

On Beauty of Artworks as Aesthetic True Representations of Reality

On Beauty of Artworks as Aesthetic True Representations of Reality

**A Collection of Pragmaticist
Inquiries into the Epistemology
of Artistic Creation
and Evaluation of Artworks**

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To Rutie and Talila

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Introduction

I am by nature an inquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for knowledge, the restless passion to advance ever further, the delight of discovery. (Kant, *Gesammelte Werke*, xx, 44)

Do not block the way of inquiry. (Peirce, 1998)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF THE BEAUTY AND TRUTH OF CREATED ARTWORKS IN AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

In my book *On Truth and the Representation of Reality*, which was published in 2002 (Nesher 2002a), I reconstructed and developed the Peircean epistemology of truth and its semiotics that evolved into *epistemic logic*, being the basis of all our acquired knowledge of reality. In the course of this endeavor, I engaged in Peirce's realist epistemology, which—while it relies on Kant's rich intuitions—it nevertheless aims to overcome his idealist Copernican Revolution. Then I followed Peirce's reconstruction of Kant's systematic philosophy of the Three Critiques into the three Normative Sciences, the Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic, which evolved epistemologically from the components of our basic perception and investigated by what Peirce calls *Phaneroscopy* (Peirce 1906, *EP* II: #26; Nesher 2016, 2018, 2021). Thus, I decided to follow the Peircean philosophy. This served as the basis of my book on truth, in which I analyzed and criticized Kant's First Critique as the basis of Theoretical Science. In the current book, my focus is on reconstructing the Third Critique, and hence in an investigation of the Science of Aesthetics. In the future, I hope to pursue the study of the Second Critique,

through an investigation of the Science of Ethics, with the goal of explaining the empirical basis of our moral values and conducts.

The philosophical problem regarding the beauty and truth of the created artworks as aesthetic representations of reality is to understand and explain the ways in which such representations differ epistemologically from the theoretical science, wherein conceptual logical judgments represent reality. According to epistemological realistic explanations, all of our knowledge is based on our empirical experience, without assuming transcendental knowledge, idealist assumptions, phenomenalist intuitions, and formalist axioms, which are isolated from our experiential representation of reality. All of these epistemologies have elaborated components of the Kantian epistemology and, as such, philosophers of the last few centuries have all been—to some extent—neo-Kantians, including the contemporary American Pragmatists. However, Peirce's realism is contra Kantian Copernican Revolution (Nesher 2002a, 2018, 2021). Therefore, it is no surprise that my Pragmaticist inquiries and reconstructions have remained outside the philosophical paradigm of our time, and were not easily accepted or published. This type of resistance is not new in intellectual history, as Thomas Kuhn explains in his 1962 book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Kuhn 1962). Any endeavor to progress in the development of human knowledge requires us to take heed of Peirce's appeal: "Do not block the way of inquiry." (Peirce 1998).

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF AESTHETIC SCIENCE AND HOW WE CAN JUDGE BY THE EPISTEMIC LOGIC THE AESTHETICAL OBJECTIVE TRUTH AND BEAUTY OF CREATED ARTWORKS

In Kant's analysis of the dichotomy between the logical cognitive judgment and the Aesthetic reflective judgment, the key distinctions are between *determination* and *indetermination*, *lawfulness* and *non-lawfulness*, *intentional* and *non-intentional*, *purposiveness* and *purposiveness without purpose*, *non-free play* (determination under a law) and *free play* (Kant, CJ: #35 287). According to Kant, by means of the subjective reflective manner (modus aestheticus) the artist achieves a harmonious interpretation between the ideas of the Understanding and the Imagination, and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork.

The Peircean reconstruction of the Kantian aesthetics replaces Kant's subjective conception of *Harmony* with the Peircean realistic proof of its truth by confrontation inside cognitive reality (henceforth confrontation in reality) as the objective criterion of truth and beauty. In contrast to the formal logic of Deduction, which is isolated from reality, the epistemic logic includes the trio inferences, the Abductive inference of discovering hypotheses, Deductive

inference of deriving its conclusions, and Inductive inference of evaluating them as true or false representation of reality. Therefore, only this *epistemic logic* can explain the *human knowledge of reality* and overcomes the deficiency of the formal logic. Moreover, Kant's crucial problem is the initial *separation of the form of cognition from its content*, which renders both of them meaningless and their logics become unworkable (Kant *CPuR*: A260-292/B316-349; Nesher 2002a: V, 2018, 2021).

As an alternative to the Kantian deadlock, we can turn to the realist *epistemic logic* to represent our confrontation in reality and prove the truth of our cognitive representation of it. Hence, this epistemic logic can emerge as a *universal method* by which every such proven truth is always also a *particular judgment*, relative to our accepted proof-conditions. Given that the quasi-proven true perceptual judgments are always relative to their specific conditions-contexts, we do not face what is flawed in Kant's endeavor to define truth, his inability to "give an indicator of truth that is sufficient and yet universal at the same time," which actually led him to an "intrinsic contradiction."

As regards to the reflective aesthetic judgments, these are initiated from the imagination, which enables a comparison between the aesthetic artwork and the known facts of reality. Such judgments render not only pictorial images, but also intense reactions: "Picasso now reacted intensely, with his whole being; and his response was of course in terms of paint" (O'Brian, 1976: 320). However, such aesthetic representation of reality is done by the emotional images of the aesthetic artwork, which is already infused with the intellectual ideas of the artist, which we can elicit from the context of the specific work's creation. Moreover, by reasoning and discussing, we can come to agree on its beauty as a true aesthetic representation of reality.

However, given the upheaval of postmodernism and a sense of the historical End of Art, the question emerges: What, After All, Is a Work of Art? (Margolis and Rockmore 2000; Danto, 2013, Harrington 2004; Kuspit 2004). In this context, philosophers are called upon to reevaluate aesthetics epistemologically, in an attempt to understand the basic related conceptions, which in the postmodern era have—historically speaking—lost their clear meanings. Philosophical investigation can help us understand one of the central human enterprises: *what is Art*, and the basic concepts of *Aesthetics*, *Truth*, and *Beauty*.

THE ORIGINS OF MY INQUIRIES ON THE NATURE OF THE AESTHETIC SCIENCE AND THEN, WHAT, AFTER ALL, IS A WORK OF ART?

My work on the epistemology and the nature of the created artwork is aimed to show that artworks are based on our experience and attempt to represent

esthetically the ways in which humans live in their reality. Artists do this in order to enhance their knowledge of themselves and of their society.

Chapter 1, “The Beauty of Artwork Is in Its Aesthetic True Representation of Reality: Epistemology of Creation and Evaluation of Artwork,” is based on my first presentation at the World Phenomenology Institute’s conference (2003, Harvard University). In the common-sense approach, it seems that the creation and evaluation of artworks is subjective feeling expressing aesthetically only in the eyes of the creator and also in the impressions of the beholders, the people looking on and evaluating them, which Kant called *reflective judgment*. However, the Pragmaticist epistemology of aesthetic creation and evaluation of artworks, of their beauty or ugliness, is the basis of all philosophy of art in distinction from all other social aspects of artworks, be they institutional, historical, political, ethical, and more.

Chapter 2 is titled “It Is an Illusion That Artworks Are Fictitious Illusions as They Are Actually Aesthetic Modes of Representing Reality.” Its first version was presented at the World Phenomenology Institute’s annual conference (2004, Harvard University). In this chapter I elaborate a global explanation of the epistemology and role of artworks in human life, by criticizing the common-sense and the art critics’ conception that literature and other types of artworks are illusions of the mind imaginations that came from nowhere. Instead, by applying the realist epistemology, I demonstrate that all our cognitions evolve from our empirical experience and that we represent it by different modes of knowledge.

The seeds for the ideas presented in chapter 3, “Epistemology of Aesthetic Experience: Criticizing and Reconstructing Kant’s Aesthetic Theories of Genius Creativity and Judgment of Beauty,” were first presented at World Phenomenology Institute’s annual conference (2005, Harvard University). However, in my inquiries on the aesthetic nature of artworks, I continued to elaborate these ideas through further analysis and reconstruction of Kant’s rich intuitions regarding the three modes of representing reality, the Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic as Normative Sciences. Thus I endeavored to show the epistemological difficulties inherent in each of them. To overcome those difficulties, I had to turn to Peircean realistic reconstruction of the Kantian Idealist Transcendentalism. By schematizing his theory of knowledge, I was able to show how we can replace the transcendental components with the Peircean empirical basis of all our knowledge.

The main ideas of chapter 4, “Free Creation of Artwork Is the Determinate Self-Control of Proving Its True Interpretation and Representation of Reality,” were presented at the World Phenomenology Institute’s annual conference (2006, Harvard University). Kant explained the creation of fine arts as a *Harmonizing* of the intellectual ideas of Understanding and the aesthetic ideas of Imagination, brought together by *Free play*, to create the *aesthetic*

artwork. According to Kant, we can develop our knowledge only through the determinate relationship between Imagination and Understanding, which in turn enables us to deduce the necessary empirical concepts and operate the logical judgment to present the determinate phenomenal objects. However, the Kantian free play needed to create the work of fine art cannot determine the aesthetic reflective judgment to be any knowledge of reality.

Chapter 5, “How to Square (*Normo*, CP:2.7) Peirceanly the Kantian Circularity in the Epistemology of Aesthetics as a Normative Science of Creating and Evaluating the Beauty of Artworks,” is based on the paper presented at The International Conference on Charles Sanders Peirce’s Normative Thought, University of Opole, Poland, June 2007, in response to the invitation from Nathan Houser, the general editor of Peirce Edition Project and the organizer of the conference. In this work, I explore the relation between the Kantian systematic philosophy, the Transcendental epistemology of his Three Critiques and their inter-relationships, and the Peircean Realist-Empiricist criticism. I offer a reconstructed version of the Three Critiques, by finding their common principle, which Kant could not find, and showing that we can understand the Theoretic, Ethic and Aesthetic critiques as the Three Basic Normative Sciences. Indeed, this common principle is the semiotic proof of our empirical knowledge of external reality, the Kantian things in themselves, and thus we can know the Kantian *noumena*. I develop this method of the semiotic basic proof as the epistemic logic (Nesher 2016, 2018, 2021). With such realist epistemology, I reconstruct the Aesthetic Normative Science and explain how the artworks represent reality aesthetically, truly and beautifully.

Chapter 6, “The Role of Productive Imagination in Creating Artworks and Discovering Scientific Hypotheses” is based on a paper presented at the Wittgenstein International Symposium, in Kirchberg Austria, in August, 2010. In this chapter, I elaborate on Kant’s conception of artistic *Productive Imagination* in creating artworks and I generalize it, to explain the scientist *intellectual intuition* in discovering new hypotheses. Kant explicates *Intuition* as a presentation of the imagination and develops the conception of *Productive Imagination* to explain the genuine creation of fine art.

Kant developed the conception of *Intellectual Intuition* of supersensible objects of reason as distinct from the *sensual intuition* of empirical ones. I turn his transcendental concept of *Intellectual Intuition* into cognitive operations and thus explain all cognitions experientially. Hence, the role of *productive imagination* lies in the artistic creation of new exemplary artworks, and the role of *intellectual intuition*, as productive imagination, lies in the scientific discovery of new scientific points of view. I explain, within the framework of Pragmaticist epistemology, that artists and scientists use their productive imaginations differently in their respective enterprises, to construct their different modes of representing reality.

Chapter 7, “On Post-Modern Artworks: A New Aesthetic Genre or Rather a Pseudo-Concept of Art, and Then ‘What, After All, Is a Work of Art?’” aims to analyze the philosophical confusion about Work of Art, due to how we usually understand this question common-sensically, and especially in the contemporary discussions about it. It is about clarifying the epistemology of the works of artists and then considering what is the true nature and the various conceptions of Art, Aesthetic, Beauty, and Truth, which philosophers such as Margolis, Danto, Kuspit, Harington, and others are puzzling about.

Indeed, in the realist epistemology, we have to investigate all these difficulties, to understand how these conceptions are embedded in our understanding of the Aesthetic Science, in which the created artworks are meant to represent reality aesthetically and beautifully, by proving their truth. Hence, the aim is to understand the Peircean realist epistemic revolution in relation to the Kantian idealism, by investigating and explaining the Aesthetic Science, the creation and the evaluation of the aesthetic artworks, and how they can represent reality.

Chapter 8, “Epilog: Can We Theorize Some Bizarre Aesthetic Domains—The Beauty of Music-Aesthetics, Mathematics-Theoretics, and Human-Ethics?” is the endeavor to inquire how can we apply the Pragmaticist-realist theory of truth and beauty of artworks to some of the more difficult domains, in an attempt to explain the beauty of music, mathematics, and humans. The epistemology of the aesthetic representation of reality can be considered one aspect of the Three Normative Sciences and thus explain the enigmatic Beauty, Truth, and Good of music, mathematics and humans.

**THE DIFFICULTY THAT MY INQUIRIES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETIC AND THEORETICAL
SCIENCES HAVE FACED WITHIN THE
ESTABLISHED NEO-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL
PARADIGM, IN THE ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP
A PEIRCEAN REALIST EPISTEMOLOGY**

In my attempt to develop the Peircean realist epistemology, in distinction from the contemporary Idealist Metaphysical Realism and the Phenomenalist Internal Realism, I found that my new ideas were met with a certain degree of resistance from the philosophical community. Most of the Peircean scholars interpreted Peirce after William James and John Dewy, who were basically neo-Kantians and missed the last stage of Peirce’s revolution against Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Thus, when developing Peirce’s late realist epistemology, in distinction from his earlier nominalist epistemology that Peircean scholars in America and Europe are more acquainted with, I found it difficult to publish my ideas.

I see this Peircean revolution as essential to understanding human knowledge, especially in contrast to Transcendentalism and Phenomenalism, which cannot explain how we know the external world, and even do not have an epistemology to explain how we know ourselves, as Russell argued against Descartes, whose statement “I think therefore I exist” could only mean that, at most, Descartes knows his own thoughts. However, Russell himself admitted that he was unable to explain how we know external reality and, therefore, his approach remains Solipsistic. Peirce’s realist revolution, and Spinoza’s too, as I tried to explain, were the pioneers of the epistemological realism by which we can also criticize the movements of the last century, specifically, Metaphysical Realism with its fictional *models*, and Internal Realism with its *sense-data*. It is significant that we cannot criticize one by the other, but only both by the third, i.e., by means of Pragmaticist Realism (Nesher 2002a: III).

Moreover, in order to develop the Peircean realist revolution, it is imperative that we show that formal logics and their formal systems are isolated from reality and, actually, these theories cannot be proven to be true representations of reality. Instead, they are merely closed games of argumentations, like syllogisms, based on artificial definitions of unproved axioms with the assumed sterile deductive rules of inferences. Hence, we have to rely on Peirce’s cognitive semiotics to derive an *epistemic logic* based on our perceptual confrontation in reality, which can explain that all our knowledge is empirical, including logic and mathematics. This is the gist that I aim to in this book on the *aesthetic* and eventually on the *ethic* science, and of course some other types of human knowledge.

Chapter 1

The Beauty of Artwork Is in Its Aesthetic True Representation of Reality

Epistemology of Creation and Evaluation of Artwork

We assert that art reveals reality, or expresses truth, without inquiring into the precise meanings of crucial words like “reality,” “truth,” “expressions,” which are so constantly employed in discussion of this kind. Moreover, in discussing about art, as in moral, there is a great temptation to let our feelings run away with us and consequently use language with a chiefly emotive intent—which means an end of rational discussion. Is a work of art true as a statement is true? Do these general terms such as “meaning,” “reality,” “truth,” have any definite meaning at all when applied to the arts, and if so, is it the same meaning these terms have in logic or metaphysics?

(Hospers, 1946:v; cf. Peirce
CP: 1.612; cf. 5.129)

INTRODUCTION: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

Human Cognition Can Be a Meaningful Representation of Reality

The general thesis of this inquiry is that human cognition can be a meaningful representation of reality through our perceptual confrontation in it. Therefore, any cognitive operation develops by confrontation in reality and there is no other external restriction for our criteria of the meaning and truth of our cognitions (Gadamer [1960]1989: 83-84). The aprioristic theories of cognition assume a transcendental source of knowledge, whose truth no one can prove,

cannot explain a human's knowledge and behavior. This is because they are blind to the epistemological components of the human cognitive confrontation in external reality and thus disregard our knowledge being the quasi-proved and proved cognitions representing reality (Nesher 2002a).

The epistemology of aesthetic creation and evaluation of artworks, of their beauty or ugliness, is the basis of all philosophy of art since without epistemological explanation it is impossible to understand all other aspects of artworks, be they institutional, historical, political, ethical, and more. The social conventions that operate as criteria or standards for judgment of artworks must be based upon an epistemological explanation of art as a kind of human knowledge of reality. The represented reality is both physical reality and psychological reality, which are the two aspects of whole Reality: the Spinozist Attributes of Thought and Extension. Psychological reality is represented with respect to physical reality and physical reality is represented through our cognitive operations. The operations of *interpretation* and *representation* are intertwined like Siamese twins in all human cognitions. Hence the operation of *interpretation* is an essential constituent of human cognitive operations and its objectivity is achieved only through our confrontation in Reality. The Pragmaticist conception of *interpretation* of any cognitive signs is the semiotic operation in which the truth of the interpretation is achieved by its quasi-proof or proof upon the appropriate truth-conditions through the true *representation* of reality (Nesher 2002a, 2005b). This is a fruitful synthesis between the different but one-sided conceptions of *interpretation* maintained in phenomenological hermeneutics and in Analytic philosophy. The Hermeneuticians separate interpretation from external reality so they are held captive either in the "hermeneutic circle" or in arbitrary interpretations (e.g., Gadamer [1960]1989: 81-88). The Analytic philosophers are held captive within their formal semantic abstract model for language and its interpretation, for which the semanticist takes the Cartesian God's point of view, which no human can afford (e.g., Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*). The Pragmaticist epistemology of human cognitive behavior is the third way between the "scientism" of Analytic philosophy and the "Artism," as I call it, of Phenomenalist Hermeneutics, with whose epistemic logic we can explain both the physical and the psychological sciences, and thus also the artworks (Kant *CJ*:307-308; Nesher 2002a: II, 2003, 2004a).

The Pragmaticist Realist Epistemology Explaining Our Meaning Interpretation of Cognitions in Their True Representation of Reality and the Nature of an Aesthetic Representation of It

The Pragmaticist epistemology encompasses all human cognitive operations, including all kinds of aesthetic artworks, yet we have to show how aesthetic

representation differs from perceptual, scientific, and other kinds of representations. To avoid misunderstanding about the epistemology of aesthetic representation, it is essential to ask what are the modes of representations, the specific *cognitive languages*, of the different kinds of artworks and how artists aesthetically represent reality as they know it (Osborne 1955: V). I claim that the *aesthetic representation of reality* is epistemologically common to all modes of artistic interpretation and representation, and this can be the “definition of artwork,” but to show this can be only the last stage of the philosophical inquiry.

What, then, is the *aesthetic mode of representation* of reality compared with other modes of representation? We can explain artwork as the aesthetic mode of the representation of reality, wherein the artist exhibits his general ideas about reality in concrete epitomized characters and situations. This is done with the artist’s power of imagination, whose configurations are elaborated from experience in reality and represent characteristic types of human behavior in reality (e.g., Cervantes’s *Don Quixote*, Mahler’s Symphony no. 1, Picasso’s *Figures by the Sea*, 1931; cf. Kant *CJ*:313-314; Hegel [1835]1975: 281-282; Goodman 1984: 130). Dealing with art, or fine art, as distinct from crafts, we sometimes have feelings and emotional reactions of pleasure with artworks, which we aesthetically judge beautiful (Shiner 2001). The problem is to explain epistemologically how this feeling and emotional reaction that indicate their values arise, and how they are connected to the truth and beauty of the aesthetic representation of reality.

The Nature of the Artist’s Aesthetic Creation and Representation of Reality

In the following I suggest a general hypothesis about the nature of the artist’s aesthetic representation of Reality. I analyze Kant’s insight into the Genius’s creation of art and the aesthetic judgment of taste, and his difficulties showing their connection due to his epistemology, which hinders his explaining the artwork’s aesthetic representation of reality. I present a better suggestion by Hegel about the empirical source of fine art, albeit not a satisfactory explanation for the aesthetic representation of reality due to the lack of an explicit theory of truth. Thus I revise and reconstruct pragmatically some of Kant’s and others’ insights about the creation and evaluation of artworks, and show how their beauty is their aesthetic true representation of reality. This inquiry into the representational function of aesthetic artworks and their truth and beauty is based on a Pragmaticist theory of meaning, truth, and the representation of reality (Nesher 2002a).

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTY OF AESTHETIC WORKS AND OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS

The Nature of the Judgment of Beauty

I distinguish epistemologically between the judgments of beauty of physical objects and those of the *beauty* of artistic artworks aesthetically representing Reality (Kant *CJ*:229; Hegel [1835]1975: 2-3, 29). Dealing with the beauty of physical objects, we can understand our emotional reaction to perceiving them visually, in the framework of other perceptual modalities such as hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. We can understand our positive and negative reactions to such perceptual confrontations in physical reality as they developed in the evolution of our perceptual organs as means of survival in a physical environment, and what we elaborate therefrom. It is different when we consider our own purposely created artworks in their aesthetic representations of reality. We can see this distinction in Hutcheson's conception of the *absolute beauty* of objects in nature and the *relative beauty* of aesthetic artworks representing reality (Kant *CJ*:312).

Beauty in corporeal forms is either *original* or *comparative*; or, if any like the terms better, *absolute* or *relative*. . . . We therefore by absolute beauty understand only that beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison to anything external, of which the object is supposed an imitation or picture, such as the beauty perceived from the works of nature, artificial forms, figures. Comparative or relative beauty is that which we perceive in objects commonly considered as *imitations* or *resemblances* of something else. (Hutcheson [1725]1973: 38-39)

Of course we can understand *imitations* or *resemblances* not in the formal semanticists' pictorial representation but in a Pragmaticist *aesthetic representation* of reality.

And farther, to obtain comparative beauty alone, it is not necessary that there be any beauty in the original. The imitation of absolute beauty may indeed in the whole make a more lovely piece, and yet an exact imitation shall still be beautiful, though the original were entirely void of it. Thus the deformities of old age in a picture, the rudest rocks or mountains in a landscape, if well represented, shall have an abundant beauty. (Hutcheson [1725]1973: 54-55; cf. Aristotle 1941:1448b, 10-15; Kant *CJ*: 311-313; Guyer 1997: 217&n93)

This distinction can be shown by many examples of artworks, e.g., the ugly face of the "devastations of war" or "the deformities of old age in a

picture” as represented beautifully, e.g., Picasso’s *Guernica* and Rodin’s *She Who Was the Helmet-Maker’s Beautiful Wife*. Kant understands the difference between natural beauty and aesthetic beauty but since his epistemology cannot explain artwork as representation of reality he lumps together such distinct human cognitions which somehow match ordinary language usages (Kant *CJ*: 311-313).

How Do We Make Our Aesthetic Judgment of Artworks Objective?

The question is, why does Kant reject the representational function of aesthetic artworks? The key notions of Kant’s analysis of the dichotomy between the theoretical judgment of Understanding and the aesthetic reflective Judgment are those between *determination* and *nondetermination*, *lawfulness* and *non-lawfulness*, and thus between *determination under a law* and *free play* (Kant *CJ*: 288ff.; Meerbote 1984). Kant needs these dichotomies to sustain the epistemic separation of the objective lawful strict rationality of scientific reasoning from the subjective artistic free creation of artwork, with the aesthetic experience of pleasure and displeasure indeterminate by laws and concepts in judgments of taste (Kant *CJ*: 219). This distinction is echoed in the controversy between two Kantian traditions, the “scientism” of Analytic philosophy and the “artism” of Hermeneutic philosophy (Kant *CJ*: 307-308, 304-306). Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom comes from the Cartesian concept of freedom as opposed to determination. The above dichotomy between scientific determination and artistic freedom causes Kant to separate our perceptual judgment as objective knowledge from our reflective judgment of taste, which is only subjective and does not represent reality.

Here we must note, first of all, that a universality that does not rest on concepts of the object (not even on empirical ones) is not a logical universality at all, but an aesthetic one; i.e., the [universal] quantity of the judgment is not objective but only subjective. For this generality I use the expression *general validity*, by which I mean the validity that a presentation’s reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [may] have for every subject, rather than the validity of presentation’s reference to the cognitive power. (Kant *CJ*: 214; cf. 215)

The distinction here is between rational objective judgment of cognition, which is universally *valid*, and pre-rational subjective reflective judgment of taste, which is only *generally valid*. The epistemological question is about the relation of a person’s pre-conceptual cognition of the object to the extension of the predicate of beauty over the entire sphere *of the judging person*. Yet what may be the function of such reflective judgment of taste without

the relation to the aesthetic object? If perceptual judgment is knowledge by empirical concepts it must also start from the preceding pre-rational cognitions being synthesized to quasi-prove the truth of the perceptual judgment (Kant *CJ*: 215). We see that both perceptual objective judgments and the subjective reflective judgment of taste are operated by pre-rational quasi-concepts and quasi-rules of judgments. Thus their separation due to the dichotomy of scientific determination and artistic freedom in respect of representation of reality can no longer hold, and both can be knowledge of reality. However, Kant's problem is with the predicate "beautiful," which cannot be an empirical predicate. But since the extension of the predicate "beauty" is over the entire sphere of the judging person it has a different cognitive function from empirical concepts, namely not as perceptual representation of objects but as indicating the relation between artworks and reality. This is similar to the function of the predicate "truth" but in the evaluation of artworks in their aesthetic representation of reality. In understanding the evolution of our knowledge from the pre-rational instinctive and practical cognitive operations to rational reasoning the Kantian dichotomy disappears, and all our cognitions, including our aesthetic ones, are representation of reality.

How to Make Our Conception of Beauty Clear and Distinct?

To identify the beauty of aesthetic artworks with the beauty of natural objects and human bodies is to accept what we perceptually are accustomed to calling beauty, and therefore, we take our perceptions of such natural forms as standard for feelings of beauty (Kant *CJ*: 312; Osborne 1953: 169ff.). This identification is to misunderstand the epistemology of fine art, which leads some philosophers and art critics to state that modern fine arts are an abuse of beauty (e.g., Danto 2003; Kirwan 1999: Preface). On the distinction between *pure* beauty and *accessory* beauty of purposively created artworks, Kant writes:

A judgment of taste about an object that has a determinate intrinsic purpose would be pure only if the judging person either had no concept of this purpose, or if he abstracted from it in making his judgment. But although he would in that case have made a correct judgment of taste, by judging the object as a free beauty, another person who (looking only to the object's purpose) regarded the beauty in it as only an accessory characteristic, would still censure him and accuse him of having wrong taste, even though each is judging correctly in his own way, the one by what he has before his senses, the other by what he has in his thought. If we make this distinction we can settle many quarrels that judges of taste have about beauty, by showing that the one is concerned with free and the other with accessory beauty, the one making a pure and the other an applied judgment of taste. (Kant *CJ*: 231; cf. 229)

Epistemologically artworks include variety of aesthetic modes of representation containing artistic imaginative languages developed by the artists to express adequately the specific meanings of artworks in representing reality. These artistic languages can diverge widely from the images by which we are accustomed to perceiving physical objects, which we call “natural beauty.” In experiencing, for example, Francesco Granacci’s *Madonna and Child* (1520), or Picasso’s *Mother and Suckling Child* (1963), Kant’s first person above will judge the former as beautiful and the latter as ugly, while the other person with his “applied judgments” can evaluate both as beautiful if he understands the purposes and the pictorial languages of these artists.

AESTHETIC FEELING OF BEAUTY IN AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF REALITY: KANT’S TWO THEORIES OF GENIUS AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT OF TASTE

Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgment of Reflection on the Harmony of Faculties That Determines the Feeling of Pleasure and Beauty

The question is whether we can explain the *artistic creativity* and the *aesthetic experiential evaluation of artworks* within Kant’s *transcendental idealism phenomenology*. In his philosophy Kant endeavors to combine rationalism with empiricism, but instead of a fruitful synthesis he keeps their main characters unchanged, and on this essential issue Peirce criticizes Kant’s epistemology and revises it pragmatically (Nesher 2002a: III, X.9). This shortcoming bases Kant’s system on dichotomies that cannot be solved, including that between *logical cognitive judgment* and *aesthetic reflective judgment*, such that the first is based on *determinate* pure and a priori concepts and rules, and the second on *nondeterminate* presentations that I prefer to call, after Peirce, quasi-concepts, quasi-rules, and quasi-principles.

We can readily see that judgments of taste are synthetic; for they go beyond the concept of the object, and even beyond the intuition of the object, and add as a predicate to this intuition something that is not even cognition: namely, [a] feeling of pleasure (and displeasure). (Kant *CJ*: 288; cf. 221)

Pragmatically, these aesthetic feelings of pleasure and displeasure operate with such quasi-concepts and quasi-rules but are our cognitions of artworks representing reality. However, for Kant there is only a subjective feeling of pleasure that we judge as beauty, which he tries to explain such

that when we feel such pleasure it is due to the harmony between the ideas of Understanding and Imagination without any relation to reality. Yet if we do not have another criterion to determine this harmony we remain only with our subjective feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This takes Kant's aesthetic theory to the paradox of the meaning of beauty, as in Wittgenstein's paradox of the meaning of following rules, that if every subjective feeling of pleasure determines beauty, and every feeling of displeasure can contradict it, such subjective feeling cannot be an intersubjective determination of beauty (Wittgenstein 1953:#201; Neshier 2005b). In discussing Kant's conception of aesthetic judgment, it is crucial to understand his conception of judgment and how judgments differ according to the epistemic domains of their operations. Here we distinguish the domain of cognitive judgment of rational reasoning from that of aesthetic judgment of pre-conceptual aesthetic experience. According to Kant, in both domains the operator of such processes is the faculty of Judgment, which in the first case is a *determinate (logical) judgment* and in the second is a *nondeterminate reflective (aesthetic) judgment*. The question is how these constitutive notions of Kant can affect his aesthetic theory. By aesthetic reflective judgment we can understand that reflective self-consciousness is the instinctive feeling of pleasure or displeasure in aesthetic experience with an object that we predicate as beautiful.

Therefore, in calling a judgment about an object aesthetic, we indicate immediately that, while a given presentation is being referred to an object, by judgment we mean here not the determination of the object, but the determination of the subject and his feeling. . . . Now although this sensation [*Empfindung*] is not a sensible [*sinnlich*] presentation of an object, it is connected subjectively with judgment[*'s general activity of*] making concepts of the understanding sensible, and hence may be included with sensibility, namely, as a sensible presentation of the state of the subject who is affected by an act of that power [of judgment]. We may include this [kind of] sensation with sensibility, and call a judgment aesthetic, i.e., sensible (as regards the subjective effect [the feeling, as effect of the harmony between the two cognitive powers], not as regards the [whole] basis determining [the judgment]), even though judgment is (objectively) an act of the understanding (i.e., of one of the [*Oberhaupt*] higher cognitive powers), not an act of sensibility. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 223'; cf. 19-22)

These different kinds of *sensations* are our sensible intuition of objects and our reflective feelings about the former. However, our reflective feelings operate in both types of judgments, cognitive logical judgment and aesthetic reflective judgment, respectively. The reflective feeling of the former is about the relation between Understanding and sensual Intuition in representing an object, and the latter reflective feeling is about the subjective mental

conditions, the relation between Understanding and Imagination, without any direct relation to the object. It can be shown that feeling in the former type of judgments is the indication of the *truth* of our perceptual judgments, while in the latter type of judgments feeling is the indication of the *beauty* of the object.

According to Kant, aesthetic judgment cannot be any knowledge by concepts and rational rules because it is a pre-conceptual experience, so the ensuing expressions of “beauty” and “beautiful” cannot be concepts that unify the sensual intuition of empirical experience of objects but only indicates instinctive reflection on our aesthetic experience. The logic-procedure of Kant’s reflective judgment of taste is the Abductive *reflective* inference considered the judgment of *taste* of the *Third Critique* whose structure is different from both the Inductive *determinative* inference of the *theoretical* judgment of the *First Critique* and the Deductive *apodictic* inference of *moral* judgment of the *Second Critique* (cf. Neshier 2005b).

Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is *determinative* (even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must be met for subsumption under that universal to be possible). But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely *reflective*. (Kant *CJ*: 179; cf. *Logic*: ##81-84)

What Peirce calls Abductive inference Kant calls in his *Logic* Inductive judgment, but both Kant and Peirce speak about the inference from *particular* (or particulars) to *universal* or *general* (Kant *Logic*:#84). For Kant the general in reflective judgments is indeterminate and therefore it is only *subjective* judgment, while for Peirce it is not a judgment at all but only the inferential discovery of *concepts* or *hypotheses*, which by being indeterminate are only suggestions for further proofs. According to Peirce, judgments can be only the conclusions of the entire *trio* of Abduction as logic of discovery, Deduction as logic of consistency, and Induction as logic of evaluation, when only the concluded propositions can be determined true judgments. But since Kant holds these different types of inference separately, even by assuming some unproved metaphysical propositions as true, not one of his three Critiques’ types of judgments can be proved, and here, in particular, his reflective judgment of taste of artworks (Neshier 2005b). We can identify the experiential formation of empirical concepts in perceptual judgments, as Kant analyzes it, with Peirce’s material logic of Abductive inference in which our perceptual operation suggests a concept to *synthesize* the pre-conceptual perceptual *presentations* of an object (cf. Kant *Logic*: #3-Note 1, ##33, 40, 82-84).

Every empirical concept requires three acts of the spontaneous cognitive power: (1) *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) of the manifold of intuition; (2) *comprehension* of this manifold, i.e., synthetic unity of the consciousness of this manifold, in the concept of an object (apperception *comprehensiva*); (3) exhibition (*exhibition*), in intuition, of the object corresponding to this concept. For the first of this act we need imagination; for the second, understanding; for the third, judgment, which would be determinative judgment if we are dealing with an empirical concept. (Kant *CJ*: 220')

The above is also the structural operation of the aesthetic judgment though in a different mode of presentation and of different epistemic function (e.g., Kant *CJ*: 179-180, 231-236). Instead of sensual intuition of an object in empirical judgment we have the *apprehension* of the feeling of an object by imagination, and instead of the concept of the object in the former we have its form *comprehended* by Understanding in the latter when we feel their harmony the reflective judgment *exhibits* their synthesis as feeling of pleasure and judgment of taste (cf. Kant *CJ*: 220'-221', 289-293). The following is the Abductive Inference of Indeterminate Reflective Judgment of Taste:

The "free play" between our cognitive faculties is their mutual operations to subsume harmoniously the *Apprehended* Feeling of Object by Imagination under the Understanding *Comprehended* Form of Object to be *Exhibited* in the reflective judgment of taste. The harmony or the logical consistency between these cognitive powers inspires our aesthetic pleasure and our aesthetic judgment of taste: "this is a beautiful object" (cf. Kant *CJ*: 240-241).

Kant only identifies beauty with subjective pleasure, without explaining epistemically how we can know that the cognitive source of such pleasure in beauty is the harmony among our cognitive faculties. Without any confrontation in an independent reality, Kant cannot explain when there is harmony between the ideas of Understanding and of Imagination to determine the feeling of aesthetic pleasure and the beauty judgment of artworks.




Figure 1.1 Kant's pure aesthetic judgment of reflection about the harmony of faculties that determines the feeling of pleasure.

Kant's Aesthetic Theory of the Creation of Artwork: On the Genius

Kant's aesthetic theory of fine arts divided into two parts: the creation of artwork by a genuine artist and its evaluation in reflective judgment of taste. This theory is problematic in three ways: (1) The mystery of the sources of the genius in creating artwork. (2) How, according to Kant, can the genius's creation of artwork be both the free play and under presupposed rules? (3) The reflective judgment of taste cannot distinguish the evaluation of natural beauty from the beauty of the artwork despite Kant's acknowledgment of their difference, namely the artwork is the purposive creation of the genius's spirit (Kant *CJ*:307-308). In the following I will show that the solution to the second difficulty facilitates the solution of the other difficulties by understanding that free creation is self-controlled and generally, according to Spinoza, freedom is inner self-controlled determination (Nesher 1999b).

Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put it in this way: *Genius* is the innate mental predisposition (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art. (Kant *CJ*: 307)

Kant makes a dichotomy between learning and creating such that ordinary people learn through imitation while geniuses are create or discover new ideas. But artists and scientists, and all human beings, have inborn capacities for learning and there is no learning without discovery. Hence in fine arts, as in science, the talent for discovery of new ideas is a matter of degrees (Kant *CJ*: 305-310; Nesher 1999a, 2001). Thus thate endeavor of the artist in the creation of artwork is to making concepts of the understanding sensible: their exhibition of individual characters of the artwork.

Spirit [*Geist*] in an aesthetic sense is the *animating* principle in *the* mind. But what this principle uses to animate [or quicken] the soul, the material it employs for this, is what imparts to the mental powers a purposive momentum, i.e., imparts to them a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens the power for such play. Now I maintain that this principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit *aesthetic ideas*; and by aesthetic ideas I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it. It is easy to see that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a *rational idea* which is, conversely, a concept to which no *intuition* (presentation of the imagination) can be adequate. (Kant *CJ*: 313-314)

The artist has the motivation and plan to interpret or transform her *intellectual ideas* into the imaginatively created and exhibited *aesthetic ideas* of the artwork. But how does the genius know whether her interpretation of the intellectual ideas in creating the aesthetic ideas is a true interpretation such that the spiritual comprehension of the former is truly exhibited in the epitomized artwork? What can be the harmony between the ideas of the cognitive faculties of the mind due to the free play between the rationality of intellectual ideas and the sensuality of aesthetic ideas (Hegel [1835]1975: 156)? How can the artist's free play of the productive imagination be self-controlled to continually evaluate the beauty of her work in aesthetic judgment?

For the imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. . . . Such presentations of the imagination we may call *ideas*. One reason for this is that they do at least strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given semblance of objective reality. Another reason, indeed the main reason, for calling those presentations ideas is that they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate. (Kant *CJ*: 314)

Kant calls the fine art presentations “ideas” since he believes that no empirical intuitions can be subsumed under intellectual ideas and no concepts exist under which aesthetic ideas can be subsumed. But this means that these ideas are meaningless and no one can operate with them (Kant *CPuR*: A50-52). But Kant's insight that intellectual ideas “are given semblance of objective reality” and that they are exhibited in aesthetic ideas was bound to lead him to understand that artworks are *aesthetic representations* of reality, albeit of a different mode from the perceptual judgment representing a particular object.

A poet ventures to give sensible expression to rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation, and so on. Or, again, he takes [things] that are indeed exemplified in experience, such as death, envy, and all the other vices, as well as love, fame, and so on; but then, by means of imagination that emulates the example of reason in reaching [for] a maximum, he ventures to give these sensible expression in a way that goes beyond the limits of experience, namely, with a completeness for which no example can be found in nature. And it is actually in the art of poetry that the power [i.e., faculty] of aesthetic ideas can manifest itself to full extent. Considered by itself, however, this power is actually only a talent (of the imagination). (Kant *CJ*: 314; cf. 355)

This discussion exemplifies Kant’s insight about what I call aesthetic representation of reality, even though he considers it as going “beyond the limits of experience, namely, with a completeness for which no example can be found in nature.” Indeed the poet or the artist wants, like Dostoevsky in *The Devils*, to create a complete type of a cruel man or, like Tolstoy in *Anna Karenina*, a complete type of some loving women, not to represent one of their acquaintances but a type of human character, a “sensible expression” of which everyone can find something in himself or herself, and thus to represent aesthetically the reality of human mind and behavior. Still, Kant’s genius develops, in a mysterious way, his *intellectual ideas* which, according to Kant, are incomplete concepts of Understanding that have no empirical intuition correlated to them since their contents are the intuitions of the Imagination (cf. Kant *CJ*:308-309). But wherefrom come these intellectual ideas with their meaning-contents if not from the artist’s experiential confrontation in reality (Gadamer [1960]1989: 54)? The artist’s motivation is that aesthetic ideas emulate intellectual ideas to create beautiful artwork, and this can be achieved through the *harmony* between them (cf. *CJ*: 240).

We can understand that the Intellectual Ideas contain rich experiential and general meaning as the theme of the intended artwork from which the artist quasi-Deduces and exhibits the aesthetic types of individual characters of her work, namely, deductively subsuming the individual under the general idea. This quasi-deductive inference is similar to attempts at heuristic formal proofs to see intuitively the best conclusion one can reach from one’s axiomatic assumptions. Since this is a productive imaginative pre-rational operation there are no formal rules or laws to control the exhibition of the aesthetic ideas. However, “It is a feeling that the imagination by its own action is depriving itself of its freedom, in being determined purposively according to a law different from that of its empirical use” (Kant *CJ*: 269). This is the artist’s inner purposively determinate self-controlled free creation of her




Figure 1.2 Genius creation of artwork and his reflective free play to harmonize the intellectual ideas of understanding and aesthetic ideas of imagination.

artwork. It is done with choice of the best elements that will attune the initial Intellectual ideas (Kant *CJ*: 317). To evaluate these elements in the creative operation the artist has to resort to her general knowledge of reality not only after completing the creative artwork but continuously, to achieve its truth and beauty (cf. Kant *CJ*: 313-314; Crawford 1982: 172-176).

Kant's Two Aesthetic Theories: Genius's Creativity and Aesthetic Judgment of Taste

The difficulty with Kant's entire aesthetic theory of creation and evaluation of artworks is the separation the genius's creation of art from aesthetic judgment of taste. The genuine artist creates by his spirit the artwork, i.e., "production of the beautiful," and then he and others judge it aesthetically as if it is a physical object but not a purposive creation of the artwork representing reality (Kant *CJ*: 344; Gadamer [1960]1989: 53-55). Yet if the artistically *inspired* interpretation of *intellectual ideas* as created *aesthetic ideas* is the operation of the productive power of Imagination it must be judged as mental meaning-content representing reality and not as the represented reality itself. Next Kant's two theories of fine arts are set out: The genius creativity and the aesthetic judgment of taste.

Kant's two theories of fine arts, the genuine creation of artwork and the reflective judgment of taste, are separate, with no common epistemic logic that can explain the entire cognitive operation of creation and evaluation of artworks (Kant *CJ*: ##45, 48, 50).

If we ask which is more important in objects [*sachen*] of fine art, whether they show genius or taste, then this is equivalent to asking whether in fine art imagination is more important than judgment. Now insofar as art shows genius it does indeed deserve to be called *inspired* [*geistreich*], but it deserves to be called *fine* art only insofar as it shows taste. (Kant *CJ*: 319)

Kant gives the priority not to the genius's spiritual creation of artwork but to the judgment of its taste, which is too crude a criterion to decide between the aesthetic quality of genuine artwork and other objects of works and natural objects. Since Kant cannot connect these two aesthetic theories of fine arts




Figure 1.3 Kant's separation between the genuine creation of artwork and the reflective judgment of taste.

epistemologically, the genius cannot judge the beauty of his created artwork, and with the reflective judgment of taste we cannot evaluate the artwork as created spiritually by the genius.

Whenever we convey our thoughts, there are two ways (*modi*) of arranging them, and one of these is called *manner* (*modus aestheticus*), the other *method* (*modus logicus*); the difference between these two is that the first has no standard other than the *feeling* that there is unity in the exhibition [of the thoughts], whereas the second follows in [all of] this determinate *principles*; hence only the first applies to fine art. But in art a product is called *mannered* only if the way the artist conveys his idea *aims* at singularity and is not adequate to the idea. (Kant *CJ*: 318-319)

The artist with his spirit and productive imaginative “free play” interprets the generality of intellectual *ideas* in the singularity of *aesthetic ideas* and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such a quasi-deductive inference the faculty of Judgment is exercised in its *reflective manner* (*modus aestheticus*) to achieve the harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding and the Imagination for the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork.

The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature, holds his work up to it, and, after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy his taste, finds that form which is adequate to it. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of free momentum of the mental powers; the artist is, instead, slowly and rather painstakingly touching the form up in an attempt to make it adequate to his thought while yet keeping it from interfering with the freedom in the play of these powers. (Kant *CJ*: 312)

In this insight into the artist’s working Kant comes close to Spinoza’s conception of freedom. However, Kant’s dichotomy between the *modus aestheticus*, which is based on *feeling* and therefore free, and the *modus logicus*, which is based on determinate *principles* and *rules*, cannot explain their connection. Hence he uses two meanings of “adequate”: as belonging to scientific *method* and to artistic *manner*. Kant’s transcendental idealism hinders him from elaborating the unified epistemic logic of our cognitions, the evolutionary hierarchy of our pre-rational instinctive and practical self-controlled cognitive operation with habitual rules and our rational self-controlled reasoning with explicit rules and concepts (Nesher 2002a). Moreover, Kant’s dichotomy between natural determinism and transcendental freedom prevents him from explaining how the genuine artist can combine rule-following in interpretative free play for harmony of the ideas of Understanding and Imagination, as well as the feeling of the reflective judgment of taste, with rational interpretation of artworks (Kant *CJ*: 312).

But taste is merely ability to judge, not to produce; and if something conforms to it, that [fact] does not make yet the thing a work of fine art: . . . In fine art we include, rather, a poem, a piece of music, a gallery of pictures, and so on; and here we often find a would-be work of fine art that manifests genius without taste, or another that manifests taste without genius. (Kant *CJ*: 313)

However, if the “*Genius* is the talent that gives the rule to art” and with such rules he is “painstakingly touching the form up in an attempt to make it adequate to his thought” then the genuine creation of artworks must include both the production and the judgment of taste of artworks since in their creation they “deserve to be called *inspired*,” and “in an attempt to make it [the artwork] adequate to his thought” the artist continually judges its form reflectively to make it beautiful (cf. Kant *CJ*: 307, 312). Yet this evaluation must be by the *method* (*modus logicus*) of empirical knowledge aesthetically representing reality. Without it there is no external restriction for judgment of taste, and every interpretation can forge it as true genuine artwork. The dichotomy between the *method* of science and *manner* of art eliminates the possibility to evaluate the truth of the artwork and judge its beauty. In the artist’s creating artwork the reflecting judgment is her self-control to achieve harmony in evaluating the aesthetic experience of the artwork in the feeling of pleasure, and its beauty according to how it aesthetically represents reality. Hegel understands that when the artist has self-control over his creation he can achieve harmony, hence truth and beauty, in the artwork, while the lack of self-control in creating artwork results in its being ugly (Hegel [1835]1975: 159).

In criticizing and revising Kant’s conception of aesthetic artwork it is crucial to overcome these difficulties and combine the theory of genuine creation of the artwork with the theory of judgment of taste for beauty into one unified theory in the epistemological framework of Peircean Pragmaticism (Nesher 2002a; Gadamer [1960]1989: 83-88). We have to inquire how we reflectively judge the beauty of artworks, [as distinct from natural beauty], and whether and what can be the connection between their artistic creation and their evaluation in the judgment of taste. This connection, which is still vague in Kant’s exposition, is developed further by Hegel:

For the task of the imagination consists solely in giving us consciousness of that inner rationality, not in the form of general propositions and ideas, but in concrete configuration and individual reality. What therefore lives and ferments in him the artist must portray to himself in the forms and appearances whose likeness and shape he has adopted, since he can so subdue them to his purpose that they now on their side too become capable of adopting what is inherently true and expressing it completely. (Hegel [1835]1975: 282)

The specific intellectual idea, the spiritual content which is inherently true, determines the specific aesthetic idea, the mode of aesthetic exhibition of the artistic content, and only complete harmony of the content and its aesthetic concretization will make the artwork true and beautiful (e.g., Hegel [1835]1975: 77-79).

But appearance itself is essential to essence. Truth would not be truth if it did not show itself and appear, if it were not truth *for* someone and *for* itself, as well as for the spirit in general too. Consequently, not pure appearance in general, but only the special kind of appearance in which art gives reality to what is inherently true can be the subject of reproof. (Hegel [1835]1975: 8)

We can understand Hegel as claiming that the intellectual truth of the artist that “lives and ferments in him” can be artistic truth only by being presented in the reality of the artwork. Moreover, this realization should have a specific harmony in being an artistic truth.

The most general thing which can be said in a merely formal way about the ideal of art, on the lines of the previous considerations, comes to this, that, on the one hand, the true has existence and truth only as it unfold into external reality; but, on the other hand, the externally separate parts, into which it unfolds, it can so combine and retain in unity that now every part of its unfolding makes this soul, this totality, appear in each part. (Hegel [1835]1975: 153)

But if truth is inherent in the artist’s spirit it already somehow exists *for* itself before appearing. The question is, whence came the inherent truth of art to the artist’s spirit, and how do we know that this content of the potential artwork is true (Hegel [1835]1975: 196-197)?

REFLECTIVE SELF-CONTROL IN CREATING ARTWORKS AND WHY CANNOT ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHERS AND PHENOMENAL HERMENEUTICIANS EXPLAIN ARTWORKS MEANING AND TRUTH?

Analytic Philosophy’s Formal Semantic Conception of Interpretation and the Referential Representation of Physical Reality, and Its Shortcomings

The problem is to explain whether and how the meaning and truth of artworks determine their aesthetic beauty. I would argue that an analytic philosophers

and phenomenological Hermeneuticians have different conceptions of meaning, truth, interpretation, and representation, and both are one-sidedly missing the logic of epistemological explanation of human confrontation in reality and its representation. The analytic philosophers' conceptions of meaning and truth are the formal semantic *vertical* stipulated relations between abstract formal language and structure of objects, which cannot work as a model for real human knowledge. The phenomenological Hermeneuticians' alternative is *horizontal* relations between different stages of interpreting human cognitions without any confrontation with external reality, hence without explaining our knowledge. Therefore, neither side can explain epistemologically either natural sciences or psychological sciences, including artworks. Pragmaticist epistemology, as an alternative to both of them, intertwines interpretation and representation to explain that the objectivity of meaning of an artwork lies in the proof of the truth of its interpretation, which is achieved in the proof of its true aesthetic representation of reality.

Formal semanticists in the Aristotelian tradition of evaluation of the truth and falsity of our propositions also miss the epistemology of the meaning and truth of the aesthetic representation of reality. According to this grammatical understanding of truth à la Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, Tarski, and others, only elementary perceptual judgments can be genuinely true because scientific and aesthetic representations do not represent Reality directly, by common logical forms of observational propositions and common-sense states of affairs. The Analytic philosophy model of interpretation of language and its representation of reality is abstract *vertical* stipulated *semantical relations* between elements of formal language and abstract structure of objects. Frege's classic scheme of the meaning and truth of basic sentences with their senses and references is the following:

Names and Predicate of the Sentence with their Senses are interpreted in the References, Objects and Concepts (properties), and the Truth-Conditions of the Sentence are the relations between the References such that when the Object falls under (or does not fall under) the Concept (property), the Thought expressed in the Sentence is true (or false) accordingly. We find similar




Figure 1.4 Analytic philosophy's "vertical" conception of referential interpretation.

formulations in Russell's logical analysis of sentences and Wittgenstein's conception of elementary sentences in the *Tractatus*. Yet how do we know that the elements of our sentences refer to objects in the real world when our perceptual immediate references are at best only our Humean ideas, our sensual feelings, sense-data, or the Fregean objects and concepts of abstract Platonic Thoughts, and not the real empirical world (Nesher 2002a: X)? This formal idealized model of the relation between Thought and Reality creates only the illusion of relevancy to real life. The illusion is in the interpretation of the formal language in the abstract entities which is actually assigned to them by the formal semanticist, without discerning that this is done outside these idealized domains. So in this operation the formal semanticist assumes a Cartesian God's external point of view, but in the natural situation no human being can get outside his "cognitive skin" (Davidson 1986: 312; Putnam 1990: 17; Russell 1914: Ch. II; Nesher 2002a: V, IX, X; Margolis 2003: Ch. 4). This formal semantic illusion about the meaning and truth of our cognitions also affects the way some understand the creation and interpretation of artworks and their truth, including the aestheticians' illusion about artworks as make-believe-fictions (e.g., Wolterstorff 1980: Part Six #X; Walton 1990; Currie 1990: 2.1, 2.2). Thus, the analytic philosophers cannot develop an epistemology of aesthetic interpretation and representation in their formal semantic framework. As a result, we see that some philosophers decide either that artworks do not represent any reality but only express subjective feelings and emotions, or that artworks' declarative propositions are false and thus fictional make-believe, or that not all artworks are representations of reality but only few general thematic propositions of fictional literature (Weitz [1955]1969; Margolis 1965: #11; Walton, 1990; Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 5-14). Of course, without any theory of truth for the artistic creative artworks anything can go about the word "truth" (cf. Kivy 1997: #4ff.).

The Phenomenological Hermeneuticians' Conceptions of Interpreting and Representing Being as Truth, and Their Shortcomings

The contending alternative to the analytic philosophers' formal semantic conceptions is the phenomenological Hermeneuticians' conceptions of meaning and truth, especially in the explanation of the creation and evaluation of artworks. Thus, meaning conceived as the cognitive content interpreted in *horizontal* relations between different stages and truth is disclosedness of the essence of being in an interpretative operation, following the Greek conception of truth as *Aletheia*, literally disclosedness or unconcealment (Nesher 2003). Thus the essence of a being itself is unconcealed in the interpretation of its meaning-content such that its appearance is a true interpretation of its

a phenomenological point of view the confrontation with external reality is impossible (Gadamer [1977]1986:111-112). They accept only intuitively, probably through a strong feeling, that the “true friend,” “true gold,” or the “true artwork” shows itself in the hermeneutic interpretation. Yet this common-sense feeling about our experiential judgments, including aesthetic judgments, can be only the starting point of philosophical analysis. It cannot replace any philosophical explanation of why we feel such assurance of their truth or beauty (Hume [1757]1963). Insofar as the Hermeneuticians cannot show that their theory about the appearance of the truth of human essence or of artworks’ essence is the indication of their truth and beauty, this theory cannot work (Heidegger [1930]1993: 123; Gadamer [1960]1989: 189-191, [1984]1986: 22; Bernstein 1983: 131-139; Wachterhauser 2002: 53-54). When the Hermeneuticians take art as the paradigm for truth and of human knowledge, the question is, what is the relation of the *truth* of interpreted-created artwork to Art’s *essence* itself? Does its appearance truly express its essence in the interpretation or not?

In the light of the essential definition of the work [of art] we have reached at this point according to which the happening of truth is at work in the work, we are able to characterize creation as follows: to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work’s becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens. It is all rest on the essence of truth. (Heidegger [1936]1993:185)

Because it is the essence of the truth to establish itself within beings, in order thus first to become truth, the *impulse toward the work* lies in the essence of truth as one of truth’s distinctive possibilities, by which it can itself occur as being in the midst of beings. (Heidegger [1936]1993: 187; cf. Hegel [1835]1975: 8)

The potential truth of any being, like artwork, shows itself as true as it appears actually and as its truth is disclosed, for example, in the created figure of art. The following is a scheme of Heidegger’s conception of showing itself: *Being [True Essence]→[Interpretation] Appearance: Showing Itself [Being] as factual Truth*, where the Appearance or the factual being is the True Interpretation of Being and this is the Disclosedness of the Truth. We can understand this *Showing Itself*, as distinct from referring to something else, as the way the being or its essence appears in an experiential situation. In the working of Art as the paradigm of *knowledge as interpretation*, Art as essence appears in the work of art and the artist manifests herself in the artwork (Heidegger [1950]1993).

Here the problem of explaining interpretation comes to the fore as an existential development, in Heidegger’s terms, or as the cognitive operation, in

Pragmaticist terms. In this paradigm the phenomenological Hermeneuticians remain inside the phenomenal “lifeworld,” “Being already in the world,” or the Wittgensteinian “form of life,” without being able to develop a theory of truth or explain the representation of “the world” as external reality or even the very possibility of the evolvment of the phenomenal lifeworld (Heidegger [1927]1962: 246-252; Wittgenstein 1969: ##94ff.; Habermas 2003:23; Neshet 2005a). In a similar vein we can show that the phenomenological Hermeneuticians cannot show the truth of artworks if the truth just appears, if we do not have any criterion to distinguish between true and false appearances. The problem is the initial separation of the “horizontal” interpretation of cognitions from the “vertical” representation of the structure as “objective world” (Habermas 2003: Introduction).

The Function of Reflective Self-Control of Interpretation and Representation of Physical Reality and Psychological Reality as Two Operations of Human Knowledge

The Pragmaticist conception of interpretation *cum* representation shows that the formal semantic *vertical* conception of representation and the hermeneutic *horizontal* conception of interpretation cannot explain the objectivity of cognitive interpretation and representation of reality since they cannot prove their truth (Neshet 2004b, 2005b). The way out of the predicaments of the analytic philosophers and the phenomenological Hermeneuticians is to understand that interpretation and representation are connected, like Siamese twins, as the two essential components of human cognition of reality. The Pragmaticist conception of aesthetic beauty and truth takes the third way, between the metaphysical realism of analytic philosophers, built on the formal semantic model, and the internal realism of the phenomenologists and Hermeneuticians and their post-modernist followers. An alternative to these shortcomings is the Pragmaticist conception that combines cognitive interpretation with representation of both the Descriptive *Representation* of Physical Reality, its *objects* and events, and the Anaphoric *Representation* of Psychological Reality, its Subject’s *Signs of Mind* (Habermas 2003:16). In my Pragmaticist diagrams the perceptual initial cognitive Sign is the cause of the sequence of Feeling Quality, Emotional Reaction to it, and their synthesis in Thought Reasoning, the interpretations of the initial Sign in representing Reality.

We cannot represent physical reality without representing our own cognitive minds, and vice versa, so we represent physical reality when we prove it cognitively and we represent psychological reality when we prove it upon the constraints of physical reality. However, the cognitive interpretational operation cannot take place as a cognitive expression in a vacuum, and it function




Figure 1.6 Siamese twins: The interpretational and representational relations of human cognition in representing physical and psychological reality.

in its true representation of reality. In this Pragmaticist epistemological theory of cognitive meaning and truth all human cognitions are interpretations of cognitive signs-operations and such interpretations involve essentially *reflection* upon such operations as the basis of our self-consciousness and self-control of our cognitive life at different evolutionary stages of instinctive, practical and rational. This is crucial since the persons' reflective self-controlling the operation of interpretation and representation is the condition to prove the truth of both of them; otherwise, every interpretation seems correct or incorrect and empties the conception of interpretation, without which there is no representation either (Wittgenstein 1953: #201; Neshar 2005a).

Dealing with artworks we feel some emotional reactions of pleasure, and aesthetically judge them as beautiful. The problem is to explain epistemologically how this feeling of emotional reaction of pleasure indicates the beauty of the artworks and how it is connected to their true aesthetic representation of reality. We use "feeling" in two senses: either a *sensual feeling* in our confrontation with physical objects as their iconic representation, or the *reflective feeling* of our cognitive operations as our self-consciousness of these operations, indicating our self-conscious of them. Such a reflective feeling of self-conscious and eventually of self-control that we have in our perceptual operation is the comparison between the sensual feeling of quality of objects and the emotional reaction to them, which indicates their coherence or incoherence, hence the truth or falsity of our perceptual judgments (Crocce [1902]1992: X; Neshar 2002a). This reflective feeling of self-conscious and self-control over our cognitive operation is apparent in Descartes, Hume, Davidson, and other philosophers' feelings about the veridicality of most of our perceptual experience and self-evident ideas, notably Frege's feeling of "the real assertive force" of indicative sentences that determines their truth (Frege [1918]1999; Neshar 2002a:V, IX, X).

The logical structure and the function of reflective judgments are common to any instinctive, practical, or rational reflective self-control of our

cognitive operations, including quasi-proofs of the truth of perceptual judgments and proofs of scientific theories which by proving them true we know they are true representation of reality (Nesher 2002a). Hence the function of *reflective feeling* of self-control of our sensual feeling of quality and of the emotional reaction in our experience with the artwork is to indicate our pleasure or displeasure. Yet since the artwork's aesthetic epitomes are different from natural objects our *reflective feeling* of aesthetic pleasure and beauty can be explained only by being an indication of the truth of the artwork's aesthetic representation of reality. This solves the Kantian paradox of the meaning of beauty since the *harmony* or *coherency* between the intellectual ideas and the aesthetic ideas embedded in the artwork is not arbitrary but is achieved through their true representation of some reality. Aesthetic judgments of beauty of artworks are similar to perceptual judgments of representing objects: we feel instinctively the truth of our perceptual judgments and thus accept them as "given" or "self-evident" if we cannot explain the perceptual operation as quasi-proofs of our perceptual judgments. Judgments of beauty are also accepted as self-evident even if we cannot explain the cognitive operation that leads to such judgments, and also to our erroneous judgments (see Collingwood 1938: 215-221, 282, on adequate and inadequate expression of inner feelings; cf. Lewis, D. 1983: 279).

THE MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE OF ARTWORK: THE ARTIST'S INTENTION AND THE PROOF OF THE TRUTH OF AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

Artistic Creations Are Based on Human Experience Epitomized in Aesthetic Modes of Representing Reality


Artistic creation is based on human experience that evolves into general intellectual understanding of reality which is epitomized in aesthetic modes of representation. Aesthetic languages and styles, as modes of representation, change according to the intellectual ideas from which the aesthetic epitomes are adequately inferred to represent reality. The controversy about the meaning-content and interpretation of artwork, whether the artist's intention is its meaning, or if the meaning of the artwork's language is independent of its artistic creation, à la Kant, rests on different theories of meaning and truth. By the language of the artwork I understand any cognitive aesthetic sign representing reality with iconic feeling of qualities, indexical reactions of emotion, and symbolic reasoning of thoughts which humans express and

communicate (e.g., Peirce *CP*: 5.119). Indeed, some can understand the artist's intentions as a subjective feeling only that we can never know, so they suggest that we take artworks independently of their creation, as if the artistic languages of artworks are self-sufficient meaningfully and truly (Hirsch 1967: 111-126; Ricoeur 1976: 81-94).

In my Pragmaticist theory of cognition, meaning, and truth I suggest the conception of meaning as the content of our experience and what we develop from it in the operation of interpretation by abstraction and generalization (Nesher 2002a). The aesthetic meaning-content of the artwork originates in the artist's experience; but if the Structuralists, the New Critics, and some Phenomenal Hermeneuticians suggest the autonomy of the art work, like the Analytical Philosophers' conception of the autonomy of language or text with its meaning and truth, they must show where meanings came from to the languages of artworks. If there is no transcendental meaning from nowhere, and the meaning of our cognitions comes from human experience and its interpretation, then if the meaning is not the artist's meaning it must be the experiential meaning-content of the interpreter. However, the subjective feelings of qualities and emotional reactions in aesthetic experience, as in every other human cognizance, are essential components of the experiential meaning-content. However, they can become objective when the entire cognitive operation is interpretatively synthesized in perceptual judgments, in conclusions of reasoning thought, or in judgments of taste and proved to be true interpretations and representations of reality (Wollheim 1968: ##25-31; cf. Nesher 2002a: X, 2005b).

We can regard the meaning-content of a proposition as a structure that evolves hierarchically in the experiential-perceptual operation from pre-verbal sensorimotor signs into a verbal proposition of perceptual judgment. This propositional structure includes essentially the early stages of the perceptual sign operations of Feeling and Emotion as the meaning-content of the evolved propositional Thought:

The signs that eventually represent the Real Object are the Iconic sign as the Feeling of the Property P of the Object, the Indexical sign as the Emotional Reaction to this Object ([this] K is the Object represented in P), and the Symbolic sign as the Thought, being the synthesis of the previous sign-stages of the perceptual operation, which are the meaning-content of the perceptual judgment. There is no meaning-content of any language or text that is not developed from such basic perceptual experience. Thus if the experiential meaning-content of the artwork's interpreter is different from the artist's, while their judgment are of the same wording, the meaning of the interpreted artwork is different. However, when we understand the proof-conditions of the artist's experiential knowledge, and therefore the experiential meaning of the created artwork, we can interpret it according to



(cf. Peirce, CP 2.243–65, c.1903; Neshet, 2002a: I, vs. Kant, CPuR: B1-2, CJ: IX)

Figure 1.7 Perceptual experience of interpretation and representation and its meaning-content.

its genuine meaning. Yet we still have to prove the truth of our interpretation of the proof-conditions of the created artwork in order to understand how the artist aesthetically represents reality.

Is the Beauty of an Artwork Only of Subjective Feeling or is Objective in Respect to the Artistic Experience and Creation in Its True Representation of Reality?

The question whether beauty is in the artwork as a physical object or in the “eye of the beholder” raises a wrong dilemma since the beauty is in neither the former nor the latter by itself, but in the interpretation of the artwork and its representation of reality, either by the artist or by others (comp. Zemach 1997; Zangwill 2001: 2-3). However, the truth or falsity of the interpretation of an artwork is the proof of the truth or falsity of the interpretation of the artwork aesthetic mode in its representation of reality, namely in respect of the genuine truth-conditions of its creation by the artist. There are some predicaments in the explication of the conception of interpretation of artwork. First is the Platonic-Socratic dilemma in Meno:80d-e, that if we do not understand the text how can we interpret it, and if we do understand it we need not interpret it. Ricoeur suggests understanding text as an entity, a kind of semantic autonomy, as if language and even actions have meanings independent of their agents, as in the Fregean-Russellian formal semantics conception of the sentence (e.g., Ricoeur 1976: 89-94). The question is whether sentences can refer by themselves to the world. Ricoeur accepts, after Frege, a formal semantic position where the autonomous text refers by itself, since otherwise the reference is with the subjective meaning of the interpreter or with the artist’s subjective intentional meaning in creating the artwork.

What has to be appropriated is the meaning of the text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of thought opened up by the text. In other words, what has to be appropriated is nothing other than the power of disclosing a world that constitutes the reference of the text. In this way we are far from the Romanticist ideal of coinciding with a foreign psyche. If we may be said to coincide with anything, it is not the inner life of another ego, but the disclosure of a possible way of looking at things, which is the genuine referential power of the text. (Ricoeur 1976: 92)

The question is, what do we mean by text, either written or non-verbal like painting, music, and dance, or even action (Hirsch 1967: 126; Ricoeur 1976: IV)? Is it only a physical object or does it belong to our historical culture, our “form of life” that we are familiar with? Furthermore, what can be “the genuine referential power of the text” that discloses a world that constitutes the reference of the text? If we do not have any criterion for interpretation of the text how do we know that we understand the “genuine referential power of the text?” We must know the “world that constitutes the reference of the text” in order to interpret the text because otherwise we enter either into indefinite interpretations or into a vicious circle, as we see in hermeneutic theory and practice. Therefore, how can we know the world of the text if not through our knowledge of the world of the artist? The solution to the conception of texts is that we know the initial meaning of the text by learning the language of the artist as belonging to our culture through true interpretation and representation (Nesher 2005b, 2007b). When we encounter a text which belongs to our culture we interpret it instinctively in the common practice, what Ricoeur calls “guess” (Ricoeur 1976: 75-79). Sometime when we are not certain about our initial interpretation of the text, we go on to explain it further by a rational interpretation that some call exegesis.

The Pragmaticist solution for the “hermeneutical circle” predicament of interpretation is that we start our cognitive understanding of our perceptual experience from the initial and vague cognitive elements and the rule of habit; we continue to interpret them with our reflective self-control by synthesizing them in our perceptual judgments to quasi-prove their true interpretation and representation of reality. These cognitive operations are the quasi-proofs of our perceptual judgments and are our basic facts upon which we continue our interpretation and its validation-proof (Nesher 2002a: II, III, V, X, 2005b). With this theory of meaning, in which the experiential sensual feeling and emotional reaction are the basic cognitive meaning-content of the languages of any artwork, we can also explain away the conception that music at best has content but not meaning since, according to this claim, meaning belongs only to propositional language.

This is the logical positivist conception of meaning in formal semantics; but where has this meaning come from, if not from our pre-symbolic cognitive confrontation with reality (Nesher 2002a: VI)? Yet, if instrumental music, the “absolute music” à la Kivy, has no meaning then what is its content? Of course, we interpret our experience with physical objects, like our sensual feeling and emotional reaction to the gray sky or the fragrance of the rose, which affect our moods. But we cannot interpret them or be affected by them as we are in our interpretation of the feelings and the emotions of human beings when they are exhibited as the meaning-contents of a painted picture or composed music in which the human spirit is involved (e.g., Kant *CJ*: 313-314; Hegel [1835]1975: 1-2, 29). The question of how we can understand and explain the meaning-content of instrumental music cannot be solved without understanding the background experience and the intentions of the composer, his remarks on his compositions and even by comparing some lyrics that go with the instrumental melody and thus interpret the entire meaning-content of the music by comparing these components of the artwork, the “intellectual ideas,” with the emotional and imaginative meaning-content of the melody and the harmony as the “aesthetic ideas” of the piece of music. This actually we are doing with colloquial verbal-symbolic language in which we connect the experiential meaning-contents with the verbal expressions in order to understand the latter. Without understanding the conceptual language of music, its “intellectual ideas” or “spirit,” it is impossible to give it a conceptual interpretation as representation of reality, that expressing the cognitive ideas of the composer about her or his life experience. Yet if we do not understand the musical “intellectual ideas” or “spirit,” we respond to its aesthetic qualities, its “aesthetic ideas,” only emotionally and practically, similar to the response of primates to the conceptual human language or of the newborn baby to her parents’ verbal talk: while she does not understand its propositional concepts she understand its feeling and emotional meanings, what Piaget calls the sensori-motoric language. Thus, we somehow understand the emotional meaning of such “absolute music” without being able to interpret it conceptually. But if we are moved emotionally by pieces of music they are meaningful for us, since they contain the intellectual and spiritual meaning-contents of their composers. Like on learning a foreign language, we too can rediscover them from their emotional expressions and interpret them rationally and explain this interpretation philosophically. If someone does not believe in the representational function of “absolute music” he might prefer to define it, after Carroll, as belonging to the historical narrative of art. But then he faces the problem of how to define “standard cases” of such narrative, moreover, how to define the beginning of this art-history narrative without any “standard cases” (Carroll 2001: Part II).

Interpretation is Always of Cognitive Signs in Their Operation of Representing Reality

Interpretation is always of cognitive signs in their operation of representing reality. This relation to reality can help us explain why the fallibility of the interpretation is only relative to its proof-conditions, and why the circularity of interpretation appears in a phenomenological conception that cannot anchor interpretation in its representational function. Under such a Pragmaticist epistemological theory of meaning as interpretative cognitive operation we can avoid the nihilism and skepticism of post-modernism (e.g., Rorty 1982). The Pragmaticist theory of truth that I suggest is that proving the truth of some cognitions is to prove their true representation of reality, and proving their falsity is to prove that they do not represent reality, but when we do not prove our cognitions they are doubtful. Yet doubtful cognition is distinct from our being simply wrong in our interpretation, which is due to lack of self-control in our interpretative operation (Nesher 2002a). Gadamer in his discussion of the truth of artworks criticizes Kantian subjectivism and hermeneutic nihilism in this regard:

A creative process randomly and arbitrarily broken off cannot imply anything obligatory. From this it follows that it must be left to the recipient to make something of the work. One way of understanding a work, then, is no less legitimate than another. There is no criterion of appropriate reaction. Not only the artist himself possesses none—the aesthetics of genius would agree here; every encounter with the work has the rank and rights of a new production. This seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism. (Gadamer [1960]1989: 94-95; cf. Bernstein 1983: 118)

Therefore, to understand the original meaning of the artwork we should understand the artist's meaning and the truth of his aesthetic representation of reality. The interpretation of the meaning of artwork cannot be absolutely fixed, and it can change with our better knowledge of the truth-conditions of the artist in its creation (Hirsch 1967: App. I; Palmer 1969: 60-65; Wollheim 1968: #39; Ricoeur 1976: 78-79). How can we know the experiential truth-conditions of the artist if they are only components of his subjective experience? We have to compare his created artwork with his surrounding reality and to learn how he cognitively developed it from his experience. To overcome Ricoeur's rejection of "the Romanticist ideal of coinciding with a foreign psyche," with "the inner life of another ego," we have to solve the central problem of explaining our communal life, how we can know ourselves and the other minds (Ricoeur 1976: 92). To explain how we understand each other and the creative artworks of our

fellows we have to show that subjectivity is the basis of our objective communicative actions when we quasi-prove and prove the truth of our subjective representation of reality (Nesher 2004b).

THE REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTION OF ARTWORKS: THE ILLUSION THAT ARTWORKS ARE ILLUSORY FICTIONS

The Aesthetic Knowledge and Its Function in Human Life

How can we understand the aesthetic knowledge and its function in human life, and if there is a cognitive dichotomy between science and aesthetics, or if we have a common epistemological explanation for the entire human cognitive representation of reality. Could it be that scientific theories are fictional (the instrumentalists' conception of theories) like literary artworks (the fictionalists' conception of artworks)? Or are they both human cognitions representing reality but in different cognitive modes? One may suggest that at last we can detect particular atoms and electrons (the realistic conception of theories) but we will never detect Hamlet or Anna Karenina (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 19). However, the scientific "atom" and "electron" do not function as proper names but as general names of groups of similar objects; thus we can also say that the literary "Hamlet" and "Anna Karenina" are not proper names of real persons but general names of types of persons or of features and motivations of human being in general (Goodman 1978: VI.5, 1984: IV.4; Wittgenstein [1921]1961: 6.341-6.35). Misunderstanding of this nature of aesthetic representation led some philosophers to consider artworks as fictions since there is no particular Don Quixote or Hamlet or Anna Karenina that these artworks could represent (e.g., Walton 1990).

We see that for the anti-realists, like Goodman and Rorty, scientific theories and artworks are all made-up fictions, and for the fictionalists there is a demarcation between science and art such that they are realist and truth-seeking in science and anti-realist in arts. The problem with the fictionalists and the anti-realists in aesthetics is that they consider the artistic modes of representations as if they represent their own content, the characters and situation in the possible fictional world (Strawson [1950]1964: 38-39; cf. Nesher 2002a: X.2). Scientific theories and artistic novels and poetry are all modes of human cognitive representation of physical and psychological reality, and are not these realities themselves. Hence, Hamlet and Anna Karenina do not exist as fictional human beings but they represent really human types of characters (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: Ch. 13). Therefore, it is a mistake to

write “truth in fiction and fictional world” if the problem of the truth of artworks, and “fictions” included, is the truth of their aesthetic representations of reality and not “in” the fictional stories, as if one can ask whether Hamlet is telling the truth when he says to Ophelia, “I did love thee once,” or whether Iago said falsely to Othello, “Desdemona loves Cassio.” The “worlds” of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* or *Othello* are not fictional worlds because they are just the meaning-contents of the artworks themselves which only metaphorically can be considered “worlds.” This is like considering Einstein’s relativity with its particles and waves as a “world” and not as a physical theory representing the physical world (Currie 1990: 2.1, 2.2). The world represented by artworks or “fictions” is the human-life world, and in the above case the world that Shakespeare experienced and represented with these artworks. The question is about the truth of artworks for the human world and how we prove it. Currie’s discussion of fictional and possible worlds is in the line of the formal semantic analytic philosophy which cannot explain the representational function of artworks (Currie 1990). It is an illusion that literary works are illusions of make-believe since it is an illusion that Hamlet and Anna Karenina are proper names intended to represent particular persons in “a fictional world” while they are only names of particular types of persons. We should inquire into the cognition of aesthetic creativity to analyze how artists relate to their reality, their environment and society, and how readers and viewers evaluate their artworks.

One of the most important events in my story will be Ivanove’s murder by Nechayev, which is well known in Moscow. I hasten to add a reservation: I do not know and never have known either Nechayev or Ivanov, or the circumstances of this murder, except from the newspapers. And even if I had, I would not have begun copying them. I’m only taking the accomplished facts. My fantasy can in the highest degree differ from the reality that took place, and my Pyotr Verkhovensky may in no way resemble Nechayev, but it seems to me that in my astonished mind imagination has created that character, that type, which corresponds to this crime. (Dostoevsky, on *The Devils*, October 8, 1870, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 409; cf. 35)

The correspondence of the novel and reality is not to an individual person and a circumstance, e.g., Ivanove’s murder by Nechayev, but of the created imaginative a type character of vicious criminal behavior, which endeavors to be a true representation of such human behavior.

For the whole question consists in that—what to consider as the truth. This is why the novel is written. (Dostoevsky’s notations for the final part of *The Devils*, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 424)

The Creation of Artworks From the Artistic Human Life Experience and How They Represent and Affect it

We can assume similarly between scientific theories and artworks, and even see myths as a kind of art works epitomizing individual characters representing types of real human behavior. Actually, in the interpretational creation of the artwork by the artist and the interpretational understanding by others they continuously compare these interpretational operations with their entire experience and knowledge of their lives. They attempt to feel its coherency and explanatory contribution to their understanding themselves, and if it truly induces their aesthetic pleasure in such knowledge.

. . . the experience of art is *experience* in a real sense and must master ever anew the task that experience involves: the task of integrating it into the whole of one's own orientation to the world and one's own self-understanding. The language of art is constituted precisely by the fact that it speaks to the self-understanding of *every* person, and it does this as ever present and by means of its own contemporaneity. Indeed, precisely the contemporaneity of the work allows it to come to expression in language. (Gadamer [1964]1976: 101-102)

This operation of integrating the experience with artwork “into the whole of one's own orientation to the world and one's own self-understanding” is the operation of evaluating and proving to oneself the truth of the artwork in one's own experience and understanding of the world and of oneself. The question is whether we accept Gadamer's wording above, being in our phenomenal world of experience, or if there is a way to explain how the integration of one's art experience into one's world experience is possible only by explaining our confrontation with external Reality. Adherents of the anti-representational conception of artworks must also hold a position against any definition of art, since, as they try to argue, there is no one aesthetic property that can be a common property of all kinds of artworks. Their conception of definition must be the formal semantic conception that requires one necessary and sufficient property for such a definition. The aesthetic properties that some regard as the potential candidates for such a general definition of art are different aesthetic modes of representation and cannot offer any definition of art based on a common mode of representation. However, understanding that the nature of artworks is in the aesthetic representation of reality, this could be the gist of the epistemological theory that can explain this common function of all modes and styles of art (Kivy 1997, 2001). Moreover, the feeling of pleasure and the criterion for the evaluation of the beauty of artworks and the judgments of taste can be shown as the indication of the truth of aesthetic

Imagination so the judgment of aesthetic beauty is subjectively arbitrary. The way out of the Phenomenalist “internal realism” is to move to the Pragmaticist “representational realism” based on our confrontation with the represented reality. Yet, since Kant does not combine the three inferences into a complete proof that can indicate the truth of the theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic judgments, he has to deduce, or better justify, the a priori assumptions of each by what he calls Transcendental Deduction; at best this can be considered an implicit operation of the Peircean *Trio*, otherwise an artificial device that cannot work (Kant *CPuR*: A84-130, B116-169; *CPrR*: 42-50; *CJ*: 279n1., 287-291; *Logic*: #II). This difficulty is admitted by Kant about how to make judgments of empirical experience universal synthetic judgments a priori.

And yet, that these judgments [of taste] are, or want to be considered, a priori judgments as regards the demand that *everyone* assent, a demand they make despite the fact that their predicate (of one’s *own* pleasure [as] connected with the presentation) is empirical, is also already implicit in the expressions used to make that claim. Hence this problem of the critique of judgment is part of the general problem of the transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic judgments possible a priori? (Kant *CJ*: 289)

Thus, if in a complete cognitive proof we confront reality by the Abductive discovered suggestions, by Deductive consistency elaborating them, and by their Inductive evaluation, this enables us to justify them with such cognitive proof without any need to justify or deduce transcendently any a priori concepts, principles, and rules (Kant *CPrR*: 66).

CONCLUSION: THE EPISTEMIC LOGIC OF ARTWORKS AND THE QUASI-PROOF OF THEIR TRUTH AND BEAUTY IN REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

The Aesthetic Evaluations of Works of Art as Beautiful Are Self-conscious Reflective Judgments by Proving Their True Interpretation and Representation of Reality

The aesthetic evaluations of works of art as beautiful are self-conscious reflective judgments by the artists of their own creative-interpretative operations and by others through their interpretations of the artists’ artworks. These reflective judgments of the artists of their creative operations are based on instinctive and practical self-control, though it also reaches a rational intuition controlling the *free play* between imagination and understanding. Reflective evaluation is an essential factor in the entire process of artistic

creation of artwork to appraisal critically the operation to the completion the artwork.

Simply defined, aesthetic judgment is the ability to recognize aesthetic quality residing in any relationship of elements within an organization. It is vital to the artist in that good aesthetic judgment permits him to know when it is good or, if it is unsatisfactory, what might be done to improve it. It is also basic to art criticism and underlies the appreciative aspect of aesthetic response. Studies show that it is present in children to some degree, but it is undoubtedly subject to considerable development through learning and experience. (Meier 1942: 156)

This is a description of the artist's evaluation of artwork in the creative process, but the criterion for such aesthetic evaluation is missing since the general criteria of order, unity, consistency, coherence, completeness, and more are only *ad hoc* rules that are always specific to each artwork to explain the impression gained from it. What in one case is an order in another can be a disorder (Meier 1942: 25-28, 65-75). The difficulty with the evaluation of aesthetic artworks is that they appear in aesthetic ideas, the particular-epitomes that affect our sensual feeling of quality and the emotional reaction to it, which do not allow us a simple and direct comparison with our knowledge of Reality.

It is esthetic enjoyment which concerns us; and ignorant as I am in Art, I have a fair share of capacity for esthetic enjoyment; and it seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the totality of Feeling—and especially to the total resultant Quality of Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating—yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that there is a Feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable Feeling. (Peirce *CP*: 5.113)

Our first interpretation and understanding of artworks are in the totality of Feeling we experience, but later we can interpret intellectually their contents, which are exhibited in their aesthetic representation of reality. The Inductive inferential evaluation of the artistic epitomized representation of reality is very difficult to analyze, similarly to Kant's problem with his *schematism*, for our pre-conceptual cognitions.

This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves. (Kant *CPuR*: A141)

We can apply this reasoning to the evaluation of aesthetic representations. We interpret and prove the truth of artworks with our entire knowledge of reality so

that the artworks are evaluated within such knowledge and their explanatory contribution to such knowledge (Hutcheson [1725]1973: IV.II). Since the evaluation of the aesthetic imaginative exhibition is basically by habitual instinctive rules, philosophers tend to think that there are no such cognitive rules and that we will not be able to discover this “secret art residing in the depths of the human soul.” Yet Peirce develops an alternative conception, that we can have “habitual knowledge” of the inner rules in the depths of our mind and that we can feel their working in us and discover them by analyzing our cognitive behavior (Nesher 1994).

According to the maxim of Pragmatism, to say that determination affects our occult nature is to say that it is capable of affecting deliberate conduct; and since we are conscious of what we do deliberately, we are conscious *habitualiter* of whatever hides in the depths of our nature; and it is presumable . . . that a sufficiently energetic effort of attention would bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a special sense, a conscious operation. (Peirce *CP*: 5.440–441, 1905; cf. 5.417ff., 1905)

With this Pragmaticist conception we endeavor to explain the epistemic rules of the cognitive operations of both the creation of artworks by artist and their evaluation by others as a cognitive operation of interpretation. Hirsch is right in his enterprise of an objective interpretation though he is wrong in separating validity from truth. This is due to his conception of the absolute truth and his lack of epistemic logic to explain the proof of the truth of interpretation and especially the quasi-proof of the instinctive-practical preverbal operation of interpretation (Hirsch 1967:235-244). The proof of the true interpretation depends on our knowledge of the artist’s truth-conditions which must be relative to our knowledge of the artist’s “spirit,” his “intellectual ideas” and the reality he endeavors to represent in the artwork. This suggestion shows also why there can be different interpretations of the artwork’s intellectual content from its aesthetic exhibition by different viewers and readers. However, without understanding the language and knowing the truth-conditions of the author we cannot understand the artwork or judge its beauty as true representation of reality (Gombrich 1960:76-78). Moreover, to reach a coherent interpretation we should understand the truth-conditions of the author’s artwork, and we cannot attain such complicated coherence by a fabrication of truth-conditions because the interminability of possible meanings cannot be controlled. Thus, only through the artist’s experiential truth-conditions of the created artwork can we interpret it. The artist reveals his intellectual ideas about reality in the appearance of the created aesthetic artwork as representing reality according to his ideas. For Hegel the truth of artwork is not just imitation of reality but the aesthetic exhibition of the artist’s true ideas of reality (Hegel [1835]1975: 74).

It is one thing for the artist simply to imitate the face of the sitter, its surface and external form, confronting him in repose, and quite another to be able to portray the true features which express the inmost soul of the subject. For it is throughout necessary for the Ideal that the outer form should explicitly correspond with the soul. (Hegel [1835]1975: 155-156)

Therefore, if the artist's imitation does not harmonize with his true Concept of reality, or he has no true ideas of reality but only imitates it, then there is no true representation of reality. In both cases there is no true representation of reality and there cannot be production of true art, the Ideal. We can say that artistic imitation of reality without spirit is *kitsch* artwork and the disharmony between the artist's concept and the aesthetic exhibition is *false* artwork. The following are the three stages of the complete operation of the artist's aesthetic representation of reality: (1) creation of the artwork, (2) discovery of the intellectual ideas in the aesthetic ideas of the created artwork, (3) evaluation the beauty and truth of the artwork.

At the stage of *Abductive Rediscovery of the Intellectual Ideas in Artwork* (figure 1.9b) the artist cannot self-control rationally this operation since it is done only by the instinctive habitual rule of Abduction. The result of this interpretation can only be proved later in the Inductive




Figure 1.9 The schemes of artwork creation, its evaluation, and the judgment of its beauty.

evaluation and the proof of the truth and beauty of the artwork's representation of reality. In Kantian philosophy this proof cannot take place, and therefore neither can the explanation of the harmony between the artist's intellectual ideas and the aesthetic ideas of his artwork. The imaginative developed aesthetic ideas C^{Dd} are sensibly richer than the intellectual ideas A^{Dd} and therefore $A^{Dd} \rightarrow C^{Dd}$, and thus the aesthetic ideas cannot be subsumed under the intellectual ideas, though the latter can be contained in the aesthetic ideas.

The Pragmaticist Epistemology Explains the Instinctive Reflective Act of Comparison

The Pragmaticist epistemology explains how the instinctive Reflective Act of Comparison between the Iconic aesthetic feeling A^{Dd} , and indexical emotional reaction C^{In} to it, and the harmony between them, amounts to the feeling of aesthetic pleasure as the beauty of the aesthetic artwork. Since this can be achieved only when the artwork aesthetically represents reality, the feeling of aesthetic beauty is also *the sense of the Truth* indicating aesthetic knowledge of this reality.

We often call the power of judgment a sense, when what we notice is not so much its reflection as merely its result. We then speak of a sense of truth, a sense of decency, of justice, etc. We do this even though we know, or at least properly ought to know, that a sense cannot contain these concepts, let alone have the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rule, but that a conception of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we were not able to rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers. (Kant [1790]1987: 293)

This rise from the instinctive reflection on our cognitive aesthetic experience to an epistemological explanation of it is the role of philosophy and other scientific inquiries. The following are the entire threefold stages of the artistic cognitive operation in creating artwork aesthetically representing reality, with the compacted stage (figure 1.9b), i.e., $A^{Dd} \rightarrow C^{Dd}$:

This is a combined cognitive operation of the artist from his knowledge of reality, creating the artwork, and to its evaluation against his comprehensive knowledge of reality. If the artistic intellectual idea A^{Ab} is exhibited in the Artwork C^{Dd} then by evaluating the meaning-content of the artwork against the artist's knowledge of reality the artist can evaluate his artwork. The question is how the artist can know whether the artwork exhibits or not his ideas of reality. The artist evaluates the harmony between his intellectual ideas A^{Ab} and his created aesthetic ideas C^{Dd} in the Deductive inference $Dd((A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{Ab}) A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{Dd})$. We should remember that C^{Ab} is the artist's




Figure 1.10 The scheme of an artwork's creation and its evaluation, and the proof of judgment of its truth and beauty.

initial Abductive experiential knowledge of reality, and therefore his basic knowledge of Reality from which he develops his intellectual ideas A^{Ab} as the theme of his intended artwork. Thus A^{Ab} is Deductively interpreted by the productive imagination as being involved in the aesthetic ideas of the artwork C^{Dd} . Then the artist has to evaluate his artistic production by an Abductive rediscovery of the embedded intellectual ideas A^{Dd} from the aesthetic ideas, the artwork C^{Dd} , i.e., $((C^{Dd} (A^{Dd} \rightarrow C^{Dd}) \Rightarrow A^{Dd})$, and next he evaluates his aesthetic artwork through the rediscovery of its intellectual ideas, its meaning-content A^{Dd} . The last stage of rediscovery and evaluation is: $Ab (C^{Dd} (A^{Dd} \rightarrow C^{Dd}) \Rightarrow A^{Dd}) + In((A^{Dd}, C^{In}) \sim \rightarrow PR_{n/m} (A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In}))$.

And thus, if C^{In} is similar to C^{Ab} , namely the enduring artist's experiential knowledge of reality before and after the creation of his artwork, then by comparing the intellectual meaning-content A^{Dd} of the artwork with his knowledge of reality C^{In} he evaluates Inductively his artwork to be a beautiful representation of reality: $In((A^{Dd}, C^{In}) \sim \rightarrow PR_{n/m} (A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In}))$ when $(A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In})$ is true. Where A^{Ab} is the artistic idea discovered-interpreted from the artist's experiential knowledge C^{Ab} ; and C^{Dd} is its aesthetic exemplification, the artwork that contains the meaning-contents of the artistic idea A^{Ab} . The Inductive inference $((A^{Ab}, C^{In}) \sim \rightarrow PR_{m/n} (A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In}))$ is the evaluation of the artwork C^{Dd} through the embedded intellectual artistic idea A^{Ab} as its meaning. Then $PR_{m/n}(A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In})$ is the evaluated coherence or incoherence of A^{Ab} with real factual knowledge C^{In} of the artist, the viewers and readers, all of whom are the interpreters of the artwork. The feeling of the coherence (or incoherence) of (A^{Ab}, C^{In}) in the inductive evaluation $PR_{m/n}(A^{Ab} \rightarrow C^{In}) = 1$ (or < 1) is the norm of judging the beauty of artworks (cf. Nesher 2002a: X).

The Evaluation of the Artwork Can Determine and Indicate Its Truth and Beauty

The evaluation of the artwork determines and indicates the truth and beauty of the artwork and proves the aesthetic judgment.

Now the nature of the artistic Ideal is to be sought in this reconveyance of external existence into the spiritual realm, so that the external appearance, by being adequate to the spirit, is the revelation thereof. (Hegel [1835]1975: 156)

The question is how the success or failure of the aesthetic exhibition can affect the beauty and truth of the artwork, and what is our indication to judge it. Indeed, we can distinguish degrees of beauty and relative truths among created artworks. Some philosophers emphasize the importance of art education for knowing how to experience artworks and basically that without understanding the aesthetic language of the artist we cannot judge properly the beauty and truth of the artwork and lament over why Venus is in exile, and rejoice when we think that beauty is restored.

However, if someone should object that there exist aesthetically perfect expressions before which one feels no pleasure, and others, perhaps flawed, which yield the liveliest of pleasure, we must recommend them to pay attention, in what is aesthetic, to what is true aesthetic pleasure. This can sometimes be reinforced or somewhat muddled up with pleasures arising from extraneous factors which are only contingently connected with it. (Croce [1902]1992: 89)

Moreover, it is possible that the artist can err or lie in the creation of the artwork and the reader or viewer can misunderstand or be deceived when the created artwork is either ugly and false or even kitsch and doubtful. Therefore we have to analyze and distinguish between beautiful, ugly, and kitsch in artworks. The following is the extended explication of the above epistemic logical scheme of the creation and evaluation of artworks by proving their being true and beautiful or false and ugly, and artworks that cannot be proved and considered doubtful and kitsch. This classification of artworks is paralleled by and connected with my Pragmaticist theory of truth that we either prove the truth or the falsity of our cognitions and that what we do not prove is just doubtful.

The question is how can we know whether the disharmony of the aesthetic exhibition or form of the artwork is due to the lack of aesthetic spirit, or the truth of the intellectual ideas embedded in the aesthetic exhibition, or due to the artist with his intellectual idea producing an inadequate aesthetic form to represent such reality. The answer is that if we know the reality the artist




Figure 1.11 The success or failure of aesthetic exhibition affects the beauty and truth of artwork.

represents aesthetically, the truth-conditions of his artwork, we can inquire into this distinction between true and false aesthetic representation of reality. However, every rational analysis of artworks starts with our experiential feelings and emotional reaction to artwork as pleasure or displeasure as its beauty and truth.

Yet why does the truth of aesthetic representation of reality affect our emotional reaction to this pleasure with beauty? The emotional reaction to artwork is an intensified indication of the true aesthetic representation of reality of human life, our life, by helping us to know ourselves better and self-control our lives in reality. Empathy and identification with characters and situations are imaginative preparations for our further behavior in similar situations, so we evaluate our emotional strength to endure such situations in the future. These emotional reactions to the true aesthetic representation of reality are components of our real life, our understanding of ourselves and also our preparation to self-control our future life (Croce [1902]1992: 89-90). The emotional reactions to such true aesthetic representations of reality, our life, are what bring us to evaluate it as beautiful artworks. The true aesthetic representation of reality includes the representation of the nature of our social life, and therefore contains a representation of its morality. We can therefore define artwork as an aesthetic representation of reality when the artistic created modes of representations are exhibited in epitomes, particularly types of characters and situations representing general features of human reality.

Chapter 2

It Is an Illusion That Artworks Are Fictitious Illusions as They Are Actually Aesthetic Modes of Representing Reality

For the whole question consists in that—what to consider as the truth. This is why the novel is written. (Dostoevsky's notations for the final part of *The Devils*, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 424)

INTRODUCTION: CREATED ARTWORKS ARE COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY AND THEIR MEANING-CONTENTS CAN BE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE CREATORS' LIFE EXPERIENCE

Can We Elucidate Our Understanding of Created Artworks by Considering Them Fictions or Ideal Thoughts?

The question is what one means by considering the created artworks as “fiction”—whether it is an imaginative text separated from human reality, or rather, a cognitive representation of this reality. The fictionalists, who see artworks as separated from the representation of real life, based their conceptions of the meaning and truth of artworks on the formal semantics of analytic philosophy (Walton 1990; Currie 1990; cf. Neshet 2002a: V, X). The difficulty with the fictionalists' epistemology of artistic creative and evaluative cognitions is that their theories of meaning and truth essentially adopt the assumptions of formal semantics of analytic philosophy, of ideal thought and models, separated from reality. It is based on Frege's, Russell's and Wittgenstein *Tractatus*, with Austin's and Searle's speech acts theory, which are also connected with Frege's Platonism that views objects as the

ideal emanating from the ideal thoughts. Indeed, Frege suggests that thoughts as ideal ideas are either true or false, yet he never showed how we prove or know their truth or falsity (Searle 1974; Neshar 2002a: IX: 2, X.5.). Searle developed a theory of illocutionary acts of assertions when the truth of the assertion is an essential condition for such an act, but he did not develop any theory of truth either for perceptual assertion or for literary fictionally assertion (Searle 1969: Ch. 3, 1979: Ch. 3).

How Can Created Artworks Cognitively Represent Human Reality?

The problem with all of those theories is that they neglect human confrontation in reality and thus are groundless theories of meaning and truth (Neshar 2002a: X, 2007b). They assume the naive common-sense conception of the perceptual representation of reality, the sense-data, without answering the difficulties that arose from Descartes and Hume to Kant, the Phenomenalists, the modern Logical Positivists and Analytic philosophers. But even assuming the common-sense naiveté, the question is whether we can accept that the truth of artworks should have the same rules of meaning and truth and the same evidence of truth and falsity as we require from perceptual assertions. In other words, does the author's creative endeavor refer to particular objects? And if it does not refer to physical objects, can it be said to refer to reality nonetheless? Let us assume that in creating and evaluating their artworks, artists do so using cognitive operations that are different from perceptual and theoretical ones. It follows that the epistemological explanations of the ways in which their works represent reality would be different as well (Searle 1979: 61ff.).

What Is the Origin and the Cognitive Function of the "Fictional Make-Believe" Artworks?

If the fictionalists assume a separation of the literary artwork as a fictional make-believe from its relation to human experience with reality and, therefore, from its representation of human reality, then the question is what is the origin and the cognitive function of the "fictional make-believe" artworks? I claim that the meaning-contents of artworks cannot arise but from the experiential knowledge of their creators, and with these meaning-contents the artworks, which originated in the confrontation in reality, relate with their aesthetic modes of representation back to this reality (Neshar 2003).

REALITY IS OUR COGNITIVE AND PHYSICAL REALITIES AND WE CANNOT REPRESENT ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER: REFLECTIVELY REPRESENTING THE MENTAL OPERATION WITH REPRESENTATION OF PHYSICAL REALITY

Analytic Philosophy's Conception of Referential Interpretation is Isolated from Reality

We cannot separate the knowledge of oneself from our knowledge of physical objects, and further, we cannot represent mental and physical realities separately, one without the other. Hence, by expressing our inner feelings, emotions and thoughts we represent reflexively their mental reality while they are representing physical reality (Nesher 2004a). Thus, artworks are not just expressions of the artist's inner feelings, emotions and thoughts, but also representing experientially the external reality of human life in the environment. However, the analytic philosophers and the hermeneutic Phenomenalists, because of their "one-sided diets" about representing reality, claim that the mental reality is, respectively, either a *description* or an *expression* but in no way a representation of the external reality itself, which is concealed from humans. Neither the formal semantic of analytic philosophy nor the phenomenology of hermeneutic philosophy can explain how human cognition represents both the physical and the mental realities. However, we cannot represent one without the other, as Kant tries to show in his "Refutation of Idealism," although this refutation remains in the subjective prison of our transcendental inner selves and assumes only outer sensual experience of phenomena, without proving the representation of external reality (Nesher 2002a: 56-66, 99-115).

The epistemology of artworks should pave its "own way" between Analytic Philosophy and the Phenomenology of Hermeneutic Philosophy to explain how creators of artworks represent reality by expressing their cognitive experience and representing their environment aesthetically. We can explain artwork as the aesthetic mode of representation of reality when the creators exemplify their general intellectual ideas about reality in allegorical particulars (e.g., Don Quixote), which function as characteristic types representing reality. What is represented in literary works? Do these works proffer empty or merely anaphoric references? Lamarque and Olsen bring a paragraph from George Moore's novel *Esther Waters* and write:

These sentences are uttered fictively. The singular terms 'she', 'the platform', 'the receding train', 'the white steam', etc., do not identify actual individuals,

though a reader is invited to make-believe that they do. The make-believe status of the references (and truth-values) does not affect a reader's ability to grasp the sense of the sentences. Having grasped the sense a reader comes to imagine (but not believe) that these events are real. Supplementation of the sentential content will help make the imaginings vivid. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 78)

This explanation of the epistemic nature of artworks and specifically of literature is based on the epistemology of the formal semanticists, which hails from the Aristotelian tradition of evaluating the meaning, the truth and the falsity of the grammatical propositions of our cognitive conduct. Indeed, this explanation is sterile, because in its formal abstraction, it can explain neither our experiential confrontation in reality, nor our understanding of the truth or falsity of our cognitions, including our cognitions of the aesthetic artworks' representation of reality. According to this grammatical understanding of truth a'la Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, Tarski, Carnap and others, only elementary perceptual judgments and observational propositions can be true because neither scientific nor aesthetic representations represent reality directly. Hence, the common logical forms of the perceptual propositions and the accepted state of affairs are only artificial models of reality. The classical Fregean scheme of the truth of basic sentences with their senses and references is presented in figure 1.4 (p. X).

We can find similar formulations in Russell's logical analysis of sentences and in Wittgenstein's conception of elementary sentences, which represent possible states of affairs by having logical forms in common with the latter. The basic difference between Frege's and Wittgenstein's semantical models, for example, is that Frege holds a Platonic metaphysics in which the Objects are abstract components that emanate from the Thoughts, whereas Wittgenstein holds a sort of Kantian metaphysics, according to which the Objects are abstract metaphysical assumptions that combine all the possible states of affairs, independent of language with its senses. The formal semanticists, a'la Fregean tradition, assume the ideal senses of our sentences with the reference to the invented ideal models of reality to explain the meanings of our language in its ideal operations, which is epistemologically separated from our experiential confrontation in reality.

The Phenomenological Interpretation of Cognitive-Phenomenal Reality Remains Subjective and Illusory

An alternative to the Analytic Philosophers' formal semantic conception of meaning and truth is the Phenomenological Hermeneuticians' conception of truth as disclosedness of the essence of being, in an interpretative operation that relates to the etymology of the Greek word *Aletheia*, which literally




Figure 2.1 The phenomenological “horizontal” interpretation of cognitive reality.

means disclosedness or unconcealment. Thus, the essence of a being unconceals itself in the interpretative operation, such that its actual appearance is the true interpretation of its essence and its truth. Yet, it is not the correspondence of a proposition to its states of affairs, but the “truth of being” is in its interpretational appearance, the essence of being is showing itself true (Heidegger [1930]1993; Gadamer [1960]1989: III.3; Macomber 1967: 93-140; Palmer 1969; Okrent 1988: 236-253).

The cognitive interpretation of the Being-here, the primordial *essence* is by, let us say, the personal cognitive Feeling, Emotional and Action/Linguistic behaviors, respectively, while Action and Language are the interpretation of the Reality-*essence* of this Being-here. This Being-here is an independent inner essence, which in its final interpretation by an Action or also by Language is a propositional expression, Interpreting the primordial Being-here, in its disclosed Essence-Truth. Hence, the Being-here, which precedes its interpretation by its Feeling and Emotional meaning in the *Action* and the *Language* is the Propositional-Cognitive interpretation of its Reality to disclosed its *essence-truth*. According to Heidegger the truth of the Being-here, its essence, remains unconcealed until the operation of interpretation of the Being-here $\Rightarrow F \Rightarrow E$, culminating in the proposition that relays its truth, since only in its disclosedness the *essence* is the *truth*, “Truth does not originally reside in the proposition” (Heidegger [1930]1993: 122-124). Truth is the disclosedness of the *Being* or the Being in its disclosedness, since the primordial Being can be True only by its disclosedness or, let us say, Pragmatically proved true, and this is our Knowledge (Heidegger [1930]1993: 9. Note).

The Heideggerian conception of truth as a propositional expression of the disclosure of the initial being can be compared to the Peircean semiosis, i.e., the evolvement of the interpretation, from the initial cognitive iconic feeling of the percept to its indexical reaction, which is then synthesized in the symbolic-verbal thought of perceptual judgment.

The question of the essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of essence. In the former question essence is understood initially in the sense of whatness (*quidditas*) or material content (*realitas*), whereas truth is understood as a characteristic of knowledge.

...

The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tastes itself as transformation of its relatedness to Being. (Heidegger [1930]1993: III 9. Note)

The question is what can be the proof of the true representation of this disclosedness, which as the initial-primordial being is true and thus the contents of knowledge—in the hermeneutic interpretation? For Heidegger, the reality-essence and truth of reality are compatible, but only at the end of interpretation, with its disclosedness. This is also the phenomenological neo-Kantian position of the contemporary Internal Realism, whereby the truth of Reality-essence is achieved by transformational-interpretational clearing the related Being, because it is assumed that the truth of reality and reality of truth are identical (Heidegger [1930]1993: 9. Note; Putnam 1981; Neshier 2002a: VII).

In Distinction From Formal Semanticists and Phenomenalists, the Peircean Realist Epistemology Can Prove the True Representation of Reality

However, for Heidegger the *truth of being* is ended phenomenally in our verbal cognition, yet with no criteria for its true knowledge. This is distinct from Peircean realist epistemology in which we are confronting in reality and can prove the true representation of it, such that being-reality is not identical with truth but can be represented by a true propositional judgment. Hence, insofar as the Hermeneuticians cannot show or prove that their theory about the truth of perceptual judgments and of artworks is the indication of their being propositional or aesthetical representations of reality, their epistemological theory cannot work.

In other words, without our confrontation in reality, and not only the cognitive phenomenal reality, Hermeneuticians cannot have any criterion for proving the truth of our cognitive representation of reality, including the created artworks. The misunderstanding of our confrontation in reality as mere perceptual operations that ensue our perceptual judgments, brings the phenomenalist Hermeneuticians to develop the “indefinite interpretations” or “hermeneutical vicious circle” as the dialectic device which does not lead to any epistemological solution that can explain our cognitive interpretation. This difficulty can also be seen with the circularity of Frege’s compositional thesis and in Wittgenstein’s difficulty with “ostensive definition” (Wittgenstein 1953; Gadamer [1960]1989: 189-191; Neshier 2002a: IX, X, 2005a).

**EXPRESSION AND DESCRIPTION ARE THE SIAMESE
TWINNS OF COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION OF
REALITY: WHY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND
HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY CANNOT
EXPLAIN THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY**

**Peircean Pragmaticist Epistemology Explains
Our Confrontation in Reality and How We
Can Prove the Truth of Representing It**

The problem with the Phenomenological Hermeneuticians' conception of truth is that what emerges or comes to light (*Aletheia*) through the operation of interpretation of any being, be it the essence of human beings or of artwork, is presumed to be true; yet they cannot find any criterion to distinguish between the truth and falsity of what has been revealed through the act of interpretation. This is so because they do not have any theory of truth, since from a phenomenological point of view the confrontation in reality to represent it is impossible (Gadamer 1986: 111-112). Therefore, they accept only intuitively, probably by a strong feeling, that the "true friend," the "true gold" or the "true artwork" are revealed in the subjective hermeneutic operation of interpretation. This is similar to Descartes, Hume and other philosophers' feeling about our perceptual experience, and notably, Frege's feeling of "the real assertive force" that makes indicative sentences true (Frege [1918]1999; Neshet 2002a: IX.2., X.5.). A similar approach can be found in Hume's writing on aesthetic sentiment as a criterion for aesthetic beauty versus the factual force of the truth of perceptual judgments (Hume [1757]1963). However, this accepted feeling about our perceptual judgments and aesthetic judgments can be only the starting point of philosophical analysis, but cannot be a philosophical explanation of their truth.

**The Siamese Twins of Interpretational and
Representational Relations in Representing Reality**

The Pragmaticist solution to the "hermeneutical circle" or the predicaments of "ad infinitum interpretations" is that we start our cognitive understanding from the elements, or the parts, and the rule of habit of our perceptual operation and, thus, by means of our reflective self-control of their interpretations, they are synthesized in the thoughts of our true perceptual judgments. These are our first propositional facts; upon them we can prove, or falsify, our scientific hypotheses, including the science of the aesthetics of artworks. To understand Hermeneutics as a conception or a theory of interpretation, we have to look at

Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics and Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics. The attempts to interpret Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics as Pragmatism cannot be the Peircean mature Pragmaticism, but can be similar to James's phenomenological pragmatism, following the early writings of Peirce and also James, due to the misunderstanding of Peirce realist epistemological revolution of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Thus, Peirce started his analysis from the introspection and phenomenological inquiry of our basic cognitive operations, his Phaneroscopy, in which he showed that from introspecting the internal relations of our perceptual operations we can detect epistemically our confrontation in reality. Hence from the internal relation of our perceptual operations we can quasi-prove our perceptual judgments as true representation of reality, as the Kantian things in themselves, yet in distinction from the Metaphysical Realism of the Cartesian and Fregean tradition and from the Internal Realism of the Berkeleyian and Kantian traditions, and so also in regard to Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics (Dahlstrom 1994: 5.4.; Nesher 2002a). Therefore, to discover one's true essence, one needs to interpret the self and according to it one must learn about oneself, about one's true essential being through one's own experience by confrontation in reality. Thus, an individual may prove the truthfulness of the representation of one's essential nature.

The Siamese twins of interpretational and representational relations in representing reality are depicted in figure 1.6 (p. X). We cannot represent physical reality without representing our own cognitive minds and vice versa and thus we represent physical reality when we prove it cognitively and we represent psychological reality when we prove it upon the constraints of physical reality. With this understanding of the nature of our mind's cognitions we can avoid the vicious circle of the "hermeneutic contextualism," since through confrontation in reality by our reflective self-control of interpretation, we can prove locally the truth of our cognitive interpretation and representation of reality upon specific proof-conditions (Nesher 2004a).

How Aesthetic Metaphors of Artworks Truly and Beautifully Represent Reality

But what are the references of the individual characters and objects that are aesthetically expressed in artworks? This depends on what we mean by *reference* in respect to artwork: it can mean either the relation of its individual characters and objects to the objects and characters of external reality, or alternatively, when Shakespeare writes about Hamlet, for example, he simply presents him as fictitious character without referring to any real person. However, because Shakespeare (to continue our example) uses the same

language in literature that he uses to refer to real persons and objects, we have the illusion that the name Hamlet still refers to some person. And although we know better than to go to seeking for a Hamlet in external reality, at least instinctively and implicitly, we refer to our life experience as a reference point, to determine whether Hamlet the literary character is a true representation and explanation of some properties and behaviors of real people. Thus we evaluate the character's representation and through the literary creation we can learn about ourselves and human characters and conducts in some specific social situations (Goodman 1978: VI.5, 1984: IV.4).

ARE ARTWORKS ILLUSORY FICTIONS OF MAKE-BELIEVE? SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AND AESTHETIC ARTWORKS ARE JUST DIFFERENT MODES OF REPRESENTING REALITY

The Aesthetic Artworks Specific Mode of Representing Reality, and Who Do the Fictional Characters of Hamlet and Ophelia Refer to?

Walton in his theory of fictional artworks, *Mimesis as Make-believe*, confuses the aesthetic modes of representing reality with "fictional worlds," as if they themselves are the represented reality. What are the references of the literary works? are they empty references, or are they only anaphoric references in their own "fictional worlds?" The question is whether by reference we mean the external reality of objects and persons or the literary reality, in which Hamlet can refer to Ophelia. As noted earlier, what confuses philosophers is that in literature, authors use the same language that we use to refer to real persons and objects. So we have the illusion that literature is illusory, since the name 'Hamlet' does not refer to any real Hamlet and nevertheless seems to have referential function. However, knowing that this is a work of literature, we do not look for the real Hamlet, but compare his character with our life experience to determine whether Hamlet is a true representation of the behaviors of people, their characters and situations. Therefore, if the problem of the truth of artworks is the truth of their aesthetic representations of reality, it is a mistake to write "Truth in fiction and the fictional world". Indeed, "in" the artworks story we can learn from the setting itself whether Hamlet's statement to Ophelia "I did love thee once," is true or false, or whether Iago's words are false when he says to Othello "Desdemona loves Cassio." The "worlds" of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and *Othello* are just the *contents* of the created artworks themselves which only metaphorically can be considered as "worlds," since their aesthetic mode of representations is the allegorical

presentation of particular persons, objects, and events, as if they comprise real worlds. Hence, the criterion of the aesthetic artwork and its beauty is its true aesthetic representation of reality, which cannot be conveyed without reference to the reality that lies beyond the created contents of the artworks. In addition, our impression of the artwork as a true representation of reality depends also on the internal coherence of the created art-world, since without such coherence, the “worlds” or the contents of the artworks could not render an aesthetic representation of the human reality.

Can Theories of Meaning and Truth of the Artistic Work Explain Also its Aesthetic Beauty?

Lamarque and Olsen wrote a long book on truth, fiction and literature, but they do not have any clear epistemology of theories of meaning and truth in general, let alone any epistemology of literature and art; they argue very forcefully against other positions about truth, fiction and literature.

Thus it is that our defense of a non-truth theory must be sharply distinguished from those currently in favour. Our account rests on no special premises, indeed on no particular metaphysical or epistemological premises at all. We certainly do not reject the idea of truth *per se*, a position that is basically incoherent, but we remain neutral as between different theories of truth; we wish to retain some conception of an objective world but without commitment to any epistemological stance concerning that world, be it realist, idealist, constructivist, foundationalist, or whatever; we will have much to say about the relation between reference and fiction but the issues do not hang on the nature of objects and objectivity; and far from understanding humanistic conception of literature our argument aims to strengthen it and in doing so find proper location for intuitions about literature’s ‘truth-telling’ capacities. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 3)

This position in respect to the epistemology of meaning and truth can be similar to Tarski’s formal semantics or Brower’s Intuitionism, as being isolated from human life and reality and trying to avoid a serious epistemology of knowledge. Therefore, they cannot develop any epistemic theory of truth, beside a fragmentary formal semantic logic and subjective intuitionist logic, which is barely capable of providing an explanation of human knowledge and life (Putnam 1990: Ch. 1; Neshet 2002a: V, VIII, X). Although argumentation is indeed an element of philosophical inquiry, it cannot replace a serious theory that one can argue for and prove its truth (cf. Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 3).

It is intended to answer the problem about the cognitive value of literature, to develop a coherent and consistent account of the traditional demand that

literature to be good and great must have a content of universal interest. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 438).

The approach of Lamarque and Olsen falls short because they avoid developing their own theories of meaning and truth of artistic literature to explain its aesthetic true representation of reality. Instead they adhere to what they call the standard theories thereof, namely theories that are based either on formal semantics and speech acts of the Analytic Philosophy or the Intuitionistic logic that can hardly work even in their accepted conditions, let alone in any truth theory about human's cognitive representation of reality (Nesher 2002a, 2005a, 2017). Thus, they cannot develop an epistemology of literature as a cognitive enterprise and simultaneously suggest not only that true or false propositions can only be examined in relation to the work's immediate assertions about phenomenal perceptual objects, but also that the thematic propositions of literature are only *about* their *contents*. Yet meaning-contents are components of the propositions and they cannot be about themselves, but only about reality (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: Ch. 13, esp. 328-331). Moreover, Lamarque and Olsen based the appreciation of literary works on these works being *interested* or *important*. "Judgments about interest are made with regard to content and are independent of judgments concerning truth" (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 329).

The problem is that one cannot determine *interest* or *importance* and *trivial* or *superficial* without any objective criteria, but only by determining whether they constitute a true representation of reality. Hence either the scientific theories are fictional (the instrumentalist's conception of theories) as are the literary artworks (the fictionalists conception of artworks), or they are both products of human cognitions that represent reality, but in different cognitive modes. The difficulty is to inquire and understand how, for example, theoretical, moral, and aesthetical cognitive enterprises are different modes of representing reality.

One can suggest that at least we can detect particular atoms and electrons in physical reality (realistic conception of theories), but we will never detect Hamlet or Anna Karenina in social reality (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 19). However, the scientific "atom" and "electron" are not proper names but a general name of a group of similar objects and thus we also can say that the literary "Hamlet" or "Anna Karenina" are not proper names of real persons, but general names that refer to certain types personality and conducts, identifying different individuals who have a similar character and similar motivations (Goodman 1978: VI.5, 1984: IV.4). Thus, it is an illusion that literary works are illusions of make-believe. Rather, it is an illusion that Hamlet or Anna Karenina are proper names of specific persons in the world, whereas they are characters of literary stories that represent certain types of people in

particular situations. About this we find evidence in Dostoevsky's letter to Katov about his writing of *The Devils*:

One of the most important events in my story will be Ivanove's murder by Nechayev, which is well known in Moscow. I hasten to add a reservation: I do not know and never have known either Nechayev or Ivanov, or the circumstances of this murder, except from the newspapers. And even if I had, I would not have begun copying them. I'm only taking the accomplished facts. My fantasy can in the highest degree differ from the reality that took place, and my Pyotr Verkhovensky may in no way resemble Nechayev, but it seems to me that in my astonished mind imagination has created that character, that type, which corresponds to this crime. (Dostoevsky October 8, 1870, from the letter to Katov, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 409; cf. P. 35)

Thus we can see that for the anti-realists like Goodman and Rorty, scientific theories and artworks are all made-up fictions, whereas for the fictionalists there is a demarcation between science and art, such that science is realistic and truth seeking and the arts are anti-realistic (Goodman 1978; Rorty 1982). Setting aside the anti-realists' and phenomenologists' view of science, the problem with the way in which fictionalists and anti-realists view artworks and aesthetic creations confuses the artistic modes of representation with the realities that are represented using the aesthetic mode. Scientific theories and artistic novels, poetry and more, are all modes of human cognitive representation of physical and social reality—not these realities themselves. The particular artworks are also physical signs cum cognitive presentations of characters and objects, but these are not the real human characters and social and physical reality which they represent. And the question is not whether Hamlet or Anna Karenina exist as human beings but whether they aesthetically represent real human types of characters and conducts. The confusion between the aesthetic reality of artworks and the reality they represent is the result of a lack of epistemology of meaning and truth of the created artworks formulated through confrontation in reality, in distinction from the Aristotelian-Tarskian formal semantic conceptions of meaning and truth that fail to work outside the abstract structures (Margolis 1965: Ch. 11, 1980: Ch. 12; Walton 1990; Lamarque and Olsen 1994: Ch. 1; cf. Quine 1953: 44; Neshet 2002a: V, X).

Peircean Epistemic Logic Representing Our Confrontation in Reality to Explain How Theories, Moral Rules, and Aesthetic Metaphors Have Different Modes of Representing Reality

The attempts to antagonize science and art are based on an inadequate epistemology of human cognitive conduct in reality. The logic of science is not, as the logical positivists and the analytic philosophers thought, and probably

still think, systems of formal axiomatic deductive structure, in contrast with their conceptions of the creation and evaluation of artworks, which they believe are devoid of any rules or concepts, as Kant and his phenomenalist followers think. However, epistemologically, in both sciences and artworks, we operate even implicitly with the more complete logical structure, ala Peircean epistemic logic with the trio sequence of Abduction, Deduction and Induction inferences in confrontation in reality. Yet, the difference between science and art is in the operation of this complete epistemic logic at different levels of self-consciousness and self-control in different modes of representation. The question is whether the operations of proving the truth of the representation—in science and in artwork—are the same, or rather, is there no such proof in the case of artwork because it is not a true representation of reality, as hermeneutic Phenomenalists suggest and argue for (Gadamer [1960]1989: I.3)?

The question is what one means by fiction, whether it is a text separated from the context of human world or is it a representation of it? The fictionalists have no epistemology of artistic cognition with theories of meaning and truth, and therefore they rely either on formal semantics of analytic philosophy, based on Frege's, Russell's and Wittgenstein *Tractatus*, with Tarski's and Carnap's developed formalism and Austin's and Searle's speech acts theory that is based on Frege's ideas, or, like the hermeneutic Phenomenalists, they rely on the subjective intuitions. Both paths refrain from confrontation in reality and consequently have defective theories of meaning and truth.

SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AND AESTHETIC ARTWORKS ARE DIFFERENT MODES OF REPRESENTING REALITY

Different Modes of Representing Reality Are Distinguished from Formal Perceptual References

We can assume a similarity between scientific theories, ethical rules, and aesthetic artworks, and even see the myths as a kind of work of art, metaphorical representations of reality, with types exemplified by characters.

Fiction, then, whether written or painted or acted, apply truly neither to nothing nor to diaphanous possible world but albeit metaphorically, to actual worlds. Somewhat as I have argued elsewhere that the merely possible—so far as admissible at all—lies within the actual, so we might say here again, in the different context, that the so called possible worlds of fiction lie within actual worlds. Fictions operate in actual worlds in much the same way as nonfiction. (Goodman 1978: 104; cf. 1984: 60)

Now the problem with Goodman's special kind of phenomenalism, which cognitively recognizes our possible and actual worlds, is about the relationship between his worlds, his versions of fictional artworks, and the actual world (Goodman 1978: I.5., 1984: II.2.). According to Goodman there are many versions of our making the actual world, or many worlds, and thus there are versions of artworks as fictional kind of worlds, and they relate to the actual worlds, which are not artistic worlds. Moreover, we must ask how does our scientific world-making differ from our artistic world-making and if both are our cognitive makings, are all of them fictional or actual? What then is the difference between different types of made worlds? Or are the fictional art worlds themselves versions of the scientific worlds? It seems that relation of reference must be a component of a world, or of a version of the world, and the question is whether it is possible to have references across the various versions of worlds, or do they only function inside one of them?

If references can function across worlds, there must be a relationship of transformation between worlds and, therefore, all of them would consist of the one world, and then all the plurality of worlds is vanished. Hence, we must accept that all references are in the same version of the actual world. Nevertheless, the difficulty is whether the references of literary and all artworks must be in their own version only or also across to the actual world. However, it seems that there cannot be reference relations between the worlds of the artworks and the actual world, since Hamlet can refer to Ophelia but cannot refer to you to say that your conduct is similar to his. Therefore, the relations between the artwork world and the actual worlds are not of reference, but of representation, as Shakespeare's intellectual ideas are intended to represent specific kind of human conduct in such difficult situation in the legend of the Kingdom of Denmark.

It turns out that although Goodman's intuition about literature and other artworks as many versions of the actual world was correct, the relationship of the artworks to the world of human life cannot be *referential*, like the logic of the perceptual judgments, as the Kantian and Formal Semanticists assume, but rather *representational*. However, to consider artworks as fictional worlds because the *references* of characters in artworks can operate only inside their own world version, is nevertheless an illusion (Goodman 1984: 66-71). This is so, because the artists who create their artworks are themselves part of the actual world, being phenomenal, or rather real, and their realities are independent of being cognitively represented, and artworks are likewise components of the actual world and, as such, they cannot be fictional. Indeed, within the world of the artwork, characters refer to objects and incidents that are inside their own world as if they are not fictional and, as such, the characters are not real human beings; rather, they are intended as aesthetic representations

of actual humans and human conduct in the actual world (Goodman 1978: VI.5, 1984: IV.4).

The references in the actual world and their meanings are based on our empirical experience and the actual aesthetic artworks are components of our actual world and yet, they can represent it cognitively, as is also the case with scientific theories and ethical moral laws. This similarity of references is due to their meanings which were extracted by the artists from their own life in the actual world, to create the aesthetic artworks as metaphorical embodiments, epitomes that aesthetically represent the actual world (Goodman 1984: III.2.).

Metaphors in artworks convey a meaning aesthetically and eventually they are recognized as true representations of reality, but to consider them as fictions is to distort the role of artworks as representations of the human actual world, as works that denote an aesthetic knowledge of reality. However, Goodman's subjective phenomenalist epistemology of his "*ways of world-making*" does not have any objective criteria for determining whether the works of art convey true meaning and are true representations of reality. Is there any criterion for beauty and truth of the aesthetic metaphorical representation of reality? Given that fictional artworks are components of phenomenal actual worlds, is their relation to the actual world *referential* or *metaphorical* (Goodman 1984: III.2., e.g., p. 73)? Indeed, Kant's difficulty is his assumption that aesthetic judgments can somehow be of the structure of the perceptual logical judgments, namely as references to objects that fall under the propositional concept. Hence, Kant's identification of theoretical and especially aesthetic mode of *representation* of reality with the perceptual *references* of objects prevents him from explaining the objectivity of aesthetic judgments, which for him remain subjective, or rather mysterious, judgments (Goodman 1984: III.4. pp. 80-86; Neshet 2005b).

Indeed, Goodman's ingenious intuition, that Cervantes' Don Quixote is the artistic true representation of reality of some typical persons in the relevant situations, remains a phenomenalist illusion, instead of a solution for understanding the cognitive and social roles of literature and art. Therefore, Goodman's perspective as "a radical relativism under rigorous restraints that eventuates in something akin to irrealism" remains irrealism, namely relativism without rigorous restraints, which cannot explain how artworks can represent reality truly (Goodman 1978: x, Ch. I, VI.5, VII.7; 1984: 59-71, 80-86, 126-130). Goodman's difficulties can be exemplifying in the following quote: "An extremely important but often overlooked form of *nondenotational* reference is exemplification: reference by a sample to a feature of the sample" (Goodman 1984: 59).

Or alternatively, *nondenotational* reference is *representation*, but it is conveyed by particular aesthetic characters that are samples of general features

and characteristics of many in the real world, for example, Don Quixote in relation to almost every person in the reality.

Representational Realism Versus Radical Phenomenalism: Scientific Theories, Moral Rules, and Aesthetic Artworks, Representing Reality upon Perceptual Facts

The riddle of Goodman's radical phenomenism can be solved if we understand realistically, contrary to Goodman's phenomenist perspective, that all his versions of the worlds, by being proved true, are actually cognitive modes of representing reality, which is independent from being represented by them (Peirce *CP*: 6.95, 1903). In other words, Goodman, by following Kant's phenomenism, C.I. Lewis' structure of concepts and the formal semantic symbolic systems, confuses our modes of representing reality with external reality itself, as if they are themselves the worlds or versions of "the world" or the cluster of versions that constitutes a world (Lewis, C.I. 1946; Goodman 1978: x, Ch. I). Also, in a similar vein, according to the approach that approximates subjective intuitionism,

There are, moreover, also good reasons for avoiding terms like 'truth', 'knowledge', and 'insight'. These concepts invite the theories to assimilate the cognitive value of literature to that of philosophy, history, and science, and it raises the temptation to see imaginative truth and literary insight as having the same epistemological status and as being subject to the same logical constraints as philosophical, historical, or scientific truth. Consequently, the better way is to dispense with the use of these concepts altogether. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 438)

Accordingly, literature and culture cannot be explained as representations of reality and hence only by vague concepts that cannot explain literary common judgments (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: Ch. 1, 13). Yet the question is, what do Lamarque and Olsen mean by "imaginative truth and literary insight", if the imagination and insight of artworks can develop cognitively only from the experience of the artist with human and natural realities. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the philosophical, historical, or scientific inquiries without imagination and insight, and there cannot be any human knowledge which is disconnected from reality or from its truth. It seems that Lamarque and Olsen have an inaccurate conception of the "logical constraints" of philosophy, history, and science, if the philosophers, historians and scientists by their confrontation in reality cannot serve also the authors of literature due to the distinction between these works and the literature, respectively, direct or indirect relation to reality. From this distinction, Lamarque and Olsen infer

that literature is not a true or false representation of reality (although, with the exception of perceptual experience in reality, no knowledge is in direct referential relation to reality, as the illusory formal semantic model of meaning, truth, and representation suggests) (cf. Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 438-9; comp. Neshet 2002a: II, III, V, VII, IX, X).

As we have identified it, the principal representational quality of literary works resides in a kind of ‘aboutness’—explained as a thematic content—akin to that applied to fiction. In this respect at least we have emphasized the fictional aspect of literary works. And this, it might be contended, weakens the idea of true representation. By substituting a thematic aspect for a genuine mimetic aspect in explaining the cognitive value of literature, the objection turns, we have failed to account for the requisite ‘direct representational relation’. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 438)

Indeed, the cognitive relation between the artwork and the world cannot be “direct representational relation” to reality, because artworks represent reality through our direct representation of perceptual judgments. However, Lamarque and Olsen do not have any theory of truth of representing reality to explain either perceptual judgments or scientific enterprises, and since they cannot find any alternative to the accepted contemporary enterprises of Formal semantics and Hermeneutic-Phenomenology epistemologies, they prefer a sort of intuitive conception of the appreciation of artworks and especially literature (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 5-14; Neshet 2002a, 2016, 2018).

Our principle debate is with those who want a ‘stronger’ sense of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ applied to literature, i.e., those who see the aim of literature as a conveying or teaching or embodying universal truths about human nature, the human conditions, and so on, in a sense at least *analogous* to that in which scientific, or psychological, or historical hypotheses can express general truths. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 6)

Indeed, the epistemological distinction is between the perceptual judgments, as the source of our basic knowledge, and the other types of scientific and ethical knowledge, which are based on perceptual judgments; thus, it is crucial to understand that artworks’ aesthetic representation is a specific mode of knowledge representing the human condition and human nature. Those general types of knowledge do not have particular names referring to particular objects in reality, but nevertheless they represent them, though in different modes than perceptual judgments do. Yet, they are neither illusions nor formal semantic pictorial representations, as

analytic philosophers tend to suggest. The theorists of fictional make-believe confuse aesthetic modes of representation with what they call “fictional worlds.” But these “fictional worlds” of art are just the meaning-contents of aesthetic modes of representations, which are kinds of particular allegorical prototypes exemplifying the artist’s general ideas about human and natural reality. The artwork aesthetically represents reality by exemplifying the artistic idea in a particular metaphor, as in the example of *Don Quixote*, which is the aesthetic presentation representing characters and life in reality. Thus Goodman writes,

Taken literally, *Don Quixote* describes no one—there never was or will be the Man of La Mancha—but taken metaphorically, *Don Quixote* describes many of us who battle wind mills (or windbags). A fantastic allegory, though an unrealistic fictive-person-story when read literally, may be realistic real-person-story when taken metaphorically. (Goodman 1984: 130)

And yet Goodman’s perspective as “a radical relativism under rigorous restraints that eventuates in something akin to irrealism” is actually relativism without any rigorous criteria in terms of external reality, given that his epistemology cannot explain how artworks can represent reality truly and beautifully, or rather falsely (Goodman 1978: x). This can be solved if we understand realistically that all his “versions” or “worlds” are actually cognitive modes of representation of reality which is independent of being represented by them. Artworks differ from science in their modes of representing reality: artwork embodies ideas by concretization in particular characters that reflect universal features of concrete human life, whereas science seeks to identify general formulas and theories in order to represent objects and behaviors. Some philosophers suggest distinguishing between aesthetic truth and scientific truth. Yet the distinction is not between different conceptions of truth, but rather between different modes of representation that can be proven true of reality. Indeed, the conception of truth is not Tarski’s formal logic definition and not the mysterious phenomenalist conception of unconcealment, but the Pragmaticist explication that includes all human cognitive representations of reality as theoretic, ethic, and aesthetic in artworks, and perceptual judgments (Nesher 2002a).

According to my Pragmaticist theory of truth, we can understand Goodman’s different versions of worlds as rather proven true theories of representations of reality. Although all of them are true they are proven relative to their different proof-conditions, such that these are independent and true representations of reality, like the difference between the true Newtonian and Einsteinian physical theories. Yet, the pragmatist theory of truth is not involved in “radical relativism” (Goodman 1978; cf. Nesher 2002a: X).

The artworks' relationship with reality is not through our perceptual judgments, as in the illusory model of reality proposed by formal semantics, models are intuitive assumptions, seemingly alternatives to reality itself, yet without proving their representation of reality (Nesher 2002a: V, 2003). Lamarque and Olsen argued for the functionality of literary artworks without having any epistemology of aesthetics representation and by accepting the standards of formal semantics analytic philosophy, which cannot explain human cognitive representation of reality in perceptual judgments and scientific theories (Nesher 2016). Yet Lamarque and Olsen insist that fiction can be defined independently of semantic notions of reference and truth (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 47). They based their conception of literature as fiction on their epistemological dichotomy between artworks and other kinds of human cognitions that represent reality, such as philosophy, history, and science. This is the Kantian dichotomy between artistic creativity, aesthetic judgments, and scientific knowledge. The separation of the aesthetic experience of beauty from the cognition of Reality makes the aesthetic judgments arbitrary and without any epistemic explanation. Thus, Kant just identified beauty with pleasure without explaining epistemically the cognitive source of such pleasure, which—as such—remains subjective.

Walton on *Mimesis as Make-Believe* and his Confusions: Truth Cannot be in the Aesthetic “Worlds” as Modes of Representation but in Their Relation to Reality

According to Walton, by self-representation we know the beauty of artwork, as with the disclosure of truth by Heidegger, but the criteria for the communal agreement cannot be the “discourse agreements” of Stanley Fish or Kant's common-sense, because they too need an objective criterion in order to be communally accepted (Walton 1990: 2.9; Nesher 1994). Walton in his theory of fictional artworks, *Mimesis as Make-believe*, confuses aesthetic modes of representing reality with presentation of fictional worlds of imagination, without any theory of meaning, beauty and truth by which to objectively judge the artworks. According to Walton, Make-belief is the *imitation* of things as they are in experience, namely, once children already know some segment of reality, they learn how to *practice* their conducts in reality accordingly.

What all representations have in common is a role in *make-believe*. Make-believe, explained in terms of imagination, will constitute the core of my theory. I take seriously the association with children's games—with playing house and school, cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, with fantasies built around dolls, teddy bears, and toy trucks. We can learn a lot about novels, paintings,

theater, and film by pursuing analogies with make-believe activities like these. (Walton 1990: 4)

According to Walton, make-believe is the imitation-depiction of objects in reality as if the imitation is the object itself, by the reflexive presentation of itself as he explains in the following quote.

Some representations are their own objects . . . A doll directs players of the game not just to imagine a baby, but to imagine the doll itself to be a baby. So it generates fictional truths about itself; it represents itself. Let's call it a *reflexive* representation. (Walton 1990: 3.6.: 117)

Is Reflexive self-representation possible and does it work for artworks' representations of reality (Walton 1990: 3.6.)? The conception of self-representation is probably based on the explanation that the imitation is identified with the object itself and therefore representation can be self-representation, but then we cannot know its meaning and truth when it is divorced from our empirical experience in reality, because all that we know is its phenomenal form.

Let us look at the artworks themselves, as for example, the character of Don Quixote. This character cannot be such a mimetic imitation, because there is no such person in reality, but then Cervantes must have created it from nothing, and so it is also for all artworks' representation of reality. Yet Picasso's portrayal of his beloved Dora is not an imitation, but a representation of her character in his specific cubist artistic language, not a mimetic representation, but a representative display of her character, which we did not know and thus acquired new knowledge about her personality. To represent is to discover and prove new true knowledge about reality. However, the mimesis-imitation of Walton contradicts the Aristotelian conception of mimesis as the experiential acquisition of new knowledge that teaches us about reality.

And it is also natural for all to delight in works of mimesis. This is shown by experience: Though the things themselves may be painful to see, we take delight in seeing the most perfect image (εἰκών/icon) of them, the forms for example of obscene beasts and corpses. The reason is this. Learning things gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it. The reason that we enjoy seeing images is that one is at the same time learning and gathering what each thing is . . . (Aristotle 1941: 1448b2-6; cf. Walton 1990: 4-5).

We can see from Aristotle's reasoning why we enjoy artworks' representation of our reality, as we can learn from their aesthetic representations of

reality, and we have an emotional reaction to it, because by learning from such a representation of reality we are also able to know it rationally and, in turn, control our conduct in it in a practical sense. Yet, Aristotle would not be able to explain how we learn from artworks if he considered mimesis an imitation of reality, because he understands representation as though initially based on iconic feeling, like a picture on the tablet a'la Descartes, relation as grammatical in the fashion of formal semantics, which assigns a relation to the abstract structure of objects, based on the common-sense understanding of perceptual judgment, when we perceive the object directly. Yet this is not the artistic mode of representation, even in the art of painting, which is more of the artist interpretation than a copy of the presented object (Plato 1961: 957-1017; Wittgenstein [1921]1961: *Tractatus*). However, Aristotle has another kind of mimesis which is not iconic but explanatory with the universal-type representation rendered through particular and individual allegorical-characters (Hospers 1946: VI; Neshar 2002a: V).

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the [particular] thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e., what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universal, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such and such kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is already made up of probable incidents that they give it a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any name that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the historic names; . . . Nevertheless, even in Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are some without a single known name, . . . and it is not less delightful on that account. So that one must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which tragedies are based. (Aristotle 1941: 1451a36-1451b25; cf. Hospers 1946: VI.2)

We can understand that according to Aristotle, History is a collection of facts, whereas philosophy and poetry are general theories about reality, though probably with different kinds of representation. The Aristotle's

conception of the connection between the aesthetic universal-type presented by particular metaphors, and allegorical-characters in representation of reality seems to be essential for understanding the specific mode of artistic artworks aesthetical representation of reality (Hospers 1946: Part II). Hirsch is right in his enterprise for an objective interpretation, though he is wrong in separating validity from truth. This is due to his conception of the absolute truth, and due to his lack of an epistemic logic, by which to explain the proof of the truth of interpretation and especially the quasi-proof of the instinctive-practical pre-verbal operation of interpretation (Hirsch 1967).

Once again I want to emphasize that literature does not present us with propositions which are empirically verifiable like those of science and history; few if any statements in novels, that is, depicting the action or thought of a fictional character, can be verified in the way that informative propositions can. And yet they are true-to human nature as we know it. Thus in a way we *can* verify what the artist has presented; we can verify his insight in our own further observations of people and actions. (Hospers 1946: 173)

Hospers' epistemology of artwork suggests that the artistic artworks are a typical mode of representing reality, similar to what I suggest; yet, his use of "fictional character" is mistaken, because according to his explanation, an artwork represents reality by its created characters and situations, which as aesthetic ideas can be proved true aesthetic representation of "our own further observations of people and actions." But then Hospers seems to contradict himself by claiming: "The novel does not *state* truths about human nature; but it presents them indirectly by simply *being* true-to human nature, allowing us to see these (fictitious) characters revealed, and leaving us to draw the proper inferences and make the application to the people around us" (Hospers 1946: 206).

The reason is that Hospers seems to stick to the propositional conception of truth of the formal semantics of the Analytic Philosophy, in distinction from the realism of pragmaticist epistemology in understanding artwork as specific aesthetic mode of representing reality, as will be shown below. Moreover, Hospers with his separation of the "aesthetic surface" from the "artistic truth" of artworks allows the artworks to be aesthetic but not true, such that for him the artwork having aesthetic beauty is independent of its being true to human reality. But this is due to a sort of Logical Positivist conception of models or Kantian Phenomenalist conception of truth, reality and knowledge that Hospers accepted after all (Hospers 1946: VII, VIII; Neshet 2002a: III, V, IX, X).

However, according to my Pragmaticist theory, the beauty of an artwork's "aesthetic surface" is in its aesthetic "artistic truth" representation of reality,

and we can generalize and say that artworks that have an “aesthetic surface” but without “artistic truth” are merely kitschy. And thus we cannot say that the beauty of an artwork depends basically on the “aesthetic surface” and that the “artistic truth” is only a bonus. But, as Hospers also writes, “There are propositions about human nature which we may be able to assert after reading Dostoevsky, which we never could in the other cases . . .” and yet “The writer was sincerely convinced that his novels lacked sufficient artistry,” or in other words, that the “aesthetic surface” of his artworks was “inferior to such artists as Turgenev and Lev Tolstoy” (Hospers 1946: 206).

Here we can make the distinction between the Aristotelian mimesis, “the most perfect image (εἰκών/icon) of them”, of objects, in distinction from the artworks aesthetic metaphors that represent reality, which, according to Kant’s impressive intuition, are already embedded with *rational concepts* (Kant [1790]1987: 313-315). Hence Walton’s identification of the Aristotelian mimesis with artworks’ make-believe is an epistemological misunderstanding of the role of artworks in their aesthetic mode of representing reality and our emotional and rational knowledge of ourselves in it (Walton 1990).

The concept of iconic-mimesis can be understood through the analysis of the initial stages of perceptual operation as our basic experience, which we can inquire through phenomenal introspection into its signs and their interpretations and reflect on their relationships. From this introspection, we can detect the relation between the perceptual *Iconic* sign of feeling, and the *Indexical* sign of emotional reaction to it, which by interpreting the former the latter presents the “immediate object” sign that are synthesized in the thought to expectable quasi-proof by the perceptual judgment representing external reality (Peirce *CP*: 5.53, 1903, *EPII*: #11, 1903). As can be seen in figure 1.7 (p. X), we can detect the place and the role of the *Icon-Mimetic feeling* in our basic experience of confrontation in reality, which is an important stage in our perceptual operation. However, only their synthesis in *symbolic* thought can be interpreted conceptually to form our Perceptual Judgment, which is proven a true representation of external reality, yet not by the *Icon-Mimetic* itself (see figure 1.7, p. X).

We can assume a similarity between scientific theories and aesthetic artworks, and even consider mythologies as a form of artwork that represents reality through the archetypes embodied in individuals, such as gods, heroes, and other mythological characters. Thus, the author, the reader, the artist and the literary critic of the artwork can sense its beauty and identify—instinctively and practically, or even rationally—their quasi-proofs or proofs of its truth, which leads one to draw a conclusion and render an aesthetic judgments regarding the beauty of the artwork. Hence, we can understand the nature of the artistic works as an aesthetic representation of reality, and the artworks as

compositions that use a specific aesthetic language, whether verbal, pictorial, vocal (Gombrich 1960: 76-78; Cooke 1959; Stephan 1990: #8.5).

THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF THE ARTWORK IN HUMAN LIFE AND HOW THE CREATORS AND THE SPECTATORS OF ARTWORKS EVALUATE THEM

Aesthetic Artworks Are Not Fiction, but Represent Reality upon Perceptual Facts and Common-Sense Knowledge

There is a similarity between the proof operation of science and the proof operation of artwork. In the evaluation of scientific theories, there are no ordinary perceptual judgments of facts, as scientists prove the truth or the falsity of scientific hypotheses upon the proved true general observational propositions. This is not the case with what is called “fictional” literary works, because artworks contain not variables but particular names that have no individual referents outside of themselves, and the question is how artworks nevertheless can be judged true or false. We can consider the individual names of characters in literary artworks in order to exemplify their personal attributes in their fictitious environment, and thus the question of the truth of such artworks is whether there is any explanatory force to view them as representing real lives. In such a discussion, in spite of Goodman’s Phenomenalist’ standpoint and his problem with truth and reality independent of being represented by us, as his only reality is of our cognitively *world-making*, it is interesting to see his three types of realism and representation (Goodman 1984: IV.4).

A typical English eighteenth-century portrait is more realistic, according to prevalent Western usage, than a Picasso showing three sides of a head at once or an El Greco accentuating upward swirls; [and so on] . . . Realism in all these cases depends upon familiarity; the pictures in the accustomed, standard mode of representation count as the more realistic.

“Realism”, though, has another use as well. Practical palls; and new mode of representation may be so fresh and forceful as to achieve what amount to a revelation (Languages of Art, pp. 37-38). This was true for standard Western perspective when it was invented during the Renaissance, and no less true for modes that broke away from that system, such as the Oriental mode when rediscovered by the late-nineteenth-century French painters, and various modes developed by the later artists . . . (Goodman 1984: 126-127)

Hence, according to Goodman, the first kind of realism is “standard mode of representation”, and the second one is aiming “to achieve what amounts to

a revelation". However, "Realism is not always a matter of familiarity or of revelation. . . . Where literary works are concerned, this third sort of realism often takes precedence over the other. The distinction between a realistic and unrealistic story usually lies rather in what is said than in how" (Goodman 1984: 128).

Hence, the third one is "rather in the told than in the telling", namely "*Don Quixote* describes no one" and yet, "*Don Quixote* describes many of us who battle wind mills" (Goodman 1984: 130). Indeed, realism in aesthetic artworks is not embodied in their different styles or their "aesthetic surface," which Goodman considers the first two types of realism, but in a third kind, namely, the "artistic truth," i.e., "the true aesthetic representation of reality" (Goodman 1984: 130). In the analysis of the cognitive operation of aesthetic representation of reality, I will show that Goodman's two former types of 'realism', or better yet, the two kinds of aesthetic presentations, are only a matter of differences in style and in the language of the artist. However, in contradiction with Goodman's radical phenomenism, the third type of "realism", the allegorical representation of the reality which is external to the aesthetic presentations can be proved true and beautiful, and can be specific and essential to all modes of artworks (Goodman 1968: 68-70, 1978: 17-19, 1984: 30-41, 80-86, 102-107, 126-133).

However, understanding the nature of literature and art as fictions, their styles and their artistic languages of presentations, depends on the accepted epistemology which determines their beauty and truth. Therefore, realistically we have to understand the nature of the artistic-aesthetic representation of reality, which is different from the truth of perceptual judgments propositions and the formal semantic abstraction from them, as one can find in the analytic tradition of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and their followers. Therefore, it is a mistake to write on "Truth in fiction and fictional world" if the problem of the truth of artworks is not "in" the, so called, fictional stories. One cannot ask whether it is true that Hamlet says to Ophelia "I did love thee once", or whether it is false that Iago says to Othello that "Desdemona loves Cassio." The worlds of Shakespeare's Hamlet or Othello are not fictional worlds because these worlds are nothing but the presentational contents of the artworks themselves, which only metaphorically can be considered as "worlds." This is so because the aesthetic modes of representations are allegorical representation of particular persons, objects, and events, which with our imagination we can picture them as if they comprise real worlds. However, the worlds of artworks are not fictions, but the aesthetic metaphorical-allegorical representation of the world of the human life. In the above-mentioned case, the world that Shakespeare experienced is represented in these artworks, and the question is how can we prove their truth and beauty (Currie 1990: ##2.1, 2.2).

Currie's discussion of fictional and possible worlds is in the line of the formal semantic analytic philosophy, with its fictional possible models of reality, but with an artificial theory of truth and of the impossibility to explain the representational role of artworks (comp. Currie 1990: Ch. 2, 4; Neshar 2002a: III, V, IX, X). In a similar way we can understand the arguments of Kivy against Lamarque and Olsen's criticism of the propositional theory of literary-fictional truth of the general thematic propositions expressed therein. It seems that neither of them has any viable theory of truth, or only the theory of truth of the accepted formal semantics, which cannot work in real life, or else, the vague intuition of the common-sense notion of truth. Therefore, they cannot understand where to look for the truth of artworks and end up with a misguided discussion of the truth of artworks (Neshar 2002a: V).

Debate about the truth or falsity of the propositions implied by a literary work is absent from literary criticism since it does not enter into *the appreciation of the work as a literary work*. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 334; cf. Kivy, 1997: Ch. 5 and p. 122)

This argument can hold also for the acceptance of ordinary perceptual judgement and scientific discourse, if we consider the ordinary language use and what the ordinary language philosophers take as their basic evidence for their philosophizing. Yet we should look into the epistemology of aesthetic creativity and the manner in which the creators of artworks relate to their own reality, their environment and society, and what criteria are used by readers and spectators to evaluate what is essential in the great artworks, to appreciate or depreciate them. For example,

I'm only taking the accomplished facts. My fantasy can in the highest degree differ from the reality that took place, and my Pyotr Verkhovensky may in no way resemble Nechayev, but it seems to me that in my astonished mind imagination has created that character, that type, which corresponds to this crime. (Dostoevsky, October 8, 1870, from the letter to Katov, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 409)

However, the created character does not correspond to an individual person, but to a type of a criminal behavior and crime, and the created imaginative character should be true representation of such human behavior. There are no ordinary "judgments" in scientific theories and the scientists only prove the truth or the falsity of their scientific hypotheses and general propositions of observation. This is not the case with so called "fictional" or literary works and the question is how artworks nevertheless can be considered a true representation of reality. We can consider the individual names in

literary artworks as a disguise of variables that are needed in order to present or exemplify concretely the reality of humans with their environment, and the question of the truth of artworks is about the work's explanatory power. In literary artworks the natural language employed differs from its regular use and we learn how to understand and interpret their texts and how their representation of reality differs from other modes of representing reality. However, the understanding of the nature of artworks depends on the epistemology by which we prove them as true and beautiful, in distinction from the epistemology of the formal semantics and the related speech act theory, because formally we cannot prove any human knowledge and that includes knowledge of artwork as well. Therefore, the problem is to understand the nature of the artistic-aesthetic representation of reality, which is different from the truth of perceptual judgments propositions and from the formal semantic abstraction derived from them (Nesher 2002a: V, IX, X).

It is possible to criticize Walton's suggested fictionality of artworks, by claiming that if there is no one-to-one correspondence between representation and the represented then all human cognitions are fictitious. Yet this is not the weakness of Lamarque and Olsen's critique; rather, what is wrong is the reliance on formal semantic model of representation. In light of aestheticians' acceptance of this model as the only theory available, artists are persuaded to make artworks *sui generis* and eliminate art's representational function of human knowledge of reality. Is there any fictive representation in artworks and of any other cognitive modes of representation? *Fiction* can be a misunderstanding or misapplication of cognitions, verbal, pictorial or metaphorical, or it can refer to something other than what cognitions conventionally mean and refer, in distinction from true, false or doubtful cognition.

The epistemological difficulty with the conception of fictional works is how we understand their meanings, if not from our empirical experience in the real world, since otherwise it is meaningless, unless, a'la Frege, we assume our acquaintance with Platonic abstract ideas, the meaning of which can be explained only through our empirical intuitions in experiencing in the real world.

For there is, I maintain, no such thing as the real world, no unique, ready-made, absolute reality apart from and independent of all versions and visions. Rather, there are many right world-versions, some of them irreconcilable with others; and thus there are many worlds if any. A version is not so much made right by a world as the world is made by a right version. (Goodman 1984: IV.4., 127; cf. Walton 1990: 2.9.)

Hence if there is no such thing as the real world, the reality independent of being represented by our cognition, then all our world-versions are subjective

intuitions without any criteria to distinguish between true or false versions of our imagination, and hence every one of us lives in one's own fictional world. Then the problem is to explain the difference between the fictional world-versions, and the fictional worlds of artworks. Alternatively, we can explain and understand Aesthetic metaphors, Scientific theories, and Ethical rules, as different modes of representing reality. Can Goodman's extreme phenomenalism explain epistemologically how artworks represent reality, if for him there is only explanatory reality, not the Kantian *noumena*, but only our mysterious cognitions of seeming realities, namely fictions. Indeed, realist epistemology can explain how artistic created artworks exemplify their intellectual ideas metaphorically, and by imagination we can compare them with reality and prove their truth and beauty in representing it aesthetically, in distinction from referring to particular objects, as in perceptual judgments (Goodman 1984: III.1., 59-71, IV.4., 127).

Realistically, however, there cannot be references, by the characters of artworks from inside of the artworks to the world life of the artists or to any other human participants in it. Artworks can only be aesthetic representations of the independent reality when they are proved true and beautiful. Thus, instead of considering Art and its entities a fictitious institution we better consider the artworks as representation by exemplification or allegories (Walton 1990: Introduction). Hence, we can show that the author, the reader or the literary critic of the artwork can prove or disprove its truth or falsity, however not only by subjective feeling. By self-controlling their proofs of its truth and beauty they conclude with their aesthetic judgments.

The Creators and The Beholders of Artworks Evaluate Their True Representation of Reality

The understanding of the nature of literature and art depends on the epistemology that can show how to prove their truth and beauty of their representation of our reality. Yet the epistemology of the formal semantics and the analytic philosophy that is based on it is sterile in respect to human conduct in reality, and consequently, the entire analysis and theorizing that is based on it cannot work for artwork either. But with a Pragmaticist theory of meaning and truth, we can show how artworks can be evaluated to be true and beautiful.

More importantly, fiction can offer us contingent truth about this world. It cannot take the place of nonfictional evidence, to be sure. But sometimes evidence is not lacking. We who have lived in the world for a while have plenty of evidence, but we may not have learned as much from it as we could have done. . . . Then the author of the fiction has made a discovery and he gives his readers the means to make that same discovery for themselves. (Lewis, D. 1983: 278-279)

Therefore, the creators and the beholders ability to feel and understand the beauty of artworks, by evaluating them instinctively and practically, is only the initial phase of the epistemological explanation of how we quasi-prove or rationally prove their true representation of reality (Nesher 2002a). However, the basic difficulty is to explain how the artist creates and evaluates the truth and beauty of the work in respect to her experience and understanding of human life in reality.

For the first time I want to touch upon one category of characters, still rarely dealt with in literature. As the ideal of such a type, I am taking Tikhon Zadonsky . . . I confront him with the hero of my novel, and bring them together for a time. I'm very much afraid: "I've never tried this; but I know something of this world". (Dostoevsky about program for his *Devils*, 8 October, 1870, in Mochulsky [1947]1967: 410)

Yet Dostoevsky's astonished imaginative mind must understand this kind of crime and this kind of criminal, in *Crime and Punishment* (1866), only from his own experience and general knowledge—as he says, "I know something of this world." Indeed, the aesthetic judgments of artistic literary works as beautiful are artists' and writers' self-conscious reflective judgments, presented by means of creative operations and comprehended through the interpretative operations of spectators and readers of the truth and beauty these works.

First is the question of whether, and in what sense, one can speak of "truth" in a literary work of art. It arises, on the one hand, from the assertion made previously that no sentence in a literary work of art is a "judgment" in the true sense of the word and, on the other hand, from the frequently made assertion that the poet seeks to give "reality" in his work and also from the charge of "unreality" that one makes against some works. (Ingarden 1931[1973]: 300)

On the one hand, we can see here the influence of Aristotle's *Poetics* and of the Analytic philosophers, e.g., Margolis (1965), who come from the formal semantic model of representation and posit that only judgments that are true are perceptual (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 5-11).

. . . since no individual proposition in a literary work is a judicative proposition in the true sense of the term. (Ingarden 1931[1973]: 301)

On the other hand, phenomenologists such as Heidegger claim that the truth just happens to be a general "metaphysical quality" of artworks, embedded in "the idea of the work," *whereby the idea* is inherent in the aesthetic

“mode of representation and exhibition,” namely “the metaphysical quality that manifests itself in the realization of a work [of art].” It seems, to express Heidegger’s feeling, that truth happens to art works (Heidegger [1950]1993). This subjective phenomenism is criticized in the following quote.

Finally, there is still another sense in which one speaks of the “truth” or the “untruth” of a literary work—though one is not fully conscious of the sense of such a statement . . .

It bestows upon the work the mysterious “sense” concealed in the complex of represented events, a sense that cannot be determined purely conceptually . . . (Ingarden [1931]1973: 303-304).

In contrast, it might be posited that the artists’ and the writers’ self-conscious reflection on the creative operations results in their own aesthetic evaluation of the truth and beauty of their created artwork. However, it is this self-conscious reflection on the part of the creators of artwork, which is instinctive and yet self-controlled, that quasi-proves the truth of the aesthetic representations of reality. These are not philosophical or scientific propositions, but a vibrant realization of their intellectual representation of reality (Kant *CPuR*: A141). The aesthetic evaluation and judgment is the important factor in the entire operation of the artist’s creation of the artwork, a critical appraisal in the process of creating and completing the work of art. This is also the case with the aesthetic evaluation of artworks by others.

Simply defined, aesthetic judgment is the ability to recognize aesthetic quality residing in any relationship of elements within an organization. It is vital to the artist in that good aesthetic judgment permits him to know when it is good or, if it is unsatisfactory, what might be done to improve it? It is also basic to art criticism and underlies the appreciative aspect of aesthetic response. Studies show that it presents in children to some degree, but it is undoubtedly subject to considerable development through learning and experience. (Meier 1942: 156; comp. Hospers 1946: 9-11)

This is an important description of the artist’s evaluation of her artwork in the creative process, but the criteria for such aesthetic evaluation is missing, as are the general criteria of order, unity, consistency, coherence, completeness and more. Yet, if these are only ad hoc rules that are always subjective and specific to each artwork, a means to explain the artist’s or the observer’s impression of the artwork, then what would be viewed as order in one work might be viewed as disorder in another (Meier 1942: 25-28, 65-75).

In reconstructing Kant’s theory of reflective judgment of artwork, the quasi-deductive inference of the Aesthetic Ideas of Imagination from the

Intellectual Idea of Understanding is the “free play” of the productive Imagination, which seeks to achieve harmony and consistency between them. However, in experiencing artwork, the reflecting aesthetic judgment is not of the control of achieving harmony between them, but in evaluating the beauty of the artwork if the harmony is already achieved, and the difficulty is to establish the harmony between them, not only through one’s subjective feelings, but by any objective criterion for the universality of the aesthetic Judgmental evaluation of the beauty of the artistic product. We can understand the freedom of the productive imagination as “free play,” or rather, the absence of any strict determination, which enables the artist to infer from the Intellectual Ideas the Aesthetic Ideas and exhibiting-exemplifying them through the development of the intended artwork. The role of the intellectual ideas as a “semblance” of objective reality is what constitutes the content, which the productive imagination elaborates in creating the aesthetic ideas, the artwork to be evaluated in aesthetic judgment of reflection, as intuitively expressed by Kant:

Spirit [Geist] in an aesthetic sense is the animating principle in the mind. But what this principle uses to animate [or quicken] the soul, the material it employs for this, is what imparts to the mental powers a purposive momentum, i.e., imparts to them a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens the power for such play. Now I maintain that such principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit *aesthetic ideas*; and by aesthetic ideas I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it.

For the imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. . . . Such presentations of the imagination we may call *ideas*. One reason for this is that they do at least strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given semblance of objective reality. Another reason, indeed the main reason, for calling those presentations ideas is that they are inner intuitions to which no concept can completely adequate. (Kant [1790]1987: 313-315; cf. 341-344; cf. Guyer 1997: 207-208, 217-218, 347, 357-361)

For Kant the intellectual ideas of the Genius are indeterminate concepts of understanding that have no direct empirical intuitions correlated to them, and by the creative imagination of the artist their contents embodied in the aesthetic ideas, “making concepts of the understanding sensible” exemplified in the artwork to aesthetically represent reality (Kant [1790]1987: 223’, #57,




Figure 2.2 Author's creation is the endeavor to prove the truth and beauty of artwork aesthetic representation of reality.

343). Accordingly, Hamlet is an aesthetic idea, exemplified the indeterminate rational concept of this type of human character and Shakespeare, by his artistic productive imagination created the metaphorical character Hamlet, which represent human behavior in almost impossible human situation (Kant [1790]1987: ## 46-50, #57, 343; cf. Crawford 1982: 169).

The artist develops from her general knowledge and specific cases the Intellectual Ideas that are the core of the intended artwork. The Intellectual Ideas include rich experiential and general meaning of the theme of the intended artwork, from which the artist by creative imagination, epitomizes the characteristic individual types of her work. This is done by choosing the best elements that will exemplify the initial Intellectual ideas. Now in order to evaluate these elements in the creative operation, the artist has to rely on her general knowledge of reality—not only after completing the creative artwork, but continuously throughout the creative operation. Indeed, this imagination creativity is similar to quasi-deductive inference attempts in heuristic formal proofs to see what can be the best conclusion one can reach from one's assumptions. There are no formal rules or laws by which to comprehend the ways in which one can attempt to exemplify the *Aesthetic Ideas* and, therefore, it is may be understood as an imaginative quasi-deductive interpretation, in which the faculty of judgment is being exercised in its *reflective* capacity to operate continuously to reach the harmony, a'la Kant, between the quasi-concepts of Understanding, the Intellectual Ideas, and the Aesthetic Ideas of intuitions of creative Imagination, which produces the intended aesthetic artworks (Crawford 1982:172-176). Kant's concept of the harmony of the faculties of mind provides an explanation of the feeling of beauty, but can we have rules by which to recognize such harmony? The harmony can be detected only in respect of the cognitive-modes of these two faculties, feeling

of an iconic image and a form-scheme of an indexical object (Shusterman 1992: Ch. 3; Allison 2001:50; Guyer 1997: 88ff).

In the interest of clarification, it will be understood that aesthetic judgment does not imply the application of a series of rules or maxims. In fact, it has little to do with rules; only insofar as it has reference to constants at all does aesthetic judgment refer to general principle discussed in Chap. 2. But although these constants may usually be in the background of most judgments, the process of judging is primarily an individual matter. (Meier 1942: 156)

When proving aesthetic representation of reality, the criteria are not just the perceptual judgments, but also the general propositions that are inferred from them, which constitute our basic common-sense beliefs that form a general experience in representation of reality (Nesher 1994).

The Aesthetic Knowledge of Reality: How Beauty of the Artworks Is in Their True Representation of Reality

The main difficulty is to explain how we evaluate the representations of Reality in aesthetic artworks. The focus is on how we can compare the aesthetically presented allegory, a general and typological representation of particular aspects and instances of Reality, with our experiential knowledge of Reality? This inferential evaluation of the artistic allegorical representation of reality is very difficult to analyze, not unlike Kant's problem when suggesting schematism to explain the relationship between our conceptual reasoning and our sensual-perceptual experience.

This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves. (Kant *CPuR*: A141)

In different ways, we can apply this reasoning to the evaluative proofs of our artworks' aesthetic representation of reality. As it is suggested, we—the authors, the readers and the spectators—interpret and prove the truth and beauty of artworks not directly by means of our perceptual confrontations in Reality and their judgments, but with our entire knowledge (physical and social) of Reality, such that the artworks are evaluated against such knowledge and their explanatory contribution to such knowledge (Hutcheson [1725]1973: IV.II).

Once again I want to emphasize that literature does not present us with propositions which are empirically verifiable like those of science and history; few if

any statements in novels, that is, depicting the action or thought of a fictional character, can be verified in the way that informative propositions can. And yet they are true-to human nature as we know it. Thus in a way we *can* verify what the artist has presented; we can verify his insight in our own further observations of people and actions. (Hospers 1946:173)

First if by “informative propositions” one means perceptual judgments that we verify in perceptual experience and with ostentation, then neither are general propositions of natural and human sciences verified in such a way. In the section on Pragmaticist epistemology, I explained that our basic facts are propositions which are either proved true or quasi-proved based on our perceptual judgments, and all others which are proved upon them. Thus we can see a similarity between the proof of the truth and beauty of artworks and the proof of scientific theories and moral rules, which are done by “further observations,” upon our observational facts. Indeed, common-sense beliefs are the accumulation of the proved truths of the above three basic sciences, i.e., our general knowledge of reality, in respect to their relative proof-conditions. This is a coherent system of proved propositions and theories, and upon this system of facts our artistic-literary works are evaluated. However, in case of difficulties with the coherent explanation by the artworks, it can be the case that we return to reevaluate our more basic knowledge of Reality, even to the extent of re-examining our perceptual judgments, which are our confrontation in Reality, and upon which our entire knowledge and its artistic explanation are based, in an operation similar to Quine’s conception of the evolution of human knowledge (Quine 1953).

Dostoevsky was the creator of a new narrative form, the novel-tragedy. . . . in *The Devils* it attained its perfection. *The Devils* is one of the greatest artistic works in world literature. . . . Dostoevsky’s novel is not the description of a city, not portrayal of manners: the “descriptive part,” the conditions of life, do not engage him. He is a chronicler of events that are unexpected, sudden, amazing. His art is contrary to the poetic of Tolstoy, Turgenev, Goncharov: against the *statics* of descriptions and history he advances the *dynamics* of events—movement, action, struggle. He had “no time” to paint with words or to narrate customs in epic style. . . . The writer was sincerely convinced that his novels lacked sufficient artistry, justified himself inferior to such artists as Turgenev and Lev Tolstoy. This low opinion of his works is explained by the limitations of his poetics. (Mochulsky [1947]1967: 433-434; cf. Dostoevsky’s *notebook* No. 3)

However, without understanding the language and knowing the truth-conditions of the author we cannot understand the artwork and judge its beauty as a true representation of reality (cf. Gombrich, 1960:76-78). Moreover, to

reach coherent interpretation, we should understand the proof-conditions of the author's artwork. It is impossible to reach such a complicated coherence by the fabrication of truth-conditions, because the indefinite number of possible meanings cannot be controlled. Thus, only through the creator's intended truth-conditions can we interpret her artwork. However, to represent Reality, the aesthetic "realizations" must be coherent and correspond to it, and this can be achieved only through confrontation in Reality and the specific truth-conditions of the author as the foundation of her creation (cf. Nesher 2002a).

We often call the power of judgment a sense, when what we notice is not so much its reflection as merely its result. We then speak of a sense of truth, a sense of decency, of justice, etc. We do this even though we know, or at least properly ought to know, that a sense cannot contain these concepts, let alone have the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rule, but that a conception of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we were not able to rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers. (Kant *CJ*: 293)

Indeed, the colloquial use of *sense*, as discussed by Kant, is rather the *imagination* in its operation at different levels of cognitions from perceptual operation to theoretical, ethical, and aesthetical operations aiming to represent reality. Hence, there is a difference between the role of imagination in perceptual judgment in the Abductive discovery of concepts and its role in the artistic creative-productive process, which is already embedded with rational concepts representing reality (Nesher 2003).

As to the reflective aesthetic judgments, it is based on comparison by the imagination between the Aesthetic Artwork and the known reality, as Picasso's "Guernica" intending to represent aesthetically Guernica disaster, according his knowledge of it. Namely, in creating the artwork, the aesthetic idea and its metaphors, which is already infused with the intellectual ideas of the artist, he or she is continuously comparing—by means of imagination—the artistic creation with what one can know from the context of its creation; hence, the comparison renders the proof-conditions of this specific artwork (Nesher 2007b). More generally, our imaginative operations in each specific mode of representations (in this case, the aesthetic representation of reality through the imagination of the artist in creating the artwork) provide the proof of truth and beauty in representing reality.

Whether in the perceptual operation, whereby a perceptual judgment leads to the quasi-proof, or in the artistic creation, whereby the artist evaluates the truth and beauty of the artistic rendering of intellectual ideas, in both cases, the imagination works in different ways to interpret and cohere the conceptual components (Makkreel 1990; Nesher 2001; 2007a). The role of imagination in aesthetic judgment arises from the instinctive reflection on our

cognitive aesthetic experience, and the epistemological duty of philosophy is to explain the operation of imagination in our knowledge including of the scientific inquiries (Peirce *CP*: 5.119; Neshet 2002a).

The Pragmaticist reconstruction of Kant’s difficulty to explain the Artistic Creation of Artwork as Beautiful, suggests that the consciously reflective and self-controlled evaluation of the work’s beauty seeks to prove that the work is a True Aesthetic Judgment Representing Reality. The artist’s *intellectual ideas* are the relevant knowledge of reality upon it she endeavors to create the intended artwork to represent aesthetically the relevant local reality. This can be achieved with the role of artistic *productive imagination*. At the core of the creation of aesthetic representation of reality lies the trio of Abductive Discovery of Aesthetic Ideas, which are derived from the artist’s intellectual ideas, the Deductive interpretation of the aesthetic ideas is epitomized in Aesthetic artwork and the Inductive evaluation proves its beauty, by recognizing its true aesthetic judgment. This Inductive evaluation of the created artwork is done by imaginative evaluation the similarity between the epitomized Aesthetic artwork and the relevant known reality, to prove its true aesthetic representation of reality.

The proof of the aesthetic beauty of the artworks can be achieved in the complete cognitive proof through the evolving stages: from the *feeling* of its aesthetic beauty to the accurate *emotional* reaction to it, which has also *the sense of the Truth*, and through the *rational* reasoning of the *ingenious* comparison of the artwork with reality, and concluding that the knowledge conveyed through the aesthetic artwork is a true representation of this reality. “For the whole question consists in that—what to consider as the truth. This is why the novel is written.” (Dostoevsky, about his writing of *The Devils*, 1870)

The following are the threefold stages of the artistic creating and evaluation of Artwork representing reality, upon common sense knowledge, which




Figure 2.3 The artist’s creation of artwork and his reflective “free play” to harmonize intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas: The role of productive imagination.

is the accepted knowledge of all our normative sciences: Theoretical, Ethical, and Aesthetical.

The artist with his spirit and productive imaginative “free play” interprets the generality of *intellectual ideas* into the singularity of *aesthetic ideas* and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such a quasi-deductive inference, the artist exercises, a’ la Kant, the *reflective manner (modus aestheticus)* to achieve the harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding, the Imagination, and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork. This is an elaboration of Kantian aesthetics; however, by replacing Kant’s subjective conception of *Harmony* with the Peircean notion of “confrontation in reality”, we obtain an objective criterion of truth and beauty (Kant *CJ*: 1781-87: B84-109, B316-349; Neshet 2005b, 2007a).

Thus we can avoid Kant’s aesthetic theory with the paradox of beauty, as in Wittgenstein’s paradox of the *meaning* of following rules, which if every subjective pleasure determines beauty, and every displeasure can contradict it, such subjective feelings cannot be an intersubjective Judgment of beauty. Hence, there is no phenomenal objective criterion for harmony between the *intellectual ideas* and *aesthetic ideas*, and the judgment of aesthetic beauty remains arbitrary. The way out of such “internal realism” and also “external realism” is the epistemology of Pragmatist “representational realism” (Neshet 2002a: III).

Chapter 3

Epistemology of Aesthetic Experience

Criticizing and Reconstructing Kant's Aesthetic Theories of Genius Creativity and Judgment of Beauty

Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist. (Peirce CP: 5.525, 1905)

KANT'S CONCEPTION OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT— BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM

Can Kant Explain Artistic Creativity and the Aesthetic Experiential Evaluation of Artworks?

The initial question of this inquiry is whether Kant with his *Transcendental Idealism phenomenology* can explain *artistic creativity* and the *aesthetic experiential evaluation of artworks*. In his entire philosophical enterprise, Kant endeavors to combine rationalism with empiricism; yet, instead of pursuing a fruitful synthesis, he tries to keep the main features of both unchanged and separated. This results in a system based on dichotomies that cannot be solved, including the dichotomy between the *logical cognitive judgment* and the *Aesthetic reflective judgment*, whereby the first is based on determinate pure and a priori cognitive concepts and rules and the second on indeterminate *presentations*, that remain entirely subjective, and at best can be called quasi-concepts and quasi-rules or quasi-principles.

The Reflective Aesthetic Judgment of Beauty and How Judgments Can Be Objective Knowledge

The result of the above Kantian dichotomy is that only the determinate *logical cognitive judgment* and reasoning of Understanding can be considered

knowledge, whereas the indeterminate presentations of *Aesthetic reflective judgment* are only subjective feelings of Imagination that cannot be considered cognitive representations of the world. Moreover, without any objective criteria, Kant is not able to show when there is a harmony between the intellectual ideas of Understanding and the aesthetic ideas of creative Imagination, to determine the beauty of artworks. Therefore, there is only a subjective feeling of beauty, which—as Kant postulates—when one feels it, there is a harmony between the ideas of these faculties. Hence, like in Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, Kant faces the paradox of beauty, namely, if every subjective feeling of pleasure determines beauty, then every subjective feeling of displeasure can contradict it. Therefore, such subjective feelings cannot provide an intersubjective measure for judging aesthetic beauty (Wittgenstein 1953: #201).

The Subject Can Prove the Truth of Judgments to Be Objective Representations of Reality

With the Pragmaticist epistemology, we can overcome this Kantian dichotomy between the subjective feeling and the objective judgment, and so also with the “paradox of beauty.” This can be done by adopting the conception of the evolutionary hierarchy of cognitive operations, which begins with *feeling* an object, progresses to the *emotional* reaction to it and to their synthesis in the content of *thought* of the perceptual judgment, and so also in higher reasoning operations. Accordingly, there can be either a harmony or a disharmony between the feeling and the ensuing emotional reaction, but their synthesis in the Aesthetic reflective judgment of the beauty of the artwork can be known only by confronting in reality; hence, we can quasi-prove and thus evaluate the truth or the falsity of the aesthetic representation of reality (Nesher 2003, 2004b; Kant *CPuR*: A168).

KANT’S THREE CONCEPTIONS OF JUDGMENT: THEORETICAL, ETHICAL AND AESTHETICAL JUDGMENTS

The Nature and the Role of the Power of Judgment in Kant’s Transcendental Epistemology

When discussing Kant’s conception of Aesthetic judgment, it is crucial to understand his conception of judgment and how judgments differ according to the epistemic domains of their operations. In Kant’s analysis of the dichotomy between the logical *cognitive* judgment and the Aesthetic *reflective* judgment,

the key distinctions are between *determination* and *indetermination*, *lawfulness* and *non-lawfulness*, *intentional* and *non-intentional*, *purposiveness* and *purposiveness without purpose*, *non-free play* (determination under a law) and *free play*. It seems that Kant needs the conception of artistic free play as being indeterminate by any law in order to explain the artist's freedom to create new artwork by the creative imagination and thus demonstrating that we can have our subjective aesthetic experience with its universality without being determined by rules and concepts. This conception of artistic free play explains also the opposition between the artist's free creation of artwork and the theoretician's lawfully strict scientific reasoning. Indeed, this dichotomy is repeated in the distinction between the "Scientism" of the Analytic Philosophy and the "Artism" of the Hermeneutic Philosophy (Nesher 2003, 2004a, 2008).

However, given that the operation of judgment is essential for human cognition to achieve knowledge of reality, it seems that for Kant only true perceptual and theoretical propositions and theories can be considered knowledge of the world. In other words, knowledge is attained basically *through Logical judgment*, in which the sensual object is subsumed under the concept of Understanding. This is probably due to Kant's conception of three different, let us say, separated mental powers, Understanding, Reasoning, and Imagining, which are respectively related to his three Critiques, but then the question might be whether accordingly there are also three different types of judgments, each of which is compatible with one of the three modes of relating to reality. Yet, according to Kant, this cannot be the case with *Moral judgment*, which we infer or prove deductively from the moral law, nor is it the case with *Aesthetic judgment*, which relates only to our subjective feelings. Indeed, both are different from *Logical judgment*, which is applied to sensual objects. In all three cases, the question is about the validity and truth of such types of judgments (Kant *CPuR*: Ch. II, 81, 163).

However, in respect to the *Aesthetic reflective judgment*, what type of reality can it represent and how? According to Kant, *Aesthetic reflective judgment* does not represent the sensual object, as is the case with Logical judgment of understanding; rather, it presents the feeling of enjoyment of natural and artificial objects, which is tantamount to what the concept of *beauty* presents. Therefore, Kant's difficulty is to explain how such a subjective cognition can be at the same time universal and objective. The question is if we can prove the truth of the Aesthetic judgment to be our knowledge of reality (Kant *CJ*: #6). This is the question Kant considered in his epistemological explication of the role of "beautiful" in the judgment of taste.

This explication of the beautiful can be inferred from the preceding explication of it as object of a liking devoid of all interest. For if someone likes something

and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone. He must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from everyone because he cannot discover, underling this liking, any private conditions, on which he might be dependent, so that he must regard it as based on what he can presuppose in everyone as well. He cannot discover such private conditions because his liking is not based on any inclination he has (nor on any other considered interest whatever): rather, the judging person feels completely *free* as regards the liking he accords the object. (Kant *CJ*: #6, 211)

Thus, Kant follows his experience of liking an object without any external interest to explain why we call something *beautiful* and his explanation employs a sort of “ordinary language philosophy,” accepting the common and unsophisticated way of expression as the clue for the philosophical explanation. Kant continues with this approach, as the following excerpt demonstrates.

Hence he will talk about the beautiful as if beauty were a characteristic of the object and the judgment were logical (namely, a cognition of the object through concepts of it), even though in fact the judgment is only aesthetic and refers the object’s presentation merely to the subject. He will talk in this way because the judgment does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as we may presuppose it to be valid for everyone. On the other hand, this universality cannot arise from concepts. For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws; but these carry an interest with them, while none is connected with pure judgments of taste). It follows that, since the judgment of taste involves the consciousness that all interest is kept out of it, it must also involve a claim of being valid for everyone, but without having a universality based on concepts. In other words, a judgment of taste must involve a claim to subjective universality. (Kant *CJ*: #6, 211-212)

But then, another question arises, namely, if the concept *beauty* does not represent the property of objects, then what can it indicate or represent, and if it is about the feeling of the subject, why should we assume the same feeling of all subjects in such an experience? However, Kant himself follows the ordinary language usage of the predicate “beautiful” for different experiential situations as related to *natural objects* and also to *aesthetic artworks*, which are artistically created to represent aesthetically reality which is different from the objects themselves (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 244’). The problem with Kant’s explication of the universality of the Aesthetic judgment, i.e., of the subjective feeling that objects are beautiful, is that feelings by themselves cannot be a criterion of objective reflective judgment of taste, given that

different persons and the same person in different contexts of experience can regard the same object and determine it to be either a source of pleasure and beauty or not so, as with Wittgenstein's paradox of interpretation. Therefore, for the explication of such experiences of reflective judgment of taste we need some objective criterion to substantiate the intersubjective validity and truth of judgments of taste of beauty. To explicate the validity of Aesthetic judgments of taste, we have to inquire how the experience of taste can be objective and nevertheless relative to the contexts of judgments (Nesher 2002a: X, 2007b).

However, beauty is not a property of the physical objects, nor is it the cognitive meaning of the feelings themselves, but rather the cognitive confrontation with the objects and the feeling of pleasure in a particular experience, and called beautiful (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 206'). And thus, even without a concept, the meaning of the feeling of beauty is represented through the cognitive confrontation with the object, though it is not the property of the object itself. There is therefore a perceptual operation in which we reflect upon the object, and which we are accustomed to calling beauty, but which we attribute to the object itself. According to Kant's explication ". . . he [a person] will talk about the beautiful as if beauty were a characteristic of the object and the judgment were logical (namely, a cognition of the object through concepts of it)," but by the reflection upon one's experience one can recognize that the concept of beauty presents a reflective, cognitive experience. However, it is neither the reflection itself nor the physical object itself and, therefore, it is a specific mode of judgment that represents our cognitive reality.

The above explication by Kant of the conception of judgment of beauty neglects the essential difference between feelings regarding natural objects judged beautiful and similar feelings experienced in reaction to produced artifacts, and the Aesthetic reflective judgment of artistic artworks, which are thoughtful and intentional creations, rendered as true judgments convey an aesthetic knowledge of reality (Nesher 2004b). This distinction is crucial, as Kant himself suggested: the creation of artworks initiated from the artist's intellectual ideas being the conceptual understandings of reality, which are emulated and reproduced through the creative imagination as aesthetic ideas of the artworks. Hence these ideas, the intellectual conceptions, are implicitly or explicitly contained in the artworks and are vital for evaluating of the truth and the beauty of the artworks in the Aesthetic reflective judgment, which eventually comes to represent reality beautifully. The question is whether Kant considers the *Aesthetic reflective judgment* as knowledge of any reality or just a subjective experience and recognized as a universal feeling? And furthermore, is this commonality, this shared experience indicative of the common nature of minds? If so, what is the relationship between such

experiential judgments and the phenomenal reality of sensual intuition (Kant *CJ*: # 48; Guyer 1997: 216-218)?

The Three Conceptions of Judgment in Kant's Transcendental Epistemology: Logical, Moral, and Aesthetical

Kant has three types of judgments in his three Critiques: in the Critique of Pure Reason, it is the *Logical judgment*; in the Critique of Practical Reason, it is the moral, *Practical judgment*; and in the Critique of Judgment, it is Aesthetic reflective judgment. These then would be the operations that render human cognitive representations of physical, social, and mental realities, and show how human knowledge and behavior operate in the different realms of Kant's three Critiques (comp. Kant *CPrR*: 91, *CPuR*: A10-16/B24-30). In the following section, some Peircean epistemic formulations are used, which Peirce somehow reconstructed from his studies of Kant. Accordingly, the basic structure of the *Logical judgment* of the First Critique is of Induction, when—as in the perceptual judgment—the Rule of Judgment operates on Understanding Concepts, to subsume under them the Sensual Intuitions of the objects. Hence, when by Reflective Comparison with the Schematism that mediates them, they are in harmony, then the concept presenting the Object and this judgment is true (Kant *CPuR*: B 84-109, B 316-349).

Synthesis as such, as we shall see hereafter, is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely (Kant *CPuR*: B 103, cf. B 152).

Its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility. (Kant *CPuR*: B 152)

To this extent, therefore, the imagination is a power of determining sensibility a priori: and its synthesis of intuitions *in accordance with the categories* must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination*. This synthesis is the action of the understanding upon sensibility, and is the understanding's first application (and at the same time the basis of all its other applications) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. (Kant *CPuR*: B 152)

The following is the schema of *Logical judgment*:

This type of *Logical-Theoretical Judgment* of Understanding is initiated in the perceptual judgment, in which the object of the sensual intuition is subsumed under the empirical concept that evolves from Imagination and Understanding, to be synthesized into *Theoretical Judgment*. The second

and thus enables us to control our moral conduct in social life (Kant *CPrR*: #1, 21, *CJ*: 173). Hence, the *Moral Judgment* of Reason cannot be of the same structural operation as the *Theoretical Judgment* of Understanding and, as assumed by Kant, with different philosophical principles and objects (Kant *CJ*: Introduction, I, 171-173).

To explicate Kant’s *aesthetic reflective judgment* of the Third Critique, we can compare Kant’s analysis of the perceptual formation of empirical concepts with Peirce’s material logic of the Abductive inference of discovery. As Peirce explains, our perceptual operation initiates from a particular preconceptual, sensual intuition called *percept* to suggests a general concept to explain it (Peirce *CP*: 5.553 1931-1935; Neshet 2002a: III.3). Kant explicates the structure of the *aesthetic reflective judgment* differently from his understanding of Judgment in general:

Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is *determinative* (even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must be met for subsumption under that universal to be possible). But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is only *reflective*. (Kant *CJ*: IV, 179)

Yet, according to Kant, in the aesthetic mood, we reflect only on our perceptual operation and like animals, we feel the relation between the cognitive operations of Imagination and Understanding instinctively, without explicit rules and concepts (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction. V, 211’). As Kant suggests, our feeling in response to the relation between these faculties can be of pleasure or displeasure, depending on whether we find the relationship between these cognitive faculties to be harmonious. Thus, the suggested Form of Object (“beautiful”) represents the Quasi-Object, more specifically our “feeling” of it as beautiful.




Figure 3.3 Abductive suggesting the universal quasi-concept for the given particular aesthetic reflective judgment (Kant, *CJ*: 287).

The conceptions of Quasi-Rule and Quasi-Object show that we do not cognize them under any principles or concepts, but by our habitual pre-rational cognitions, through the instinctive and practical reflection, self-controlling the outcome of such operations, while the *reflective judgment* is only indeterminate rationally.

When we *reflect* (even animals reflect though only instinctively, i.e., in reference not to acquiring a concept, but to—say—determining an inclination), we need a principle just as much as we do when we determine, where the underlying concept of the object prescribes the rule to judgment and so takes the place of the principle.

The principle by which we reflect on given objects of nature is this: that for all natural things *concepts* can be found that are determined empirically. . . . For if we were not allowed to presuppose this, and did not base our treatment of empirical presentations on this principle, then all our reflections would be performed merely haphazardly and blindly, and hence without our having basis for expecting that this [reflection] is in agreement with nature. (Kant *CJ*: V, 211'-212'; cf. V, 211'-216'; Neshier, 2002a: V.5.)

Indeed, we have to understand the difference between reflection in general, which is instinctive and practical, and the rational, self-conscious and self-controlled operation of our cognition, whereby the former is used in determining an inclination and the latter for determining intention, knowledge and conduct. However, this is different from the reflection in Aesthetic judgment, which controls only our subjective feelings of pleasure and beauty, without being any knowledge of objects, as with the Logical judgment, and yet not "be performed merely haphazardly and blindly."

Hence a judgment of taste is not cognitive judgment and so is not a Logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis *cannot be other* than *subjective* (Kant *CJ*: #1, 203). Therefore, not all types of judgment are merely the ability to subsume natural objects under a general concept, as the logical-theoretical judgment does, but Aesthetic judgment, and even Moral judgment are different modes of presenting different types of things. It seems that Kant, besides philosophizing the nature of the *Aesthetic reflective judgment*, also deals in the *Critique of Judgment* with whether and how the operations of judgments can work differently in his three Critiques. Moreover, although Kant calls the Aesthetic judgment *reflective*, it is clear that the capacity to reflect is general to animals and humans in their cognitive operations, yet at different levels of validity: instinctive, practical, and rational (Neshier 1990: 24-44).

Hence, according to Kant, in all three kinds of judgment, we reflect on our judging operations to feel and detect the harmony or disharmony between

our mental powers. But the difference between the two rationally-determined Theoretical and Moral judgments, and the subjectively-determined Aesthetic reflective judgment, is that for the latter, our judgment is not controlled by determinate rules and concepts. Consequently, we cannot reflect rationally on the operation of the *Aesthetic reflective judgment*, but only instinctively and practically, and hence only feel pleasure or displeasure, as Kant surmises, in the harmony or disharmony of the two cognitive faculties, the Imagination and Understanding. Thus, both the *Theoretical judgment of knowledge of nature* and the *Practical judgment of moral law* have transcendental a priori and pure rules and concepts, whereas the *Aesthetic reflective judgment of taste* operates without such rules and concepts, since the concept beauty is not of property of objects, but only the subjective feeling in respect to them. Hence, it can be explained only in terms of empirical psychology, or by analogy to the other judgment types and the cognitive relation between Imagination and Understanding (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, II, III, 201'-208', X, 237'-238', Introduction, I, II, III, 171-179). Kant draws a distinction between determinate *Theoretical and Moral* judgments and their knowledge and the indeterminate *Aesthetic* judgment, which is not knowledge at all, but an expression of subjective feelings. The epistemological reason seems to be that Kant deals with *taste* in general, that of liking and beauty as well, without analyzing the difference between the experience of beauty of natural objects and even artifacts, and the beauty of artistic created artworks. Indeed, according to Kant, we can see that the judgmental evaluation of aesthetic artworks should be epistemologically different from the reflective judgments of taste pertaining to other types of objects and artifacts. This is because artworks, which are created to represent reality aesthetically initiated from the artist's *intellectual ideas*, the artist's conceptual understanding of reality, and from those ideas the artist, by means of the imagination, creates the aesthetic ideas of the artwork, the beauty of which is evaluated by proving, implicitly or explicitly, it to be a true representation of reality.

Peircean Pragmatist-Realist Examination of Kant's Transcendental Epistemology of Judgment

The question is how do the three different types of judgment basically operate? Theoretical Judgment operates by Understanding, Moral judgment—by Reason, and Aesthetical judgment—by Imagination, although all of them can be operated by reflections involving different levels of self-control, as Kant suggested and Peirce elaborated (Kant *CJ*: V, 211'; cf. V, 211'-216'; cf. Neshier 1990, 2002a: V.5.). Moreover, what is the difference between determinate judgment and indeterminate judgment, when comparing Kant's understanding with that of Peircean Realist Pragmatism, and in each

approach, can these judgments be true to what they represent? The theoretical and the moral judgment are determinate; hence, they can be true or false, but what about the aesthetic reflective judgment, which is subjective and universal? Can we say that such judgment can be true or false, in some cases either, and in some cases doubtful or also neither, due to their being meaningless or kitschy?

Peirce explains, with his realist epistemology, how to overcome the Kantian Transcendental phenomenalism of the three kinds of judgments, which are based on separate transcendental assumptions. Thus the Reflective Aesthetic Judgment is an Abductive inference of discovery, the Practical Moral judgment is a Deductive inference of expectation, and the Theoretical Judgment is an Inductive inference of Evaluation. However, according to Peirce, their separation must be based on the unprovable transcendental or implicit assumptions, and only by considering the *tri-part* sequence in this order can they provide the complete empirical proof of true representation of reality. Hence, we can avoid the need to assume Transcendental a priori principles and concepts to explain our knowledge of reality, overcome Kant's idealist Copernican Revolution and, thus, our judgments not only *present* phenomena, but *also represent* the reality independent of being represented. Namely, instead of the human mind presenting the phenomenal world by the miracle of transcendental abilities, by using their natural cognition, humans can prove their knowledge of reality (Peirce *CP*: 7.672, 1903, 6.468-473, 1908; Nesher 2002a: III, X; cf. Kant *CPuR*: A451/B479, B274f.).

Kant actually has no theory of truth and so there is no criterion to distinguish between true and false judgments, nor does he offer an objective criterion by which to determine when we experience a feeling of harmony versus disharmony between our mental powers of presentation (Hanna 1993). The suggested solution is in the Peircean Pragmaticist epistemology, according to which judgments by themselves are only the last components of the operation of the complete proof of the truth or the falsity of our cognitions. Without proving any perceptual or scientific hypotheses, judgments remain doubtful. This brings us to the question of what is the inferential structure of complete proof of either the *theoretical* or the *moral* determinate judgments? Or, to phrase the question à la Kant, what is the inferential structure of the indeterminate *Aesthetic reflective judgment*? Addressing this question is expected to explain how—by being proved true, all these types of judgments represent their respective realities (cf. Kant *CJ*: III, 205'-207', V, 211'-216').

Kant's epistemological deadlock is that none of his three different judgments can operate as a complete proof of its validity and truth; however, by following Peircean epistemology, we can consider their different inferences as the three essential components of the complete empirical proof. This can be done only by confronting in reality when the Abductive material logic

first suggests a new *indeterminate* concept, from which the Deductive formal inference *necessarily* derives its predicted consequence, and the Inductive material logic continues to evaluate experientially its *probability*. At the end of this sequence of operations, it may be possible to prove the validity of the *determinate* true or false perceptual judgment in reality. Only the entire tripart sequence of these inferences can be the complete proof of the Truth of Perceptual Judgment. Consider, for example, “a is P” (Concept \rightarrow Object); hence, what Kant considers *Aesthetic reflective judgment* by imagination cannot be a judgment at all, but only the Abductive discovery of a quasi-concept, the explanatory power of which can be realized only upon proving, at the end of the trio inferences, the Truth of the hypothesis in which it is embedded. However, the Truth of Perceptual Judgments, are our proved true basic propositions, the basic *true facts* upon which we can prove the truth or the falsity of other scientific hypotheses, let us say, of the three Peircean *normative sciences*, Theoretic, Moral, and Aesthetic, which are comparable to Kant’s three Critiques.

I then find that a judgment is nothing but a way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. That is what the little relational word *is* in judgment intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given presentations from the subjective one. (Kant *CPuR*: B141-142)

However, the epistemologies of the above three basic sciences differ from the basic perceptual facts upon which they depend, and they also differ among themselves (Nesher 2002a: III, X, 2008). Namely the objective unity, the synthesis of the cognitive components of the perceptual judgment, initially presenting a quasi-object and suggesting a quasi-concept, can be interpreted as the *symbolic thought* objective perceptual judgment, i.e., “a is P” = ($\mathbf{A} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$), which has been proven the true representation of reality.

Thus, \Rightarrow is the *plausibility connective* suggesting the concept \mathbf{A}^{Ab} to indicate a hypothetical perceptual object \mathbf{C}^{Ab} , then \rightarrow is the *necessity connective* deducing the anticipating abstract object \mathbf{C}^{Dd} , and \approx is the *probability connective* evaluating the relation of the concept \mathbf{A}^{Ab} to the new expected object in experience \mathbf{C}^{In} .

However, the epistemological distinction between *reflection of logical-perceptual judgment* and *reflection of Aesthetic judgment* is essential, since the former is our endeavor to prove the basic facts, and the latter is based

$$\text{Abduction } ((\mathbf{C} \xrightarrow{\text{Discovery}} \mathbf{A}^{\text{Ab}}) + \text{Deduction } ((\mathbf{A} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}) \mathbf{A}) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}^{\text{Dd}}) + \text{Induction } ((\mathbf{A}^{\text{Ab}}, \mathbf{C}^{\text{In}}) \approx \mathbf{A}^{\text{Ab}} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}^{\text{In}}))$$

Figure 3.4 The perceptual operation is the sequence of the trio of abduction, deduction and induction.

on such facts that eventually prove the truth of the *Aesthetic Judgment*. Yet the problem remains: we have yet to explain the structure of the *Aesthetic Judgment* in the evaluation of the truth and beauty of the artistic artworks in their representation of reality (Nesher 2007a). The alternative to the Kantian Indeterminate Aesthetic judgment of beauty is to explain this judgment in the above complete *trio* of Abduction, Deduction and Induction. Thus, the Abductive discovery of the universal concepts, of the intellectual ideas to be embedded in the aesthetic ideas of the artwork, is only the initial hypothesis; the true Aesthetic judgment of beauty is in the entire proof of the above tri-part inference. Hence, this can only be completed through the Inductive evaluation of the determinate Aesthetic judgment of the truth and beauty of the artwork; yet not as a logical-perceptual judgment of a particular object, but as an imaginative comparison of the aesthetic artwork with the reality represented by the artist's intellectual ideas.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEORETICAL AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS

Kant's Epistemology of Sensual Experience and the Theoretical and Aesthetical Judgments

Indeed, how can we understand Kant's constitutive notion of *Theoretical Judgment* and how does it differ from *Aesthetic Judgment* in respect to his Aesthetic theory? The epistemological dichotomy between these two types of judgments is based on the distinction between *rational reasoning* of Understanding and the preconceptual *empirical experience* based on the operation of Imagination. In both cases, the basic operation is what Kant calls the *faculty of judgment*, whereby, in the former it involves a *determinate (logical) judgment* and in the latter—an *indeterminate reflective (aesthetic) judgment*. Kant discusses the distinction between his use of the notion *aesthetic* in reference to sensual intuitions in perceptual cognition of *Theoretical Judgment*, and its meaning as the feeling of pleasure of beauty in *reflective judgment*.

However, for a long time now it has become customary to call a way of presenting aesthetic, i.e., sensible, in different meaning of the term as well, where this means that the presentation is referred, not to the cognitive power, but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. . . . Yet this feeling is not an objective sense, not a sense of the determination of which we would use to *cognize* an object, but a sense that contributes nothing whatsoever to our cognition of objects. . . . We apply the term aesthetic not to intuition, let alone to presentation of the understanding, but solely to the acts of the *power of judgment*. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 222')

In what follows, Kant explains the difference between *sensual intuitions* operating in Theoretical Judgment, i.e., in the determinate judgment of objects, in contrast to the *aesthetic feeling* of the subject, i.e., the subject's sense of pleasure or displeasure in the *aesthetic* judgment of Beauty.

Therefore, in calling a judgment about an object aesthetic, we indicate immediately that, while a given presentation is being referred to an object, by judgment we mean here not the determination of the object, but the determination of the subject and his feeling. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 223')

Hence, given that these two types of judgment, Theoretical and Aesthetical, are determined by the harmony between the same two cognitive powers, Imagination and Understanding, we have to explain how they differ epistemically as judgments. Moreover, while dealing also with *Aesthetic reflective judgment of artworks*, we ought to attempt to explain the distinction between it and the judgments that hold in feeling of *pleasure or displeasure* with natural and artificial objects (Kant *CJ*: 211-212; *CJ*: First Introduction, 205'-206'). Following Peircean Pragmaticist epistemology of cognitions, as in the above trio proof, Kant can be understood such that in Theoretical Judgment of perception, the initial operation is that Imagination presents the sensual intuition of the object, which is then interpreted by Understanding. Thus, this operation renders the empirical concept presenting the object which constitutes a *determinate judgment*.

This can explain the difference between the Theoretical Judgment and reflective Aesthetic Judgment: the former is operating through the harmony between the powers of *Imagination* and *Understanding* whereas the latter, in reverse order, through the harmony between the powers of *Understanding* and *Imagination*. This difference is an outcome of their basic distinct inferential structures, namely, the Inductive logic of the *Logical judgment* and the Abductive logic of the *Aesthetic judgment*, respectively. However, understanding Peircean realist epistemology as the Pragmaticist reconstruction of the Kantian Transcendental Phenomenology, we can see the epistemic distinction between the two types of logical inferences, the Induction of the determinate *Theoretical Judgment* of Understanding, and the Abduction of the indeterminate *Aesthetic reflective judgment* of Imagination (figures 3.1, 3.3).


However, according to Pragmaticist epistemology, all judgments are based on the trio of Abduction of discovery, Deduction of prediction, and Induction of evaluation. This trio constitutes the complete proof of the validity and truth of representing aspects of reality according to their different modes of representation, Theoretical, Ethical, and Aesthetic, where all three representation types are based on perceptual judgments as basic true facts (Nesher 2002a: X, 2007a). In contrast, according to Kantian conception, none of these different judgments can constitute a complete proof, because, as shown, the Kantian

conception consists of only one component of the trio inferences (figure 3.4), and thus these judgments must be based on unproved Transcendental assumptions. Hence, according to Kant, without concept, the Aesthetic reflective judgment cannot be related to any representation of an object, but only to the feeling it evokes and therefore, such a cognitive operation remains indeterminate (figure 3.3). “But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is only *reflective*.” (Kant *CJ*: IV, 179)

The following is the reconstruction of Kant’s explanation of the reflective Aesthetic judgment.

The above figure, which explicates Kant’s conception of Aesthetic judgment, shows the specific relationship between Understanding and Imagination, which renders an indeterminate judgment of aesthetic Beauty. Kant conveyed the nature of the relationship thus:

Now since a judgment of taste is not based on a concept of the object (in the case of a presentation by which the object is given), it can consist only in the subsumption of the very imagination under the condition [which must be met] for the understanding to proceed in general from intuition to concepts. In other words, since the imagination’s freedom consists precisely in its schematizing without a concept, a judgment of taste must rest upon a mere sensation [*feeling*], namely, our sensation of both the imagination in its *freedom* and the understanding with its *lawfulness*, as they reciprocally quicken each other; i.e., it must rest on a feeling that allows us to judge the object by the purposiveness that the presentation (by which an object is given) has insofar as it furthers the cognitive powers in their free play. (Kant *CJ*: #35 287)



“[O]ur sensation [feeling] of both the imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness, as they reciprocally quicken each other.” (Kant, *CJ*: 287)

Figure 3.5 The Kantian conception of the *Aesthetic reflective judgment* is the abductive discovery of the universal predicate *beautiful* from the subjective feeling of particular object or art.

We can detect here the different functions of Understanding and Imagination in the Aesthetic Judgment, such that the Understanding has the feeling of the sensual object without representing it, and the Imagination, with its freedom, discovers the quasi-concept beautiful. Consequently, the role of imagination in Aesthetic judgment is to “schematize without a concept,” in contrast to the role of Imagination in Theoretical Judgment, which is to render a determinate *empirical concept*, which can be interpreted by Understanding. Thus, we can say that in Theoretical Judgment, the reflective self-control by imagination of the harmony between those two mental powers, Imagination and Understanding, can continue to determine the validity and truth of our perceptual judgment upon the object. However, the subjective feeling of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure, evolving from the reflective self-control by blind imagination of the harmony between Understanding and Imagination, can be reached upon the Abductive discovery the universal imaginative quasi-concept of beauty, from the sensually, given feeling of object to present the subjective feelings of pleasure. Yet only by the indeterminate judgment and with reflective aesthetic pleasure in feeling the harmony between Understanding and Imagination we can reach the subjective feeling of beauty but without any objective criterion of its truth. (Kant *CPuR*: #24-B150-152).

Hence we may define an aesthetic judgment in general as one whose predicate can never be cognition (i.e., concept of an object, though it may contain the subjective conditions for cognition as such). In such judgment, the basis determining [it] is sensation. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 224')

Hence, feelings of pleasure and displeasure are the reflective subjective conditions for the *aesthetic expression* of *beauty* or *ugliness* in respect to the sensual experience of an object, in contrast to the perceptual judgment, which represents conceptually the object itself in the determination of *theoretical judgment* of eventual truth (Nesher 2002a: II, III, X). Indeed, the function of the reflective feelings in both kinds of judgments is the basis for determining the harmony or disharmony between components of our cognitive faculties, Imagination and Understanding, in our cognitive operations. The comparison between these components determines whether our theoretical judgments of perception are true, and our aesthetic reflective judgments of Beauty acceptable.

Empirical Concepts Are the Core of Kant's Conception of Knowledge, Based on Logical Judgment

The problem is to explain the connection between the operation of schematism as the relationship between pure concepts-categories and the sensual

intuition of empirical objects, and the role of empirical concepts in the Theoretical Judgment of Understanding (Kant *CJ*: V, 214', *CPuR*: A137/B176, A141/B180-1; Guyer 1987: 158; Neshier 2007a).

On definitions. To *define*, as the term itself yields, is in fact intended to mean no more than to exhibit a thing's comprehensive concept originally within its bounds.¹⁰⁵ According to such requirement, an *empirical* concept cannot be defined at all but can only be *spelled out*. For since in such a concept we have only some of the characteristics belonging to a certain kind of objects of the senses, we can never be sure whether by the word designating the same object we do not sometimes think more and sometimes fewer of the object characteristic.

Comprehensiveness means clarity and sufficiency of the characteristic; *bounds* means the precision whereby there are no more characteristics than belong to the comprehensive concept; and *originally* means that this determination of the bound is not derived from somewhere else and thus still in need of proof—which would render the supposed explication of the concept incapable of standing at the top of all judgments concerning an object. (Kant *CPuR*: A727/B755; cf. Neshier 2007b)

Hence what is the meaning of *the word designating the object*, and can an iconic image of the sensual intuition be considered an object by virtue of its being transcendentally in space's contour-shape and time's endurance (Kant *CPuR*: A120-121)? Moreover, how we chose the word, let us say, "The morning star" a'la Frege (Kant *CPuR*: A 727/B 755)? Hence, it seems that the *words* for the sensual images are the *quasi-empirical concepts*, which only when the Kantian Transcendental pure concepts are applied to them and their relevance *is spelled out*—only then do these words become determined *empirical concepts* that present *empirical objects*. Hence, the difficulty for Kant is how the subjective feeling of the sensual intuition of an imagined object can become the *empirical concepts* of the Understanding in perceptual judgment. However, the relational word "is" indicates a synthesis of cognitions in perception, a synthesis which renders a perceptual judgment; and yet, only if the reflective apperception can convey the subjective feeling of the presentations, i.e., if there is an objectively coherent unity of the perceptual components, only then can the eventual object of experience be represented (Kant *CPuR*: B141-142). But, if the eventual image of the sensual intuition, renders a quasi-object that is *blind*, or in other words, *meaningless*, then how can a *pure concept* be applied to it and, moreover, how can a *spelled out* word have any eventual meaning if the pure concept applied is empty?

The empirical solution to this predicament must be, as it is also with the preconceptual images of animals and infants, that the empirically presented

iconic image of feeling, the Kantian sensual intuition, can be understood only through the preconceptual quasi-meaningful imagination. Therefore, as is the case with Peircean reconstructions of the Kantian difficulties, only the sequence of interpretation, whereby the *iconic image* of feeling evolves into the *indexical image* of the emotional reaction to it, can render a synthesized meaning-content of a newly discovered *empirical concept* of the cognized object represented in the cognitive perceptual judgment (Peirce *EPII*: #21, 1903; Neshier 1983a, 1999a, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). Kant explains in a nutshell the nature of the Theoretical Judgment of Understanding presenting a singular object:

A presentation that, though singular and not compared with others, yet harmonized with the conditions of the universality that is the business of the understanding in general, brings the cognitive powers into that proportioned attunement which we require for all cognition and which, therefore, we also consider valid for everyone who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and the senses in combination (in other words, for all human beings). (Kant *CJ*: 219)

We can recognize in Kant's cognitive explanation of the evolvement of empirical concepts the combination of the *hierarchical relation* in the operation of Pure Understanding and the *linear relation of evolvement* of Reflective Interpretation of Imagination. In this manner, Kant combines Transcendental Idealism with Empirical Realism to represent our phenomenal-empirical presentations (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, I: 195', V: 211'-212'). With regard to the universal concepts of nature, which afford us the concept of experience to begin with (apart from the particular determination, which is get empirically), judgment requires no special principle by which to reflect: the instruction for this reflection is already embedded in the concept of nature as such, i.e., in the understanding. Judgment *schematizes* a priori and applies these schemata to each empirical synthesis; without such a synthesis, no empirical judgment whatsoever would be possible. Here judgment not only reflects but also determines, and its transcendental schematism also provides it with a rule under which it subsumes given empirical intuitions (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 212'; cf. *CPuR*: B177/A138).

Hence, judgment is operated by reflection of the Understanding, which controls the synthesis of its elements, and in this manner the discovered empirical concept evolves as a universal into an empirical judgment presenting a particular object of sensual intuition.

Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it is just as necessary that we make our concepts sensible (i.e., that we

add the object to them in intuition) as it is necessary that we make our intuitions understandable (i.e., that we bring them under concepts). Moreover, this capacity and this ability cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot intuit anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition arise. (Kant *CPuR*: B75/A51; cf. #24-B152; yet compare, *CJ*: #35 287)

The difficulty is to understand the way in which the imagination, by its reflective control, interprets the schema to synthesize the *empty pure concepts* with the *blind sensual objects*, as Kant endeavored to elucidate in the First Critique “On the schematism of the pure concept of understanding” (Kant *CPuR*: B177/A138ff.; Neshar 2007a). The explanation provided here explicates the following diagram (figure 3.6), using the Peircean suggestion that the sensual intuition, composed by the iconic and indexical cognitive signs, is interpreted into the eventual emerging indeterminate object, which Peirce calls the Immediate Object. As noted, it is the Synthesis of the Immediate Object with the formal Empirical Concept that constitutes a Perceptual Judgment (Kant *CPuR*: B151, A100; Paton 1936: Vol. I, C. XIX; Bowie 2003: 24).

It can be claimed that the synthesis of the predetermined meaning of the sensual object with the form of the empirical concept is what makes the concept meaningful and the object determinate. Thus, we might say that by definition, the *empirical object* is subsumed under the *empirical concept*. The evolvement of empirical concepts from sensual intuitions into perceptual judgments, through the habitual synthesis of pure intuitions of space and time with pure concepts and Imagination, reveals Kant’s difficulty with the epistemology of empirical concepts (Kant *CPuR*: #24-B150-151).




Figure 3.6 The evolvement of empirical concepts from blind sensual intuitions, with the pure intuitions and the empty pure concepts, into their habitual synthesis in perceptual judgment.

The question is whether the pure intuitions of space and time are united with the sensual intuition and evolve into indeterminate objects, or alternatively, whether the pure intuitions of space and time belong to the indeterminate empirical concept, or perhaps they belong to both the indeterminate empirical concept and to the sensual intuition. In Kant's philosophical system, the Pure Concepts of Understanding that relate to space and time are not derived from sensory experience; rather, they are miraculously inherent in the evolving sensual intuitions. So too, the Pure Concepts of Understanding are inherent in the operation of schematism. Hence it is reasonable to consider both of them, the *pure intuitions* and the *pure concepts*, as components of the *empirical concept*. Thus, the cognized content-meaning of *empirical concept* is the Determinate Phenomenal Object that falls under it (Kant *CPuR*: A/B, Logic, 97).

The empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the objects of experience and receives, through the understanding, merely the form of generality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which they have been extracted as to their content. Whether there are *pure concepts of the understanding* (*conceptus puri*) which, as such spring solely from the understanding, independent of any experience, must be investigated by metaphysics. (Kant [1800]1974, Logic, 97; cf. *CPuR*: B159)

The pure intuition of space and time, when fitted with the Sensual Intuition and interpreted in imagination, into the indeterminate Blind Object *Schematizing* with the Empty Pure Concept, then it is emerging as the Indeterminate Empirical Concept when and then the empirical concept is becomes determinate through the *synthesis* of the *indeterminate quasi-empirical concept* with *indeterminate quasi-object*, which become the *meaning-content* of the determinate empirical concept, which resulting in Perceptual Judgment as True presentation of the determinate Object.

The following can explain Kant's experiential intuition of perceptual judgment and the role of sensual intuition in human cognitive presentation of objects, without relinquishing the role of pure concepts of formal logic as grammatical categories of cognition. Thus, there is still a need for the *secret art* of the mysterious Schematism, residing in the depth of the human soul (Kant [1782] 1950 *Prolegomena*, #39; Longuenesse 1998: 397-399; Peirce *EPII*: #17, esp. 242-246).

There is something strange and even preposterous about the supposition of there being a concept that [as such] must surely have a signification, but that is not capable of any explication. Yet here, with the categories, the special situation is that only by means of the universal *sensible condition* can they have a

determinate signification and reference to some object; but that this condition has been omitted from the pure category, so that the category can contain nothing but the logical function for bringing the manifold under the concept. But from this function alone, i.e., from the form of the concept alone, we can cognize and distinguish nothing as to what object belongs under the category, precisely because we have abstracted from the sensible condition on which alone objects can belong under the category at all. Hence the categories require, in addition to the pure concept of understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility as such (schemata). Without these determinations the categories are not concepts through which an object is cognized and distinguished from others, but are only so many ways of thinking an object for possible intuitions, and of giving the object (under conditions that are still required) its signification in accordance with some function of the understanding, i.e., of *defining* it. Hence they cannot themselves be defined. (Kant *CPuR*: B303)

Therefore, *empirical concepts* are needed that can present the sensible intuitional quasi-objects that are to become determinate to evolve into determinate concepts, in order to be presented by these empirical concepts; hence, only through the synthesis of the categorical-pure concepts with sensual intuition can the empirical concepts evolve. However, Kant cannot explain without assuming a miracle conception of *schematism* that might synthesize the two poles of his Transcendental Idealism. Kant sees this as the alternative to the impossibility of empiricism and rationalism, advocated by his philosophical predecessors (with the exception of Spinoza's empirical realism, which—as I explain—is fundamentally distinct from the expositions of the Rationalists and the Empiricists that were Spinoza's contemporaries, and who preceded Kant (Nesher 1979, 1987a, 2002a: I, IV).

The following explains the deadlock of Transcendental Idealism, by attempting to bridge the epistemological dichotomy between Rationalism and Empiricism by means of the unexplainable operation of Schematism. Kant refers to schematism to explain that a Theoretical Judgment is possible only through the experiential evolution of empirical concepts.

Thinking is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the kind of this intuition is not given in any way, then the object is merely transcendental, and the concept of understanding has none but transcendental use, viz., to provide the unity of thought of a manifold as such. Hence through a pure category, in which we abstract from any condition of sensible intuition (the only intuition possible for us), no object is determined; rather, a pure category expresses only the thought of an object as such according to different modes. Now the use of a concept involves also a function of the power of judgment, by means of which an object is subsumed under the concept, and hence involves at least the formal

condition under which something can be given in intuition. If this condition of the power of judgment (the schema) is lacking, then all subsumption is lost; for nothing then is given that can be subsumed under the concept. Hence the merely transcendental use of the categories is in fact not a use at all, and has no object that is determinate, or is even determinable as regards form. (Kant *CPuR*: B304)

Hence, Kant can explain cognitive Theoretical Judgment of Understanding only through the mysterious schematism. Without the conception of schematism, knowledge cannot be achieved, and the entire epistemology of Kant's Copernican Revolution of Transcendental Idealism collapses. The difficulty is that the empty concept and the blind object are meaningless for us and we do not have any clue whether we can schematize them or not, unless the empty concept is only a form of concept, which can fit any blind object and such an object is only a sensual matter that can accept any conceptual form without any homogeneity. In that case, however, their eventual synthesis cannot possibly render a specific determinate empirical concept presenting any determinate object.

The essential difficulty with the Theoretical Judgment of Understanding is whether it is possible to bridge the metaphysical dichotomy between Rationalism of Understanding and Empiricism of Senses, in Kant's Transcendental Idealism, through schematism, an operation which performs a kind of *transcendental synthesis of imagination*. Ultimately, the question remains whether such a *transcendental synthesis is capable of overcoming* the schism between *empty pure concept* and the *indeterminate blind object* (Kant *CPuR*: B152, *CJ*: V: 195).

Whenever an object is subsumed under a concept, the presentation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept, i.e., the concept must contain what is presented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. For this is precisely what we mean by the expression that an object is contained under a concept. (Kant *CPuR*: A137/B176; cf. B40)

Now this difficulty "necessitates a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment," but the judgment itself is based on the impossible *transcendental schematism*. The essential difficulty is how such a meaningful *homogeneity* can be achieved between *heterogeneous* and incomparable *forms* of empty pure concepts of understanding, on the one hand, and *matter* of blind objects of *heterogeneous* sensual intuitions, on the other hand (Kant *CPuR*: A137/B176ff.)?

This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their mere form, is the secret art residing in the depth of the human

soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves. Only this much can we say: The *image* is [here] a product of the productive imagination's empirical ability. (Kant *CPuR*: A141/B180-1; cf. A121, B185-187)

To overcome the dichotomy between Transcendental Idealism and Experiential Empirism, Kant had to suggest the notion of schematism, which remains unknown and unexplainable and therefore cannot help him explain human knowledge and conduct in nature and society. Hence, the approach of the Peircean realist, criticizing and revolutionizing the Kantian enterprise, is to consider Kant's notion on empirical grounds (Nesher 2002a, 2016, 2021).

The Epistemology of the Perceptual Judgments of Kantian Transcendentalism and Peircean Realism: Theoretical Judgment and Aesthetic Judgment of Artworks and Their Representations of Reality

Kant's conception of Theoretical Judgment of Understanding evolved from his experiential intuition. In explicating its empirical operation in perceptual judgment, he used the example "This object is a Table," when the '*this object*' is subsumed under the concept *Table*.

Understanding—speaking generally—is the power of *cognitions*. Cognition consists in determinate reference of given presentations to an object. And an *object* is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is *united*. (Kant *CPuR*: B137; cf. figure 3.6)

Kant has in mind the perceptual judgment in which the concept expresses properties of the object; however, this explanation of perceptual judgment cannot hold in the case of Aesthetic judgments, because *beauty* is not an empirical property of an object and, therefore, according to Kant, it cannot even be considered an empirical concept. It is here, at the juxtaposition of perception and beauty, that all the difficulties in respect to the conception of judgments arises. Accordingly, in Ethics and Aesthetics, we are not representing objects and their properties; rather, these are different modes of representation of different aspects of reality. The question is whether Kant has a true epistemology of knowledge and a valid theory of truth to prove our true representations of such different aspects of reality, including the Theoretical Judgment of experience (Kant *CPuR*: A57/B82-B86/A62; Makkreel 1990)?

Therefore, the difficulty with the Aesthetic judgment in the framework of Kant's idealistic epistemology is that if it is explained by the subjective feelings of individuals without any objective criterion, then there is no explanation

of validity and universality of such judgments. However, this difficulty may be addressed by adequately proving the truth of the Aesthetic judgment of taste based on specific subjective or intersubjective proof-conditions.

For judgment of taste consists precisely in this, that it calls a thing beautiful only by virtue of that characteristic in which it adapts itself to the way we apprehend it. (Kant *CJ*: #32, 282)

A judgment of taste, just as *if* it were merely *subjective*, cannot be determined by bases of proof. (Kant *CJ*: #33, 284; cf. #34)

A similar difficulty can be found in the Moral imperative judgments which are not related to empirical objects to be judged valid and true, but rather to humans' understanding of their reality and their willingness to execute the entailed behaviors in a social setting. Thus, the problem is to explain whether the Moral imperatives represent and operate in reality and if so how? Indeed, the entire structural operation of Moral imperative judgments is more complicated, given that the relevant conceptual predicates do not indicate any empirical properties of objects, and their peculiarity requires further elaboration. According to Spinoza, the moral concepts are the *guidance of reason* and are based on the knowledge of the self and the society. The purpose of such moral concepts is to guide humans towards moral conduct for their own well-being, by controlling their representation of their operations, (Spinoza, *Ethics* VI: P35, [1677]1985; Neshet 1972). This issue can be elaborated in respect to Peirce's epistemology of the Three Normative Sciences, Theoretic, Ethics, and Aesthetics, in reconstructing Kant's three Critiques (Peirce *EP2*: #14; Neshet 2007a).

Indeed, due to Kant's limited epistemological conception of judgment and representation of empirical reality, and because his classical structure of judgment seems, let us say, Cartesian in terms of its formal semantics, the critical conclusion is restricted to his First Critique only. Moreover, following Peircean realist epistemology, it is clear that we cannot prove the *truth* of our judgments without confronting them with the external reality, and without a sound theory of truth, Kant cannot explain the determinate nature of such judgments and he can only think they are so.

Thus if truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must here be distinguished from others. For if a cognition does not agree with the object to which it is referred then it is false, even if it contains something that might well hold for other objects. Now a universal criterion of truth would be one that is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But while in such a universal criterion of truth we thus abstract from all content

of cognition (i.e., from its reference to its object), yet truth concerns this very content. Clearly, therefore, asking questions about a mark for the truth of this content of cognitions is quiet impossible and absurd, and hence one cannot possibly give an indicator of truth that is sufficient and yet universal at the same time. Hence we shall have to say that no universal indicator can be demanded for the truth of cognition in terms of its matter, because such an indicator would be intrinsically contradictory. (Kant *CPuR*: A58/B83; cf. A57/B82-B86/A62; also *CPuR*: A134/174, B177/A138; Scherer 1995: 15-17; Hanna 1993)

Yet, despite Kant's difficulty with the general framework for proving the truth of our theoretical judgments, he nevertheless considers that the proof of our judgments has to depend on both our *inner* and *outer* experiences.

Problematic idealism . . . only alleges that we are unable to prove by direct experience an existence apart from our own, is reasonable and is in accordance with a thorough philosophical way of thinking—viz., in permitting no decisive judgment before a sufficient proof has been found. The proof it demands must, therefore, establish that regarding external⁴³ things we have not merely *imagination* but also *experience*. And establishing this surely cannot be done unless one can prove that even our *inner* experience, indubitable for Descartes, is possible only on the supposition of *outer* experience. (Kant *CPuR*: B275; cf. Neshier 2007a)

In terms of the wording, this explanation is similar to Peirce's epistemology of proving our knowledge of reality, although the Kantian *outer experience* differs from the *external reality* of the Pragmaticist realism by being only phenomenal. Hence, according to Kant, our *sensual intuitions* are the *outer* experience, in the sense that they are outside the *transcendental self* with its *pure concepts*, upon which our cognitive *inner* experience depends. The Pragmaticist external reality is not the Kantian *outer reality*, which is the sensual intuition experience, but the reality that is external to both our *inner* and *our outer* experiences, and without confrontation in *external reality* we cannot have any external criteria for proving the truth of our cognitive representation of reality (Neshier 2002a, 2016, 2021). As noted, Kant has an intrinsic difficulty with truth which stems from his phenomenological conception of knowledge and his use of a somewhat formal semantic epistemology of *language* to represent the assigned *model*, whereby the inner *understanding* of *pure reasoning* and the outer *sensual blind objects* are both components of human cognition. Indeed, Kant's *outer* experience is nothing but our *inner* cognition of our sensual intuition itself and not of any *external* reality. Hence, if it is merely our *cognition* of sensual intuitions, then it is similar to the dogmatic idealism of Descartes, according to which we can know only our cognitions, thoughts, and sensations, but we cannot know the external

world unless we can have God's advantageous perspective. Let us use Kant's assertion, which has yet to be proven, that our inner experience of our *consciousness* is essentially connected with our outer experience of *reality*, and hence we cannot prove the truth of our existence without proving the truth of representing external reality: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects . . . outside me." (Kant CPuR: B275).

As Russell questions Descartes' assumption that "I think *ergo* I exist," he is critically suggesting that from *I think* I can only conclude that my *thoughts* exist and not myself as a thinking thing (Russell 1946: 589-590). It seems that also the Kantian Transcendental Idealism has difficulty explaining this essential intuition phenomenologically, i.e., the intuition that the external reality can be inferred based on our knowledge of ourselves, as he has no objective criteria by which to truly present the phenomenal subject and object. Looking to overcome these Kantian epistemological difficulties, we can follow the Peircean realist epistemology, in which we can recognize and theorize the relation between sensing and thinking, to find out what "is the secret art residing in the depth of the human soul" by phenomenological introspection into our perceptual operations and analyzing their elements as interpreted and synthesized in perceptual judgments. Hence, through the phenomenological introspection on our perceptual operation we can cognitively penetrate into this "*secret art*," to explain the phenomena of this operation, the *phaneron*, which we instinctively introspect and which is subject to our self-control. This basic inquiry of experience is what Peirce calls *Phaneroscopy* (Peirce CP: 7.381n19, 1902, 5.440-441, 1905, EPII: #26, 1906; Neshier 1990, 1999a, 2016).

Everybody recognizes that it is not inconsiderable art, this business of "phaneroscopic" analysis by which one frames a scientific definition. (Peirce EPII: #28, p. 403)

Hence, we can explain how the perceptual *iconic image* is the initial component of our working imagination, which is interpreted further in the *indexical reaction* to it, and their synthesis in the *symbolic thought* under our reflective self-control results in our perceptual judgment about the eventual object of the genuine perceptual *image*. This Peircean realist epistemology of our basic perceptual knowledge enables us to theorize our experiential operation as being synthesized and quasi-proved true in perceptual judgment representing reality. With this realist epistemology, there is no need for transcendental, a priori assumptions of belief, and we can overcome the deadlock of the Kantian Transcendental phenomenology (Peirce EPII: #17, 1903, #26, 1905; Neshier 2002a: II, III, X; 2021).

Hence, we have to turn to the alternative empirical epistemologies to explain that the only objective criterion for the knowledge of subjective existence is through one’s cognitive confrontation in external reality. Through this confrontation we can prove the truth of the representation of reality in perceptual judgment which is also the proof of the existence of the self (Nesher 2007a). Thus, through the subjective interpretation of one’s own cognitive signs, through one’s Reflective Self-Controlled Feeling of Cognitive Operations of *Interpretation*, one can feel in control of one’s meaning coherency and thus avoid the expectation of contradiction in the resulting judgment. Thus, by controlling this operation, one cognizes oneself as the being that is actively operating on the confrontation in reality, and by proving the truth of one’s perceptual representation of external reality, one simultaneously proves anaphorically that the self *represents* one’s mind. In this manner, we can empirically achieve what Kant phenomenally could not, the knowledge of the *inner self* and the *outer reality* together, as in the following:

In the Pragmaticist diagram, the initial sign is the perceptual origin of the sequence of Imagination Feeling, Emotional Reaction, and Rational Interpretations, respectively. Peirce developed this semiotic as epistemic logic, which evolved gradually from the study of the Kantian philosophy and his fruitful ingenious intuitions, which at the end of the nineteenth century resulted in his realist revolution (Nesher 2018). Unfortunately, the Kantian penetrated intuitions are wrapped in an impossible idealist epistemology; however, they can be salvaged by the Peircean realist revolution, which makes it possible to penetrate the Kantian phenomenalist prison of subjectivism and solipsism, to which—inexplicably—contemporary philosophy continues to cling. What is flawed in Kant’s endeavor to define truth, in his inability to “give an indicator of truth that is sufficient and yet universal at the same time,” which actually led him to the aforementioned intrinsic contradiction. The essential problem in Kantian phenomenalism is that because we are captured in our cognitions, every inner criterion for the representation of the outer object remains subjective, without any objective general or




Figure 3.7 Siamese twins: Interpretation of meaning and representation of outer and inner realities.

universal criterion. “Hence we shall have to say that no universal indicator can be demanded for the truth of cognition in terms of its matter, because such an indicator would be intrinsically contradictory” (Kant *CPuR*: A58/B83). In contemporary philosophy, Kant’s epistemology serves as a sort of *formal semantics* inside the Internal realism (Putnam 1981: Ch. 3, 1990: Ch. 2). The following points summarize Kant’s basic epistemological difficulties.

- A. Kant’s framework for combining Rationalism of empty concepts with Empirism of blind objects, which is meant to bridge the initial schism between *pure concepts* of Understanding and *blind objects* of Sensual Intuition, relies on his Schematism; however, this appears to be a miraculous operation to combine entities that share no common dominator.
- B. Kant’s definition of truth is based—confusedly—on the phenomenalism of Barkley and Hume, according to which we cannot go outside our cognitive skins to represent external reality (e.g., Davidson 1986; Neshar 2002a: VI), and the metaphysical realism of Descartes that assumes the external reality and the *clear and distinct* ideas which can be connected together only by the help of God.
- C. Kant’s definition of truth relies on finding a coherence or correspondence between concepts and sensual intuition, but he does not offer any objective criterion for the validity of such a correspondence (Hanna 1993; Neshar 2018).

Kant offers the following conceptions of correspondence: (1) The pure concepts of space and time correspond with the sensual intuition. (2) The empty concepts of Understanding correspond to the blind objects of imagination, which are then synthesized by his Schematism into empirical concepts. (3) The synthesis of the predetermined meaning of the sensual object with the empty form of concepts to the empirical concept, which miraculously makes the concept meaningful and the object determinate and, thus, the *empirical object* is subsumed under the *empirical concept* (Kant, *CPuR*: A97; cf. figure 3.6 above):

By *synthesis*, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various presentations with one another, and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition. (Kant, *CPuR*: A77/B103)




Figure 3.8 Kantian logical-theoretical judgment: Can schematism correspond-synthesize empty concepts with blind objects?

Kant claimed, as we saw earlier, that three kinds of synthesis are required to organize information, namely apprehending in intuition, reproducing in imagination, and recognizing in concepts (A97/A105). (Brook 2013)

However, it remains questionable whether the pure intuitions of space and time can mold and give parameters to blind-amorphous sensual intuitions, and whether the schematism can lead to agreement between the empty concepts and the blind object; moreover, how can the subjective feeling of coherence between the Sensual Intuitions and the Indeterminate Object emerge as a Determinate Empirical Object (figure 3.6)?

When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment upon the understanding; and the only question is whether in determination of the object there is truth or not. But the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations which are referred to objects (for they are the same in both cases), but by their connection according to those rules which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in experience or not. (Kant [1782]1950, *Prolegomena*: 290-291)

Kant’s Transcendental Phenomenology cannot explain the difference between the subjective feeling of coherence in perceptual judgment and in the dream. This is so because we first have to prove the truth of the meaning’s coherency of Sensual Intuitions and Imagination, and for this, we first must have our reflective self-control in the operation of the working imagination to make it valid, and we need an objective criterion for the soundness of this entire operation, in order to prove the truth of our perceptual judgment in representing external reality (Kant *CPuR*: A191/B236). The alternative is to take the epistemological perspective of Spinoza and of Peirce on the cognitive evolvment from perceptual feeling and emotional experiential signs to their synthesis in conceptual thought. Thus, by introspecting perceptual judgment, we can attain a meaningful interpretation that coincides with, is true to, and thus serves as proof of our representation of the external reality (Peirce *CP*: 5.53–57; Neshar 2002a: I, II, III, X).




Figure 3.9 Peircean perceptual evolvment from cognitive signs to their interpreting-synthesizing in the proven true perceptual judgment.

From the Phaneroscopic explanation of the perceptual experience, by apperception reflecting on its basic components, we can detect the coherence of the iconic sign of *ego* expectation of an object, and the indexical sign of the *non-ego* eventually representing reality. In such introspection, by interpreting the components of perceptual signs, we can cognize that by arriving at a coherent interpretation, we are able to represent the external reality in our perceptual cognition, through our perceptual judgments. The Peircean Empirical-Realist epistemological revolution of the Kantian Phenomenal-Idealism proved how the form of cognitive thought evolved from its experiential contents into a perceptual quasi-proof of the validity of perceptual judgments in representing reality (Nesher 1990, 2018). In this alternative to Kant, using the realist *epistemic logic* to represent our confrontation in reality, the truth of representation of reality can emerge as a *universal method*; *nonetheless*, every such proven truth is always also a *particular judgment*, relative to our proof-conditions. Hence, given that the quasi-proved true perceptual judgments are always relative to their specific conditions-contexts we do not face Kant's difficulty of an "intrinsic contradiction." Yet, the structure of logical-theoretical judgment of the First Critique remains incomplete and in order to be proven as a true representation of reality, it should be reconstructed as the basic mode for proving our knowledge of reality.

However, neither in the Moral imperative judgment of the Second Critique, nor in the universality of Aesthetic judgment of the Third Critique, Kant could find any explainable mode to represent reality; hence there is no objective criterion by which to prove the objective truth of our representations or the affective relations between our representations of reality and our conduct in life (Kant *CJ*: # 31).

**THE AESTHETIC JUDGMENT DEPENDS ON
THE THEORETIC-LOGICAL JUDGMENT, THE
ACCEPTED KNOWLEDGE, TO EVALUATE THE
ARTWORK BY INGENIOUS COMPARISON
OF ART WITH THE KNOWN REALITY**

**The Difficulties in the Epistemology of Aesthetic
Reflection of Pleasure and Judgment of Beauty**

Aesthetic reflective judgments, as such, are only quasi-determinate, as we operate them using only the instinctive and practical rules of habit, namely, quasi-rules and quasi-concepts, which are controlled by the imagination, through non-verbal feelings and emotional reflections, "a universal rule that

we are unable to state,” although the philosopher might express them rationally (Kant *CJ*: #18, 237, 238-239).

But we think of the *beautiful* as having a *necessary* reference to liking. This necessity is of a special kind. . . . Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*, i.e., a necessity of the assent of *everyone* to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state. (Kant *CJ*: #18, 237)

Thus, our *reflection judgment* operates to evaluate the beauty (or ugliness) of the perceived object, without representing the object cognitively with a concept. Yet this Abductive inference of beauty cannot be a complete proof of the judgment since it can only suggest the plausibility of an indeterminate intuitive concept. This is because, by reconstructing Kantian logic of cognition, only the entire tri-part sequence, consisting of Abductive suggestion, Deductive expectation, and Inductive evaluation, can provide determinate proof; otherwise, there is no objective criterion for the acceptability of such Abductive suggestive reflective judgment (figure 3.5).

For it is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgment, and hence does not involve a *concept* of the character and internal or external possibility of the object through this or that cause; rather, it involves merely the relation of the presentational powers to each other, insofar as they are determined by a presentation. Now this relation [present] when [judgment] determines an object as beautiful, is connected with the feeling of a pleasure, a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares to be valid for everyone. (Kant *CJ*: #11, 221; cf. ##8, 22, 35, 40, 57)

In the reflective judgment of aesthetics, the subjective feeling of pleasure is derived from the reciprocal relationship between the presentational powers of Understanding and Imagination. The question is then, how can such an operation be considered as an objective criterion for determining that the Aesthetic Reflection of Pleasure and of Beauty is a universal perception that transcends personal feelings?

The very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness [i.e., cognitive, not material] in the play of the subject's cognitive [i.e., mental] powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given, is that pleasure. For this consciousness in an aesthetic judgment contains a basis for determining the subject's activity regarding the quickening of his cognitive powers, and hence an inner causality (which is purposive) concerning in general, which however is not restricted to a determinate cognition. Hence it contains a mere form of the

subjective purposiveness of a presentation. . . . Yet it does have a causality in it, namely, to *keep* [us in] in the state of [having] the presentation itself, and [to keep] the cognitive powers engaged [in their occupation] without any further aim. We *linger* in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself. (Kant *CJ*: #12, 222)

These two cognitive powers, the *Understanding* and *Imagination*, jointly operate the reflective judgment of taste (Kant *CJ*: 219). However, the difficulty with Kant's epistemology of the universality of the Aesthetic judgment is at the level of subjective reflective feeling of our mental cognitive operation. Hence, we must conclude that Kant's universality of the reflective Aesthetic judgment is based upon an a priori principle of mental causality that leads everyone to agree on the subjective judgment of Beauty. Thus, the question becomes: can we accept the epistemology of the Critique of Pure Reason that includes an a priori principle of *causality*, and is such an epistemology effective also in the Critique of Judgment? Accepting this epistemology implies that the mental operation is preconceptual and that the perceived harmony or disharmony between the faculties of Understanding and Imagination is not based on the sensual experience, but on a consciousness of a cognitive purposiveness in the play between the subject's cognitive powers. Yet, how can *causation* and purposiveness be compatible with the notion of *free play* between the faculties of Understanding and Imagination?

Hence the critique of taste is itself only subjective as regards the presentation by which the object is given to us: it is the art, or science, of finding the rules for the reciprocal relation that understanding and imagination have in the given presentation (without reference to prior sensation or concept), and hence for their accordance or discordance, and of determining them as regards to their conditions. The critique of taste is an *art* if it shows this only through example; it is *science* if it derives the possibility of such judging from the nature of these powers as cognitive powers as such. It is with the latter alone, with a transcendental critique, that we are here concerned throughout. Its aim is to set forth and justify the subjective principle of taste as an a priori principle of the power of judgment. (Kant *CJ*: #34 286)

Kant endeavored to explain the reflective Aesthetic judgment of a subjective experience of pleasure and beauty by referring to the *free play* that takes place between the two cognitive powers, *Understanding* and *Imagination*, and this we can understand by examples. However, to distinguish between the subjective experience and judgment of pleasure derived from objects and the subjective experience and judgment of pleasure and beauty derived from artworks, Kant needs to provide subjective formal conditions of judgment. This

condition is fulfilled through the subject's discernment of an *inner causality*, a formal purposiveness, between the *Imagination* and *Understanding*. In this manner, Kant can explain the *universality* of the reflective Aesthetic judgment of Beauty of artworks. Thus, the universality of subjective judgment can be attributed to a transcendental *a priori* principle, or to a formal rule that governs the relationship between *Understanding* and *Imagination* and holds for everyone. In his explanation of the universality of Aesthetic judgments of artworks, Kant accepted both options as viable (Kant *CJ*: #35, #12, 222, #37, #38 290 & n¹⁵-291; figure 3.5).

A judgment of taste differs from a logical one in that a logical judgment subsumes a presentation under concepts of the object whereas a judgment of taste does not subsume it under any concept at all, since otherwise the necessary universal approval could be [obtained] by compelling [people to give it]. But a judgment of taste does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as it alleges a universality and necessity, though a universality and necessity that is not governed by concepts of the object and hence is merely subjective. Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition of the object), while a judgment of taste cannot be determined by concepts, its basis is only the subjective formal conditions of judgment as such. The subjective conditions of all judgments is our very ability to judge, i.e., the power of judgment. (Kant *CJ*: #35 286-287; cf. #38 290 & n¹⁵)

The difficulty is that according to Kant, the universality and objectivity of the judgment of taste depends only on its subjectivity and, hence, perhaps the problem is that he extends his conception of Judgment beyond what it can reasonably accomplish. The problem is to explain why Kant, which in his three Critiques elaborated on the three powers of the mind, Understanding, Reason, and Imagination, respectively, discusses the power of judgment in the third critique while the power of judgment operates in all the three Critiques. Furthermore, why is the Third Critique called the *Critique of Judgment* instead of the *Critique of Imagination*, which according to Kant is the essential power or faculty of aesthetic operations, both of sensual intuition and of taste of objects and of artistic works (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction: II 201'-205'; cf. *CPuR*: A120)? Indeed, Kant hesitated about the place of the operation of judgment in his philosophy, saying that "perhaps it will lay the basis for a special part of philosophy, even though philosophy as a system can have only two parts" (Kant *CJ*: 202'), namely, the two critiques, the First of Understanding and Second of Reason.

Yet judgment is a very special cognitive power, not at all independent: it gives us neither concepts nor ideas of any object whatever, whereas understanding

does give us such concepts, and reason such ideas. For judgment is only an ability to subsume under concepts given from elsewhere. (Kant *CJ*: 202')

And yet, the reflective Aesthetic judgment of taste and beauty does not have the ability to subsume objects under concepts, which is the essential operation in Kant's conception of Logical judgment and therefore the paradigm of any judgment. Consequently, we are left to wonder why Kant adamantly attempted to "save", i.e., redeem the validity of the reflective Aesthetic judgment—to the extent that he posited contradictory assumptions without presenting an epistemological explanation. In other words, reflective Aesthetic judgment is difficult to explain precisely because it is outside Kant's formal semantic model of the subsumption of an object under a concept to explain human knowledge. To complete the Critique of Judgment, Aesthetic judgment, which is basically an operation of the imagination, needs to be explained using a different epistemological conception. An alternative epistemological explanation can be found in the reflective self-controlled apperception of the operation of Imagination (Scherer 1995: 4; Neshar 2010).

In the above discussion of the reflective Aesthetic judgment in distinction from the Logical judgment, we noted the deviation from the Transcendental Idealism towards the empirical cognitive operation. This shift can also be seen in the operation of discovery and evaluation of *empirical concepts*, although no explanation addresses the question of the transition from empirical imagination to cognitive meaning-content of perceptual operations and judgment (figure 3.6). Indeed, the shift towards the empirical cognitive operation is close/related/akin to the Peircean epistemological explanation of our empirical knowledge of external reality, the components of which can be found—albeit in a less organized fashion—in Kant's three Critiques but only haphazardly. It seems that for Kant, if the judgment of taste is not based on a concept of the object, then it must be isolated from empirical reality and based only on subjective feeling. And yet, to maintain that the reflective Aesthetic judgment has a universal and objective quality, it is incumbent upon Kant to show that, in sensual intuitions, the reflective operation of imagination on aesthetic experience does convey, through synthesis, a symbolic-concept that is eventually quasi-presenting an object of reality. But However, this formula cannot work in the case of reflective Aesthetic judgment, because it is an operation carried out by the imagination alone; without attributing concepts of understanding to the experience of reflective Aesthetic judgment, it can be neither objective nor universally accepted (Kant *CJ*: #1, 203-204). For the universality of reflective Aesthetic judgments of the Beauty of artworks, in distinction from the subjective judgment of taste, Kant needs a different criterion of universality, which he found in the common sense of human communication.

Whenever we make a judgment declaring something to be beautiful, we permit no one to hold a different opinion, even though we base our judgment only on our feeling rather than concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as a common rather than a private feeling. But if we are to use this common sense in such a way we cannot base it on experience; for it seeks to justify us in making judgments that contain an ought: it does not say that everyone *will* agree with my judgment, but that he *ought to*. . . .

But is there in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or is there a still higher principle of reason that makes it only a regulative principle for us, [in order] to bring forth in us, for higher purposes, a common sense in the first place? (Kant *CJ*: #22, 239-240; cf. Coleman 1974: 144-157; Guyer 1997: 217& n93, Ch. 8)

Indeed, Kant accepts the conception of common sense as a common cognition that enables humans to communicate and understand each other, but this is just a hypothesis to explain the dynamics of human society and particularly the common reflective Aesthetic judgment of Beauty. In contrast, the epistemic endeavor is to explain how our common sense can serve not only as “a regulative principle for us” as a society, but also for understanding the universality or the truth of the proved reflective Aesthetic judgment of artworks.

Kant’s Epistemology of Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Judgments in Evaluation of the Beauty of Artworks and of Natural and Artificial Objects

Kant aspired to show that the evaluation of the aesthetic beauty of artworks is based on the free play between the mental powers of Understanding and Imagination, through the harmony or disharmony between them. But unfortunately, he did not show how we can reflectively judge the relationship between them without having any external restriction or objective criterion for such an evaluation (Nesher 2003). However, such an objective criterion is necessary if we are to obtain coherent meanings and interpretations of the aesthetic artworks and their creation through a self-controlled free play between the aforementioned mental powers. To this end, we must be able to prove that the artworks convey a true aesthetic representation of a relevant external reality (Nesher 2002a: II, X). However, as noted, according to Kant, Aesthetic judgment cannot be any knowledge, by concepts and rational rules, because it is pre-conceptual experiential creation, and thus the ensuing expressions of “beauty” and “beautiful” cannot be concepts that present the sensual intuition of empirical experience of objects, but convey a subjective and instinctive reflection upon our aesthetic experience.

If we wish to decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the presentation to the object to give rise to cognition; rather, we use imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Hence a judgment of taste is not cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis *cannot be other than subjective*. But any reference of presentations, even of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real [rather than formal] in an empirical presentation); excepted is a reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure—this reference designates nothing whatsoever in the object, but here the subject feels himself, [namely] how he is effected by the presentation. . . .

The presentations given in a judgment may be empirical (and hence aesthetic⁸ [From Greek . . . ‘to sense’]), but if we refer them to the object, the judgment we make by means of them is logical. On the other hand, even if the given presentations were rational, they would still be aesthetic if, and to the extent that, the subject referred them, in his judgment, solely to himself (to his feeling). (Kant *CJ*: #1, 203-204)

This experience of aesthetic feeling is not the Logical judgment about the presentation of an empirical object; it is only the subjective feeling of deriving pleasure or displeasure from the reflective judgment of aesthetics. However, by limiting ourselves to such an explanation of the Aesthetic judgment, we risk overlooking the distinction between subjective pleasure derived from an empirical experience with natural and artificial objects, and the subjective pleasure derived from the experience with the artistic created artworks, given that in both cases, “the subject referred them, in his judgment, solely to himself (to his feeling).” Kant adds that “if the given presentations were rational,” i.e., if the subject can explain the criterion for this Aesthetic judgment, then the reference may extend beyond one’s subjective feeling. In the above citation, Kant does not distinguish explicitly between aesthetic appreciation of natural objects and artistically created artworks, in respect to their beauty or otherwise, but then how we can decide about it?

Aesthetic experiences are based on perceptual experience, yet the artwork as an aesthetic cognitive presentation is based on the artist’s ability to aesthetically represent reality. Hence, we cannot cognize the aesthetic value of the work of art without understanding the artist’s rational ideas and the aesthetic language embedded in the artistic creation of the artwork, the language that includes feeling and emotions that Kant calls *imagination* that aims to communicate a true representation of reality. The question is whether the artwork is merely a physical object that is part of

	“Form”		“Matter”	
Cognitive Sign:	<i>Sign Cognitive Structure</i>		<i>Physical Appearance of Cognitive Sign</i>	Reality of Sign:
	Sensation = (Icon = Feeling)		(Tone = Property)	Phenomenal
	Imagination = { Index = Emotional		Token = Actuality }	Affective
	Understanding = \ Symbol = Conceptual	≈	Type = Generality)	Object

Pragmaticist Structure of Cognitive Signs Confronting and Representing External Reality

Figure 3.10 Pragmaticist structure of cognitive signs as of artworks, confronting in external reality: *The structure of cognitive signs with their physical appearance.*

our reality, or whether it is essentially an artistic cognitive representation of reality, as are, for example, literary propositions, figurative pictures, theatrical presentations, notes of melodies. The latter are artistic cognitive signs, iconic feelings, indexical emotions, and symbolic conceptions that function as basic cognitive components of the aesthetic representations. Yet these components can be embedded in or united with the physical elements of an object, as the union of “Form” and “Matter.” It is this unison which produces the artistic cognitive language, combining the preverbal and the verbal, in an effort to aesthetically represent a particular known reality.

The following is the Peircean semiotic structure of a cognitive symbolic-type sign and the hierarchy of its components. This structure was probably influenced by Kant, but it is epistemologically distinctive, because for Kant, the *reality* is our phenomenal cognition, whereas for the Pragmaticist, knowledge of *external* reality is the basis of life:

In respect to perceptual experience, the question is about the distinction between the aesthetic reflective judgments of beauty in perceiving natural objects and in perceiving created artworks, and the feelings and reactions about their beauty. Moreover, in what respects might Aesthetic judgments operate differently when dealing with natural objects vs. created artworks? There is the epistemic distinction between natural objects that we experience and artworks, which are created intentionally by the artists, using their specific aesthetic languages, for their subjective purpose of expressing an intellectual idea of reality epitomized in aesthetic ideas, the artworks themselves. Thus as being originate from the artists’ ideas when they are intended to represent something else, rendered by means of specific aesthetic languages. Therefore, *Artworks* are *Cognitive Signs* that express and convey meaning through *Physical Appearance*, thus *aesthetically representing an external reality*. In this sense, artworks may be perceived as physical objects, as long as they are not perceived as aesthetic cognitions with a specific cognitive nature.

Fine art shows its superiority precisely in this, that it describes things beautifully that in nature we would dislike or find ugly. The Furies, diseases, devastations, of war, and so on are all harmful; and yet they can be described, or even presented in a painting, very beautifully . . .

Let this suffice for the beautiful presentation of an object, which is actually only the form of the concept's exhibition, the form by which the concept is universally communicated. Now, giving this form to a product of a fine art requires merely taste. The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature, holds his work up to it, and, after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy his taste, finds the form which is adequate to it. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of a free momentum of the mental powers; the artist is, instead, slowly and rather painstakingly touching the form up in the attempt to make it adequate to his thought while yet keeping it from interfering with the freedom in the play of these powers. (Kant *CJ*: # 48, 312; cp. Guyer 1997: 215-218)

Indeed, Kant makes a clear distinction between the experience of beauty of natural and artificial things, and the beauty of the created artworks, the fine art. Given that he conceives judgments of knowledge are inherently logical-perceptual, Kant believes that the artist "having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature." In other words, Kant does not explain that in the endeavor to create, the artist seeks not only to satisfy a desire for beauty, but to represent aesthetically the reality known by his intellectual ideas. Yet, Kant's suggestion that Aesthetic judgments represent reality *imaginatively*—and not by logical *understanding*—, it becomes clear that in his "laborious attempts" to aesthetically represent the external reality, the artist is also satisfying his taste of beauty (Kant *CJ*: # 48, 312; Guyer 1997: Ch. 12, esp. 351-355).

The Aesthetic judgments of natural objects and artifacts are subjective experiences, without any universality of taste. The question remains however: can reflective Aesthetic judgments of artworks be considered subjective and universally objective in the *imaginative mode* of true aesthetic representation of reality, which is epistemically distinct from the mode of Logical judgment of perception used in the theoretical study of the sciences and in the rules of moral science? In the creation and the Aesthetic judgment of artworks, a meaningful coherence of Understanding and the Imagination is attained through reflective interpretation, which renders a controlled experiential synthesis—a harmony—which proves the truth of the Aesthetic judgment. At the same time, given that the the Aesthetic judgment is an indeterminate judgment, there can be no such proof, and without it, there is no valid harmony between those mental powers and therefore, no clear meaning to the Aesthetic judgment, regardless of whether *beautiful* or *ugly*. Moreover, according to Kant, there can be no *intuitive concepts* of the reflective Aesthetic judgment, namely, empirical formal concepts, without any particular

object to represent (figure 3.5). However, only by understanding that the epistemology of Aesthetic judgment of artworks is different from the Logical judgment of perceptual knowledge, can we understand our knowledge of the meaning and truth of the Aesthetic judgment of the Beauty of artistically created artworks (Guyer 1997: Ch. 12).

Kant's Two Aesthetic Theories of Art: Genius Creativity and Judgment of Aesthetic Pleasure

Kant separated the aesthetic experience in art into two aesthetic theories, one related to the Genius of creativity and the second pertaining to the feeling of aesthetic pleasure experienced by everybody. But then we have to explain that the harmony between our two faculties, Imagination and Understanding, works and feels differently, in the aesthetic reflection to ensuing the artistic creation of beauty, and the Aesthetic judgment of the pleasure of artworks' beauty (Kant *CPuR*: A168).

In an aesthetic judgment of reflection . . . the basis determining [it] is the sensation brought about, in the subject, by the harmonious play of the two cognitive powers [involved] in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding; [they are in harmonious play] when, in the given presentation, the imagination's ability to apprehend, and the understanding's ability to exhibit, further each other. In such a case this relation between them brings about, through its mere form, a sensation; and this sensation is the basis determining a judgment, which is therefor called aesthetic, and amount to subjective purposiveness (without concept) and hence is connected with the feeling of pleasure. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 224'; cf. ##10-12: 221-223)

This is, according to Kant, the basic cognitive structure of the aesthetic judgment of reflection operates on the faculties of Imagination and Understanding, and the outcome of their interaction between the two faculties determines the feeling of pleasure and the judgment of Beauty. This structure is similar to the epistemic logic of the formation of empirical concepts in the perceptual judgment, although in the case of Aesthetic judgment only the instinctive formal quasi-rule of judgment operates on the form of quasi-concept of the object, to judge it as beautiful (figure 3.5).

For the imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. . . . Such presentations of the imagination we may call *ideas*. One reason for this is that they do at least strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational

concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given semblance of objective reality. Another reason, indeed the main reason, for calling those presentations ideas is that they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate. (Kant *CJ*: # 49, 314; cf. 341-344; cf. Makkreel 1990)

Kant calls the indeterminate concepts “ideas,” given that there are *no empirical intuitions*, which is the condition of cognitive experience, which can be subsumed under these presentations. Hence, the rational concepts of understanding are the *intellectual ideas* and though they have no *sensual intuitions* to give them empirical content directly, they strive to have semblance to objective reality. Analogically, the *aesthetic ideas* are the product of the cognitive power of imagination without any determinate concepts, which are inadequate quasi-concepts, exhibited to emulate aesthetically the intellectual ideas, to makes them sensible in the created artworks.

Spirit [Geist] in the aesthetic sense is the animating principle in the mind. . . . Now I maintain that this principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit *aesthetic ideas*; and by an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts such thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it. (Kant *CJ*: 313-314)

Thus, aesthetic ideas are the imaginative interpretation of intellectual ideas, intended to exhibit the sensual aesthetic artwork; however, if we do not know the artistic intellectual ideas directly from the artist, it is hard to discover and formulate them completely from the Aesthetic ideas themselves. The difficulty with Kant’s two theories of fine arts, the genuine creation of artwork and the reflective judgment of taste, is that they are separate and there is no common epistemic logic that can explain both the artists’ cognitive operation of creation and their evaluation of their own artwork as well as the interpretation of such artworks by others (Kant *CJ*: ##45, 48-50; Allison 2001: 271). Kant’s two theories of fine arts, Genius Creativity and Aesthetic judgment of Taste, are presented in figure 1.3 (p. X) (comp. Kant *CJ*: #48, 312).

If we ask which is more important in objects [*sachen*] of fine art, whether they show genius or taste, then this is equivalent to asking whether in fine art imagination is more *important* than judgment. Now insofar as art shows genius it does indeed deserve to be called *inspired [geistreich]*, but it deserves to be called *fine art* only insofar as it shows taste. (Kant *CJ*: #50, 319)

Hence, Kant separates the Genius creation of art from the Aesthetic judgment of taste, such that the genius creates the artwork without judging its

aesthetic beauty, and the others are the ones who judge it aesthetically as a physical object of pleasure or displeasure, without knowing that in creating the artwork, the artist endeavors an aesthetic exhibition of his intellectual ideas to represent reality (Kant *CJ*: #45; Zammito 1992: 129-142, esp. 131). But then, even according to Kant, physical objects are not aesthetically beautiful but (subjectively) agreeable, and in this sense, completely distinct from artworks, which according to Kant are subjectively—but also universally—beautiful to all humans.

As regard to the *agreeable* everyone acknowledges that his judgment, which he bases on a private feeling and by which he says that he likes some object, is by the same token confined to his own person. . . . Hence about the agreeable the following principle holds: *everyone has his own taste* (of sense) . . .

It is quite different (exactly the other way round) with the beautiful. . . . For he must not call it *beautiful* if [he means] only [that] *he* likes it. Many things may be charming and agreeable to him; no one cares about that. But if he proclaims something to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; (Kant *CJ*: #7-212)

Here Kant can distinguish between agreeable objects and beautiful artwork and yet the question is how a person can distinguish between them without knowing to which of the two categories they belong, and what can be, let us say, the aesthetic meaning of the artwork without knowing what the genius meant in them, due to the separation between the aesthetic creation of art and the reflective judgment of taste.

But taste is merely an ability to judge, not to produce; *and* if something conforms to it, that [fact] does not make the thing a work of art: it may belong to useful and mechanical art, or even to science, as a product made according to determinate rules that can be learned and that must be complied with precisely. . . .

In fine art we include, rather, a poem, a piece of *music*, a gallery of pictures, and so on; and here we often find a would-be work of fine art that manifest genius without taste, or another that manifests taste without genius. (Kant *CJ*: #48, 313)

Thus, people can feel pleasure observing a kitschy artwork that lacks “spirit;” moreover, given the separation between the Aesthetic judgment of artwork and the genuine creation of it, they cannot understand the intellectual ideas and aesthetic language of the genius, e.g., Picasso, and can feel displeasure with it (Kant *CJ*: #48, 312-313). Furthermore, given the separation between the artistic creation of an artwork that manifests genius without taste to evaluate its beauty, and the aesthetic evaluation of artwork that manifests taste without understanding that is a genuine creation, there cannot be any aesthetic creation and evaluation

of artworks. Indeed, in creating the aesthetic artworks, the artist continuously evaluating whether the exhibition of the intellectual ideas in the aesthetic ideas of the artwork is meaningful and whether it represents the relevant reality that it is about, (e.g., a Picasso creating *Guernica*, or painting his beloved *Dora*), or, alternatively, whether it is only mechanical art, without spirit, kitschy or false, lacking genuine true beauty.

The Kantian predicament that emerges is due to the confusion between the taste judgment of objects and the Aesthetic judgment of artworks, and the confusion is further fueled by his incompleteness of the *Critique of Judgment*, which might have explained the epistemology of Aesthetic judgment of the truth and beauty of artworks. Indeed, the Aesthetic judgment of artworks cannot emulate the epistemology of the Logical judgment and its structure, which provides the proof of the basic propositional facts of perception and which is the condition for any knowledge, whether theoretic, ethic, or aesthetic which having different modes of judgments of representing reality. However, it is surprising that Kant does not consider the artist's ongoing evaluation of the artwork (as previously described herein) as an integral part of the creativity. The eventual answer is that for Kant, the evaluation is only in Logical judgment of understanding, whereas the artist's evaluation is through feeling in imagination and, therefore, it cannot be considered an Aesthetic judgment, as Kant wrote, "The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature, holds his work up to it, and, after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy his taste, finds the form which is adequate to it" (Kant, *CJ*: # 48, 312). In other words, the artist's taste is related to the imaginative—rather than the understanding—judgment. The difficulty with Kant's understanding of judgment stems from his narrow conception of judgmental knowledge as logical, which thus excludes Aesthetic judgment of artwork from being representations of reality, as he himself described it. Hence Kant is looking for different explanation for the universality of Aesthetic judgment; to this end he proposes the unexplainable conception of common sense (Kant *CJ*: # 48, 312; Coleman 1974: 144-157; Nesher 1994; Guyer 1997: Ch. 8).

THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF IMAGINATION IN HUMAN COGNITION AND HOW AESTHETIC JUDGMENT CAN BE OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: THE PROBLEM WITH ACHIEVING SYNTHESIS

In Contrast to Kant's Logical Judgment, Different Modes of Judgment Represent Reality

Kant makes the distinction between Aesthetic judgment as *an art* and as *a science*. In the former, pleasure of beauty is derived from observing natural

objects and artifacts, which evokes a subjective feeling in an individual person, and can be detected only through examples. By contrast, in the latter case, as a science, the Aesthetic judgment of beauty is subjective, but universal when manifested in the harmonious relationship between the mental powers of Imagination and Understanding. Thus, as a science, Aesthetic judgment pertains to the evaluation of created artworks (Kant *CJ*: #34 286). However, for Kant the *Aesthetic reflective judgment* of imagination is subjective and thus only indeterminate, unlike the *logical-theoretical judgment* of understanding, which is determinate and eventually leads to true knowledge. As noted, the *Aesthetic reflective judgment* can be understood as the interpretation of the beauty of artworks, which according to Kant, exhibit the artist's *intellectual ideas* of reality and, according to Kant, exhibited in the *aesthetic ideas*, the aesthetic artwork itself, which can be the artist's aesthetic mode of representing reality (Kant *CPuR*: A260/B316ff., *CJ*: 314-315, IV, 179, V, 211'-216', #34 286).

Now if a concept is provided with [*unterlegen*] a presentation of the imagination such that, even though this presentation belongs to the exhibition of the concept, yet it prompts, even by itself, so much thought as can never be comprehended within a determinate concept and thereby the presentation aesthetically expends the concept itself in an unlimited way, then the imagination is creative in [all of] this and sets the power of intellectual ideas (i.e., reason) in motion: it makes reason think more, when prompted by a [certain] presentation (though the thought does pertain to the concept of the object [presented]). (Kant *CJ*: # 49, 314-315; cf. Kirwan 2004: 35)

Thus, the intellectual ideas are rational concepts of reason, which are the abstraction and generalization by the imagination from the concepts of understanding in Logical judgments, and they cannot be reduced to or comprehended by means of a determinate theoretical concept. Hence, according to Kant, the artistic creative imagination initiates from *intellectual ideas*, which are interpreted creatively by manifesting them in *aesthetic ideas*, and thus composing the aesthetic artwork itself. This explanation of the artistic creation of artworks can be understood the ways in which the Aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artworks differs from the Logical judgment through which we conceptually present phenomenal objects. At this point, however, we may note that Kant's notion of the aesthetic creative imagination composing the artwork and eventually representing reality as intended by the artist does not align with Kant's conception of Aesthetic judgment as producing a feeling of pleasure or displeasure from the observation of physical objects.

Kant's concept of universal cognition indeed views Understanding as a rational or verbally determinate cognitive mode, which attributes conceptual

meaning by applying certain operational rules to present by the determinate logical judgments sensual objects. In distinction, the aesthetic reflective judgments are viewed as evolving from preverbal or instinctive and practical operations, to discover the hypothetical universal, namely, the intuitive rational concepts of pleasure or beauty. Yet *pleasure* and *beauty* are not conceptual presentations, nor are they properties of objects, but rather predicates expressing a particular subjective—and hence indeterminate—Aesthetic judgment (Kant *CJ*: IV, 179, #32 282, 209'-210'). In the following excerpt, Kant develops his conception of the Aesthetic reflective judgment, which is similar to Peirce's conception of Abductive inference, whereby the universal concept stands in for the perceived particular percept, though not as the complete—albeit indeterminate—reflective judgment, but only as an initial suggestion, which is to be reflectively inferred further to proving its truth through the Inductive perceptual evaluation (Nesher 1994, 1999, 2001).

Judgment can be regarded either as mere[ly] an ability to *reflect*, in terms of a certain principle, on a given presentation so as to [make] a concept possible, or as an ability to *determine* an underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation. In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determinative power of judgment*. To *reflect* (or consider [*überlegen*]) is to hold up to, and compare them with, either other presentations or one's cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible. The reflective power of judgment [*Urteil*] is the one we also call the power of judging [*Beurteilung*] (*facultas diiudicandi*). (Kant *CJ*: V, 211'; cf. V, 211'-216')

Peirce, early in his life, studied Kant's philosophy very carefully and we can see some similarities in their philosophies, though Peirce in his epistemological realist revolution overcame the dichotomy of Kantian Idealism of Transcendental phenomenalism, and developed his representational realism, explaining the evolvement of our cognitive knowledge and conduct in reality, as in the following:

An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of the individual's Nature . . . manifested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behavior. In man, at least, this behavior is always conscious, and not purely spasmodic. More than that, unless he is under some extraordinary stress, the behavior is always partially controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflection. (Peirce 7.381 n19, c. 1902; Kant *CJ*: V, 211'-212'; cf. Nesher 1990, 1994b, 2002b, 2018)

Kant, in his epistemological enhancement, started from the First Critique, which is based on the dichotomy between the Empirism of Sensual Intuition

and the Rationalism of Transcendental Pure Concepts of Understanding. He tried to bridge the epistemological gap by the unexplainable schematism to synthesize those alien components to Inductively evaluate the Logical judgment (Kant *CPuR*: APENDIX, B 316-349, A141/B180-1; Guyer 1987: 158). Then, continuing on to the Second Critique, with its unique *Transcendental Subject* and its freely legislating Moral Principle, in which he attempted to infer Deductively Particular Imperatives, independent of any phenomenal nature. Finally, in his Third Critique he became quasi-Empiricist, claiming that from the subjective empirical experience it is possible to discover Abductively the quasi-concepts that express the subjective emotional reaction of pleasure or displeasure, evoked in respect to the object of experience and the appreciation of beauty or ugliness of artwork, through the reflective Aesthetic judgment (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, III).

Now the two different conceptions of aesthetic, of the basic sensual intuitions and of the reflective imagination, are controlled by our feelings and synthesized into different kinds of judgments, cognitive *Logical judgment* and reflective *Aesthetic judgment*, respectively. However, the synthesis in the former case is based on the Imaginative Reflective Self-control of the relation between Imagination and Understanding in presenting an object, while the synthesis in the latter case is based on the Reflective Self-control of the relation between Understanding and Imagination, but without representation of any objects as the criterion for their harmony.

In the Peircean theory of perception we can see the prototype of the structure and operation of the human mind confronting in reality. According to the particular combination of the basic components of the perceptual operation, one of Kant's components of the mind predominates: Sensation (in Aesthetic Judgment), Volition (in Moral judgment), Understanding (in Theoretical Judgment). These are the embryos of Kant's Three Critiques and of Peirce's Three Normative Sciences (e.g., Kant *CPuR*: 33-34, 109-110; Peirce *MS*:283, *EP* vol. 2: #27; 2007a, 2008, 2009, 2018).

The difficulty in Kant's philosophical system is that he could not find the principle he looked for that connect all his three Critiques, which according




Figure 3.11 The similarity between Kant and Peirce on mental powers in the entire operation of sensual perception is the sequence of the trio of abduction, deduction and induction (cf. Figure 3.4).

to Peircean realist epistemology are basic structures of our knowledge of reality, the complete trio of the basic inference. Hence, each component is the predominant element of Peirce's Three Normative Sciences, Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic, which constitute different modes of representing reality. Consequently, these modes constitute also the essential clue for analyzing the epistemology of Aesthetic Science and for examining how aesthetic artworks represent reality. As in the above scheme, which presents the structure of the perceptual judgment that represents reality, our task here is to show the structure of the creation and the evaluation of the artwork, the aesthetic knowledge that operates in the humans' representation of their behavior and life in the environment. The Peircean realist epistemological revolution explains how the form of cognitive thought evolved interpretatively with the experiential contents into the perceptual quasi-proof of the truthfulness of the perceptual judgments representing reality (Nesher 1990, 2001, 2002b, 2016, 2018). In this alternative to Kant by i.e., in the conception that the realist *epistemic logic* represents our confrontation in reality, the truthfulness of our representation of reality can be proved by this general method of knowledge. However, every such proved truth is always relative to the accepted proof-conditions, which are themselves proven true facts, such that the cognition and its matter are always relative to specific conditions, and as there is no absolute truth, we do not face Kant's difficulty of an "intrinsically contradictory" deadlock.

The Deadlock in Kant's Essential Connection between the Transcendental and the Empirical, and the Proposed Alternative Epistemology

The way to resolve Kant's deadlock in his theory of truth, and thus with the transcendental epistemology, is to explain that the meanings and the validity of empirical concepts in perceptual judgments are only relative to the specific context of their discovery and proofs. In other words, our basic cognitions can be considered determinates and thus provide proof of the truth of Logical judgments that pertain to empirical objects since such proofs are always relative to our proof-conditions (Kant *CPuR*: A137/B176, A141/B180; Nesher 2007b).

Hence, since we do not assume complete or absolute knowledge, we can descend from the transcendental sky to the ground of empirical realism using the ladder of realism, such that we view our cognition as evolving from the genuine Percept, i.e., from the specific sensual intuition of our empirical experience. Hence, through the instinctive and practical reflective self-control of one's imagination, we interpret an iconic feeling of quality and an indexical emotional reaction to Abductively discover a new concept, which we can use to further interpret the perceptual operation. Nonetheless, at this stage,

this empirical concept is still hypothetical and indeterminate, until—through additional cognitive interpretation—it is eventually synthesized into cognitive thought and quasi-proved in perceptual judgment as true representation of external real objects (Nesher 2001, 2002b, 2012, 2016, 2018; Kant *CJ*: 209'-210'; e.g., figures 3.10 and 3.11). Indeed, in this manner, we prove the truth of our perceptual judgments and overcome Kant's difficulty to explain the empirical judgment by the miracle schematism. This suggests that in their preconceptual imagination, through reflective self-control, animals and infants can instinctively and practically control their confrontation in reality, to quasi-judge their perceptual operations involving sensual intuition and imagination. Thus, by theorizing the perceptual rules that govern our operations of cognition, we can explain the manner in which human infants are able to develop the ability for perceptual judgments, using innate and acquired habits of judgment—and not miraculously, as Kant suggests.

And thus we find that, whereas understanding is capable of being taught and equipped by rules, the power of judgment is a particular talent that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced. This is also the reason why the power of judgment is the specific [feature] of so-called mother wit, for whose lack no school can compensate. (Kant *CPuR*: A133/B172; cf. Spinoza [1662]1985; Nesher 2002b)

Hence it can be concluded that animals and infants operating preconceptual quasi-judgments to control themselves in their natural and social environment, in order to sustain themselves, to learn new habits, and to develop their quasi-judgment abilities and their mental capacity to acquire knowledge (Peirce 1900; Nesher 2002b). We can understand that the Imagination works with the reflective self-control not only rationally, but also instinctively and practically, whereby the cognitive components of this operative interpretation are images, feelings and emotions, which evolve by means of the perceptual operations, although there are—as of yet—no conceptual components, much like what Einstein experienced in his discovery of a new portrayal of physical reality (Einstein 1945; Nesher 2008, 2010). Hence, this imaginative intuition, which evolves from an initial perceptual confrontation in reality into components of meaning, becomes the cognitive true representation of reality (figures 3.5 and 3.11).

It is plausible that the discovery of a new empirical concept is done by the Imagination and the inferential logic of Abduction, but the difficulty is that it is still remains indeterminate, until we quasi-prove the truth of the perceptual judgment in which it is embedded. Thus Kant's conception of the subjective feeling of reflective imagination can become an empirical judgment

with a determinate concept, yet for Kant, this does not hold in regard to the Aesthetic reflective judgment of Beauty (Nesher 2007a). However, considering the operations of our imagination with preconceptual cognitions such as iconic images and the indexical emotional reactions to them, the role of the imagination can be adjusted to work in different cognitive fields, as in perceptual experience, scientific discovery and the examination of hypotheses, artistic production, and even the feeling of morality (Kant *CPuR*: B xvii; B103, 152, 175, 177, 271-277).

Hence, not even one of Kant's different judgments is complete proof of its truth, validity, or universality. To overcome the *a priorist* epistemology, I showed that only the sequence of the three inferences, the *Trio* of Abductive Logic of Discovery, Deductive Logic of Necessity, and the Inductive Logic of Evaluating hypotheses, can confront reality and constitute complete proof (Nesher 2007a). This epistemic logic of cognition comprises complete proof of any judgment without recourse to transcendental *a priori* postulations.

Now logic, in turn, can be done from two points of view, either a logic of the understanding's general [universal] use of logic or its special [particular] use. The logic of the understanding's general use contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought, without which the understanding cannot be used at all. Hence it deals with the understanding without regard to the difference among the objects to which the understanding may be directed. This logic may be called elementary logic. The logic of the understanding's special use, which may be called the organon of this or that science, contains the rules for thinking correctly about certain kind of objects. (Kant *CPuR*: B76/A52)

Namely, the universal logic of Kant can be understood as what I call the Epistemic Logic of Peircean Pragmatism, representing our confrontation in reality, whereby the the sequence of the three inferences that provide complete proof of the truth of cognitive operations is equivalent to Kant's general logic of all knowledge. Furthermore, the special use of logic can be understood as its application to different sciences in different modes that represent various aspects of reality.

Rather, we may call transcendental only the cognition that these presentations are not at all of empirical origin, and the possibility whereby they can nonetheless refer *a priori* to objects of experience. (Kant *CPuR*: A56/B81)

The question is as follows: if we can explain empirically any knowledge by means of the Peircean epistemic logic, what need is there for transcendental cognition, which despite being of non-empirical origin can nonetheless refer *a priori* to objects of experience?

We shall expect, then, that there may perhaps be concepts referring a priori to objects. . . . In this expectation, then, we frame in advance the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, whereby we think objects completely a priori. Such a science would determine the origin, the range, and the objective validity of such rational cognition. It would have to be called *transcendental Logic*. (Kant *CPuR*: B81/A57)

Unlike Kant's *transcendental logic*, Peirce's *epistemic logic*, as I call it, is developed through our epistemic confrontation in reality; in that case all our cognitions and knowledge are of empirical origin and develop empirically, without any need to present and think objects through a priori pure intuitions and concepts (Nesher 2002a, 2016, 2018, 2021). The central question of epistemology is how can we know whether our perceptions of objects of external reality are true. According to Kant, through our Sensual Intuitions presented by Pure Intuitions-Space and Time, we perceive Blind objects or proto-objects, which, when synthesized with the Empty Pure Concepts of understanding by the imaginative Schematism, the Empirical Concepts are formatted to present the Determinate Objects by the *logical judgments* (figure 3.6). However, as explained above, the Kantian Logical-Theoretical Judgment cannot work, since the Schematism cannot Synthesize Empty Concepts with Blind Objects as both are meaningless and without any common denominator to synthesize the Transcendental and Empirical components, and thus cannot create the empirical concepts for the logical judgments to present determinate objects (figure 3.8).

Hence, why not explain this Kantian deadlocked epistemology by using the Peircean realist empirical epistemology? To recap, according to the latter, by means of Abductive inference, we discover and suggest the new concept; we further elaborate it by means of Deductive inference, reach its expectations, and then prove its universality through Inductive evaluation. By proving the truth of the perceptual judgment as the synthesis of the previous stages in which the discovered concept is embedded, we prove the true perceptual representation of reality and thus make the concept determinate (Nesher 2002a: II, III, X, 2018). According to the explanation proposed herein, empirical concepts can evolve when we use our Reflective Interpretation in Imagination, and synthesize the iconic image and the indexical emotion into Empirical *Concepts*. Thus, by abstracting and generalizing from our initial sensual intuitions, we can explain our perceptual judgment by the empirical concept. In other words, according to this operation, we start from *an empirical origin*, without needing to rely on any transcendental, a priori origin, to provide proof of the objective validity of our rational cognition (Kant *CPuR*: B81/A57). Therefore, by eliminating in figure 3.6 the transcendental components from the Kantian explanation of the evolvement of empirical concepts,




Figure 3.12 The evolvement of empirical concepts from the empirical origin through cognitive interpretation into synthesis in perceptual judgment.

we can propose explanation that essentially replaces the *transcendental Logic* with the *epistemic logic*, to reach Peircean realism.

Indeed, as in figure 3.6, here too there is a metaphysical chasm between Sensation and Understanding. They are epistemologically different, as their presentations depend on different noumenal sources that *affect* the mind differently: the transcendental *noumenal subject* and the *noumenal object*. However, the criterion to prove the truth of our cognitive Understanding about the eventual sensual objects being independent from them is too weak or impossible schematism of the imagination to enable to bridge their dichotomy (Kant *CPuR*: A50/B74ff., A103-110).

The epistemological issue at hand is what is the cognitive nature of those transcendental capacities? How might we explain the Kantian conditions that enable the *empirical subject* to cognize *empirical objects* and so also allow for self-cognition? Furthermore, is there any correlation between the transcendental capacities of the empirical subject and the *empirical objects*? In other words, how can the *empirical subject's* sensual intuition be transformed—through the use of cognitive operations—into an *empirical object*? (Kant *CPuR*: B275, 278-9; Neshet 2002a, 2002b; figure 3.6). Given that we are assuming two noumenally different entities, that of the *subject* and that of the *object*, how are they able to operate together to overcome the schism between them? Peirce questioned Kant's justification, i.e., the acceptance of transcendental a priori rules and pure concepts in order to maintain the Copernican Revolution. He sought a different explanation in response to Kant's own query, namely, whether sensibility and understanding spring from a common root. To explain how our cognitions evolve from an empirical origin of perceptual interpretation, Peirce relied on experiential introspection as a way to observe this phenomenal operation, to perceive and analyze the cognitive signs, the rules of their interpretation, and their interrelationships. He called this cognitive methodic experience *Phaneroscopy*, i.e., the examination of the *phaneron*, an attempt to fathom this empirical experience, so as to show that what we really experience is *not*, as we tend to assume, a transcendental coherence between its basic components. When there is coherence between our expectation of an eventual phenomenal object, an expectation aroused by the iconic feeling, and our indexical reaction to it,

our expectations are pleasantly fulfilled, whereas incoherence means that our expectations are frustrated and unfulfilled as a different phenomenon appears. This is the indication that separate from and beyond our self-control, there is an objective obstacle, which we can call *negative reality*. When our expectation is fulfilled and the expected cognition materializes, we can conclude that this cognition represents *positive reality*. The conclusion of Phaneroscopy is that when confronting the external reality, our perceptual operation can represent it negatively or positively, which might be the noumenal reality that Kant could not explain. However, Peirce's phaneroscopic experience can explain how from inside our cognition we can detect the noumena which serves to bridge the gap between sensibility and understanding (Kant *CPuR*: APENDIX, B316-319; Peirce *EPII*: #11, 1903; Neshet 2002a: VI, VIII, X).

Kant's Basic Epistemology Problem with Combining Empirism and Rationalism: Peircean Theory of Truth and Representation of Reality—The Harmony of Ego and Non-Ego

Kant's epistemological explication of his Copernican Revolution, which is based on the dichotomy between the sensual intuitions' Empirism and transcendental understanding's rationality, is the starting point for the Peircean counter-revolution. Consequently, we may say that Peircean empiricist epistemology developed from Kant's observation that "Human cognition has two stems, viz., sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common root, though one unknown to us" (Kant *CPuR*: B29). This can be said to be Peirce's endeavor to solve the riddle inherent in our basic perceptual experience, by empirically discovering and identifying the common source of our sensual intuitions and our understanding of concepts (Kant *CPuR*: Bxvi-xvii; Peirce *CP*: 5.525, *EPII*: ## 24-26); Neshet 2002a, 2004b, 2007a, 2018).

Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition. This assumption already agrees better with the demanded possibility of an a priori cognition of objects—i.e., a cognition that is to ascertain something about them before they are given to us. The situation here is the same as was that of *Copernicus* when he first thought of explaining the motion of the celestial bodies. . . .

Now we can try a similar experiment in metaphysics with regard to our intuition of objects. . . .

Or else I assume that the objects, or—what amounts to the same—the *experience* in which alone they (as objects that are given to us) can be cognized, conformed to those concepts. On this latter assumption I immediately

see an easier way out. For experience itself is way of cognizing for which I need understanding. But understanding has its rule, a rule that I must presuppose within me even before objects are given to me, and hence must presupposed a priori; and that rule is expressed in a priory concept. Hence all objects of experience must necessary conform to these concepts and agree with them. (Kant *CPuR*: Bxvi-xvii)

Hence we can see that Kant seeks to make his Copernican Revolution overcome the axiomatic assumption that rationalism is separate from experience. Given that, according to Kant, the sensual intuitions of empirism cannot on their own account for our conception of objects, Kant concludes that we must accept a priori the assumption that our pure intuitions and concepts explicate our knowledge of the phenomenal world. Indeed, if we accept that our sensual intuition of eventual objects is a component of human cognition, as Kant assumes, then both the empirical objects and the rational concepts are instances of human cognition and, hence, the outer reality is actually a phenomenon of human cognition and not an external reality. This still leaves us with two sources of knowledge, rational and empirical, without any miracle they cannot be schematized together. Nevertheless, the sensual intuitions, which are not yet determinate objects in the *experience*, are not “bequeathed” to us, but rather must be cognized, by fitting them into those molds of understanding, the empty concepts that are still not empirical concepts, but which can represent the experiential objects. However, we cannot presuppose the a priori concepts that are devoid of meaning and hence, the schism between our sensual intuitions and our understanding of concepts has yet to be overcome and, indeed, these two different sources of human cognitions cannot schematize together (cf. figure 3.6). Hence, we have to analyze* Kant’s conception of *a priori*, which he bases on the acceptance of the Euclidian axiomatic epistemology, the formal axiomatic systems that prove the conclusions, but cannot formally prove their application to the sensual experience (Nesher 2002a: V, 2018).

It seems that the accepted epistemology of phenomenal empirism, including Positivism, Analytic Philosophy, and the contemporary Neo-Pragmatism, all face a similar difficulty, namely, how do we prove and know that our sensual intuitions, the sense-data or the assigned models, represent external objects of reality? How can we detach from our subjective confining solipsism to reach external reality (e.g., Putnam 1995; Davidson 1996: 312; Nesher 2002a: VI, VIII, 2018). Peirce’s Phaneroscopic inquiry, the analysis of our phenomenological introspection through which we interpret the unfolding of our basic perceptual experience, constitutes an essential break from the traditional and contemporary quandary of how to understand our representation of external reality without going outside our cognitive skins (Davidson 1996: 312; Neshe

2002a: VI, 2018). Indeed, only the entire *tri-part* sequence of Abductive, Deductive, and Inductive inferences, with its two material logic components, the Abductive discovery of hypotheses and their Inductive evaluation, can provide the complete proof of the Truth of human cognitions, which must originate in our pre-Rational operations, Kant's sensual intuitions, in order to quasi-prove their perceptual judgments (Peirce *CP*: 5.121–145, 1903; Neshier 2002a). In the Phaneroscopy explanation of the perceptual experience, using reflective self-control to observe the basic components, we can detect the coherency or incoherency between the iconic sign, i.e., *the ego's* desire for a confirmation of the interpretation, and the indexical experience, i.e., the *non-ego*-bound Immediate Object eventually representing the real object. By means of such introspection upon the interpretation of the perceptual sign components, we can cognize that by their coherent interpretation we can detect that in our perceptual cognition, by our perceptual judgments we represent the external reality.

Hence, rather than endeavoring to miraculously schematize two separate sources of cognition as the Kantian epistemology proposes, we examine the evolvment of the initial experiential signs, the feeling of iconic image and of the indexical emotional reaction to it, and based on a coherence between them, we interpret their resulting synthesis into a symbolic conceptual thought as the rendering of a perceptual judgment that represents reality. Thus, accepting that our true perceptual judgments are the basic propositional facts representing reality, we have to investigate how the artist elevates her/his intellectual ideas of reality to an imaginative expression of aesthetic ideas, the created artwork, and how these aesthetic expressions can represent the artist's knowledge of the particular reality, intentionally represented in the artwork.

The alternative to the philosophical imprisonment of subjectivism and solipsism is the Peircean epistemological realism developed in his Phaneroscopy, the method of phenomenal investigation by self-reflection upon one's cognitive involvement from the initial percept, which is interpreted by operating both innate and newly acquired habitual rules into the perceptual quasi-judgment. Moreover, we detect our cognitive operations through their effects on our cognitive conduct, and hence develop our knowledge of the cognitive operations to represent reality (Kant *CPuR*: Bxvi-xvii, *CPrR*: Chap. II, esp. 59, 69-71; Peirce *CP*: 5.440-441, 1905, cf. 5. 417ff.; Neshier 1999a: III, 2002a: II, III, X, 2016, 2018). Hence, the objective criterion of the truth of this judgment is the agreement-coherence between the cognitive sign components of the cognitive interpretation of imagination of iconic ego and indexical non-ego, which are synthesized into the symbolic thought of propositional quasi-proved judgment, and this knowledge leads to determine our conduct in reality.

Returning now to the intentional representation of a particular reality through aesthetic expression in the artwork, Kant claimed that the judgment of aesthetics is based on reflective imagination conveying to the subject a judgment of pleasure or displeasure, of beauty or ugliness, in respect to the artwork. In this sense, then, *Aesthetic reflective judgment* is not based on determinate pure and a priori cognitive concepts and rules. Consequently, the artwork can be said to convey indeterminate *presentations*, which nevertheless are interpreted by applying a necessarily a priori set of mental causality rules to the mental powers of mind. This dependence on *an* a priori set of inherent rules makes the subjective judgments of artworks to hold for everyone. However, this artificial reliance on a priorism is not needed in Peirce's explanation of the preconceptual cognitive operation in imagination, according to which, by reflecting on our instinctive and practical operations we can habitually self-control our cognitions to reach perceptual, aesthetical, and other true cognitive judgments.

Certain obvious features of the phenomena of self-control (and especially of habit) can be expressed compactly and without any hypothetical addition . . . by saying that we have an occult nature of which and of its contents we can only judge by the conduct that it determines, and by phenomena of that conduct. . . . According to the maxim of Pragmaticism, to say that determination affects our occult nature is to say that it is capable to of affecting deliberate conduct; and since we are conscious *habitualiter* of whatever hides in depths of our nature; and it is presumable . . . that a sufficiently energetic effort of attention would bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a special sense, a conscious operation. (Peirce *CP*: 5.441, 1905–*EP*II: #25; cf. Neshier 1999a: III.1)

It is useful to compare the Kantian conception of Logical judgment with the Peircean conception of perceptual judgment to understand how each of the two epistemologies can relate to the reflective Aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artworks. Peirce developed his semiotics into epistemic logic of our perceptual confrontation in reality, as complete proof of the true representation of external reality.

We find that through our cognitive clash between the iconic sign of *Ego* and the indexical sign of *non-Ego*, we first become conscious of the reality that is independent of and external to us:

And what do we mean by real? It is a conception which we must have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first correct ourselves. (Peirce *CP*: 5.311 [1868]1931-1935)




Figure 3.13 The confrontation in physical reality by coherent interpretation of meanings of the three inferences in the quasi-proof of the truth of perceptual judgment representing reality.

The proof of the negative knowledge of external reality is the perceptual cognitive operation in which we discover our error, which cannot come only from ourselves. This explanation can be considered a philosophical proof of the existence of something external that is independent of the way we initially present it; and when we interpret the *coherency* of the meanings of iconic and indexical signs, we can prove our positive knowledge of this external reality. Hence, *semiotics* is the *epistemic logic representing our confrontation in reality*; it is the *Methodetic* of all our *true representations of external reality* (Peirce *EP1*: #8 [1878]1992). The difficulty is to explain why Kant did not use this empirical explanation of our ability for judgment to exploit the role of the judgment operation in all our methods of gaining knowledge and in our modes of representing different aspects of reality, as well as to explain how the operation of reflective Aesthetic judgments can prove the truth of how artworks represent our reality. Hence, the central issue now is to show how the structures of judgments are different in different modes of representing reality. It seems that Kant’s intuition about our cognitive experience can explain different modes of judgments of the different basic normative sciences, which differ from his conception of the perceptual Logical judgment. This difference can be seen in Kant’s distinction between “logic of general use,” which is similar to Peircean epistemic logic, and the “logic for the special use,” which contains the rules for thinking correctly about certain kind of objects, or rather, about different modes of representing aspects of reality (Kant *CPuR*: B76/A52). Yet Kant did not apply this interesting intuition to explain either Aesthetic or Ethic judgment.

Kant has all the epistemological components to theorize the epistemic logic to explain our life in Nature, social and physical, but due to his Copernican Revolution against let us say, Descartes and Hume, which led

him to sever sensual intuitions from Conceptual Thought, he cannot combine them together as Peirce does empirically. Indeed, Kant expressed a kind of Empirism in his First Critique.

There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For what else might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring our senses did not do so? In part these objects by themselves bring about presentations. In part they set in motion our understanding's activity, by which it compares these presentations, connects or separates them, and thus processes the raw materials of sense impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience. In *terms of time*, therefore, no cognition in us precedes experience, and all our cognition begins with experience. But even though all our cognitions start **with** experience that does not mean that all of it arises **from** experience. (Kant *CPuR*: B1, 1787)

Hence, due to the Copernican Revolution, Kant continued to entertain the necessity of the Idealist Transcendental components in his epistemology of knowledge. Nonetheless, he also hints, as in the above excerpt, that the *noumena*, the “objects by themselves bring about presentations,” a pronouncement that is similar to Peirce’s Phaneroscopy analysis of the perceptual operation. It is possible that such hesitant explanations are the reason for Peirce’s criticism of Kant’s critical philosophy: “Kant (whom I *more* than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist.” (Peirce *CP*: 5.525 [1905]1934)

The role of imagination in experience is to “rouse our cognitive power to its operation” and thus to set “in motion our understanding” into our cognitive presentation; however, the problem is whether through these presentations, we can also know the objects by themselves by representing them?

Synthesis as such, as we shall see hereafter, is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely. Bringing this synthesis *to concepts*, on the other hand, is a function belonging to the understanding; and it is through this function that the understanding first provides us with cognition in the proper meaning of the term. (Kant *CPuR*: B 103; cf. B 175)

This sounds like an Empirist explanation regarding the synthesis of the components of perceptual cognition leading to the discovery of empirical concepts. Yet Kant insists on introducing the role of the empty concepts of understanding to explicate our sensual blind objects of sensual intuitions, which he concludes must be meaningful, otherwise we could not examine

our sensations through introspection, although this introspection is not conceptual. In this manner, Kant blocks the empirical solution, as it is seen in Peirce's Phaneroscopic analysis. The epistemological question is what Kant meant by *empty concepts of understanding* and the *blind objects of sensation*, in regard to their eventual relationship with and roles in cognition, and especially in respect to the following explanations.

Therefore, objects can indeed appear to us without having to refer necessarily to functions of understanding, and hence without the understanding's containing a priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find here a difficulty that we did not encounter in the realm of sensibility: viz., how *subjective conditions of thought* could have *objective validity*, i.e., how they could yield conditions for the possibility of all cognition of objects. For appearances can indeed be given in intuition without functions of understanding. (Kant *CPuR*: A89-90/B122; cf. A130-B139, A 140)

According to Kant, the first two stages of cognitive evolvment develop by the blind Imagination, and the last stage is the Understanding, the synthesis into the *empirical concept* of judgment. And yet, this synthesis is not an evolving interpretation of the preverbal components, as in the Peircean realist epistemology, but is based on another type of synthesis, operated by the imagination through a schematism between empty concepts and blind sensual intuitions. However, the schematized synthesis between empty concepts and the blind object, cannot be achieved by the Imagination, because there is no common dominator between them (Nesher 2007a).

From one point, however, I could not abstract in the above proof: viz., from the fact that the manifold for the intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it; but how it is given remains undetermined here. (Kant *CPuR*: B145)

The answer to this difficulty of Kant's is provided by the Peircean Empirical-Realist solution, which claims that the evolution of our cognition in imagination cannot be blind; if it were blind, then we would not be able to introspect it and instinctively control the operation of our cognitive imagination. Hence, the subjective validity of its evolvment is achieved by our introspective self-control and the interpretation of the manifold cognitive signs, to render the conceptual judgments (Kant *CPuR*: #21). We can see the influence of Kant's philosophical epistemology on the development of Peirce's philosophy and discern some similar elements in it, but Peirce endeavored to realistically revolutionize the Kantian phenomenalist Copernican Revolution, and to show how our knowledge of the external

world can be achieved experientially, without any transcendental *a priorism*. Moreover, Kant assumed that the Imagination operates blindly, since for him we can only reflect and control our cognitions conceptually through the faculty of Understanding; without the faculty of Understanding, our cognitions remain, in a way, indeterminate (e.g., Kant *CPuR*: B 103).

But when sensual intuitions and the understanding of conceptions, the evolving manifold, have a common origin in perceptual experience, we can show semiotically how they are synthesized into judgments of true knowledge, albeit in different modes of representation. Perceptual judgments are the source of our basic proven facts, of the observations in Theoretical, Ethical, and Aesthetical domains of knowledge and Judgment is the central cognitive activity of the human mind (Peirce *EPII*: #14; Neshier 1990, 1994, 2002a, 2007a, 2007b, 2016, 2018).

Transcendental idealism is the conjunction of two theses: (1) *cognitive idealism*, which says that all the proper objects of human cognition are nothing but mind-dependent sensory appearances or phenomena, not things-in-themselves or noumena (A369), and (2) *representational transcendentalism*, which says that all representations and their contents necessarily conform to the forms or structures of our innate spontaneous cognitive capacities (Kant *CPuR*: Bxvi, A11/B25).

However, according to Kant, the judgment of aesthetics is based on reflective imagination conveying to the subject a judgment of pleasure and displeasure in respect to arts. Thus, *Aesthetic reflective judgment* is not based on determinate pure and a priori cognitive concepts and rules, but on being indeterminate *presentations*, which nevertheless trigger a subjective judgment of *beautiful* or *ugly*. The Peircean explanation of the preconceptual cognitive operation of imagination is that by reflecting on our inborn and acquired instinctive and practical rules of operation, we can self-control our cognitions habitually and elaborate their rules rationally to reach perceptual and other types of true judgment.

Indeed, while dealing with the reflective judgment of aesthetics and its objectivity and universality in the Third Critique, our epistemological problem is to explain the nature of the faculty of Imagination and its relation to Understanding in human cognition. Moreover, our goal now is to understand how Kant's conception of *aesthetics* in *sensual intuition* relates to the *reflective judgment of aesthetics* and whether we can explain the role of imagination in Aesthetic judgment not only in terms of subjective feelings but also realistically in relation to the objects of reality.

It seems that this discussion of Kant can be elucidated by our scheme-formula above (figure 3.5). The *Sensual Intuition* of the *Iconic Image*—interpreted based on the *indexical emotional* reaction to it—is the Peircean semiosis of perceptual signs. This can help us to understand Kant's conception

of perceptual operations, as it seems that in this was the way Peirce understood Kant's the operation of perceptual judgment. It is also important to notice that what for Kant is the *object*, which is connected through schematization to the *empirical concept* in perceptual judgment, is for Peirce the Immediate Object, i.e., a component of the *empirical concept*, which in the quasi-proved true perceptual judgment represents an object in external reality. Hence, this is the gist of the Peircean realist epistemological revolution that overcomes the Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries epistemologies, including Logical Positivism, Analytic Philosophy, and The Phenomenological Hermeneutics as well (Nesher 2002a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b, 2016, 2021; Makkreel and Sebastian 2010). Therefore, it is essential to compare the Kantian Transcendentalism with Peircean Realism.

THE PRAGMATICIST RECONSTRUCTION OF THE KANTIAN AESTHETIC THEORY OF CREATIVITY AND JUDGMENT

Why Kant's Aesthetic Judgment of Artworks Cannot Be Valid: Difficulty with Harmony of Faculties

According to Kant, the Genius develops, yet in a mysterious way, his *intellectual ideas*, which are incomplete concepts of Understanding that have no empirical intuition correlated to them and their contents are the intuitions of the Imagination. From these ideas the Genius creates his *aesthetic ideas*, the artwork itself, by the productive power of Imagination. The artist aim is to emulate the intellectual ideas of Understanding through the aesthetic ideas of Imagination, to create the beautiful artwork; hence, those two cognitive faculties of the mind, Imagination and Understanding, must be in reciprocal *harmony*. How can the artist attain this harmony?

But in fact a judgment of taste determines the object, independently of concept, with regard to liking and the predicate of beauty. Hence that unity in the relation [between the mental powers] in the subject can reveal itself only through sensation. This sensation, whose universal communicability a judgment of taste postulates, is the quickening of the two powers (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but, as a result of the prompting of the given presentation, nonetheless accordant: the activity required for cognition in general. An objective relation can only be thought. Still, in so far as it has subjective conditions, it can nevertheless be sensed in the effect it has on the mind; and if the relation is not based on a concept (e.g., the relation that the presentational powers must have in order to give rise to a power of cognition in general), then

the only way we can become conscious of it is through a sensation of this relation's effect: the facilitated play of the two mental powers (imagination and understanding) quickened by their reciprocal harmony. (Kant *CJ*: 219)

Kant accepts that even the conditions for the harmony between the powers of mind in the aesthetic operation of judgment are subjective, "it can nevertheless be sensed in the effect it has on the mind." However, if the relation is not based on a concept, the eventual Aesthetic judgment cannot be considered cognitive knowledge. The difficulty is that, without arbitrarily assuming *a priori* rule of a necessary relationship between the powers of the mind, the subjective Aesthetic judgment of taste that is indeterminate can nevertheless be general and intersubjective, as a common sense presenting the reciprocal harmony between Imagination and Understanding for all human beings. Universality is the business of the Understanding in general, but it cannot work for the harmony between Understanding and Imagination in the indeterminate Aesthetic judgment of taste, without assuming *a priori* what we cannot know cognitively. This sensation, whose universal communicability Kant postulates as the judgment of taste, cannot be proven; nevertheless, this indeterminate subjective sensation is all we have to rely on in the Aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artworks for all human beings (Kant *CJ*: ##35, 38).

A presentation that, though singular and not compared with others, yet harmonized with the conditions of the universality that is the business of the understanding in general, brings the cognitive powers into that proportioned attunement which we require for all cognition and which, therefore, we also consider valid for everyone who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and the senses in combination (in other words, for all human beings). (Kant *CJ*: 219)

Indeed, the productive Imagination is non-rational and therefore *indeterminate* and *free of non-lawfulness play*. The difficulty, then, is to understand how harmony can be determined and detected in such a creative relationship and whether there can be any objective criterion for it. As the Genius has no rational self-control of the inferential interpretation that transforms his *intellectual ideas* into the exhibited *aesthetic ideas*, and as there is no external restriction on this operation, the harmony cannot be validly cognized and the beauty of the created artwork must be of subjective feeling only. According to Kant, the intellectual ideas of the Genius are incomplete concepts of understanding that have no sensual intuitions correlated to them since their emulated contents are the aesthetic ideas that are only the intuitions of the imagination. Accordingly, we might say that Hamlet is only an aesthetic idea of the artistic imaginative character, and that the quasi-concept of this type

of character is an intuition in the artistic productive imagination. Yet, from where does the artist gather the intellectual ideas, in this case, how are the ideas of the story or legend of Hamlet created by Shakespeare?

Now the understanding cognizes everything only through concepts; consequently, however far the understanding reaches in its process of division, it cognizes never through mere intuition, but always in turn through *lower* concepts. Cognition of appearances in their thoroughgoing determination (such cognition is possible only through understanding) requires a specification of the understanding's concepts that must unceasingly be continued; and hence such cognition requires an advance to the always still remaining differences from which we had abstracted in the concept of the species and had abstracted even more in that of *genius*. (Kant *CPuR*: A 656/B 684)

Therefore, objects can indeed have some meaning-content to be recognized by the empirical lower concepts, but the question is how these concepts evolve to the higher and more abstracted concepts of comprehensive knowledge (Kant *CPuR*: A89-90/B122, A90-91/B122-123, A90-91/B122-123, B145; Hanna 2017, SEP: supplement-a). The Kantian conception of perception is based on the dichotomy between feelings, and emotions, instinctive and practical mental operations, on the one hand, and the conceptual thought of the cognitive perceptual judgment that represents reality, on the other hand. However, this dichotomy can be eliminated by suggesting that the preverbal components of the perceptual operation should be considered Kantian "*lower concepts*;" in this manner, perceptual and cognitive operations can be considered empirical, without assuming any transcendental a priori sources.

This dichotomy in the entire perceptual operation makes the seeming distinction in Kantian phenomenological epistemology, between subjective imagination of Aesthetic judgment and objective understanding in the Logical judgment of cognition. However, in the realist epistemology of Pragmatism, the perceptual operation evolves from sensual subjective imagination into conceptual objective understanding, and thus generally, through the subjective operation we can prove the truth of our perceptual representation of reality as objective knowledge. Thus, Kant's unexplained intuition can be explicated, by considering the pleasant sensation of beauty as *purposive without purpose*, since the aesthetic preconceptual experience operates, at least initially, without concepts (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 224'). However, according to the explanation of Pragmatist epistemology, this preconceptual sensual perception is the *meaning-content* of the conceptual thought of the logical-perceptual judgment itself, a view that eliminates the dichotomy between sensual and conceptual components of judgments. It can be suggested that the embryo of this epistemology already present in the Kantian

conception of the evolution of the empirical concept, as in the figure 3.6 (Kant *CJ*: ##35-38; Neshet 2002a: III, X, 2018).

Kant can only *think* about the things-in-themselves as what presumably generates our empirical sensations, but accordingly, we cannot know them, since we do not have any sensual intuitions of them because they are beyond our phenomenal acquaintance. Furthermore, we can *cognize* sensual objects under the pure intuitions of space and time; however, this can be done only at low levels of cognition, without subsuming them under concepts, or synthesizing them into concepts. Therefore, we still cannot assess their nature in terms of propositional judgments. According to Kant, in our endeavor for *knowledge*, we use the operation of our imagination to schematically synthesize the empty concepts which having no sensual content, with the sensual intuition blind object, not having any comprehensive unification, in order to prove the truth of the perceptual judgment about the world (cf. figure 3.6). And yet, we can also err in such judgments due to our inability to reflectively self-control this operation of the imagination. As noted, according to Kant, only the proved true logical judgments constitute *knowledge* of the world (Kant *CPuR*: A820/B848-A831/B859, *CJ*: 461-466; Neshet 1990, 2001, 2002b, 2007a, 2018).

Although our operation of the reflective Aesthetic judgment is initiated from preconceptual cognition representing reality, nevertheless, it is not the operation of perceptual experience and judgment. This is because the science of Aesthetic creation is evaluated as a representation of reality upon the perceptual judgments themselves but not identical with them. Hence, it is interesting to see how Kant explains briefly, in his First Critique, the nature of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment, i.e., the epistemology of judgment operations, the explanation of the nature of this ability to make judgments:

Now if general logic wanted to show universally how we are to subsume under these rules, i.e., how we are to distinguish whether something does or does not fall under them, then this could not be done except again by a rule. But for this rule, precisely because it is a rule, we need once again instruction from the power of judgment. And thus we find that, whereas understanding is capable of being taught and equipped by rules, the power of judgment is a particular talent that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced. This is also the reason why the power of judgment is the specific [feature] of so-called mother wit, for whose lack no school can compensate. For although the school can offer to a limited understanding—and engraft in it, as it were—an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others, yet the ability to employ these rules correctly must belong to the learner himself; and in the absence of such natural gift no rule that one might prescribe to him for this aim is safe from misuse. (Kant *CPuR*: A133/B172)

It is clear that for Kant, the power of judgment is the ability to subsume a particular case under rules and “to distinguish whether it does or does not fall under them, then this could not be done except again by a rule” (Kant *CPuR*: A132/B171). But then we learn that we cannot regress infinitely to the first rule, because even this would require us to exercise the power of judgment. Consequently, Kant needs to rely on the help of the mysterious *mother wit* to explain our innate ability to judge without an endless need for rules. Nevertheless, as Peirce elaborated, by reflecting on our behavior, we might learn more about how the habitual rules of judgment are operated (Peirce *CP*: 5.441).

Peircean Epistemology Overcoming Kant’s Categorical Confusion in Systemizing Philosophy, in his Three Critiques of Different Mental Powers

To understand the entire development of Kant’s philosophical epistemology is to explain the role of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* in the evolution of his entire critical philosophical system. It seems that facing his last Critique, Kant felt that the power of judgment was not a super cognitive ability working equally in the three different faculties of the mind, Understanding, Reason and, let us say, Imagination, respectively, but due to his narrow conception of cognitive knowledge he could not solve it. However, it seems that the only possible theory of truth which Kant endeavored to develop is the theory of correspondence, similar the contemporary semantic theory of truth, following the model of perceptual experience, which Kant explicated in the Logical judgment. But this conception of judgment and truth does not hold in either Ethical or Aesthetic judgments, which renders Kant’s endeavors to elaborate a theory of truth unworkable.

Hence, what can be the logic of the truth of our cognitions in the different modes of representation of reality, and how can we bypass Kant’s explanation? To elaborate, how can we veer away from Kant’s conclusion that a universal theory of truth cannot work in different modes of representations “because such an indicator would be intrinsically contradictory” (Kant *CPuR*: A58/B83)? A solution to our intuition that there ought to be a theory of truth beyond our feeling of true judgment can be found by following the Peircean realist epistemology, i.e., accepting that the universal indicator for the truth of our cognitions is the complete proof operation with the *trio* sequence of the basic logical inferences, Abduction, Deduction, and Induction. Two of the three logic pillars on which this conception of the of truth relies, Abduction and Induction, are—indeed—material logics, and as such are grounded in external reality. Consequently, this conception of the of truth cannot be formal, and may be referred to as *epistemic logic*, which represents our

confrontation in reality (Peirce *CP*: 7.672, 1903, *EPII*: #11-155, 1903, #13-195, 1903, *EPII*: #26, 1906; Neshier 2002a, 2007a, 2016, 2018). Whereas the formal logic of Deduction is isolated from reality, neither the Abductive logic of discovering hypotheses nor the inductive logic of evaluating them can be considered formal; therefore, only the *epistemic logic* can explain the *human knowledge of reality*. Moreover, Kant's crucial mistake is the initial *separation of the form from the content*, and thus making both of them meaningless or unworkable (cf. Kant *CPuR*: APENDIX-A260-292/B316-349; Neshier 2002a: V, 2016, 2018).

The problem with Kant's explication in response to the question "*What is truth?*" is that it depends on an *agreement-correspondence* between a cognition and the presented object, yet no objective criterion is offered for determining such a relationship, unless we assume that the object is a component of the concept (cf. figure 3.6). Moreover, if the *coherence-harmony* between the mental powers of Imagination and Understanding is described in terms of an *agreement-correspondence* between a cognition and the presented object and vice versa, then Kant has a peculiarly circuitous theory of truth. Hence, it seems that Kant cannot answer convincingly his query about truth (Kant *CPuR*: A146/B185; A221-222/B269; cf. Hanna 1993; Neshier 2002a).

The assumption upon which the above definition of truth draws is that the imagined sensual object is a component of the empirical concept itself. However, the operation of Understanding and Imagination cannot synthesize the empty concept and the blind object to one entity, the conceptual form and the phenomenal meaning-content, and hence contradicting the conception of representation by correspondence in the Logical judgment (figure 3.6).

The problem is to explain the different nature of judgment in these three types of normative knowledge, and to understand how their modes of representing reality differ, though all three types of knowledge are based on the perceptual judgments of true propositional facts (Comp. Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, #XI to discuss his different classification of the cognitive powers). It seems reasonable to suggest that the Critique of Judgment is actually the critique of the implicit assumption that judgment of all the three powers of mind is of the same structure as that of the *Theoretical Judgment*, given that only the Theoretical Judgment of Understanding represents reality as scientific knowledge, whereas neither the practical Reason of Ethics nor the reflective Aesthetic judgment of Imagination represents reality.

Hence a judgment of taste is not cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis *cannot be other than subjective*. (Kant *CJ*: #1, 203)

Therefore, judgment is not merely the ability to subsume the physical object under a general concept; rather, *Theoretical*, *Moral*, and *Aesthetic* cognitions use different modes that represent different aspects of reality. The inference of judgment aims to prove the truth of hypotheses and their expectations, but in the different modes of representation, the *Theoretical*, *Ethical*, and *Aesthetical*, the methods of proof rely on different cognitive components (Kant *CJ*: IV, 209'-210', VII, 220', #31, 280-281). The problem is to explain Kant's complete philosophical system of the three Critiques and how it developed to be incomplete.

The First Critique deals with the epistemology of scientific logic, which is operated by the faculty of Understanding, which is also called Critique of Pure Reason, suggesting that this is our general faculty for acquiring any possible knowledge, and therefore, to identify the method of Understanding is to ascertain and prove the truth, or at least the validity of the knowledge acquired. The Second Critique deals with ethical or moral knowledge and how we can know Good human conduct and differentiate it from the Bad conduct. Hence, from the basic Pure Moral Principles of the Transcendental Free Personality with Pure Practical Reason, and from the Moral Principle, we can infer deductively that there are particular Moral imperatives that operate our Moral conduct. Kant considers these imperatives as the *objects* inferred and subsumed under the concept of Morality in Moral judgment. But what is the validity of the Pure Moral Principle and how is the Moral imperative connected with it in the Moral judgment? The Third Critique deals with our aesthetic experience: until 1788, Kant intended it to be called the "Critique of Taste"; shortly afterwards he changed it to the Critique of Judgment, and the question is—why? It seems that the three human faculties of the human mind are *Theoretical-Understanding*, *Moral-Reasoning* and *Aesthetical-Imagination*, which indicates that the *judgment operation* is not a faculty of the mind, but an operation that works differently in each one of the faculties, according to its specific nature of re-presentation (comp. Kant *CJ*: III, 205'-207', V, 211'-216'; Scherer 1995: Intr. esp. 2-5).

However, it seems plausible that at this point, Kant did not yet have a complete picture of the main faculties of mind and he was considering the possibility that the same operation of judgment that is employed to decide or prove our *Theoretic* knowledge (which is acquired through Understanding) works also for proving our *Moral practical* knowledge (which is acquired through Reason). Moreover, the same operation can also be used to prove that the *Aesthetic* pleasure and displeasure (which is acquired through Imagination) is also a universal form of knowledge, although Kant could not establish this due to its subjectivity, since expressions are not concepts of objects. The three faculties of mind are what Peirce, as a diligent student and critic of Kant, called the *Three Normative Sciences*. By virtue of his mature realism and

Counter-Copernican Revolution, he could explain that the three different sciences operate different kinds of judgments, and thus can render differently the representation of physical objects, moral human conduct, and the aesthetic representation of human's life (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 206'-208'; Peirce *EP*II: #14, 1903; Neshet 2007b, 2018).

The speculation that in the Third Critique Kant turned to deal with the conception of judgment is grounded in the observation that in the First Critique he developed the *Theoretical Judgment*, according to which, in the basic perceptual judgment "a is P" object "a" is subsumed under the concept "P"; when it is a valid or true judgment, it holds also for the Inductive inference of theoretical-logical knowledge. For Kant, this structure was applicable also for Moral judgment, in which the particular Moral Imperative is Deductively inferred from general Moral Principles, and by calling it *object*, he considered it to be subsumed under the general conceptual Moral principles. However, this relationship is not the subsumption of an object, but the Deductive inference of cognitive conclusion without having systematically related it to social reality. As to the Judgment of taste of aesthetic Beauty, according to Kant's experience, the previous kind of the *Theoretical Judgment* cannot hold and hence, he had to investigate the specific nature of such judgment. He then called it *Aesthetic reflective judgment*, which cannot be based on concepts or principles and, accordingly, the conception of Judgment requires a special critique to deal with it.

Shortly after he completed the *Critique of Practical Reason*, around Easter 1788, and was about to publish the "Critique of Taste" (*Kritik des Geschmacks*), he suddenly aborted this project and instead, almost two years later, the Third Critique appeared, now titled *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*), in two parts, "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" and "Critique of Teleological Judgment." I share Karl Vorländer's view that the delay in publication and especially the change of title of the Third Critique represented not just normal publishing delays but a significant change of mind, indicating Kant's new insights about judgment generally. (Scherer 1995: 4; cf. Kant *CJ*: 198; Coleman 1974 (4))

However, viewing this decision as an updated change seems to result in a patchwork of ideas, as it was not accompanied by the alteration of the entire philosophical system. Presumably, following the newer idea through to its system-wide implications suggests that all the three powers of mind are working together as distinct components of different types of knowledge, and that for each, there is a different type of judgment that pertains to a different aspect of reality. Thus, Kant's decision to switch from "Critique of Taste" to "Critique of Judgment" led to the development of his Aesthetic reflective

judgment, which is *subjective* and *universal*; yet he was unable to show how the subjective feeling of beauty of artworks could be proved as an objectively true aesthetic representation of reality. The notion of a subjective judgment of taste can be explained if we view it as combining the judgment of taste of natural objects with the Aesthetic judgment of created artworks; however, clearly the two are quite different epistemologically (cf. Scherer 1995: Intr.; 2007a, 2009).

Yet judgment is a very special cognitive power, not at all independent: it gives us neither concepts nor ideas of any object whatever, whereas understanding does give us such concepts, and reason such ideas. For judgment is merely an ability to subsume under concepts given from elsewhere. (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 202')

Hence, in this case, it seems that reflective Aesthetic judgment without having concept from Understanding and ideas from Reason cannot be judgment at all, or rather, there appears to be an epistemological defect in Kant's conception of such judgment and perhaps also with his epistemology of the transcendental philosophical system.

Critique of taste in other [contexts], is used only to improve or solidify taste itself. But if treatment of it has a transcendental aim, then this critique fills a gap in the system of our cognitive powers, and hence opens up a striking and—I think—most promising prospect [for] a complete system of all the natural powers, insofar as in being determined they are referred not just to the sensible but also to the supersensible, though refer to it without any shifting of the boundary stones that a strict critique has laid down for such use of these powers. . . . All the powers of mind can be reduced to the following three: *Cognitive power, Feeling of pleasure and displeasure, Power of desire*. (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 244')

However, “the boundary stones that a strict critique has laid down for such use of these powers,” which together create the unexplainable schema that bridges the supersensible with the sensible, actually does not hold for the Aesthetic judgment with its imagination. Moreover, what is the power that operates the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, if not the power of Imagination, among the other mental powers of Understanding and Reason?

We can reduce all the powers of the human mind, without exception, to these three: the *cognitive power*, the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, and the *power of desire*. It is true that philosophers who otherwise deserve unlimited praise for thoroughness in their way of thinking have asserted that this distinction is only illusory, and have tried to bring all power under nothing but the

cognitive power. Yet it is quite easy to establish, and had in fact been realized for some time, that this attempt to bring unity into that diversity of powers, though otherwise undertaken in the genuine philosophic spirit, is futile. For there is always a great difference between presentations insofar as, on the one hand, they belong to [theoretical] cognition, when they are referred merely to the object and to the unity of consciousness these presentations [contain]—or, similarly, insofar as they have objective reference when they are considered at the same time as cause of the actuality of this object and are included with the power of desire [a power that can give rise to practical cognition]—and, on the other hand, presentations insofar as they are referred merely to the subject: for here the presentations themselves are bases merely for preserving their own existence in the subject, and in so far are considered [merely] in relation to the feeling of pleasure; but this feeling neither is nor provides any cognition at all, though it may presuppose cognition as a basis that determines it. (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 205'-206')

Kant's point here is that only the *cognitive power* of Understanding, and the *power of desire* of Reason are cognitions that represent their specific objects of their different realities; but, what then is the mental power of the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure* if not the Imagination? Nevertheless, it is not a cognition, because it presents only the subject "in relation to the feeling of pleasure." The question is why does Kant claim that "this feeling neither is nor provides any cognition at all"? It seems that it is so, in Kantian terms, because feelings are not and do not belong to any phenomenal object, and as such, they cannot represent any object whatsoever. The difficulty is with Kant's discussion of the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure* as if the relation to natural objects and to creative artworks is the same and both feelings are only subjective ones. Moreover, if the *power of desire* of Reason represents the desired human conduct, so the creative artworks too can represent human life and like all cognitive sciences, even without the perceptual concepts, they can through such factual perceptual judgments represent reality (Nesher 2002a: X). The creative artworks can do it because the artist's intellectual ideas are imbued in the created aesthetic ideas, as Kant himself suggests. Thus, by using the imagination, everyone can compare the aesthetic ideas of artworks with the reality of human life in their particular environment. As in Goodman's example of the literary created character, Don Quixote by Miguel de Cervantes, by means of our imagination we can evaluate the aesthetic representation of some essential features and ideas by comparing them with our own ideas and life. Hence in the process described, the created artworks are also cognitions that represent aesthetically aspects of reality, and thus the beauty of artworks conveys a true aesthetic representation of reality, from which

we can learn about ourselves and then consider how to conduct our lives in reality (Goodman 1968; Neshar 2008).

But in order for this feeling of pleasure to be connected with the other two powers in a system, this feeling must, as these other two powers do, also rest not on merely empirical bases but on a priori principles. Hence for the idea of philosophy as a system we also need *a critique* (even if not a doctrine) *of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure* insofar as its basis is not empirical. (Kant, *CJ*: First Introduction, 207')

At this point the Peircean Pragmaticist-Realist revolution suggests turning the tables on the Kantian Copernican Revolution, by explaining that all human cognitions are rooted in the empirical experience, without requiring any transcendental a priori principles (Neshar 2002a, 2007a, 2007b, 2016, 2018). However, while Kant sought to bring the three *mental powers* (*the cognitive power*, *the power of desire*, and *the feeling of pleasure and displeasure*) together into a single philosophical system, he overlooked the fact that they are based on different types of cognitive knowledge, namely, Theoretical knowledge operates through Understanding, Moral knowledge through Reason, and Aesthetical knowledge through Imagination. Moreover, they also operate as different inferences in our basic cognitive operation, the *epistemic logic*: the sequence of Abductive, Deductive, and Inductive inferences as the complete proof of our true representation of reality. Thus, the tri-partite construct encompasses what Kant endeavored to accomplish, that is, a complete philosophical *system* and not an *aggregate* of ideas (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 206'; Peirce 1903, *EPII*: #14; Guyer 1997: Ch. 11, 12; Neshar 2007a).

The difficulty in the inquiry about truth and knowledge in general and of the Aesthetic judgment of artworks in particular is related to the nature and the role that Kant's *Critique of Judgment* plays in the development of his entire Critical philosophical system. In his last Critique, Kant understood that the ability of judgment is not a super cognitive faculty that works equally with the different *powers of the human mind*, given that their cognitive structures of judgment are different (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, III, XI, *CPrR*: 160; Scherer 1995: Introduction). It seems reasonable to suggest that the Critique of Judgment is actually the critique of the assumption that judgment in all three powers of human mind is of the same structure as that of the *Theoretical Judgment*. According to Kant, the Theoretical Judgment is of knowledge; by contrast, reflective Aesthetic judgment presents only the subject's personal feelings and not any outer reality, and thus he did not view it as a judgment that renders knowledge at all.

The Subject Can Prove the Objective Beauty of an Artwork as a True Aesthetic Representation of Reality

As Kant worked on his philosophical system, initiated by his transcendental Copernican Revolution, he discovered that it was lacking a comprehensive perspective; although he sought to redress this imperfection, it seems that the system's evolution lacks a sense of overall coherence. From the perspective of his last Critique and the steps he took in his work on each Critique, it seems that the three Critiques deal with the basic three mental powers in the following manner: the First Critique of Theoretical Understanding addresses the representation of nature, the Second Critique of Practical Reason of Moral principles addresses the choices that direct human conduct, and the Third Critique of Aesthetic Imagination pertaining to judgments of taste explains the concept of beauty of created artworks (Scherer 1995; Neshet 2008).

Peirce's realist reconstruction of these basic cognitive domains in the form of his Three Normative Sciences, which are used to judge Truth, Good, and Beauty as distinct modes, representing different aspects of reality. However, in each of these normative sciences, all three cognitive domains have a role to play, with a different dominant mental power operating in each; nevertheless, all three are based on a cognitive interpretation in the system of epistemic logic. Thus, each type of cognitive interpretation can be used to prove the truth of its representation of reality (Scherer 1995; Peirce *EP2*: #14, 1903; Neshet 2007a). Moreover, in the Peircean epistemology of perception, which essentially follows Kant's intuitions about experience, the Three Normative Sciences, comparable to Kant's three Critiques, are the essential cognitive types of knowledge, already operating embryonically as the different aspects of our perceptual experience: The Aesthetical *iconic feeling of quality*, the Ethical *indexical emotional reaction*, and the Theoretical *symbolic thought*, together they represent reality.

In the Peircean epistemology of perception (see figure 1.7, p. X), we can see the prototype of the structure and operation of the human mind confrontation in reality, whereby the basic components of the perceptual operation are the predominant components. The different combinations of Kant's powers of the mind result in different interpretations: the combination of Sensation-Imagination renders an Aesthetic interpretation, Volition-Emotion renders an Ethical interpretation, and Thought-Understanding renders a Theoretical interpretation (Kant *CPrR*: 33-34, 109-110; Kant *CJ*: Translator's Introduction xxxviii; Neshet 2004a, 2007a, 2008, 2009). Hence, according to Peirce, the iconic sign presents the Feeling-image of the eventual Object; the indexical sign presents the Emotional reaction to it, i.e., the cognition of this phenomenal Immediate Object; and the Symbolic sign presents their conceptual synthesis in Thought being the perceptual proposition to prove the truth

of the perceptual judgment represents the Real Object. This is actually what Kant hoped to achieve generally, though initially in the basic perceptual cognition, “to bring unity into that diversity of powers.” According to Peircean Pragmatics, this can be achieved under the true Thought-Synthesis (Kant, *CJ*: First Introduction, 205’-206’).

Therefore, those three basic cognitive components of perceptual operation which are embryonic cognitions of the Three Normative Sciences Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic, evaluated upon the proved true perceptual propositions, which are our basic facts representing reality (Nesher 2002a: X, 2018). Thus, all basic cognitive components operate in each of the basic sciences, but only the predominant one determines the specific mode of representing reality, Theoretical, Ethical, or Aesthetical. Moreover, the historical development of the basic sciences are different modes of representing reality and their different types of knowledge become the accepted common-sense understanding, the objective criteria for human universal communication and mutual understanding, the knowledge that explain our social life in nature (Kant *CJ*: ##20, 21, 22, 40; Coleman 1974: 144-157; Nesher 1994; Guyer 1997: Ch. 8; Allison 2001: Ch. 7; comp. Habermas 1981). This can solve Kant’s difficulty explaining the universal communication and agreement on human true judgments without the need to assume any transcendental a priori principles or unexplainable miracles, like the mysterious “Mother Nature wit,” or some other forced a priori rules. Indeed, such explanation is the basis of our belief in the common-sense knowledge, without which Kant cannot explain human communication or any agreement in social life, and on which his theory of Aesthetic judgment of artworks depends (Kant *CJ*: ##21, 22).

First as we shall see that the so-called deduction of #21 turns out to be manifestly inadequate as a deduction of a common sense, construed as the principle of taste; though it contains a line of argument that is at least plausible, if taken instead as an attempt to show that we have grounds to assume something like an epistemic common sense as a condition of the universal communicability of cognition. (Allison 2001: 145; cf. Nesher 1994)

The subjective Aesthetic judgments are based on a personal feeling of enjoyment; through our social experience, we learn that there are agreements and disagreements about these feelings, which we have to explain epistemologically in order to understand how we make our Aesthetic judgments. The universality of accepted Aesthetic judgments is based on a common objective criterion for such judgments, and this is done by proving that the artworks aesthetically and beautifully represent external reality. However, given that all such proofs are only relative knowledge, based on the subjects’ acceptance of the proof-conditions, i.e., the agreement must be relative to these conditions,

the universality of such proofs is, likewise, relative. Thus, we show, and can also prove, that subjectivity and universality do not contradict each other, but remain relative. This observation also helps explain our controversies on the Aesthetic judgment of artworks, their interpretations and proofs, and of course our disputes regarding the agreeable and disagreeable feelings evoked by observing natural and artificial objects, the instinctive and practical proofs of which deserve further discussion. Furthermore, this explains the relativity of art criticism, whereby the discussions and controversies aim to prove the relative truth of the proposed judgment based on accepted proof-conditions, i.e., our knowledge of the styles and the historical period of the created artworks. At the same time, such relativity cannot be entirely subjective, given that the relative truth is based on objective proof-conditions. Hence, some artworks that once seemed beautiful are later proved to be falsely judged or kitschy (Kant *CJ*: # 40-293).

A judgment of taste, just as if it were merely *subjective*, cannot be determined by bases of proof. . . .

If others make a judgment that is unfavorable to us, this may rightly make us wonder about our own judgment, but it can never convince us that ours is in correct. Hence there is no empirical *basis of proof* that could compel anyone to make [some] judgment of taste. (Kant *CJ*: # 33-284; cf. Guyer 1997: 242ff.)

According to Kant, the “nominal definition” of truth of the judgment is determined by the “agreement” or “correspondence” (*Übereinstimmung*) of a cognition, (i.e., in an objectively valid judgment) with its object (Kant, *CPuR*: A58/B82). However, the question is whether there are other modes of representation that do not use Logical judgment to evaluate the truthful representation of objects. Just as Ethical Imperatives are used to judge the truthful representation of the value of human conduct in society, so too the reflective judgment of Aesthetic Artworks is used to weigh the truthful representation of human life in nature. We note that these are indeed different modes of representing different aspects of reality (comp. Kant *CPuR*: #32, 281-282). Thus, for example, to consider the Aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artworks is to explain how the literary Don Quixote represents human devotion, or how Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony represents human inspiration, or how Picasso’s Guernica represents the reality of human cruelty and suffering. And generally, to explain how we can prove the truth of artwork representation of reality.

Here the role of imagination is prominent in the reflective judgment of aesthetic representation of reality and the proof of its true representation of reality is provided by comparing the literary image of the characteristic life of Don Quixote as imbued in the aesthetic artwork with similar properties

of human conduct, which inevitably reveals a similarity between the artistic representation and our experiences in real life. Thus, we compare the artwork with reality by use of our imagination, as there is no any formal way to proof such a comparison. Only our imagination can tease out the meanings of the *intellectual ideas* embedded *aesthetically* in the work of art. Only by means of the imagination can we compare the aesthetic embodiment of images with our understanding of life. Thus, it is the imagination, which serves as a means to discover the similarity between the embodiment of aesthetic ideas in artworks and knowledge of reality, that provides the proof of the Truth of the artistic aesthetic representation of reality (Kant *CJ*: 189-190, 314-315, 354). Can Similarity by Imagination of Artworks to our knowledge of reality enable a Quasi-proof of their Truth and thus an objective and valid representation of reality?

For example, when reading Cervantes’ Don Quixote, we can feel imaginatively the *similarity* between our personal experience and the adventures of the hero-protagonist. The question is how can those feelings, which provide proof of the artwork’s beauty, conceptually prove the true representation of human reality? Moreover, what about different feelings of different persons? Can subjective aesthetic feelings of beauty serve as proof of the artwork’s objective and true representation of reality? As to the former question, it seems that having different proof-conditions is comparable to having different perceptual judgments of the same situation or the same artwork. Hence, instead of seeing the Aesthetic judgment of artwork as only subjective, we can explain interpersonal differences as judgments that relate to different proof-conditions. Moreover, by reasoning and discussing, we can come to agreement on the beauty as a true aesthetic representation of reality, as it can be illustrated in the following figure:

As to the reflective Aesthetic judgments, consider for example the imaginative comparison between the Aesthetic artwork of Picasso’s “Guernica,” and the Proven Facts of Guernica disaster: this comparison is based not on pure imagery but on images imbued with the intellectual ideas of the




Figure 3.14 The quasi-proof of the artwork true aesthetic representation of reality by comparing its similarity to facts of human reality.

artist, in this case Picasso. Both the observer and the artist recognize that the context of its creation serves as the proof-condition of the artwork's truthful and beautiful representation of reality. However, an observer of the Picasso's "Guernica," that is not familiar with the Proven Facts of Guernica disaster can easily aesthetically judge this artwork as repelling and ugly (Nesher 2007b).

Fine art shows its superiority precisely in this, that it describes things beautifully that in nature we would dislike or find ugly. The Furies, diseases, devastations of war, and so on are all harmful; and yet they can be described, or even presented in the painting, very beautifully. (Kant *CJ*: 312)

The *intellectual ideas* are the relevant knowledge of reality upon which the artist endeavors to create a work of art that represents aesthetically the relevant intended reality. The role of artistic *productive imagination* in the creation of aesthetic representation of reality lies in the Abductive *discovery of aesthetic ideas* from the artist's *intellectual ideas*. The artist uses Deductive interpretation to turn *aesthetic ideas* into the epitomized *Aesthetic* artwork, and Inductive evaluation to prove the artwork's beauty, and the *truth* of the *Aesthetic judgment*. The Inductive evaluation of the created artwork is done by *imaginatively comparing* the epitomized *Aesthetic* artwork with the relevant reality, to prove the artwork as true esthetic representation of reality. The proof of the aesthetic beauty of artworks can be achieved in the complete evolution of the cognitive process: this begins with the *feeling* of aesthetic beauty and continues to the next stage of an accurate *emotional* reaction to it, which produces *a sense of the Truth*. The process then culminates in the *rational* reasoning of the outcome of our *ingenious* comparison of the artwork with reality, by which we prove the true representation of this reality, thus indicating its knowledge. "For the whole question consists in that—what to consider as the truth. This is why the novel is written." (Dostoevsky, about his writing of *The Devils*, 1870).

The three stages of the artistic creating and evaluation of Artwork as representing reality, upon the view of common-sense knowledge as the accepted knowledge of our normative Theoretical, Ethical, and Aesthetical sciences, are depicted in figure 2.3 (p. X). The artist, with his spirit and productive imaginative "free play", interprets the generality of *intellectual ideas* in the singularity of *aesthetic ideas* and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such a quasi-Deductive inference the artist exercises, a'la Kant, the *reflective manner (modus aestheticus)*, to achieve the harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding and the Imagination and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork. This is an elaboration of Kantian aesthetics, which replaces Kant's subjective conception of *Harmony* with the Peircean

realist confrontation in reality, whereby the latter serves as the objective criterion of truth and beauty (Kant *CJ*: 1781-87: B84-109, B316-349; Neshar 2007a, 2018). Thus, we can avoid the paradox in Kant's Aesthetic theory of Beauty (which is similar to Wittgenstein's paradox of the *meaning* of following rules). According to Kant, if every subjective pleasure determines beauty, and every displeasure can contradict it, such subjective feelings cannot be an intersubjective Judgment of Beauty. Hence, there is no phenomenal objective criterion for harmony between *intellectual ideas* and *aesthetic ideas*, and the judgment of aesthetic beauty remains arbitrary. The way out of such "internal realism" and also "external realism" is the epistemology of Pragmaticist "representational realism" (Neshar 2002a: III).

We evaluate artworks by understanding how the artistic intellectual ideas are interpreted in the aesthetic ideas and exhibited as artwork. The proof of such true interpretation depends on our knowledge of the artist's truth-conditions for evaluating the truth and beauty of her created artwork, which must be relative to our knowledge of the artist's initial "spirit," to express his "intellectual ideas" in creating the artwork, and the reality he endeavors to represent aesthetically. Without understanding the artistic language, we cannot understand the artwork and judge its beauty as a true representation of reality. The truth of artwork is not the kitschy imitation of reality but the aesthetic exhibition of the artist's true conceptions of it. Since artistic imitation of surface of reality cannot harmonize with the true conception of reality it cannot be its true aesthetic representation. Artistic imitation is without *spirit* and just *kitsch*, and the disharmony between the artist's conception and the aesthetic exhibition is *false* artwork (Kant *CJ*: ##46, 49).

We evaluate artworks by proving their *truth* and *beauty* or *falsity* and *ugliness*; and artworks for which those cannot be proved are *doubtful* and *kitschy* (see figure 1.11, p. X). Every rational analysis of artworks starts with our experiential feelings and emotional reaction to artwork as pleasure, or displeasure, and eventually its beauty and truth. The emotional reactions to the true aesthetic representation of reality reflect our self-understanding, expose our real life, and guide our self-controlled life.

Chapter 4

Free Creation of Artwork Is the Determinate Self-Control of Proving Its True Interpretation and Representation of Reality

ARTWORKS AS AESTHETIC REPRESENTATION OF REALITY: BEAUTY, UGLINESS, AND KITSCH

The epistemology of artistic creation of artworks and their evaluation is the only means of understanding their merit, beauty and truth. According to Hermeneuticians like Heidegger and Gadamer, the essence of artwork appears, or is disclosed, in the actual creation, and the question is how can the artist know whether his creation has a sense of beauty and truth. Does he follow some rules of interpretation, which can determine the beauty and the truth of his creation? Wittgenstein's conception of interpretation, like the hermeneutic conception, cannot suggest or show any criterion for the meaning of following rules and thus every interpretation is possible without being able to distinguish between true and false interpretations. The same applies to fine art, where without any external criterion the paradox of beauty appears as such that neither the artist himself nor other interpreters can distinguish objectively between beauty, ugliness or kitsch, of the artwork. The solution of the paradox of beauty is to show that the beauty of an artwork is the proof of the true interpretation in the creation and evaluation of the artwork. This can be done with the artist's and others' determinate self-control of these operations, but according to Kant, we cannot combine artistic freedom with determination in the creation of the artwork. The solution to such a Kantian dichotomy is through the understanding that free creation is determinately self-controlled, and generally, according to Spinoza, freedom is the inner self-control determination of one's cognitive behavior. Therefore, the question is how can this self-control of artistic creation determine the beauty and truth of the artwork, avoiding its ugliness or kitsch? This can be done by

proving the true interpretation of the artistic conception and the vision of the artwork as it is exhibited epitomizing in the actual artwork, its adequacy or harmony. This harmony is the beauty of the artwork but only together with the proof of the *true interpretation* of the aesthetic *representation* of reality.

HERMENEUTICIANS' DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CONCEPT OF TRUE INTERPRETATION

The problem lies with phenomenological Hermeneuticians' conceptions of meaning interpretation and truth in explaining the creation and evaluation of artworks. Meaning is conceived as the linguistic content interpreted in *horizontal* relations among different stages, and truth is the disclosedness of the essence of being in an interpretative operation, the Greek *alētheia*. The essence of a being itself is unconcealed in the interpretation of its meaning-content so that its appearance is the true interpretation of its essence. However, this truth is not the correspondence of a proposition which includes external states of affairs, but is rather the "truth of being," its essence, which shows itself in its appearance. We can understand this operation of interpretation of the truth of the Being as the deductive proof from the true axioms to the truth of the conclusion as a Thought or an Action, though it is not a rational proof but only instinctive and a practical quasi-proof. Let us assume that the true essence of a person (*Design*) is an axiom: then how do we know that its interpretation is a true disclosedness of this essence? This is like Leibniz's conception of the true essence of Julius Caesar, which we can only guess from his behavior, but never know it truly since only God can know it because he conceived Caesar's essence directly. So how can humans know the truth of the interpretation of human inner essence? In the horizontal operation of interpretation, there can be indefinite possible interpretations and one cannot decide which is the true representation of the subject-person inner essence. Can a person know him/herself, and can we know truly the essences of our interlocutors?

The problem with the phenomenological Hermeneuticians' conception of truth, the true interpretation of the essence of human being or of the artwork, is that they do not have any criterion to distinguish between the truth and the falsity or the beauty and the ugliness in showing itself. They do not have any external criterion for evaluating their different interpretations, nor any theory of truth for the interpretive results, since from a phenomenological point of view, the confrontation with external reality is impossible. They accept only intuitively, probably by a strong feeling, that the *Atrue friend*," the "true gold" or the "true artwork" shows itself in the hermeneutic interpretation.

In the light of the essential definition of the work [of art] we have reached at this point, according to which the happening of truth is at work in the work, we are able to characterize creation as follows: to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work's becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens. It all rests on the essence of truth. (Heidegger [1936]1993: 185)

Because it is the essence of the truth to establish itself within beings, in order thus first to become truth, the *impulse toward the work* lies in the essence of truth as one of truth's distinctive possibilities, by which it can itself occur as being in the midst of beings (Heidegger [1936]1993: 187; cf. Hegel [1835]1975: 8). The following is a scheme of Heidegger's conception of showing itself:


*Being [True Essence] → [Interpretation] Appearance: Showing Itself
[Being] as factual Truth*

Here the problem of explaining interpretations comes to the fore as an existential development, in Heidegger's terms, or as the cognitive operation, in pragmaticist terms. Hence, phenomenological Hermeneuticians remain inside the phenomenal "lifeworld," while "Being is already in the world," or the Wittgensteinian "form of life" without being able to develop a theory of truth and explain the representation of "the world" as an external reality, or even the very possibility of the evolvment of phenomenal lifeworld. Therefore, the phenomenological Hermeneuticians cannot explain the truth of artworks as an appearance without having any criterion of distinguishing between true and false appearances.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PARADOX OF INTERPRETATION

In discussing the *interpretation* of meaning according to rules, Wittgenstein shows that under some understanding of *interpretation* we arrive at a paradox about the following rules.

Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with this rule. That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. (Wittgenstein 1953: #198)



\approx is a *plausibility connective* suggesting the concept, or theory, A^{Ab} from the perceptual

Figure 4.1 Pragmaticist Proof of the Truth of Interpretation and the Representation of Reality.

To overcome the “Paradox of Interpretation” Wittgenstein has to invent a mystical conception of “Grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*.” This Grasping is similar to Frege’s concept of grasping objective Thoughts as a Kantian Intellectual Intuition lacking any epistemological explanation of learning the meaning of rules and their use. The Pragmaticist understands the Criteria for the meanings of our cognitions not as phenomena of our experience but of our procedure of proving the truth of the interpretations of cognitive signs “to make our ideas clear,” the true meanings of our linguistic expressions. We start with the tentative-vague primordial meanings of the components of our perception and synthesize them into our perceptual judgment proposition so that by quasi-proving its truth we also prove true the interpretation of its basic meaning-components.

We start our operation from the initial-vague cognitive meanings of Feeling A and Emotion C as experiences of the Real Object. If there is *Coherence* between A and C, then their Interpretation-synthesis in the proposition $A \rightarrow C$ is Proved as True representation of the same Real Object. Therefore, the Interpretations of A and C are True and their Meanings are *certainly clear* as synthetic components of the *distinctly* True $A \rightarrow C$ being True Representation of the Real Object. This can be seen as a solution to the hermeneutical circle and the Fregean “Compositionality” that through reflective control over a complete proof, not a formal proof but the Peircean trio sequence of Abduction, Deduction, and Induction, we can avoid any vicious circle or an infinite regression (Nesher 1997a, 2005b). We do not prove the truth of the meaning components of the proposition, but the truth of their interpretation-synthesis in a proposition, namely, that the resultant proposition of the proof is true. We prove the interpretation because every proof is

an interpretation of the assumptions, and every true interpretation is the *trio* complete proof.

This is not a sort of Verificationist Theory of Meaning since the Proof of the Truth of $A \rightarrow C$ entails the Truth of the interpretation of its Meaning, and thus, it also makes *certainly clear* the Meanings of its components A and C. According to the Logical Positivist Verifiability Principle of Meaning, a proposition is meaningful if, at least in principle, it can be verified or falsified in the formalism of logical calculus. This Logical Positivist principle has the function of eliminating metaphysical propositions that are meaningless since they are unprovable as true or false. According to my pragmaticist theory of meaning and truth, every human experience has some initial-vague meaning, and in the final *interpretation*, we can make the meaning-ideas a *clear* and *distinct* representation of reality. Metaphysical propositions also have experiential meaning contents and are our outmost empirical generalizations, but as distinct from Kant and the contemporary neo-Kantians, e.g., Putnam, we can evaluate them empirically. If such propositions have not been proved true or false, they remain doubtful; but a doubtful proposition is meaningful although it is still vague. This holds also for artistic artworks, which are created and evaluated by a cognitive interpretation to represent reality aesthetically, as true-beautiful, false-ugly, or doubtful-kitschy.

With this Pragmaticist theory of meaning of interpretation and the proof of its truth, we prove also our knowledge of reality. These proved cognitions are our knowledge, which are the basic communal conventions of our form of life. This is the solution to the hermeneutical circle and the Fregean paradox of “compositionality.” We do not prove the truth of the meanings of a proposition’s components but the truth of their interpretation-synthesis in a proposition, namely that the result of the proof is true. We prove the interpretation because every proof is an interpretation of the assumptions, and every true interpretation is the *trio* complete proof.

KANT’S PARADOX OF GENIUS: FREE CREATION AND NATURAL DETERMINATION

The function of interpretation of an artistic creation appears in Kant’s aesthetic theory of the fine arts in the artist spirit of the Genius as the animating principle in the mind of playing freely between the ideas of Understanding and Imagination to create one’s artwork. How may the genuine artist determine freely the interpretation of the ideas of understanding *in its lawfulness* in harmony with the ideas of imagination *in its freedom*? The artist has the motivation and plan to interpret his *intellectual ideas* into the imaginatively created *aesthetic ideas* of the artwork.

The concept of fine art does not permit a judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule whatsoever that has a *concept* as its determining basis, i.e., the judgment must not be based on a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Hence fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product. Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must be nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his powers) that gives the rule to art; in other words, fine art is possible only as the product of genius. (Kant *CJ*: 307)

But how does the genius know whether his interpretation of the intellectual ideas in creating the aesthetic ideas is a true interpretation, such that the spiritual comprehension of the former is truly exhibited in the epitomized artwork? If the genius with his spirit is playing with his productive Imagination freely, without knowing the rules working in his nature, how can he exercise his self-control to achieve the harmony between the ideas of his two faculties; and if he knows his Understanding rational rules and has self-control over their operation to interpret his intellectual ideas into the aesthetic ideas of the artwork, this cannot be a free play of the genius' spirit. Therefore, in both cases the genius cannot create any fine art (Kant *CJ*: 307-308). The solution to this predicament is to eliminate his transcendental dichotomy between freedom and determination by understanding, with Spinoza, who says that freedom is the inner self-controlled determination, so the artist's free play is his/her determinate self-controlled creation of artwork. Thus, we have to eliminate Kant's abyss between the *aesthetic mode* of the habitual rules, operating feelings and emotions, and the *logical mode* of explicit rules of conceptual reasoning in order to explain the entire operation of artistic creation of artworks. The artist's spiritual determinate free play combines the *rationality* of intellectual ideas and the *sensuality* of aesthetic ideas in the creation of his artwork (Kant *CJ*: #35). The question is how this self-control of artistic creation can determine the beauty and truth of the artwork and avoid its ugliness and falsity, or being kitsch. Still, Kant's Genius develops, in a mysterious way, his *intellectual ideas* which, according to Kant, are incomplete concepts of Understanding that have no empirical intuition correlated to them since their contents are the intuitions of the Imagination (Kant *CJ*:308-309). But whence come these intellectual ideas with their meaning-contents if not from the artist's experiential confrontation in reality (Gadamer [1960]1989: 54)? But, if the spiritual motivation is based on these aesthetic ideas of the productive Imagination to emulate and interpret truly, and the intellectual ideas of Understanding lead to create a beautiful artwork, there must be an interpretative *harmony* between the cognitive faculties (see figure 1.2, p. X).

This Imaginative creation of an artwork is to be achieved in the Harmony between the intellectual ideas of Understanding and created aesthetic ideas of

Imagination, and it has to be done by their reciprocal free play interpretation. The Intellectual Ideas include rich experiential and general meaning as the core or the theme of the intended artwork from which the artist quasi-Deduces interpretively and exhibits the aesthetic types of individual characters of his/her work, namely Deductively subsuming the individual under the general idea. This is done by choosing the best elements that will attune the initial Intellectual ideas (Kant *CJ*: 317). In order to evaluate these elements in the creative operation, the artist must have recourse to his/her general knowledge of reality not only after completing the creative artwork, but continuously in the creative operation. This quasi-deductive inference is similar to attempts in heuristic formal proofs, serving to see intuitively what is the best conclusion one can reach from one's axiomatic assumptions. Since this is a productive imaginative pre-rational operation, there are no formal rules or laws to comprehend and control the exhibition of the aesthetic ideas. However, "It is a feeling that the imagination, by its own action, deprives itself of its freedom, in being determined purposively according to a law different from that of its empirical use" (Kant *CJ*: 269; cf. 306).

In reconstructing Kant's theory of the genius, the artist with his spirit creates the artwork in operating his/her reflective self-control of "free play" to harmonize the intuitive Understanding and the productive Imagination in the quasi-deductive, inferring adequately the *aesthetic ideas* from the *intellectual idea* (Kant *CJ*: 313-314; Crawford 1982: 172-176). Yet how can the artist determinately self-control and measure such a harmony? The artist has to prove his or her true interpretation of the intellectual idea through aesthetic ideas, and this proof must be self-controlled apart from the trio epistemic logic of Abduction, Deduction and Induction. This can be done only with his or her confrontation with reality through knowing it. Namely, not only with the quasi-Deductive interpretation, but rather with her or his two legs on the confronted reality, i.e., the material logic of Abduction and Induction, and this proving of the truth of the interpretation can only be done by the "free play" of the imagination that is "determined" by the reflective self-control of its operation, as will be discussed hereinafter.

The artist, with his spirit and productive imagination's "free play," infers from the generality of *intellectual ideas* the singularity of *aesthetic ideas*, and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such quasi-deductive inference, the faculty of Judgment is exercised in its *reflective manner (modus aestheticus)* to achieve harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding, and the Imagination and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork.

The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature, holds his work up to it, and, after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy his taste, finds that form which is adequate to it. Hence this

form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of free momentum of the mental powers; the artist is, instead, slowly and rather painstakingly touching the form up in an attempt to make it adequate to his thought while yet keeping it from interfering with the freedom in the play of these powers. (Kant *CJ*: 312)

However, Kant's dichotomy between the *modus aestheticus*, which is based on *feeling* and therefore free, and the *modus logicus*, which is based on determinate *principles* and *rules*, might explain his two meanings of "adequate" as one belongs to a scientific *method* and the other to an artistic *manner*. However, Kant's transcendental idealism prevents him from understanding the epistemic logic of our cognitions, namely combining these two *modi*, the *modus aestheticus* and the *modus logicus*, as two components of our cognitive representation of reality. This would come to the evolutionary hierarchy of our pre-rational instinctive and practical self-controlled cognitive operation with habitual rules and the rational self-controlled reasoning with explicit rules and concepts (Nesher 2002a). Yet, Kant's dichotomy between natural determinism and transcendental freedom prevents him from explaining how can the genuine artist combine rule following in the interpretative free play for achieving harmony between the ideas of Understanding and Imagination, as well as the feeling of the reflective judgment of taste with rational interpretation of artworks (cf. Kant *CJ*: 312). This leaves the artistic genuine creation of artworks and its evaluation to the reflective judgment of taste as two separate cognitive operations that cannot be explained.

The artist has the motivation and plan to interpret and transform his *intellectual ideas* into imaginatively created and exhibited *aesthetic ideas* of the artwork. But how does the genius know whether his interpretation of intellectual ideas in creating aesthetic ideas is a true interpretation, such that the spiritual comprehension of the former is truly exhibited in the epitomized actual artwork? How can one achieve harmony between the ideas of the cognitive faculties of the mind in the free play between rationality of intellectual ideas and sensuality of imaginative aesthetic ideas? The question is how can the artist's free play of his productive imagination be self-controlled on the one hand, and continually evaluate the beauty of his/her work in aesthetic judgment of reflection on the other?

FREE CREATION AS DETERMINATE SELF-CONTROL, TRUE INTERPRETATION AND REPRESENTATION

The aesthetic evaluation of artistic works as beautiful is a self-conscious reflective judgment of the artist on his own creative-interpretative operations as well as by others through their interpretations of artworks. This

reflective judgment of the artist on his creative operation is based on instinctive and practical self-control, though it also reaches rational intuition that controls the *free play* between the ideas of understanding and of imagination. This is a description of the artist's evaluation of her or his artwork through the creative process, but the criterion for such aesthetic evaluation is missing, since the general criterion of order, unity, consistency, coherence, completeness, and more, are only *ad hoc* rules that are always specific to each artwork for explaining the artist's or our impressions of the artwork. What in one case is order, in another may be disorder. The difficulty with the evaluation of aesthetic artworks is that they appear in aesthetic ideas of the creative imagination, while the particular epitomes that affect our sensual feeling of quality and the emotional reaction, which do not allow us a simple and direct comparison with our perceptual experience and general knowledge of Reality. But what is the criterion for a correct, good or true aesthetic evaluation of the beauty of an artwork? This can be done only when the artist quasi-proves the truth of the aesthetic representation of reality that is the vivid exhibition of his intellectual understanding of reality, whereas a reflective evaluation is an essential factor in the entire process of artistic creation of artworks in critically appraising the operation until the completion of the artwork. We can apply this reasoning to the evaluation of aesthetic representations. We, the artists, readers and viewers, interpret and prove the truth of artworks not only directly upon our perceptual confrontations with Reality and their judgments, but with our entire knowledge of Reality, physical and psychological, in a way that the artworks are evaluated within such knowledge and their explanatory contribution to such knowledge (cf. Hutcheson [1725]1973: IV.II).

With artworks, we have to start our evaluation of the aesthetic imaginative exhibition instinctively and practically, and only then deal with their intellectual content through the interpretation-explication of the former. Since the evaluation of the aesthetic imaginative exhibition is basically done by habitual instinctive rules, philosophers tend to think that there are no such cognitive rules and that their Asecret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves" (Kant *CPuR*:A141). Yet Peirce develops an alternative conception that we can have an "habitual knowledge" of the inner rules in the depths of our mind and that we can feel their working in us and discover them by analyzing our cognitive behavior (Nesher 1994).

It is esthetic enjoyment which concerns us; and ignorant as I am in Art, I have a fair share of capacity for esthetic enjoyment; and it seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the totality of Feeling and especially to the total resultant Quality of Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating,

yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that there is a Feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable Feeling. (Peirce *CP*: 5.113)

Our first interpretation and understanding of artworks are in our Emotional reaction to the totality of Feeling we experience in them, but we later interpret intellectually their contents that are exhibited in their aesthetic representation of reality. The Inductive inferential evaluation of the artistic epitome representation of reality is very difficult to analyze, similar to Kant's problem with his schematism that is to explain the relation between our sensual-perceptual experience and our conceptual reasoning about it. With this pragmatist conception, we endeavor to explain the epistemic rules of the cognitive operations of both creating of artworks by the artist and their evaluation by others as a cognitive operation of interpretation. Hirsch is right in his striving towards an objective interpretation, though he is wrong in separating validity from truth. This is due to his conception of the absolute truth and his lack of epistemic logic to explain the proof of the truth of interpretation, especially the quasi-proof of the instinctive-practical pre-verbal operation of interpretation (Hirsch 1967: 235-244). The proof of the true interpretation depends on our knowledge of the artist's truth-conditions, which must be relative to our knowledge of the artist's spirit, his intellectual ideas and the reality he endeavors to represent in the artwork. This suggestion also shows why there can be different interpretations of the artwork's intellectual content versus its aesthetic exhibition by different viewers and readers. However, without understanding the language and knowing the truth-conditions of the author we cannot understand the artwork and judge its beauty as a true representation of reality (Gombrich 1960: 76-78). Moreover, to reach coherent interpretation we have to understand the truth-conditions of the author's artwork and we cannot reach such complicated coherence by a fabrication of truth-conditions because the indefinite possible meanings cannot be controlled.

Thus, only through the artist's truth-conditions of the created artwork can we interpret it. The aesthetic artwork must be coherent and this can be achieved only through its correspondence with reality, which in turn can be achieved only through confrontation with this reality and the specific truth-conditions of the artist as the foundation of her or his creation (Nesher 2002a: V, X). We can know that our aesthetic judgments of beauty are also the true aesthetic representation of reality, and explain it through the harmony between the intellectual ideas and the aesthetic ideas in the operation of the creation and evaluation of artworks. Thus, the artist reveals his Concept of reality in the created aesthetic outer appearance of his artwork as relating or representing reality according to his Concept of it. For Hegel the truth of an artwork is not the superficial imitation of reality, but the aesthetic exhibition of the artist's true Conception representing reality (Hegel [1835]1975: 74).

It is one thing for the artist simply to imitate the face of the sitter, its surface and external form, confronting him in repose, and quite another to be able to portray the true features which express the inmost soul of the subject. For it is throughout necessary for the Ideal that the outer form should explicitly correspond with the soul. (Hegel [1835]1975: 155-156)

Therefore, if the artist's imitation does not harmonize with his true Concept of reality, or he has no true Concept of reality but he only imitates it, then there is no true representation of reality. In both cases, there is no true representation of reality and there cannot be a production of true art, the Ideal. We can say that an artistic imitation of reality without spirit is a *kitsch* artwork, and the disharmony between the artist's concept and the aesthetic exhibition is a *false* artwork. The three stages of the complete operation of artists' aesthetic representation of reality are: (1) the Abductive discovery of the intellectual ideas referring to the creation of the artwork, (2) the Deductive interpretation of the intellectual ideas in the aesthetic ideas in creating the artwork, (3) the evaluation of beauty and truth of the artwork by proving the truth of the interpretation and representation of reality. This ascent from an instinctive reflection on our cognitive aesthetic experience to an epistemological explanation of it is the role of philosophy and other scientific inquiries (e.g., Peirce *CP*: 5.119; Nesher 2002a). The entire threefold stages of the artistic cognitive operation in creating an Artwork aesthetically representing reality are presented in figure 1.10 (p. Xx). The evaluation of the artwork determines and indicates its truth and beauty and proves the aesthetic judgment. To achieve it the artist has to prove the truth of his interpretation and this can be done only by proving that the artwork is a true representation of reality.

ARTISTIC CREATION WITH EVALUATION: BEAUTY, UGLINESS AND KITSCH

Free creation of beautiful artwork can only be accomplished by being determinate self-controlled in order to prove its true interpretation and representation of reality. The question is how the success or failure of the aesthetic exhibition can affect the beauty and truth of the artwork and what our indication for judging it is. Some philosophers emphasize the importance of art education for knowing how to experience artworks. Basically, without understanding the aesthetic language of the artist we cannot judge properly the beauty and truth of his artwork; then we can lament over why is "Venus in exile" and rejoice when we think of "beauty restored."

However, if someone should object that there exist aesthetically perfect expressions before which one feels no pleasure, and others, perhaps flawed, which yield the liveliest of pleasure, we must recommend them to pay attention, in what is aesthetic, to what is true aesthetic pleasure. This is sometimes reinforced or somewhat muddled up with pleasures arising from extraneous factors which are only contingently connected with it. (Croce [1902]1992: 89)

Moreover, it is possible that the artist errs or lies and cheats in the creation of the artwork and the reader or viewer can misunderstand or be deceived when the created artwork is either ugly and false or even kitsch and doubtful. Therefore, we have to analyze and distinguish between beautiful, ugly, and kitsch in artworks. This classification of artworks is paralleled and connected with my pragmaticist theory of truth, which we prove either as truth or falsity of our cognitions, and what we do not prove, is just doubtful (see figure 1.11, p. X).

The question is how we can know if the disharmony of the aesthetic exhibition or form of the artwork is due to the lack of aesthetic spirit, or the truth of the intellectual ideas embedded in the aesthetic exhibition, or rather refer to the artist with his intellectual idea producing an inadequate aesthetic form to represent such reality. The answer is that if we know the reality the artist represents aesthetically, the truth-conditions of his artwork, we can probe this distinction between true and false aesthetic representation of reality. However, every rational analysis of artworks starts with our experiential feelings and emotional reaction to artwork as pleasure or displeasure, but we must prove its beauty and truth rationally.

Chapter 5

How to Square (*Normo*, CP:2.7) Peirceanly the Kantian Circularity in the Epistemology of Aesthetics as a Normative Science of Creating and Evaluating the Beauty of Artworks

Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist. (Peirce *CP*: 5.525, 1905)

INTRODUCTION: KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY OF AESTHETICS AND HOW PRAGMATICISM BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM

Kantian Abyss between Rationalism and Empiricism and the Dichotomy Between Objective *Theoretical Cognitive Judgment* and Subjective *Aesthetic Reflective Judgment*

The question of this inquiry is whether Kant, with his *transcendental idealism phenomenology*, can explain *artistic aesthetic creativity* and the *aesthetic evaluation of artworks* and, if not, how can we correct him with Peircean epistemology. In his philosophical enterprise, Kant endeavors to combine *rationalism* with *empiricism*; however, instead of a fruitful synthesis, he tries to keep the main characteristics of both of them unchanged and separated (e.g., Kant 1785: Preface). This causes his system to be based on a dichotomy that cannot be solved between the *a priori* empty concepts and the empirical blind sensual intuitions, which in turn lead to the dichotomy between *theoretical cognitive judgment* and *aesthetic reflective judgment*. The former is based on *determinate* pure and *a priori* cognitive concepts and rules, and the second on *indeterminate* presentations, which I prefer to call, after Peirce,

quasi-concepts and quasi-rules or quasi-principles (cf. Kant *CJ*: #36, 288; 462-463; *CPuR*: B767; cf. #11, 221; Peirce *CP*: 5.441, 5.473, 7.444-450; 1998: 257, MS: 1900; Neshet 2002a: III, X). In the Kantian view,

A critique that precedes a science is divided into elementology and methodology. But this division is not applicable to a critique of taste, since there neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and a judgment of taste cannot be determined by means of principles. (Kant *CJ*: #60, 334-335)

The result is that only the determinate reasoning operations of judgments can be considered knowledge, whereas indeterminate presentations are only subjective feelings, and thus artistic aesthetic presentations and the judgment of taste or beauty cannot be based on any cognitive representations of the world.

Accordingly, since we cannot have rational-explicit concepts and rules to create and evaluate artworks, we cannot have a science of artistic beauty. Inasmuch as the key concept underlying aesthetic creation and its evaluation and judgment of taste is the harmony between ideas of Understanding and ideas of Imagination to determine the beauty of artworks, it remains puzzling how we cognize this harmony without any determined concepts and rules. Yet it seems that without our cognitive confrontation in reality and the evaluation of artworks according to their artists' cognitive representation of reality, Kant cannot explain how such harmony or disharmony is determined by aesthetic judgment (Neshet 2003, 2005b). This can be understood analogically to Wittgenstein's paradox of interpretation of meaning in following rules, such that if any subjective feeling of pleasure can determine beauty, then any feeling of displeasure can contradict it; therefore, a subjective feeling by itself cannot produce the intersubjective determination of beauty (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: #201; Neshet 2005a).

What I call Kant's "paradox of beauty" is due to his wrong conceptions of *knowledge* and of *aesthetic beauty* as belonging separately either to a genius creation of aesthetic artworks or to the judgment of their taste as severed from the cognitive representation of *reality*. This is like the "Liar Paradox," which comes from wrong conceptions of *Language*, *Meaning*, and *Truth* (Tarski 1944; Neshet 2002a: V). To overcome the "Paradox of Beauty," Kant had to invent a mysterious conception of "harmony" that lacks any epistemological explanation of how we cognize it (or cognize disharmony) between ideas of Understanding and ideas of Imagination when creating and evaluating artworks. By following Peircean epistemology, I will show that in creating and evaluating artworks, we are self-consciously self-controlling their aesthetic representation of external reality; only in such an operation can we distinguish the "harmony" or "disharmony" between presentations of

Understanding and Imagination in the creation and evaluation of such works. Therefore, we have to make a radical revision of the Kantian epistemology of creation and evaluation of artworks, their cognitive meanings and their truths. As Tarski suggests:

The appearance of an antinomy is for me a symptom of disease. . . . Whenever this happens, we have to submit our ways of thinking to a thorough revision, to reject some premises in which we believed or to improve some forms of argument which we use (Tarski 1969: 66).

I suggest that only by moving from the premises of Kant's Transcendental-Phenomenological *a priori* enterprise to Peirce's Pragmaticist epistemology can we overcome this Kantian dichotomy between cognitive knowledge and aesthetic beauty, and thus the "paradox of beauty" explains that theoretical cognitions and aesthetic cognitions are just two different modes of representing reality, and this holds also for the third mode, the ethical cognitions (Peirce 1998: 273-274; Neshier 1983a, 2004a).

How to Revise and Reconstruct Kantian Epistemology in Order to Explain Scientific Theories, Knowledge of the Norms of Action, and Aesthetic Epitomes as Knowledge of Human Life

There is no question about the Kantian roots of Peircean Pragmaticism. The problem is rather to inquire how Peirce developed his empirical realist philosophy with its semiotics as epistemic logic from Kantian transcendental idealism as phenomenology. My thesis is that Peirce proved that we can explain human cognitive behavior empirically without speculating on faith in the *a priori* transcendental domain separated dichotomously from the empirical sensual experience. I will show that Peirce, turning the table on Kant's Copernican Revolution, explains how we can exploit Kant's important insights into human cognitive operations in order to explain epistemologically our aesthetic, ethical, and scientific knowledge of external reality. This is in contrast to some Peircean scholars who interpret him as a neo-Kantian (e.g., Apel, Putnam, Habermas; cf. Wellmer 1991: 170ff.; Neshier 2002a: III, VIII, X, 2003, 2004b).

Indeed, one can find some Kantian elements in Peirce's discussions of aesthetics, especially in his early writings as well as in his mature philosophy, in which we can see how he revised and reconstructed his Kantian epistemological foundations. The question here is how, by following Peirce, can we revise Kant's philosophy of aesthetic artworks to understand aesthetics as a normative science and explain the creation and evaluation of artworks, their

beauty and truth? This, as I have suggested, can be done in the framework of Peircean epistemology, which we can reconstruct from his writings.

Peirce analyzes philosophy as consisting of “three grand divisions”: (1) *phenomenology* as a description of our preliminary experience; (2) the three *normative sciences, logic, ethics, and aesthetics*, which comprise the comprehensive epistemic logic of the three main human modes of representing reality: scientific theories, norms of action and moral conduct, and aesthetic epitomes as knowledge of human life—divisions that are comparable to Kant’s three Critiques; and (3) *metaphysics*, which according to Peirce is not *a priori* knowledge but, I would say, our most generalized and abstracted comprehension of Reality as distinguished from Kant’s “Metaphysics of Experience” (Paton 1936, I: 258; cf. Peirce *CP*: 5.121; Nesher 2002a: III).

The Essentials of Pragmaticist Epistemology for Bridging the Abyss between Rationalism and Empiricism, Objectivism and Subjectivism, and Creation and Evaluation

The following are the essentials of Peircean Pragmaticist epistemology, which form the basis for the revision and reconstruction of Kantian epistemology:

1. *Experience*: Every cognitive operation is based on our sensual experience through confrontation in external reality as explained in Peirce’s epistemology of perception and formalized in his Three Cotary (sharp) Propositions:
 - (a) There is nothing in the intellect that did not exist before in the sense in which *intellect* in Peirce’s understanding is “the meaning of any representation in any kind of cognition . . .”; and in *sense*, Peirce means “*in a perceptual judgment*, the starting point or first premise of all critical and controlled thinking.”
 - (b) “That perceptual judgments contain general elements, so that universal propositions are deducible from them . . .”
 - (c) “That Abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or in other words, our first premisses, the perceptual judgments are to be regarded as an extreme case of Abductive inferences, . . .” (Peirce *CP*: 5.180-181).

These basic elements of Peircean epistemology explain how, in the perceptual operation of Abductive quasi-inference, we discover genuine concepts synthesized and embedded in our perceptual judgment propositions, which form the premises of all our knowledge of reality (Nesher 1990, 2002a: II, III, X).

2. *One source of knowledge*: Peirce overturns the Kantian Copernican Revolution by explaining that our empirical experience is the only source

of our concepts and knowledge of reality. Peircean epistemology overcomes the Kantian unbridgeable abyss between empty *a priori* concepts and blind objects of sensual intuitions by explaining that our knowledge has only one source: our sensual-experiential confrontation in reality, from which our concepts and reasoning develop hierarchically.

3. *Hierarchical synthesis*: Through perceptual operation of interpreting pre-conceptual cognitive signs, the *iconic quality of feelings* and *indexical emotional reaction* are abstracted and generalized into a synthesis, which evolves into the content of our conceptual *symbolic thought* of the perceptual judgments representing external real objects (comp. Kant *CPuR*: A135-137/B174-176). The Peircean empirical synthesis of perceptual pre-conceptual components into a conceptual proposition representing reality overcomes the Kantian dichotomy between the *intellectual synthesis* of Understanding presentations and the *figurative synthesis* of the manifold intuitions of sensual presentations, which Kant endeavors to solve through his mysterious schematism (Kant *CPuR*: B151, B103-105/A77-79; A100-110, A141/B180-181; Peirce *CP*: 6.378, 1.383; Paton 1936, II: 17-78; Neshier 1983a, 1990, 2002a: II, III, V, X; Guyer 1987: #6; Kitcher 1990: 70-81).
4. *Proof of the truth of our perceptual representations*: Thus in our instinctive and practical self-consciousness and self-control of perceptual operations, we quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments as our genuine propositions and as our basic facts. Upon those facts, we prove the truth of other generalized, abstracted propositions as our theoretical representations of reality (e.g., Peirce *CP*: 5.142, 533; Neshier 2002a: X, 2002b). Yet the proof of the truth of judgments in the Peircean epistemic logic cannot consist of only one of the Kantian syllogistic inferences, which appear separately in his three Critiques; however, only their triadic sequence can work out the complete proof of the truth of any kind of judgment (e.g., Peirce *CP*: 5.145; Neshier 2002a: III, V).
5. *Subjective proof as objective truth*: Peircean epistemic logic overcomes the traditional dichotomy of subjective cognition and objective reality that makes the representation of reality impossible, thus avoiding transcendentalist or phenomenalist imprisonment within our cognitive minds. With this epistemology, we can explain how subjective, self-controlled, perceptual quasi-proof is an objective truth relative to its proof-conditions representing reality. Thus we can avoid solipsism, nihilism, skepticism, and the relativism of so-called "post-modernism" about our knowledge of reality (cf. Peirce *CP*: 5.121; Neshier 2002a: III).
6. *Norms and descriptions interwoven*: With these epistemological explanations, we can explicate the Peircean-Pragmaticist philosophy of aesthetic norms of artwork beauty and ethical norms of the right behavior with

the epistemic logic of scientific norms of truth that apply to the general theory of cognitive semiosis, encompassing the explanation of human knowledge representing reality. The interweaving of claims of facts and norms of behavior is essential to our *concrete reasonableness*, the human cognitive self-control of life in the physical and social environment (Peirce *CP*: 5.18, 1903; Neshier 1983b; comp. Putnam 2002, 2004; Habermas 2003: Ch. 5, 6).

7. *Beauty is an aesthetic true representation of reality*: Aesthetic creation is one of human modes of the cognitive representation of reality, as normatively evaluated for its truth and beauty. Hence, we can define aesthetic artworks as artistically created modes that are exhibited in epitomes, particular types of characteristics and situations representing general features of human reality. The artist, in creating and evaluating artwork, has to prove its beauty as a true aesthetic representation of reality (Neshier 2003, 2005b).

KANT'S CONCEPTIONS OF JUDGMENTS: THE LOGICAL DIVERGENCE OF THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS AND PEIRCE'S TRIO

Kant's Three Types of Judgments: Theoretical, Practical, and Aesthetic

When discussing Kant's conception of the *aesthetic judgment*, it is crucial to understand his general conception of *judgment* as the basic operation of the human cognition.

I then find that judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. (Kant, *CPuR*: B141-142)

A judgment is the presentation of the unity of the consciousness of several presentations, or the presentation of their relation so far as they make up one concept. (*Logic* [1800]: #17; cf. Peirce *EP*: 19, 191; Longuenesse 1998: 73-80)

Judgment is a function that is an act of synthesizing a number of presentations into a unity, or one common presentation as a claim (cf. Kant *CPuR*: B92-94). With this general conception of judgment, we should inquire how judgments differ according to their epistemic domains of operations (cf. Kant *CPuR*: A85/B117, B143; cf. Peirce *CP*: 2.461-516, 4.2-5; comp. Beck 1960: 128-129&n5).

Hence all our judgments can be divided, in terms of the order of the higher cognitive powers, into theoretical, *aesthetic*, and *practical* ones. But by aesthetic one I mean [here] only aesthetic judgments of reflection, which alone refer to a principle of the power of judgment, as a higher cognitive power. . . . (Kant *CJ*: First Int. VIII 226'; e.g., *CPuR*: B94, 141; cf. Peirce *CP*: 6.378)

The aesthetic judgments of reflection are *judgments of taste*, which are about the subjective feeling of beauty by itself; not representing any object or property, it thus is distinguished from the *aesthetic judgments of sense*, which are about the agreeable and are interested in the existence of some object. However, in all of these three kinds of judgments, *theoretical*, *aesthetic*, and *practical*, we consciously reflect on our operations to feel the relationship among their different operated presentations (cognitions). It is a reflection that does not deal with the objects themselves. Rather, its function is to compare and detect the *agreement* and *conflict*, or the *harmony* and *dis-harmony* between the given presentations of our cognitive powers, Reason, Understanding, and Imagination, in order to perform *affirmative* or *negative* judgments in their epistemically different domains (Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: #6, *CPuR*: B316-324, *CPrR*: 105-106, 124-125, 160, 60-70; *CJ*: 220').

Deliberation (reflexio) does not deal with objects themselves in order to obtain concepts from them straightforwardly, but is our state of mind when we first set about to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we can arrive at concepts. It is our consciousness of the relation of the given presentations to our various sources of cognition—the consciousness through which alone the relation of these presentations to one another can be determined correctly. (Kant *CPuR*: B316; cf. B317-324, A85/B117, B143)

The Kantian distinction between transcendental and aesthetic kinds of judgments is that we do not have determined rules and concepts in *aesthetic reflective judgment*, and thus we cannot determine our cognitive operations as representations of objects. We only reflect to compare the relationship of presentations of Imagination and Understanding as components of the power of judgment, and thus we feel the pleasure or displeasure that Kant assumes for them because of the harmony or disharmony between the presentations of these cognitive faculties. Yet the distinction between *transcendental judgment* and *reflective aesthetic judgment* also lies in their epistemic structures.

Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is *determinative* (even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must be met

for subsumption under that universal to be possible. But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is only *reflective*. (Kant *CJ*: 179)

Hence, both the *theoretical judgment of knowledge of nature* and the *practical judgment of moral law* have transcendental a priori, pure rules and concepts, whereas the *aesthetic reflective judgment of taste* operates without such rules and concepts and can be explained only by empirical psychology or by analogy with other judgments about the cognitive relationship between Imagination and Understanding (cf. Kant *CJ*: First Introduction: X, 237'-238', #17, 233-236). Both the *theoretical judgment (of knowledge of nature)* and the *moral practical judgment (of morality)* are determinate operations of Reason but in different capacities and, therefore, with different logical-epistemic operations (cf. Kant *CPuR*: A135/B174). The *theoretical judgment* of Pure Reason has to bridge the abyss between the Transcendental universals and the sensual particulars, whereas the *moral judgment* of Practical Reason is entirely within the Suprasensible realm. Kant explains the difference between the *theoretical judgment of knowledge of nature* and the *practical judgment of moral law* in terms of the logical-epistemological operational relationship between *a priori principles* and *concepts* and *sensible objects* (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 16, 42; *CJ*: 355-356). On this distinction, Beck writes: "But though formally similar, the two syllogisms are quite different in their epistemic or transcendental function" (Beck 1960: 128-129).

Beck analyzes the different functions of the faculty of judgment in two different domains of human cognitions, the theoretical and the practical; however, the aesthetic is also crucial. The differences among these three types of judgments are not only in their epistemic or transcendental functions, but also in their formal structures, in the syllogistic procedures by which judgments should be proved (cf. Kant *CPuR*: B360-366; Beck, 1960: 154 & n56 & Ch. IX #10). Since every cognition in Pragmaticist epistemology is a representation of reality, of both physical and psychological realities, there is no distinction between aesthetic reflective judgment, on the one hand, and theoretical and practical judgments, on the other. In all three types of representations, it is through reflections, whether instinctive, practical, or rational, that we self-consciously determinately self-control our minds' operations (cf. Peirce 5.119; Neshier 1990, 2002a: II, III, 2004b).

The Structures of the Three Kantian Types of Judgments, and Their Applications

Hence, we can interpolate these three types of judgments into the Peircean three basic kinds of inferences, Abduction, Deduction, and Induction.

Abduction:	Deduction:	Induction:
C	$A \rightarrow C$	A
$\frac{A \rightarrow C}{A}$	$\frac{A}{C}$	$\frac{C}{A \rightarrow C}$
A = universal concept, "case" (CPuR: A135/B174).	C = particular "result," an abstract object	A \rightarrow C = "rule" of subsumption of object under concept

Figure 5.1 The three Kantian types of judgments interpreted into Peircean three basic inferences.

Accordingly, *reflective aesthetic judgment* is Abductive inference, when "the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it" (Kant *CJ*: 179). *Practical moral judgment* is a Deductive inference, when "starting from principles, proceed to concepts [of abstract particulars] and only then, if possible, from these to the senses" (Kant *CPrR*: 16). And *theoretical judgment* is Inductive inference, when "an object is subsumed under a concept," such that "*pure concepts of understanding* to be applied to appearances" (Kant *CPuR*: B176-177). These three types of inferences are just the three arranged possibilities of the three components of the logical syllogisms: the rule $A \rightarrow C$, the case concept A, and the result C as in the following figure (Peirce *CP*: 2.461-516, 2.619-644, 5.318ff., 8.209; Nesher 1983a: 226ff., 1990:14-17, 2002a: II, III; Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: ##56-74, *CPuR*: A306/B363):

The *first type* of judgment, of the First Critique, is Kant's *theoretical judgments*, basically experiential judgments, in which the Inductive inference of judgments operates on Understanding concepts to subsume under them the sensual Intuitions of the Objects, if there is harmony, or *homogeneity*, between them (Kant *CPuR*: B84-105, B316ff., *CPuR*: A181, *Logic*[1800]: #84; Paton 1936 II: 66ff., 82).

Whenever an object is subsumed under a concept, the presentation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept; i.e., the concept must contain what is presented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. For this is precisely what we mean by the expression that an object is contained under the concept. . . . How, then, can an intuition be subsumed under a category, and hence how can a category be *applied* to appearances . . . Now this question, natural and important as it is, is in fact the cause that necessitates a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment. The doctrine is needed, viz., in order to show how it is possible for *pure concepts of understanding* to be applied to appearances as such. . . . Now clearly there must be something that is third, something that must be homogeneous with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other hand, and that thus makes possible the application of the category to appearance. This mediating presentation must be both *intellectual*, on one hand, and *sensible*, on the other hand. Such a presentation is the *transcendental schema*. (Kant *CPuR*: A 137-138/B 176-177)




Figure 5.2 Inductive evaluation of the harmony (or disharmony) relationship for the subsumption of the object of intuition under the concept of understanding.

However, not only can the concepts apply to objects by being schematized, but also their appearances can be unified in one presentation of intuition by the act of *synthesis of apprehension* through imagination; they are thus schematized into an object in order to be subsumed under the schematized concepts. According to Kant, "appearances must consequently be subsumed not under the categories taken absolutely, but only under their schemata" (Kant *CPuR*: A181; cf. A135-137/B174-176, A140-147; Paton, 1936, I: 260-261, II: 82; Guyer, 1987: 162-166).

Thus the judgment of understanding is not the "pure kind," the First Figure of syllogism; that is, it is not a formal deductive inference, but rather an inferential evaluation of the possible subsumption of the object of intuition under the concept of understanding (cf. Kant *Logic*, [1762]1963: 84, 91-95). This inference evaluates whether there is *homogeneity* between the schematized form of a concept and the sensual matter of intuition. The entire procedure has the epistemic-logic structure of Peircean Inductive inference, which evaluates the truth of "the application of the category to appearance" (Kant *CPuR*: A138). However, the Kantian difficulty is whether the transcendental power of judgment can synthesize the a priori pure concepts and experiential sensual objects and how their respective schemata can be compared, while they belong dichotomously to different sources of cognition. How can we know the respective schemata without having the empirical experience of the specific properties of objects? Moreover, how can the Imagination compare two severed types of schemata, the theoretical and the sensual, in order to compose a determinate judgment? The Peircean empirical solution to this predicament is that these schemata originate in our experience, and without this common source our concepts would remain empty and our sensual intuitions haphazard, without any coherence. The synthesis in judgment, similar to the Kantian development of empirical concepts, evolves *hierarchically* in the experiential process of perceptual operation from *Pre-verbal* Sensori-motoric Signs of *Feeling* and *Reaction* as the *Meaning-contents* synthesize into verbal Perceptual Judgment *Propositional Thought representing Reality* (see figure 1.7, p. X). As can be seen in figure 1.7, the Iconic sign presents the Feeling of the Object and the Indexical sign presents the Reaction to

existence of this Object, and the Symbolic sign presents their synthesis in Thought (this referring to Object by law), which sequentially represents the Real Object.

With this analysis of the hierarchical evolvment of propositions, it can be shown that only by abstraction we can separate the *symbolic* general structure as the verbal *form* of the proposition from its experienced *meaning-content*. Thus *form* and *content* cannot be separated and still constitute the human cognitive signs of perception representing reality (comp. Kant *CPuR*: A19-22). Our pre-verbal, initially vague, sensual intuitions as feelings and the emotional reaction interpretation are not blind; but the empirical content, when synthesized in the symbolic proposition, becomes clear and distinct as a quasi-proved, true representation of external objects. Thus we avoid the Kantian dichotomy between *empty concepts* and *blind objects of intuitions* that characterize his two severed components of human knowledge (cf. Kant *CPuR*: A50-52, A19-21, A84-86; Peirce *CP*: 5.142; Nesher 2002a: III, V, X).

The *second type* of judgment, of the Second Critique, is Deductive inference of the *moral practical judgments* of action, which can appear as the propositional judgment, “This [conduct] is Right” or “Do the C, the particular *result*.” However, its entire structural operation is more complicated when Kant assumes the *supreme condition-imperative* of Practical Moral Law of Pure Practical Reason, which he calls “the categorical imperative,” to which Practical Moral Laws are subordinate. The form of this *moral practical judgment* is syllogistic inference, such that imperative Moral Action is validly inferred from the Moral Principle and the Concept of its Moral Action as the object to be operated in our moral conduct (Kant *CPrR*: 46; Paton 1947: 157-164).

For since it is *pure reason* that is here considered in its practical use, and hence considered commencing from a priori principles and not from empirical determining bases, the division of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason will have to turn out similar to that of syllogism [‘inference of reason’]: viz., proceeding from the universal in the *major premise* (the moral principle), by a subsumption—undertaken in the *minor premise*—of possible actions (as good or evil ones) under the major premise, to the *conclusion*, viz., the subjective determination of the will (an interest in the practically possible good and the maxim based on this interest). (Kant *CPrR*: 90)

It is here, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, that the conception of “inference of reason” meets the conception of formal deduction, its “pure kind,” the First Figure or *modus ponens* Syllogism. In this logical-epistemic operation, the basic premise from which Moral Judgment is inferred is Moral Law, which is presumed to be without any justification as an axiom or the

“fact of Pure Reason” (Kant *CPrR*: 31). Thus, its inferred conclusion, the Moral Action imperative itself, is validated in this entire sequence of rational reasoning (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 67-71-89; 1785: VI, 211-213; *CJ*: 222; *Logic* [1800]1974: #36).

As regards practical Reason, the case is quite different [from theoretical Reason]. For what is first given to us is the universal law of morality, which commands that our actions should be determined by it alone. It such appears that in the moral law we have that complete determination of particulars by universals which pure Reason demands. (Cassirer 1938: 70)

The epistemological function of relating particulars to universals is different in theoretical Reason from that in practical Reason: the former *subsumes* sensual particulars under universal concepts, while the latter *subordinates* suprasensual particulars under such universal rule. Hence, the logics of these inferences of judgments, Induction and Deduction, respectively, are also different (Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: Appendix).

Now since the concepts of good and evil, as consequence of the a priori determination of the will, presuppose also a pure practical principle and hence a causality of pure reason, they do not (as, say, determinations of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness) refer originally to objects as do pure concepts of understanding or categories of reason used theoretically, but they rather presuppose these objects as given. (Kant *CPrR*: 65)

The formal procedure of inferring pure practical judgment of morality contains as its components the pure practical principle of reason, the concepts of good and evil action, and only the possibility of action as an abstract object given by understanding for theoretical judgment. Thus the formal procedure determining the practical judgment of morality is that of *deductive inference* resulting in the formal possibility of an action as the object intended or desired by the pure will (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 68-71; Beck, 1960:128-136). The operation




Figure 5.3 Deductive inference of a particular moral action from the formal necessity of a practical moral law and its universal moral principle.

of Pure Practical Reason in the inference of Moral judgment implies that “the moral law is in fact a law of causality through freedom, and hence a law of possibility of a suprasensible nature” (Kant *CPPr*: 47) and from this law and its concept of moral action of the possible abstract particular moral action is deduced apodictically.

The Particular Moral Action (e.g., “Tell the Truth!”) can be a Moral Judgment only if it is proved or inferred from Moral Principle and the Concept of Moral Action. (cf. Beck 1960: #VI). The question is how do we know that the moral law commanding us to tell the truth and not to lie is morally valid (cf. Paton 1947: 137-139, #6)? “Direct intuition” of the validity or truth of a particular moral judgment is impossible, since neither sensual nor intellectual intuition can work in pure practical judgments (Paton 1947: 120-128). Kant understands that the systematic harmony of purposes in society should be the criterion or the evidence for a moral law to be valid or true as a Subordinate Practical Moral Law that is applied from the Supreme Condition-Imperative of a Practical Moral Law (Paton 1947: 156-157; Kant *CPPr*: 109-110, 145-146). What, though, is the validity of the Pure Moral Principle and how is the Moral imperative connected to it?

With pure practical judgment the problem is more difficult, since the law is the law of reason, not of understanding, and no intuition can be adequate to it. We can never be sure, in any experience, whether the full terms of the moral law have been observed (Beck 1960: 156).

If we cannot, then, theoretically or rationally prove or deduce-justify the universal condition of the moral law as the categorical imperative, how should we understand that it is established “on its own?” The moral law cannot establish itself, since it is a *synthetic* proposition, not an *analytic* one. It also cannot do so by “the deduction of freedom as the causality of pure reason,” because moral law should have reality in order to justify freedom, while freedom itself has no previous reality, only its possibility through speculative reason. Kant claims that moral law, by being cognized as obligatory by rational beings, proves the actuality of the unconditioned freedom of their moral practical reason. And yet the problem is, how do such beings “cognize this law as obligating for them?” This remains enigmatic in the Kantian epistemology of human moral behavior if “no experience is able to prove it” and if it is severed from any “empirically support,” and its contention that this moral law itself, with its principle, “needs no justifying grounds” can be explained by the presence of some inscrutable cognitive operations, some non-rational procedures to cognize the moral laws and their obligatory nature (Kant *CPPr*: 47; cf. Beck 1960:167-168).

The consciousness of this basic law may be called a fact of reason, because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason—e.g., from the conscious of freedom (for this is not antecedently given to us)—and because, rather, it thrusts itself upon us on its own as a synthetic a priori proposition not based on any intuition, whether pure or empirical (Kant *CPrR*: 31).

We can understand the status of *fact* as the basic assumption accepted without any rational proof from other assumptions. The question is, how is it accepted? We can explain that the Moral Principle and the Moral Concept develop in our moral experience with the social behavior of humans in their society, and their combination constitutes the Moral Law which form the major assumption for deducing the possible Moral Act (cf. Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: #33). Yet, assuming or accepting the reality of the moral law cannot be done circularly as Kant seems to do (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 42-50; Beck 1960: X#2; Scherer 1995: #5.3). Moreover, even if we assume the reality of the Practical Moral Law of Pure Reason, we do not have any judgment that can be synthesized from the Pure Practical Law of Reason and from a particular sensible action in the world to obligate moral action (cf. Cassirer 1938: 73-78). Since, according to Kant, we cannot represent Moral actions in the world as physical events only by the concepts of Pure Practical Reason, we must have recourse to the concepts of Understanding, which can represent such moral factual events (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 67-68; Paton 1947:158-160). The question is whether Understanding can mediate the supersensible concept of moral action with the sensible action-event? But this means that with Understanding's Induction, we will have to evaluate empirically the truth of the Moral Concept and Laws, of the alleged Pure Practical Reason, as is suggested in Peircean epistemology (cf. Cassirer 1938: 74; Neshar 2004b, 2005c). Hence, the proof, or the quasi-proof, of the truth of Moral Laws and their actionable application can be achieved only by our empirical knowledge of human nature and the social behavior of humans in their society (Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: #33). The way to solve this predicament is to prove the truth of Moral Practical Laws; their imperative abstract actions in the sensual world will then be applied by Abductive discovering, Deductive inferring, and evaluating Inductively the truth, and thus the reality, of these laws and their application in the empirical world (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 29-30). In this manner, we overcome the dichotomy between the supranatural world of freedom and the natural world of determinism and we understand freedom Spinozistically as a person's internal determination through self-conscious and self-controlled conduct according to the psychological and physical laws of nature (cf. Neshar 1999).

The *third type* of judgment, of the Third Critique, is the Abductive inference of *reflective judgments of taste*, whose validity is different from both

the Inductive and the Deductive inferences of judgments of the First and the Second Critiques, respectively.

The power of judgment is twofold, either *determinative* or *reflective*. The former proceeds from the *universal* to the *particular*, the latter from the *particular* to the *general*. The latter has only *subjective* validity, for the general to which it proceeds is *empirical* generality only—a mere analogon of the logical (Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: #81; cf. ##82-84).

What Peirce calls Abductive inference of discovery, Kant and the entire tradition that followed call Inductive inference “in proceeding from the particular to the general in order to draw general judgment from experience—hence not *a priori* ([but] *empirically*) general judgment . . .” (Kant *Logic* [1800]1974: #84).

Every empirical [judgment with a-DN] concept requires three acts of the spontaneous cognitive power: (1) *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) of the manifold of intuition; (2) *comprehension* of this manifold, i.e., synthetic unity of the consciousness of this manifold, in the concept of an object (*apperception comprehensiva*); (3) exhibition (*exhibition*), in intuition, of the object corresponding to this concept. For the first of this act we need imagination; for the second, understanding; for the third, judgment, which would be determinative judgment if we are dealing with an empirical concept. (Kant *CJ*: 220’)

This, according to Kant, is also the structural operation of aesthetic judgment, though in a different mode of presentation and with a different epistemic function (e.g., Kant *CJ*: 179). In the aesthetic mode of reflective judgment, we only feel the relation between the cognitive presentations of Imagination and Understanding and synthesize them like animals, without any explicit rules and concepts (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction, 211’). The following is the scheme of the abductive inference of indeterminate reflective judgment of taste:

By operating the Abductive Quasi-Rules on the Form of Object as Quasi-Concept, the experience of Pleasure/Displeasure with the Quasi-Object




Figure 5.4 Abductive inference of indeterminate reflective judgment of taste.

suggests Subjective Aesthetic Judgment. We consciously reflect our free play between Imagination comprehending the Feeling-Object and Understanding apprehending the Form of Object when comparing their relationship. The harmony or disharmony arouses a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and then the object is called beautiful (in the former case) in the reflective judgment of taste (cf. Kant *CJ*: 189-190, 222).

The problem concerns the cognitive *validity* of the reflective judgments of taste, since the only criterion the beauty of the artworks depends on the subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which can differ for different persons and even change for the same person in different situations, unless we have some objective criterion of the truth of aesthetic judgments. To overcome this difficulty, we have to understand judgment of taste of artwork as human discovery, creation, and the evaluation of its ideas and of their aesthetic representation of independent reality. In this way, we overcome Kant's conception of the subjectivity of aesthetic judgment of artworks.

Why Kant Cannot Prove the Truth of Judgments in His Three Critiques: The Peircean Solution

According to Peircean epistemic-logic, only a sequence of the three basic types of judgments of the three Critiques can operate a complete procedure to prove their truths. Since Kant separates them, he cannot prove any one of the three types of judgment of his Critiques. Hence, without any epistemological explanation, Kant attempts to *justify-deduce* each basic type of judgments by itself; he must, therefore, presuppose [1] *a priori* concepts of Understanding from nowhere, [2] pure principles of Reason based on faith, and [3] Imagination as subjective feeling of pleasure, as they respectively belong to the different faculties of the mind. Kant's predicament is that none of his three types of inference of judgments can operate by itself to prove true judgments. Indeed, neither the inference of theoretical judgments nor that of the aesthetic reflective judgment of taste is of the general-formal logic of Deduction, since the first is operated by *Transcendental* Logic and the second by empirical indeterminate quasi-rules and quasi-concepts (Kant *CJ*: 214, Logic [1800]1974: #I). However, the sequence of all three essential inferences of human cognitive operations can be formulated in Peircean epistemic-logic as the *trio* of the Abductive Logic of Discovery, the Deductive Logic of Consistency, and the Inductive Logic of Evaluation. This *trio* is the complete proof of either the theoretical, moral, or aesthetic judgments when confronted with the reality represented by these judgments in their different epistemic domains (cf. Peirce e.g., *CP*:5.145, 7.672; Neshier 1983a, 2002b). What Kant considers the "Logic of Truth," the formal Deductive inference, cannot be a complete proof of the truth of its judgments, since it is isolated

from confrontation in reality and cannot formally prove the truth of the axioms, it's *a priori principles*, and cannot formally evaluate their *conclusions* (cf. Peirce CP:5.121-126; Neshier 1999, 2002a: III, V, X). Hence, Truth remains an empty conception of the consistency of Thought with itself. We cannot even know how to decide about this self-consistency, since we cannot prove the truth of the principles of this Logic of Truth.

Neither of these rules [of deductive syllogisms] is capable of proof. For a proof is only possible by means of one or more rational inferences; hence an attempt to prove the supreme formula of all ratiocination would be to reason in a circle. (Kant *Logic* [1762]1963: #II)

This is so since, by itself, the Rational Formal-Logic of Deduction cannot prove the truth of its principles, axioms, and conclusions (cf. Gödel 1930; Hintikka 2000; Peirce CP: 5.121-126, 5.142; Neshier 2002a: Intr., V, 2007a). "But formal logic must not be too purely formal; it must represent a fact of psychology, or else it is in danger of generating into a mathematical recreation" (Peirce CP: 2.710).

Only the entire *trio* sequence of Abduction, Deduction, and Induction, with its Material Logic components, can provide the complete proof of the Truth of human cognitions, which must originate from our pre-Rational operations in order to quasi-prove Conceptual Judgments (cf. Peirce CP: 5.121-126, 143-145). For this enterprise, however, Kant had to dispose of his transcendental assumptions and change his conception of empirical knowledge (e.g., Kant *CPrR*: 45-46). His three types of judgments could then operate human cognitive representations of physical, mental, and social reality and show how human knowledge and behavior can be possible in the different realms of Kant's three Critiques (comp. Kant *CPrR*: 91, *CPuR*: A10-16/B24-30).

where \Rightarrow is the *plausibility connective* suggesting the concept or theory A, \longrightarrow is the *necessity connective* deducing the abstract object or fact C, and $\approx\Rightarrow$ is the *probability connective* evaluating the relation of the concept/theory A to the new experience of objects or proved facts C. (On facts, see Neshier 2002a: X). Yet, to explain scientific, moral, and aesthetic human knowledge as determinative, the complete cognitive operation of the *trio* must work on different levels of self-consciousness and degrees of self-control, from instinctive and practical quasi-proofs to the rational proofs of the truth of judgments in these different domains (cf. Peirce CP: 5.121, 143-146; Neshier 2002a).

Abduction ($C^{Ab}(A \rightarrow C) \Rightarrow A^{Ab}$) + Deduction ($(A \rightarrow C)A \rightarrow C^{Dd}$) + Induction ($(A, C^{In}) \approx\Rightarrow (A \rightarrow C)$)

Figure 5.5 The complete cognitive operation is the sequence of the Trio of Abduction, Deduction, and Induction.

According to Peirce, the three normative sciences -- *logic*, which aims at Truth; *ethics*, at Right; and *aesthetics*, at Beauty -- belong to the second of the three grand divisions of philosophy (Peirce *CP*: 5.121). In Peircean Pragmatism, we can overcome not only Cartesian epistemological difficulties but also the Humean dichotomy of *is*-descriptive and *ought*-normative cognitions, which Kant accepted into his transcendental idealism. Pragmaticistically, every cognitive operation consists of descriptive and normative elements, which genuinely comprise both the rules of habit in our perceptual operation and rational norms, as imperatives embedded in every rational judgment, including scientific theories (cf. Neshier 1983a: 218-234, 1983b, 1990, 1994, 1999, 2004b; comp. Putnam 1995: 72-74, 2002, 2004).

Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood. (Peirce *CP*: 5.18, 1903)

With Pragmaticist epistemology, every cognitive human operation can be explained as an entanglement of both the descriptive and normative components enabling humans to represent and act in their physical and psychical-social reality; thus they evolve themselves through rational self-control in their environment.

The pragmaticist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be *destined* ["habits of conduct" as well as true beliefs (5.430)], which is what we strive to express in calling them *reasonable*. In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for making the rational purport to be general. (Peirce *CP*: 5.433, 1905; cf. 5.3)

Employing this perspective, we can see that the Peircean three normative sciences, as types of cognitive conduct, are different modes of representing reality: Aesthetical, Ethical, and Logical; their true representation is essential for our self-controlling in our reality (Peirce *CP*: 5.18; *TEP2*: 273-274; Potter 1967: 36; Hudson 1969; Searle 1969; Putnam 2004; Neshier 1983b, 2007a).

The work of the poet or novelist is not utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in the pronouncing them

beautiful, which, if it is not exactly the same as saying the synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind. (Peirce *CP*: 1.383; cf. 2.200, 5.152)

And yet, for a complete cognitive proof, we confront reality by Abductive-discovered cognitions, Deductive-consistent elaborations, and their Inductive evaluation. This enables us to justify cognitive proofs without any need to justify any *a priori* concepts, principles, and rules (cf. Kant *CPrR*: 66; Peirce *CP*: 5.121-126). Indeed Kant also aspires to this complete systematic unity of the cognitions of human reason.

For someone who has been able to convince himself of the propositions occurring in the Analytic, such comparisons [between reason in its theoretical and in its practical use—D.N.] will be gratifying; for they rightly prompt the expectation of perhaps being able some day to attain insight to unity of the entire pure power of reason (theoretical as well as practical) and to derive everything from one principle—this being the unavoidable need of human reason, which finds full satisfaction only in complete systematic unity of its cognitions (Kant *CPrR*: 90-91; cf. *CPuR*: A304-305; *CJ*: #5, 209n19, #8, 215).

A solution for Kant's expectation of the unity of human reason (or better, of the human cognitive mind) so as to explain how "to derive everything from one principle" can be seen in the Peircean *Trio*. With this *epistemic-logic*, it is possible to explain human cognition in all of its uses—let us say, after Kant, "the theoretical, practical, and aesthetic"—and we can then avoid Kant's need for *a priori* pure reason and turn to an empirical explanation of human knowledge and behavior (cf. Peirce *CP*: 5.121-126). According to the Peircean epistemic-logic of the cognitive mind's representation of reality, the judgments of all normative sciences, logic, ethics, and aesthetics are representations that are formed in opposition to the Humean-Kantian tradition, which was followed by modern and contemporary philosophy (e.g., Putnam 2002, 2004). Though every cognitive representation of reality is of the category of Thirdness, the normative sciences differ in their modes of representation: the *aesthetics—qualities of feeling beauty* is the Firstness of Thirdness; *ethics—aiming to the right action*, the Secondness of Thirdness; and the *logic-proof of true representation*, the Thirdness of Thirdness (cf. Peirce *CP*: 5.120-150). The three normative sciences share these same three components, but there is *one predominate component* in each of the normative sciences (cf. Peirce *CP*: 5.112; 5.129-150; 1.575; 2.7; Feibelman 1945: 391ff). Hence, aesthetic beautiful epitomes, ethical right norms, and logical true thoughts are proved as true representations of reality in order to elaborate our knowledge as *concrete reasonableness* aimed at self-control in our environmental-reality.

When one deals with Aesthetic knowledge, the sensual feeling of Firstness of Thirdness is the basis of the aesthetic imaginative *representation* of reality in creation and experience. By itself, however, it cannot compose the aesthetic science, since without action of *creation*, the Secondness of Thirdness, and without the logic of *evaluation* of its truth and beauty, the Thirdness of Thirdness, there can be no such science (cf. Peirce *EPII*: #20, 273-274, *CP*: 5.128-136, 5.551, 2.135-139, 2.303). Our issue is Kant's aesthetic theory of taste and beauty of artworks, and so we now turn to his epistemology of aesthetic experience (cf. Kant *CPuR*: B316ff.).

THE KANTIAN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN *THEORETICAL [LOGICAL]* AND *AESTHETIC [REFLECTIVE]* JUDGMENTS AND THE PEIRCEAN ALTERNATIVE

Kant on *Theoretical [Logical]* and *Aesthetic [Reflective]* Judgments

According to Kant, only theoretical-scientific cognitions can be considered as knowledge. The reason is that judgments of taste, either sensually agreeable or aesthetically beautiful, are not conceptual judgments about the objects themselves, and therefore they cannot be knowledge representing them (cf. Kant *CJ*: 213-214).

A critique that precedes a science is divided into elementology and methodology. But this division is not applicable to a critique of taste, since there neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and a judgment of taste cannot be determined by means of principles. (Kant *CJ*: 354-355)

Hence, the reason that there cannot be a science of the beautiful is that we cannot have a scientific explanation of the creation and evaluation of artworks, since no concept can encompass aesthetic ideas, and no rational rules can comprise a method of artistic creation and the evaluation of fine arts (Kant *CJ*: #60). The key notions of Kant's analysis of this dichotomy between the theoretical judgment of Understanding and the aesthetic reflective Judgment of taste are, respectively, those between *lawfulness* and *non-lawfulness*, *purposiveness* and *purposiveness without purpose*, and *non-free play* (*determined* under a rule) and *free play* (*non-determined* under a rule) (Kant *CJ*: 240-242, #36; cf. Meerbote 1984).

For every art presupposes rules, which serve as the foundation on which a product, if it is to be called artistic, is thought of as possible in the first place. On the

other hand, the concept of fine art does not permit a judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule whatsoever that has a *concept* as its determining basis, i.e., the judgment must not be based on a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Hence fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product. Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must be nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his powers) that gives the rule to art; in other words, fine art is possible only as the product of genius (Kant *CJ*: 307).

In regard to fine arts, it seems that in order to explain how we can have our non-rational subjective aesthetic experience of pleasure and displeasure, Kant understands indeterminate free play in creating and evaluating artworks to be indeterminate by rules and concepts (cf. Kant *CJ*: 241). This understanding of fine arts reinforces the dichotomy between the imaginative free creation of artistic artwork and the lawful strict rationality of scientific reasoning (cf. Kant *CJ*: 219, #35; Trans. Intr.: lx-lxi). Indeed, this dichotomy echoes in the contemporary controversy between two Kantian traditions as the “scientism” of Analytic Philosophy and the “artism” of Philosophical Hermeneutics. Pragmaticist epistemology, whose aim is to explain human knowledge of reality, takes an intermediate route between these two extreme and sterile epistemologies as I will show below (cf. Neshier 2002a: III, 2003, 2004a).

That is precisely why the aesthetic universality we attribute to judgment must be of a special kind; for although it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the *object*, considered in its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the entire sphere of *judging persons*. (Kant *CJ*: #8, 215)

However, although grammatically “beautiful” as a predicate takes the place of empirical concepts of objects, as in perceptual judgments, in Kantian aesthetics it predicates only our subjective feeling in regard to objects but in special relation to them (Kant *CJ*: ##36-38). Kant tries to show that this subjective feeling of pleasure in aesthetic reflection is universal and objective because of the principle of harmony between imagination and understanding as the criterion of aesthetic pleasure and the taste of beauty of the form of an object.

. . . for beauty is not a concept of an object, and a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment. All it asserts is that we are justified in presupposing universally in all people the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; apart from this it asserts only that we have subsumed the given object correctly under these conditions. It is true that this latter assertion involves unavoidable difficulties that do not attach to the logical power

of judgment since there we subsume under concepts, whereas in the aesthetic power of judgment we subsume under a relation of imagination and understanding, as they harmonize with each other in the presented form of an object, that can only be sensed, so that the subsumption may easily be illusory [*trügen*]. But this does not in any way detract from the legitimacy of the power of judgment's claim in counting on universal assent, a claim that amounts to no more than this: that the principle of judging validity for everyone from subjective bases is correct. For as far as the difficulty and doubt concerning the correctness of the subsumption under that principle is concerned, no more doubt is cast on the legitimacy of the claim that aesthetic judgments as such have this validity (and hence is cast on the principle itself), than is cast on the principle of the logical power of judgment (a principle that is objective) by the fact that [sometimes] (though not so often and so easily) this power's subsumption under its principle is faulty as well (Kant *CJ*: #38, 290-291).

The question is how a person who feels an aesthetic pleasure knows that it is due to the harmony between imagination and understanding, and what about different persons who feel different pleasures in reflecting upon the same artwork object? In order that the judgment of taste be universal, it has to have some external restriction according to which two persons can compare their judgments. Alternatively, we can understand our reflective subjective feelings epistemologically, i.e., that they function like what Frege calls our strong feeling of the "real assertive force" of perceptual judgment (Frege 1918). This is an indication of its truth, and therefore the predicate "beautiful" operates like the predicate "true" to indicate our special relationship to the representation of objects without being their representation (cf. Kant *Logic* [1800]1974, Introduction: #VII). The question about this special relationship with the representation of artworks is how and what does the predicate "beautiful" indicate as a cognitive representation? According to Kant, aesthetic reflective judgment of taste cannot indicate any kind of knowledge of objects, only our subjective feeling of pleasure with respect to them (cf. Kant *CJ*: 242).

As for the object-artwork, the question is not only our reflective relation to this object by itself, but also our understanding that this object-artwork is itself the artistic representation of something else: the reality represented aesthetically. Thus, the explanation of beauty of such artwork cannot be separated from its function in representing the artist's physical and human reality. Therefore, the question about this representation concerns the function of the aesthetic reflection in the creation and evaluation of artwork as representing reality, and how do the aesthetic pleasure or displeasure and the predicate beautiful or ugly, expressing this feeling, is indicated in this representation. However, if the artistic artwork is a cognitive aesthetic representation of reality and, given such a function, pleasure and beauty indicate some properties

of that representation, the Kantian dichotomy between determination of the cognitive theoretical judgment and the indeterminate reflective judgment of aesthetics is dissolved.

Kant's antinomy of *determination* and *freedom* is based on his conception of mechanistic natural determination and that of spontaneous human moral freedom from nowhere and the freedom of productive imagination in aesthetic creation and the evaluation of artworks (cf. Roberts 2004: 309-310). In Peircean-Pragmaticist terms, this is the distinction between scientific rational self-controlled operations and habitual pre-rational cognitive operations, which are instinctively and practically self-controlled. Since Kant cannot explain the low degrees of self-controlled cognitive operation as performing different kinds of knowledge, he attributes it to the mysterious nature of the unique subject he calls genius. Yet the Pragmaticist conception of artistic freedom in the creation and evaluation of artworks is not in opposition to natural determination; it is the inner determination of the agent or the artist on different levels of self-consciousness and degrees of self-control—instinctive, practical, and rational—according to the laws of mind, and in this conception the antagonistic dichotomy between scientific and artistic knowledge disappears.

The Reflective Manner (*modus aestheticus*) of Aesthetics and Method (*modus logicus*) of Science

According to Kant, rules are conceptual and we follow them only rationally. The abyss between the operations of imagination and understanding and between artistic and scientific discovery and evaluation keeps both enterprises epistemologically inexplicable. The reason is that scientific inquiries start with our pre-conceptual perceptual operations, whereas artists cannot create fine art works without intellectual ideas; neither can they be explained without following our cognitive rules at different levels of self-consciousness and degrees of self-control. However, Kant's transcendental idealism hinders him from elaborating a unified epistemic logic of cognitions that are applicable to different normative sciences.

Whenever we convey our thoughts, there are two ways (*modi*) of arranging them, and one of them is called *manner* (*modus aestheticus*), the other *method* (*modus logicus*); the difference between these two is that the first has no standard other than the *feeling* that there is unity in the exhibition [of the thought], whereas the second follows in [all of] this determinate *principles*; hence only the first applies to fine art. (Kant *CJ*: 318-319)

This dichotomy between the *logical method* of science operating according to *determinate rules* and the *reflective manner* of art, of *free play*, is

the philosophical source of the abyss between contemporary philosophical “scientism” and “artism”; this deep gap eliminates the possibility of explaining epistemologically not only the creation and evaluation of artwork and its beauty, but also the truth of scientific theories. The question is, how can we understand these constitutive notions of Kant’s aesthetic theory? I argue that all these dichotomies are based on the distinction between rational reasoning of Understanding and the empirical pre-conceptual experience as the productive operation of Imagination (cf. Kant *CJ*: #35, 287).

As far as *empirical judgments have universal validity* they are JUDGMENTS OF EXPERIENCE; but those *that are valid only subjectively* I call mere JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION. The latter require no pure concept of understanding, but only the logical connection of the perceptions in a thinking subject. Judgments of experience, on the other hand, require in addition to the presentation of sensible intuition, special *concepts produced originally in the understanding*. And it is this concept that makes the judgment of experience *valid objectively*. (Kant [1782]1950 *Prolegomena*: 45-46; cf. *CPuR*:A120, 374, B422n., *Logic* [1800]1974: #40)

In both these domains, the operator of such operations is a rule of the faculty of Judgment, which in the first domain is *determinate (logical) judgment* of the knowledge of an object, and in the second *nondeterminate reflective (aesthetic) judgment* of some subjective perceptual feelings of positive and negative connections and reactions. Cognitively, how can we consecutively combine the subjective feelings of perceptual judgment with the universal validity of judgment of experience in order to develop our knowledge of the external reality? The Peircean position is that initially we follow rules habitually, rules which evolve hierarchically from our pre-rational, instinctive and practical self-controlled cognitive operations to rational, self-controlled reasoning with explicit rules and concepts (Peirce *CP*: 5.440-441; cf. Neshier 1990, 1999, 2002a: II). Accordingly, Pragmaticist epistemology can explain that we combine hierarchically the Kantian subjective *reflective manner* and the objective *logical method*, which posits both artwork and science in the same epistemological framework in order to explain our cognitive representation of reality (cf. Neshier 2003, 2004b). Below, I will show that the solution to the dichotomy between the *scientific* determinate following rules and *artistic* free creation and evaluation of artworks is by showing how free artistic creation and evaluation are also self-controlled determinations, while scientific discovery and proof are also free human operations. Generally speaking, according to Spinoza, freedom is a human, intentional, inner determinate operation relative to the levels of people’s self-consciousness and degree of self-control (cf. Neshier 1999). Hence, we cannot follow our

pre-conceptual operations by means of rational rules, since they are habitual and only instinctively and practically self-controlled. As shown by Descartes, to grasp the truth of axioms and the rules of inference for their application requires perceptual and intellectual intuitions to operate rationally the deductive proof of the truth of our theorems. However, if we would formulate conceptually our intuition of the rational rules of inference, then we will need another intuition to grasp and apply these rational rules of the first intuition (Descartes [1628]1985; Kant *CJ*: 309).

Peirce on Degrees of Self-Control to Eliminate Kant's Dichotomy Between Logical and Aesthetic Modes of Representation

Kant makes a dichotomy between learning according to determinate rules and the free creation of artworks, i.e., common people learn rules and ideas through imitation, while genius freely creates new ideas. However, artists, moralists, scientists, and all human beings have both inborn and acquired dispositions for learning; there is no learning without the Abductive discovery of new rules and ideas, since no one can just give or take knowledge as they can with physical objects (e.g., Peirce 5.182-205). Moreover, even *imitation* cannot be achieved without learning the quasi-rules of how to imitate. Hence, in fine arts, as in science, the talent for discovery and creation is a matter of the degree of self-control in regard to the freedom to suggest new ideas and prove their truth (Kant *CJ*: 305-310; Nesher 1999, 2001). In the case of aesthetic formal reflective judgment, we can understand the reflective self-consciousness upon cognitive operations and interpretations of artworks as being the instinctive feeling of pleasure or displeasure, hence as indications of the evaluation of their beauty. However, this is not the sensation, feeling qualities, and predications of the real objects; it is rather the subjective feeling of the reflective self-consciousness of this aesthetic and other cognitive operations. Hence, we have to analyze the function of self-reflective operations upon our cognitive operations. Kant himself makes the distinction between sensation of the empirical object and sensation-feeling of the subjective pleasure or displeasure.

Therefore, in calling a judgment about an object aesthetic, we indicate immediately that, while a given presentation is being referred to an object, by judgment we mean here not the determination of the object, but the determination of the subject and of feeling. . . .

Now although this sensation [*Empfindung*] is not a sensible [*sinnlich*] presentation of an object, it is connected subjectively with judgment['s general activity of] making concepts of the understanding sensible, and hence may be included

with sensibility, namely, as a sensible presentation of the state of the subject who is affected by an act of that power [of judgment]. We may include this [kind of] sensation with sensibility, and call a judgment aesthetic, i.e., sensible (as regards the subjective effect [the feeling, as the effect of the harmony between the two cognitive powers], not as regards the [whole] basis determining [the judgment]), even though judgment is (objectively) an act of the understanding (i.e., of one of the [*überhaupt*] higher cognitive power[s]), not an act of sensibility (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 223’).

Yet since every cognitive operation is self-conscious and thus, reflectively self-controlled, the question is, what is the difference between reflection upon the cognitive representation of an object and reflection upon the subject’s aesthetic sensation-feeling of pleasure or displeasure in judgments of taste? What are the functions of these two kinds of reflection in logical and aesthetic judgments, respectively? According to Kant, these different kinds of sensations are our feelings of the reflections of these different types of judgments, logical judgment and aesthetic judgment (cf. Kant *CPuR*: B316ff.). However, the reflective feeling of the former is about the relationship between the sensual intuition of an object and the concept of understanding in representing an object objectively. The latter are the subjective feelings about the relationship between ideas of Understanding and Imagination but without any explicit attention to the object. Thus we can say that the former kind of feeling is an indication of the *truth* of our experiential (perceptual) judgment, whereas the latter kind of feeling is an indication of the *beauty* of the aesthetic art-object (cf. Kant *Logic*, [1800]1974, Introduction: #VII). Here the question is whether the aesthetic judgment of artworks is severed entirely from its cognitive relationship with reality, or whether it is not about the object cognitively represented but about our relationship with such representation.

Hence we may define an aesthetic judgment in general as one whose predicate can never be cognition (i.e., concept of an object, though it may contain the subjective conditions for cognition as such). In such a judgment, the basis determining [it] is sensation. There is, however, only one so-called sensation that can never become a concept of an object: the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This sensation is merely subjective, whereas all other sensations can be used for cognition. Hence an aesthetic judgment is one in which the basis determining [it] lies in a sensation that is connected directly with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 224’)

Pragmaticistically, we explain our subjective feeling and emotional reaction to our cognitive operations as our self-reflection of our operations in self-control, and we evaluate their being positive (agreeable-pleasant) or negative

(disagreeable-unpleasant) as the cognitive-content, which later might be synthesized into our proved judgment of what is true, good, or beautiful (cf. Kant, *CJ*: 216). Accordingly, we cannot separate our reflection upon our cognitive operations from their being representations of reality. The difference between reflection on our cognitive interpretation of scientific theory, reflection on our cognitive interpretation of moral law, and our cognitive interpretation of artwork, that is all representations of reality, is that they are different modes of representations that express judgments of truth, good-right, and beautiful, which are commonly considered as norms in our conducts.

We can show that Kant's explanation that "subjective conditions of cognition as such" are the "feelings of pleasure and displeasure", which in *aesthetic judgment* of *taste* indicate the *beauty* of artworks according to Frege, that the subjective cognitions in indicative sentences are "the real assertive force" in asserting perceptual judgments, which in *theoretical judgment* indicate their *truth* (Frege [1918]1999; Neshet 2002a: III, V, X). Therefore, the function of the reflective feelings in such judgment is "the basis determining it" by indicating the harmony or disharmony between components of our cognitive faculties, imagination, and understanding in our cognitive operations. These are the feelings of beauty and truth in cognitive operations representing reality (Kant *CPuR*: B176-187; *CJ*: 351-352). A comparison of these components determines whether our perceptual judgments are true and whether our aesthetic judgments of reflection refer to beauty. Kant analyzes the distinction between theoretical (logical) judgment and reflective judgment of taste:

A judgment of taste differs from a logical one in that a logical judgment subsumes a presentation under concepts of the object, whereas a judgment of taste does not subsume it under any concept at all, . . . But a judgment of taste does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as it alleges a universality and necessity, though a universality and necessity that is not governed by concepts of the object and hence is merely subjective. (Kant *CJ*: #35, 286)

Though there are differences between these two kinds of judgments in respect to their experiential contents and objects, their subject matters, they nevertheless have the same formal structure, which enables every use of our power of judgment in regard to a presentation to be a judgment.

Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition of the object), while a judgment of taste cannot be determined by concepts, its basis is only the subjective formal condition of a judgment as such. The subjective condition of all judgments is our very ability to judge, i.e., the power of judgment. When we use this power of judgment in regard to a presentation by which an object is given, then it requires that there be a




Figure 5.6 Reflective self-control of the interpretation of human cognition in representing reality.

harmony between two presentational powers, imagination (for the intuition and the combination of its manifold) and understanding (for the concept that is the presentation of the unity of this combination). (Kant *CJ*: #35, 287)

Now, “the subjective formal condition of a judgment as such” is not subjective in the sense of belonging to one individual only. It is a universal, formal structure of presentation (cognition) that belongs to every human subject in her or his use of the power of judgment to issue any kind of judgment (cf. Kant, *CJ*: #56). But what is this formal condition that is the universal form of every kind of judgments? The formal structure of any use of the power of judgment is that it operates on presentations of the two presentational powers, Imagination and Understanding. The question is whether this operation is the same for both kinds of judgments, the theoretical and the aesthetic? The distinction seems to lie in the relationship between the Inductive inference of *subsumption* in evaluating the theoretical judgment of cognition and the Abductive inference of *discovery* in aesthetic judgment of taste as was analyzed above (cf. Kant *CJ*: #IV, 179).

In both types of judgments, theoretical and aesthetic, as well as in practical moral judgments, there must be some common formal structure that makes them operations of judgments, only because of the harmony between the particular presentations of our cognitive powers is their synthesis in any judgment possible. The harmony in the formal structure of the three basic types of judgments is between any two of our cognitive powers of Understanding, Imagination-Intuition, and Reason, but in different orders. However, whereas theoretical and moral judgments are about factual and possible objects in the world, aesthetic judgment is only about their formal condition, without any cognitive representation of objects in the world.

If we resolve these logical peculiarities, which distinguish a judgment of taste from all cognitive judgments, we shall have done all that is needed in order to deduce this strange ability we have, provided that at the outset we abstract from all content of the judgment, i.e., from the feeling of pleasure, and merely

compare the aesthetic form with the form of objective judgments as prescribed by logic. Let us begin, then, by presenting these characteristic properties of taste, using examples to elucidate them. (Kant *CJ*: #31, 281)

Without harmony between the presentations of two cognitive powers, there can be no synthesis in the different judgments. The question now is how do we know that the subjective feeling of truth or beauty, let alone good or right, is correct or incorrect without having any objective criterion of the interpretation embedded in such judgment? Without relating representation to external reality, we cannot control and evaluate such interpretations objectively (cf. Neshet 2002a, 2005b, 2007a).

KANT'S TWO AESTHETIC THEORIES OF GENIUS, CREATIVITY, AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT OF TASTE: THE PRAGMATICIST WAY OUT OF THEIR SEPARATION

Kant's Two Separated Aesthetic Theories: Genius Creativity and Aesthetic Judgment of Taste

Kant's *aesthetic theory of genius* explains how the genius freely creates artwork by productive Imagination through Deductively quasi-inferring from *intellectual ideas* the *exhibition* of the *aesthetic ideas* in creating the artwork. The artwork is completed when, by reflective feelings on the creative operation, the genius harmonizes the *intellectual ideas* of Understanding and the *aesthetic Ideas* of Imagination. The *aesthetic theory of taste* is the operation of the Abductively quasi-inferred indeterminate reflective judgment of taste for comparing the relationship between the Imaginative *feeling of aesthetic object* and the Understanding *form of this object*. Thus the genius evaluates the merit of the artwork created either as beautiful or as ugly according to the harmony or disharmony between the components of these two cognitive powers. The difficulty with Kant's entire aesthetic enterprise, of creation and evaluation of artworks, is the separation of the *aesthetic theory of genius* in creating artwork from the *aesthetic theory of taste* in evaluating the artwork. The genuine artist creates the artwork with one's spirit—i.e., the “production of the beautiful”—and then this person and others judge it aesthetically in separation from the artistic spirit of its creation, as though it is a physical object and not a purposive human creation of artwork (Kant *CJ*: 344; Gadamer [1960]1989: 53-55; comp. Adorno 1970: 86ff.). The function of the artist's spirit in this creativity is the inspired motivation for the genuine creation of artwork:

Spirit [*Geist*] in an aesthetic sense is the animating principle in the mind. But what this principle uses to animate [or quicken] the soul, the material it employs for this, is what imparts to the mental powers a purposive momentum, i.e., imparts to them a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens the power for such play. Now I maintain that such principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit *aesthetic ideas*; and by aesthetic ideas I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] *concept*, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it. It is easy to see that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a *rational idea* which is, conversely, a concept to which no *intuition* (presentation of the imagination) can be adequate. (Kant *CJ*: 313-314)

Aesthetic ideas are the imaginative interpretation-exhibiting of intellectual ideas; however, if we do not know the latter directly from the artist, we cannot discover and formulate them from the former.

For the imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. . . . Such presentations of the imagination we may call *ideas*. One reason for this is that they do at least strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus [these concepts] are given semblance of objective reality. Another reason, indeed the main reason, for calling those presentations ideas is that they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate. (Kant *CJ*: 314; cf. 341-344; comp. Adorno 1970: 86-100; Allison 2001: 256-258)

Kant calls them “ideas,” since there are no empirical intuitions, the condition of cognitive experience that can be subsumed under these presentations.

Kant’s two theories of fine arts, the genuine creation of artwork and the reflective judgment of taste (see figure 1.3, p. X), are separated without any common epistemic logic that can explain the artist’s cognitive operation of creation and evaluation of one’s artwork and its interpretation by others (cf. Kant *CJ*: ##45, 48-50; Allison 2001: 271).

If we ask which is more important in objects [*sachen*] of fine art, whether they show genius or taste, then this is equivalent to asking whether in fine art imagination is more important than judgment. Now insofar as art shows genius it does indeed deserve to be called *inspired* [*geistreich*], but it deserves to be called *fine* art only insofar as it shows taste. (Kant *CJ*: 319)

Kant gives priority not to the genius' spiritually creating artwork, but to the judgment of his taste, which indeed is too crude a criterion even to decide between the aesthetic quality of genuine and deceitful artworks, let alone between fine arts, on the one hand, and artifacts and natural objects, on the other. If the artistically *inspired* interpretation of the artist's *intellectual ideas* into created *aesthetic ideas* is the operation of the productive Imagination, it must be judged as artwork with cognitive purposive meaning-content representing reality, not as the represented reality itself.

But taste is merely an ability to judge, not to produce; and if something conforms to it, that [fact] does not make yet the thing a work of fine art: . . . In fine art we include, rather, a poem, a piece of music, a gallery of pictures, and so on; and here we often find a would-be work of fine art that manifests genius without taste, or another that manifests taste without genius (Kant *CJ*:313).

The artist cannot produce fine art without tasting continuously the beauty of the aesthetic ideas that exhibit the artist's intellectual ideas in creating the fine artworks. But Kant cannot connect epistemologically these two aesthetic theories to explain the creation *cum* evaluation of fine arts as the two essential components of a unified aesthetic theory. Therefore, geniuses themselves cannot judge the beauty of their own artwork during its creation, nor can we evaluate with the reflective judgment of taste the artwork created spiritually by the genius (cf. Kant *CJ*: ##48, 49). The reasons for this epistemological separation seems to be that Kant developed his aesthetic theory from a theory of judgment of taste without considering the difference between the beauty of natural objects and the beauty of fine arts as human creation (cf. Alison 2001: Ch. 12). This separation, however, was vindicated by Kant's epistemological distinction between objective *theoretical [logical] judgment* and subjective *aesthetic [reflective] judgment*, which explains why, according to Kant, fine art is not a cognitive representation of reality. Therefore we judge it as an object of beauty *per se*, not as a genuine human mode of knowledge that epistemologically is another mode of representation like scientific and moral knowledge (cf. Kant *CJ*: 311; Neshier 2003, 2006).

Why the Kantian Theory of Genius Cannot Operate without Following Rules of Harmony Between Ideas of Understanding and Imagination to Create and Evaluate the Beauty of Artwork

In his first aesthetic theory, Kant explains the genius creation of artwork. The artist, endowed with a spirit animated by a productive imagination, infers-interprets in a "free play" from the generality of *intellectual ideas* the singularity of the

aesthetic ideas exhibiting the intended artwork. In such quasi-deductive inference, the faculty of Judgment is exercised in a *reflective manner* (*modus aestheticus*) to achieve a harmonious interpretation of the ideas of Understanding and Imagination, and thus to attain the unity of aesthetic ideas of the artwork being created (cf. Kant *CJ*: 318-319; see figure 1.2, p. X).

By achieving this Harmony between the ideas of Understanding and Imagination, the artist can make the ideas of Understanding sensible and the artwork beautiful. How can the artist do so?

Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put it in this way: *Genius* is the innate mental predisposition (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art. . . . *Genius* is a *talent* for producing something for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition consisting of a skill for something that can be learned by following some rule or other; hence the foremost property of genius must be *originality*. (Kant *CJ*: 307-308; comp. 310)

Indeed Chomsky's conceptions of natural endowment and innateness, his theory of a Universal Grammar, echoes almost completely this Kantian view; in both cases, nature works its innate rules mechanically-computationally (e.g., Chomsky, 1986; cf. Neshet, 1988, 1999). Kant admits that genius, in exhibiting aesthetic ideas when creating fine art, consciously follows inborn rules and those acquired by experience and training to compare the ideas of Imagination and Understanding and reach their harmony.

In order [for a work] to be beautiful, it is not strictly necessary that [it] be rich and original in ideas, but it is necessary that the imagination in its freedom be commensurate with the lawfulness of the understanding. For if the imagination is left in lawless freedom, all its riches [in ideas] produce nothing but nonsense, and it is judgment that adapts the imagination to the understanding. (Kant *CJ*: 319)

How is this adaptation of the imagination to understanding achieved? Kant's dichotomy between natural determinism and transcendental freedom prevents him from explaining how the genuine artist can both follow the rules of interpreting intellectual ideas to become aesthetic ideas in creating artwork, and free-play to achieve harmony between ideas of Understanding and Imagination. And yet the unexplained *originality* cannot work without academic training with rules.

Genius can only provide rich *material* for products of fine art; processing this material and giving it *form* requires a talent that is academically trained, so that

it may be used in a way that can stand the test of the power of judgment. (Kant *CJ*: 310)

How, then, can one explain artistic creation and the evaluation of fine artwork, and how does the artist know when this harmony is achieved and its beauty is being accomplished? Moreover, can this be done without following some rules, be they inborn rules of nature or rules that are acquired by academic training and the artist's aesthetic experience in creating his artwork? Kant senses this difficulty and tries to show how the genius somehow trains an evaluative judgment to guide the imagination to achieve the purposed beauty of art.

Taste, like the power of judgment in general, consists in disciplining (or training) the genius. It severely clips its wings, and makes it civilized, or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance as to how far and over what it may spread while still remaining purposive. (Kant *CJ*: 319)

The artist cannot create and complete an artwork without operating intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas together in order to achieve harmony in creating the work and judging its beauty (cf. Kant *CJ*: 307, 312). The Kantian problem is that for grasping Intellectual Ideas, the artist needs some determinate rational rules, while in free play with productive Imagination, he cannot follow any rules to control the harmonization of the two kinds of ideas. Furthermore, the interpreter, who does not know the intention and the plan of the artist, cannot interpret it as a fine artwork, only as a natural object or an artifact (Kant *CJ*: #46; See figure 5.4, p. X).

The difficulty with the two aesthetic theories of *genius creativity* and *aesthetic judgment of reflection* is how the harmony between the ideas of Understanding and Imagination can be felt in the aesthetic reflection of the ensuing artistic creation of beauty. Without an objective criterion of distinguishing among feelings of the beautiful, the ugly, and the erroneous, the aesthetic judgment derived from pleasure or displeasure would remain empty of meaning (cf. Neshier 2007a).

In an aesthetic judgment of reflection . . . the basis determining [it] is the sensation brought about, in the subject, by the harmonious play of the two cognitive powers [involved] in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding; [they are in harmonious play] when, in the given presentation, the imagination's ability to apprehend, and the understanding's ability to exhibit, further each other. In such a case this relation between them brings about, through its mere form, a sensation; and this sensation is the basis determining a judgment, which is therefore called aesthetic, and amounts to [*als*] subjective purposiveness

(without concept) and hence is connected with the feeling of pleasure. (Kant *CJ*: 224')

This is the basic cognitive structure of the *aesthetic judgment of reflection*, in which the operation of the faculty of judgment on the faculties of imagination and understanding determine the feeling of pleasure and the judgment of beauty. This structure is similar to the epistemic logic of the formation of empirical concepts in perceptual judgment, Kant's judgments of experience, although in the aesthetic judgment of taste there is only instinctive quasi-rule and the form of quasi-concept of the object to judge its beauty. We can see that in spite of the intellectual origin of the genius-created artwork, the judgment of taste of the aesthetic ideas cannot be intellectual because it is not based on concept; therefore, the connection and harmony between intellectual ideas and their exhibition in aesthetic ideas cannot be judged (cf. Kant *CJ*: #16; comp. Hegel [1835]1975: 12-13; Bungay 1987: 16-17).

However, people can feel pleasure with kitschy works devoid of any intellectual and emotional spirit, or even with ugly works that contain no aesthetic mode of representation (e.g., Hegel [1835]1975: 17-20, 42-45). Moreover, people who are uneducated in specific styles of artworks declare their ugliness without even understanding the aesthetic language of the genius—e.g., Picasso's artworks—and feel displeasure with it (Kant *CJ*: #48; Hegel [1835]1975: 13, 19, 44, 74). Furthermore, if the interpreter of an artwork already knows the spirit and intellectual ideas of the artist, then judgment in evaluating it is already based on previously held concepts, not only on reflective judgment of feelings. Kant, with some insight, understood the difference between an evaluation of the beauty of a natural thing and an evaluation of the beauty of an artwork as a representation of reality.

If we consider genius as the talent for fine art (and the proper meaning of the word implies this) and from this point of view wish to analyze it into the powers that must be combined in order to constitute such a talent, then we must begin by determining precisely how natural beauty, the judging of which requires only taste, differs from artistic beauty, whose possibility (which we must also bear in mind when we judge an object of this sort) requires genius. A natural beauty is a *beautiful thing*; artistic beauty is a *beautiful presentation* of a thing. (Kant *CJ*: 311)

From this we can infer that without knowing the spirit of the genius-artist performing the interpretation of the intellectual ideas into aesthetic ideas of the presented artwork we cannot evaluate its truth and beauty; but then we also cannot consider it as pure judgment of taste, which according to Kant, is the only way to evaluate fine art. In other words, without purposive intention

of the genius, there cannot be a creation of artwork; but this must be done by following rules and then, according to Kant, it cannot be the free play of the productive imagination and the product cannot be fine art without it (cf. Allison 2001: 271-272).

In [dealing with] a product of fine art we must become conscious that it is art rather than nature, and yet the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from all constraint of chosen rules as if it were a product of mere nature. It is this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive powers, a play that yet must also be purposive, which underlies that pleasure which alone is universally communicable although not based on concepts. Nature, we say, is beautiful [*Schön*] if it also looks like art; and art can be called fine [*schön*] art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks like nature. (Kant *CJ*: 306)

Thus Kant's destructive dilemma brings him to conceptual confusions and playing with words:

Therefore, even though the purposiveness in a product of fine art is intentional, it must still not seem intentional; i.e., fine art must have the *look* of nature even though we are conscious of it as art. And a product of art appears like nature if, though we find it to agree quite *punctiliously* with the rules that have to be followed for the product to become what it is intended to be, it does not do so *painstakingly*. In other words, the academic form must not show; there must be no hint that the rule was hovering before the artist's eyes and putting fetters on his mental powers. (Kant *CJ*: 307; comp. *CJ*: 310)

The problem is that if it looks like a natural product, we cannot judge an artwork aesthetically as an intended product of the genius animated by an aesthetic Spirit; and if it is an intended operation of one's spirit, it must follow the principle and laws of mind, and the artist's freedom cannot be just chance and haphazard (cf. Kant *CJ*: 310). This is an artificial and illusory solution that cannot solve the destructive dilemma.

The Pragmatist's Way Out of the Kantian Destructive Dilemma Between the Freedom of Imagination and the Determination of Understanding in Creating and Evaluating Artworks

The question is why does Kant circulate around purposive-intended production of fine art when the artist, seemingly following the rules of creation and actually the blind production of artwork, is determined mechanically by natural laws? I suggest that Kant cannot explain how humans, artists in particular,

can follow rules of behavior without writing them down formally so that they remain “hovering before the artist’s eyes.” Moreover, Kant considered the marvel of the genius to be a free play of his productive imagination, which cannot be done by mechanically following formal rules of production and thus “putting fetters on his mental powers.”

. . . the concept of fine art does not permit a judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule whatsoever that has a *concept* as its determining basis, i.e., the judgment must not be based on a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Hence fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product. Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must be nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his powers) that gives the rule to art; in other words, fine art is possible only as a product of genius. (Kant *CJ*: 307; cf. 307-319)

The solution to this dichotomy of rule-following and free creation is that *freedom* does not contradict following rules but is an *intentional, self-controlled conduct*; humans can follow rules instinctively and practically without formulating them explicitly as with walking and talking (Nesher 1988, 1999). In Peirce’s formulation:

Certain obvious features of the phenomena of self-control (and especially of habit) can be expressed compactly and without any hypothetical addition . . . by saying that we have an occult nature of which and of its contents we can only judge by conduct that it determines, and by phenomena of that conduct. . . . According to the maxim of Pragmaticism, to say that determination affects our occult nature is to say that it is capable of affecting deliberate conduct; and since we are conscious of what we do deliberately, we are conscious *habitualiter* of whatever hides in the depth of our nature; and it is presumable . . . that a sufficiently energetic effort of attention would bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a special sense, a conscious operation. (Peirce *CP*: 5.440-441; cf. Chomsky 1980: 128, 1986: 27, 262; Nesher 1999: III)

We are conscious *habitualiter*, namely, by self-reflecting on our conduct, we instinctively know the rules of our habits, and from this “habitual knowledge” we learn how to follow these rules practically as well as rationally. With these kinds of knowledge, we can self-control our conduct at different levels of self-consciousness in different kinds of conducts (cf. Nesher 1999; 2002b, 2006; comp. Kant *CPuR*: A141). Hence, “nature gives the rule to art” only through some levels of artistic self-conscious and degrees of self-controlled creative aspiration, since creation cannot be a blind operation but

a determinate free play intended to reach its purpose (cf. Kant *CJ*: ##44-50). Since the evaluation of the aesthetic imaginative exhibition is initiated by our habitual instinctive rules, philosophers intend to think that there are no such cognitive rules, only blind rules of nature (e.g., Kant and Chomsky). Instead of the Kantian dichotomy between the scientific “rules with concepts” of Understanding and the artistic “rules of nature” of the productive Imagination, Peircean epistemology elaborates the evolutionary hierarchy of the *habitual rules* and the *rational rules* of conduct. Through intellectual reflection on our deliberate conduct, however, we can discover the inner springs of our human behavior, the habitual rules, and develop some of them into explicit rules of Abductive and Inductive material logic inferences, which we can follow rationally (cf. Neshier 1994: II, III).

In any criticism and revision of Kant’s conception of aesthetic artwork, it is crucial to overcome its difficulties and combine it into one unified theory, the theory of genuine creation of artwork and the theory of judgment of taste of its beauty. It is my endeavor to show that this can be done within the epistemological framework of Pragmaticism (cf. Neshier 2002a, 2003, 2004a; comp. Gadamer [1960]1989: 83-88). We have to inquire how we reflectively judge the beauty of an artwork and what can be the relationship between the artistic creation and the evaluation of the artwork in the judgment of taste. The artist’s intellectual ideas as the content of the artist’s spirit interpreted into the specific exhibited aesthetic ideas that together evolve into the intended artwork. According to Kant, the artist evaluates the artwork in his aesthetic experience of pleasure and displeasure through the “free momentum of the mental powers” to achieve their harmony, and thus attain the beauty of the artwork (cf. Kant *CJ*: 312; e.g., Peirce, 5.416-435; Neshier 1990, 2006). Kant, with his aesthetic experience with fine arts, admits that creation and evaluation are involved with each other and the genius cannot create an artwork blindly, but must do so with elaborated artistic rules to discover the aesthetic ideas which express and exhibit in the best way the artist’s intellectual ideas in creating an artwork.

The artist, having practiced and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from art or nature, holds his work up to it, and after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy his taste, finds that form which is adequate to it. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration or of a free momentum of the mental powers; the artist is, instead, slowly and rather painstakingly touching the form up in an attempt to make it adequate to his thought while yet keeping it from interfering with the freedom in the play of these powers (Kant *CJ*: #48, 312-313).

The artist, employing deductive interpretation of intellectual ideas in aesthetic ideas, continuously reflects on self-controlling of their relationship

according to the artistic feeling of pleasure or displeasure as the indication of the beauty of the artwork may be. The *reflective self-control* of the artist on the evolving artwork is the continuous *self-correction* of this operation in order to approach more closely the intended aesthetic: its beauty.

Among the things which the reader, as a rational person, does not doubt, is that he not merely has habits, but also can exert a measure of self-control over his future actions; which means, however, *not* that he can impart to them any arbitrary assignable character, but, on the contrary, that a process of self-preparation will tend to impart to action (when the occasion for it shall arise), one fixed character, which is indicated and perhaps roughly measured by the absence (or slightness) of the feeling of self-reproach, which subsequent reflection will induce. Now, this subsequent reflection is part of the self-preparation for action on the next occasion. Consequently, there is a tendency, as action is repeated again and again, for the action to approximate indefinitely toward the perfection of that fixed character, which would be marked by entire absence of self-reproach. The more closely this is approached, the less room for self-control there will be; and where no self-control is possible there will be no self-reproach. (Peirce *CP*: 5. 418)

The artist achieves the beauty of a created artwork when he is satisfied with the harmony that exists in it between *Intellectual Ideas* and the exhibited *Aesthetic Ideas*. But how can this be done and explained?

The problem is to reconstruct the Kantian aesthetic theory in order to be able to show how the creation and evaluation of the beauty of artworks can be *objective* and *general*, rather than just a subjective experience of pleasure and displeasure (cf. Kant *CJ*: 241). Creating artwork beauty is the *true interpretation* of the theme, of the intellectual ideas, of the artists in their exhibition of aesthetic ideas. The artist's reflective judgment of this creativity is based on instinctive and practical *self-control* of *free play* with ideas of Understanding and productive Imagination in order to attain rational control of its success.




Figure 5.7 The union of Kant's genuine criterion of artworks and the reflective judgment of taste.

The Watching of his own work with a vigilant and discriminated eye, which decides at every moment of the process whether it is being successful or not, is not a critical activity subsequent to, and reflective upon, the artistic work, it is an integral part of that work itself. (Collingwood 1938:281)

The Pragmaticist's way out of the Kantian dichotomy between explicit *rational rules* and hidden *rules of nature* is to explain the epistemic rules of both the creating-evaluating of artworks by the artist and their evaluation by others as a cognitive operation of proving the truth of their interpretation.

According to Kant, however, aesthetic judgment cannot represent reality as does a rational synthesis of concepts that unify the sensual intuition of empirical experience with objects; it can only indicate the instinctive reflection upon our aesthetic experience with expressions of "beauty" and "beautiful." We can explain that even the aesthetic experience initiates from the artist's knowledge of reality and understanding it conceptually. Thus we can detect the alleged harmony of Understanding and Imagination of ideas objectively only through the correspondence with the specific experiential knowledge of the artist and the interpreters, which represents their respective physical and social reality that enables the judgment of taste on the beauty of the artwork. Therefore, the artist has to quasi-prove or prove the truth of the creative interpretation, and we have to show that this can be done only by proving that the artwork is a true aesthetic representation of reality and, thus, beautiful (cf. Neshet 2002a, 2003, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b).

WHY KANT'S AESTHETIC JUDGMENT CANNOT BE VALID AND UNIVERSAL

Kant's Missing Link in the Chain of Genius Creation: Abductive Discovery of Intellectual Ideas

It seems that the genius conceives *intellectual ideas* mysteriously, since according to Kant they are incomplete concepts of Understanding that have no empirical intuition correlated to them, and their content is the intuition of the Imagination. The epistemological question is, from where does the genius' imaginative intuitions evolve to become the content of the envisaged artwork if not from this person's personal experience. Hence, the first link that is missing in the chain of a Kantian genius creation is the Abductive discovery of the Intellectual ideas of the artwork from the artist's experiential knowledge of reality. Only from cognizing these ideas can the artist continue to interpret their content, transferring them by productive imagination into aesthetic ideas.

Abductive *Discovery of the Intellectual Ideas of the Intended Artwork* (cf. Allison, 2001: 256-257)




Figure 5.8 Kant's missing link in the chain of genius creation of artwork: The abductive discovery of intellectual ideas.

From some aspects of the artist's experiential Knowledge of Reality (C^{Ab}), he discovers the *Intellectual Ideas* (A^{Ab}) that represent the aspect of experience ($\text{A}^{\text{Ab}} \rightarrow \text{C}^{\text{Ab}}$) that will provide the suggested content (A^{Ab}) of the intended artwork. However, these experientially discovered intellectual ideas are not the Kantian ideas which lie beyond the bounds of experience to which no sensual intuition can be adequate, but are representations of reality we confront experientially. Thus from Abductively discovered *intellectual ideas*, the genius imaginatively creates *aesthetic ideas* to be the exhibition of the artwork. However, if these aesthetic ideas have to emulate the intellectual ideas to be beautiful artwork, they must be created in such a manner as to promote *harmony* between the ideas of these two cognitive faculties. If the productive Imagination is non-rational and therefore, *nondeterminate*, intentional, and *non-lawful* free play, the question is how harmony can be determined and evaluated in such a creative relationship. If the genius has no rational self-control upon the interpretation from *intellectual ideas* to the exhibited *aesthetic ideas*, and there is no external restriction for this operation, the harmony cannot be cognized, and the beauty of the creation must remain just a subjective feeling. This is the paradox of the Kantian judgment of taste: there are only subjective feelings of pleasure so that one can say that harmony exists between the ideas of these faculties when one has such a feeling. Therefore, if every subjective feeling of pleasure determines beauty, then every feeling of displeasure can contradict it; consequently, subjective feeling cannot be an intersubjective-objective determination of beauty (cf. Kant *CJ*: 288ff.; comp. Hegel 1935: 73-90; Neshar 2005b). Kant's "paradox of beauty" is due to his wrong conception of aesthetic beauty as belonging to the genius exhibition of aesthetic artwork but severed from the cognitive representation of reality.

Why Kant Cannot Explain the Validity and Objectivity of the Aesthetic Judgment of Taste

In the Kantian philosophy of fine art, not only is a genius' creation separated from the aesthetic judgment of taste, but in this judgment we cannot even distinguish between artworks created spiritually and natural objects. However, without the unity of all three inferential components of the creative operation—the Abductive Discovery of artistic Intellectual Ideas, the Deductive quasi-inference

of Aesthetic Ideas from Intellectual Ideas by the productive imagination of the artist's creation of the artwork, and the Inductive evaluation for achieving and judging its beauty—we cannot have a complete explanation of harmony in aesthetic creation and evaluation of artworks. Hegel emphasizes the unity of the intellectual concept of the intended artwork and its aesthetic appearance:

. . . it is precisely the *unity* of the Concept with the individual appearance which is the essence of the beautiful and its production by art. . . . Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance of the Idea to sense. (Hegel [1835]1975: 101, 111)

In order to achieve this unity of creation and evaluation of artwork, the artist has to exercise self-control over the cognitive operation in order to achieve this unity of the intellectual Concept with the specific aesthetic appearance—epitomized as the nature of its beauty.

If we recall what we have already established about the Concept of the beautiful and art, we find two things: first, a content, an aim, a meaning; and secondly the expression, appearance, and realization of this content. But thirdly, both aspects are so penetrated by one another that the external, the particular, appears exclusively as a presentation of the inner. In the work of art nothing is there except what has an essential relation to the content and is an expression of it. What we called the content, the meaning, is something in itself simple. . . . This simple thing, this theme, as it were, which form the basis for the execution of the work, is the abstract; the concrete comes only with execution. (Hegel [1835]1975: 95-96)

But what is the law or the rule causing the subjective spiritual content to be exhibited and realized in the concrete form of an artwork? Hegel takes one step further in this understanding of the necessary unity of the two essential components of aesthetic theory, but the explanation remains within his phenomenological description. Hence, we have to explain how the artist's reflective self-control can achieve the harmony and beauty of the created artwork. Accordingly, through self-control we reflect the harmony of the feeling and the emotional pleasure of the beauty of the artwork when there is quasi-proof, and thus an evaluation of the truth of the aesthetic representation of reality, which results in a reflective aesthetic judgment (cf. Neshier 2003, 2004). In order to explain how creation and evaluation of artworks can be true and beautiful, one must show how this artistic undertaking stands with its two legs planted on external reality, which is the independent ground of the Inductive evaluation of the beauty of the artwork as aesthetically representing reality (cf. Neshier 1999: III.2, 2002a: xv-xx). Only in this way can we explain how human spiritual-cognitive activity in the creation of artwork can

be a true aesthetic representation of Reality. Pragmaticist epistemology can overcome the Kantian dichotomy between cognitive knowledge and aesthetic beauty by explaining that *intellectual ideas* and *aesthetic ideas* cannot come from nowhere but are two different artistic cognitive modes of representing reality. In order for the artist and other persons to compare the Intellectual Ideas and Aesthetic Ideas of an artwork, they have to relate them to a third mode, a common ground, and thus have an objective basis for comparison to evaluate the harmony between these components of the artwork. Common ground is sought by tracing back their representational roles, the intuitions of the Imagination, the content of the genius' intellectual ideas, and the aesthetic ideas of the productive imagination. This common ground cannot be any transcendental faith but the proven, true experiential knowledge of the genius-artist that is shared by the members of the community (Nesher 2002a: X).

There is No True Aesthetic Judgment without Confronting and Representing Reality: Peircean *Trio*

The question is, how can we know whether the artist's spirit and inner intellectual ideas, "the content, aim, and meaning," of the created artwork have actually been interpreted truly by the aesthetic ideas, and how can we evaluate whether "the external, the particular, appears exclusively as a presentation of the inner," since there are many possible aesthetic modes of presentation of the inner content by the external form (Hegel [1835]1975: 95-96). What, in other words, is the truth of artworks and how is beauty connected with it? This remains for Pragmaticist epistemology to explain, and it can be done by reconstructing the Kantian aesthetic with some insights from Hegel and other philosophers, and thus solve their own difficulties (cf. Nesher 2003, 2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a). Claiming that the aim of art is the self-interest of the human spirit separated from its function to represent reality severs it from any objective criterion of its truth and beauty. Even Hegel, from his phenomenological perspective, cannot show how the restriction of external reality is a component of the conditions needed for the proof of the truth and beauty of artworks. For him, "representation" is only the relation of the artist's inner spirit to the creation of external forms, not to any reality external to this operation.

Art by being the representation of the Ideal must introduce it in all the previous mentioned relations to external reality, and associate the inner subjectivity of character closely with the external world. But however far the work of art may form a world inherently harmonious and complete, still, as an actual single object, it exists not for *itself*, but for *us*, for the public which sees and enjoys the work of art. (Hegel [1835]1975: 263-264; cf. 289-291)

This “external reality” as “the external world” is not external to the artwork, but “a world inherently harmonious and complete” that is formed by the artist’s powers “as an actual single object,” the art that represents the Ideal as the subjective source of the complete work of art. Adorno expresses this Hegelian conception of the coherence of the essential components of artworks in this way:

That through which artworks, by becoming appearance, are more than they are: This is their spirit. The determination of artworks by spirit is akin to their determination as phenomenon, as something that appears, and not as blind appearance. What appears in artworks and is neither to be separate from their appearance nor to be simply identical with it—the nonfactual of their Facticity—is their spirit. It makes artworks, things among things, something other than a thing. . . . The spirit of artworks is objective, regardless of any philosophy of objective or subjective spirit; this spirit is their own content and it passes judgment over them: It is the spirit of the thing itself that appears through the appearance. Its objectivity has its measure in the power with which it infiltrates the appearance. (Adorno 1970: 86-87)

How can the artist and others measure the power that the intellectual spirit infiltrates or interprets into the artwork appearance? The difficulty, both for the artist and for us, is to explain how to self-control the interpretation of the inner spirit in the external appearance of the artwork. More difficult still is our evaluation of artworks, as distinct from the artists’ evaluation, which appear to us only as aesthetic ideas of the creative imagination, the particular-epitomized characters that affect our sensual feeling of quality and judgmental emotional reaction to them. Hence, if we do not have any direct access to the spirit and the intellectual ideas of the artist, how can we know whether they harmonize with the aesthetic ideas of the artwork? Moreover, how are both related to our experiential representation of Reality?

It is esthetic enjoyment which concerns us; and ignorant as I am in Art, I have a fair share of capacity for esthetic enjoyment; and it seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the totality of Feeling—and especially to the total resultant Quality of Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating—yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that there is a Feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable Feeling. I do not succeed in saying exactly *what* it is, but it is a consciousness belonging to the category of Representation, though representing something in the Category of Quality of Feeling. (Peirce CP: 5.113)

Peirce's conception of "reasonable Feeling" can be an indication of the Inductive quasi-inferential evaluation of the artwork in its aesthetic representation of reality. But, just like Kant's problem with schematism, it is very difficult, as Peirce admits, to analyze this operation, which involves explaining the relation between our sensual-intuitions of experience and their conceptual unification.

This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves. (Kant *CPuR*: A141)

We can apply Kant's wonder about the "secret art residing in the depths of the human soul" to the evaluation of aesthetic representation of reality.

By reading the spirit of artworks out of their configurations and confronting the element with each other and with the spirit that appears in them, critique passes over into the truth of the spirit, which is located beyond the aesthetic configuration. This is why critique is necessary to the works. In the spirit of the works critique recognizes their truth content or distinguishes truth content from spirit (Adorno 1970: 88).

How can a critique recognize the truth content of the artworks or distinguish the truth content of the spirit? The artists, the readers, and the viewers interpret and quasi-prove the beauty and truth of artworks not directly as with our perceptual judgments of objects, but in respect to our knowledge of the physical, psychological, and social reality. Hence, artworks are evaluated within such basic knowledge; moreover, they incorporate explanatorily and contribute to such knowledge (cf. Hutcheson [1725]1973: IV.II). The proof of the true interpretation of artworks depends on our knowledge of the artist's truth-conditions for creating artwork, which must contribute to our knowledge of the artist's "spirit" and "intellectual ideas" and the reality the artist endeavors to represent through the "aesthetic ideas" of the artwork.

However, without understanding the language of the artist in the specific artwork and without knowing the truth-conditions of its creation, we cannot understand the artwork, or judge its beauty as a true representation of reality (Gombrich 1960: 76-78; Neshet 2007a). To attain a true, coherent interpretation of artwork, we need to understand how the artwork represents aesthetically the artist's knowledge of reality. We cannot interpret the artwork coherently and truly by fabricating truth-conditions that are foreign to the artist's knowledge of reality, because the indefinite possible meanings cannot be interpretively controlled. Thus, only through the artist's truth-conditions

of the created artwork can we interpret the artwork truly (cf. Nesher 2005b, 2007a). The aesthetic artwork must be coherent, reflected in the harmony between its intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas, and this can be achieved only in confrontation in reality through the specific truth-conditions that form the ground of the artist's creation (cf. Nesher 2002a: V, X).

But beauty is only a specific way of expressing and representing the true, and therefore stands open throughout in every respect to conceptual thinking, so long as that thinking is actually equipped with the power of Concept. (Hegel [1835]1975: 91-92)

The connection between beauty as a specific way of expressing and representing truth and *beauty* as the *truth* of the Idea or Content of the artwork when exhibited or interpreted in the actual aesthetic mode of the artwork is a very interesting insight (cf. Hegel [1835]1975: 8, 92). We can explain that our aesthetic judgments of beauty are due to the artwork's true aesthetic representation of reality, which can be indicated through the harmony between the intellectual ideas and the aesthetic ideas in the creation and evaluation of artworks. Thus, the artist reveals a conception of reality in the created, aesthetic, outer appearance of the artwork as relating to or representing reality according to the artist's knowledge of it. However, Kant fails to show and explain the entire process of creation and evaluation of artworks, since he separated the artistic enterprise from a cognitive representation of our reality and thus from its being an aesthetic kind of knowledge with which we can learn about our life. Without confrontation and the representation of reality, there is no ground for the objective and true creation and evaluation of artworks in our judgments of taste. Thus, the Kantian Abductive inference of the judgment of taste cannot operate by itself to prove the truth of this judgment. To judge created artworks aesthetically, no one type of inference is sufficient in itself; only the complete cognitive proof, employing the Pragmaticist *trio* with its epistemic logic, is able to explain and judge an artwork.

CONCLUSION: PRAGMATICIST RECONSTRUCTION OF KANTIAN THEORY OF ART

Self-Control in Following the Rules of Free Creation of Artwork is Only Through its True Aesthetic Representation of Reality

The artistic creation of artworks as beautiful operates by the artists being self-conscious and operating self-controlled reflective evaluation to prove

their own creative-interpretative operations as an aesthetic true representation of reality. The reflective judgments of the artists of their creations are based on instinctive and practical-intuitive self-control of their *free playing* between the intellectual and imaginative ideas constituting their artwork. In this Pragmaticist explanation, I accept the Spinozist conception of *freedom as determinate self-control* to explain the artistic operation in creating artworks (cf. Neshar 1999b, 2006). This reflective self-control enables the artists to quasi-prove the truth of their artworks' aesthetically representing reality, a representation that is not scientific or moral, but the imaginative exhibition of their intellectual understanding of reality (cf. Kant *CPuR*: A141). Art, then, is conceived as the adequacy of the spirit and content of the mind of the artist with its exhibition in the aesthetic form of characters and situations, the ideal being the perfect harmony or conformity between them (e.g., Hegel [1835]1975:73-75).

Only in the highest art are Idea and presentation truly in conformity with one another, in the sense that the shape given to the Idea is itself the absolutely true shape, because the content of the Idea which that shape expresses is itself the true and genuine content. (Hegel [1835]1975: 74-75; cf. 153-154)

The difficulty with Hegel's theory of art is how we can detect the truth of the content of the Idea and how the truth of the shape expresses the Idea, conforming with perfect harmony between them, thus proving it to be a true and beautiful artwork. Indeed, we usually feel the distinction between genuine and spiritless artworks though technically perfect artworks that we call kitsch; philosophically, however, we have to explain how we distinguish and judge the genuine spiritual intellectual content to be true and in harmony with its exhibition or interpretation in aesthetic forms and, moreover, how can we evaluate the shape itself as true (comp. Hegel [1835]1975: 75). The reflective evaluation is an essential factor in the entire process of artistic creation, a critical appraisal of the entire operation up to the completion of the artwork. But what is the criterion of the correct, good, or true aesthetic judgment?

Simply defined, aesthetic judgment is the ability to recognize aesthetic quality residing in any relationship of elements within an organization. It is vital to the artist in [if] that good aesthetic judgment permits him to know when it is good or, if it is unsatisfactory, what might be done to improve it. It is also basic to art criticism and underlies the appreciative aspect of aesthetic response. Studies show that it is present in children to some degree, but it is undoubtedly subject to considerable development through learning and experience. (Meier 1942: 156; comp. Hospers 1946: 9-11)

This is an important description of artists' evaluation of their artworks in the creative operation; however, the criterion of such an aesthetic evaluation is missing, since the general criteria of the "relationship of elements within an organization" are only *ad hoc* rules that are always specific to each artwork and act to justify the artist's or our impressions of the artwork. What for one person is order, for another can be disorder (cf. Meier 1942: 25-28, 65-75). To overcome this essential predicament, we have to show how the artist, in creating an artwork, is quasi-proving its beauty by its truthful aesthetic representation of reality, based upon a general knowledge of this reality. This can be done by the Peircean *trio*, the three stages of the *complete proof* of artists' aesthetic representation of reality.

How Is the Creative Artwork Proved to Be a True and Beautiful Representation of Reality?

With Pragmaticist epistemology, we endeavor to explain the epistemic rules of the cognitive operations of both the creating of artwork by the artist and its evaluation by others as a cognitive operation of interpretation. Hirsch is correct in his enterprise for an objective interpretation, though he is wrong in separating validity from truth. This is due to his conception of absolute truth and the lack of epistemic logic to explain the proof of the truth of interpretation, especially the quasi-proof of the instinctive-practical pre-verbal operation of interpreting artworks as aesthetically representing reality (cf. Hirsch 1967: 235-244; comp. Neshier 2002a: V, X, 2003).

The proof of the true interpretation of artworks depends on our knowledge of the artist's proof-conditions, which must be relative to our knowledge of the artist *spirit*, *intellectual ideas*, and the reality the artist endeavors to represent in the artwork. Thus, only through the artist's proof-conditions of the created artwork can we interpret it truly. The artist reveals a conception of reality in the created, aesthetic, outer appearance of the artwork as relating to or representing reality according to the artist's conception of it. We have to distinguish explanations of the artistic creation and evaluation of an artwork from explanations of perceptual knowledge of natural-physical objects.

Following are the three stages of the complete operation of artists' aesthetic representation of reality, which are based on their general knowledge of reality and the specific components they endeavor to represent aesthetically in their artwork: (a) the Abductive discovery of intellectual ideas for the creation of the artwork, (b) the Deductive interpretation of the intellectual ideas in the aesthetic ideas in creating the artwork, and (c) the Inductive evaluation the beauty and truth of the artwork by proving the truth of the interpretation and the aesthetic representation of reality.



Figure 5.9 Schemes of artwork creation, its evaluation, and the judgment of its beauty by quasi-proving its true representation of reality.

In Kantian Transcendentalism, this proof can neither take place nor explain the harmony between the artist’s intellectual and aesthetic ideas of artwork, since it cannot be entirely formalized.

Just as in the case of a rational idea the *imagination* with its intuitions does not reach the given concept, so in the case of an aesthetic idea the *understanding* with its concepts never reaches the entire intuition that the imagination has and connects with a given presentation. And since bringing a presentation of the imagination to concepts is the same as *expounding* it, aesthetic ideas may be called *unexpoundable* presentations of the imagination (in its free play). (Kant *CJ*: 343, cf. 314, 350-355; comp. Allison 2001: 257).

Even though the imaginatively developed aesthetic ideas C^{Dd} are sensibly richer than intellectual ideas A^{Ab} , the intellectual ideas A^{Ab} are integrated and fused in the quasi-Deductive inferential-interpretation of aesthetic ideas C^{Dd} as A^{Dd} ; therefore $A^{Dd} \supset C^{Dd}$ (e.g., Cervantes’ intellectual ideas of a heroic moral struggle through a beaten but undefeated hope is exhibited aesthetically in the personality of Don Quixote to represent something in every one of us). And thus even though aesthetic ideas are *unexpoundable* or cannot be subsumed entirely under intellectual ideas, the latter can be *expounded* or

interpreted by aesthetic ideas (cf. Peirce on Mona Lisa). Pragmaticist epistemology explains how the instinctive Reflective Act of Comparison between the Iconic aesthetic feeling A^{Dd} and the indexical emotional reaction C^{In} to it, and the harmony between them, amounts to a feeling of aesthetic pleasure as the beauty of the aesthetic artwork. Since this can be achieved only when the artwork aesthetically represents reality, the feeling of aesthetic beauty is also *the sense of the Truth* indicating the aesthetic knowledge of this reality.

We often call the power of judgment a sense, when what we notice is not so much its reflection as merely its result. We then speak of a sense of truth, a sense of decency, of justice, etc. We do this even though we know, or at least properly ought to know, that a sense cannot contain these concepts, let alone have the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rules, but that a conception of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we were not able to rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers. (Kant *CJ*: 293)

This rise from instinctive reflection of our cognitive aesthetic experience to an epistemological explanation of it is the role of philosophy and other scientific inquiries (e.g., Peirce *CP*: 5.119; Neshier 2002a). The entire threefold stage of the artistic cognitive operation in aesthetically creating Artwork representing reality is presented in figure 1.10 followed by commentary (p. X). This is a combined cognitive operation of the artist from a knowledge of reality, creating the artwork, and to its evaluation against a comprehensive knowledge of reality. The evaluation of the artwork determines and indicates the truth and beauty of the artwork and proves the aesthetic judgment. The question is, how can the success or failure of the aesthetic exhibition affect the beauty and truth of the artwork and according to which indication can we judge it?

How to Distinguish among Beautiful, Ugly, and Kitschy Artworks?

We can distinguish degrees of beauty, ugliness, and kitsch, in created artworks and the problem is how can we validate or refute our emotional reactions to them. Some philosophers emphasize the importance of art education in order to know how to experience artworks, and one can show that without understanding the aesthetic language of the artist, we cannot judge properly the beauty and truth of artworks. Others lament why is “Venus in exile” and rejoice when we think that the “beauty is restored” and the problem is to find objective methods to understand artworks (cf. Eddy 1914: Ch. X).

However, if someone should object that there exist aesthetically perfect expressions before which one feels no pleasure, and others, perhaps flawed, which

yield the liveliest of pleasure, we must recommend them to pay attention, in what is aesthetic, to what is true aesthetic pleasure. This can sometimes be reinforced or somewhat muddled up with pleasures arising from extraneous factors which are only contingently connected with it. (Croce [1902]1992: 89)

Is it possible that the artist can err or lie in the creation of an artwork, and the reader or viewer can misunderstand or be deceived when the created artwork is either ugly and false or even kitsch and doubtful? For Hegel, the truth of artwork is not the superficial imitation of reality, but the aesthetic exhibition of the artist's true conception representing human reality (cf. Hegel [1835]1975: 74).

It is one thing for the artist simply to imitate the face of the sitter, its surface and external form, confronting him in repose, and quite another to be able to portray the true features which express the inmost soul of the subject. For it is throughout necessary for the Ideal that the outer form should explicitly correspond with the soul. (Hegel [1835]1975: 155-156)

Therefore, if the artist's imitation does not harmonize with a true conception of reality or the artist has no such true conception but only imitates it, then there is no true representation of reality; in both cases, there cannot be any production of true art, the Ideal. We can say that artistic imitation of reality without a spiritual concept of it is *kitschy* artwork, and that the disharmony between the artist's spiritual concept and the pseudo-aesthetic exhibition of it is *false* artwork, since both cannot truly represent reality.

Therefore, we have to analyze and distinguish among Beautiful, Ugly, and Kitschy in artworks. The following is an extended explication of the above epistemic logic scheme of the creation and evaluation of artworks by proving their being true and beautiful or false and ugly, or artworks that cannot be proved and therefore are considered doubtful and Kitschy (see figure 1.11, p. X). This classification of artworks parallels and is connected with my pragmatist theory of truth, in which we either prove the truth or the falsity of our cognitions, or what we do not prove is just doubtful.

The question is, how can we know whether the disharmony of the aesthetic exhibition or form of the artwork is due to the lack of aesthetic spirit, or the truth of the intellectual ideas embedded in the aesthetic exhibition, or rather due to the artist whose intellectual idea produces an inadequate aesthetic form to represent such reality?

Works of art are all the more excellent in expressing true beauty, the deeper is the inner truth of their content and thought. And in this connection we are not merely to think, as other may, of any greater or lesser skill with which natural

forms as they exist in the external world are apprehended and imitated. For, in certain stages of art-consciousness and presentation, the abandonment and distortion of natural formations is not unintentional lack of technical skill or practice, but intentional alteration which proceeds from and is demanded by what is in the artist's mind. Thus, from this point of view, there is imperfect art which in technical and other respects may be quite perfect in its *specific* sphere, and yet it is clearly defective in comparison with the concept of art itself and the Ideal. (Hegel [1835]1975: 74; cf. 77-79, 154)

The answer is that if we know the reality that the artist represents aesthetically, the truth-conditions of his artwork, we can inquire the distinction between true and false aesthetic representation of reality. However, every rational analysis of artworks starts with our experiential feelings and emotional reaction to artwork as pleasure or displeasure as its beauty and truth.

Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of a special minutiae that the scientific man is looking for. (Peirce CP:1.315)

The above are our epistemological criteria for understanding and ascertaining true and beautiful artworks from false and ugly, as well as doubtful and kitschy ones. The problem is to show how these criteria can apply to "post-modern" artworks so as to distinguish between the true and fake, deceitful, worthless, disguised, pretentious, and trashy works. Since we are human beings and no artwork can be completely perfect because of its disturbing influences and errors in their creation and evaluation, we can see in any artwork all of the above features of beauty, ugliness, and kitsch, and they can all be considered according to their predominant feature. Kant also writes on the development of our ability to judge what is beautiful and what is not. So there is a third possibility here, which is that we mistakenly judge something as beautiful because we still have not developed our aesthetic taste. Therefore, what, in the process of aesthetic judgment, can be an indication that we know our judgment of taste to be mistaken? One can suggest that the proper and the mistaken judgment of an aesthetic experience are based on the relationship within our mental faculties of Imagination and Understanding, and thus we judge properly if there is harmony between them or not. This relationship should explain the difference between feelings of pleasure and displeasure, or beautiful and ugly; how, though, can we know whether these feelings are adequately controlled or erroneous? Thus the question is about the components in the aesthetic, cognitive, or mental operations that determine our mistaken judgment of taste and how we can detect them through rational analysis.

Why does the truth of aesthetic representation of reality affect our emotional reaction to this pleasure that comes from beauty? The emotional reaction to artwork is an intensified indication of the true aesthetic representation of the reality of human life, our life, by helping us know ourselves better and self-control our life in reality. The empathy and identification with characters and situations are imaginative preparations for our further understanding reality and for preparing our conduct in a similar situation, and thus we evaluate our emotional strength in order to endure such situations in the future. These emotional reactions to the true aesthetic representation of reality are components of our real life, our understanding of ourselves, and also our competence to self-control our future life (Croce [1902]1992: 89-90). The true aesthetic representation of reality includes the representation of the nature of our social life and contains a representation of its morality. We can, therefore, define artwork as an aesthetic representation of reality when the artistically created modes of representation are exhibited in epitomes, particularly the types of characters and situations representing general features of human reality.

Chapter 6

The Role of Productive Imagination in Creating Artworks and Discovering Scientific Hypotheses

INTRODUCTION: PROBING KANT ON THE ROLE OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN ARTISTIC AND SCIENTIFIC CREATING AND DISCOVERING NEW MODES OF REPRESENTING REALITY

In this chapter, I elaborate on Kant's conception of artistic *Productive Imagination* in creating artworks and I generalize it to explain the scientific *intellectual intuition* in discovering new hypotheses. Kant explicates *Intuition* as a presentation of the imagination and develops the conception of *Productive Imagination* to explain the genuine creation of fine art. "For the imagination (as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it" (Kant *CJ*: 314).

Kant developed the conception of *Intellectual Intuition* of supersensible objects of reason as distinct from the *sensual intuition* of empirical ones. I turn his transcendental concept of *Intellectual Intuition* into cognitive operations and thus explain all cognitions experientially. Hence, the role of *productive imagination* lies in the artistic creation of new exemplary artworks, and the role of *intellectual intuition*, as productive imagination, lies in the scientific discovery of new scientific points of view. I will explain, within the Pragmaticist epistemology, that artists and scientists use their productive imaginations differently in their respective enterprises to construct their different modes of representing reality. These two kinds of imaginary productive operations are based directly and indirectly on the perceptual images of empirical objects. To understand the artistic creation of exemplary artworks, and the scientific discovery of new hypotheses, we have to elucidate the roles of their productive imaginations in these different enterprises by analyzing

the different structures of the artistic *aesthetic reflective judgment of taste* and scientific *logical reflective judgment of coherence*. I criticize Kant's narrow conception of *judgment* and offer the Pragmaticist epistemic logic as a complete proof of truth.

KANT ON THEORETICAL JUDGMENT AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT: DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONCEPTION OF JUDGMENT

Kant's Division Between *Theoretical Logical Judgment and Aesthetic Reflective Judgment*

Kant's dichotomy of art and science is based on the epistemological division between *theoretical [logical] judgment* and *aesthetic [reflective] judgment*, when the former is an objective and true representation of phenomenal reality, while the latter is subjective, though universal to human nature in aesthetic experience without representing any reality. This is based on the metaphysical division between the *determinism* of scientific mechanical rules followed in the development of theories, and the *freedom* of the artistic-genius's productive imagination in creating exemplary fine arts. Kant explicates this division as *lawfulness* versus *free play* (Kant *CJ*: §§35-36). This dichotomy between art and science, between artistic *free productive imagination* in creating fine arts and scientific *determined mechanical rules* of formulating theories, is elaborated in our traditions of phenomenological "Artism" and analytical "Scientism."

Kant's Conception of Judgment and Its Difficulties in His Three Critiques

Kant's epistemology developed on his general Conception of Judgment: "I then find that judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception" (Kant *CPuR*: B141-142).

Kant has three conceptions of judgments: *theoretical logical judgment* of science, the *practical judgment of moral law* commands, and the *aesthetic reflective judgment* of fine art. In these three types of judgments, we reflect upon our judging operations, feeling and controlling them by comparing the relations among the operated cognitions of our faculties of Imagination, Understanding, and Reason. Thus, we detect harmony or disharmony, but always between two of them, as the subject inner conditions for adequate or inadequate judgments. However, not every cognitive operation determines objective judgment, since aesthetic reflective

judgments are not objective knowledge of reality but only subjective reflection on the ideas of the Imagination and Understanding faculties in comparing their harmony or disharmony, ensuing from the feelings of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure (Kant *CJ*: 237'-238'). The difficulty with Kant's three types of judgments is that because of his phenomenalist epistemology there cannot be any external restriction for their objectivity, so he must assume transcendental principles, concepts, or rules, based on faith only. I showed that Kant's judgment of taste of the *Third Critique* is the same as Peirce's *Abductive inference of suggesting* new concepts or hypotheses, the *moral* judgment of the *Second Critique* is *Deductive apodictic inference*, and the theoretical judgment of the *First Critique* is the *Inductive determinative inference*, being equivalent to Peirce's three basic *inferences*: Abduction, Deduction, and Induction.

The Pragmatist Overcomes Kant's Narrow Conception of Judgment by the Epistemic Logic of the Trio

Hence, none of Kant's different judgments is complete proof of its truth, validity, or universality, since each of them assumes a priori transcendental assumptions of beliefs, whose truths he cannot prove. To overcome the *a priorist* epistemology I showed that according to Peircean Pragmatism, only the sequence of the three inferences, the *Trio* of Abductive Logic of Discovery, Deductive Logic of Necessity, and the Inductive Logic of Evaluating hypotheses, can confront reality and comprise a complete proof (Nesher 2007a). This epistemic logic of cognition is the complete proof of any judgment without recourse to any transcendental a priori assumptions. Our basic cognition is the perceptual operation of the *trio*: Abduction, Deduction and Induction (see figure 5.5, p. X).

Since Kant does not combine the three inferences into complete proofs of the truths of theoretical, ethical and aesthetical judgments, he has to justify their a priori assumptions separately (Kant *CPuR*: A84ff, *CPrR*: 42, *CJ*: ##30, 31). Hence, by completing a cognitive proof we confront reality with Abductive material logic of discovering new cognitions and Inductive material logic of their evaluation, which can justify them empirically without any a priori justification. Kant's frustrated attempt to unify human reason "to derive everything from one principle—this being the unavoidable need of human reason, which finds full satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of cognitions" is solved by the Peircean epistemic logic of the *Trio* (Kant *CPrR*: 91; Peirce *EPII*: 286-288, 1903; Nesher 2007a, 2021). With Pragmatist epistemic logic, we can understand better the artist's *creation* and prove the truth and beauty of artworks and the scientist's *discovery* of hypotheses, and prove their true representation of reality.

ARTISTIC GENUINE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN CREATING FINE ARTS AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Can the Artist Play Freely with Productive Imagination in the Creation of Exemplary Artwork?

Kant's aesthetic theory of fine arts is divided into two parts: the creation of the artwork by the artist and its evaluation in reflective judgment of taste. How, according to Kant, can artistic genuine creation of artwork be both, the artist free play without following rules, as well as purposely and rationally trained to control his work? One can show that free creation is self-controlled by habitual rules, and generally, according to Spinoza, personal freedom is one's inner determination of conduct (Nesher 1999b). Kant cannot accept such a conception of freedom since his critical philosophy is based on the dichotomy between the determinism of nature and the freedom of the transcendental subject. Yet we cannot explain the role of the artists' *productive imagination* without his playing freely with self-control determination, the harmony of the Intellectual ideas and the creating Aesthetic Ideas of artwork.

The Conception of Aesthetic Experience and Creativity

The artist's aspiration in creating an artwork is to make his abstract true ideas of reality sensible by exhibiting them aesthetically in individual characters and situations in the artwork. The artist has the motivation and theme to turn his intellectual *ideas* into the imaginatively created *aesthetic ideas* as artwork. Yet these intellectual ideas with their intuitive meaning-content come from the artist's experiential confrontation in reality. The artist wants to create an epitome of a lover or a cruel person, as Dostoevsky does in *The Idiot*, and *The Devils*, respectively, not to represent any individual person but a type of human character, a "sensible expression" in which everyone can find something of himself, and thus the artist represents aesthetically the reality by exhibiting characteristically the human mind and behavior.

My fantasy can in the highest degree differ from the reality that took place, and my Pyotr Verkhovensky may in no way resemble Nechayev, but it seems to me that in my astonished mind imagination has created that character, that type, which corresponds to this crime (Dostoevsky, on *The Devils*, October 8, 1870).

The correspondence between a novel and reality does not refer to a specific person and circumstance, e.g., Ivanove's murder by Nechayev, but between the created imaginative type of character, Pyotr Verkhovensky, who

demonstrates a vicious criminal behavior, striving to be a true representation of such typical human personality.

Hence, we have to explain how the artist, through free play of his productive imagination, reflecting continually on his experience and evaluating the beauty of the work during its creation, can achieve harmony between the *rationality* of the *intellectual ideas* and the *sensuality* of the *aesthetic ideas*.

Reflective Self-Control of the Productive Imagination in Creating the Aesthetic Product

However, if the spiritual motivation is that *aesthetic ideas* are to emulate *intellectual ideas* in creating a beautiful artwork, the artist must have reflective self-control in order to achieve harmony between them (see figure 1.2, p. X)

The creation of artwork by the *Productive Imagination* is done by harmonizing the artist's *intellectual ideas* while creating *aesthetic ideas*, which can be achieved by using a free-play between them reciprocally. Intellectual Ideas include rich experiential and general meanings, which are the theme of the intended artwork, ideas from which the artist takes the pre-conceptual imagery meaning-components to quasi-Deducting and exhibiting the aesthetic epitomes by creating the exemplified particulars from the general ideas. This is done with the best elements that would attune to the initial Intellectual ideas. In order to evaluate these elements in the creative operation the artist has to recourse continuously to his *general knowledge of reality* and his *imagery sensual intuition*. Since this productive imagination is an unstated operation, there are no formal rules to control the exhibition of aesthetic ideas, but with the habitual quasi-rules the artist instinctively and practically self-controls and infers adequately *aesthetic ideas* from *intellectual ideas*. Yet the criterion for achieving beauty is only a true aesthetic representation of reality.

DISCOVERY OF NEW MODES OF REPRESENTING REALITY: INTELLECTUAL INTUITIVE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION DISCOVERS NEW HYPOTHESES AND GENUINE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION CREATING A NEW STYLE AS A METAPHOR

Sensual Intuition and Intellectual Intuition in the Discovery of New Concepts and Hypotheses

Epistemically, the role of intellectual intuition in Abductive logic of discovering new scientific hypotheses is analogous to that of our sensual intuition of

a perceptual discovery of new concepts (Nesher 1999c, 2001). The scientist's *intellectual intuition* operates with *productive imagination* on scientific background knowledge to solve its difficulties in explaining reality. This is done by *the productive imagination* operating through instinctive and practical self-control in order to recombine the iconic imagery and indexical emotionally meaning-contents of background knowledge in discovering a new picture of reality. Then the scientists formulate them in a new abstract hypothesis, so we do not need the scientists' *a priori* intuition as a miracle, à la Einstein and Popper. The artist reflects on his/her intellectual *ideas* and from there uses imaginatively discovering-creating aesthetic *ideas* as artwork. We can understand an intuitive discovery of new aesthetic ideas and scientific hypotheses as *metaphors*. By creating and discovering new ideas, artists and scientists still use some old expressions, such as the terms of *harmony* or *space and time*, but they change the imagery meaning-components in order to elaborate new pictures of their enterprises, so as to replace or extend an accepted classical concept of artistic beauty of Rembrandt by one of Picasso, or the classical picture of physical reality by a relativist one. The new accepted theory or evaluation of beauty loses their metaphorical character as a new discovery, and becomes an accepted standard as merely an analogy of the old style or theory.

In his first paper on atomic theory in 1913, Bohr emphasized that although Newtonian mechanics is violated, its symbols permit visualization of an atom as a minuscule solar system. Bohr based all of his reasoning on the following visual metaphor: The atom behaves *as if* it were a minuscule solar system (Miller 1996: 225).

All the same, the source of the intellectual meaning-content intuition lies in sensual intuition, otherwise it would remain an empty abstract formalism.

The Role of Intellectual Intuition of Productive Imagination in the Recombination of Scientists' Background Knowledge in Discovering New Hypotheses

The role of human intellectual intuition in genuine scientific discovery of new hypotheses lies in overcoming the difficulties with the existing theories, and by interpreting scientific background knowledge into a discovery of a new comprehensive imagery-picture of reality to formulate the hypothesis. This is done by the scientists' *productive imagination of intellectual intuition* operating on the *imagery* components of symbols of the background knowledge to recombine them in Abductive discovery. Hence, scientists work on detecting new iconic similarities and indexical analogies for new combinations of background knowledge components. For example, in looking for a new intellectual




Figure 6.1 Intuitive recombination of background knowledge by using productive imagination to abductively suggest a new picture of reality for intellectual scientific hypotheses.

image of the quantum theory components, instead of the images of wave and particle separated complementarily, the scientist can imagine a dynamic continuum of particle-wave components (Bohm and Hiley 1993). Similarly, in creating his artwork, Cervantes combines in Don Quixote two different characters: a brave fighter for justice and a ridiculous fantasist, a combination that we can find, in different portions, in every one of us. Thus, the *productive imagination* can freely play with different components of our experiential knowledge to create new scientific hypotheses or aesthetic characters.

This Abductive discovery of new scientific symbols and hypothesis is the first stage of the entire scientific discovery; it continues with Deductive inference of theoretical prediction and Inductive evaluation proving its truth. Here is Einstein’s expression of his play with the productive imagination:

In the following, I am trying to answer in brief your questions as well as I am able. . . .

- (A) The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychological entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be “voluntarily” reproduced and combined. There is, of course, a certain connection between those elements and relevant logical concepts . . .
- (B) The above mentioned elements are, in any case, of visual and some of muscular [kinesthetic] type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be produced at will.
- (C) According to what has been said, the play with the mentioned elements is aimed to be analogous to certain logical connections one is searching for.
- (D) Visual and motor. In a stage when words intervene at all, they are, in my case, purely auditive, but they interfere only in a secondary stage as already mentioned.
- (E) It seems to me that what you call full consciousness is a limit case which can never be fully accomplished. . . .

I am enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination circles the world. (Einstein 1945 to Hadamard)

"Intuitive thinkers have made many of the breakthroughs in science." (Louis de Broglie)

The Self-Conscious and Self-Control Aspect of Intellectual Intuition in Discovering a New Hypothesis

What Einstein expresses as *thought* without words can be understood as a distinction between *imagination* and *reasoning* (Einstein 1949: 7-9). The idea is that one's cognitive operation can be meaningful when its elements have cognitive meanings in a way that the entire operation is meaningful in order to communicate with others. Yet without any verbalization of such an operation we hardly remember and articulate it, though we can elaborate upon it *habitualiterly*, albeit with some explanation for it as an unconscious process, hence as the work of a god, a muse, or any supernatural (e.g., Plato, Kant). However, we can explain that there is no mystery in such an ingenious scientific operation. How can we understand Einstein's *unconscious thought* in scientists' creative imagination (Einstein 1949: 7)?

Certain obvious features of the phenomena of self-control . . . can be expressed compactly . . . by saying that we have an occult nature of which and of its contents we can only judge by the conduct that it determines, . . . and since we are conscious of what we do deliberately, we are conscious *habitualiter* of whatever hides in the depths of our nature; and . . . that a sufficiently energetic effort of attention would bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a special sense, a conscious operation. (Peirce *CP*: 5.440-441)

Yet all self-control of mental operation must be at some level of self-consciousness for connecting the phases of intuitive creativity in order to discover, elaborate and prove the hypothesis rationally.

DIFFERENT ROLES OF "PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATIONS" IN ARTISTIC CREATION AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

The Roles of "Productive Imagination" in Artistic New Exemplary Representations of Reality

The role of artistic *productive imagination* in the creation of aesthetic representation of reality lies in the artist's *Deductive* interpreting of his *intellectual*

ideas into *aesthetic ideas* as an epitomized artwork. This operation and the Abductive evaluation of it are done by quasi-proof of this entire operation to ensure that artwork is a true aesthetic representation of reality (see figure 2.3, p. X).

The artist with his spirit and productive imaginative free play interprets the generality of *intellectual ideas* in the singularity of *aesthetic ideas*, and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such a quasi-deductive inference, the faculty of Judgment is exercised in its *reflective manner (modus aestheticus)* to achieve the harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding, the Imagination and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork.

The Roles of “Productive Imagination” in Scientific Discovery of a New Picture of Reality

However, the role of the scientist’s *productive imagination* lies in his *intellectual intuition* recombining Abductively the imagery components of scientific background knowledge to overcome its difficulties. This is discovering a new imagery picture of reality and formulating a new hypothesis to prove its truth.

But taken from the psychological view-point, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought—before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to others. (Einstein 1945)

Scientists reach the coherency of the new scientific picture only by evaluating the hypothesis experimentally, but in the imaginative phase, they only feel it in regard to background knowledge. So what is the difference between *Productive Imagination Creativity* of the artists and the *Productive Imagination Discovery* of the scientists, in their respective endeavors to represent reality? In the Pragmaticist epistemology, this is the difference between these two modes of representation, the artistic *aesthetic Epitomes* and the scientific *theoretical representations* of reality, that is analogical to Kant’s distinction between the *modus aestheticus* and the *modus logicus* of representation:




Figure 6.2 Genuine discovery of scientific theory by intellectual intuition of productive imagination solves the difficulties of previous theories.

Whenever we convey our thoughts, there are two ways (*modi*) of arranging them, and one of them is called *manner* (*modus aestheticus*), the other *method* (*modus logicus*); the difference between these two is that the first has no standard other than the *feeling* that there is unity in the exhibition [of the thought], whereas the second follows in [all of] these determinate *principles*; hence only the first applies to fine art. (Kant *CJ*: 318-319)

Hence, Kant's subjectivity of the aesthetic mode of feeling has no criterion for its determination as being detached from the criterion of external reality, we thus cannot explain the universality of our aesthetic experience in distinction from the realism of the Pragmaticist epistemology.

However, there is an epistemic-logical difference of operations, and therefore the proofs of their truth, between those two modes, the *Productive Imagination Creativity* of the artists and the *Productive Imagination Discovery* of the scientists. In the former, the productive imagination is in the *Deductive creation* and in the latter it is in the *Abductive discovery*. The creative imagination is an inferential interpretation from the *intellectual abstract general* knowledge to be exemplified in *particular sensual aesthetic* presentation of epitomes, the images created from the artist's experiential background knowledge of reality. One can see, for example, how Shakespeare creates the personality of Hamlet from his knowledge of how persons behave in conflicting situations and endeavor to keep their integrity and sanity; or how Tolstoy creates the personality of Karenina from knowing from his experience the conduct of women's strong love in impossible situations; or consider Picasso's experience of human cruelty in vicious wars, like in Guernica. The situation of scientists' epistemology in their *Abductive discovery* of new hypotheses is based on their difficulties with the existing theories and how they use their *intellectual imagination* to discover from them and from their background knowledge new revolutionary hypotheses to overcome the impossibility of the existing picture of reality. This is as Copernicus overcomes the limitation and difficulties of Ptolemy's theory of the solar system that cannot explain anymore the accepted observations; or Einstein's newly discovered General Relativity theory that explains the non-classical physical elements and velocities that the Newtonian dynamics cannot do due to their different contexts, which I defined as different proof-conditions: the proved true new observational facts and the new methods of proof.

Artists and Scientists Represent Reality through Their Cognitive Confrontation in Reality

Hence, Peirce criticized the Kantian phenomenology by hypothesizing and proving his realist epistemic logic as an explanation of human cognitive

confrontation in external reality to prove our true representation of it. We can explain that our aesthetic judgments of beauty regarding an artwork are due to their true aesthetic representation of reality that can be indicated through the harmony of intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas in the creation and evaluation of artworks. But, without a confrontation in reality there is no ground for the objective creation and evaluation of artworks in our judgments of taste, and in scientific feeling of the coherence and beauty of their hypotheses based on the proof of their true representation of reality (Nesher 2002a, 2005b, 2007a, 2021).

CONCLUSION: GENUINE ARTISTIC AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS ARE DIFFERENT MODES OF REPRESENTING REALITY

Fine Art and Science Are Different Cognitive Operations in Representing Reality

There is similarity in representation between scientific theories and fine arts and even myths as a kind of artistic epitomizing of characters, such as Apollo and Dionysus, representing types of persons and reality. In the creation of artworks by artists, and their evaluation by others, one continuously compares them with one's experience. The difference between the artist and the scientist in representing reality is that the former quasi-proves only instinctively the truth of artworks, while scientific hypotheses are proved rationally. This explains why artworks are regarded as fictions since we feel their truth only implicitly, while in science we prove it explicitly.

Every natural science will be worthless if its claims could not be tested by observation of nature; every art would be worthless if it was no longer able to move men, no longer able to illuminate for them the meaning of existence. (Heisenberg [1948]1974: 88)

Hence, from our sensual experience and inquiries into the nature of reality we develop our scientific theories and aesthetic artworks in order to represent reality truly and elevate our life through it.

Art and Science Are Different Modes of Representing Reality: "Aesthetically" and "Theoretically"

Aesthetic and *scientific* modes of representation differ in that the artist's representation of reality is by *aesthetic epitomizing* of characters and situations,

and the scientist's is by logical *abstraction of formulating* general theories. In dealing with artworks, we have feelings and emotional reactions of pleasure by which we aesthetically judge them as beautiful to indicate their beauty and truth in an aesthetic representation of reality. The proof and truth of scientific logical abstraction formulations are proved true at the rational level of self-control of the discovery, elaboration, and evaluation of the hypotheses, yet they are always relative to the accepted proof-conditions, the truth-conditions and the proof methods of theories.

Both Art and Science Prove the Truth of Their Representation of Reality and thus Have Truth in Beauty and Beauty in Truth

What is the beauty of scientific formulas and their proofs? The icons of aesthetic presentations in art and science have some similarity, and so does the indexical analogy between them in representing reality. Therefore, we can hypothesize that in both cases the feeling of aesthetic pleasure can be explained as true aesthetic representation of reality, though the modes of representations of art and science differ as individual epitomization and general formalization, respectively. However, the aesthetic components in the proof of truth are only parts of the entire proof, and it can help us feel the coherence of the operation of proving the truth of the created arts and the discovered hypotheses but cannot be the criterions of truth by themselves.

Chapter 7

On Post-Modern Artworks

A New Aesthetic Genre or Rather a Pseudo-Concept of Art, and Then “What, After All, Is a Work of Art?”

INTRODUCTION: POSTMODERNISM “THE END OF ART” DUE TO THE COMMERCIAL LATE CAPITALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL MISCONCEPTION OF ART, AESTHETIC, TRUTH AND BEAUTY OF ARTWORKS

The Idea of Modernism and the Enigma of the Postmodernist Conception of Art

The idea of Modernism is connected historically and socially with the development of the capitalist industrial society, its rationality, optimism, and realist creativity in art. In the past, we used the descriptor *beautiful* when something caused us to perceive and feel immediate pleasure; however, the enigma of postmodernist artworks is *that we perceive them as an Abuse of Beauty* and, hence, we cannot really know whether they are works of arts or rather artifacts. As a result, we are confused about “*what is art?*” (Danto 2003, 2013). Thus, in contrast to Modernism, we cannot know whether postmodern artworks are beautiful or not, and until we learn their languages and inquire into their real spirit in the contexts of their creation, we cannot decide whether they are art at all. In addition, it is unclear whether Postmodernism is an expression of all that remains *After the End of Art*, or is it an inquiry to discover *What After All Is a Work of Art?* (Danto 1997; Margolis 1999). Moreover, the postmodernists shift and the resulting question of what art is raises an urgent need to re-examine, epistemologically, the conceptions of *Art*, *Aesthetics*, the *Truth* and *Beauty* of artworks, and their cognitive roles in human life.

To inquire into the epistemology of art we can evaluate some case studies, e.g., Picasso’s search for the right conception of new genres and styles to express his

understanding of human reality, epitomized in aesthetic artworks. In reviewing the activities of artists like Picasso, we can further investigate the role of artists in creating artworks and, even more generally, the roles of *Theoretical*, *Moral*, and *Aesthetic* sciences in human life (Stein 1984, Harrington 2004).

Understanding the Concept of *Aesthetics* as Artworks' Mode of Representing Reality: A Re-examination of *Art*, *Aesthetics*, and the *Truth* and *Beauty* of Artworks

There are many uses of *Aesthetic*, and the difficulty is to explain its meaning in the epistemology of artistic creation and evaluation of artworks. Indeed, it is not the immediate subjective *pleasure* in experience, but a specific type of artistic creation, a representation of characters and situations emulated and rendered imaginatively and sensually, as in the examples of Don Quixote or Ana Karenina, as prototypes of human lives. Epistemologically we should not confuse *aesthetic* and *beauty*, since aesthetic representation can be *ugly* or *kitschy* and hence *aesthetic* is not always *pleasing*, but rather a specific mode through which reality is represented, in distinction from the perceptual, theoretical, and ethical modes of representing reality (Goodman 1968; Neshet 2004b).

In his Transcendental Epistemology, Kant makes the distinction between preconceptual Aesthetic Intuition as intuitive presentation of the phenomenal objects and the Transcendental Aesthetic as non-conceptual presentation of these sensual phenomena (Kant *CPuR*: Part I, 1781-87, *CJ*: 221, 1790). In following Peircean epistemological realist reconstruction of Kantian idealism, the Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic are the Normative Sciences that seek to gain empirical knowledge, and the artistic created artworks embody the aesthetic mode of representing reality beautifully. With this realistic epistemology, we can understand epistemologically the conceptions of *Aesthetics* as a mode of artistic representation of reality, and the created *artworks* are *beautiful* when proven as a *true* representation of reality.

This is crucial not only to understand the nature of the Aesthetic Science in comparison to the two other normative sciences, but also to enable us to understand epistemologically the affiliated concepts of Art, Truth, and Beauty in the aesthetic knowledge.

The Epistemology of Artistic Creation and Evaluation of Artworks and How the Postmodern Capitalist Economy and Culture Fetishized the Cognitive Role of Art and Its Value

Modernism is the development of the industrial society and culture, which led to a shift in the concept of artistic beauty, from the classic ideal to a

realist conceptualization of *beauty* as an aesthetic representation of reality. Postmodernism emerged during the period of late capitalism, when money and commercialism replaced developed industrialism, and consumption replaced creativity. At the same time, this created a cultural shift also in respect to artworks; hence, the postmodern commercial conception of art is that everything can be considered art and thus everything can be sold as artwork, including artifacts, forms of entertainment, and of course, conceptual art (Alberro 2003: 2; McEvelley 2005: Ch. 1; Galenson 2009: Ch. 9).

In Postmodern society, it is not clear whether artistically created artworks can be *beautiful* or even *ugly*; without any clear and distinct epistemological criteria for the conception of true Art, in many cases the issue of its beauty remains a matter of subjective feelings only. Likewise, it is impossible to differentiate between true, false, and even kitsch art, without proving its interpretation as a true aesthetic representation of reality. Moreover, given the confusion about the conception of *what after all is a work of art*, philosophers, art historians and critics are still inquiring whether, in contemporary Postmodernism—especially when compared to the classical image of art—we are already at *the end of art*, and therefore it is impossible to separate art from spiritless kitsch, pseudo-artwork, and erroneous or senseless works (Gogol, *The Portrait*, 1842).

The “Kitsch-man” (or woman) is one who either creates kitsch-works or who imbues them with the prestige of artworks, without understanding their aesthetic language, their content, or the intellectual ideas of the artist in creating the artwork (Broch [1933]1969; Calinescu 1987). The deadlock between Postmodernism and art is that we call *beautiful* whatever we perceive and feel immediately as enjoyable, but we cannot know whether artworks are beautiful or not unless we accept a realist epistemology through which to learn their languages, inquire into their real spirit, and evaluate their truth or falsity in their endeavor to represent reality.

THE SPIRIT OF MODERNISM, PICASSO AS A CASE STUDY, YET OF A DIFFERENT GENRE AND NEW ARTISTIC STYLES

Picasso’s Work as a Modernist: The Aesthetic Representation of Reality as He Understood It

Picasso endeavored to reveal in his portraits the inner self, the character of the portrayed subject, through a profoundly expressive and unexpected style, much like what Freud aimed to reveal through psychoanalysis. Yet the question is, how can he reveal the inside from the outside? In other words,

without researching the personal biographical context or the characters of *Gertrude Stein* or *Dora*, how can the external expression reveal the internal nature of the subject? To accomplish this, artists must reflect on their knowledge of the subject whom they wish to represent aesthetically, discover the intellectual ideas that represent the subject's inner reality. Indeed, Picasso was continually searching for the proper style of painting that would render a better aesthetic expression of the subjects' characters and situations, so as to provide a true representation of the reality he knows, e.g., *Guernica* (Stein 1984: 1-8 ff.).

Their aim, as politically motivated painters, is to tell the truth about our society. How is that goal to be achieved in visual form?

To write a history of art at all, it is perhaps necessary to deploy some notion of visual truth. (Roskill and Carrier 1983:114)

It seems that from 1905 Picasso began studying the innermost character of persons, and at the same time moved to the African cubist genre and style (cf. Stein 1984: pictures—13, 14, 16).

Picasso said once that he who created a thing is forced to make it ugly. In the effort to create the intensity and the struggle to create this intensity, the result always produces a certain ugliness, those who follow can make of this thing a beautiful thing because they know what they are doing, the thing having already been invented, but the inventor because he does not know what he is going to invent inevitably the thing he makes must have its ugliness. (Stein 1984: 9)

The explanation can be that the intellectual idea that triggers the artist's endeavor is to express, by aesthetic ideas, one's understanding of reality, though the artwork itself can appear ugly in the artist's previous intuition and the accepted common-sense. This suggests that to render a true aesthetic representation of reality as the artist understands it, the artist is forced to adopt new aesthetic ideas, as in Picasso's *Les Demoiselles D'Avignon* (1907). Hence, the artist is driven to elaborate a new genre or style, as in the case of Cubism, by the desire to be sincere and thus to adhere to his or her aesthetic role.

Then commenced the long period which Max Jacob has called the Heroic Age of Cubism, and it was a heroic age. All ages are heroic, that is to say there are heroes in all ages who do things because they cannot do otherwise and neither they nor the others understand how and why these things happened. One does not ever understand, before they are completely created, what is happening and

one does not at all understand what one has done until the moment it is all done.
(Stein 1984: 9)

In a similar line Stein describes how Picasso misunderstood what he did in discovering the new aesthetic cubist form of artistic expression.

At this period 1908–1909 Picasso had almost never exhibited his pictures, his followers showed theirs but he did not. He said that when one went to an exhibition and looked at the picture of the other painters one knows that they are bad, there is no excuse for it they are simply bad, but one's own pictures, one knows the reason why they are bad and so they are not haplessly bad. (Stein 1984: 9)

Thus, Picasso represented reality in his paintings, not as things immediately perceived, but as he thought and understood them to be in their essential inner nature. At first, these kinds of works seemed bizarre, but after understanding Picasso's cognitive ideas of reality, they were viewed differently, as representing and revealing the deeper truth and essence of a given reality.

The things that Picasso could see were the things which had their own reality, reality not of things seen but things that exist. It is difficult to exist alone and not being able to remain alone with things, Picasso first took as a crutch African art and latter other things.

...

He commenced the long struggle not to express what he could see but not to express the things he did not see, that is to say the things is everybody is certain of seeing but which they do not really see. As I have already said, in looking at a friend one only see one feature of her face or another, in fact Picasso was not at all simple and he analyzed his vision, he did not wish to paint the things that he himself did not see, the other painters satisfied themselves with the appearance, and always the appearance, which was not at all what they could see but what they knew was there. (Stein 1984: 19)

The challenge is to explain how the artist can see in reality some deeper layers that a common person cannot see and know yet. It can be explained epistemologically that to know reality we have to interpret what we perceived and to prove the truth of such interpretation. However, this we can do by inquiring about the wider context of our immediate experience (Nesher 2007b). Thus, a sensitive and intellectual artist inquires about the historical and cultural period of relevance, in an attempt to understand and then emulate or express his or her ideas in the artwork. The resulting aesthetic representation of the artist's reality is presented as new knowledge for the benefit of the artists' contemporaries.

Picasso as a Modern Artist Looking for and Working with True New Genres to Represent Reality

According to the above analysis, Picasso began to look for a new understanding of the role of artistic painting in representing reality. Thus, in distinction from some of his predecessors, he did not aim to present what he saw only aesthetically, but rather, realistically. This is in distinction from the Phenomenalists who aimed to represent solely the appearance, i.e., their “sense data”—to use the terminology of the neo-Kantian Internal Realists, and from the neo-Cartesian Metaphysical Realists, who assume a metaphysical reality and thus cannot prove their knowledge of it. Nevertheless, they somehow manage to represent reality, but with the intuitive imagination, and without a rational understanding of it. Picasso and his colleagues endeavored to develop new genres, to be able to better represent their ideas about reality.

The aims of Cubism are plastic. We only saw it as a means of expression what we saw with our eyes and minds, expressing it with all the potentiality that drawing and color possess in their own right. (Picasso, an interview with Zayas cr.1923, in O’Brian 1976: 167)

However, to represent aesthetically “what we saw with our eyes and minds” is indeed what we know from our intellectual ideas, which is the reality beyond what we see phenomenally; accordingly, it requires different manners, genres or styles, as, for example, Picasso’s picture of *Dora Maar Seated* (1937).

But after all, this problem remained, how to express not things seen in association but the things really seen, not things interpreted but things really known at the time of knowing them. All his life this had been his problem but the problem had become more difficult than ever, now that he was completely master of his technic he no longer had any real distraction, he could no longer have the distraction of learning, his instrument was perfect. (Stein 1984: 35-36)

If this is what Stein understood from Picasso himself, we might consider him as the prototype of Modernism, in distinction from, let us say the Phenomenalist Impressionism that expressed more of their feelings and emotional reaction to modern life than rational ideas of a severe reality, and moreover, in distinction from the Postmodernist nihilism that entertains with art, and so on (e.g., Stein 1984: 22-23; O’Brian 1976: Ch. XI, pp. 256-259; Nesher 2002a: III; cf. Kandel 2012).

Picasso as a Modernist Creating New Genres to Aesthetically Represent His Modern Reality

Thus Picasso can be seen as a researcher of the aesthetic science, aiming to represent reality truly—and hence—beautifully, so that we might enhance our knowledge of it and know better how to conduct our life in reality.

Art does not evolve by itself, the ideas of people change and with them their mode of expression. . . . If an artist varies his mode of expression this only means that he is changes his manner of thinking, and in changing, it might be for the better or it might be for the worse. . . . If the subjects I have wanted to express have suggested different ways of expressions I have never hesitated to adopt them. . . . Whenever I had something to say, I have said it in the manner in which I have felt it ought to be said. Different motives inevitably require different methods of expression. This does not imply either evolution or progress, but an adaptation of the idea one wants to express and the means to express that idea. (Picasso an interview with Zayas cr.1923, in O'Brian 1976: 256-258)

Of course, Picasso is not a philosopher or a historian of art, but he expresses clearly the relation between the intellectual ideas of the artist and the aesthetic manners or means by which the artist wants to express these ideas in the created aesthetic work; the artwork itself serves as an aesthetic representation of reality. By contrast, the postmodernist artists might replace creativity by producing kitsch works, which are both technically easier to produce and economically more profitable. It is fruitful to learn from Apollinaire about the spirit of Modernism in painting as distinct from the premodern artists, and yet, his criticism of the latter seems to lack epistemological and historical analysis and perspective (Apollinaire [1902-1918]1972).

If painters still observe nature, they no longer imitate it, and they carefully avoid the representation of nature scenes observed directly or reconstituted through study. Modern art rejects all the means of pleasing that were employed by the greatest artists of the past: the perfect representation of the human figure, voluptuous nudes, carefully finished details, etc. . . . Today's art is austere, and even most prudish senator could find nothing to criticize in it.

If the aim of painting has remained what it always was, namely, to give pleasure to the eye the works of the new painters require the viewer to find in them a different kind of pleasure from the one he can just as easily find in the spectacle of nature. (Apollinaire "On the Subject in Modern Painting" [1912]1972)

While making distinction between art and kitsch, it is mistaken to consider the premodern artists as copying nature and persons in order to please the

spectators; rather, with their genres and different styles they were searching to represent the spirit or the characters as they understood them through their intellectual ideas. And yet, the modern artists having different intellectual ideas, were looking for new genres and styles to represent their deep understanding of reality, as we can see in Picasso and other modern artists.

THE MODERNIST EXPERIMENTATION WITH NEW GENRES OF ARTWORKS REPRESENTING REALITY AND THE POSTMODERNIST MOCKED ART

Picasso's Realism in Distinction from Duchamp's Formalist Elimination of Aesthetic Artworks

We can epistemologically investigate the distinction between two salient and creative personalities, Picasso and Duchamp, who represent, respectively, the abyss between realist Modernism and nihilist Postmodernism, in regard to the conception and the role of art in human culture and society. They present, implicitly if not explicitly, critical distinctions in the conceptions of *art*, *aesthetic*, *beauty*, and eventually the *truth* of artistic aesthetic representation of reality and human conduct in it.

The shift in art-world domination from Paris to New York in the postwar period is summed up by Marcel Duchamp's *boite-en-Valise*. The work comprises a collection of miniatures and samples of the French-born artist's pre-1935 output . . .

The objects presented in the *boite* attested to cultural mutations. Early oil paintings by the artist were represented via reproduction. Objects which had once been 'readymades' (the term Duchamp applied to the mass-produced objects he had accorded art status) now has a paradoxically 'crafted' quality (the urinal is the case in point). The *boite* also spoke of commodification. Part of an edition (initially a "de luxe" one of 24), it represented, in Duchamp's words, "mass production on a modest scale." (Hopkins 2000: 37)

However, let us compare Picasso's interesting creation of the *Bull's Head* of 1942 with Duchamp's (urinal) *Fountain* of 1917. Picasso uses a bicycle seat and their handles to represent aesthetically the head of bull, with the possible interpretation that the artist had the intellectual idea to convey the expression *to take the bull by the horns* in an aesthetic idea, the work of the *Bull Head*. The question is whether an analogy can be drawn between Picasso's use of bicycle components to create the *Bull's Head* and Duchamp's use of an industrial ready-made urinal *to "create" Fountain*. Indeed, this is a misguided analogy, because it equates creative artwork with a readymade object. In the case of Duchamp's

urinal *Fountain*, the industrial object, the artifact in its entirety, is presented primarily to undermine people's perception of art and perhaps to advertise or sell it as artwork. Picasso, in his ingenious artistic idea, created a new style of artwork to represent reality, be it the reality of the bull fight or the reality of the bombing of Guernica, e.g. 1933-1937. The confusion is to think that Picasso's *Bull's Head* is a readymade object, instead of the juxtaposition of different objects to compose an original sculpture. If we consider the *Bull's Head* as an artifact, then we might as well consider Van Gogh's painting of *Sunflowers* an artifact too, as he used the artifacts of paints, brushes and canvas to create his painting. Yet Van Gogh and Picasso are creative artists with their genres and specific styles, which they employ to aesthetically represent reality.

There is an epistemological schism between the intellectual perspectives of Modernism and Postmodernism, in terms of the cognitive and social role of artists in the particular historical context, and in terms of the ways the artists understand the reality, implicitly or explicitly. The modernist and postmodernist artistic movements interacted and became interwoven during the first half of the twentieth century, a period marked by the calamities of the two World Wars. Hence the difficult epistemological question is to explain how these movements differ in their conceptions of art, what is Art after all, or is Picasso's artistic creation modern or postmodern in respect to his new genre and different artistic styles? The answer cannot be merely intuitive or historical: the interweaving of different artistic periods and movements affects also the cultural conflict between art and pseudo-art, which is affected by the economic, social, and political powers operating in human society (Calinescu 1987; Jameson 1991; Carroll 2000; Hopkins 2000; McEvilley 2005; Galenson 2009).

Modernism and Postmodernism are not just historical epochs, characterizing—let us say—the last two centuries, starting with the entrenchment and flourishing of industrial capitalism through to the late capitalist commodification and the early signs of its deterioration. From the social, cultural and artistic perspectives, these two movements are associated with different social and intellectual tendencies. The two movements confront one another to manifest the optimism of modernist realism and the pessimism of postmodernist nihilism in respect to culture, creative arts, and the competitive avant-gardes social movements (Jameson 1991; Butler 2002).

Hence, with realist-empirical epistemology we can explain their different conceptions of the place of art in society, the role of the artist in creating and evaluating the artwork, and art's contribution to our understanding of ourselves and the reality in which we conduct our lives. However, it is essential to separate created art and its representation of reality from the entertainment and the commercial values of artworks, a by-product of the crisis and the dehumanization of the deteriorating capitalist society (Calinescu 1987: 263ff.; Butler 2002: Ch. 4).

A Postmodernist-Post Structuralist reading may also move outside the text—all text—in order to make contact with social reality. (Harland 1999: 241)

Indeed, what are the artists' new intellectual ideas as they search for new aesthetic modes of representing reality—their new aesthetic ideas about their artworks? How can we explain epistemologically the ways in which social reality affects the reconceptualization of reality and of artistic intellectual ideas, which the artist seeks to convey by creating the aesthetic works of art (Barasch 2000-3:48-49; Harrison 1997: Ch. I; Neshet 2004b)?

Programmatic Manifestations and Practices of Avant-Garde Art Movements: Symbolism, Cubism, Dada, Surrealism, Abstract Art and Conceptual Art

In order to understand the question “what is art?” we have to explore the epistemology of artistic creation and evaluation of the aesthetic artworks, their role in society and their working in history. This entails exploring periodization of historical cultures, attitudes to empirical reality, and intellectual and social movements. However, in discussing the question of the nature of art in modern and postmodern epochs and tendencies, including in the contemporary situation, the difficulty is to explain the various artistic movements of the avant-garde: the trends of constructive realist progression and distractive relativist-nihilism, in relation to the nature and role of art in society and the aesthetic knowledge of reality. Therefore, the avant-garde movements differ from each other in terms of their social and political trends, their conceptions of Art and the implicit or explicit epistemologies as exemplified, let us say, by Picasso and Duchamp, respectively (McEvelley 1993: Introduction, 2005: Ch. 1—Kant, Duchamp, and Dada).

As radically new forms of art were appearing, the radicality of the transition seemed to indicate to many that some really unusual and historical culmination was about to dawn, something beyond the linked problem-and-solution approach to art history that had obtained for at least two hundred years. The artists who were in the forefront of the transition felt that they were going through a breakthrough that would culminate in something like the end of art history, or the transition to a wholly new developmental phase. They slowly underwent the realization that history was over and with it the meaningful direction of everyone's work. The artist now lived in the post-historical situation that Danto described with the sentence “History is dead, and everything is permitted.” New lines of work appeared that had no inherent parameters or sense of meaning, that could go anywhere at any time, and pointed again and again to the shattering of the myth of the wholeness of art and culture and even civilization. (McEvelley 2005: 367-368)

This historical and cultural situation of the break and crisis in the evolving and meaning of artistic creation requires epistemological inquiry and explanation to release humanity from what seems as a cultural deadlock. The following social and cultural art movements combine ideological and political inclinations with revolutionary genres and styles; moreover, they demonstrate the interplay between creative artworks, cultural entertainment, and commercial interests: *Symbolism* (Charles Baudelaire; Edgar, A. Poe; Jean Moreas), *Abstract Art* (Wassily Kandinsky), *Cubism* (Georges Braque; Pablo Picasso), *Dada* (Marcel Duchamp; Man Ray.; Francis Picabia), *Surrealism* (Andre Breton), *Pop Art* (Roy Lichtenstein; Andy Warhol), *Abstract Impressionism* (Marc Chagall), *Abstract Expressionism* (Jackson Pollock; Mark Rothko), and *Conceptual Art* (Joseph Kosuth).

It is worth dealing with the unique approach of *conceptual art*, in which the concept of the object determining the production of the *artifact*, is the object that conceptually thought beforehand. Hence, the artifact is not the artwork *aesthetic ideas* that represent reality, but rather the *artifact* presented by the initial *concept*, or what Kant calls *intellectual ideas*. If the *intellectual ideas* are not creatively interpreted into the imaginative *aesthetic ideas*, there can be no artistic aesthetic representation of reality, which epistemologically is the role of art as aesthetic knowledge.

In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. (LeWitt 1967)

McEvelley (2005) explains that anti-art is not the rejection of art, but rejection of the meaning of art as it is used in Modernism and changing it in Postmodernism, especially after the upheaval of the twentieth century World Wars and the cruelty of the capitalist society. Therefore, *what is the epistemology of creating and evaluating artworks?* Given that the aesthetic science of knowledge is an essential component of human life, then “*the end of art*” is the end of the full-fledged human society. Yet, it seems that this is not what philosophers understand this slogan to mean; therefore, our task is to explain epistemologically, what is the nature of art in order to understand where we stand now (McEvelley 2005: 17). Indeed, there are different descriptions and analyses of how to understand those avant-garde social and cultural movements and whether they only suggest new genres and styles of art or rather new conception of what can be understood as artworks. In fact, there have been attempts to display the destruction of art as a new conception of art, which actually is only construction of artifacts that serve as entertainment commodities for commercialization. Hence our essential question is whether

we face new genres of art, the destruction of its most recent manifestations, or the end of creating art, due to the late capitalist economy that sacrificed the creativity of the artist in favor of extraneous interests.

In short, to say that he [Picabia] produces paintings in order to be “naughty” explains little about why he produced the paintings in the specific ways he did. One of the problems with the kind of art history that suppresses this sort of inquiry, therefore, is the way it divorces intentions from technical decisions, and as such from the way intentions are made out of technical decisions. Intentions are not performed entities that get illustrated at the point of artistic production (through, of course, beliefs and ideological commitments ontologically informed what might and might not be reasonably picked out), but generated out of the tension between given competences and the incompetence of certain moves tried out in the face of the resistance of given cognitive and aesthetic materials. Thus a history of modernism as a history of successive “ruination” [ruins] of artistic antecedents does not explain why in particular such “ruination” took the forms that it did. This is merely Mifflin’s “art history without names” in update guise. As such, *Inter Alia* [Dave Beech and Mark Hutchinson] argue that the structure of the work is not ancillary to the intention to ruin. (Roberts 1994: 23; See p. 53; Dave Beech and Mark Hutchinson, in Roberts 1994: 37-62)

Indeed, for example, we can understand the avant-garde Cubism as a transformational phase, veering from the modern-phenomenal paintings towards the new modes of representing the inner character of the person or object, in distinction from pseudo-art and kitsch (Faulkner and Ziegfeld 1969:432-433; Eddy 1914; Apollinaire [1911]1972).

The link between kitsch (whose dependence on fads and rapid obsolescence makes it the major form of expendable “art”) and economic development is indeed so close that one may take the presence of the kitsch in countries of the “Second” or (Third) world as an unmistakable sign of modernization. Once kitsch is technically possible and economically profitable, the proliferation of cheap or not-so-cheap imitations of everything—from primitive or folk art to the latest avant-garde—is limited only by the market. (Calinescu 1987: 226)

However, in Peircean realist epistemological reconstruction of Kant’s conception of art, artists are the researchers of the aesthetic science who aim to represent reality truly, and hence, beautifully, in order to enhance our knowledge of it and thus to afford us insights on how to better conduct our life in society, and to change it in accordance with their understanding of the undercurrents of reality. This understanding was implicit or explicit in the

history of art and become clearer in the development of artistic movements in the beginning of the twentieth century, which reacted to the mischiefs of the capitalist-bourgeois societies and the disasters of the wars that ensued. However, the new trends of the postmodernist artists' movements tended to misunderstand and neglect the social role of the aesthetic science in representing reality truly and hence beautifully. Moreover, as Duchamp's urinal *Fountain* clearly illustrates, postmodern works sought to abuse the social role of the aesthetic science, thus creating the impression that Postmodernism is the end of art (McEvelley 2005; Margolis 1999, 2003; Danto 2003, 2013). Yet the development of artists' intellectual idea about their reality and the discovery of new genres and styles by which to aesthetically express their ideas through art suggest that artists' role in aesthetic science keeps them involved in social action. However, it is essential to distinguish between artists' artistic creation and their participation in social activities, whereby the latter may be connected to their aesthetic representation of reality, yet it differs from their artistic creations. Indeed, in avant-garde movements, the distinction between those two tendencies—of the aesthetic science and the political activities—seems to be a delicate one, and it might be interesting to observe the ways in which artists' social activities have evolved under the guidance of their artistic creativity. Just as any scientific knowledge can direct our activities in reality, in a similar manner, created artworks can direct our conduct, as is indeed the intention of the avant-garde Surrealism, unless the epistemology behind the artwork is not realistic and cannot explain or direct the creation and evaluation of artworks (Peirce 1906, *EPII*: #27; Nesher 2005b).

Pragmaticist Epistemology of Creating and Evaluating Artworks Reveals That Historical Theories of Art and Artist Movements Manifest Only Some Aspects of Art

The difficulty art historians face is to distinguish between modernism and postmodernism in art, by means of any particular historical feature and artistic aesthetic properties of the artworks. This is especially difficult, given that these can change and evolve, as Butler (2002) suggests in the following excerpt.

Indeed, much of the significant artistic activity of the period since 1945 (and more particularly, for our purpose, since 1970) managed a compromise between modernist and postmodernist ideas. (Of course, there is going to be just as much difficulty in defining 'modernism' in contrast to 'postmodernism' as there is in defining postmodernism itself, and some artists are very difficult to categorize in this respect.)

...


Many distinguished writers like Eco, have some very obvious postmodernist elements, but they also have a number of more enduring conservative features,

which indeed help to place them more nearly at the center of the culture, as it is very likely to wish to remember itself. (Butler 2002: 125-126)

As previously mentioned, although modernism and postmodernism were dominant in different historical periods, the two cultures work together and have become interwoven in the last two centuries. Consequently, when trying to characterize artists' styles in their created artworks, the method by which a clear distinction can be drawn is the epistemology of the creation and evaluation of artworks, in respect to the historical distinction between, let us say, the two different stages of capitalism and the cultural and intellectual movements at work within each of them.

Taking the Pragmaticist epistemology of creating and evaluating artworks, we note that all historical theories of art and the movements of artists and writers with their manifests, emphasize only some aspects of the artistic methodical operations. Nevertheless, the art historians see them as the sole essential factor of artistic creation and evaluation: the artists' aesthetic ideas and intellectual ideas, the contents and the forms of their intentions in the creation of artworks, the feeling of their harmony, the feeling of the truth of the artwork, the sincerity of the author-artist, and so on (Faulkner and Ziegfeld 1969:430ff.). The following is the Peircean reconstruction of the Kantian intuition of artistic creation and evaluation of artworks: the threefold stages of the artistic creation and evaluation of artwork representing reality, upon common-sense knowledge that constitutes the accepted knowledge of our three normative sciences, the Theoretical, Ethical, and Aesthetic.

The artist with his spirit and productive imaginative "free play" interprets the generality of *intellectual ideas* into the singularity of *aesthetic ideas* and thus exhibits the intended artwork. In such a quasi-deductive inference the artist is exercising, a'la Kant, the *reflective manner (modus aestheticus)*, to achieve a harmonious interpretation between the ideas of Understanding, the



AQ: Please provide in-text citation for figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.6

Figure 7.1 The artist's creation of artwork and his reflective free play to harmonize intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas: The role of productive imagination.

Imagination, and the unity of aesthetic ideas of the created artwork. This is an elaboration of Kantian aesthetics, but by replacing Kant's subjective conception of *Harmony* with the Peircean notion of "confrontation in reality," we obtain an objective criterion of truth and beauty. Indeed, such a reality is represented by the Common-Sense Knowledge of Reality, which is the historical accumulation of the perceptual and scientific knowledge available to the artists in their creation and evaluation of their artworks (Kant *CJ*: 1781-87; Nesher 1994, 2007a).

The difficulty is to explain the principal role of art and the aim of the artist, whether it is to imitate nature, decorate our life, entertain us, or to represent reality aesthetically and beautifully in such a way that would guide our conduct in it, prompting us to get involved in moral activities and political movements, to change reality according to the knowledge and the impetus we gained from the created artworks. However, it is interesting to explain how a piece of artwork can affect our cognitions to help and elaborate our social, moral, and intellectual conduct in reality. Indeed, this is equivalent to the effects of an interpersonal interaction, such that the artist, by expressing his intellectual ideas about reality in creating imaginatively the aesthetic ideas embodied in the artwork, produces an aesthetic representation of our reality, which we contemplate and enjoy. Thus, Quixote or Karenina, affecting our own spiritual images that are beautiful precisely because they are expressing our understanding of our own life. In other words, art's purpose is to enable us to bring to mind the truth about ourselves, and so to become aware who we truly are and how to behave in life. Art therefore is not just for art's sake, but for knowledge and beauty's sake, for the sake of a distinctively sensuous form of human self-expression and self-understanding.

ART AND ANTI-ART: DOES CONCEPTUAL ART REALLY REPRESENT REALITY AESTHETICALLY?

"Conceptual Art and Imageless Truth": No Art without Iconic and Indexical Imagination and Aesthetic Representation

Roberts, in his "Conceptual art and imageless truth" confused philosophical arguments and aesthetic practice. However, there can be no art without aesthetic imagination, as art cannot be "a kind of formal language," because without the imaginative aesthetic embodiment of the concepts, the intellectual ideas of the artist, there cannot be created any artworks (Roberts 2004; Kosuth 1991: 84; cf. Goldie and Schellekens 2010). The question is whether the construction of artifacts is intended as *Tricks or entertainments*. By

explaining the epistemology of what is called *conceptual art* we can decide how to understand it and whether it is art at all or only *Tricks or entertainments or crafts*, that artists employ to expose themselves to the public eye, in an attempt to leave an impression and thus, by manufacturing new and attractive commodities for the collectors, they hope to gain a foothold in the commercial business of the *arts* and *crafts* market (Alberro 2003: 1-2; Galenson 2009: Ch. 15; Goldie and Schellekens 2010: Ch. 3).

Are artworks attributable only to physical objects as it seems with paintings and sculptures, and other visual artworks, or rather can they be understood epistemologically as pertaining to certain cognitive functions, as is the case with poetry, literature, and probably music, which their linguistic attributes and written characters are also physical marks but less distinctive? According to Kant, artworks are not physical objects, but aesthetic ideas, our aesthetic truth revealed as a beautiful representation of reality.

Instead of the historical approach, the approach we will adopt will begin by considering some of the features or characteristic that are often taken to be associated with, or typical of, conceptual art, even if they are not definitive of it. (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 10-11) . . .

Self-reflectiveness which is ironic goes one step further. It not only acknowledges its own activity, but also in some sense playfully pokes fun of it, or in some way undermines it. This ironic self-reflectiveness is exemplified by Duchamp's *fountain*. Part of Duchamp's aim in his artistic statement was to challenge the definition of art and the role of the artist in art making, and he did this in a highly self-reflective and playful manner. (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 13)

Indeed, the self-reflectiveness, which is an ironic criticism of the historical approach to art, can be considered a conceptual critical device introduced in order to change our intuition about and the definition of art, as well as the role of the artist in society. However, such a critical device fails to offer a positive alternative to the traditional common-sense intuition, as the readymade object can only serve to present a rational criticism, but not any form of created art. Employing realist epistemology according to the Peircean epistemological reconstruction of the Kantian transcendental theory of art makes it possible to avoid the phenomenological understanding of the historical approach to artworks, by elaborating the cognitive conceptions of *art*, *aesthetics*, and *beauty*, and thus viewing the role of artistic art in society as providing the *true* aesthetic representation of reality.

Again what we see here is the ironic self-reflectiveness about art—and about art-making—that is characteristic of conceptual art . . . (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 13)

Aren't we right, then, to feel that our traditional common-sense notions of art are being threatened, and to feel resentment and frustration at what the art world is putting in front of us for our appreciation? Or are our everyday commonsense ideas about what art is, and what art ought to be, really so inviolable that we should dismiss all conceptual art outright, as failing to match up to what we expect? Perhaps what we've called the enacted thought experiments of conceptual art really *ought* to make us rethink some of our traditional ideas about art and about aesthetic. (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 34)

Challenging our traditional ideas about art or reflecting on the common-sense conception of art, by positing, à la Duchamp, ironic self-reflectiveness about art, can be considered, at best, a philosophical or cultural exercise intended to question what art is. However, such a philosophical or critical move, in and of itself, cannot be considered art. Hence, if such conceptual art cannot be art, but is in essence criticism of the accepted conception of art, then such work belongs in the journals of art critique, but not at all in art exhibitions or art museums. Hence, the only reason to consider them as so-called *artworks* is because doing so corresponds to the commercial interests of the artists and the marketing institutions.

How are we to perceive, assess, and enjoy conceptual art, given that it has no physical medium? What should we look out for, and by what criteria should we judge it? . . . Now, faced with conceptual art, we find ourselves in an uncharted definitional, ontological, epistemological evaluative waters—drift too, without a point where we can firmly make anchor in order to get our bearings in our unfamiliar surroundings. (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 62-63)

However, Goldie and Schellekens (2010) analyse and explain the conception of art using the effective—albeit limited—concept of common-sense, instead of analysing epistemologically and experientially the philosophical theories of art, to reconstruct them so as to reveal that the realist epistemology of aesthetic artworks is the aesthetic true representation of reality. This is what makes the artworks beautiful, but always relative to their contexts, namely the *relative proof-conditions* for their beauty (Nesher 2004b). Our aesthetic mode of knowledge of reality enables us to know better our life and to develop our conduct in society. Indeed, the aesthetic mode of knowledge is similar to other modes of knowledge, both theoretically and ethically; in contrast, conceptual art has nothing to do with an aesthetic mode of knowledge. It is, at best, a craft used for purposes of entertainment and commercial enterprise (Jameson 1991; Nesher 2002a: X, 2007a, 2007b; Kieran and Lopes 2007: Part I; Galenson 2009: Ch. 15).

Dealing with “conceptual art,” the difficulty is to understand whether it is beautiful or not, since we cannot have any objective criteria for being so or

otherwise. As conceptual artworks do not represent any reality but are only interpretations of the concepts represented by means of the artistic artefact, we cannot decide whether the interpretations are true or false or rather that they are only subjective and as such those interpretations are only due to the feelings of the interpreters (Nesher 2004b, 2007b). Therefore, we can consider conceptual artifacts as only *tricks or sources of entertainment*, which can help their owners to sale them as special commodities (Alberro 2003; Roskill 1989; Kieran and Lopes 2007: Introduction, Part I).

... we hope we have shown that conceptual art, and the idea of idea, really does represent a significant break with traditional art—a more significant one than we find from other kinds of art that have gone before. This isn't surprising because many of the conceptual artists whose work we've been looking at have explicitly set out to challenge art's received wisdom and traditional, orthodox notions. Connected with this is the fact that so much conceptual art is philosophically knowing, for conceptual artists often turned to philosophy to help them make good challenges. (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: 135-136)

Yet, even though conceptual art is philosophically self-knowing, it is not art but a rational critique of the traditional conception of art. In the same vein, it is also not a philosophical inquiry into the epistemological understanding of what art is, as we can find in Kant and in Peirce's conception of aesthetic science dealing with the epistemology of art. (Peirce *EPII*: # 27, 1906; Nesher 2007a).

Indeed, it is interesting to see how a faulty philosophical-epistemology brings to a misconception of art and thus to conceptual art. Yet conceptual art can be considered as an explicit elaboration upon the leading, inspiring intellectual ideas of artworks. However, if "art is the continuation of philosophy" (Kosuth 1991), then there can be different kinds of art according to the different philosophical-epistemologies that they continue. And yet, if some such philosophies cannot explain art without encountering certain predicaments, then so also the artworks that follow them are likewise suspicious. Thus, can philosophy determine art or science and what is its function in them? But yet, we can think that artworks present philosophical systems, In Kosuth's *One and Three Chairs*, the Three Chairs visualize the Platonic idea of Chair; but then, this is only an idealist deductive inference of material objects, which even Plato regretted later on in his writings, and it is not the same as explaining or defining what is art. So what is the function of philosophy in art?

Deciding arbitrarily and subjectively what is artistic and what is art effectively makes art everything or even nothing. The alternative, however, is to epistemologically and historically inquire into the cognitive role of art, taking into consideration the realist suggestion that art is an aesthetic mode of

representing reality and gaining knowledge. The artistic aesthetic representation of reality, following Peirce and Goodman's illustration, is that the artist, in her or his genuine endeavors to create artwork, also experientially proves the work as a true representation of reality and so proves also its aesthetic beauty (Goodman 1978: VI.5, 1984: IV.4; Nesher 2004b, 2005b, 2007a). Moreover, the Pragmatist-realist epistemology of the beauty of artwork as an aesthetic true representation of reality explains that the meaning of *aesthetic* is not only the common-sense subjective feeling of pleasure. Rather, the artist's intellectual ideas of reality are creatively interpreted into aesthetic ideas, the artwork itself, which is the aesthetic mode of representing reality. This definition pertains to all artworks and not only to visual arts, whereby, by virtue of being true are also beautiful. Duchamp, in contrast suggests that the beauty derives from the pleasure itself.

But for Kosuth, this process is not necessarily connected to any kind of visual form. The propositional function of the Conceptual art object is not bound by the traditional dictates of material visualization: "Objects are conceptually irrelevant to the condition of art." Given Kosuth's attack on post-Romantic aesthetics, this would appear to be uncontroversial. Yet this anti-aestheticism does not entail a subsumption of art under the discursive interests of philosophy or politics, and so on. . . . (Roberts 2004: 316-317).

However, in respect to the conception of *aesthetic*, it is epistemologically essential to distinguish between the feelings of beauty of natural and artificial objects and the created artworks and so also about the aesthetic judgments of them as they are used commonsensically (Hegel [1835]1975: Int.). Moreover, by means of a realistic reconstruction of Kant's conceptions of aesthetics, the *Aesthetic Intuition* is related to sensual intuition of objects and the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is the representation of the former as existing in space and time. By a realist reconstruction of the Kantian Transcendental Epistemology, we can understand that the mode of the artistic created artworks is aesthetic true representation of the reality as initially understood intellectually, comparable to Kantian conceptions of intellectual ideas which the artist expresses subjectively, and that the aesthetic ideas are the artistic mode of representing reality truly. This can explain the conceptual artists' criticism, their conception of the aesthetic in respect to what they consider art, e.g., Duchamp's *Fountain*, which is neither real artwork nor an aesthetic artifact (Goldie and Schellekens 2010: Ch. 4).

The question is whether, in conceptual art, the aesthetic representation is the illustration of the intellectual ideas and conceptual attitudes, or whether we understand and discover the artist's intellectual ideas from the aesthetic ideas, which serve to guide the interpretation of the artwork, literature, etc.

(Roskill 1989; comp. Neshet 2003). As I already explained, the so-called philosophy of conceptual art is not art at all, but at best intuitive criticism of the traditional and philosophical conception of art, namely, the Kantian philosophical intuition about artistic genius creation of artworks, and moreover, a misunderstanding of the epistemology of artwork and hence the concept of art (Danto 2003: Introduction and Ch. 1-especially: 19).

The Epistemology of Conceptual Art is to Interpret Concepts in Objects, but the Conceptualists Do Not Create Artistic Aesthetic True Representations of Reality

It might be that in the variety of the so-called historical time of Postmodern artistic works, there are also many artistic activities that are genuine creations and true aesthetic representations of reality, and not just false, kitsch or artifacts, none of which is considered artwork at all. Yet can we distinguish between what we consider better or less true artworks, by *explaining* the meaning of their contents and, according to Kant, the level of the *harmony* between their intellectual ideas and the aesthetic ideas and, furthermore, by considering how we are affected and how we understand their representation of reality in respect to our own knowledge of reality (Kant *CJ*, [1790]1987; Neshet 2005b). In this respect, it is interesting to investigate Magritte's *Attempting the Impossible*, 1928, and Picasso's *The Artist and his Model*, 1914 or *Girl before a Mirror*, 1932 in distinction from Duchamp's *Bottle Rack*, 1914 and *Fountain*, 1917, Pollock's *One*, 1950, and Kosuth's "*Titled*" (*Art as Idea*), 1967 (cf. Collingwood 1938: IX *Sensation and Imagination*, X *Imagination and Consciousness*, XII #3 "*Good Art and Bad Art.*" X: #7 "*Consciousness and Truth,*" on "the 'corruption' of consciousness"; McEvilley 1995; Kuspit 2004: Ch. 2).

To understand the distinction between artistic, genuine, reflective, self-controlled creation and evaluation of artworks, on the one hand, and the conceptual exposition of artifacts, on the other hand, we have to inquire into the different cognitive operations to achieve their different goals.

But expressing an emotion is the same thing as becoming conscious about it. A bad work of art is the unsuccessful attempt to become conscious of a given emotion: it is what Spinoza calls an inadequate idea of an affection. Now, a consciousness which thus fails to grasp its own emotions is a corrupt or untruthful consciousness. For its failure (like any other failure) is not a mere blankness; it is not a doing nothing; it is misdoing something; it is activity, but blundering or frustrated activity. . . .

The corruption of consciousness in virtue of which a man fails to express a given emotion makes his in the same time unable to know whether he has

expressed it or not. He is, therefore, for one and the same reason, a bad artist and a bad judge of his own art. A person who is capable of producing bad art cannot, so far as he is capable of producing it, recognize it for what it is. He cannot, on the other hand, really think it good art; he cannot think that he has expressed himself when he is not. To mistake bad art for good art would imply having in one's mind an idea of what good art is, and one has such an idea only so far as one knows what it is to have an uncorrupted consciousness; but no one can know this except a person who possesses one. An insincere mind, so far as it is insincere, has no conception of sincerity. (Collingwood 1938: XII: ##2, 3; cp. Croce [1902]1992: X; Neshet 1994)

This criticism of the production of bad art is explainable by the lack of artistic spirit and also, the artistic failure of cognitive reflective self-control on the creation and evaluation of one's artwork, which is indirectly also theoretical criticism of Kant's dichotomy between the creation and the evaluation of artworks. Moreover, his conception of aesthetic judgment operating by *Aesthetic Intuition* of a phenomenal object, natural or artifact, and not of the created *aesthetic ideas* of the artwork itself. Indeed, "it is misdoing something; it is activity, but blundering or frustrated activity" as in Collingwood, above (Neshet 2007a).

But nobody's consciousness can be wholly corrupt. . . . Corruptions of consciousness are always partial and temporary lapses in an activity which, on the whole, is successful in doing what it tries to do. A person who on one occasion fail to express himself is a person quite accustomed to express himself successfully on other occasions, and to know that he is doing it. Through comparison of this occasion with his memory of these others, therefore, he ought to be able to see that he has failed, this time to express himself. And this is precisely what every artist is doing when he says, "This line would not do." He remembers what the experience of expressing himself is like, and in the light of that memory he realizes that the attempt embodied in this particular line has been a failure. Corruption of consciousness is not a recon-dite sin or remote calamity which overcomes only an unfortunate or accursed few; it is a constant experience in the life of every artist, and his life is a constant and, on the whole, a successful warfare against it. But this warfare always involves a very present possibility of defeat; and then a certain corruption becomes inveterate. (Collingwood 1938: XII: ##2, 3)

This could be the source of the turn to conceptual art or to some other postmodernist readymades, which become the alternative of artistic genuine creation and evaluation of their artworks.

What we recognize as definite kinds of bad art are such inveterate corruptions of consciousness . . .

Art is not a luxury, and bad art not a thing we can afford to tolerate. To know ourselves is the foundation of all life that develops beyond the merely psychical level of experience. Unless does its work successfully, the facts which it offers to intellect, the only thing upon which intellect can be build its fabric of thought, are false from the beginning. A truthful consciousness gives intellect a firm foundation upon which to build; a corrupt consciousness forces intellect to build on a quicksand. The falsehoods which an untruthful consciousness imposes on the intellect are falsehood which intellect can never correct for itself. . . . But corruption of consciousness is the same thing as bad art. (Collingwood 1938: XII: ##2, 3)

What is exactly the “corruption of consciousness” in Collingwood’s theory of cognition of art creation? It seems that it is the lack of self-control of one’s cognitive operation, which for the artist can be the inability to express one’s feelings and emotions through the imagination to produce the artwork that results in a work of art but a bad one. A bad artwork can result also if, while producing it, the artist introduces into it not his or her truthful consciousness, but an attempt to please the audience or to gain commercial benefits. The question is how, according to Collingwood’s theory of artistic interpretation, which views art as the use of feeling and emotion when expressing imagination, can one learn and know how to express truthful consciousness and not corrupted consciousness? However, Collingwood’s theory cannot explain it, because, according to him, the artist cannot learn from his successful previous expressions and the question is, how does he know that the previous ones are truthful and not corrupted (Collingwood 1938: XII ##2, 3)? The solution must rely only on objective criteria, i.e., the confrontation in external reality, so as to quasi-prove or prove the truth of the interpretation in the created artwork, by demonstrating it to be a true aesthetic representation of reality. For Collingwood, however, the truth is based only on subjective feelings, without any objective criteria as proof of the truth of the artwork ability to represent reality (Nesher 2002a, 2003).

To summarize, there are two possible ways of understanding the creation of postmodernist artworks: either as an erroneous creation, as a result of the artist’s lack of self-control in the process of creation and evaluation, or as a false, and thus nihilistic endeavor, as a result of a “corrupted consciousness.” An *erroneous* creation can emerge because the artist does not have self-control over his intellectual ideas or lacks any clear intellectual ideas, or the erroneous quality can be acquired in the process of interpreting the intellectual ideas into the aesthetic ideas, in the creation of his artwork, or at least as we understand it. This can result from the observer misunderstanding the particular language of the artist, e.g., Picasso’s languages of arts, or from the observer having a different understanding of reality than that which the artist

conveyed in his or her particular aesthetic representation (Collingwood 1938: XIII). And yet, as regards Postmodern art there is the additional possibility of bad artwork resulting from the introduction of non-artistic considerations into the work, specifically, attempting to provide the observer with a sense of *amusement*, pleasure or usefulness.

The Epistemology of “Conceptual Art” is of Artifacts and Entertainment and Not of Art as a True Aesthetic Representation of Reality

The question is whether the influence of other external components, such as social and economic factors, on the creation of artworks interfere with art’s role, which according to the realist reconstruction of Kant’s cognitive theory of creation and evaluation of artworks and Peirce’s interpretation of Kant’s theory regarding truth and beauty, is the aesthetic representation of reality (Nesher 2005b, 2007a). The problem for the artist is how to present his intellectual ideas aesthetically, and at the same time survive economically and continue to create truthfully, and in modern time to withstand the pressures of the capitalist marketplace. (Compare Michelangelo’s life and his creation for the Pope, Zola’s literature, and others, see Greenberg [1939]1961: 3-21; Alloway 1958 in Harrison and Wood 2003: 715-717). For the philosophers and art critics, the problem is how to analyze and evaluate on the one hand, the new artistic aesthetic modes of representation of the postmodern era, and on the other hand, the mass culture of the commercial capitalism. In other words, how do they draw a clear distinction between true artworks and kitsch without tossing out the baby with the bath-water (Alloway [1958]2003 vs. Greenberg [1939]1961). In our modern civilization, the people are educated but nevertheless some are also looking to the popular and kitschy arts as an easy entertainment since they are spoiled as capitalist market consumers and do not always have the character to think and feel seriously about artwork and of course literature.

“Modern” art and the work before seemed connected by virtue of their morphology. Another way of putting it would be that art’s “language” remained the same, but it was saying new things. The event that made conceivable the realization that it was possible to “speak another language” and still make sense in art was Marcel Duchamp’s first unassisted Ready-made. With the unassisted Ready-made, art changed its focus from the form of the language to what was being said. Which means that it 1939. This change—one from “appearance” to “conception”—was the beginning of “modern” art and the beginning of conceptual art. All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. (Kosuth 1969)

This analysis describes how art changed its focus from the form of the artistic language to what was being said, namely from the morphology to the meaning of artworks; and yet, we must ask: was modern art meaningless and Postmodern conceptual art introduced a meaningful dimension? Moreover, what are both movements about, or more precisely, what is the role of art's language in our lives? What do Marcel Duchamp's readymade artworks convey or represent in our reality? Indeed, it seems that Kosuth's epistemology of conceptual art is a misconception of the role of the aesthetic science of art as an aesthetic representation of reality.

Duchamp said he was engaged in "a renunciation of all aesthetics, in the ordinary sense of the word."⁵⁶ The qualifying phrase "in the ordinary sense of the word" shows that this was not, as it has often been called, an "aesthetic nihilism."⁵⁷ In European art since the eighteenth century, aesthetic "in the ordinary sense of the word" means the aesthetic theory briefly adumbrated by the third Earl of Shaftesbury and fully articulated by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), along with various German metaphysical elaborations by Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer and others. . . . Duchamp focused his critique on two sets of ideas. First was the trichotomy of faculties that it embodied in Kant's distinction among his Critiques: *The Critic of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*. The idea behind the distinction is adopted from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle says that the human made up of three faculties, the cognitive, the ethical (what Kant calls "practical") and the aesthetic (taste or "judgment") (e.g., *NE* II, VI 3-12). (McEvelley 2005: 24-25, Ch. 1: "Kant, Duchamp and Dada" 15-31)

McEvelley attempts to explain away the notion that Duchamp's work intended to introduce "aesthetic nihilism," by claiming that in renouncing all *aesthetics*, Duchamp was referring to *Kant's aesthetics*.

However, let us recall that Kant had some difficulties, as the Third Critique, seemed confusedly called *Critique of Judgment*, when in the first place it had to be called "Critique of Taste" (Easter 1788, in Scherer, 1995: 4), and systematically it had to be the *Critique of Aesthetic*, as Kant himself understood the basic three faculties of mind:

Hence all our judgements can be divided, in terms of the order of the higher cognitive powers, into *theoretical*, *aesthetic*, and *practical* ones; but by the aesthetic ones I mean [here] only aesthetic judgments of reflection, which alone refer to a principle of the power of judgment, as a higher cognitive power, whereas aesthetic judgment of sense directly concern only the relation of presentations to the inner sense, insofar as that sense is feeling. (Kant *CJ*: 226; cf. Neshor 2005b, 2007a)

In this context, then, the aesthetic judgment, in distinction from the logical judgment, is a subjective feeling and therefore, aesthetics cannot be considered an objective science of art. This, indeed, is the weak point of Kant's epistemology of art. However, as shown herein, in Peirce's philosophy, this was rectified as the *aesthetic science*, one of the three Normative Sciences, which are different modes of representing reality (Nesher 2005b, 2007a).

Moreover, Peirce, in his realist reconstruction of Kantian idealism suggested that inherent in the epistemology of perception, which essentially, with epistemological alterations, follows Kant's intuitions about experience, there are the seeds of the three Normative Sciences, comparable to Kant's three Critiques. They are the essential cognitive types of knowledge, already operating embryonically as the different stages of our perceptual experience. These are Aesthetic knowledge, derived from an Iconic feeling of quality, Ethical knowledge, derived from Indexical emotional reaction, and Theoretical knowledge, derived from symbolic thought. These three Normative Sciences aim to judge the Truth, the Good, and the Beauty, as distinct modes of representing different aspects of reality. Although in each case, one of the three mental operations is the most dominant (as I elaborated in my Peircean critical reconstruction of Kantian transcendental philosophy), we can see aspects of all three modes in each of these normative sciences. Notwithstanding, they all based on cognitive interpretation in the Epistemic Logic of the trio, to prove the truth of their representation of reality, or the falsity of their hypotheses that cannot represent it (Scherer 1995; Peirce *EP11*: #14, 1903; Nesher 2007a). Moreover, as I have previously argued, had Kant been consistent in his Critical Philosophy, he would have considered the first critique as that of Understanding, the second as that of Reason, and the third critique as that of Imagination, with all three together constituting the basic cognitive powers of the mind. This is so, because our cognitive judgments operate the different modes of representation in all of the three critiques, as Peirce showed in his Pragmaticist-realist epistemology (Peirce *EP11* #27 [1906]1998; Nesher 2002a, 2005b, 2007a).

When Duchamp declared (in an interview with James Johnson Sweeney)⁶⁰ that he wanted "to put painting once again at the service of the mind" he was directly attacking this doctrine, announcing that art can be based on the cognitive faculty as well as the aesthetic. This was the foundational principle of what would later be called Conceptual Art. The introduction of text into visual works would increase until a situation was reached in which text alone could count as a work of Fine Art rather than literature. (McEvelley 2005: 24-26)

McEvelley explains why Duchamp's elaboration of conceptual art is essentially a critique of Kant; however, this claim does not help substantiate the

artistic essence of conceptual art. As previously noted, the *beauty* of Fine Art is bound to our perception of the Imaginative aesthetic ideas as being a true representation of reality; hence, the *beauty* of Fine Art is not derived from a mere *linguistic* interpretation of concepts.

A second aspect of Modernist aesthetics that Duchamp wanted to reduce to inconsequentiality goes back to the section of the *Critique of Judgment* called the “Analytic of the Beautiful.” There Kant posits what he calls four “moments” each comprising a related group of propositions. According to the first “moment” the pure aesthetic judgment or sense of taste has nothing to do with cognition or concepts. This, as already remarked, was perhaps the central target of Duchamp’s revisions—the basis of his desire not to be “stupid as painter.” (McEvelley 2005: 26)

However, Duchamp does not understand Kant’s conception of artworks’ beauty and eventually representing reality. Indeed, Kant’s conception of art is that the artist’s intellectual ideas of reality are ingeniously interpreted through imagination in creating the aesthetic ideas, the artwork itself, to represent aesthetically the reality as it is known to the artist conceptually (Kant *CJ*: # 49, 314; cf. 341-344; Neshet 2005b; McEvelley 2005: 26). Duchamp’s purported argument against Kant’s conception of taste in aesthetic judgment is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of art’s aesthetic representation, and overlooks Kant’s distinction between artistic creation of aesthetic artwork and its evaluation in aesthetic judgment. Kant sees a dichotomy between the conceptual intellectual ideas, on the one hand, which the artist conveys by creating the aesthetic ideas of the artwork, and on the other hand, the imaginative aesthetic ideas applied in judging the beauty of the artwork. Nevertheless, the artist is aware of the role of his or her intellectual ideas in the aesthetic judgment evaluation of the beauty of the created artwork, as we can also learn from Picasso: “I paint objects as I think them not as I see them” (Neshet 2007a). Duchamp probably did not understand the essential connection between the creation and evaluation of artworks and consequently, he attempted to create artworks by eliminating the aesthetic ideas that are the artwork itself, in distinction from Picasso who expressed his intellectual ideas about reality aesthetically (Neshet 2005b; McEvelley 2005: 26ff.).

Historically, Duchamp and Dada seem to have been summoned into action by disgust at the events that were leading to and then comprising World War 1—that Tzara referred to as “Dadaist disgust.” Not long after that war the European art world moved away from chance and the Readymade and back into the

Kantian aesthetic of Picasso and Matisse, Bonnard and Vuillard. The faculty of taste was back in the saddle again for a long generation.

When in the early '60s Duchamp's reputation was reborn— . . . —many young artists agree that the principles of anti-art had not done their job thoroughly enough the first time, that the “brushfire” needed to be revived and continue to work. (McEvelley 2005: 30)

Hence, the essential epistemological difficulty that remains is to inquire and explain what art is and why it cannot be based on an arbitrary procedure by which anything and everything can be considered art, as is the typical post-modern attitude to art, which is perceived as aesthetic nihilism and hedonism (McEvelley 2005: Ch. 1).

**NO BEAUTY WITHOUT AESTHETIC IDEAS
INTERPRETING THE INTELLECTUAL IDEAS OF
THE ARTIST: ORIGINAL VS. FAKE, IMITATION,
AND POSTMODERNISM DECADENCE**

**The Beauty of Artwork is Its Proved True Aesthetic
Representation of Reality Being the Artistic Mode
of Knowledge of the Aesthetic Science**

A case study can be used to explain how the pictorial arts interpreted into intellectual ideas and represent reality aesthetically, in other words, through the pictorial arts we can observe how art can teach us about our life in the world.

What we need is an epistemology of art—a theory of what we know about the world *through* art and what we know about art from the art itself. (Kieran. and Lopes 2007: xi)

The Warrant Challenge: even if art afford significant true belief, it does not warrant belief, and knowledge requires warrant. (Kieran and Lopes 2007: xiii)

The Uniqueness Challenge: even if art works warrant important true beliefs, they do not convey knowledge in any distinctive manner (Stolnitz 1992). Areas of inquiry such as philosophy or science are characterized by their objects of study and the methods of they prescribe for learning about those objects. . . . By contrast, art delimits no distinctive area and method of inquiry. (Kieran and Lopes 2007: xiii-xiv)

The Relevance Challenge: even if the Uniqueness Challenge can be addressed, a work's affording knowledge is no part of its artistic value. (Kieran and Lopes, 2007: xiv)

The epistemological confusion of Kieran and McIver Lopes in the introduction to their edited book *Knowing Art* (2007) is that in deliberating whether art can give us knowledge of art and reality, they draw a distinction between "significant true belief" and the "warrant belief" which only the latter is a real knowledge. However, for them knowledge that warrants belief is related to perceptual judgment, the knowledge of objects, which does hold true for artworks. Moreover, Kieran and McIver Lopes based their conception of knowledge upon the formal semantics, which is actually based on an accepted model that relates only to our sensual sense-data, but cannot explain our knowledge of external reality. Thus, they based their conception of knowledge only on the mode of representing perceptual objects, following the Kantian tradition of "logical judgment" of perception. However, logical judgment cannot explain the reflective aesthetic judgment as objective knowledge. In the same vein, Friend in his "Narrating the Truth" is trying to compare the truth of artistic artworks and scientific-historical representations of reality, as if aesthetic art and theoretical sciences belonged to the same mode of representation and knowledge. However, aesthetic science is not theoretical, and the character Don Quixote is not a name of an object represented in reality (Goodman 1984: III.1.; Nesher 2005b; Kieran and Lopes 2007: Part I, Ch. 3).

The alternative, following Peirce ([1906]1998, *EPII* #27), is that beside the proved true perceptual judgments, as our basic knowledge of reality, there are also three basic "normative sciences," Theoretical, Ethical and Aesthetical, which have their own different modes of representing aspects of reality; yet, they differ from the perceptual knowledge on which they are based (Peirce [1906]1998, *EPII* #27; Nesher 2002a: X, 2007b, 2016, 2021). Thus, to summarize, Kieran and McIver Lope's basic argument about why artworks, in contrast to the other cognitive enterprises, which render scientific and philosophical knowledge, cannot give us knowledge of reality is as follows: in artworks, we can find propositional knowledge from other sources, but artworks do not provide their own proved knowledge; there is no knowledge about reality that only artwork alone can supply. Moreover, even assuming that artworks could afford knowledge, according to Kieran. and McIver Lopes, such knowledge plays no part in the work's artistic value. Nevertheless, this basic claim requires an investigation of the epistemology of the artistic creation and evaluation of artworks, asking ourselves what might be the roles of *truth* and *beauty* in the *aesthetic* representation of reality.

Thus, as there are different conceptions of beauty in their historical contexts, can there be also different aesthetic true representations of reality, which affect

the different conceptions of the beauty of experienced artworks? In the realist conception of art and in the aesthetic science of knowledge, the experiential quasi-proofs of beauty in different historical and social contexts are based on different intellectual ideas of reality. Consequently, different aesthetic ideas of artworks are conveyed, and so too are different appearances of beauty in correspondingly different historical contexts: because the beauty of artworks is in their true aesthetic representation of reality, it stands to reason that in different historical genres and styles we can find different expressions of beauty. Thus, for example, the same legend, The Rape (Abduction) of the Sabine Women is portrayed in paintings by Paul Rubens 1635-440, and Picasso 1962. However, this specific difference can also be explained by the artists' different intellectual understanding of the historical real event, either as an abduction or a rape, and this can also contribute to the differences between their aesthetically beautiful representations (Nesher 2004b, 2007b). This can explain how historically, we have different samples of the created beauty of artworks in different historical periods, genres and styles that represent different realities, from the Antiquity, through Classicism to The Middle Ages, Renaissance, Romanticism, Modernism, and Postmodernism, which can reject the transcendental ideal of timeless beauty, although they are both aesthetically true and beautiful representations, yet they are relative to their different proof-conditions (Calinescu 1987: Introduction; Nesher 2002a: X, 2016, 2021).

The artist, with his or her spirit and productive imaginative "free play", or perhaps more accurately stated, with reflective self-control, interprets the generality of *intellectual ideas* in the singularity of *aesthetic ideas* and thus exhibits the intended artwork (Kant [1790]1987; Adorno 1970: 86ff.). It is essential to underscore Kant's distinction between logical-theoretical judgments of perceptual and propositional judgments, the criteria of which can be clear and distinct, and the aesthetical judgments, which are based on subjective feelings, for which there exists no criterion for comparing the feelings of different individuals in relation to their aesthetic judgments. Nevertheless, Kant suggests, albeit arbitrarily, that these feelings and judgments have universal validity. However, Kant determined this without offering any proof, viewing the universal validity of such feelings and judgments as an a priori objective criterion for the acceptance of any aesthetic judgment.

The puzzle of aesthetic testimony seemed to arise because of (1) the mismatch between the epistemic worthlessness of aesthetic testimony and the high epistemic value of much other testimony, and (2) the mismatch between our resistance to aesthetic testimonial uptake and our ordinary tendency to form beliefs on the basis of others' testimony. But I suspect that the relevant phenomena have been misdescribed. It is not that we *never* form aesthetic judgments on the basis of the testimony of others. (Meskin 2007: 120)

The discussion of Meskin is based on a phenomenal interpretation and on the meanings in use in colloquial language, a'la Wittgenstein. Like Wittgenstein, Meskin cannot develop any realist epistemology to explain the artistic role of artwork as representing reality and impelling us to develop knowledge about our life, to understand ourselves better, and to direct our conduct in society accordingly (Nesher 1992).

The account starts with an observation about the epistemology of testimony: all non-skeptical parties to the debate agree that not all testimony is of equal epistemic value. For example, insincere and intentionally deceptive testimony may fail to provide justification and knowledge. (Meskin 2007: 121)

The question is what can be the objective criteria for distinguishing between sincere and intentionally reliable testimony and the insincere and intentionally deceptive testimony, if there is no objective epistemic proof to provide aesthetic knowledge of reality? We find an explanation in the theory developed by Peirce in his reconstruction of Kant's epistemology of the aesthetic science of art (Peirce [1906]1998, *EPII*: #27; Nesher 2003, 2005b, 2007a).

My proposal is that unreliability in the aesthetic realm explains the epistemic weakness of aesthetic testimony (Meskin 2004). A long tradition in aesthetics suggests that most ordinary aesthetic testimony is likely to be unreliable. (Meskin 2007: 121)

However, we should not compare the proof of aesthetic judgments of artworks with quasi-proof of perceptual judgments, with which humans engage all the time, in every perceptual experience (Meskin 2007: 120-22). The epistemology of Aesthetic science explains what the artists are doing as scientists in creating the artworks, which when proven true, constitute an aesthetic mode of representing reality, and thus provide us with knowledge of ourselves and of the external reality, according to which we control our conducts in life. Moreover, the theoretical scientists do the same, and when their theories are proven true, they provide a theoretical mode of representing reality, which in turn can guide us on how to live and conduct ourselves in this reality. Indeed, the expert scientists in both domains have a better understanding of their artworks or their theories than do the amateur or lay people, and therefore their judgments in their particular domains are more reliable than those of others.

However, our epistemology of the aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artwork must be based not only on the evaluation of them as artifactual objects, but on the explanation of the cognitive operation of the artists in the creation and evaluation of their artworks and the role of this explanation in society as

aesthetic knowledge of reality. Thus, we are able to avoid Kant's dichotomy between the creation and the evaluation of artworks (Nesher 2005b, 2007a). And yet, if only experts in arts are competent to perform aesthetic judgments, are they the only audience capable of enjoying the beauty of arts and the knowledge they convey? I propose that a distinction be drawn between the intuitive aesthetic judgment, which holds basically for the wide audience of artworks, on the one hand, and the intuitive and the rational inquiry of the artistic creation and evaluation of artworks conducted by the experts, to explain their true and therefore beautiful representation of reality.

So some of our resistance to testimonial uptake in the aesthetic realm can be explained by appeal to the fact that we recognize that others often fail to meet the requirements for being true judges. Another factor is the widespread existence of folk relativism and folk subjectivism. A person who believes that beauty really is in the eye of the beholder will be unlikely to trust the aesthetic judgments of others. (Meskin 2007: 120-21)

So what does it mean that the beauty is "in the eye of the beholder"? The epistemological task is to show that the judgment of the truth and beauty of artworks can be objective and yet differ from Kantian logical judgment. This can be achieved through an evaluation of *artwork's aesthetic ideas*, which differ from *propositions* or *theories*, by seeking an imaginative and qualitative similarity between the aesthetic ideas which the artwork aimed to represent and our own knowledge of reality. However, such proofs are relative to their contexts, the acceptance proof-conditions, which can differ according to the understanding of the artists' aesthetic languages and their historical and social contexts of the works' creation (Nesher 2002a: X, 2007b; Meskin 2007).

The question is whether artworks can or cannot convey a unique kind of knowledge, different from that conveyed by other cognitive enterprises, such as scientific, ethical and philosophical knowledge. According to our epistemological analysis, the Kantian intuitions suggest the interpretation of the *true intellectual ideas* based on accepted common-sense knowledge, into the embodied aesthetic ideas of artwork, which the artists endeavor to prove to be *true* representation of reality. The task is to explain that *aesthetic ideas* conveyed in the artworks have meanings that are different from, broader and more elaborate than the meanings of the artist's *intellectual ideas*, such that the aesthetic mode of representation used to convey aesthetic ideas in works of art is different from the mode of representation used to convey intellectual ideas about reality. Thus the aesthetic science in which artists' work uses the aesthetic mode to represent reality and, hence, it differs from the theoretical and the ethical sciences with their specific modes of representing reality.




Figure 7.2 The artist's creation and evaluation of artwork by proving the truth of the aesthetic judgment in the proof-conditions: The method of proof upon the proved facts of reality.

Indeed, the aesthetic ideas in artworks are created by the imagination of the artist and offer richer and a greater abundance of meanings than do the intellectual ideas. They represent the intended reality of the artist differently. For example, Peirce showed that the painting of the Mona Lisa cannot be exhausted by any descriptive propositions about her personality; similarly, the imaginatively reached situations and personalities that were created by Cervantes in *Don Quixote* or by Tolstoy in *Anna Karenina* are so emotionally and intellectually rich that no set of theoretical propositions can exhaust them. These examples demonstrate that the nature of the artistic creation, which is grounded in the specific aesthetic mode of knowledge of the Aesthetic Science, can be rendered only through art. It is this peculiar aesthetic "nature," that is the essential beauty, the same beauty that confers an "artistic value" on the work of art.

When I say that pure fiction denotes nothing, I am speaking of its literal application. Taken literally, *Don Quixote* describes no one—there never was or will be the Man of La Mancha—but taken metaphorically, *Don Quixote* describes many of us who battle windmills (or windbags). A fantastic allegory, though an unrealistic fictive-person-story when read literary, may be a realistic real-person-story when taken metaphorically. (Goodman 1984: 130)

Although Goodman is still a formal semanticist and phenomenalist, his main intuition can explain realistically that the aesthetic artworks, like scientific theories, are not fictions, since the artworks with their imaginative-ideas represent reality aesthetically. Indeed, unlike perceptual judgments that represent objects, humans, and more, the created characters and situations truly represent human life in reality. Through such aesthetic knowledge, we are, like *Don Quixote*, battling the windmills of injustice to attain a better

society. However, the *proof-conditions* of truth are the *Method of Proof*, and the *Proved Facts of Reality* are the context, whereby the text or the artwork is equivalent to any hypothesis before being proved true. Such hypotheses are the means available to and accepted by artists, scientists, ethicists, and also by all of us in our analysis of our sensual experience and perceptual judgments. Hence, the truth and knowledge are relative to the available proof-conditions. This holds also in the creation and evaluation of artworks, whether by the artists with their original available true facts and valid method for creating arts, or by the art critics, as far as their familiarity with the artist's biography, genre, and styles enables them to inquire, interpret, and determine whether the works in question convey truth and beauty. However, this is also the case with the amateurs, who although neither artists nor critics, they are able to judge artwork according to their intuitive understanding of the artist's aesthetic language. The amateurs operate differently, due to their different experiential knowledge of each case; nevertheless, their judgments can overlap with judgments made by art critics and artists themselves, when they all are relatively true (Nesher 2002a: X, 2007b). The different proof-conditions can explain what can be considered by Meskin 2007, "the puzzle of aesthetic testimony" and the a priori assumption of the universality of aesthetic judgment by Kant, which is similarly related to the accepted proof-conditions of those participating in the judgment.

How the Commercial Price of the Artworks Affects Their Spiritual and Aesthetic Significance: The Late Capitalist Economy and Its Race for Money Endangers the Creation of Art

What is the essence of art? Is it possible to distinguish between created artworks and produced artifacts and other commercial products, let us call them pseudo-arts, and if so, how can this distinction be made? The ability to make such a distinction has become critical in the postmodern phase of the late capitalist economy, which is characterized by the competition for money and a hedonistic lifestyle. The crucial need to determine what is art and what is not stems from the current tendency to produce pseudo-art, which risks devolving the artistic creation into the kitsch that is the outcome of the pseudo-aesthetic production. The main drive behind this production tendency is to address the commercial needs of the consumers, which in turn serves to increase the financial benefit of the producers themselves. Pseudo-art does not aim to provide a true aesthetic representation of reality, which is the essence of the genuine created artworks. However, the difficulty is to establish criteria for identifying kitschy works, which are fake due to the futility of the artist and the producer of the commercial artifacts, and therefore cannot be considered

essentially aesthetic works. Hence the basic concept of what constitutes art becomes the essential challenge for philosophers, historians of art, and the art critics, not to mention the artists themselves and the managers of artworks (Greenberg 1961; Adorno 1970; Bell 1976; Calinescu 1987; McEvelley 2005; Galenson 2009).

What constitutes the essence of kitsch is probably its open-ended indeterminacy, its vague “hallucinatory” power, its spurious dreaminess, its promise of an easy “catharsis.” . . .

Kitsch may be conveniently defined as a specifically aesthetic form of lying. As such, it obviously has a lot to do with the modern illusion that beauty may be bought and sold. Kitsch then, is a recent phenomenon. It appears at the moment in history when beauty in its various forms is socially distributed like any other commodity subject to the essential market law of supply and demand. Once it has lost its elitist claim to uniqueness and once its diffusion is regulated by pecuniary standards (or by political standards in totalitarian countries), “beauty” turns out to be rather easy to fabricate. (Calinescu 1987: 228-229)

However, the epistemological task is to inquire and explain the objective criteria to distinguish between artistic beauty and fabricated kitsch in works. How to distinguish among aesthetic true representation of reality and the kitsch: (1) By knowing the biography and the language of the artist, whether visual, musical, literary, etc.; (2) By understanding the entire historical, and social context that gave rise to the artist’s intellectual ideas about reality, which the artist endeavored to represent aesthetically; (3) By relying on a subjective evaluation of how the artwork represents components of one’s life and of the lives of others with whom we are acquainted and how it affects one’s self-understanding and understanding of life in society.

The possibility of the avant-garde’s using kitsch elements and, conversely, of kitsch’s making use of avant-garde devices is just an indication of how complex a concept of kitsch is. We are dealing here indeed with one of the most bewildering and elusive categories of modern aesthetics. Like art itself, of which it is both an imitation and a negation, kitsch cannot be defined from a single vantage point. And again like art—or for that matter antiart—kitsch refuses to lend itself even to negative definition, because it simply has no single compelling, distinct counterconcept. (Calinescu 1987: 232).

The reason for this common difficulty of explaining the difference between art and kitsch is due to the absence of any clear intuition regarding what constitutes art and due to the lack of an epistemology of the *aesthetics* and *beauty* of artworks, their creation, or their cognitive role in influencing human

conduct in life (Nesher 2003, 2007a). Hence, epistemologically, following Kant's discussion of art and Peirce's realistic reconstruction of Kant's theory, we have at our disposal a single, compelling, and distinct counterconcept to that of *kitsch*. This concept refers to the genuine artistic spirit and to the aesthetic meaning of the created artwork that proves to be a true representation of reality. Moreover, the common difficulty regarding the clear distinction between art and kitsch is due to the colloquial use of the terms *aesthetics*, *beauty*, *art* and its *truth*, i.e., the common-sensical meanings which are based on the accepted use in natural language as it evolved historically. Consequently, the common intuitions of what we mean by *aesthetics*, *beauty*, and *art* are epistemologically problematic and cannot be resolved without a realist epistemology to help us understand what is art (Wittgenstein 1953; Nesher 1994). However, this quandary can be resolved by relying on the realist epistemology based on the Kantian genuine intuitions and the Peircean Pragmaticist epistemology with its theory of the meanings and truth of those terms, which differ from their common-sense meanings.

Hence, the meaning of *aesthetic* is not related to the feeling of subjective pleasure as with Kant's conception in his Third Critique, which is similar to his concept of the *Aesthetic Intuition* regarding sensual experience of the First Critique, but more akin to the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, which is the a priori *aesthetic representation* of our sensual intuitions of experiential phenomena. However, the Pragmaticist conception of aesthetics is distinguished from Kant's conception of aesthetic judgment, insofar as the latter is based on the structure of his *logical judgments*, but due to the absence of concepts in the *reflective aesthetic judgments* it is only subjective feeling in experiencing of artworks (Kant *CJ*: VIII, 224'). Indeed, this distinction is based on the Transcendental Epistemology of the dichotomy between the transcendental a priori concepts and the *empirical* sensual experience (Nesher 2004a). However, in the Peircean realist epistemology, the Kantian *Aesthetic Intuition* becomes experiential intuition about the beauty of natural and artifactual objects, and the Kantian *Transcendental Aesthetic* is no longer *transcendental*, but similar to Kant's artistic *aesthetic ideas* of the artists: their artworks endeavor to represent reality.

In the Pragmaticist epistemology, however, we do not have to assume transcendental a priori cognitions, since we can show that all our cognitions evolve from our experience and the aesthetic cognitions are our mode of the creating artworks that represent external reality. Thus, the aesthetic mode of representation is neither a theoretical nor an ethical scientific mode, but the aesthetical scientific mode of the creating artworks that represent human life, whether through literature, painting, drama, music, or other representational renditions. This aesthetic mode of representation through literature or drama is manifested in characters such as Hamlet, Don Quixote, Anna Karenina and

others, and in the situations in which they metaphorically live in, and thus representing respectively human dispositions and the social and historical situations in which they conducting themselves.

Hence, the philosophical duty is to show the distinction between the colloquial conception of aesthetics and the epistemological conception of aesthetics, the latter being the essential mode of artistic true and beautiful representation of reality. Thus, the specific conception of beauty in artworks is bound with their true aesthetic representation of reality. Our conception of beauty in artworks is essentially connected to our emotional reaction and rational explanation of why we are excited and to our opportunity to learn from it about our life and thus extend our knowledge of reality; however, if not true the aesthetic of artwork is not beautiful. In this line, we have to investigate the conception of art and thus also find a clear distinction between art and kitsch, the task that Calinescu could not complete, as in the above citation (Calinescu 1987: 232).

The challenge is to investigate if kitsch is a kind of art or rather only a pseudo-art, such that while art is the artistic creation of aesthetic ideas conveyed in the artwork, which by proved to be true enhances our knowledge of reality. Thus, the aim of art is essentially to aesthetically represent reality, not to be pleasing for the sake of commercial benefit, in distinction from kitsch, which is not produced with the intention of extending our knowledge of reality, but only to give a sense of pleasure without intellectually challenging the enjoyer, and thus, the intention of the producer of kitsch is not to give us any new knowledge of reality.

The term kitsch is, like the concept it designates, quite recent. It came into use in the 1860s and 1870s in the jargon of painters and art dealers in Munich, and was employed to designate cheap artistic stuff. . . . According to others its possible origin should be looked for in German verb *verkitschen*, meaning in the Mecklenburg dialect “to make it cheap”. (Calinescu 1987: 234)

Thus, we can see that kitsch is only “disguised” art, and that such products appear mainly in the commercial milieu of late Capitalism in distinction from the previous industrial Capitalism, the distinction that corresponds to the artistic shift from Modernism to Postmodernism, which also heralded the End of Art (Jameson 1991; Calinescu 1987; Danto 2003; Ranciere 2004; McEvelley 2005). Moreover, the later Capitalism corrupted also the theoretical sciences, by looking basically to their practical and business applications, and also the ethical sciences and their application to social life, using them instead as egotistic norms to sustain and prolong selfish economic enterprises and the private interest of the few. Thus, it can be said that capitalist Postmodernism affected what Peirce calls the three Normative Sciences, i.e.,

the theoretical, ethical, and aesthetical sciences, thus essentially corrupting human social life. In the context of this upheaval, we can explain the confusion of the artists, philosophers, and art critiques about the basic concepts of the Aesthetic Science, namely, Art, Aesthetics, Beauty, and Truth (Peirce *EPII*: #27, [1906]1998; Calinescu 1987; Jameson 1991; Galenson 2009).

The sociology of art and beauty, the bad taste of people, and probably, to some degree, erroneously perceiving Dada and Surrealism as kitsch (which rather are artistic movements' reactions to the horrors of the World Wars and other difficulties of life), are all factors that led the observers to misunderstand the artistic languages of the era. Indeed, such reactions to new movements of art are often based on subjective taste, without understanding the epistemology of the newly created artworks and the contexts in which those artistic movements developed, in other words, without recognizing in them the aesthetic true representation of reality (Calinescu 1987: 229-232).

The Difficulties with Conceptual Art: If a Work of Art Exemplifies Concepts, it is an Interpretation and Not an Aesthetic Representation of Reality

The difficulties with conceptual art and whether it exemplifies concepts become more urgent in the context of the postmodernist era, which coincides with the deterioration from industrial to commercial Capitalism, when the arts become merchandise for the financial benefit of the big collectors and for the artists themselves. Hence, kitsch and artifacts are produced for such aims, instead of adhering to art's true cognitive role of delivering an aesthetic representation of reality, to enhance knowledge and to elevate our life (Calinescu 1987; Kuspit 2004; McEvelley 2005; Galenson 2009).

Being an artist today now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art; if an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) as art he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. (Joseph Kosuth 1969, in Alberro 2003:26).

The Pragmaticist epistemology of created artworks aims to prove the truth and beauty of art as an aesthetic representation of reality, in distinction from the Kantian conception of aesthetic judgment as the colloquial use, similar to Wittgenstein's meaning as used based on our subjective feeling of pleasure and enjoyment. Then the distinction between art and what is not art, i.e., pseudo-art and artifact, is that artworks are created for aesthetic representation of reality and artifacts are, at best, for enjoyment and practical use, and in this line we can explain the distinction in the conception of beauty between artwork and the use of beauty to artifacts and natural objects. This is due to

the sociological or historical definition of art: according to the “institutional definition,” art is whatever art schools, museums, and artists accepted as such, regardless of epistemic definitions. In other words, it became the role of those social institutions to decide and define what should be accepted practically as artworks. Thus the term “artworld” by which Danto means cultural and social context of art, can be understood as institutional definition of art, but then everything can go as art. This is also the case with the common use of “aesthetic experience” and “artworld,” instead of the epistemological explanation of art as the human aesthetic mode of representing reality.

In this section I will discuss the separation between aesthetics and art, consider briefly formalist art (because it is leading proponent of the idea of aesthetic as art), and assert that art is analogous to an analytic proposition, and that it is art’s experience as a tautology that enable art to remain “aloof” from the philosophical presumption. (Kosuth 1969: 3)

The above discussion about the separation between aesthetics and art can be explicated in the following schema. Explaining Kant’s idealist understanding of our knowledge of the phenomenal objects that we experience involves two separate meanings of aesthetic. Hence, Kant has two conceptions of aesthetics: *Aesthetic Intuition* and *Transcendental Aesthetic*, which under the Peircean realist reconstruction are, respectively, the experiential feeling of beauty of objects and artifacts, and the artistic *Aesthetic Ideas* of artworks, being the aesthetic mode of representing reality (Kant *CPuR*: B119, B151, B33, *CJ*: 221; Peirce *EPII*: #27, [1906]1998).

This schema, which explains the synthesis of the indeterminate meaning of the *blind object* with the *empty pure concept*, makes the concept meaningful and the object determinate. Thus the *empirical object* can be determined by




Figure 7.3 The roles of Kant’s aesthetic intuition and transcendental intuition in the evolvement of empirical concepts from blind intuitions and pure intuitions into their synthesis in perceptual judgment.

being subsumed under the *empirical concept*. However, the Evolvement of the Empirical Concepts in Perception from the Sensual Intuitions to the Pure Concepts, and with Imagination to their Synthesis in Perceptual Judgment reviles Kant’s Difficulty with the Epistemology of Empirical Concepts (Kant *CPuR*: #24-B150-151).

However, under the analogy, the Kantian Transcendental Aesthetic as a mode of representation in the First Critique is reconstructed into the artistic imagination, actively creating the *Aesthetic ideas* of the artwork, aesthetically representing reality in the Third Critique. Moreover, the *Aesthetic Intuition* in the First Critique evolves into the sensual perception as used in everyday *Aesthetic Judgment* of the beauty of natural objects and artifacts in the Third Critique. Yet, those two usages of the term *aesthetics*, namely, using the term aesthetic to refer both to the activity of creating aesthetic ideas of artworks that represent reality and to refer to our passive enjoyment in experiencing objects, can confuse us in understanding the epistemology of creation and evaluation of artworks. This was also Kant’s mistake, i.e., taking his *notion of reflective aesthetic judgments* and applying it to the different types of cognition: to the judgment of object, on the one hand, and to the judgment of created artworks intended to represent reality, on the other hand, as though the two belonged to the same category (Hegel [1835]1975 Int. [4]; Neshet 2005b, 2007a). Hence, Kant’s mistake was in separating altogether the artistic creation of aesthetic ideas of artwork from their evaluation by the artist by proving their truth and beauty. Indeed, the artist cannot create the artwork without inspecting it continually to ensure the validity of the interpretation of his intellectual ideas in the aesthetic ideas of the artwork and evaluating their aesthetic true and beautiful representation of reality. Without this process, the artist cannot complete the work.

Following is the schema of Kant’s two theories of fine arts, Genius Creativity of aesthetic ideas, and Aesthetic Judgment of Taste (comp. Kant *CJ*: #48, 312).

Indeed, Kant understood these two components of the *fine art*, but upon understanding the reflective aesthetic judgment of the beauty of artwork as cognitively based on the logical judgment of perceptual judgments of physical objects, he could not explain the beauty of the created fine art.




Figure 7.4 Kant’s separation of genuine creation of artwork from the reflective judgment of taste.

If we ask which is more important in objects [*sachen*] of fine art, whether they show genius or taste, then this is equivalent to asking whether in fine art imagination is more important than judgment. Now insofar as art shows genius it does indeed deserve to be called *inspired* [*geistreich*], but it deserves to be called *fine* art only insofar as it shows taste. (Kant *CJ*: #50, 319)

Hence, Kant separates the genius creation of art from the aesthetic judgment of taste, such that the genius creates the artwork without judging its aesthetic beauty, whereas the others judge it aesthetically as a physical object of pleasure and displeasure, without knowing the artist and his artistic language and that in creating the artwork the artist endeavored an aesthetic exhibition of intellectual ideas that represent reality (Kant *CJ*: #45; Zammito 1992: 129-142, esp. 131). But then, even according to Kant, the physical objects are not aesthetically beautiful, but agreeable, and this is a completely subjective judgment, in contrast to artworks, which Kant considers to be subjectively beautiful but also universally valid.

When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object existing in the realm of art means that the object's existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. (Kosuth 1969: 3)

Unfortunately, in this respect Kosuth does not distinguish between those two conceptions of *aesthetics*, the *sensual* and the *artistic*, in the Kantian philosophy, which according to the Peircean realist reconstruction belong either to the theoretical knowledge or to the aesthetical knowledge (Peirce *EPII*: #27, [1906]1998; Neshet 2007a). Hence, as Kosuth wants to mold a conception of art that includes conceptual art, as exemplified by Duchamp's artifacts, he prefers to use Kant's conception of *Aesthetic Intuition* and leaves aside the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. Thus in Kosuth's realist reconstruction, the artistic *aesthetic ideas* are irrelevant to his conception of art. However, we have to draw several distinctions, namely, between the artist's *intellectual ideas* in understanding reality, to be interpreted in the *aesthetic ideas*; the artwork itself in representing reality; and Postmodern conceptual art, which, according to Kosuth, is the embodiment of the intellectual concepts interpreted through artifacts, without representing any reality.

In contrast, the Peircean realist reconstruction of the Kantian philosophy of fine art is that *artistic artworks* are *aesthetic mode endeavor to represent reality beautifully*, and the Kantian *reflective aesthetic judgments* are *perceptual representation of objects*. Thus, the essential epistemological role of the

Kantian *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the *Aesthetic Intuition* is related to the specific scientific mode of representing reality. However, in the realist epistemology we explain the concept of Aesthetics in the conception of Aesthetic Science of artistic creation of artworks and their evaluation. This epistemology enables us to understand the conceptions of *Aesthetics*, *Art*, *Beauty*, and *Truth* as they operate in the aesthetic science of art. It is crucial to understand the nature of the Aesthetic Science in comparison to the two other normative sciences, the Theoretical and Ethical, and their specific modes of representing reality, because it is our knowledge of our reality which determines how we conduct our lives.

**CONCLUSION: BEAUTIFUL, UGLY, AND KITSCHY
IN POST-MODERN QUASI-ART, IS IT THE END OF
ART? THE LATE CAPITALISTIC COMMERCIALISM
ELIMINATES ARTISTIC CREATIVITY AND
THE AESTHETIC SCIENCE OF ARTWORKS**

**The Epistemological Concept of Art and Its Beauty: Are
Artistic Avant-Garde Movements Creating Art or Pseudo-Art?**

Given that the genres and styles of creating artworks change historically and socially, we cannot take one of them to characterize art in general without abolishing art as an aesthetic science and mode of cognitive knowledge. But then the question “Is it the End of Art?” is misguided, as even in what is called Postmodernism, pseudo-art can continue to exist side-by-side with true art, while some of the art genres, such as the avant-garde ones, might deserve more delicate analysis (Adorno 1970: 3).

It was modernity’s own alliance with time and long lasting alliance on the concept of progress that made possible the myth of a self-conscious and heroic avant-garde in the struggle for futurity. Historically, the avant-garde started by dramatizing certain constitutive elements of the idea of modernity and making them into cornerstone of the revolutionary ethos. (Calinescu 1987: 95)

The dilemma of what is art belongs basically to the epistemology of art and, therefore we have to consider also the conceptual art, as was argued by Kosuth, among others. However, as conceptual art does not represent natural and social reality, but only interprets concepts through objects and artifacts, it should not be considered art at all. Indeed, art is not of philosophy of linguistics, but the science of aesthetic knowledge by proving the truth of the artworks to be a beautiful representation of human reality. Despite Kosuth’s

intent to include conceptual art (such as the works of Duchamp) in his reconsideration of the nature of art, it appears that it cannot be defined but only presented, yet without any epistemological explanation (Kosuth 1969: 3; Neshet 2002a, 2004a, 2007a).

Here then I propose rest the viability of art. In an age when traditional philosophy is unreal because of its assumptions, art's ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a service—as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration—which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture, and technology, but, rather, it will remain viable by not assuming a philosophical stance; for in art's unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from philosophical judgments. It is in this context that art shares similarity to logic, mathematics, and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake. . . .

And art's strength is that even the preceding sentence is an assertion, and cannot be verified by art. Art's only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art. (Kosuth 1969: 9-10)

Indeed, by rejection the major available analytic philosophy of the time, Kosuth rejected any inquiry into the epistemology of art and the role of artistic works in society, and instead prefers to rely on vague and subjective intuition to decide that art is art. The alternative explanation of the essence of art can be the Peircean empirical epistemology, which reconstructs Kant's delicate and rich intuitions on the three main human cognitive enterprises: *theoretical*, *ethical*, and *aesthetic* judgments. As previously shown herein, Peirce elaborated these judgments as realist conceptions of the three basic normative sciences, the *Theoretic*, *Ethic*, and *Aesthetic sciences*. These are




Figure 7.5 Art knowledge and social affairs: The artistic creation of artwork from intellectual ideas to proving true aesthetic ideas as art knowledge enables to engage in social activities.

our different basic cognitive modes of representing reality, and the basic knowledge that can direct our conduct in life (Kant *CJ*: 226, 1790; Peirce *EPII*: #27, [1906]1998; Neshet 2007a). Hence, the artist's aesthetic creation and representation of reality produces human art-knowledge, which we can interpret into engaging in social and political affairs in the ways we choose to conduct ourselves and even how we opt to change our reality. Thus, for example, "Self-conscious and heroic avant-garde influenced the struggle for futurity" (Calinescu, 1987: 95). This influence is schematized in the following figure.

Thus, we can understand the emergence of avant-garde organizations, which also change the activities of the artists themselves. The effect of the artworks on our life and modes of behaviour is exerted by virtue of their true aesthetic representation of the reality we live in, together with our theoretical and ethical knowledge we acquired. This quality constitutes the beauty of the artworks, which in turn touches our feelings, emotions, and intellects as new knowledge, urging us to better understand ourselves and to change our ways of life in the social and natural environments, enhancing the cohesive effort of human beings to conduct a humanitarian society, as was philosophized also by Spinoza (Neshet 1987, 1999b; Calinescu 1987: 95, 132; Butler 2002: 126-127).

The colloquial use of the concept of art and its beauty in respect to the created art is difficult to explain philosophically and sociologically, and it goes from objective absolutism to subjective relativism. This might be seen in the evolution of the history of art, let us say, from Antiquity to Classicism, and through the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Baroque, Romanticism, Modernism to Postmodernism. The problem, then, is how to understand the changes to the concept of beauty.

The concept of art is located in a historically changing constellation of elements; it refuses definition. Its essence cannot be deduced from its origin as if the first work were a foundation on which everything that followed were constructed and would collapse if shaken. . . . (Adorno 1970: 2)

Hence, what is the concept of art and moreover how does it affect human understanding and conduct in social life at different historical moments? How can we understand the beauty of artworks from the historical perspective and, moreover, epistemologically?

Even the most sublime artwork takes up a determination attitude to empirical reality by stepping outside of the constraining spell it casts, not once and for all, but rather ever and again, constantly, unconsciously polemical toward this spell at each historical moment. (Adorno 1970: 5)

The concept of beauty promulgated in the Renaissance and the Baroque academies thus remains highly idealized and prescriptive in character. It rested on a Platonic understanding of beauty as something eternal, absolute and transcendent, and as inhering in some basic cosmological content. This stands at odds with more modern understanding of beauty as being not absolute but *relative* to changing historical contexts of perception, and as existing only 'in the eye of the beholder' in some important general sense, not 'in itself.' (Harrington 2004: 10)

Indeed, philosophers, like Kant, tried to connect these extreme conceptions by artificially arguing for both the universality and subjectivity of the experience of beauty (Danto 1981, 2003: Ch. 1, 3, 6; Margolis 1999; Yanal 2002; Nesher 2005b). The deadlock of Postmodernism's understanding of art is that we use the term *beautiful* to describe whatever we perceive and feel has evoked for us an immediate sense of pleasure. Yet, as regards these crafted, postmodernist works, we cannot *know* whether they are beautiful or not, and therefore the experience of feeling beauty cannot be a criterion for what is art or pseud-art. However, alternatively, using a realist epistemology, we can endeavor to learn the aesthetic languages of the artists and their true spirits in creating the artworks. Such a method is not based solely on our own or others' immediate impression from the artworks, but on an inquiry into the artist's understanding when creating the aesthetic work, in a manner similar to what Kant suggested (Nesher 2005b; Danto 2003; Alberro, 2003: 2; Galenson 2009: Ch. 9).

The difficulty with the new artistic languages of artworks with which we are not familiar is that in order to evaluate them, we have to learn their languages and the spirits-intentions of the artists in the created contexts. Consequently, the inquiry into their truth and beauty necessarily demands an effort, and until we understand and prove whether they are beautiful, ugly or just kitschy, we must consider them as doubtful. This is a tricky situation: as we read, hear and see the artworks without being able to evaluate them immediately, we might turn to our traditional knowledge and prejudices to evaluate them without understanding them. According to Danto, *neither beauty nor aesthetics* is essential for *art*, so that "Beauty had disappeared" (Danto 2003: 19-25). Yet, when we understand the three concepts, *art*, *aesthetics* and *beauty*, not only historically and socially, but also epistemologically, then art is understood to be the aesthetic true and thus beautiful representation of reality. This approach is distinct from that of art historians, who based their conceptions of art on historical samples, without looking into the epistemology of art. Given that according to the postmodernist view everything can be a sample of art, there cannot be any suggested definition or explanation of it; and hence, postmodernists declare that this is the End of Art history, after Hegel's conception of history (Calinescu 1987: 263-312).

It is the mark of the present period in the history of art that the concept of art implies no internal constraint on what works of art are, so that one no longer can tell if something is a work of art or not. Worse, something can be a work of art but something quite like it not be one, since nothing that meets the eye reveals the difference. This does not mean that it is arbitrary whether something is a work of art, but only that traditional criteria no longer apply. (Danto 2003: 17)

Moreover, the accepted Institutional Theory of Art is based on the commercial and market demands of late Capitalism. In other words, it is based more on the commodity value and less on the artistic aesthetic value.

The mark of the contemporary condition in the *philosophy* of art is that philosophical definition of art must be consistent with the radical openness that has overtaken the domain. It is still true that works of art constitute a restricted set of objects. What has changed is that these cannot easily be identified as such, since anything one can think of might be a work of art, and what account for this status cannot be a matter of simple recognition. It is by now well understood that something can resample a work of art entirely and yet itself not be a work of art at all. (Danto 2003: 18)

The attempt to define or find historical criteria for the description or the definition the works of art cannot work, because it is based on common-sense intuitions and not on an epistemological inquiry: instead of examining art's cognitive role in human understanding, this approach defines art according to arbitrary historical samples. Thus, it can be shown that the postmodernist conception of the Death of Art results from the absence of a clear understanding of the epistemology and the role of art as a specific mode of aesthetic representation of our reality and, thus, the aesthetic knowledge that affects human conduct in life. Art, according to this understanding is distinct from all other created products that *present* themselves as art, but which do not *represent* reality aesthetically or beautifully. Referring to artifact commodities as *beautiful* is merely an indication of subjective enjoyment. This is how the Postmodern capitalist economy and culture fetishize artistic works. When the consumption of artifacts as commodities replaces the cognitive role of art as a source of knowledge, the value of the artwork becomes institutionalized and commercialized (Harland 1999: 238ff.).

Opting for a realist, epistemological investigation of artworks *in terms of Art, Aesthetics, and Beauty*, in distinction from the phenomenalist historical and common-sensual description, makes it possible to save Art from its so-called Death. This approach also prevents artworks from being treated primarily as merchandise, whereby their sale prices are determined according to the extent to which they overwhelm the consumers. The capitalist

approach loads the museums with artworks and makes their managers the most influential persons in art culture of our days; the rich collectors are considered artwork experts and, hence, it can be asked, What After All, is a Work of Art?

It is incredible—but true enough—that, if you ask professional aestiticians what a work of art is, they will not be able to find a compelling answer in the whole philosophy of art. Theorists are skittish on the question, for a variety of reasons: (a) they have been burned many times; (b) they are aware some ingenious artist will make a point of producing a “work” theorists will be uneasy about excluding, though it will defeat their definitional darlings; (c) they find it too difficult to say, in the face of art’s baffling variety; and (d) would-be answers tend to be too ambitious and too abstract. (Danto 1997: Ch. 3, 67)

The problem with the attempt to define What, After All, is a Work of Art is that Danto and other philosophers of art are trying to use formal semantic methods of logical positivism and analytic philosophy to define *art* formally. Essentially, they examine a limited collection of artworks and try to formulate precise definitions, by specifying a number of necessary and sufficient conditions that justify applying the term *art* to works that merit the use of the concept. But this method cannot apply to the phenomenological inspection of the historically and culturally changing domain of artworks, as also Margolis (1999) noticed, and hence we must turn to philosophy and elaborate on the epistemology of art, to show that we can even prove its truth. However, such proofs are always relative to our available and accepted proof-conditions. Epistemologically, the theory does not depend on any physical properties of art, but on the cognitive role of art as our Aesthetic Science and its representation of human reality. Despite -- or perhaps because of -- the fact that this definition does not rely on any descriptive properties, the explanation of the cognitive role still holds in different situations, under a variety of changing genres and styles of the artistic creation of artworks. Hence, artifacts and objects that were not created to fulfill such cognitive roles, are not artworks at all.

Aesthetic Science of Art is Equivalent to Other Normative Sciences (Theoretical and Ethical) as Different Modes of Knowing Reality, Proven in Relative Proof-Conditions

The beauty of artworks is their aesthetic proved true representation of reality, relative to historical and social contexts, which constitute their relative proof-conditions. Yet, although their value is grounded in their being true and beautiful, this judgment fluctuates in the eyes of the beholders. Hence, it seems

that a subjective evaluation is rendered, according the way the artworks are perceived in the public eye and according to the commercial values assigned to them. In this case, the evaluation rendered is relativistic, instead of being measured against objective truth and beauty relative to the historical changes of their proof-conditions. Hence, there is the need for epistemological scrutiny, to distinguish between subjective relativism, that obstacle which Kant could not overcome, and the objective proof upon relative proof-conditions (Adorno 1970; Calinescu 1987; Harrington 2004).

During the last one hundred and fifty years or so, such terms as “modern,” “modernity” and more recently “modernism,” as well as a number of related notions, have been used in artistic or literary contexts to convey an increasingly sharp sense of historical relativism. This relativism is in itself a form of criticism of tradition. . . .

What we have to deal with here is a major cultural shift from a time-honored aesthetic of permanence, based on a belief in an unchanging and transcendent ideal of beauty, to an aesthetics of transitoriness and immanence, whose central values are change and novelty. (Calinescu 1987: Introduction)

However, this description and explanation of the historical and social change of the concept of beauty is based on the assumption that the fluctuation from one artistic genre or style to the next reflects a change in the transcendental-absolute concept of beauty. This view is in distinction from the realist epistemological explanation, according to which artistic beauty is the aesthetic true representation of reality, and that the changes in artistic genres and styles are due to the changing reality and to human knowledge of it. Moreover, the changing of genres and styles and even changes in the artistic topics, as viewed through art history, cannot be explained phenomenologically as a mere reaction to the previous artistic generations. Such changes cannot be arbitrary, since both the change in artists’ intellectual ideas and their embodiment in aesthetic ideas of artworks cannot be independent of the artists’ knowledge of themselves and of the world they live in. Hence, by representing reality, all sciences provide us with knowledge of reality, the theoretical, moral, and of course including the achieved aesthetic knowledge of it. From these sciences we learn about human life in different generations of changing social and natural environments (Peirce [1906]1998; Neshet 2004a, 2007a; Kieran and Lopes, 2007).

Hence, the historical and conceptual changes in art also reflect the change in the *conception of beauty* from the Ideal-Transcendental beauty to a Relative-Phenomenal beauty in respect to the changing of contexts, genres and styles, whereas the change from Modernism to Postmodernism is the radical change of the concept of art, which led to the notion of The End of Art (Danto 2003; McEvilley 2005). The endeavors to find experientially the

explanation for what is the concept of art and the concept of aesthetics, by counting samples of art and the colloquial usages of the relevant words, is based on common-sense intuition, without any epistemological explanation of what is the cognitive role of art in human life (Danto 2003; Ranciere 2004: Introduction; Galenson 2009: 40). However, alternatively, there is the realist conception of aesthetic art, which by failing to understand such epistemology of art as an aesthetic mode of knowing reality, some artists, critics, and historians of art are prone to accept the crisis instead of overcoming the conceptual confusion (Nesher 2002a, 2004a, 2005b, 2007b).

What in the Hegelian tradition has been called progress is the record of the stages of the mind's reintegration? When its self-knowing is complete again, these conflicts will be over and history will be at an end. The story will be over. . . . Applying this scenario to art history, one sees that art was first concerned with imitation of the outside world (beginning), then, in the era of abstraction, with imitation the world of ideas, the inside world (middle), and finally, in the era of (strong) Conceptualism, it was simply inspecting itself, its own knowing mechanism (end). McEvelley 2005: 265-266)

The essential difficulty is to explain the relation between historical change and the corresponding social and economic evolvment through the epochs, and how the conceptions of art and its beauty changed accordingly. However, when we explain epistemologically that the beauty of artwork is its true aesthetic representation of reality, then the concept of beauty of artworks holds throughout the history of art, even though its nuanced meanings can change in different genres. Therefore, it seems to art historians, that the concept of the beauty of artwork itself is changing historically, and thus it evolves from Modernism to Postmodernism, which leads to the notion of the End of Art, an explanation they consequently find irrefutable. However, according to the realist epistemology, the changes are not in the meanings of Beauty but in the styles and the proof-conditions of aesthetic representation of reality.

Thus, the Phenomenalist understanding of the concept of aesthetic beauty of artworks can bring us to a Nihilist *relativism* of aesthetic beauty as a merely subjective feeling, in distinction to the understanding of artistic beauty as grounded in the true representation of reality. Indeed, according to realist constructive relativity, the changes of our aesthetic knowledge of reality are based on the acceptance of the relative proof-conditions of the true representation of reality, being just the Positive *relativity* (Nesher 2002a, 2007b, 2016, 2021; Kieran and Lopes 2007). But, the difficulties remain: how we can understand the artistic languages of artworks in their changing styles and meaning, and moreover, how can the aesthetic true representation of reality be distinguished from the false representations of ornamental and

kitschy works? The misunderstanding of those epistemological distinctions can bring aestheticians to conclude that the decadence that is associated with Modernism and Postmodernism signaled the end of art in the last century and led to the current *dénouement* of social and economic life (Vattimo [1985]1988; Calinescu 1987; Kuspit 2004).

Can we understand the aesthetic language of the Postmodern abstract art, its language and the ideas or the specific feelings and emotions it represents? (Kuspit, Vattimo, and Calinescu). If we cannot understand the meaning of abstract art either from knowing the artist's background or eventually from the artist's own explanation, it can be difficult to distinguish ornamental, kitsch, or other types of art from the true representation of the artist's inner consciousness in respect to his or her experience in external reality. The difficulty with Postmodern artworks is to analyze the extent to which Postmodernism is related to the weakening of Capitalism with its commercially corrupted fashion, or is Postmodernism actually a new artistic language that informs painting, writing, composition and other artistic media? (Vattimo [1985]1988; Calinescu 1987; Kuspit 2004). The relevant issue of interest is the epistemic similarity between abstract art and instrumental music, when in both of them it is a challenge to understand their meanings beyond the direct feeling and emotional reaction to them. Hence, it seems that meanwhile we have to accept that the individuals' subjective feelings can fluctuate, as in respect to the beauty of objects and persons, which can be due to one's personality, social or cultural background, and yet we have to continue to inquire into this difficulty.

Epistemologically it is essential to make the distinction between the *aesthetic science*, in which the artists endeavor to create their artworks to represent reality truly and beautifully, and the artisans who endeavor to create-produce crafts to facilitate their experience and entertain humans to feel pleasure and enjoyment with them. In this line of inquiry, we can distinguish between the aesthetic science, by which the artists endeavor to represent reality truly and beautifully to evoke human feelings of elation and inspiration, and the *commercial artistic crafts*, including some abstract arts, which at best express the artists' feelings and emotions, but represent only those inner subjectivities, which devoid of any intellectual ideas about reality cannot represent reality aesthetically.

Historical epochs of artistic representations of reality: Changes in genre and style reflect shifts in artists' intellectual and aesthetic understanding of their current reality

The epistemology of art is concerned with investigating and elaborating upon the artistic creation of artworks as aesthetic, true and beautiful representations

of reality. A particular aspect of this endeavor is to understand how historical and social changes affect the artistic genres and styles employed in the creation of artworks. Indeed, it is the artists' encounters with such realities, accompanied by changes in their inner selves, in their cognition, and in their understanding of the external realities, which bring about the shifts in their intellectual ideas, expressed in their aesthetic artworks (Adorno 1970: 1-2). Thus, for example, Structuralists and Formalist art historians, by being Phenomenalists, who deal only with the formal structures of artworks, treat the works as if they were divorced from reality or from the artists' endeavor to represent reality. Hence, proponents of this approach cannot explain the cognitive conceptions of *Art*, *Aesthetics*, *Truth* or *Beauty*. They opt to investigate the *history of art* as separate from the *epistemology of art*; yet, even the *history of art* has to be validated epistemologically. The basic philosophical concerns regarding "what is art" is to inquire what is the epistemology of art, which can be shown and established also in relation to its history. Thus, our approach of reconstructing the Kantian intuitions about the artistic creation of artworks, supported by the Peircean understanding of artworks as artists' "working hypotheses", affords us a clear link between the epistemology of art and art history. The truth of these hypotheses is proven upon the relevant reality manifesting such aesthetic mode of knowledge. In this manner we can establish that the epistemology of art is the cognitive enterprise of the artist, attempting to represent reality aesthetically. This then explains the essential character of art and its historical role in society.

Hence, to understand art and its history, it is essential to investigate the nature of *genres* as general artistic modes for understanding historical reality aesthetically. Genres serve as a resource for the individual artists who throughout their career employ the relevant *styles* to create particular true artworks. Genre and style are resources that enable artists to explain how they approached the creation of a specific artwork as suggested by Bakhtin (Bakhtin 1981; Morson and Emerson 1990: 88-89; compare with Gombrich 1960: Introduction). Thus, we have to inquire whether different conceptions of experiential beauty are related to a historical change in artistic genres and styles and the artists' reactions to earlier genres and styles, or whether such differences stem from the artists' perceptions and experiences of different realities, perceptions which are rendered as distinct aesthetic representations in the artworks. Such an inquiry will enable us to, explain the evolution of different genres and styles of aesthetic artworks in representing reality, let us say, Naturalism, Realism, Impressionism, Expressionism, and others. In discussing how we can explain art by social theory, it is crucial to explain it epistemologically. More specifically, we need to address and solve Harrington's (2004) exposition of the difficulties. At the end of his discussion on how social theories can explain the enigma of art and its history, Harrington turned

to the five *constitutive antinomies* in explaining the role of art in society which seems as an epistemological deadlock.

However, we have seen that social theory confronts many profound problems of conflicting epistemological standpoints in its various attempts to accomplish its task. We will summarize these problems here in terms of five constitutive antinomies of social-theoretic thinking about art. (Harrington 2004: 207)

As we will see in the following, the five constitutive antinomies that Harrington found in the social-theoretic thinking about art are based on two conflicting epistemologies, *Transcendental Objectivism* and *Sensualist Relativism*, similar to the Kantian basic conception of knowledge initiated in his *Transcendental Aesthetic* as the a priori structure of phenomenal objects, and the *Aesthetic Intuition* as these objects appearing to different persons. Indeed, according to Harrington, these epistemological constitutive antinomies determine the antinomy between *Modernism* and *Postmodernism* (Harrington 2004: 207-210; see figure 7.3). In respect to the query "What is Art?" we can summarize Harrington's third antinomy, *the antinomy between objectivism and relativism*, which in Kant's epistemology of the reflective aesthetic judgment of art is between the subjective feeling of beauty and its universal value. This antinomy is between the objective transcendental basis of knowledge and the subjective sensual intuition of the object which we judge as true. This antinomy is present also in modern philosophy, between the objectivism of the positivist and the analytic philosophy, which is based on assumptions of objective syntax and the semantic formalism of logic and mathematics as "Scientism", and the subjectivism of the hermeneutist-intuitionist philosophy, in logic, mathematics, sciences and aesthetic art "Artism" (Nesher 2004a).

The alternative epistemology, capable of contending with the contradictions and shortcomings of the analytic and hermeneutic epistemologies is the Peircean realist Pragmaticist epistemology. In this approach, Peirce reconstructs and criticizes the Kantian philosophical system, by revolutionizing his famous Copernican Revolution, from Transcendentalism to Realism, to explain our knowledge of reality in general and specifically the riddle of art and how to explain the aesthetic science of art in advancing the knowledge of reality (Peirce 1905-1907, *EP*II: ## 24-28; Nesher 2002a: III, 2016, 2021). The actual dilemma in understanding art is whether to explain it *phenomenally* or *realistically*. Like the formalist movement in art history, a *phenomenally*-based explanation considers the historical relations among different *genres* and *styles* and assumes that the continual shift and evolution of different *genres* explains what is art. The alternative *realistic* approach to understanding *art* posits that *genres* and *styles* are manifestations of the artist's different intellectual ideas, which affect the creation of the artworks and the artist's personal styles. Yet

the different genres share a common role, namely, to represent aesthetically different historical and social realities. Indeed, is there a way to define art historically?

I have tried, using Duchamp and Warhol to achieve my definition of art, to outline examples from the history of art to show that the definition always has been the same. Thus I used Jacques-Louis David, Piero della Francesca, and Michelangelo's great ceiling for the Sistine Chapel. If one believes that art is all of the piece, one needs to show that what makes it so is to be found throughout its history. (Danto 2013: xli)

The difficulty with Danto and other theoreticians dealing with the nature of art is that they based their definitions on the historical samples and the changing of genres and styles, so that any general definition of art must demonstrate continual change through history with new samples as that of Duchamp and Warhol. Yet, without suggesting a criterion for what constitutes an acceptable example we are left without any definition of art. Indeed, without any clear epistemological guidelines for forming a conception of art, scholars are perplexed about how to continue.

Thus sketched, the master narrative of the history of art—in the West but by the end not in the West alone—is that there is an era of imitation, followed by an era of ideology, followed by our post-historical era in which, with qualification, anything goes. Each of these periods is characterized by a different structure of art criticism. Art criticism in the traditional or mimetic period was based on visual truth. The structure of art criticism in the age of ideology is the one from which I sought to disengage myself: it characteristically grounded its own philosophical idea of what art is on an exclusionary distinction between the art it accepted (the true) and everything else as not really art. The post-historical period is marked by the parting of the ways between philosophy and art, which means that art criticism in the post-historical period must be as plausible as post-historical art itself.

...

In our narrative, at first only mimesis was art, then several things were art but each tried to extinguish its competitors, and then, finally it became apparent that there were no stylistic or philosophical constraints. There is no special way works of art have to be. And that is the present and, I should say, the final moment in the master narrative. It is the end of the story. (Danto 1997: 47)

Given that historically and in respect to art history, we cannot know what may be considered Art in the future, it is difficult or even impossible to define it with the conceptions of *aesthetics* and *beauty*, especially following the

examples of postmodernist accepted artworks. The art historians, art critics, and philosophers of art, who cannot avail themselves of any clear historical definition, claim that we are at the End of Art. This can be explained by their difficulty to define and explain Art with what they understand the meanings and the use of the terms *aesthetics* and *beauty*. Therefore, they are confused about the “Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art” (Danto 2003), “What Art Is” (Danto 2013) and, What, After All, Is a Work of Art? (Margolis 1999), all of which bring us now to consider what remains After the End of Art (Danto 1997).

The alternative is the epistemological investigation of the immanent roles of art in human life. Then we can understand aesthetics as a science that represent human life and is implemented in the creation of artworks, and consequently also affects them, as the aesthetic science also guides our conduct in reality. The epistemological enterprise is to reconsider the commonly accepted conceptions of *Art*, *Aesthetics*, and *Beauty*, the meanings that they acquired as they were used to defined Art, and moreover the *implication of Truthfulness that was attributed to these meanings*. Danto in his endeavor to explain the conception of *art* by reevaluating the conception of *aesthetics* asked, “But if aesthetic is not the point of art, what is the point of aesthetics?” (Danto 2013: 150; Margolis 1999: 16-22).

I want now to move to a rather deeper level, to a concept of aesthetics that almost certainly has some impact on how we think about art philosophically, but could have an even more significant impact on how we think about some of the central issues of philosophy itself. This is an approach to aesthetics that, because it is associated with one of the most respected names in modern philosophy, might recommend itself to philosophers inclined to be scornful of aesthetics as a minor discipline, preoccupied by frill and forth. In 1903, William James arranged for the philosophical genius Charles Sanders Peirce to give a series of lectures at Harvard on the meaning of Pragmatism. In the lectures, Peirce specified three normative disciplines—logic, ethics, and aesthetics (what is right in thought, in action, and in feeling respectively)—of which aesthetic was the most fundamental. (Danto 2013: 151-152; cf. Neshor 2007a)

Hence, let us see how Danto interpreted Peirce on the conception of *Aesthetics*, and how it connected with the conception of *Art* and the conception of *Beauty*.

What I admire in Peirce and Heidegger is that they have sought to liberate aesthetics from the traditional preoccupation with beauty, and beauty’s traditional limitation to calm detachment—and at the same time to situate the beauty as

part of ontology of being human. But this would be put into the class of beautiful days or beautiful settings. And this put it into connection with natural objects, from flowers to the Grand Canyon, and it is not what Hegel speaks of as “born of the spirit and born again.” It skips past aesthetic creativity. (Danto 2013: 154-5)

In his interpretation of Peirce’s conception of the aesthetic as one of the three Normative Sciences, namely, as a reconstruction and a revolutionizing of the Kantian philosophical system, Danto confusing the use of beauty in aesthetic science of art with the judgment of the beauty of objects. Moreover, Danto’s conceptions of *aesthetics* and *beauty* in artworks disregard the notion of aesthetics as a science and its role of representing reality. While dealing with art and beauty, Danto concludes:

But it can be art without being beautiful at all. Beauty was an eighteenth century value. (Danto 2013: 155)

Much of the contemporary art is hardly aesthetic at all, but it has in its stead the power of meaning and the possibility of truth, and depends upon the interpretation that brings these into play. (Danto 2013: 155)

In this discussion, Danto confuses the common-sense conception of aesthetics with its place in the aesthetic science, and so also the correspondingly different conceptions of beauty, by giving the historical examples of postmodernist art before understanding and defining “what is art”. Indeed, the epistemological difficulty is to explain what we can consider as Art, the created artworks, what we understand about their Aesthetics and how we can judge them as beautiful, ugly, or kitschy. The answer, according to the Peircean Pragmaticist epistemology, is that all created artworks are the aesthetic ideas, à la Kant, but only true artworks are beautiful in their representation of reality. However, to state it thus requires that we first explain what art is, and what is aesthetic and beautiful in artworks. Kant has two conceptions of aesthetic in respect to his conception of artworks and of their evaluation: that of *aesthetic ideas*, referred to in his Third Critique, whose role is similar to the role he ascribes to his *Transcendental Aesthetics* in the First Critique, and the *aesthetic judgment* of the Third Critique, whose role is similar to that of *aesthetic intuition* of the First Critique. However, in Peircean epistemology, the concept of *aesthetic ideas* indicates the cognitive created artworks and their mode of representing reality (figures 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5).

The expression, *aesthetic way of presentation*, is quiet unambiguous if we mean by it that the presentation is referred to an object, as appearance, to

[give rise to] cognition of that object. For here the term *aesthetic* means that the form of sensibility ([i.e.,] how the subject is affected) attaches necessarily to the presentation, so that this form is intuitively transferred to the object (though to the object only as phenomenon). That is why it was possible to have a transcendental aesthetic, as a science pertaining to the cognitive power. (Kant *CJ*: 221')

Thus, Kant relates the transcendental aesthetic to our knowledge of phenomenal objects, which can explain how the subject with the cognitive power of understanding determines aesthetically the space and time of the experiential sensual intuition, which is then transformed into knowledge of a phenomenal object. This remark could be a hint for Peirce to develop his concept of aesthetic science, in which the artist creates the aesthetic ideas of the artwork.

However, for a long time now it has become customary to call a way of presenting aesthetic, i.e., sensible, in a different meaning of the term as well, where this means that that the presentation is referred, not to the cognitive power, but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

Now it is true that (in the line with this meaning of the term aesthetic) we are in habit of calling this feeling too a sense (a modification of our state), since we have no other term for it. Yet this feeling is not an objective sense, not a sense that the determination of which we would use to *cognize* an object, but a sense that contributes nothing whatever to our cognition of objects. . . .

Precisely because all determinations of feeling have only subjective significance, there cannot be, as a science, an aesthetic of feeling as there is, say, an aesthetic of the cognitive power. Hence the expression, aesthetic way of presenting, always retains an inevitable ambiguity, if sometimes we mean by it a way of presenting that arouses the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, but sometimes a way of presenting that concerned merely the cognitive power insofar as we find in it sensible intuition that allows us to cognize objects, [though] only as appearances. But we can remove this ambiguity if we apply the term aesthetic not to intuition, let alone to presentations of the understanding, but always to the acts of the *power of judgment*. (Kant *CJ*: 221'-222')

Hence, after debating whether to use the term *aesthetic* to refer to the “transcendental aesthetic as a science pertaining to the cognitive power,” or to “the acts of the *power of judgment*”, to the subjective experience with objects which cannot be any objective determination, Kant decided to consider it for the describing the individual feeling in the *reflective aesthetic judgment* of objects, “the determination of the subject” and not for the objective aesthetic science. That there can be an aesthetic science can be understood from what Kant hinted at, that “all our judgments can be divided, in terms of the order of the higher

cognitive powers, into *theoretical*, *aesthetic*, and *practical* ones” (Kant *CJ*: 226). This last suggestion, which fits better with the Kantian philosophical system, was taken by Peirce in his realist reconstruction of Kant’s Transcendental Epistemology, to take the Three Critiques as the basis for the three Normative Sciences of human basic modes of knowledge. Thus Peirce considers the aesthetic to be a basic science through which the artistic represents reality (Peirce, [1906]1998, *EPII*: #27; Nesher 2007a). Nevertheless, Kant did not develop the aesthetic science to consistently complete his philosophical system, and kept the term aesthetics to refer to the subjective judgment of feelings.

Therefore, in calling a judgment about an object aesthetic, we indicate immediately that, while a given presentation is being referred to an object, by judgment we mean hear not the determination of the object, but the determination of the subject and his feeling. (Kant *CJ*: 223’)

Therefore, by assigning the term *aesthetic* to mean the subjective experience of beauty of natural and artifactual objects in aesthetic judgments, Kant extended it also to artistic artworks, thus making their evaluation a subjective matter and blocking the way to the development of either an aesthetic science of the created artworks or the possibility of aesthetic knowledge. Peirce, in his epistemology of human knowledge reconstructs Kant’s philosophical system as developed in the three Critiques, into what Peirce calls the Pragmaticist theory of the three Normative Sciences. According to Peirce, the three Normative Sciences are *logic*, which aims at Truth; *ethics*, at Morality; and *aesthetics*, at Beauty. However, it would appear that Kant’s system is more accurate, at least, let us say, insofar as the first normative science is *theoretical* and not *logical* (Kant *CJ*: First Introduction VIII 226’, *CPuR*: B94, 141; Peirce *CP*: 5.121, 6.378, *EPII*: #27, 1906).

Indeed, if in the context of the Peircean realist revolution we replace the Kantian *Transcendental Aesthetic* with the *cognitive aesthetic* of the created artworks, we can explain that in the realist epistemology of artistic aesthetic knowledge, the conception of aesthetics is not of sensual pleasure but of the artist’s *aesthetic ideas* of the created artworks. Hence, the concept of aesthetics refers to a mode of representing reality as the artist endeavored, which by virtue of being a true representation is also beautiful. Thus, we can interpret the relevant Ancient Greek concept of *Poïesis*, as the creation of artworks and the concept of *Aesthesis* as the artistic mode of representing reality.

The three stages of the artistic creation and evaluation of Artwork representing reality, based common-sense knowledge as the accepted knowledge of our three Normative Sciences, the Theoretical, the Ethical and the Aesthetical, are presented in figure 7.1. As noted, this is an elaboration of Kantian aesthetics, except that Kant’s subjective feeling of *Harmony* is

replaced with the Peircean conception of self-controlled confrontation in reality, which serves as an objective criterion of the truth and beauty of the artwork (Kant *CJ*: 1781-87: B84-109, B316-349; Nesher 2005b, 2007a, 2016). Thus we can avoid the paradox of beauty in Kant's aesthetic theory (as in Wittgenstein's paradox of the *meaning* of following rules), whereby, if every subjective pleasure determines beauty, and every displeasure can contradict it, such subjective feelings cannot serve as an intersubjective universal Judgment of beauty. Indeed, there is no phenomenal objective criterion for harmony between *intellectual ideas* and *aesthetic ideas* and, accordingly, the judgment of aesthetic beauty remains arbitrary. However, the way out of such "internal realism" and also "metaphysical realism" is the epistemology of Pragmaticist "representational realism" (Nesher 2002a: III).

This can be explicated in the following example. For Cervantes, Don Quixote is an aesthetic idea of an imaginary persona in the specific situation of the early Spanish capitalist society with its cruelties. This fictitious protagonist is an aesthetic representation of particular human traits: and he follows imaginary ideas and endeavors to do justice, has the courage to fight for his ideas, and, moreover, dreams an imaginary beloved Dulcinea, who being a dream--is realistically unattainable. Thus, by reading Cervantes' Don Quixote, we feel some *similarity* between our personal experience and the adventures of the protagonist in the story, which can be the proof of the true representation of ourselves in typical human reality, and thus an example of beautiful literature. However, what about different feelings of different readers about the protagonist Don Quixote? Will all readers share the same subjective feelings of a similarity between this character and their personalities? Do we all recognize within ourselves the satiric condition of our hero, with his unrealistic inspirations? Even when we do share the same subjective feelings, this is not enough to constitute proof of the truth of human reality and hence beautiful art. Regardless of the different feelings about the truth or falsity of this art, having different understandings of the artwork can be an indication of having different proof-conditions, just as different perceptual judgments can be expressed about what seems the same situation. In other words, instead of seeing the aesthetic judgment of artworks as only subjective, we can explain the differences between the people's judgments as relative to their different knowledge, and through rational discussions we can come to agree on the artwork as an aesthetic and beautiful representation of our reality.

The difficulty to identify the personal relative proof-conditions bring us to base our aesthetic judgments on our intuitions until the inquiries will lead us to an objective criterion to understand the relativity of our quasi-proof and proof conditions, but also the objectivity of the truth and beauty of the considered artwork. As to the reflective aesthetic judgments, based on the imagination

in comparison between the aesthetic artwork, e.g., Picasso’s “Guernica,” and the known facts of Guernica disaster, it is not only by pictorial images but “Picasso now reacted intensely, with his whole being; and his response was of course in terms of paint” by emotional images of the aesthetic artwork that already infused with the intellectual ideas of the artist, which he and we can know from the context of its creation (O’Brian 1976: 320ff.).

Fine art shows its superiority precisely in this, that it describes things beautifully that in nature we would dislike or find ugly. The Furies, diseases, devastations of war, and so on are all harmful; and yet they can be described, or even presented in the painting, very beautifully. (Kant *CJ*: 312)

As can be illustrated in the following figure:

Hence, how should we understand what is aesthetics in the epistemology of Art, and whether Picassos’ *Guernica* with all its awful manifestations, can be considered beautiful? Aesthetics by itself is not beauty, as has been the traditional and accepted, understanding in history of art; rather aesthetics is a mode of artistic representation of reality, which—upon being proved as true-- is considered a beautiful representation of reality. However, this is not an indication of the beauty of the reality itself. Also, if it is proved false, it is considered ugly, kitschy, or not art at all. This is because without cognitive spirit, the artist cannot create an artwork that represents reality. Thus, the basic duty of the philosopher, in the upheaval of Postmodernism and the feeling of the historical End of Art, is to reevaluate epistemologically how to understand the basic conceptions, which historically lost their clear meanings. Such a reevaluation and can help us understand one of the central themes in human cognition and conduct, namely, what is Art, and the basic concepts that need to be explained for this purpose are *Art*, *Aesthetics*, *Truth*, and *Beauty* (Vattimo [1985]1988; Margolis1999; Carroll 2000; Harrington 2004; Calinescu 1987; Kuspit 2004; Ranciere 2004; Danto 2013).




Figure 7.6 The quasi-proof of the artwork true aesthetic representation of reality by comparing imaginatively its similarity to facts of human reality.

Aesthetic is the science of *Art* and not the experience of pleasure with objects but rather, the artistic *Aesthetic* mode of representing *reality* (Peirce *EPII*: #27, 1906; Nesher 2004a; Danto 2013).

Art is created *Aesthetic ideas* cognitively representing reality to be *True and Beautiful* and therefore it cannot be artifacts or whatever introduced to museums or bought or sold as arts (Margolis 1999; Danto 2013).

Truth of the Artwork is the artistic *Aesthetic* representation of reality, achieved by being proved upon the artist's general knowledge of reality (Nesher 2002a, 2007a).

Beauty of Art is the artistic *Aesthetic* mode of *true* representation of reality, but when not true is *not Beautiful Artwork* (Danto 2003; Nesher 2003).

The epistemological distinction between Art and Artifacts in general and in Postmodernism in particular, i.e., the criterion that artists, art historians, art critics, philosophers and others are looking for, can be summarized as follows: only artworks that aesthetically represent reality, parallel to the other normative sciences that do this, theoretically and ethically, and proved upon the perceptual judgments true facts, can be considered works of art. However, empirically, only the sequence of the three essential inferences of human cognitive operations, as formulated in Peircean semiotics -- Abductive Logic of Discovery, the Deductive Logic of Consistency, and the Inductive Logic of Evaluation -- constitutes the complete proof of our knowledge. This is the Epistemic Logic which represents our confrontation in reality, the basis of our knowledge of reality, i.e., the theoretical, moral, and aesthetic proofs, in their different epistemic domains (Peirce *EPII* #27 [1906]1998; Nesher 1983a, 2002b, 2007a, 2016, 2021).

We can understand Aesthetic Science by drawing an analogy with the theoretical sciences, such that the artists are viewed as aesthetic scientists, who through their artworks endeavor to aesthetically represent human lives in the world. Hence, with their intellectual imaginations, the artists compare their created artworks with their knowledge of the reality which they intend to represent, and thus can quasi-prove or prove the truth of the artworks to aesthetically represent reality beautifully. The historical changes in art genres and artists' styles, which mark the evolvement of the aesthetic science, can be explained in analogy to the evolvement of paradigms and theories in the theoretical sciences. In Art as in Ethics, norms change paradigmatically according to the historical changes in human life and so too there is a corresponding shift in the modes that are used to scientifically represent these new norms. Such a description can explain the changes in the concepts of art and

beauty, which is actually the changing of genres and styles in the consciousness of the time, with the actual historical realities and their representations. Yet, these are not capricious changes of the ideals of beauty, as is claimed by formalist historians and other phenomenologist enterprises (Calinescu 1987: Introduction).

The distinction between Modernism and Postmodernism is not just a distinction between two cultures of the growing industrial capitalism and its commercial deterioration, but also, between two human cultures: optimistic creativity and pessimistic hedonism. Moreover, the differentiation also reflects the ideological controversy of the twentieth century, namely, between the endeavor for creativity and the corresponding socialization and moralization of humanity, on the one hand, and the commercial hedonism and the corresponding egotism, nihilism and disintegration of humanity.

However, the aforementioned distinction is different from the theoretical controversy between Habermas, who followed the approach of the Frankfurt School in the Enlightenment project of objective universalism, which is akin to Transcendentalism, and Lyotard's subjective relativism, which is akin to Sensualism. The epistemologies underlying the controversy between Habermas and Lyotard are not realistic since they have no corresponding theories of truth and, therefore, they cannot prove or explain their different conceptions of art and aesthetics (Adorno 1970; Bell, 1976: 53-54, 71-42; Calinescu 1987: 263-312; Jameson 1991: Ch. 7, 10; Habermas 2003). Epistemologically, we can observe that historically there are continually working artists honest to their own ideas of creating true aesthetic artworks, despite the surrounding pressures, in distinction from those who surrender to external social and economic forces and divert away from their original spirit to satisfy their patrons and customers. Although the phenomena produced via this process of alienation differ from one epoch to the next, in our postmodern era they are prominently present in the conflict between the modern artistic movement and postmodern civilization, as demonstrated in the distinction between the works of Picasso and Duchamp in the early twentieth century and thenceforth. Consequently, in order to distinguish art from pseudo-art and artifact, or to distinguish created artworks from the products of cultural and social entertainment, it is essential to understand the Aesthetic Science of Art, its beauty, and its function of elaborating our knowledge of ourselves and of the social and natural reality we live in. The progression of modernity in Art, the creation of original artworks that aesthetically represent the spiritual intentions of the artists and the reality they work in, depends on the artists' courage not bow to the commercialism of capitalist decadence, but to remain faithful to themselves, to resist the current wave of Postmodernism. The realist epistemology of Peircean Pragmatism with

its explanation of Theoretic, Ethic, and Aesthetic knowledge as the three Normative Sciences that constitute the source of human conduct is radically distinct from the philosophies of the previous two centuries. The latter were basically neo-Kantian philosophies that failed to address the way in which we represent reality and conduct our lives in it (Makkreel and Sebastian 2010; Neshar 2018, 2021).

Chapter 8

Epilog

Can We Theorize Some Bizarre Aesthetic Domains—The Beauty of Music-Aesthetics, Mathematics-Theoretics, and Human-Ethics?

The beauty of music and what is its meaning? The beauty of mathematics and what is its truth? The beauty of humans and what are their ethical contributions to themselves and others?

The Epistemology of Aesthetic Representation of Reality: Are the Aspects of the Three Normative Sciences, Aesthetic, Ethic, and Theoretic, Can Explain the Enigmatic Beauty, Truth, and Good of Music, Mathematics and Humans?

INTRODUCTION: THE BEAUTY OF MUSIC, MATHEMATICS, AND HUMANS

The difficulty in analyzing the enigmatic human enterprises, Music and Mathematics, is that although musicians and mathematicians are doing very complicated and skillful work in their fields, the following quote from Russell, which he made in regard to mathematics, is also applicable to the epistemological explanations regarding music, as well as mathematics:

“Mathematics is the subject in which you don’t know what you’re talking about, and don’t care whether what you say is true” (Russell [1901]1918: 75).

The difficulty is to explain the meanings of music and of mathematics, how to understand their languages as they evolved, and how we know to operate them (Robinson 1997: Int.; Kivy 1984, 1990). The epistemological difficulty is to explain the meaning of music, although it seems to be obvious and yet, how do we understand it, what is its beauty, and how does it affect our lives? Mathematics seems quite simple to operate, with its basic signs

that we learned in school, but what is the source of their meanings and how can we validate them in case of confusion? And also, how can we understand and use the beauty of mathematics, which mathematicians claim is so obvious? Another enigma is about the beauty of human beings: is this merely a subjective experiential feeling related to a particular encounter between two persons and their idiosyncratic exchange of feelings and emotions, or is there also an epistemology for understanding the beauty of human beings, and what we experience? Indeed, let us say, we have to look beyond the mere form of humans, toward the genuine concept of the beauty of human beings. However, as it is also with the beauty of music and mathematics, it is difficult to explain, so let us give some epistemological hints, which might help us avoid confusion and puzzlement.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CREATION AND EVALUATION OF THE MEANINGS OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS

The Riddle of the Appreciation of Musical Compositions Is How We Understand Its Meaning

The riddle of the appreciation of musical compositions is to explain how we understand their meanings and appreciate their beauty, which in turn affect our emotions and our conceptual understanding of ourselves and influence our behavior in life. To investigate this epistemologically, we might ask: what could be the cognitive roots of music in human evolution and how do they affect personal and social life? It seems that the pre-verbal expressions of feelings and the vocalized emotional sounds with which human babies and also other animals, especially primates, react to the social and natural environment constitute the basic tonality of music. However, later on, these sounds are interpreted and expressed also in verbal language as poetic songs put to a melody, with various forms that span the entire gamut of expression: poems, prayers, ballads and odes, which are used to express fear, encouragement, thanks and love. Instances of these can be found as far back as ancient cultures, as for example, in Miriam's and Deborah's songs in the Bible, and the hymns of Homer. Now it would appear that the contents of those expressions of natural feelings, whether an emotional cry of sadness or joy evoked by or in response to a specific situation—in fact, the entire range of expressions can be rationally interpreted. Hence, the musicians could elaborate their tunes and lyrics to further express the desired feelings and emotions, thereby developing poetic songs and communicating their social message (Molino 2000; Netil 2000).

The epistemological difficulty is both to explain how we understand the musician's feeling and the emotional meaning of melody and to determine whether we can truly interpret its content, without it being expressed in words. Likewise, are we able to understand the intellectual ideas that composers have embedded in the melodies? We have the ability to understand each other's mental moods, even without the accompaniment of any verbal communication about our own or others' feelings and emotions. Indeed, we express emotions through our behavior and others can interpret them in the particular contexts in which they appear. However, in hearing a created melody, a symphony recital, we cannot see the composer's behavioral expressions, but only hear the musical composition. Nevertheless, we can understand it, just as we understand the tonality of a single voice without words as an expression of happy or sad, angry or pacified emotions. Indeed, the question is: can we learn to interpret music as we interpret personal behavior, as easily as we interpret a smile or tears? How is the musical expression connected to the behavioral expressions? Clearly, in music the meaning and what it represents is more implicit, at least for amateurs, and therefore it seems so problematic.

Hence, we can understand the meaning-content of music which developed by diverting familiar human expressions and sounds, which can be further elaborated into more complicated forms, such as sonatas, recitals, symphonies, and more. Beethoven said "Music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy" and "Music comes to me more readily than words" (Beethoven, in Hatten, R. S. 1994). Mahler said "The symphony must be like the world. It must embrace everything." Through these quotes we can understand that composers understand their music clearly and distinctly, as clearly as we understand the meanings of our verbal linguistic expressions. This is due to their conscious representation of reality through music, as Mahler hinted (Adorno 1992). Thus, we already explained the feeling and emotional roots of the evolved musical expression and one can ask, how can we evaluate the music and know whether it is beautiful or ugly, sincere or fake, or just without any spirit, and what can be our criterion for understanding its meanings? As with common human cognitive behavior, we can interpret and understand the meanings and evaluate their sincerity by quasi-proving or proving the veracity of the interpretations communicated in the composition (Nesher 2002a: VI. #7). This can be done with musical expressions, by proving their truth as representing the composer's personal, social and natural reality, which is the source of all our experience and knowledge. Hence, the specific situation in which the music evolves experientially is the reality with which human cognition is confronted, and from which our feelings and emotions arise. Thus, composers melodiously express intellectual ideas that represent their knowledge of self and the epoch in which they live. Consider

the manner in which Beethoven's personality is expressed in the *Heroica* (Siepmann, 2005: Prolog and Ch. Three—The Hero).

The Endeavor to Epistemically Explain the Creation of Musical Artistic Compositions

The epistemic explanation of the creation of compositions of musical art can be that the meaning of musical melodies emanates from the composer's emotional expressions experienced in a specific personal and social context. The artist, in this case the composer, understands these emotions, even before they are interpreted and form intellectual ideas, which are expressed symbolically through the music. The artist or composer interprets and expresses these intellectual ideas through the poetic forms with which he or she is familiar and interested. The meaning of the melody can be expressed through one's preferred poetic form, when the composer reflects on the connection between the emotions and the contextual reality. All of these are experienced and expressed in the melody, and this is the meaning of such music. The creation and evaluation of musical compositions can be achieved by, so called, quasi-proving their true mode of representation of the composer's emotional confrontation in reality, specifically, the composer's *musical reality*. Much as other artworks represent their realities by the epistemic logic, so also mathematics with the mathematical reality, or the ethics with ethical reality. However, this understanding is to be distinguished from the epistemologies of Metaphysical Realism, the Formal Semantic and the Internal Realism of Phenomenological Hermeneutics, whose propositional representations and interpretations refer solely to their own sense data, or sensual intuitions (Meyer 1956: vii-x; Nesher 2016, 2018).

The question of what constitutes musical meaning and by what processes it is communicated has been the subject of numerous and often heated debates (Meyer 1956: 1-3). Here we offer the following explanations:

Hence, when feelings and emotions arise and are expressed melodiously, they constitute the basic cognitive operations with which the artist-composer confronts reality. This voiced-sound expresses emotions, which are basic components that enable humans to represent themselves and know themselves, and through which they develop and elaborate their self-control in their environment, in the *Natural and Social Reality* (Nesher 2002a: X.10; Meyer 1956: 22-42; Wallin et.al. 2000; Mithen 2006: Part Two). The musical form that represents reality is the melodic evolution of basic emotional expressions, such as sorrow, pain, tears, laughter, joy, and happiness. These are the basic sound expressions that represent personal experience in reality, and they convey the composer's intellectual ideas regarding self and nature. The intellectual ideas evolve and develop into melodic musical expressions



Figure 8.1 The double layer of musical creation and representation: (1) voiced-sound emotionally expressed; (2) interpreting and proving the truth of the created musical melody to represent musical reality.

that represent the reality from which they evolved. The composer endeavors to express sincerely the personal emotions and ideas, through melodies that emerged from one's experience in reality. These are true expressions of true emotions, and as such they are not meaningless attempts to impress one's listeners or to meet their expectations, through the artificial formal structure of the composition alone. Moreover, there cannot be a priori formal structures to compose true music, but only which comes from the heart's feelings and emotions, as they are always original and not dictated by any formal standard (Storr 1992: 83-88; vs., e.g., Meyer 1956: 23; cf. Kivy 1990: 156).

The evolvement of the instrumental music from the human voice and the seeming separation between the two media makes music without words difficult to interpret. Early musical instruments were melodic imitators of the human voice; it took centuries to establish music as a series of sounds unrelated to the voice and detached from any verbal association (Storr 1992: 66).

Yet the question is whether the evolvement of music without words, e.g., a'la Mendelsohn, is completely separated from the artist's intellectual ideas, which drive the aesthetic composition—a musical work of art, a'la Kant. Hence, what can be the meaning of instrumental music and how can it be understood if it remains "detached from any verbal association"? Indeed, if music conveys only subjective feelings of meaning without any criterion for a more communal understanding of the objective meaning, it is difficult to explain the similar emotional effect it has on us, let alone any explicit common meaning or interpretation. Let us accept that when we hear a melody

conveyed by the medium of the human voice, without words, we feel its emotional expression more clearly than we do if it is conveyed through instruments other than the human voice. But can we also explain this difference conceptually (Storr 1992: Chap. IV)?

One consequence of the separation of music from words is to render the meaning of music equivocal. Because words define its content, we know what we are intended to feel when we hear a song in a language with which we are familiar; but we cannot be as sure when we hear a symphony. Disputes about the meaning of music, which are still heated, are centered around “absolute” music; that is, they concern instrumental music which does not refer to anything outside itself (Storr 1992: 67). The question is whether there is a relevant context in which to place the text of instrumental music, which could help us be more certain about its meaning-content (Nesher 2007b). Are there meaning conventions about how specific formal structures in Western music represent different kinds of emotions and ideas, and if so, what are the criteria for such conventions (Cooke 1959: 33, Stravinsky and Craft 1962; Barzun 1982: 77; cf. Storr 1992: 72-80)?

Hence, what is the criterion or the proof of the true meaning of music and the beauty of its aesthetic expressions, if not the effects that the music has on our feelings and emotions? These effects can include a quiet mood, sadness or sorrow, or in contrast happiness and elation. The emotional experiences evoked by music even influence our intellectual life. However, is there any criterion by which to ascertain that we react to music and interpret it truly—or could we also err on our interpretation of a musical piece? It can be suggested that the experience of music is a sort of perceptual experience. Thus, confronted with a segment of music representing reality, our iconic-imaginative feelings are interpreted in terms of an indexical-desire, i.e., an emotional reaction that renders a rational understanding, whereby this cognition affects our life and the way we conduct ourselves in reality. And yet, we can also be wrong and have to change our interpretations of such piece of music. In a new experience of a musical performance, we sometimes continue to reevaluate the meaning of the composition, by learning more of the biography of the composer and the real situation in which it was composed. Thus we rediscover the relevant conception of the melody and gain a reassurance of our understanding of it, by quasi-proving or proving our judgment of its aesthetic beauty. This is similar to humans’ cognitive self-expression, which enables us to understand and communicate with each other, by exchanging feelings and emotions and our conceptual understanding of each other. This communication holds also in understanding the musical meaning through feelings and emotions expressed in melodies of poems and even in instrumental music. However, as the language of music, its meaning, and what it represents is more implicit, it is also more enigmatic and problematic for the audience to

understand. Furthermore, it is not a reciprocal communication between the composer and the listener. It is plausible, however, that musicians, who are professionally immersed in the language of music, find it easier to communicate with one another through music.

The Epistemology of Interpreting and Understanding the Aesthetic Truth and Beauty of Music

The difficulty is whether it is the same with our musical experience as it is with environmental objects or artifacts in respect to their beauty. As we are limited to using only one of our senses and cannot touch and see what the music is about, which is the way we experience other phenomena, we cannot be certain about its meaning or the ideas relating to it. Hence, can we experience music conceptually, intellectually, or just emotionally? Assuming that the beauty of music is explained by its ability to touch us, by representing our true inner selves in real situations, then we can know this when we cognize its meaning and therefore it can affect our life. In this sense, let us say that musical expression is poetry in melody. However, in this case, like in aesthetic artworks in general, we have to understand the meaningful language of the artist, of the composer, through the biography, the genre, and the style, and also through specific hints, provided either with or without words. The artist usually provides some clues to help the audience understand the work, as in the case of Mendelssohn, when he hinted on the subject and consequently words were added to the songs. Mendelssohn wrote:

If you ask me what I had in mind when I wrote it, I would say: just the song as it is. And if I happen to have certain words in mind for one or another of these songs, I would never want to tell them to anyone, because the same words never mean the same things to others. Only the song can say the same thing, can arouse the same feelings in one person as in another, a feeling that is not expressed, however, by the same words.

People often complain that *music* is too uncertain in its meaning, that what they should be thinking as they hear it is unclear, whereas everyone understands words. With me it is exactly the reverse, and not only in the *context* of an entire speech, but also with individual words. These, too, seem to me so uncertain, so vague, so easily misunderstood in comparison to genuine music that fills the soul with a thousand things better than words. The thoughts expressed to me by the music I love are not too indefinite to be put into words, but on the contrary, too definite. (Mendelssohn 1842, quoted in the Encyclopedia Britannica)

The problem is related to the various social contexts in which words and sentences are used colloquially, as each person perceives the context

differently. This is what I have referred to as the proof-conditions for the true interpretation of meanings of words. In social communication, the common context is the sum of all personal contexts that are not completely overlapping. This state of affairs contributes to different nuances of meanings and thus, as Mendelssohn explains, “the same words never mean the same things to others;” hence, their meanings can be ambiguous for the participants in the discussion. According to Mendelssohn, this is distinct from the composer’s notes, phrases or melodies: for the composer, the context is the shared human experience and therefore it seems to be clear and distinct.

Indeed, we have to compare the role of our ordinary language usage, i.e., when we interpret our experiential feelings and emotions into words and propositions for ourselves and for communications with others, with the language of music, i.e., when the composer and the listeners of music attempt to understand and share the experiential meaning of their feelings and emotions, by interpreting them by means of ideas and thoughts, which can be expressed verbally. However, the verbal and the musical language are both grounded in human experience in reality, though they have different structures and different modes of expressing and representing our lives, whereby, we might say, the structure of one language is based on *logical-theoretical judgments* and that of the other language is based on *aesthetic judgment*, as Kant suggested.

In this aesthetic mode of musical creation and representation, we can learn the meaning and the truth of the musical composition, by inquiring about the composer’s biography, the meaning of the composer’s individualized *musical language*, and also how it connected to the composer’s personality and life. However, it is also possible to feel, emote and enjoy music without researching the composer’s personality and the context in which the music was created. In other words, one need not rely on the musical critics, their interpretations of the true musical meanings and their descriptions of how these affect them intellectually. Thus, music resonates in our feelings and emotional reactions and, in some cases, it can also help us understand ourselves and life in general. The epistemology of the creation and evaluation of musical compositions is based on quasi-proving the true representation of the musical reality, as is the case with other artworks’ realities, in comparison with the reality of epistemic logic, mathematical, theoretical, and ethical reality. (Nesher 2012, 2016, 2018). However, music is the expression of human feelings, expressions of emotional and intellectual experiences when confronting reality. The difficulty is to explain whether the beauty and truth of aesthetic musical compositions can be understood conceptually and how they differ from other aesthetic artworks. Interestingly, Storr elaborated on the similarity and the inner *beauty of mathematics and music*, describing them as set apart from reality, and yet music and mathematics represent

different aspects of reality through different modes, *aesthetic* and *theoretic* respectively (Storr 1992: 177-188; Neshar 2012, 2018).

THE CRITERION OF MATHEMATICAL AESTHETIC BEAUTY AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM OTHER THEORETICAL SCIENCES

Truth and Beauty of Mathematics and How They Proceed in Mathematical Proofs

Some mathematicians may derive aesthetic pleasure from their work, and from their experience of the beauty of mathematics. They express this pleasure by describing the *aesthetics* of mathematics or, at least, some aspect of mathematics as *beautiful*. Mathematicians describe mathematics as an art form, a creative enterprise (Peirce 1906 *EPII* #27; Cellucci 2015). Mathematics is often compared with music and poetry. Bertrand Russell expressed his sense of mathematical beauty in these words:

Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than Man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as poetry. (Russell [1907]1918: 60)

It seems that this conception of the beauty of mathematics can be understood as “sublimely pure” and as “only the greatest art can show” and moreover as the quality of a pure science, but then we have a difficulty to explain that mathematics is a pure science, since what can be the epistemology for understanding its meaning and proving its truth (Krantz 2011: Chap. 13, esp. 226; Neshar 2012, 2016)? But as to the emotional understanding of the high qualities and supreme beauty of mathematics, this nevertheless remains mysterious. However, it can be shown that without a realistic epistemology of mathematics as an empirical science, it is impossible to explain the meaning of its signs and the truth of its theories. Thus we cannot explain the nature of mathematics with its ambiguities and contradictions. Furthermore, by accepting its scholasticism, we must expect the paradoxes and deadlocks encountered when trying to prove its theories (Byers 2007; Neshar 2012, 2016, 2018). Indeed, simple inferences seem to be elegant and beautiful, but the complex proofs can be tiring, ugly or clumsy. Yet one can ask whether

these complicated proofs can be the best way to prove many theorems and not only one. Moreover, what can be considered to be proof in mathematics? What is the logic of mathematical proof, and what do mathematical proofs prove (Gold and Simons 2008)? Finally, is it possible that mathematicians themselves cannot explain the epistemology of mathematical proofs, as hinted by Russell:

Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions to the effect that, if such and such a proposition is true of *anything*, then such and such another proposition is true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is, of which it supposed. (Russell [1901]1918: 75)

Indeed, what is truth in mathematics, since if it is *pure science*, we cannot prove the truth of the axioms and so also the truth of the theorems, as “nothing comes from nothing.” However, if mathematics is an *empirical science* then first we have to discover the relevant hypotheses and to prove their truth in relation to, let us say, the relevant mathematical reality. Yet such proof of truth cannot be done by formal logic, as it is isolated from reality: “This is the formalist position: there is no truth; there are only logical inferences” (Byers 2007: 335).

Hence, it seems that only the epistemic logic, with its two *material inferences* in reality, the Abductive logic of discovery and the Inductive logic of evaluation, can prove the truth of empirical sciences (Nesher 2016, 2021). This can be the solution to the problem of sterile deductive formal logic, which cannot explain how to prove the truth of sciences, unless we add to such logic the intuitions of the scientists, which would replace the material logic components of the epistemic logic (Nesher 2016, 2021). But then, scientists and all of us would not have rational control of such intuitive proofs, which brings mathematical operations to *Ambiguities*, *Contradictions*, and *Paradoxes*, as revealed and explained by Russell, Tarski, Byers and others. Does that mean that mathematicians can take their *aesthetic intuitions* to help them control their inferential semi-proofs (Nesher 2002a: V, 2012)?

Traditional mathematical proofs are written in a way to make them easily understood by mathematicians. Routine logical steps are omitted. An enormous amount of context is assumed on the part of the reader. Proofs, especially in topology and geometry, rely on intuitive arguments in situations where a trained mathematician would be capable of translating those intuitive arguments into more rigorous argument. (Thomas Hales, in Bonnie and Simons 2008: 62)

Hale drew a distinction between the former description and formal proofs, where “all the intermediate logical steps are supplied” and “no appeal is made to intuition.” However, are the proofs in mathematics *aesthetic* or, rather, *theoretic*, and if the latter, can the *aesthetic* feeling of consistency-coherency serve as an aspect of the theoretical proof? Moreover, is there also an *ethical* aspect of theoretical proofs? If the aesthetic aspect of proof is our sensual-imaginative cognition, or the structure of the inference or proof in mathematics, this raises the question about the role of the aesthetic aspect in the control and evaluation of mathematic operations: can it replace or only assist in the rational controlling of proofs? Hence, what we mean by *aesthetic* and *beautiful* depends on whether the mathematical epistemology is Euclidean Formal Construction, Platonian-Gödelian, Intuitionistic-Hermeneutic, or rather Empirical Realist (Russell 1918; Cellucci 2015).

The difficulty with the epistemology of mathematics is that mathematicians are not clear about what is proof and truth in mathematics, as Calude and Marcus (2004) discuss in their “Mathematical Proofs at a Crossroad?” The difficulty is that so called *pure mathematics*, the construct of the mathematical system is based on Euclidean formal logic, which is based on intuitive postulates or axioms initiated from experience, but without any clear conceptions of proof and truth. Indeed, actually mathematicians in their practice intuitively suggest particular axioms to infer the intended theorems, but this is a *closed-formula-game*, as the Wittgensteinian *language-games*, without any clear conception of meaning and truth, as they lack any external criteria by which they can be proven (Nesher 2018). Namely, “Mathematicians think using ambiguity, contradiction, and paradox to create mathematics,” in order to redirect their intended solutions, as suggested by Byers (2007). However, such operations are based on individual-subjective intuitions, initiated from their experience, which can differ from one another without having any clear and distinct common objective criteria of proof and truth by which to evaluate them. Indeed, the mathematicians rely on their subjective intuitions and this can be the explanation for why they seek *aesthetics* and *beauty* as criteria of mathematical proofs.

Can Mathematics Be Pure Science or Rather an Empirical Representation of Reality and What Are Its Proofs?

In elaborating about the role of the mathematical beauty in its operations, Cellucci wrote: “The quest for beauty has often been a motivation for doing research in mathematics” (Cellucci 2015: 353). Colyvan even states that mathematics “is developed primarily with broadly aesthetic considerations in mind” (Colyvan 2012: 101).

This does not mean that in mathematics the quest for beauty is an end in itself. On the contrary, it is instrumental to the development of mathematics.

This fact is often overlooked or denied. For example, Todd states that “aesthetic judgements and the evaluation of scientific theories are odd bedfellows, and their conjunction a just object of suspicion” (Todd 2008, 62). Indeed “aesthetic appreciation and epistemic satisfaction are distinct,” and hence one must “avoid collapsing them into each other” (ibid., 75).

But this amounts to confining epistemology to the evaluation of scientific theories, hence to the context of justification, assuming that aesthetic factors cannot have any epistemic role *qua* aesthetic factors. Indeed, if epistemology is confined to the context of justification, then aesthetic factors cannot have any epistemic role at all, not only *qua* aesthetic factors. However, as argued above, epistemology need not be confined to the context of justification. Mathematical beauty can have a role in the context of discovery, because it can guide us in selecting which hypothesis to consider and which to disregard. Therefore, the aesthetic factors can have an epistemic role *qua* aesthetic factors (Cellucci 2015).

The difficulty is to understand what here is the meaning of *aesthetic* and *beauty*, when looking for their cognitive roles in mathematical operations. Following Kant about these concepts, and as reconstructed by Peirce, it can be suggested that aesthetics is the science of artworks representing reality sensually and imaginatively, namely aesthetically. Moreover, the aesthetic science of the artworks considers the aesthetic mode of representation of reality as either beautiful, ugly, or even kitschy, and thus we should not confuse *beauty* with *aesthetic*. However, in any cognitive representation of reality, there are always aesthetic aspects of beauty and of ugliness, as well as ethical aspects of good and bad, and of course the theoretic mode of representation in proving its truth or falsity.

However, the problem is to explain how the first two modes of aesthetic representation, beauty and ugliness, also contribute to the theoretical science of mathematics and hence, to explain the potential role of the aesthetic mode of representation in understanding not only the meanings and the validity of mathematical and scientific inferences, but also the soundness of the mathematical proofs. Now, if in mathematics, the *beauty* is the criterion of truth then it cannot be a science, since such beauty is merely subjective, being a personal play in a private formula-game and not any science. Indeed, it is an inversion of the *aesthetic science* of artworks, wherein the proof of their true representation of reality makes them beautiful (Nesher 2003). Moreover, as all our knowledge of reality is based on the proven true perceptual judgments, then the mathematical knowledge too must be based on such experiences (Wang 1974: VII.3; Nesher 2002a: III).

The basic *Mathematical reality* that we initially represent when confronting our environment consists of *our operations of grouping, counting, and measuring physical objects*, through the discovered cognitive *mathematical*

signs, (Nesher 1990, 2002a: V, 2007a). The first problems are with the Pythagorean conception of numbers, according to which *all things are numbers, Mathematics is the basis for everything, and geometry is the highest form of mathematical studies and the physical world can be understood through mathematics*. According to this mystical metaphysics, mathematical signs are viewed as objects, rather than as signs that we conjured and discovered to measure the components of nature. The second problem is with the Euclidean formal logic of Geometric and Mathematical Constructed Models, which was created to investigate some structures and properties of real objects. Despite this assumed “real world” intended use, it remained in the realm of pure science, because its formal logic is such that its axioms and the assumed models, which were intended to represent external reality, cannot be proven and hence, neither can we prove the models’ ability to represent reality.

Moreover, the historical-methodological confusion had been to use the abstract *formal logic* of the Euclidian deductive Geometry to Constructing Models, for developing mathematical and scientific theories, which endeavor to represent reality. Yet this cannot work by formal logic, whereas in the realist epistemology, it can be done with the *epistemic logic*, which was already investigated by Peirce at the beginning of the twentieth century, in his reconstructing of some of Kant’s intuitions (Peirce [1906]1998, *EPII*: # 26; Nesher 2002a, 2016, 2018). According to the realist epistemology, the *discovery* of the basic concepts of the *number signs* is through the basic mathematical operations of *counting*, *grouping*, and *measuring* and thus, only by quasi-proving the truth of the perceptual facts representing mathematical operations can we represent mathematical reality. Hence, the perceptual representations of these operations are our basic representation of mathematical reality. By understanding that mathematical reality consists of perceptually self-controlled numerical operations on physical objects, we can see how mathematicians confuse the meaning-content of mathematical signs and symbols with Platonist mathematical abstract forms as ideal objects (Nesher




Figure 8.2 The double layer of mathematical operations: (1) counting and measuring physical objects; (2) perceptual quasi-proving the truth of discovering the numerical signs and of operating with them.

2012, 2018). Hence, the arithmetical numbers are neither *physical objects* nor *abstract concepts*, but the *conceptual components* of our quantitative operations upon *physical objects*, as the mathematical reality upon which we prove the truth or the falsity of our abstract mathematical hypotheses. From these basic operations, scientists derive the abstract mathematical skeletons of their scientific hypotheses, according to which their predictions are to be evaluated (Nesher 2012, 2018).

The *determination* of numerical signs lies in proving their true interpretation by the true representation of their operation on objects, and this holds for propositions and their sign components as well. The *identity* of a sign is in making its meaning *clear*, by comprehending its meaning in further interpretation. The meanings of those signs are made *clear* and *distinct* by proving the truth of their representation of reality, and this is the *soundness* of the reasoning. However, the *Validity* of these operations is manifested in the *coherence of meaning* interpretations, and the *Soundness* of this reasoning is the *proof of their truth* in representing external reality. This contrasts with Cartesian *subjective feeling of intuiting clearly and distinctly the truth* of propositions, which are without any *objective criterion* for their meanings and truth (Descartes [1628]1985: Rule Three; [1644]1985: Part One: ##43-50; Peirce *EPI*: #8, [1878]1992, *CP*: 5.448, 1905).

The Epistemic Role of Aesthetic Factors of Beauty in Mathematical Proofs of Meaning and Truth

The aesthetic sensual-imaginative appearance of the signs does not have—by itself—a rational-conceptual meaning that can be interpreted and proved as valid and sound in the mathematical proof. Hence the mathematical operations with the aesthetic appearance of signs are still indeterminate and there remains only a subjective feeling of its operations. Without being proved as a true representation, it cannot even be aesthetically beautiful. Thus, the conception of mathematical operations as beautiful remains subjective, similar to the intuitionist subjective feeling of controlling the interpretation and proof in mathematics. Therefore, beauty in mathematics is related to a cognitive feeling, without the rational control, as Gödel and other logical mathematicians use intuitive proofs to compensate for the lack of formal logic in the representation of mathematical reality (Nesher 2012, 2016). The conceptions of *aesthetics* and *beauty* in mathematics hold when aesthetics is a cognitive mode of presentation or representation, yet its beauty is not like that of natural and artificial objects. Rather in the epistemology of the theoretical sciences, we can recognize and know the beauty of their operations only by proving that the scientific hypotheses truly represent reality. However, aesthetic




Figure 8.3 The interpretation of signs to determine their clear meanings and to prove the truth of their interpretation to be distinct and sound reasoning of representing reality.

feelings of beauty in mathematical operations can be grasped as *coherent* structures and, as such, can be qualified as beautiful, but this cannot prove their truth. Given that mathematics is a theoretical science, essentially we endeavor to prove the truth of its hypotheses and not the beauty of the proofs; nevertheless, we prove also the beauty of the true proofs (Nesher 2007b, 2018).

We have, hitherto, not crossed the threshold of scientific logic. It is certainly important to know how to make our ideas clear. However, they may be ever so clear without being true. How to make them true is the next step in our study (Peirce *EPI*: 141 [1878]1992). Meaning is *clear* by its *coherent* interpretation; it is *distinct* by being proved a *true interpretation*, i.e., a *true representation of reality*; thus, a true proposition enables our self-controlling conduct in reality. However, the aesthetic sensual-imaginative appearance of the mathematical sign-operations do not by themselves have a rational-conceptual meaning that can be interpreted and proved as valid and sound in the mathematical proof. Hence, the aesthetic nature of mathematical operations with the aesthetic appearance of signs is still indeterminate and remains only a subjective feeling. Without being proven true, they cannot be beautiful, and the conception of mathematical operations as beautiful remains subjective, similar to the intuitionist subjective feeling of controlling the interpretation and proof.

Therefore, the cognitive feeling of the beauty of mathematics without the explicit controlling of the logical proof remains a subjective feeling of beauty. Hence, Gödel and other logic mathematicians can only compensate for the sterile formal logic by providing intuitive seeming proofs of the eventual representation of empirical mathematical reality (Nesher 2012, 2016, 2018). Thus, only the mathematical theoretical proofs of their true representation of reality are also the proofs of the aesthetic beauty of their components;

consequently, by proving the truth of the mathematical hypotheses we prove also the beauty of the proof itself.

To summarize, mathematical proof can be beautiful only when its aesthetic components contribute to prove the truth of representing the mathematical reality. Thus, the feeling of beauty in mathematical operations and proofs can be only an intuitive support for the proof. Only by successfully proving the truth of the theoretical hypothesis can the mathematicians prove the beauty of mathematics. Mathematical beauty is the aesthetic control exercised in proving the true representation of mathematical reality. Mathematical beauty can only be a subcomponent of the theoretical proof of the true representation of mathematic reality (Nesher 2012).

THE BEAUTY OF HUMANS AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM BEAUTY IN AESTHETIC, ETHICAL AND THEORETICAL SCIENCES

The Beauty of the Human Being Is the Expression of One's True Ethical Humanly Nature

The beauty of human being is not just in the physical proportions of the body, but mainly in the expression of one's true ethical, humanly nature, the character, with its personal spirit expressed coherently by the facial expression, the eyes, and one's entire behavior. Without having a true humanly nature expressed through one's personal spirit, the human being cannot be deeply beautiful. The difficulty is how to explicate the essence of humanity, without regard to our intuitive feeling and emotional attraction to sincere human beings. The conception of the physical beauty alone is a misunderstanding of the true beauty of human beings, and the problem is to determine what is the mental-cognitive reality of a person as represented through the person's physiognomy and behavior. The question is what can we understand of the other's personal true nature or inner spirit—call it one's integrity or true personality—that evolves from one's essence. This is the Spinozist conception of one's essential nature as freely self-controlling life, without surrendering to external indulgent forces that contradict one's essential self, by imitating others and falsifying one's own real nature, but rather remaining faithful to one's true cognitive interpretation and representation of one's essential character (Spinoza [1677]1985; Peirce [1907]1998; Nesher 1999).

Hence, the beauty of a person is the self-controlled realization of one's essential human nature, which is conveyed through facial expressions and conduct in the environment, such that it evolves coherently, and truly represents one's inner essence. If a person cultivates his or her own essential

nature truly, it is naturally presented and expressed in the body, eyes, face, and behaviors, one's integral personality is embodied in the physiognomic beautiful appearance. Likewise, one's empathy towards others is its own happiness expressing the personal beauty. The beauty of a human being appears in the reciprocal relation of personalities, through the representation of the essential nature, the truth of which he or she feels or quasi-proves, and is interpreted by the others who perceive the beauty of this nature. The basic question is whether we can distinguish between true, false, and kitschy or spiritless character, and if so whether only the true nature can be interpreted as beautiful. The human face communicates an incredible array of emotions, which are an integral element of one's humanly conduct and being humanly true, it is a comprehensive beauty.

In this sense, then, there is a similarity between our true knowledge of the beauty of artworks and of human beings: in both we have to inquire into their inner essence. In the previous discussion, we inquired about the creator of the artworks and the proof of the work's aesthetic true representation of reality; in the latter case, the true knowledge of the essence of the person appears to us through the other's personal beauty. A person cannot know the beauty of another person without knowing one's integral character and, moreover, the person's beauty appears when you know and appreciate and love one. This holds because the integral human beauty appears attractive, as the inner personality is the true essence of humanity, which invites compassion and love. However, a cruel person who has lost his or her ethical humanity can be judged as ugly or at least as unattractive. When the personality is morally true and represented as such by one's facial expression and behavior, one is beautiful and thus the beauty is different among personalities as their essences-natures differ. However, what is the true essence of a personality?

By virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e., virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is the very essence, *or* nature, of man, in so far as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone. (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: D8)

If the person is sincere, without being pretentious, fraudulent, or kitschy, and with integrity in herself/himself and to the others and society, then the beauty of the human is seen through the facial and behavioral aesthetic representation of the true character. A beautiful person lives in harmony with himself or herself, with society, and with Nature, according to the *Guidance of Reason*, (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics*: IV; Peirce 1992 [1893] *EPI*: #25,).

Thus if we say, e.g., That is a beautiful woman, we do in fact think nothing other than that nature offers us in the woman's figure a beautiful presentation

of the purposes [inherent] in the female build. For in order to think the object in this way, through a logically conditioned aesthetic judgment, we have to look beyond the mere form toward a concept. (Kant 1987[1790] *CJ*: 312)

The perception of physical beauty alone is a misunderstanding of the true beauty of human beings and the problem is to identify and explain the mental-cognitive reality of a person as revealed through his or her physiognomy.

The Two Meanings of Beauty of Persons: Phenomenal and Real-internal Spirit of the Soul

Hence, we can suggest two meanings when we refer to the beauty of persons. One meaning is related to the beauty of their figures, which is subjective and also dependent on cultural conventions. The other meaning is the beauty of the personal character that depends on our knowledge of the other's inner true Essence, the true meaning of which is embodied and etched into one's bodily and facial expressions, and is also conveyed through one's conduct in life. The external expressions of a person's inner beauty affect our feelings and emotions, as we come to know the real aesthetic beauty that represents the inner personality. In some respects, this is similar to our understanding of the aesthetics of artworks, in that only by investigating the artists' intellectual ideas in creating the aesthetic ideas of the artworks can we understand the true meaning that the artists endeavored to achieve in aesthetically representing the reality. The difficulty with the beauty of humans is to consider whether there is any connection between those two aspects of human beauty, namely, the inner and the outer beauty. Hence, we wish to determine whether the beauty of humans can be defined only as the harmony between the inner character and the physiognomic appearance, as suggested in Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890), and in Picasso's cubist painting of his beloved Dora. Moreover, as regards the inner beauty, we must also consider the true morality of the person, according to the conception of one's essence of Humanity, ala Spinoza's *Imperatives of Reason* or Kant's *Categorical Imperative for Moral Obligation*, for that matter.

It is not uncommon to initially perceive another person as ugly and yet, after coming to know the individual's inner soul, one's perception is altered, so that the same individual is perceived as beautiful, as Dorothea says:

It is common to be told by someone that he or she initially found another individual ugly, but that after coming to know that person began to see him or her beautiful. Knowledge plays a significant role in determining whether one feels pleasure or pain when looking or listening to artworks. (As Dorothea says in George Eliot's 1871 novel, *Middlemarch*)

According to the Spinozist and Kantian ethical tradition, humans' social nature is to behave morally, since without the ability to live together in society they cannot survive. However, every person has an individual complexion of humanity. There is no pure-ideal of human essence in real life, and some other characteristic components can divert from the human essence and sometimes even destroy it. Thus, if the appearance of humanity is the essential beauty of persons, what contradicts it is ugliness. Kant's, and Peirce's elaborations on the Aesthetic, Ethic, and Theoretic normative sciences demonstrate that these are the basic components of our cognitive setup, by which we develop elaborated thoughts from the basic knowledge of ourselves in reality. According to this view, then, the beauty of human beings is in the ethical, aesthetical, and theoretical aspects of their individual essences. The beauty of a person is the apperception of one's essential moral nature interpreted into conduct in the society, such that it evolves coherently, and truly represents one's inner nature. If human beings develop their own individual essence and nature faithfully, these appear in their physiognomies, expressed in their eyes and face, and in behaviors. One's individual essence and nature are manifested as beautiful especially in the way one expresses feelings, in the course of one's emotional involvement in *social interactions*. Under these conditions, the joy of giving ourselves to others is its own reward and expresses our beauty and happiness.

The Reciprocal Relation of the Representation of One's Essential Beauty, Its True Humanity and Interpretation by Others

The beauty of human beings is perceived through the reciprocity of relationships and is manifested to the other when there is coherence between the representation of one's essential nature, the truth of which the other can feel and quasi-prove in its interpretation; this coherence is perceived as beauty. The basic question is whether we can distinguish between true, false, and kitschy or spiritless character, and if so, whether only the true human nature is interpreted as beautiful. Personal beauty is manifested as a true interpretation of one's self, which is achieved by self-controlling the authentic involvement of one's nature. The human face expresses and communicates an assortment of emotions, which are an integral component of one's total beauty, representing an individual and personal facet of humanity. However, every person has a unique essence, which is different from that of other persons, and we can learn the person's beauty when observing someone's face, voice, and bodily expressions, in different contexts. In due time, one is able to decipher the other's inner essence, as that individual's personality begins to come through.

Human essence is inborn, and also acquired in social life. It evolves instinctively and practically into rational personal knowledge of oneself and of one's outer reality. It develops as one determines how to live in society, how to cooperate with other persons, and one's role in elevating the common life. Moreover, in a lifetime, a person learns how to elaborate one's social knowledge so as to elevate social life. This gradual elevation of personal life, the elaboration of one's human essence, is an additional human characteristic that affects the beauty of the facial expressions and the person's behavior, as they evolve through the phases of one's life. The gradual elevation that forms the wisdom of life's experiences is imprinted in the human expression and endures as a testament to a life well lived. Thus, wisdom too is an aesthetical, ethical, and theoretical representation of one's human essence and one's life in society.

In Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890), as Dorian understands that his beauty will fade, he decides to sell his soul to ensure that he remains beautiful and that the picture, instead of himself, will age and degenerate. Having sold his human soul, Dorian is able to pursue a hedonistic and amoral life and yet remain (seemingly) young and beautiful, while his picture ages and expresses his sinful life. The problem that arises when Dorian Gray remains beautiful and his picture becomes uglier is that if the picture is a true aesthetic representation of Dorian Gray's vicious character, then as such, it is considered a beautiful representation of Dorian reality.

In addition to Dorian Gray's hedonistic and criminal behavior, the very act of selling his human soul in order to remain beautiful revealed his character as heartless, and thus his ugliness. The story is powerful because it plays against our common intuitive assumption that there is no connection between what we subjectively perceive as outer physical beauty and the inner essence of the person. However, viewing the details of his vicious-ugly life, we are able to cognize Dorian's inner character and its apparent contrast with his outwardly appearance. Hence, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* can thus be interpreted as Wilde's revolt against the nineteenth century movement of aristocratic Aestheticism, which accepts the centrality of the beauty of art as "Art for Art's sake" and human's appearance as evaluated separately from social life and one's character. Indeed, Dorian idolizes the beauty of his looks, in separation from his inner character and corrupted behavior, an approach which seems to be criticized by Oscar Wilde, by showing that the value of one's appearance cannot be separated from the person's conduct, thus indirectly criticizing the fashionable Aestheticism of his time as immoral.

However, in the realist epistemology, Aesthetics is one of the three normative sciences, along with Theoretical and Ethical sciences, which are the three different modes of representing reality. Aesthetics is the mode of representation through which artists endeavor to render artworks that represent reality,

and they are judged beautiful by proving that they are aesthetic true representations of reality. This is also the case with the aesthetic pictorial representation of a human personality. The beauty of a portrait lies in its being a true representation of the person as a whole; thus, we must consider, in the case of Dorian Gray, whether the picture of his youth, which he chose to preserve in exchange for his soul, is a true representation of his whole self. As noted, his decision to sell his soul to remain beautiful forever was already an indication of his immoral and cruel character. Consequently, his initial portrait cannot be beautiful, because it does not represent his true personality; it is only a false representation, or without knowing Dorian, it is merely kitsch. Moreover, Dorian's portrait in the closed chamber, which represents his inner corrupted personality, is a beautiful work of art, because it represents him as he truly is. Although this seems to contradict our common tradition about the beauty of artworks, in the realist epistemology of art as aesthetic true representation of reality, it must hold (Nesher 2002a: I, II, XI).

Another example of the realist epistemology of art can be seen in Picasso's painting of his beloved Dora, in which she is represented through the cubist aesthetic language. One might consider such a bizarre painting ugly; however, in Picasso's artistic style, it is a representation of Dora's good nature and hence it is considered beautiful, but only if we understand the cubist aesthetic language of Picasso.

When the personality is humanly sincere and is truly represented as such through one's physiognomy and social behavior, then this integrity is beautiful. Yet this beauty has different manifestations, as the essential natures differ by personality, and it can also change with one's experience in life. However, what is the true essence of a personality? If one is sincere—rather than pretentious, fraudulent or kitschy, when one's integrity in relationships and in society is both inwardly and outwardly maintained, when one treats the other with the same compassion one would like to receive from others, then the beauty of the human being is reflected in the face, the voice, the eyes and in bodily behavioral expressions: all of these aspects cohere into an aesthetic representation of one's true character. Hence, one who lives in harmony with

Physiognomy: *Personal Beauty is Aesthetically Expressing Human Morality*




Figure 8.4 The beauty of human person aesthetically represents its true essence-character.

oneself, the society, and the surrounding Nature, according to one's Guidance of Reason, "the laws of one's own nature," both implicitly and explicitly, is perceived as beautiful. However, it should be noted that the human essence is in one's integrity, loving oneself and the other (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: P18,). The elevation of such integrity, of one's essence, is achieved by pursuing one's individual true character and following one's particular abilities and creativity, without trying to follow or imitate the essences of others. Consequently, it also means not to envy, hate, or be angered by other persons, but to be true to oneself (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: P18).

Further, since virtue is nothing but acting from the laws of one's own nature, and no one strives to preserve his being except from the laws of his own nature . . . (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: P18)

Envy, Mockery, Disdain, Anger, Vengeance, and the rest of the affects which are related to Hate or arise from it, are evil. (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: P45)

He who lives according to the Guidance of Reason strives, as far as he can, to repay the other's Hate, Anger and Disdain toward him, with love and Nobility. (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics* IV: P46)

Integrity is expressed through one's personality, through the eyes, the facial expressions, and bodily appearances, as well as through one's conduct; in this way, by being true to one's own essence, one's own beauty is manifested (Spinoza 1985[1677] *Ethics*: IV). Therefore, human beauty is explained as the harmony between the character and its expression in the physiognomical appearance, or the integrity of the whole Human. Hence, a person's aesthetic *beauty* is determined by one's *true ethical* conduct in society and in life, and not by any ideal model.

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