РгезепіеЛ іо Тке Соттіііее оп Оеугеез іп Зосіаі Зішііез іп рагііаі /йуііітепі о/іке гециігетепіз/ог іке йеруее тік копогз о/Васкеїог о/Агіз* (Нагуаг4 Со11е§е, 1982), 93-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Тгіаіз о£\¥аг Сгітіпаіз Ьеґоге Йіе МиегепЬец\* Мііііагу ТгіЬипак..., уоі. 4 (Еіпзаіг^гирреп Сазе), 286-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. For political reasons, an exception was made for the Roma population in Crimea that was Muslim and was ethnically closer to the Crimean Tatar population. See М. Туа§1уу, УУеге *іке “Скіп$епе“ Уісііті о/іке Ноіосаизі?...,* 31-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. ¥ІУО агскіуея, КС-215 (Вегііп Соїіесїіоп), ВОХ №36, £. ОСС. Е. 4-18,2-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. М. НоИег, *ЕхіепсІіп£ іке^епосійаірго^гат..*., 267-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Н. Ьап§егЬеіп, *Ніііегз Оеаік Зциасіз: 1ке Ьо$іс о/ Мазз Мигсіег* (Техаз: А & М Ііпіуегзіїу Рге88, 2004), 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. ІЬИ.,89. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Р. 8агкіпег, Сгішіпаї )изІісе £о11оууіп§ Віє §епосі4е о£ Віє 8іпіі ап4 Кота, І). Кепгіск, е4. *Тке Сурзіез (Іигіп% іке Зесопсі Убогій \¥аг,* уоі. 3: ТЬе Гіпаї Скаріег (Наїйеісі: Ііпіуегяііу о£ Негі£ог<І8Іііге РГЄ88, 2006), 160-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Е. В. ІУевіегтапп, *Ніііег'з роїісе Ьаііаііопз: еп/огсіп§ гасіаі шаг іп Іке Базі* (Ііпіуегзіїу Рге88  
    оґКапяая, 2005), 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Е. Кіее, IV. Вге88еп, V. Кіе88, Нг8§., “Зсіїбпе 2еііеп.” 1и4ептог4 айв 4ег 8ісН 4ег Таіег ип 4 Сайег (Ггапкйігі/М., 1988), 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Е. В. ІУевіегтапп, *Ніііег з роїісе Ьаііаііопз: еп/огсіп§ гасіаі шаг іп Іке Базі,* 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. One can assume that Becker’s caution in not including “gypsies” among the victims only on the basis of ethnicity was due to his awareness of the position of Himmler, who at the time hesitated about whether all “gypsies” in the Reich should be subjected to “special treatment”; Himmler felt that some groups of Roma were descendants of the Aryan race and thus intended to preserve these groups to study racial questions. See С. Бейту, “Нішшіег апб Йіе “Еасіаііу Риге Сурвіев”, *]оигпаІ о/СопІетрогагу Нізіогу* 34, по. 2 (1999): 201-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Е. В. ІМезіегшапп, *Ніііегз роїісе Ьаііаііопз: еп/огсіп§ гасіаі шаг іп іке Базі,* 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See, for example, Yu. Matteus, “Pochatok Holokostu ta viina proty Radyans’koho Soyuzy, Babyn Iar: masove ubyvstvo I pam’iat’ pro n’oho: Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii 24-25 zhovtnya 2011 r., m. Kyiv, vid. 2-he, dop. (Kyiv: Ukr. tsentr vyvch. Istorii Holokostu, Hromad, k-t dlia vshanuvannia pam’iati zhertv Babynoho Iaru, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO), f. 3206, on. 1, spr. 105, ark. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. TsDAVO, f. 3206, on. 1, spr. 105, арк. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Е. НаЬегег, “ТЬе Сегшап роїісе аімі §епосі<1е іп Веіогиззіа, 1941-1944. Раті II. ТЬе “зесоп 4 зууеер”: Сеіміагтегіе кі11іп§8 о£)єгу8 ап4 Сурзіез оп Іапиагу 29,1942,” *]оигпаІ о/СепосісІе Кезеагск* 3, по. 2 (2001): 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Іпзіііиі £йг 2єіі§є8сііісіііє Агскіу, Р8-1133, В1. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. С. Ьеигу, *Тке НахіРегзесиііоп о/іИе Сурзіез.*.., 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)