**Dual screening at dual conflicts**

**Abstract**

This study examines how Israelis used dual screening duringtwo parallel violent conflicts in Israel in May 2021 - The Israeli and Hamas in Gaza and violent incidents inside Israel between Muslims and Jews. This study tried to map the platforms used to consume news information and, in addition, to identify the variables that explain the use of dual screening in cases of inside and outside conflicts. 400 participants were asked to complete a survey during these days of dual conflicts. The results revealed that news consumption (on all platforms) is lower regarding internal events than external events, and the consumption patterns are the same. Furthermore, the most common sources of both events were online news sites and social networks. It was also revealed that fear and integrative needs predicted dual screening in both cases, while the emotional and cognitive needs of media consumption did not significantly predict dual screening.

**Introduction**

In May of 2021, Israelis were confronted with an unprecedented circumstance in which Israelis were threatened from outside of the country and from the inside. The Israeli and Hamas in Gaza engaged in another round of violent conflict that lasted 12 days. In addition, and for the first time during the conflict, there was an eruption of violent incidents inside Israel between Muslims and Jews, particularly in urban areas where people of both religions coexist (e.g., Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and Haifa). The result of this unique situation was that most Israeli in those days were directly or indirectly involved in one or two of these situations.

This study examines how Israelis used dual screening during these violent conflicts – internal and external. Throughout the last few years, dual screening has become increasingly common. However, most research on dual screening has been done with live sporting events (Weimann-Saks et al., 2019; Kim & Kim, 2020) and political events as the primary focus (Segijn et al., 2017). However, media investigation during the war and violent conflict has garnered significant scholarly attention (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009; Knüpfer & Entman, 2018; Melki & Kozman, 2021). There is a dearth of research concerning the phenomenon of dual screening during times of violent conflict.

*Media during conflict*

Researchers have examined media coverage during wartime and how coverage affects decision-makers and national and international public opinion (Nohrstedt et al., 2000; White, 2020; Hammond, 2018; Sobel et al., 2020; Wolfsfeld, 2004). In addition, researchers have recently been interested in the new media's coverage of political conflicts and other crises (Evans, 2016; Knüpfer & Entman, 2018; Melki & Kozman, 2021). In times of extreme violent conflicts such as terrorist attacks and wars, the media plays an important role in people's lives (Katz & Liebes, 2007; Wolfsfeld & Weimann, 1997). For example, research in recent years has looked at the importance of smartphones and social media in the September 11 terrorist attack on the US. (Bracken et al. ,2005; Katz & Rice ,2002).

In addition, several studies revealed a correlation between time spent on social media and feelings of anxiety and depression (Arikan et al., 2022; Haand & Shuwang, 2020). Fear is the feeling one experiences when confronting something deemed a disaster (Hornby, 1995: 425). For example, research has found a link between exposure to broadcast crime news and increased fear (LaGrange & Ferraro, 2017; Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003). Moreover, online social media platforms are frequently associated with negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, and depression (Arikan et al., 2022; Haand & Shuwang, 2020).

Israelis extensively used online platforms throughout the 2006 Israel and Lebanon conflict to disseminate humor messages, information regarding the health of family members, and criticism of decision-makers (Lev-On, 2010; Naveh, 2008).

Kozman and Melki (2016) found that during the civil war in Syria, information was provided to Syrian civilians via the internet and social media. Schejter and Cohen (2013) argue that smartphones can be used during times of war due to their portability of smartphones. Malka et al. (2015) also found that during Israel and Gaza conflict in 2014, citizens of Israel used the WhatsApp smartphone application, a trustworthy news source, to fulfill their cognitive requirements during the conflict. They found a correlation between the use of WhatsApp by civilians and their proximity to the conflict era in Gaza. This result can be attributed to rising levels of danger and anxiety experienced by the civilian population.

RQ1: What are the prominent platforms for consuming news information in cases of internal conflict ("May 2021 riots") and in cases of external conflict ("May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict")?

*Dual screening*

Using dual screens stimulatingly has become common in the current multitasking environment. Portable devices enable people to be connected to multiple devices simultaneously. The "second screen experience" refers to simultaneously utilizing both a primary and secondary screen (Blake, 2016). Gil de Ziga et al. (2015) define this as using an electronic device to access the internet or social networks, watch broadcasts, or consume additional information while consuming media from a primary screen (mainly television). Guo (2020) suggests that media practitioners benefit from understanding dual-screening viewing patterns. In addition, second-screen activities potentially bring more engagement between content producers, broadcasters, advertisers, and audiences.

Dual-screen broadcast allows viewers to communicate with one another during a live broadcast (Weimann-Saks et al., 2019). For example, Gil de Ziga and Liu (2017) found that media consumers reported more interest when they watched political events on a second screen. Kim and Kim (2020) argued that there is a correlation between social live-streaming and the level of social well-being and feeling of isolation. Other researchers found that the emotional needs of media consumers and their ability to multitask between different media platforms determined the level of emotional satisfaction the consumer reported. People with high emotional demands find multitasking helps them feel more satisfied (Wang & Tchernev, 2012). Media consumers reported that they experienced a diminished sense of movement when they tweeted while watching television (Park et al., 2019). Jiang et al. (2022) find that people who use dual screens extensively during television are also key users on Twitter. Furthermore, high-second screening can use their digital influence to increase Television programs' awareness, authority, and credibility in digital spaces. Dias (2016) finds that people use multiple screens to make the most of their time, avoid ads, and meet integrative needs by feeling connected to their loved ones and the world.

Stacks et al. (2019) assert that in the current media environment, consumers can watch the news on their screens while gathering information via their smartphones. The current media environment is evolving due to the proliferation of media outlets and social media platforms and the increasing number of users. Researchers who look at people's uses and gratifications can examine how and how often people get information and how this affects how they think, feel, and act.

This study examines the role that the use of dual screens played in the daily lives of Israeli citizens during the internal violent events in Israel in May 2021 and the external, violent event which occurred simultaneously.

H1: significant correlations will be found between dual screening and fear level regarding (a) May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict and (b) May 2021 riots.

Uses and gratifications

In times of conflict, people in physical proximity to events may experience a greater need for up-to-date information and knowledge. This idea fits with the uses and gratifications theory, which is an effective way to look at how people use different media to meet their needs (Ruggerio, 2000). For example, Katz et al. (1974) suggested that individuals' thoughts and feelings influence what they anticipate receiving from the media. They defined five clusters of needs: cognitive, affective, integrative (personal and social), and diversion.

First, cognitive needs represent the inherent desire for information acquisition, knowledge, and understanding. Second, affective needs relate to emotional experiences and an inherent desire for pleasure, entertainment, and aesthetics. Third, personal integrative needs derive from individuals’ desires to appear credible, be perceived as confident and have high self-esteem. Fourth, integrative social needs are affiliation needs in which an individual wants to be part of a group and have a sense of belonging. Fifth, diversion needs relate to escaping and diverging from problems and routines. Ruggerio (2000) argues that many studies provide several alternative clusters, although most still utilize the earlier suggestions of Katz, Haas, and Gurevitch (1973).

Cognitive needs are intellectual needs in which individuals use media to acquire knowledge and locate information (Malloli, 2020). Cognitive needs involve acquiring knowledge and information and comprehending social environments, exploration, and inquisitiveness (Ruggiero, 2000). In addition, cognition is related to the event and product information, consultation, the satisfaction of curiosity, learning, and the acquisition of safety-related knowledge (Nambisan & Baron, 2007). Emotional needs are based on people's desires to experience specific feelings or emotions (Malloli, 2020). Moreover, emotional needs refer to fulfilling an effective strengthening experience (Chiang, 2013, Nambisan & Baron, 2007).

Integration encompasses personal integration (or identity) and social integration in terms of the outcomes of social relationships (Nambisan & Baron, 2007). Integrative gratification, for instance, refers to the gratification of forming an identity, enhancing individual values, and forming a sense of closeness or belonging through media (Nambisan & Baron, 2007). Integrative needs are interconnected with those of family, friends, and society. As a result, people turn to mass media and social media networks to satisfy these needs (Malloli, 2020).

H2: significant correlations will be found between dual screening during May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict and (a) cognitive needs, (b) integrative needs, (c) emotional needs

H3: significant correlations will be found between dual screening during May 2021 riots and (a) cognitive needs, (b) integrative needs, (c) emotional needs

Considering these research objectives and the research that was discussed earlier, we have come up with the following research question:

RQ2: **which variables predict the use of predicting dual screening in (a) the case of the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict**; (b) **the case of May 2021 riots**?

**Method**

***Participants***

Four hundred participants participated in the study. Gender distribution was equal. Ages ranged from 18 to 74 years (M = 43, SD = 15.8). All participants were Hebrew speakers, mostly non-religious (72%) and married (56%). The sample was obtained according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2019) data using an online panel that sampled a representative distribution of the Israeli population. The maximum standard error is 4.5%. G\*Power (Faul et al., 2009) is used to estimate the sample size based on a medium-sized effect size so that, 90% of the time, significant differences can be found.

***Procedure***

Participants were asked to complete a short anonymous survey (response time = 10 minutes). The institutional ethics committee approved the present study.

***Materials***

All participants completed a short anonymous questionnaire that measured the following variables in addition to demographic questions:

**Independent Variables:**

**Emotional needs** were assessed usinga three-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = .76), rated from 1 (meaning "very much") to 5 (meaning "not at all"). Based on Malka et al. (2015), the items included statements like "Consuming information helps me relieve stress" that talked about how getting information helps meet an emotional need.

**Cognitive needs** - were assessed usinga three-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = .83), rated from 1 ("Very much"), to 5 ("Not at all"). Based on Malka et al. (2015), the items included statements about how consuming information helps meet a cognitive need. For example, "Consuming information helps me understand what is going on" was one of the statements.

**Integrative needs -** were evaluated using a four-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = .94), with ratings ranging from 1 ("very much") to 5 ("not at all"). The items included statements relating to the contribution of information consumption to fulfilling an emotional need, based on Malka et al. (2015) (e.g., "Consuming information strengthens my sense of belonging to the place where I live").

**Fear-** We used a 3-item scale (Cronbach's alpha = .65) to assess fear, ranging from 1 ("very much") to 5 ("not at all"). Some items were about how scared people felt because of the security situation after the operation and how the same things scared people during the riots. For example, one item said, "I am worried about friends or family in a security threat zone."

**Dependent variable:** Dual screening We used a 3-item scale (Cronbach's alpha =.97) to assess dual-screening use, ranging from 1 ("Several times an hour or more") to 7 ("Not at all"). The questions were based on the Weimann-Saks et al. (2019) questionnaire, with minor changes to fit the security events (for example, "I use a smartphone while watching TV to stay up to date on events on both platforms"). See Table 1.

*Table 1. Descriptive statistics of research variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variables** | **Mean** | **Sd** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Cognitive needs | 3.69 | .87 | 1 | 5 |
| Integrative needs | 3.30 | 1.21 | 1 | 5 |
| Emotional needs | 2.47 | 1.02 | 1 | 5 |
| Fear regarding Israel-Gaza conflict | 3.66 | .82 | 1 | 5 |
| Fear regarding riots | 3.71 | .79 | 1 | 5 |
| Dual Screening regarding Israel-Gaza conflict | 3.49 | 2.10 | 1 | 7 |
| Dual Screening regarding riots | 3.33 | 2.02 | 1 | 7 |

**Results**

In order to examine news consumption habits (RQ1), we asked the participants about the frequency with which they use the various media platforms in order to be updated on events related to the security operation ("May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict") and the same question related to the internal riots that occurred at the same time ("May 2021 riots.")

The most common source of updates on both events was online news sites. Then in both cases, the TV was next in line, followed by WhatsApp groups, and finally, the social networks (private WhatsApp chats, Facebook at the top, and Telegram and Twitter). See table 1.

Table 1. Respondents' sources for updating in each event at least once a day

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Platform** | **May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict** | **May 2021 riots** |
|
| WhatsApp groups | 56% | 50% |
| WhatsApp privet | 52% | 45% |
| Facebook | 49% | 47% |
| Twitter | 14% | 14% |
| Telegram | 21% | 20% |
| Emergency applications | 42% | 33% |
| News websites | 77% | 73% |
| TV | 70% | 67% |
| Radio | 43% | 41% |

**In order to examine the correlations between** dual screening and fear level **(H1), Pearson correlations were conducted. As a result, a** significant correlation was found between dual screening and fear level regarding (a) May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict (r= .220, p <. 001) and H1(b) May 2021 riots (r= .169, p < .01). Thus, H1a and H1b were confirmed.

**Pearson correlations revealed correlations between** dual screening during May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict and (H2a) cognitive needs (r=.240, p<.001), (H2b) integrative needs (r=.272, p<.001), (H2c) emotional needs (r=.224, p<.001). Thus, H2a, H2b, and H2c were confirmed.

**Pearson correlations revealed correlations between** dual screening during May 2021 riots and (H3a) cognitive needs (r=.235, p<.001), (H3b) integrative needs (r=.270, p<.001), (H3c) emotional needs (r=.229, p<.001). Thus, H3a, H3b, and H3c were confirmed. Table 2 present the correlation matrices.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Dual Screening** | **Cognitive** | **Integrative** | **Emotional** | **Fear** |
| May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict | .240\*\*\* | .272\*\*\* | .224\*\*\* | .220\*\*\* |
| May 2021 riots | .235\*\*\* | .270\*\*\* | .229\*\*\* | .169\*\* |

*Table 2. Correlation between research variables*

\*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

**In order to examine which variables predict the use of Predicting dual screening in the case of the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict (RQ2),** we calculated a multiple linear regression model to examine which factors are the best predictors of dual screening.

Overall regression for predicting dual screening in this case was statistically significant (R2 = 0.12, F (4, 202) = 13.123, p < .001). It was found that the variables "fear" (β =.17, p < .001) and "integrative needs" (β =.15, p < .001) significantly predicted dual screening. All other variables did not significantly predict dual screening in the case of the operation (See table 2).

**In order to examine which variables predict the use of Predicting dual screening in the case of the May 2021 riots (RQ3), w**e calculated a multiple linear regression model to examine which factors are the best predictors of dual screening. In this case, overall regression for predicting dual screening was statistically significant (R2 = 0.10, F (4, 202) = 10.86, p < .001). It was found that the variables: Fear (β =.17, p < .001) and "integrative needs" (β =.15, p < .001) significantly predicted dual screening. All other variables did not significantly predict dual screening in the case of the operation (See table 2).

*Table 4: Regression results of predicting dual screening*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Event** |  | **Variable** | **B** | **β** | **T** |
| May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict | 1 | Fear | 0.44 | .17 | 3.60\*\*\* |
| 2 | Integrative | 0.26 | .15 | 2.11\* |
| 3 | Emotional | 0.18 | .09 | 1.54 |
| 4 | Cognitive | 0.18 | .08 | 1.18 |
| May 2021 riots | 1 | Integrative | 0.23 | .14 | 1.97\* |
| 2 | Fear | 0.28 | .11 | 2.22\* |
| 3 | Emotional | 0.21 | .10 | 1.83 |
| 4 | Cognitive | 0.18 | .08 | 1.16 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

**Discussion**

This study examined Israeli civilians' use of dual screening during a dual conflict in May 2021—the Israel-Gaza conflict and internal riots between Muslims and Jews. We discussed how civilians employ dual screens regarding how much they must think, how anxious they are, and how unsafe they feel.

In this context, the most heinous crimes occur during civil wars that transform the home front into a battlefield. Likewise, inner conflict transforms the home front into a combat zone in this context. When confronted with such intolerable conditions, civilians turn to the media to fulfill their specific needs and manage the situation more effectively (Kozman & Melki, 2016; Lev-On, 2010; Malka et al., 2015; Naveh, 2008). The study's results shed light on the role of the media during violent conflicts and contribute to a greater understanding of that role. The authors also say that technological improvements have made it possible for civilians in danger to stay informed without relying on a single platform.

In this study, we found that the news information and updates (on all platforms) are lower regarding internal events than external events. Although the consumption pattern is the same—in both cases, the most common source of both events was online news sites. Then, in both cases, the TV was next in line, followed by WhatsApp groups, and finally, the social networks (private WhatsApp chats, with Facebook at the top and Telegram and Twitter). The significant finding was that less news information was consumed across all platforms regarding internal events. Traditional mainstream media is still the most popular way to obtain news information about internal and external events, which is one factor that contributes to the significance of these outlets.

We also found that fear and integrative needs significantly predicted dual screening in both cases. However, fear was a stronger and more significant predictor regarding the external operation. Media consumption's emotional and cognitive needs did not significantly predict dual screening. Is it possible that there is no need to relax or feel good here, as well as no need to gather information and learn more-it is likely that these are both necessary and relevant to the specific situation? Nevertheless, the fear and the need to be a part of something are more substantial than they are and more immediate.

This study has several limitations. First, this is a unique case study conducted in Israel at a specific time when two parallel violent conflicts co-occurred. Although this is a fascinating period for comparative research, the ability to generalize the findings to other cases is limited. Dual screening should continue to be examined in future studies in less rare situations. Moreover, only Hebrew native speakers participated in this study because of language considerations in the online sampling system. Finally, this study's representation of the Israeli population was hurt because it did not sample enough people (20% of Israelis are Arabs), so future studies should look at the diversity of the Israeli population.

On a theoretical level, Ball-Rokeach (2010) stated that the significant changes in media production resources imply that the Media System Dependency Theory must be reexamined in order to account for the less constrained and more chaotic media landscape of the twenty-first century (e.g., the emergence and fusion of the internet with traditional media). 'The Media dependency theory' examines how people depend on the media in times of crisis. The public uses the media for information and support whenever an extreme event occurs. Research has noted that an increase in the level of risk will increase both the micro and the macro dependency on the media (Loges, 1994; Lyu, 2019). Indeed, the findings of this study indicate that the dependence on traditional and social media during conflict is complex. The dependence is not only for the need for information that is important and relevant to the situation but also for the feeling of belonging, as a response to fear, and probably also for interpreting the events.

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