**9. Conclusion: Can Kant Transcend the Pure Subject’s Empty Concepts to Explain the Knowledge of Ourselves and of Externa Reality?**

In the last centuries from the Kantian meteoric appearance of the Transcendental writings, his Copernican Revolution against the Cartesian Rationalism and Humean Empiricism, which cannot solve the basic problems of philosophy. Indeed, from then most of the philosophers were neo-Kantians of different aspects of his epistemology. We can understand the conception Transcendental as criticism of Descartes’ rational idealism that the only thing he can know is his own subjective thought namely, “I think therefor I exist” (*cogito ergo sum*), and thus he cannot know the external reality and this is the basic problem of Kant and basically all the philosophers that did not develop any theory of truth as Kant himself admitted. Hence, Kant in order to overcome the *subjective idealism* of Descartes he suggested that with his *Transcendental Idealism* he can go beyond of the only self-thinking, which according to Kant, he can *Transcend* the subjective self-knowledge to reach his sensual intuitions of the phenomenal objects in order to combine the Humean *phenomenal empiricism* with the Cartesian *subjective idealism.* However, without knowing the *external reality*, the things in themselves, the *noumena*, and this knowledge Kant calls *Transcendental realism*(Kant, *CPuR,* A367-369). Indeed, the Kantian endeavor to combine the Cartesian rational idealism with the Humean sensual empirism remained also unsolved by him due to the gap between them which his mysterious *schematism* cannot *Transcend* the *empty concepts* of the *Transcendental Subject* to reach the *blind sensual objects*, as he himself admitted (Kant to C. Grave, September 21, 1798, AK 12:257; Nesher, 2000, 2022; comp. Hintikka, J. 1972).

Hence, since without perceptual experience there is no meaning to the concepts of the Transcendental Subject and as Peirce explained, that Kant as being nominalist, cannot know his thought in order to know his existence, as Descartes claimed for himself, and thus remains blind fictional rational idealist and clearly, cannot Transcend his fictional entity even for reaching his sensual experience, not to say the noumenal reality. Thus, we can understand why Descartes cannot know himself and that all the *rational idealism*, including their formal logic and pure mathematics, remain fictions and so also the Humean sensual blind experience. Hence, the solution for this deadline is the Spinozist and Peircean realisms, how from our sensual experience we Abductively discover the perceptual concepts to interpret them Deductively in our feelings and emotions to synthesize them rationally into the meaningful conceptual thoughts of perceptual judgments which can be Inductively proved true representation of ourselves and the external reality together as the Seamiest Tweens (Nesher, 2007b; cf. Figure II).

Therefore, to some up, the Kantian *Transcendental Idealism* cannot *transcend* his *Idealism* to reach the *sensual intuition* in order to present the phenomenal experience and thus, the transcendental self remains solipsist and the Kantian epistemology cannot work.