**Conflict and the Legacy of Exclusion: The Shining Path in Huancavelica, Peru**

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This work is dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Shining Path insurgency in Huancavelica, and to those whose lives were affected by it.

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**Chapter One: Introduction**

The outbreak of the *Sendero Luminoso*, or Shining Path, insurgency in Peru is often associated with the election eve incursion of five rebels into the village of Chuschi, in the region of Ayacucho, on May 17, 1980.[[1]](#footnote-1) The fact that the community was both undefended and held materials for the upcoming presidential elections made it an appealing target. Beginning their assault at around 2:00 A.M., the lightly armed revolutionaries quickly forced their way into the voter registration office, set the ballot boxes and other election materials alight, and soon faded back into the night.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Although the attack on Chuschi was symbolically important, it was the product of years of planning and previous armed actions. The movement’s founder, Rubén Manuel Abimael Guzmán Reinoso, had begun to establish a military force as early as 1964, and by 1973, had embedded followers working as teachers in highland schools where they would form the nucleus of the insurgency. Even in 1977, Peru’s intelligence services had learned that Sendero was planning attacks, information which was subsequently verified when they sabotaged infrastructure and stole explosives in the region, or state, of Huancavelica.[[3]](#footnote-3) The ensuing insurgency would not only prove to be the longest domestic conflict in Peru’s history, but the most damaging in terms of human life, displacement, and economic upheaval. Between 1980 and 2000, over 69,000 people are believed to have lost their lives, and over 600,000 people were displaced, most of whom were highland Quechua speakers killed by either Sendero or the police and military sent to defeat them.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Guzmán, who would also become known by his nom de guerre of “Presidente Gonzalo,” was a philosophy professor and university administrator at Ayacucho’s San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University. There, he used his teaching and administrative positions to patiently craft his clandestine revolutionary organization.[[5]](#footnote-5) Even the raid on Chuschi was a relatively minor event; a fleeting, symbolic, vandalistic attack in a remote village in the Andes which left in its wake ballots turned to ashes, but no fatalities. Although its significance would become clear as future events unfolded, the attack went largely unnoticed by the media at the time. Initially, the military government saw little reason for alarm, and was in any case reluctant to share intelligence with the incoming civilian administration led by Fernando Belaúnde Terry, whom they had deposed in a coup in 1968.[[6]](#footnote-6)

In the interim, the left-wing military regime, initially led by Juan Velasco Alvarado and later by Francisco Morales Bermúdez, had become discredited as a result of their policies which had led to widespread economic hardship and social unrest. As a result of the military’s unwillingness to properly brief Belaúnde on the situation, what had been a latent, and then incipient, insurgency would ultimately metastasize into a terroristic conflict which was unprecedented in Peru’s history. In so doing, it would become an internecine theater where deep historic inequities, institutional rivalries, an initially tepid government response, and misguided strategies against a cultish foe would tragically play out on a national stage.[[7]](#footnote-7)

This work explores the colonial roots, modern context, trajectory and complex legacy of the insurgency in the region of Huancavelica, giving voice to the residents of one of Peru’s most impoverished and Quechua-speaking regions.[[8]](#footnote-8) This region, along with those of Ayacucho and Apurímac, was according to Guzmán the “principal field of battle” where insurgent operations were directed by the “Principal Regional Committee.”[[9]](#footnote-9) The violence, death and displacement associated with the conflict in indigenous communities in Huancavelica was nothing less than a twentieth century *pachacuti* (catastrophe), rivaled only by the consequences of the Spanish conquest itself. Despite the strategic importance of Huancavelica to both sides of the conflict, and the immense human, social, economic and cultural impact it had there, it has received scant attention in the literature. As a result, just like the innumerable socioeconomic challenges currently facing the residents of Huancavelica, their experience during the conflict has been largely invisibilized.[[10]](#footnote-10) Drawing on interviews, testimonials, government, NGO and industry reports, media accounts, field research, survey data and the vast primary and secondary literature on the insurgency, this work examines how largely indigenous Huancavelican communities experienced and continue to shoulder the consequences of an exterminatory conflict thirty years after Guzmán was captured and the insurgency largely, although not entirely, defeated.[[11]](#footnote-11)

While this study offers a Huancavelican perspective of the insurgency, events in the region were not intrinsically different from those in many other highland areas. People’s experiences were, paradoxically, individually unique, yet broadly shared. Viewed in the larger context, the infiltration of Sendero into villages, the early appeal of their revolutionary proposition, their increasingly overt totalitarian nature, combined with the ensuing descent into terroristic and genocidal violence perpetrated by both sides of the conflict, and the importance of the *rondas* (community-based defense forces) in bringing about its end, all broadly affirm the existing literature on the conflict.

One characteristic which differentiates Huancavelica, however, is the historical association of the region with colonial cinnabar mining and mercury production, the rise of the global economy, and the colonial conscription of Huancavelican communities and hacienda populations in this process. In this respect, colonialism had a greater social, cultural and demographic effect in this region than many others. This experience helped to define the historical memory and identity of many communities, especially that of Santa Bárbara just outside of the city of Huancavelica, and conditioned how they contend with oppressive outside forces.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Another distinguishing characteristic of Huancavelica is its extreme poverty. The effective abandonment of the region by the state during the national period, except for what could be extracted, created the conditions in which Sendero’s message was in many cases welcome. The devastating effects of the conflict, at the personal, communal and regional levels, continue today, as does Huancavelica’s penury.[[13]](#footnote-13) Whether or not these conditions reflect the “mita effect,” which posits that areas where there had been a *mita* (forced labor) draft are more impoverished and unhealthy than areas that did not provide *mitayos* (forced laborers), is still a matter of debate.[[14]](#footnote-14) What is clear, however, is that even prior to the conflict, the region was experiencing depopulation as a result of poverty-driven migration, and forty years later Huancavelica remains Peru’s most impoverished region.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Despite considerable post-conflict public investment in infrastructure, health and education, as well as government efforts to promote the inclusion of Peru’s highland majority in national life, contemporary community members and leaders in Huancavelica continue to feel politically and economically abandoned as they struggle to repopulate, and develop, their villages. For many, it is a losing proposition as people who were displaced by the conflict have found new lives elsewhere. Those who stayed in their hometowns not only witnessed the horrors of the conflict, but also the ongoing erosion of traditional norms and rites, such as reciprocity, collective work and community religious celebrations. The systematic targeting of civil society leaders during the conflict, by both Sendero and the military, also created a leadership void that has taken a generation to close.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Many of the outcomes of the conflict are intangible, as intra and inter-community divisions, which Sendero ably exploited, persist. Not only are they expressed along economic, political and religious fault lines, but between those who endured the conflict in their communities, and those who returned, often with government assistance. Other intangible effects include lost educational opportunities and the psychological effects of the violence and the loss of loved ones. Although almost eighty-five percent of Huancavelica’s population voted for left-wing President Pedro Castillo in 2021, the widespread corruption and numerous shortcomings of his administration soon transformed their hopes to disappointment. Following his attempt to dissolve congress and rule by decree, his removal from office in December, 2022, only exacerbated the widespread sense of political exclusion, distrust and frustration.[[17]](#footnote-17)

On a national level, the conflict delegitimated and divided the Peruvian Left and shifted national politics to the right. Emblematic of this is the 1993 Peruvian constitution, which enshrines neo-liberalism and has enabled a conservative alliance of business interests, politicians and media to have a commanding role in the country’s affairs.[[18]](#footnote-18) Just as the political Right has solidified as a result of the conflict, so too has the government’s penetration of rural areas increased. While this has enabled the authorities, including the military, to exercise greater dominion over national territory, it has not translated into a greater sense of inclusiveness or prosperity among Huancavelica’s population.

When one considers socioeconomic indicators, this becomes easy to understand. Not only is the city of Huancavelica highly contaminated by heavy metals largely from mercury production in the colonial era, but the region has Peru’s highest levels of infant mortality and of people who are illiterate and have never attended school. The region also leads the nation in the percent of people who lack electricity in their homes and cook with combustibles such as wood or llama dung as opposed to natural gas.[[19]](#footnote-19) It is in this context that Huancavelica’s residents, urban and rural, seek to overcome the legacy of the conflict, and the near invisible status to which they have been relegated in national life.

**Studies of Sendero**

The Sendero Luminoso insurgency has been, and remains, a fertile area of research. The academic literature encompasses foundational works, general treatments, as well as thematic and regional studies. The breadth and depth of the literature on Sendero is underscored in two bibliographies. One, by Peter Stern titled *Sendero Luminoso: An Annotated Bibliography of the Shining Path Guerrilla Movement, 1980-1993*,[[20]](#footnote-20) offers a useful chronology of the movement and contains 1,185 entries. This was followed three years later by John Bennett’s *Sendero Luminoso in Context: An Annotated Bibliography*,[[21]](#footnote-21) which contains 1,456 entries, of which only two focus on Huancavelica. Both bibliographies are, however, dated, as the field of the study of Sendero Luminoso, or Senderology, has continued to grow.

Foundational works include the concise *Violencia y campesinado*, edited by Nelson Manrique and Alberto Flores Galindo, published in 1986 during the height of the insurgency. Especially useful in placing the war in a broader historical context is Alberto Flores Galindo’s essay, “La Guerra Silenciosa,” which underscores the persistent and pervasive structural economic, political and social issues which facilitated the rise of Sendero.[[22]](#footnote-22) Manrique presents an insightful analysis of the counterproductive measures taken by the state to confront Sendero in “Democracia y campesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo.”[[23]](#footnote-23) Gustavo Gorriti’s seminal *Shining Path: A History of a Millenarian War in Peru*, first published in Peru in 1990, was one of the first major works on the conflict to appear in English.[[24]](#footnote-24) Gorriti traces the origins, ideology and tactics of the insurgency, highlighting the missteps of both the military and civil governments which allowed initial rebel actions to go largely unnoticed before expanding rapidly in Ayacucho and then throughout the country. Although Gorriti’s volume covers the early phase of the insurgency, to 1982, subsequent researchers would expand on it both thematically and temporally.

Following Guzmán’s capture in 1992, two major edited works consolidated the basis of Senderology. David Scott Palmer led the way with *The Shining Path of Peru*,[[25]](#footnote-25) which includes Michael Smith’s insightful examination of rebel backgrounds, and the social and economic forces which led to their joining the insurgency.[[26]](#footnote-26) Other chapters include Carlos Iván Degregori’s discussion of the broader context in which Sendero emerged and its organizational underpinnings,[[27]](#footnote-27) while Gorriti expands his contribution to the field with a study of Guzmán’s intellectual background, his formation as an insurgent leader, and his effective use of the university to propagate his ideology and establish the movement.[[28]](#footnote-28) Sendero’s structure and relationship with revolutionary theory are also taken up by Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano and Cynthia McClintock, respectively.[[29]](#footnote-29) The volume also offers important regional studies of the movement, such as Billie Jean Isbell’s discussion of Sendero’s emergence and appeal in Ayacucho,[[30]](#footnote-30) and Ronald Berg’s analysis of popular resentment of the military government’s land reform in Andahuaylas.[[31]](#footnote-31) Other regional studies in the collection include those of José Gonzáles, who explores Sendero’s presence in, and profit from, the Upper Huallaga valley,[[32]](#footnote-32) and Michael Smith’s chapter concerning rebel actions in Lima’s strategically vital industrial corridor of Ate Vitarte.[[33]](#footnote-33)

This important work was followed four years later by *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*, edited by Steve Stern.[[34]](#footnote-34) The volume probes key themes of the insurgency, and includes Ivan Hinojosa’s examination of Sendero’s place in the panorama of leftist politics in the 1970s in Peru,[[35]](#footnote-35) Carlos Iván Degregori and Orin Starn’s studies of the role of rondas in ultimately turning the tide of the insurgency against Sendero,[[36]](#footnote-36) and Ponciano del Pino’s discussion of the organization, tactics and composition of the insurgency.[[37]](#footnote-37) Other chapters chart the course of the insurgency, intra-government divisions, and the role of women within the movement.[[38]](#footnote-38)

More recent works include Orin Starn and Miguel La Serna’s incisive and engaging study of the insurgency, titled *Shining Path: Love, Madness and Revolution in the Andes*.[[39]](#footnote-39) Written in an accessible style, the work is based in part on exclusive interviews with many of the protagonists of both sides of the conflict. Further setting it apart, rather than centering on the events and course of the rebellion, the book follows the “backstory” of the insurgency. In so doing, the volume offers new perspectives and biographical insights concerning many of the figures involved in the conflict, ranging from its leadership and prominent victims, to journalists and the intelligence agents who led the protracted effort to capture Guzmán and much of the party’s Central Committee.

Another recent work is Carlos Tapia’s *Tiempos oscuros: (1983-1995)*,[[40]](#footnote-40) which presents a perceptive analysis of the conflict, revealing how predecessor insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s shaped the Peruvian government’s initial response to the insurgency. Tapia also details Sendero’s organization and changing relationships with indigenous communities, as well as the evolving strategies of the Peruvian government, and the role of the rondas in defeating the rebels.

Numerous other works follow a thematic approach, focusing on the ideological roots and orientations of the rebels, regional studies, the rise and efficacy of the rondas, counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, gendered analysis, internal displacement, studies of Guzmán and his capture, and conflict memory.

An excellent resource for understanding the ideological underpinnings, expressions and appeal of Sendero is Degregori’s *How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999*.[[41]](#footnote-41) This collection analyzes multiple strands of the insurgency, ranging from the increasing dissemination and appeal of communist revolutionary literature in Peru’s universities in the 1970s and the origins and motivations of university students who joined the movement, to the rise of the rondas and the war’s disproportionate impact on Quechua speakers. Studies of Mariátegui’s contribution to Sendero ideology include “In the Shining Path of Mariátegui, Mao Tse-tung, or Presidente Gonzalo? Peru’s Sendero Luminoso in Historical Perspective”[[42]](#footnote-42) by Daniel Masterson, and “El eventual legado de Mariátegui en la composición ideológica de Sendero Luminoso,”[[43]](#footnote-43) by Mariano García de las Heras González. Alexandra Jima-González and Miguel Paradela López broaden the study of Senderista ideology in “Indians in *Pensamiento Gonzalo*: The Influence of 20th-Century Peruvian Intelligentsia on Shining Path’s Ideology.”[[44]](#footnote-44) They argue that beyond Mariátegui, other intellectuals such as Manuel González Prada, Luis Eduardo Valcárcel, and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre brought political relevancy to indigenous issues and asserted the importance of fundamental change through a revolution led by non-indigenous elites. Guzmán presents his own views on what would become known as “Gonzalo Thought” in *Guerra popular en el Peru: El pensamiento Gonzalo*[[45]](#footnote-45) and more broadly expounds his views on the insurgency, and the state’s response to it, in “La entrevista al líder máximo de SL.”[[46]](#footnote-46)

Numerous regional studies have underscored the diversity of the conflict’s trajectories resulting from the differing social, political and institutional contexts in which it played out. Given the importance of Ayacucho in the conflict, it is unsurprising that it continues to be a focus of scholarship. Beyond studies in the edited volumes mentioned above, works that place the events there in comparative and historical context include Miguel La Serna’s *The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*.[[47]](#footnote-47) Focusing on the towns of Chuschi, where Sendero made its public debut of sorts, and Huaychao, La Serna emphasizes that the probity and efficacy of community leaders in providing social order was a factor which influenced Sendero’s success. The shortcomings of Chuschi’s leaders in these regards provided an opening for Sendero. This was not, however, the case in Huaychao, where local leaders were seen as more legitimate, and more effectively organized resistance to Sendero through establishing the first ronda in the region.

Also focusing on Ayacucho, but placing local dynamics in a broader historical context, is *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980*,[[48]](#footnote-48) by Jaymie Patricia Heilman. Examining the distinct historical trajectories of, and response to, Sendero in the indigenous communities of Carhuanca and Luricocha, Heilman notes that in Carhuanca the long tradition of community-level political mobilization for substantive change presaged Sendero’s appeal, and ultimate control of the community. In contrast, in Luricocha, local repudiation of Sendero and the organization of rondas was influenced by a historic lack of grassroots political mobilization as a result of severe repression in the late nineteenth century. More recently, Charles Walker has examined how youths were engaged and initiated into the movement in Ayacucho, as well as their motivations and subsequent experiences with the judicial system, in “Inocencia: Shining Path and the Recruitment of Minors, Ayacucho in the 1980s.”[[49]](#footnote-49) The impressionability and reduced legal responsibility for young recruits made them especially appealing to Sendero, and they were often recruited through friends and family who had encouraged future adepts to attend Senderista meetings. The ensuing court cases against them upon which the study is based also illustrate the often ambivalent and indulgent attitudes by the judicial system towards the accused.

Other highland regional studies include that of Puno, which is the focus of José Luis Rénique’s “Apogee and Crisis of a “Third Path:” *Mariateguismo*, “People’s War” and Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987-1994.”[[50]](#footnote-50) Centering on the northern region of Cajamarca is Lewis Taylor’s *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*.[[51]](#footnote-51) Beyond its examination of the insurgency there, the work offers a valuable discussion concerning Sendero’s ideological origins and expression, and analyzes how the events in the Cajamarca region related to the experiences in other areas.

The role of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) in Sendero’s insurgent endeavor has been the focus of several studies. Building on the early and aforementioned work of Gonzáles published in 1994, is that of Bruce Kay. In “Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of ‘King Coca’ and Shining Path,”[[52]](#footnote-52) Kay employs a “resource mobilization” approach to understanding Sendero’s success in the region. He notes that the UHV provides two critical elements favoring the emergence and development of an insurgency: a minimal state presence and extensive opportunities for illicit economic activities. Not only did this conjuncture enable Sendero to finance much of their wider operations during the 1980s and early 1990s, but it has enabled the conflict to become a “chronic insurgency,” or one in which neither the state nor their adversary has the means to defeat the other.[[53]](#footnote-53) Also focusing on the UHV is “When All Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption and Shining Path in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley,”[[54]](#footnote-54) by Pablo Dreyfus. The work traces Sendero’s insertion into the UHV in the 1980s, their relations with local coca growers and traffickers, and their response to shifting counterinsurgency strategies and to the presence of the *Movimiento Revolutionario Túpac Amaru* (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or MRTA) in the region.[[55]](#footnote-55)

More recent studies of the UHV include that of Richard Kernaghan, who places the region center stage in *Coca’s Gone: Of Might and Right in the Huallaga Post-Boom*,[[56]](#footnote-56) highlighting the corrosive and corrupting effect that the 1970s coca economy had on local government in the town of Aucayacu. Such delegitimation provided an opportunity for Sendero in the 1980s which they ably exploited. Adopting a broad chronological and comparative approach to the region is Enrique Rojas Zolezzi’s *Cuando los guerreros hablan: los indígenas campa ashánika y nomatsiguenga y la guerra contra Sendero Luminoso y el Movimiento Revolutionario Túpac Amaru en la selva central peruana*.[[57]](#footnote-57) The work explores the frequently fractious relations with indigenous groups, especially the Ashánika people in the eastern lowlands, by both Sendero and the MRTA.

While numerous studies have centered on the UHV, Lewis Taylor has broadened the scope of lowland studies to include the “*VRAEM*” (the region of the Apurímac, Ene and Mataro River Valleys), in “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium: Comrades, Cocaine and Counterinsurgency on the Peruvian Frontier.”[[58]](#footnote-58) Taylor outlines the fracturing of the insurgency after the capture of Guzmán in 1992, the demise of the UHV faction with the capture of Florindo Eleuterio Flores in 2012, and the evolution of the *Militarizado Partido Comunista de Peru* (Militarized Communist Party of Peru, or MPCP) into a VRAEM-based narco-terrorist organization which has positioned itself as an intermediary between coca growers and drug traffickers and remains the only armed wing of Sendero.

The emergence and importance of the rondas as a rural movement, and later in defeating Sendero, have been the focus of several studies. Orin Starn’s pathbreaking *Nightwatch: The Making of a Movement in the Andes[[59]](#footnote-59)* and also Ludwig Huber’s *“Depués de Dios y La Virgen está la ronda": las rondas campesinas de Piura*[[60]](#footnote-60) both describe how rondas emerged in northern Peru as local responses to livestock rustling and corruption before the insurgency, and would subsequently serve as models for locally based responses to Sendero. Expanding on his previous study, Huber and Juan Carlos Guerrero detail the role of rondas in the Cajamarca region in *Las rondas campesinas de Chota y San Marcos*.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Other studies of the rondas, such as Carlos Tapia’s [*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295)*[[62]](#footnote-62)* focus more squarely on the motivations which led to their establishment,

while in “Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho,”Degregori analyzes the progressive alienation of peasant communities from Sendero, and the ensuing rise of the rondas in Ayacucho.[[63]](#footnote-63)Orin Starn adopts a broader geographical focus in his penetrating analysis of the emergence and importance of rondas in the regions of Ayacucho, Apruímac, Huancavelica and Junín in “Villagers At Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes.”[[64]](#footnote-64) Highlighting the broader constructive potential of rondas is Mario Fumerton’s more recent “Beyond Counterinsurgency: Peasant Militias and Wartime Social Order in Peru’s Civil War.”[[65]](#footnote-65)

The rondas were but one aspect of what Palmer has termed “informal politics,” which refers to the rise of citizen efforts to fill the void created by the failure of governments to provide viable avenues of articulation and meet basic human needs.[[66]](#footnote-66) In “Citizen Responses to Conflict and Political Crisis in Peru: Informal Politics in Ayacucho,”[[67]](#footnote-67) Palmer demonstrates that even before the conflict, such political dynamics in Ayacucho encompassed the provision of food and access to education, often with the assistance of non-government organizations. Despite post-conflict government efforts to recapture some of this political space, such local efforts have continued to evolve and prove efficacious, such as the expansion of ronda activity from community security to broader development initiatives.[[68]](#footnote-68)

Contributing to the literature concerning the rondas, but from a counterinsurgency perspective, is Witold Mucha’s “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,”[[69]](#footnote-69) which examines their longer-term consequences on communities. In so doing, he highlights three negative tendencies that have emerged since the establishment of the rondas. These include an increase of human rights violations and killings based on mistaken identities. Human rights violations are associated with a third, and occasional, effect of the institutionalization of the rondas, namely an exacerbation of longstanding rivalries within communities. Moreover, Mucha notes that the rondas have, ironically, continued a trend which began with Sendero: the displacement of traditional local authorities in both local governance and conflict resolution by younger men whose frame of reference is more orientated to military than community customs. Placing the Peruvian case in a wider context, he underscores how, once established, governments often have difficulty limiting the autonomy of civilian militias, as has been seen in Western support of rebels in Libya beginning in 2011, the U.S. support of Sunni militias in Iraq in 2015, and the Mexican government’s efforts to disarm civilian militias after 2013.

The shifting fortunes of both the Peruvian armed forces and Sendero during the conflict has also informed the broader literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, some of which intersect with analyses of the movement in the UHV and VRAEM. Studies of insurgent strategy include Gordon McCormick’s *From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path*.[[70]](#footnote-70) Focusing on Sendero’s infiltration and attacks in Lima, he notes the significant expansion of rebel actions in the capital which began in 1984. Initial recruitment efforts and terroristic attacks were supplemented by initiatives to establish a greater presence in, and influence over, labor unions and other urban civic organizations. McCormick emphasizes that Sendero’s activities in Lima were designed to be mutually reinforcing with rural actions, with different roles for urban rebels depending on the phase and conditions of the insurgency.

One of the earliest works to examine the evolving approach to counterinsurgency was Lewis Taylor’s “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996.”[[71]](#footnote-71) Drawing on Robert Thompson’s counterinsurgency paradigm, Taylor notes that the initial, militarized police-led “enemy-centric” approach had little result other than to serve as rebel “recruiting drives.”[[72]](#footnote-72) Compounding the issue was generalized governmental corruption throughout the 1980s, neglect of the material needs of rural residents, the economic implosion under President García (1980-1985), and a multitude of competing and ineffective intelligence agencies. With the beginning of the Fujimori administration (1990-2000), he notes that a strategy shift was well underway. Core elements included sound economic policies and a more “population-centric” counterinsurgency approach which sought to gain pubic support with more respect for human rights and community development initiatives. Other policies included streamlining and coordinating intelligence collection and application and the expansion of civil defense patrols, all within a context of declining rural support for Sendero.[[73]](#footnote-73)

Barnett S. Koven expands on this theme in “Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Barriers for Developing Country Forces, Evidence from Peru,”[[74]](#footnote-74) offering a concise and insightful evaluation of Peru’s evolving counterinsurgency strategy from the 1980s to 2015. Like Taylor, Koven notes that this timespan witnessed a gradual but consistent refining of strategy, from the undiscerning approach of the early 1980s, to the current “hearts and minds” doctrine which seeks to address economic and other concerns of civilians in affected areas, and thus win over the “uncommitted middle.”[[75]](#footnote-75) Koven notes that the Peruvian military has made significant strides in improving key aspects of their doctrine, such as through improved intelligence gathering, better coordination among military and civilian agencies, and establishing a wider and more stable military presence in the VRAEM. Despite this, he notes that concerns within the Peruvian armed forces of being charged with human rights abuses have impeded their tactical agility and resourcefulness.

The capture of Guzmán, and subsequently much of the Sendero leadership, in 1992 was without doubt the most significant act in ending the insurgency. While not minimizing its importance, in “Toward Successful COIN: Shining Path’s Decline,”[[76]](#footnote-76) Darren Colby argues that other factors were also in play. These include an expanding democratic space prior to Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992, which provided a means of political engagement and advocacy, the adoption of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, the establishment of the rondas, and Sendero’s own loss of support as a consequence of their ruthlessness and upending of indigenous communities.

Similarly, in “At the Frontlines of the GWOT: Lessons Learned From Peru,”[[77]](#footnote-77) Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Palmer trace the mutually-reinforcing policies enacted by the Fujimori administration which led to the effective defeat of the insurgency. These included the imposition of economic austerity measures which significantly reduced inflation, restored investor confidence and set the stage for the successful counterinsurgency policies that would follow. These included legal reforms which sought both to punish insurgents and encourage defections, streamlining intelligence gathering and application, continuing the shift from a traditional, coercion based “enemy-centric” counterinsurgency model to a “population-centric” while significantly expanding the rondas. These factors, in the context of Sendero’s progressive alienation from indigenous communities, would ultimately prove central to the defeat of the movement.

While Koven, Marks and Palmer recognize that the Peruvian military slowly but steadily abandoned the “scorched-earth” policies which characterized the response to the insurgency until 1985, Sergio Koc-Menard probes the motivations behind this change in “Switching from Indiscriminate to Selective Violence: The Case of the Peruvian Military (1980–95).”[[78]](#footnote-78) Koc-Menard rejects the notion that the empirically ineffective results of the “enemy-centric” approach motivated the shift, instead characterizing it as a response to President Alan García’s efforts to engender greater respect for human rights by the armed forces. According to Koc-Menard, this change did not reflect a fundamental rethinking of their counterinsurgency doctrine, but was rather simply a pragmatic response to the then-current political context.

While Koc-Menard’s discussion of the tensions between military and civilian leaders centers on motivations concerning changes in strategy, the issue of strategic communication and coordination between the two groups is examined by Marina Miron in “The ‘Strategy Bridge’ as the Forgotten Dimension of Effective COIN: The Case of Peru and Sendero.”[[79]](#footnote-79) Miron argues that a successful counterinsurgency depends on an effective “strategy bridge,” or means of operationalizing military, social and economic policies developed by civilian leaders. What was absent in Peru before 1990, she argues, was an effective “working civil-military relationship which would ensure that policy goals would dictate military strategy formation.”[[80]](#footnote-80) This changed under Fujimori, who adopted the armed forces’ multifaceted strategic approach to defeating Sendero. For the first time in the conflict, the military and the president were essentially reading from the same page, and the ensuing closer coordination was critical in the defeat of Sendero. Also examining the relationship between military and civilian leaders in the conflict is Maiah Jaskoski’s *Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes*,*[[81]](#footnote-81)* which traces the ebb and flow of relations between the Peruvian armed forces and conflict-era governments.

Other scholars of counterinsurgency have examined Peru’s experience within a comparative perspective, seeking to apply “lessons learned” from Peru’s conflict to more recent insurgencies in the Middle East. Such works include “Violent Political Movements: Comparing the Shining Path to the Islamic State,” by Scott Englund and Michael Stoha.[[82]](#footnote-82) The authors note how both Sendero and the Islamic State sought and seek to topple the established order and impose an extremist and globalist ideology. Both also held territory, and claim to be the “true” inheritors of their respective ideologies. Both also embrace violence as “a means to an end and an end in itself” which they do not hesitate to apply against competing groups which share certain affinities, such as left-wing groups in the case of Sendero and Sunnis in the case of Islamic State.[[83]](#footnote-83) The authors note, however, that given the more eschatological orientation of the Islamic State, and its organizational structure, it is more resistant to leadership “decapitation” than was Sendero.[[84]](#footnote-84)

Also examining the Peruvian conflict in comparative perspective is Witold Mucha’s “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared.”[[85]](#footnote-85) Mucha notes numerous parallels between the two cases, including longstanding neglect of popular demands by the authorities and an initial dismissal of the seriousness of the threat the uprisings presented. When the state did respond, it did so through “indiscriminate” violence by both the police and military, who were largely not held accountable for human rights abuses.[[86]](#footnote-86) This in turn spurred others to join the insurgency and led to the ensuing spiral of increasing violence by both sides of the conflict.[[87]](#footnote-87) Mucha notes that in the Peruvian case, the adoption of a “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency approach with more targeted repression, in concert with the rondas, allowed the government to prevail. While such “population-centric” methods are widely seen as more effective, the Syrian case, as well as that of Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009, demonstrate that “enemy-centric” approaches can also be efficacious, albeit at the cost of increased violence and human life.[[88]](#footnote-88)

Seeking to apply knowledge gained from other narco-terroristic conflicts to address the security situation in Mexico, Christopher Paul and collaborators dedicate a chapter to the Peruvian experience in *Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations, Supporting Case Studies*.[[89]](#footnote-89) Their examination notes how the Fujimori administration not only protected cocaine traffickers, but entered into a form of profitable partnership with them. In so doing, they obviated both the trafficker’s and coca growers’ reliance on Sendero as a shield against the government, thus undercutting rebel support in the region. They note, however, important differences between the two cases, including the absence of putatively ideological motivations among the Mexican cartels and a smaller informal economy relative to Peru in the 1990s. Despite this, both Peru and Mexico are beset with government corruption, and the widespread use of extremely violent measures by non-state actors which are funded by drug money generated in areas with minimal or no state control.

In contrast to studies which evaluate the relationship between, and impact of, Sendero and drug trafficking, Angélica Durán-Martínez and David Hillel Soifer explore the effect of the involvement of the military in counternarcotics operations in “The Drug Trade and State Violence in Internal Conflicts: Evidence from Peru.”[[90]](#footnote-90) Following an overview of the evolving antinarcotics policies in Peru between 1980 and 2000, the authors argue that military involvement in such operations has led to an increase of violence by the military against civilians in coca growing areas, as well as spurring a significant increase of corruption within the armed forces.

The often-contradictory challenges of combatting narco-insurgencies are highlighted by

Barnett Koven in “The Perils of Simultaneous COIN and Counternarcotics in Peru and Colombia.”[[91]](#footnote-91) Koven notes that despite often being carried out at the same time, counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations often are in opposition of each other. While contemporary Western counterinsurgency operations seek to win the “hearts and minds” of local civilian populations, and thus deprive insurgents of their base of support, counternarcotics operations based on eradication often have the opposite effect. Given this, Koven urges policymakers to privilege counterinsurgency efforts over counternarcotics operations until the defeat of the insurgency.

Other thematic studies focus on the prominent role of women in the insurgency; something that has, until recently, been largely overlooked in the historiography. Starn and La Serna’s *Shining Path: Love, Madness and Revolution in the Andes*, emphasizes the prominence of women in the conflict both as combatants and in the leadership of the movement. They note that women formed almost half of the group’s Central Committee, and both Augusta la Torre and Elena Iparraguirre had leading roles in both strategic and tactical decision making, reflecting their membership in the organization’s highest authority, the Permanent Committee. Similarly, Daniel Castro’s “The Iron Legions,”[[92]](#footnote-92) underscores women’s participation in Sendero’s upper echelons.

Other works present a less favorable panorama for women insurgents. In "El discurso sobre la emancipación de la mujer durante el conflicto armado interno en el Perú: Memorias de las mujeres del PCP-Sendero Luminoso,”[[93]](#footnote-93) Fiorella López López’ highlights the patriarchal structure of the rebel organization. Despite this, and the fact that gender issues were largely absent from Sendero ideology, she notes that rebel membership did provide opportunities for agency for women that could not be found either in other leftist groups or the wider society. Isabel Coral Cordero also presents a patriarchal critique in “Women in War: Impact and Responses.”[[94]](#footnote-94) Offering a local-level analysis of women insurgents is Lucía Rojas Rodríguez’ “Memorias de la vida cotidiana en las “zonas liberadas” de Sendero Luminoso. El caso de las retiradas de Chungui u Oreja de Perro.”[[95]](#footnote-95) Based on testimonies recorded in the Peruvian government’s *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or CVR) report, she discusses the dire and unhealthy conditions of a strictly ordered collectivist life in two remote rebel camps in Ayacucho.

Given that over 600,000 people were displaced as a result of the conflict, it is surprising that the topic of internal migration has not received more attention in the secondary literature. This vital topic is, however, the focus of two works: Robin Kirk’s *The Decade of the Chaqwa: Peru’s Internal Refugees[[96]](#footnote-96)* and Coral Cordero’s *Desplazamiento por violencia política en el Perú, 1980-1992*.[[97]](#footnote-97)

Studies concerning Abimael Guzmán include Umberto Jara’s biographical *Abimael: el sendero del terror*[[98]](#footnote-98) and Santiago Roncagliolo’s[*La cuarta espada: la historia de Abimael Guzmán y Sendero Luminoso*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE003945541),[[99]](#footnote-99) whose journalistic style is infused with numerous anecdotes. The often frustrated but ultimately successful effort to capture Guzmán has been recounted in several publications. One, [*La captura del presidente Gonzalo*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE007839108),[[100]](#footnote-100) is written by Benedicto Jiménez Bacca, who led the *Grupo Especial de Inteligencia*, (Special Intelligence Group, or GEIN) which tracked down and captured Guzmán and uncovered much of his network. Similarly, *Golpe mortal: la verdadera historia de la pacificación nacional: rompiendo mitos*, describes numerous efforts to capture Guzmán and is written by Guillermo Bonilla Arévalo, a veteran of both the GEIN and the *Dirección Contra el Terrorismo* (Counterterrorism Directorate, or DIRCOTE).[[101]](#footnote-101) The role that Guzmán’s psoriasis played in his capture is discussed in Gustavo Camino’s article "Capture of the leader of Shining Path. A dermatologic disease changes the course of history.”[[102]](#footnote-102)

More recently, scholars have begun to explore the political legacies and popular memories of the conflict, and how communities have begun, with varying degrees of success, a process of physical, psychological and communal reconstruction and reconciliation. A signal contribution in this regard is the edited work of Hillel Soifer and Alberto Vergara titled *Politics After Violence: Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru*,[[103]](#footnote-103) which details the diverse ways in which the conflict influenced, and has continued to influence, Peruvian politics, institutions, civil society and public opinion. José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner[[104]](#footnote-104) provide the historical framework for subsequent analysis, while Livia Isabella Schubiger and David Sulmon situate the insurgency within the theoretical literature.[[105]](#footnote-105)

Against this backdrop, Maxwell Cameron[[106]](#footnote-106) demonstrates how the 1993 constitution, enacted under the Fujimori government, codified a stronger executive and a neoliberal economic model which reduced social protections and labor rights while favoring foreign investment in a context of a weakened and fragmented Peruvian Left. Subsequent chapters explore the impact of the conflict on Peru’s institutions. Hillel Soifer and Everett A. Vieira III[[107]](#footnote-107) focus on the effect of the conflict on the coercive apparatus of the state, noting institutional restructuring and changes in counterinsurgency doctrine which have allowed the Peruvian government to enhance its territorial control. Other chapters examine the legacy of the conflict on Peru’s higher education system,[[108]](#footnote-108) violence directed at women,[[109]](#footnote-109) the effects of non-government organizations on indigenous activists and organizations,[[110]](#footnote-110) the long-term influence of the conflict in delegitimating and further fragmenting the Left,[[111]](#footnote-111) public perceptions of the risk of terrorist violence in a comparative regional perspective,[[112]](#footnote-112) and public debates on issues of conflict memory.[[113]](#footnote-113) Steven Levitsky[[114]](#footnote-114) offers a concluding chapter highlighting the rightward shift in politics which has been among the legacies of the conflict and, until recently, precluded the rise of progressive leftist governments such as occurred in Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador.

Other studies of the legacy of the conflict focus on memory, including Caroline Yezer’s [*Anxious Citizenship: Insecurity, Apocalypse and War Memories in Peru's Andes*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE004083227), which examines community experiences with Sendero, the role of evangelicals both during and after the conflict, and local perceptions of Peru’s CVR*.[[115]](#footnote-115)* Olga González delves into the paradoxes of post-conflict memory, focusing on the community of Sarhua in Ayacucho, in her nuanced *Unveiling the Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes*.[[116]](#footnote-116) Martha-Cecilia Dietrich also explores ambiguities in the study of memory in “Pursuing the Perpetual Conflict: Ethnographic Reflections on the Persistent Role of the “Terrorist Threat” in Contemporary Peru.”[[117]](#footnote-117) Challenging the common binary presentation of memories as either of victims or perpetrators, she notes that lived experiences were not always so clearly delineated.[[118]](#footnote-118)

The role of ambiguity is also evident in Kimberly Theidon’s *Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru*.[[119]](#footnote-119) In it, she highlights how the conflict exacerbated existing internal community conflicts, and generated new ones revolving around membership in Sendero, leadership transformations, and the reintegration of former combatants into communities. The result, as Dietrich also notes, is a blurring of the line between victim and perpetrator and ongoing challenges of reconciliation. Jerónimo Ríos explores other obstacles to reconciliation in “Narratives about Political Violence and Reconciliation in Peru,”[[120]](#footnote-120) contending that an unwillingness by many former insurgents and security forces to assume responsibility for their actions presents a major roadblock on the road to reconciliation. Other studies concerning memory and reconciliation include the edited work of Ponciano del Pino and Caroline Yezer, titled *Las formas del recuerdo: Etnografías de la violencia política en el Peru*.[[121]](#footnote-121)

Following the conflict, Peru’s CVR developed and led processes to promote productive dialogue among communities, governments and civil society while identifying strategies to promote local development. A comparison of two such endeavors is offered by Lino Pineda [Aldo Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638) in *De la confrontación a la concertación en provincias indígenas del Perú: comparando las mesas de concertación para el desarrollo local de Huanta (Ayacucho) y Churcampa (Huancavelica).[[122]](#footnote-122)* Other efforts to preserve, explore and document memories of the conflict, and aspirations for the future, have utilized workshops as well as different media, such as art and song. Such an endeavor in Lucanamarca, Ayacucho, is detailed by Carola Falconí and collaborators in *Lluqanamarka llaqtanchikpa yuyariynin/ Lucanamarca, memorias de nuestro pueblo*.[[123]](#footnote-123)

Several studies combine testimonials, local histories and statistics concerning the conflict to document its impact, and the recovery from it. Focusing on Chuschi, where Sendero carried out its first attack opposing the 1980 elections, and the neighboring village of Quispillaccta, is *Pensar los senderos olvidados de historia y memoria: la violencia política en las comunidades de Chuschi y Quispillaccta, 1980-1991*, by Marté Sánchez.[[124]](#footnote-124) Carola Falconí and Edilberto Jiménez offer a similar study of the village of Chungui, Ayacucho in [*Chungui: violencia y trazos de memoria*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE004211021),[[125]](#footnote-125) as does Eva Boyle Bianchi concerning Piura, in P*ara recordar: El conflicto armado interno en Piura, 1980-2000.[[126]](#footnote-126)* The role of visual expression as memory is highlighted in *Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth-Telling in Post–Shining Path Peru*,[[127]](#footnote-127) edited by Cynthia Milton, and in [*¡Nunca más! Los años de crueldad: el terrorismo en el Perú. Never again! The Dark Years of Terrorism in Peru*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE007455132) by Oscar Medrano Pérez and Roberto Bustamante.[[128]](#footnote-128) Autobiographical accounts have also enriched studies of memory. Such works include *When the Rains Became Floods*[[129]](#footnote-129) an autobiographical work by Lurgio Gavilán Sánchez which recounts the experiences of a former guerrilla turned anthropologist, and *The Surrendered: Reflections by a Son of Shining Path*,[[130]](#footnote-130) by José C. Agüero, who shares his experiences growing up as a son of revolutionaries, and contending with the legacy of the insurgency.

In 2003, the CVR produced a nine-volume *Informe Final*[[131]](#footnote-131) (Final Report), concerning their investigation into the conflict. Available in Spanish and online, it is the most comprehensive, detailed and readily accessible documentary collection concerning the conflict. It provides background information on the insurgency, descriptive and testimonial accounts and extensive studies of the entities involved. Additional sections focus on specific regions, statistical analysis, the results of investigations into human rights abuses and suggestions for policies promoting reconciliation.

Many of the testimonies included in the Final Report may also be consulted, or viewed in audio-visual format, in the Documentation and Research Center of the *Lugar de Memoria, la Tolerencia y la Inclusión Social* (The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion, LUM). The Center also houses documents concerning post-conflict community outreach and educational initiatives. Similarly, Peru’s Ombuds Office, known as the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, administers the *Centro de Información para la Memoria Colectiva y Derechos Humanos* (Information Center for Collective Memory and Human Rights). While its collection is focused more broadly on human rights in Peru, it also houses the archives of the CVR. It is also a valuable resource for the study of transitional justice and post-conflict memory both in Peru and in other countries.

An additional repository of documents concerning the insurgency which were collected by journalist Gustavo Gorriti while researching *Shining Path: A History of a Millenarian War in Peru* is available on microfilm at Princeton University. The holdings are catalogued in “Documenting the Peruvian Insurrection”[[132]](#footnote-132) and include manifestos, leaflets, government analyses of Guzmán and the Sendero leadership, intelligence reports, newspaper articles, and reports of armed actions by Sendero and the government response.

As this illustrative review demonstrates, despite the fact that Huancavelica was squarely in the “principal field of battle,” and ranked second in rapes and third in terms of fatalities and disappearances between 1983 and 1992, it has received minimal attention in the secondary literature.[[133]](#footnote-133) While Starn’s *Villagers at Arms* and [Aldo Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638)’s *De la confrontación a la concertación en provincias indígenas del Perú*, both noted above, concern Huancavelica, their works are not centered on the region.

Among the few such works that focus exclusively on Huancavelica is *El umbral de la memoria: pasado, presente y futuro en las memorias de la violencia en Huancavelica*,[[134]](#footnote-134) by Niloufar Ahmadzadeh and collaborators. Seeking to promote inclusion and reconciliation, this important work is based on testimonies of community leaders concerning the conflict gathered from workshops carried out in 2005-06. Published as a single volume in both Spanish and Quechua, the work also offers a detailed chronology of events in Huancavelica during the conflict. Focusing on the Huancavelican district of Julcamarca, Synthya Rubio Escolar also includes testimonies in her study of perceptions of the post-conflict Plan for Reparations in *La reparación de las víctimas del conflict armado en el Perú: La voz de las víctimas*.[[135]](#footnote-135)

A key to understanding the legacy of the insurgency and the interrelation of violence and culture in Huancavelica’s community of Santa Bárbara Huancavelica is the outstanding dissertation of Hunter Farrell McFarland, titled “Hasta la luna se ponía triste:” Violencia y cultura en Santa Bárbara (Huancavelica).[[136]](#footnote-136) Farrell details how historical forms of exclusión and violence - social, political, cultural, economic, religious, physical, psychological and structural - combined with that of the conflict, have fundamentally changed the nature and functioning of the community and the culture upon which it is based. Among the results of this multidimensional corrosive process are geographic disperson, deep internal and generational divisions, distrust of and isolation from external actors, a loss of community identity and cohesion through traditional collective activities, and the rise of individualism and Protestantism. Within this context, Farrell also explores the roles of resiliency and agency in community reconstruction.

Also examining the activity and impact of Sendero in the region of Huancavelica is Ricardo Caro Cárdenas’ article titled “La comunidad es base, trinchera de la Guerra popular. Izquierda, campesinismo y lucha armada: Huancavelica, 1974-1982.”[[137]](#footnote-137) Cárdenas focuses on the mileu in which the insurgent Justo Gutiérrez Poma grew up in the Huancavelican village of Sacsamarca,[[138]](#footnote-138) as well as his radicalization and ensuing participation in Sendero.

It is within this historiographical context that this work is presented, with the objective of recognizing and recording the development, dynamics and defeat of the conflict in Huancavelica, as well as its ongoing and multifaceted social, cultural, economic and political legacies. In order to understand why Guzman’s revolutionary project was an initially appealing prospect to many highlanders, an understanding of the deeper historical context in which it erupted is necessary.

**Colonial Repercussions**

The Sendero Luminoso insurgency emerged in the context of a deep, multifaceted, historical matrix of genocidal colonial polices, forced religious conversion, political exclusion and economic exploitation, which disproportionally affected Quechua-speaking highlanders and provided an enduring font of revolutionary “raw material.” Whereas the Spanish sought to conflate the conquest and Indian salvation, so too did Sendero carry out the insurgency in the name of Peru’s native inhabitants, and largely at their cost in terms of lives, livelihood, dislocation and culture. Both also reflected a paradox of simultaneous forced indigenous inclusion into, and structural exclusion from the putative benefits of, alien systems which were imposed on them.[[139]](#footnote-139)

Prior to the conquest, the region of what is today Huancavelica was sparsely populated, initially by hunter-gatherers. Among the first sedentary groups to settle in the region were those of the Chavín culture (900 BC-200 AD), and for much of the same period, the Paracas culture. These, and later groups, were attracted to the vicinity of what would become the city of Huancavelica by cinnabar and obsidian deposits.[[140]](#footnote-140) Both were traded locally and regionally, as cinnabar had numerous ritualistic uses in addition to serving as a colorant and obsidian could be fashioned into knives. Subsequently, the Huarpa society (200 BC to 500 AD), and the more expansionistic Huari society (800 to 1200 AD), maintained a presence in the region. The cinnabar deposits at Chaclacatana continued to be the main attraction, along with pastoral and agricultural activities. Following the brief interregnum of the Angaraes society, the region became subject to Inca rule in 1470, until their defeat by the Spanish in 1532.[[141]](#footnote-141)

Prior to the conquest, the disruption associated with changes in dominance was mitigated by the fact that pre-Hispanic societies shared many cultural, linguistic, social, economic and religious commonalities. These included polytheism, the Quechua language, land held in common, social stratification patterns, a spiritual relationship with their natural environment, diet, communal labor and trade networks among extended kin groups which bridged different ecological zones. Moreover, the Huari and Inca relied on indirect rule which both reflected and facilitated a broader, assimilative, orientation. Scaling up the tradition of communal labor, the Inca developed the mita. Essentially functioning as a tax paid by men, rotating labor groups were directed to projects which often had a common benefit, such as roads, irrigation, bridges and food storage facilities.[[142]](#footnote-142)

This assimilative continuity ended abruptly with the Spanish Conquest of Peru in 1532. Among the most catastrophic effects was the population collapse resulting from the introduction of Old-World diseases to which the indigenous peoples of the Americas lacked immunity. In Peru, disease actually preceded the arrival of the Spanish, having spread south through trade routes from Panama. Among the thousands who perished during this time was the Inca ruler Huayna Capac, whose death between 1524 and 1528 set off a power struggle, and wider conflict, between two contenders for the throne, Huascar and Atahualpa. Hardly had Atahualpa vanquished his adversary than the Spanish arrived in what is today Cajamarca and imprisoned, and ultimately executed him, thus opening the way for their conquest of the region.[[143]](#footnote-143)

The ensuing demographic collapse resulted in the death of upwards of ninety percent of the native population, which, although it drastically reduced the labor pool, facilitated the consolidation of Spanish authority. The historic practice of new overlords assimilating local deities into their polytheistic hierarchy was abandoned, and replaced by coerced conversion to an alien and monotheistic Catholicism. Paralleling this process in many areas was the involuntary relocation of natives through the establishment of *reducciones* (indigenous communities laid out in the Iberian manner). Such consolidation of previously dispersed communities was intended to assist conversion to Catholicism, while also bringing people under closer physical control to exploit them. The impact of reducciones, however, was much farther reaching. Indigenous communities had a spiritual relationship with their surrounding physical world, believing their ancestors and deities inhabited local mountains and caves. Adding to such spiritual decapitation was economic decapitation, as trade patterns in different ecological zones were upended. Finally, the concentrated populations of the reducciones accelerated the spread of disease, and with it, the demographic collapse.[[144]](#footnote-144)

To forced conversion, relocation and deculturation was added forced labor. Initially this took the form of the *encomienda* (a hereditary grant of indigenous labor rights to a Spaniard, who was encharged with ensuring Indian conversion to Catholicism and was expected to defend the kingdom). Usually, a conquistador was the beneficiary and in the immediate post-conquest period the encomienda system proved to be an effective and rapid means of bringing large numbers of Indians under Spanish administration and exploitation. Despite its expediency and efficacy, the monarchy grew increasingly uncomfortable with the arrangement, fearing the emergence of a New World nobility that could ultimately challenge, or escape, their dominion. As a result, beginning with the promulgation of the New Laws of 1542, and despite the violent resistance of Peruvian *encomenderos* (those who held an encomienda), the system was phased out. In its stead, in 1573 Viceroy Francisco Toledo introduced a variant of the mita system, allowing the monarchy to control the distribution and application of indigenous labor, a key element in the consolidation of regal power.[[145]](#footnote-145)

Toledo’s introduction of the mita was also a central component of his broader effort to stimulate increased silver production through the introduction of the mercury amalgamation process to the region. While rich silver-bearing ores could be smelted to produce silver, second quality ores provided a greater yield when refined with mercury. In order to orchestrate this transition, Toledo introduced a mining code and enabled the use of hydraulic mills in the mining Mecca of Potosí, in present day Bolivia, through the creation of lagoons above, and a canal through, the city to provide water to grind and process the ore. Two other elements of his plan would have long-term impacts in Huancavelica: the seizure by the crown of the cinnabar mines there to bring mercury production and distribution under a royal monopoly in 1573, and the subsequent provision of largely free mita labor to contracted miners in Huancavelica and mine owners in Potosí.[[146]](#footnote-146)

Toledo’s mita turned out to be a far cry from that of the Inca, and applied to *originarios* (men between eighteen and fifty years old who lived in their birth towns). The rationale was that since originarios had access to community lands, their mita service in essence was a labor tax for the recognition of those lands by the monarch. While the Incaic system focused on works of common benefit in the region in which the mitayos lived, the Spanish system dispatched them far from home to work in mining, textile production, construction and other work for which they derived no benefit. In the case of mining and refining in Huancavelica, 3,289 mitayos were initially drafted from twelve provinces in what are today the regions of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Junín, Cuzco and Lima. It was in effect a subsidy provided by indigenous communities, in labor, lives and goods, for miners, refiners and the government. Although the mita in Huancavelica was putatively for two months, it was in practice based on production quotas and could easily last for twice that time. The abysmal and lethal conditions in the Santa Bárbara cinnabar mine soon earned it the moniker of the “mine of death,” and those fortunate enough to survive were commonly beset with mercury, lead and arsenic poisoning, as well as silicosis. Rather than wait to be paid in what was usually debased silver, those that were able to often made their way back to their hometowns, broken physically, financially and often mentally.[[147]](#footnote-147)

Apart from severe infirmity or death, the other escape from the mita was through becoming a *forastero* (a person who resides in a different town than they were born in). Since forasteros did not have access to community lands, they were, in theory, exempt from the mita. The ensuing mass internal migration to avoid the labor draft spurred the implosion of many indigenous communities, as mita levies lagged severely behind depopulation. As a result, instead of having to fulfill the mita every seventh year as the system was designed, people were increasingly drafted into the mita every two of three years, which only further spurred out-migration.[[148]](#footnote-148) Between the effects of the demographic collapse, reducciones, death from the mine and smelters, and flight, indigenous communities were physically, spiritually and economically eviscerated. The progressively declining flow of mitayos to Huancavelica underscore this. While the original levy for the Huancavelica mita was 3,289 men, by 1645 this had been reduced to 620 mitayos, however only around 300 arrived for service. By 1685, only forty-four mitayos mustered in Huancavelica.[[149]](#footnote-149)

For those mitayos who made it home, the panorama was bleak. They returned only to be subjected to exploitation by their local Spanish governor, priest, and *curaca* (the local Indian leader or governor). All demanded unpaid labor from their charges, for transporting goods, agricultural or pastoral work, construction, textile production or personal or religious service. Other demands were for goods, such as hens, eggs, sheep and firewood, for which they were not compensated and which were often resold by the beneficiary. Beyond tithes, first fruits and occasional commerce, clergy derived revenue from religious fees, such as saint’s day celebrations, marriages and funerals. Even a deceased Indian could still generate revenue for the local clergyman, who would often demand advance payment from bereft family members for future memorial masses.[[150]](#footnote-150)

Beyond the abuses of local clergy, indigenous communities were subject to extirpation campaigns led by religious orders which sought the systematic destruction of native religious representations and practices. Such efforts did not just involve the wholesale destruction of native religious objects and the torture of indigenous religious leaders, but drained communities of their resources as they had to provide the clerical entourage with shelter, food, drink and fodder.[[151]](#footnote-151)

Among the systems most despised by the Indians, however, was that of the *repartimiento de mercancías* (forced purchase of goods). Operated by the local Spanish governor, it involved receiving goods from merchants, usually on consignment, and having the curaca distribute them to the community at extortionate prices. Products were often defective, such as dull knives or sick mules, or of no use to the recipient, such as clothing that they were legally prohibited from wearing. As the curaca was the financial guarantor for the community and would be physically and economically punished for any shortcomings, collection practices added to the abuse. Beyond providing a steady income for Spanish governors, the repartimiento de mercancías effectively forced the Indians into a specie-based capitalist economy, and, following mercantilist principles, provided an outlet for manufactured goods.[[152]](#footnote-152)

The repartimiento de mercancías underscored the role of the curaca as the nexus of the Spanish and indigenous worlds, in the impossible situation of trying to serve their new colonial masters while preserving, if not defending, their communities. Under previous dominions, such as that of the Huari and Inca, hereditary curacas were able to strike a balance between meeting external demands and maintaining a viable community. This was possible due to the more assimilative nature of indigenous civilizations, and also because the demands upon them were, in comparison to the Spanish, modest. Under the Spanish version in indirect rule, the situation of curacas often became untenable. Unable or unwilling to meet the plethora of demands imposed by colonial governors and clergy, which included mustering mitayos and ensuring free labor for the clergy, many curacas renounced their positions.[[153]](#footnote-153)

For those that did not, whatever protection they offered to their subjects soon eroded as they were gradually replaced by “interim” curacas appointed by the Spanish governor. Often these new appointees were non-local *mestizos* (people of Spanish and indigenous descent). From the governor’s perspective, however, interim curacas offered two advantages. Since their appointment was putatively temporary, they could be appointed, and removed, without approval by a higher authority. As a result, they were beholden to the governor and were more likely to carry out orders without compunction.[[154]](#footnote-154)

Some Indians sought refuge as debt peons on *haciendas* (agricultural and/or pastoral estates), which offered a degree or protection from the mita, the repartimiento de mercancías, and the curaca. With inheritable debt, peons provided a ready and regenerating labor supply for *hacendados* (hacienda owners). Being a debt peon did not, however, free them from clerical exploitation nor did it eliminate the risk of working in Huancavelica’s mines and mercury refining operations, as local hacendados would often rent out their labor pool to those involved in mercury production.[[155]](#footnote-155)

Given the scope of death, destruction and dislocation associated with the conquest, and Spanish systems of exploitation, it is little wonder why the advent of the new order was viewed by the Indians as a pachacuti, literally a “turning of the earth,” which more broadly refers to an inexorable, cyclical destruction of their world.[[156]](#footnote-156) Never before had indigenous communities faced such multifaceted threats of their physical and cultural existence, nor would they again until the emergence of the Shining Path and the internecine conflict that ensued. It did, however, provide them with a tragic exercise in contending with powerful external forces which posed an existential threat.[[157]](#footnote-157)

Taken together, these policies superimposed Thomistic values on indigenous society. Some elements, such as an organic concept of an orderly and harmonious society ruled over by a divinely imbued hereditary monarch seeking the common good, had pre-colonial antecedents. While such similarities facilitated the imposition and consolidation of Spanish colonialism, the differences lay in how they were implemented and for whose benefit. Under the Inca, the common good was a practice as well as a concept, as shown by the use of the mita for projects of collective benefit. Under the Spanish, however, the common good was limited in practice to that which benefitted the colonizers, such as using mita labor in mining or textile production, in which individuals directly profited. More importantly, the idea of an organic society under the Inca was predicated on the continued existence and viability of native communities, whereas under Spanish and even Republican rule, they were largely expendable.[[158]](#footnote-158)

The Bourbon ascendence to the Spanish monarchy in 1700 would culminate in the mid- and late-eighteenth century in a series of inter-related measures designed to enhance regal power, the mercantilist model, and the revenues it provided. These included efforts to strengthen the metropole’s physical control over their dominions through improved fortifications, naval patrols, the establishment of Creole militias, and a territorial reorganization that saw the creation of the Viceroyalties of New Granada in 1717 and Rio de la Plata in 1776. In 1751, the longstanding repartimiento de mercancías was legalized, leading to its significant expansion, and with it, native resentment. Other initiatives included tax increases, the creation of new levies, and a more aggressive collection regimen.[[159]](#footnote-159)

Such fiscal policies alienated swaths of colonial society. This included Indians, whose community lands were subject to increasing encroachment by hacendados, and who were now compelled to pay taxes on staple products like *chuño* (freeze dried potatoes), and chile peppers. For their part, Mestizos feared being relegated to the fiscal ranks of Indians and being made to pay tribute, and like the Creoles and Indians, resented the new imposts. Adding to Creole resentment were concerted regal efforts to reduce their sizable influence in colonial government, much of which took place in the context of the American War for Independence.[[160]](#footnote-160)

In addition, a series of ecclesiastical reforms sought to limit the income and power of the Catholic Church through measures which constricted how and what they could exact from parishioners, as well as through increasing the minimum age of ordination and prohibiting clergy from drafting wills. The conflict with the Church reached a new height with the expulsion of the Jesuit order from Spanish America in 1767, and in 1804, culminated in the Consolidation Law which mandated the expropriation of Church properties and other economic interests. Beyond weakening a rival power, depriving the Church of their lands was intended to free it up for cultivation of products which could generate tax revenue. Although the independence wars would forestall the implementation of this latter measure, later Liberal governments would implement their own versions of it.[[161]](#footnote-161)

Finally, reflecting the rise of economic liberalism, Bourbon monarchs, especially during the reign of Charles III (1759-1788), relaxed trade restrictions between the colonies and Spain, and legalized intra-colonial trade. The Bourbon Reforms, while successful in achieving many of their objectives, also unleashed a dialectical process. The increased and more efficient exploitation of colonial subjects spurred widespread discontent which found expression both in the Túpac Amaru Rebellion of 1780-82, and later in the Wars for Independence.[[162]](#footnote-162)

**Independence and the Consolidation of Economic Liberalism**

In Peru, the specter of the bloodshed and upheaval of the Túpac Amaru rebellion, and that of the 1791 Haitian Revolution, gave many Creoles pause when it came to supporting the independence movement. In 1820, with Ferdinand VII’s reluctant acceptance of Spain’s relatively liberal 1812 constitution, the colonial conservative elite concluded that the monarch was no longer capable of defending their interests and privileges. In many ways, conservative landowners and mine owners and their allies became the fulcrum upon which the fortunes independence pivoted, having concluded that it was better to defend their interests directly at home instead of relying on a monarch they could no longer trust. As a consequence, despite the liberal rhetoric of many proponents of independence, Thomistic principles and social exclusion based on a caste society and indigenous denigration would prove to be enduring.[[163]](#footnote-163)

When independence was finally achieved in 1824, Peruvians inherited the physical and economic ruin that three years of conflict had left it its wake. Reduced silver and agricultural production, capital flight, population displacement and the loss of their Iberian markets did not bode well for the new republic, and nor did the leaders who emerged to fill the political vacuum. *Caudillos* (military leaders), and their allied regional civilian constituencies, fought for the limited spoils that a bankrupt state could offer. Lima’s merchant class, willingly or not, became the financiers of feuding, and shortsighted, warlords. [[164]](#footnote-164) While Lima remained the locus of power, much of the contest in the 1820s-1840s pitted protectionist Lima merchants who resented the influx of North American and British goods, along with like-minded northern sugar plantation owners, artisans, weavers, traders, small scale miners and agriculturalists, against weaker federalist and free-trade oriented groups in the south, especially Arequipa. Despite the ebb and flow of the conflicts in the first decades of the republic, the corporatist orientation, social conservatism and economic protectionism upheld by the merchant guild of Lima, caudillos, and their allies prevailed to the detriment of those who advocated free-trade and political decentralization.[[165]](#footnote-165) The process of state formation and the erosion of protectionist policies was consequently slow, uneven, and punctuated by internal and external warfare and economic collapse.[[166]](#footnote-166)

For highland Peruvians, while independence was viewed warily at best, the first few decades of the republic offered some respite from the earlier days of colonial oppression.[[167]](#footnote-167) Many Spanish hacendados and other elites had abandoned the countryside, if not the country itself. Along with them and colonialism went the despised repartimiento de mercancías system of forced distribution of goods, and the unending indebtedness it entailed. The suppression of religious orders by Bolívar and subsequent caudillos also mitigated the demands of clergy. By the late 1820s, after Peru had defaulted on its debt, traditional modes of peasant exchange were reinforced as foreign markets for wool and other products were curtailed. As a result, for much of the peasantry the early national period was both the calm after the colonial storm, and the calm before the liberal one which would soon follow.[[168]](#footnote-168)

The economic upheaval associated with the independence wars, demographic shifts, declining silver production, commercial reorientations, competition with foreign goods and the establishment of a national government and associated bureaucracy provided a space for rural Creoles and Mestizos to avail themselves to the new opportunities that the historical conjuncture offered.[[169]](#footnote-169) While indigenous occupation of the estates of Spaniards, Creoles, the clergy and curacas had begun in the 1780s, an agrarian reform law in 1828 allowed many rural residents to gain ownership over the lands they had occupied.[[170]](#footnote-170) While this imbued the new owners with the liberal attributes of a land-owning citizenry while eroding the protected status of communal lands, it also paved the way for the reconstitution and expansion of haciendas over the next century.[[171]](#footnote-171) In contrast to colonial estates, the haciendas which emerged in the nineteenth century in Huancavelica and elsewhere were generally cobbled together over time and of relatively modest size. The parceling of both community and Church lands also presented acquisition opportunities for privileged groups in indigenous communities, contributing to social stratification at the local level.[[172]](#footnote-172) In the region of Huancavelica, estates generally consisted of two types: those over around 3,500 meters which were mostly pastoral and focused on wool production complemented by cultivation of quinoa, various tubers and to a lesser extent barley; and those at lower altitudes which were primarily agricultural but also involved in raising cattle and sheep.[[173]](#footnote-173)

In contrast to much of rural Peru, the fortunes of the town of Huancavelica in the early republic were more closely tied to the production of mercury, as they had been during the colonial era. Quicksilver refining had been experiencing a secular decline for decades prior to the abolition of the crown’s quicksilver monopoly in 1811, and that of the mita in 1812. In lieu of mitayos, seconded debt peons from surrounding haciendas and wage laborers, a class of *human chis* (independent miners and refiners) carried out limited extraction and refining on their own, often precarious, terms.[[174]](#footnote-174) Humanchi mercury production consistently proved more enduring, and productive, than sporatic government-associated efforts to restart formal production; initiatives which were repeatedly undermined by politicized decisionmaking, a dearth of capital and technology, and humanchi resistance. What the humanchis could not resist, however, was the market effect of the arrival of California quicksilver in the late 1840s, which undercut them even in regional markets such as Castrovirreyna and Cerro de Pasco. By the 1850s, the increasing use of the lixiviation method, which uses solvents instead of mercury, effectively drew the curtain on the humanchis. Indicative of the economic consequences of these changes was the demographic decline of the town. Whereas in the late 1840s its population stood at around 5,000 people, about ten percent of whom were humanchis, by the advent of the twentieth century approximately 3,000 people resided there.[[175]](#footnote-175) The result by the mid-1860s was a moribund town which the naturalist and explorer Antonio Raimondi described as being in “a state of prostration” and “continuous decadence.”[[176]](#footnote-176) The only economic motor keeping it afloat was the production of wool, without which another visitor in 1866 remarked the town “would have arrived at its complete ruin.”[[177]](#footnote-177)

Just as Huancavelica settled into the economic lethargy of the 1840s, coastal elites were beginning to reap the benefits of the meteoric rise of the export of guano, or bird dung, to Europe. Used as a fertilizer, guano would decisively change the political and economic dynamics of Peru while facilitating the Industrial Revolution in Europe by increasing agricultural productivity even as rural dwellers increasingly migrated to urban areas. The extraction and export of guano would be the catalyst that enabled the definitive defeat of the federalist and independence aspirations of the Arequipan liberals and the consolidation of the modern, economically liberal Peruvian state, especially during the administrations of General Ramon Castilla (1845-51 and 1855-1862).[[178]](#footnote-178) Also reflecting and contributing to the growing primacy of economic liberalism was the erosion of the economic and political power of Lima’s merchant class, the culmination of increasing competition with foreign products and the financial exhaustion resulting from their role as the bankrollers of *caudillismo* (rule by caudillos). Likewise, domestic textile and other producers found their modest political influence waning along with their market shares.[[179]](#footnote-179)

This economic void was filled by the revenue from guano exports, which provided seemingly endless income, largesse and unprecedented opportunities for corruption. Between 1840 and 1880, Peru exported around 11,000,000 tons of guano, extracted largely by imported Chinese labor from the Islas Ballestas offshore from Chincha. The hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue that it generated enabled leaders such as President Castilla to enhance the presence, and exercise of authority, of the state and to coopt or crush rivals. Much of this was accomplished through expanding the bureaucracy, with its attendant political dividends, professionalizing the military, and by developing transport and communications infrastructure such as ports, railroads and the telegraph in the 1860s.[[180]](#footnote-180)

While Peru’s coastal elites were reveling in the guano boom of the 1850s, highland elites were experiencing a boom of their own, as international demand and prices for wool increased, and transportation costs declined, until 1920.[[181]](#footnote-181) This in turn allowed highland elites, merchants and government authorities to further expand their landholdings, and control over labor, while increasingly fusing Positivistic ideas with their quasi-liberal orientation.[[182]](#footnote-182) Despite their “modern” ideas, their efforts to “civilize” the indigenous population and integrate them into the ranks of citizens were guided by a rigid social conservatism and Thomistic ideals and relied on such time-tested practices as patron-client relationships, debt-peonage, draft labor, and surplus extraction through taxes and other levies.[[183]](#footnote-183) Although highland *gamonale* (large landowners) maintained a firm grip on local power and enabled them to enter into political alliances with Lima’s elite, their influence on a national level remained limited and was tempered by the influence of the merchant class and coastal hacienda owners.[[184]](#footnote-184)

The guano boom proved economically intoxicating, blinding isolated leaders to the need to reduce dependence on imports, diversify the economy, foster domestic production and otherwise plan for a post-guano age. This is not to say that there were not calls from progressive liberals for a more farsighted approach to national development, nor growth in domestic markets, nor investment of domestic capital in productive coastal agricultural enterprises, such as those producing cotton and sugar. Rather, such developments were, compared to the guano economy, modest. By the mid-1870s, Peru was the most indebted country in Latin America, and its guano deposits were becoming exhausted. The impressive effort to literally lay rail for a new export economy based on mineral extraction and agricultural and pastoral products proved too little, too late, further miring Peru in debt.[[185]](#footnote-185)

By the late-1870s, the truth could no longer be ignored: guano deposits were largely exhausted, the railroads were not profitable, inflation was rampant and Peru again defaulted on its debt. Desperate, President Pardo (1872-1876) seized the nitrate deposits in the Atacama region, hoping that subsequent revenues would restore Peru’s economy. Instead, it led to Peru’s involvement in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which both Peru and Bolivia would be defeated by Chile. Beyond the material destruction and economic dislocation, the war was a national disgrace as Peru would be occupied by, and lose the very territory they had sought to exploit, to Chile.[[186]](#footnote-186)

The reasons for this debacle go beyond economic liberalism and the inherent limitations and vagaries of export and enclave economies. They also reflect a lack of a grander, national vision that went beyond a coastal export orientation, an exclusivist mentality and Euro-centric infatuation, to frame an integral, holistic concept of Peru which included the peoples and cultures of the highlands and jungle lowlands.[[187]](#footnote-187) While many liberals in Peru, and elsewhere, wanted free trade, a free press, elections, and representative governments, their conception of liberalism amounted to little more than “liberalism for us.” It was a socially conservative liberalism that sought to exclude the majority of the population from its discourse or benefits, pending their eventual “civilization” through education, genetic and cultural “whitening,” and inclusion as productive members of a capitalist economy.[[188]](#footnote-188)

As a result, state consolidation did not translate into a greater sense of inclusion for Peru’s highlanders or indigenous majority, or more broadly into a sense of national identity. Like the guano trade upon which it depended and the islands from which it was extracted, the state and urban elites remained in many ways an enclave, largely isolated from the diverse society over which they ruled.[[189]](#footnote-189) With the war and guano boom now part of Peru’s history, mining and agricultural exports became the primary drivers of the economy and Peru became ever more tightly embedded in global trade networks. Reflecting this, the first three decades of the twentieth century saw over a seven-fold increase of Peru’s gross domestic product, and with it a dramatic expansion of the state bureaucracy.[[190]](#footnote-190)

Back in Huancavelica, by the turn of the twentieth century not much had changed in the town or region since independence. With rural areas under gamonal control, it languished in isolation, national neglect and abject poverty meagerly sustained by pastoralists, agriculture and the dwindling ranks of humanchis.[[191]](#footnote-191) While the arrival of telegraph service in 1908 integrated the city into Peru’s nascent telecommunications network, the area remained at least a four to five day trip from Lima, depending upon if one took the land route via Huancayo, or the sea and land route via Chincha.[[192]](#footnote-192) The promulgation of a new mining code in 1901, which replaced that of the colonial era, did spur new investment in cinnabar extraction and processing just outside of the town of Huancavelica.[[193]](#footnote-193) This was initially led by Augusto Benavides, who sequentially purchased cinnabar-bearing deposits and made significant investments in excavation, power generation and refining smelters. He later sold his enterprise to Eulogio Fernandini, whose heirs, upon his death in 1938, established the Brocal mining company which would rely on open-pit extraction to produce mercury near the mine between 1968 and 1972.[[194]](#footnote-194)

Changes in trade patterns, and the increased demand for wool, during World War One allowed gamonales to strengthen their local political and economic positions. This would, however, come to a sudden halt by 1920. The end of World War One led to a dramatic drop in demand for wool, the reestablishment normal shipping networks and greater competition, all of which precipitated an over fifty percent drop in the price of wool between 1920 and 1921. This, and an increasing rural population, led to a level of peasant mobilization that was unprecedented in the republic.[[195]](#footnote-195) The dynamics of this rural unrest had emerged in the 1890s with the imposition of new fees, draft labor regimens, more aggressive tax collection, and the establishment of a salt monopoly, all within a context of highland hacienda expansion.[[196]](#footnote-196) Thus, as economic decline set in, all sectors of rural society were affected, and the affluence that the new and ascendant hacendados had enjoyed for the previous seventy years eroded considerably, while the population and associated resource demands by the peasantry increased.[[197]](#footnote-197)

Peasant mobilization reminded political and economic elites of their inherent vulnerability, and precipitated considerable legislation concerning Peru’s indigenous population, especially under the Legía administration (1919-1930). Peru’s 1920 constitution officially recognized the corporate nature of Indian communities, and also created a government agency to provide services and better integrate Peru’s indigenous population into the national polity as citizens.[[198]](#footnote-198) This in turn fostered greater Indian organization, as groups sought to obtain state resources in the form of schools, health care, restoration of community lands and more representative and responsive local leaders.[[199]](#footnote-199)

It was under the Leguía administration that the “railroad fever,” which had gripped national leaders in the 1860s, would belatedly arrive in Huancavelica. In 1928, after twenty years of construction, the 128-kilometer link from Huancayo was completed with the assistance of local draft labor. Despite the optimism that the service would provide an economic boom as a more efficient channel for the transport of goods to and from Huancavelica, its economic impact was muted in part because the planned segment to Ayacucho was never completed.[[200]](#footnote-200) By the 1940s, Huancavelica remained at the fringes of the Peruvian economy and society. Wheat, corn, barley, quinoa, tubers, sugarcane and livestock and associated products such as wool were its primary products, in addition to limited production of cotton and precious metals as well as zinc and lead.[[201]](#footnote-201) One indicator of the poverty of the region at that time was that two-thirds of the working age population was dependent on substance agriculture, livestock raising, and hunting.[[202]](#footnote-202) By the late 1950s, gamonal concerns about land reform spurred divestment and a reorientation of many haciendas towards less labor-intensive, wage-based livestock raising in an effort to discourage land occupations by resident peons.[[203]](#footnote-203) During the 1960s, mining of mercury and other minerals such as silver, copper, zinc and lead by both national and international enterprises expanded in the region, most notably in the provinces of Huancavelica, Castrovirreyna and Lircay.[[204]](#footnote-204) Emblematic of Huancavelica’s contribution to national development, and exclusion from its benefits, was the opening in 1962 of the Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo hydroelectric plant on the Mantaro River, which generates electricity for Lima and the central coast. Providing electricity to Lima and other regions while many in the region went without, the complex would become a frequent target of attack by Senderistas.[[205]](#footnote-205)

The foregoing helps to explain why, by the 1970s, Huancavelica was among the poorest regions in the country. Largely economically, socially and culturally excluded from national life, the region and its residents were effectively invisibilized.[[206]](#footnote-206) What was not invisible, at least to Abimael Guzmán, was its revolutionary potential.[[207]](#footnote-207) As Luis, a *comunero* (community member), of the Huancavelican village of Uralla,[[208]](#footnote-208) explained during this time “there were no good schools, there were no good roads, nor means of communication, there was no health [care] … it did not exist […] it’s just that when these needs are not met … then there will always be discontent.”[[209]](#footnote-209) He added,

I think it is true … there were abuses by authorities… For example, there were judges who accepted bribes, sometimes took advantage of women … the governor was the highest authority and many times he did not do what he should have done … for example if you have some legal procedure … you [had] to work in his field, you had to work for free.[[210]](#footnote-210)

Just as with the missionaries who came before them, Sendero claimed to hold a special, salvationist truth heralding a new era, asserting that the insurgency which they had literally brought to indigenous doorsteps was being waged for their benefit. It would be nothing less than another pachacuti, but one in which the indigenous people would come out on top. At the same time, however, the putative “beneficiaries” were in many ways excluded from the conflict, in terms of their economic interests, their culture, their beliefs and aspirations, and in terms of the ultimate exclusion: death. Just as Peru’s indigenous peoples had earlier been forcibly, and often nominally, converted by the Catholic Church, so too did they have to take sides in the conflict, or at least appear to do so when Sendero or agents of the state occupied and looted their villages and violently abused, raped and killed their residents.[[211]](#footnote-211)

Beyond the colonial legacy and economic liberalism of the nineteenth century, other conditions emerged in the twentieth century which fostered the rise of the Shining Path and other insurgent movements in Peru. These included a rapidly growing and more urban population, increasingly concentrated land ownership and the expansion of public education and the means of communication, all within the context of limited economic opportunity and an increasingly global economy. Combined, this was a volatile mix which fueled aspirational deprivation, or the increasing of what people feel to be reasonable expectations without the means to achieve them.[[212]](#footnote-212) These increasing tensions led to the coup which deposed President Belaúnde Terry in 1968 and installed a left-wing military government, first led by Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and later by Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-80). Velasco Alvarado saw the resonance that Castro’s revolution in Cuba had throughout the region, and the hopes it engendered. His goal was to orchestrate a revolution from the top down, through nationalist, statist and redistributive policies designed to reduce social and economic inequities, promote development and ensure political stability.[[213]](#footnote-213)

Nationalization of major economic enterprises, a land reform program that ultimately only further concentrated control over agrarian resources, corruption, ineptitude, political centralization, and an absence of effective accountability systems all led instead in the years that followed to severe economic decline, the erosion of civil society, and dwindling legitimacy for the regime. Compounding the problem was Velasco Alvarado’s ill health, which by 1974 had left him largely unable to govern. His removal, and replacement, by Morales Bermúdez did little to ameliorate the situation. Adding to the unpopularity of the regime was the state of siege which was declared in 1976. This ultimately provoked the general strike of July 19, 1977, which was decisive in paving the way for a return to civilian rule.[[214]](#footnote-214)

The policies of the military government were intended to forestall a popular revolution, and take the wind out of the sails of two insurgent movements which emerged in the 1960s. A key part of Velasco Alvarado’s strategy was the government’s land reform project, the centerpiece of which concentrated control of land into *sociedades agrícolas de interés social* (social interest agrarian societies), which became known by their acronym, SAIS. Although inefficient and corrupt, the SAIS did undermine the strength of the rural *latifundistsas* (large private landowners). In so doing, however, the government simply created a meta-latifundista class led by the SAIS administrators. This new rural boss, and their acolytes, were often just as resented by *campesinos* (peasants), as the estate owners that they replaced. This tendency, combined with increasing rural class differentiation, would also ultimately play into Sendero’s hands.[[215]](#footnote-215)

It was in this broader historical dynamic that two Peruvian revolutionary groups emerged in the 1960s, inspired and assisted by the Castro regime: the *Movimiento Izquierda Revolutionario* (Revolutionary Left Movement, or MIR) and the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army, or ELN).[[216]](#footnote-216) The response to these insurgencies during Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s first administration (1963-1968), while effective, would later serve as an ill-suited model for confronting Sendero. Both the MIR and ELN were active from 1962-1965 and were defeated by the government, utilizing “traditional” and “enemy-centric” counterinsurgency techniques shaped by U.S. strategies developed in the Vietnam War, and French strategies used to confront the independence movement in Algeria. While the MIR had its roots in discontented elements of the *Alianza Popular Revoluciónaria Americana- Partido Aprista Peruana* (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance- Peruvian Aprista Party, APRA), a Peruvian center-left political party, the ELN was led by Hector Bejár. Heterodox both in ideology and membership, the MIR had university roots and attracted some of its members from the Peruvian Communist Party. Members of both the MIR and the ELN had training in Cuba, and subsequently followed the Castroist/Guevarist model of rural-based insurgency oriented to creating a broad revolutionary alliance against an unpopular and increasingly repressive regime.[[217]](#footnote-217)

Both were relatively small movements. For example, the quixotic ELN, which was active in Ayacucho, had about twenty members, most of whom were poorly equipped urbanites who did not speak Quechua and were otherwise ill-suited for carrying out a protracted insurgency. The MIR posed a somewhat greater threat and had created union linkages. It also operated on a broader geographical base, which included the departments of Junín and Cuzco in the Andean heartland as well as the northern departments Piura, Cajamarca and La Libertad. The military’s approach to Sendero would later be informed by their application against these two rebel groups. In this context of small Castroite insurgencies, the “brutalist” approach was largely successful. The ELN was relatively easily defeated, and the MIR’s leader Luis de la Puente Uceda was killed in 1965. A faction of the MIR ultimately became involved in electoral politics in 1980 as part of the *Izquierda Unida* (United Left) coalition. Another faction, however, would go on to lead the *Movimiento Revolutionario Túpac Amaru* (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, MRTA), which would be active in the mid-1980s and 1990s.[[218]](#footnote-218)

Compared to Sendero, the MRTA was a smaller, “old school,” movement based on the Castroite model which sought alliances with leftist political parties, unions and peasant movements to create a broad-based coalition to overthrow the government. Their actions were often carried out with an eye as much on media, symbolism and propaganda as on military objectives. Generally, they were focused more on commercial and foreign interests than on using violence such as public executions to terrorize civilian populations, and were most active in the departments of Junín and San Martín as well as the higher elevations of the rainforest. They also had a weaker national organization, less internal discipline and fewer hardened veterans than Sendero.[[219]](#footnote-219)

It was in this broader historical context of exclusion, exploitation and dehumanization that Guzmán sought to link rural and provincial discontent to a totalizing ideology. His position as a professor and university administrator in Ayacucho, and his methodical and meticulous approach to planning, placed him in an excellent position to do so. The fact that Peru was returning to civilian rule in 1980 did not, in his view, affect the underlying historical dynamics, increasingly frustrated aspirations of youths, or the inexorable and radical transformation he sought to lead.

**Chapter Two:** **From the Shadows to the Spotlight: The Origins and Emergence of Sendero Luminoso**

**The Professor of Revolution**

Abimael Guzmán and many of his followers shared much in common: he was a provincial mestizo dissatisfied with the limitations imposed on him by a caste society, where wealth, opportunity and power were concentrated among a lighter-skinned minority in Lima. Despite this, he practiced what he condemned, for just as an elite Limeño group presumed to speak for the nation, so too did Guzmán claim to represent indigenous interests, consistent with a Marxist/Leninist vanguardist mentality.[[220]](#footnote-220) Guzmán was born out of wedlock in the town of Tambo in the region of Arequipa on December 2, 1934. Raised by his mother until her death when he was five years old, he was then taken in by his father and his wife, and studied at the Catholic De la Salle school in his native Arequipa. As he grew up, World War Two, the rise of the Soviet Union and the Chinese revolution would influence his worldview and ideological orientation. While the turmoil of the war and Mao’s revolution underscored the role of violence in influencing historical outcomes, Guzmán would also grow to admire Josef Stalin, whose ruthless and totalizing tendencies he would ultimately embrace.[[221]](#footnote-221)

As a student at the Saint Augustín National University of Arequipa, Guzmán pursued graduate degrees in philosophy and law, and was characterized by peers as a somewhat reticent but dedicated student.[[222]](#footnote-222) By 1962, he had completed his studies and was hired as a professor at the San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University in Ayacucho. Led by Efrián Morote Best, the university had just reopened three years before, having been shuttered since the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). A communist, Morote served as rector from 1962-1968, benefitting from support from the militant *Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Student Front, or FER). Morote had previously lived for four years in China, and his tenure as rector was marked by sharp leftward orientation in university affairs and the curriculum. Guzmán and Morote shared an ideological and personal affinity, and the new professor soon became Morote’s protégé. Later, Morote’s son Osmán would join and become a leader of Sendero, active in the Cajamarca region until his capture in June, 1988.[[223]](#footnote-223)

Like Efrián Morote, Guzmán had a close relationship with the FER. It was an ideologically and operationally synergistic relationship, as all embraced violence as a motor of change, and Guzmán’s role as a professor and administrator placed him in a position to influence the organization. His alliance with the FER, and violent social protest generally, led to Guzmán’s arrest for disorder, vandalism and related offenses, in 1964, 1969, 1970 and 1972.[[224]](#footnote-224)

The escalation of the Sino-Soviet split in 1964, during which Mao accused Khrushchev of capitulating to capitalism, would exacerbate the divisions among the communists in the university. Like his mentor Morote, Guzmán supported Mao, and was soon placed in charge of the freshman curriculum of mandatory courses, imbuing it with a communist orientation.[[225]](#footnote-225) 1964 was an important year for Guzmán personally as well, as after a short courtship he married eighteen-year-old Augusta la Torre, the daughter of his friend and fellow communist Carlos La Torre Córdova.[[226]](#footnote-226) The next year, Guzmán would spend six months in China, studying Maoist doctrine and also receiving military training. In 1967, his wife would study there, joined for part of the time by Guzmán. By 1970, Guzmán was serving on the University Council and had been appointed as director of university personnel by Morote, a vital post which allowed him to select, appoint and promote individuals who would advance his larger revolutionary plan.[[227]](#footnote-227) In the classroom, such was Guzmán’s tendency to indoctrinate, or brainwash, his students that he earned the nickname of “Dr. Shampoo.”[[228]](#footnote-228)

Guzmán would also play a central role in organizing and directing the university’s normal school, or *Escuela Secundaria Experimental Guaman Poma de Ayala* (Guamán Poma de Ayala Experimental Secondary School). Guzmán’s influence, and recruitment base, thus extended from the curriculum and classroom to hiring university employees and training future teachers. It was, however, his work in the normal school which would be key to expanding his nascent clandestine organization as he dispatched teacher trainees to rural schools where they would begin to recruit and indoctrinate villagers.[[229]](#footnote-229) For years, these positions enabled Guzmán to infiltrate institutions and surreptitiously organize his movement in preparation for the uprising, cunningly using the state apparatus in order to overthrow the state. [[230]](#footnote-230)

Such infiltration and recruitment efforts extended beyond Ayacucho. In Huancavelica Sendero focused considerable recruiting efforts on the *Instituto Superior Pedagógico de Huancavelica* (Higher Pedagogical Institute of Huancavelica, ISPH), a normal school, and the Huancavelica branch of the *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de Educación del Perú* (Educational Workers Union, SUTEP), both of which proved to be relatively rich recruiting grounds for Sendero. They had less success penetrating other regional organizations, such as the *Federación Departamental de Comunidades Campesinas de Huancavelica* (Departmental Federation of Peasant Communities of Huancavelica, FEDECCH), the *Federación de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos* (Federation of Mine and Metallurgical Workers, FTMM) and the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Huancavelica (Front for the Defense of the People of Huancavelica, FDPH) all of which had well-established political alliances with other left-wing organizations.[[231]](#footnote-231)

Assisting Guzmán in his revolutionary endeavor was his wife and co-revolutionary, who would later be known as “Comrade Norah,” and as “the Evangelist” due to her ideological commitment. Unable to have children, La Torre worked as a teacher before dedicating herself exclusively to the revolutionary endeavor.[[232]](#footnote-232) Unlike the urban-oriented Guzmán, however, La Torre was more comfortable as a hands-on mobilizer, and also spoke Quechua.[[233]](#footnote-233) She played a key role in the development of the insurgency, led the rebel effort in Ayacucho, and promoted the idea of “Gonzalo Thought.” Beginning in 1978, she would serve as a member of Sendero’s “Permanent Committee,” its highest authority, along with Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre, who headed the insurgent efforts in Lima. La Torre also established the *Socorro Rojo* (Red Support), which was a logistical support and assassination squad active in Lima.[[234]](#footnote-234)

La Torre died under unclear circumstances in 1988, with Guzmán later suggesting that she had killed herself, while Guzmán’s lover and future wife, Elena Iparraguirre, also known as “Comrade Miriam,” claimed that La Torre died from a heart condition. Whatever the cause, Iparraguirre became the second most powerful person in Sendero, after Guzmán, having left her husband and two children. Replacing La Torre on the Permanent Committee was Oscar Ramírez Durand, also known as “Comrade Feliciano,” who would only be captured in 1999.[[235]](#footnote-235)

In August, 1975, Guzmán was granted three months medical leave from the university, signaling the end of his teaching career and direct influence in university politics. Following his leave of absence, he resigned from the university in January, 1976, and would largely remain in Lima until his capture in 1992.[[236]](#footnote-236) Part of the reason for his relocation to the coast was for health reasons. Guzmán was known to be afflicted with two maladies, one of which was Monge disease, or polycythemia, which results in the overproduction of red blood cells and can led to headaches and problems breathing, especially at higher elevations.[[237]](#footnote-237) The other was psoriasis, which was diagnosed in 1974 and would ultimately play a role in his capture.[[238]](#footnote-238)

In 1979, Guzmán was arrested due to his support of the general strike of that year against the military regime.[[239]](#footnote-239) Under questioning, he admitted to being a communist, but denied membership in Sendero, an indication that Peru’s military intelligence agencies were already aware of the organization, if not who was leading it. It was too close of a call for him, and following his release he went into clandestinity, living in middle-class safe houses in Lima and going about in disguise under the name of José Cervantes Torres.[[240]](#footnote-240) The 1979 arrest was not, however, his last close call. In the 1980s, on the road south from Lima to Chincha, the police assisted him when his car had a flat tire, while on another occasion he avoided a speeding ticket by paying a bribe.[[241]](#footnote-241)

Living in Lima, Guzmán followed a routine which began when he would wake up around six in the morning and listen to the morning news, which often included reporting on Sendero attacks. Much of the rest of the morning and early afternoon were spent managing affairs of his insurgency, or reading newspapers and books. Mid-afternoon may have found him preparing ceviche for himself or a visiting rebel, or watching a cooking show, before lunch at three. Late afternoons were often spent reading or writing, until the ten o’clock evening news. Afterwards, he would often continue reading, often Greek tragedies or history, before retiring to sleep around midnight.[[242]](#footnote-242) It seemed an almost banal middle-class existence for someone committed to violently destroying the prevailing socio-economic and political order.

**Sendero’s Creed: A Marxist Melting Pot**

Sendero Luminoso emerged as a result of splits within Peru’s communist party. In 1964, the Communist Party of Peru splintered into factions supporting either Khrushchev’s Soviet Union or Mao’s China. The Maoist faction, the *Partido Comunista del Peru-* *Bandera Roja* (Communist Party of Peru - Red Flag), allied with the *Frente de Defensa del Pueblo* (People’s Defense Front). Guzmán was a member of the Front, which was vocal in its support of universal public education, a very popular national cause at the time. A subsequent split among the Maoists led to the establishment of the more heterodox *Partido Comunista del Peru-* *Patria Roja* (Communist Party of Peru- Red Fatherland), which combined Maoist and Castroite ideas. A crackdown in 1969 led to the arrest of those associated with the People’s Defense Front, including Guzmán. Following his release from prison, in 1970 Guzmán founded the *Partido Comunista del*Peru*en el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui* (Peruvian Communist Party for the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui) to carry on his revolutionary effort.[[243]](#footnote-243) Guzmán’s split from the Red Flag group reflected his different strategy. Throughout the 1970s, as many leftist parties allied with social movements, Guzmán instead rejected a broad front approach and focused on clandestinely developing his organization, and his own revolutionary brand. With the death of Mao in 1976, Guzmán viewed himself as the intellectual inheritor of Maoism.[[244]](#footnote-244)

Guzmán’s ideology, however, also drew upon Peruvian revolutionary thought. The name of the movement paid homage to the Peruvian intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930). Mariátegui published a socialist newspaper named “*Sendero Luminoso*,” (Shining Path) which inspired the name of Guzmán’s movement.[[245]](#footnote-245) Although Mariátegui had been involved in APRA, he broke with them to espouse his interpretation of “Andean communalism,” which rather than drawing exclusively on communist ideas, was inspired by traditional Andean political and cultural practices. In his seminal *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, Mariátegui noted the sharp social, ethnic, cultural and economic divisions between Peru’s coastal and highland regions, and urged the creation of a new polity which would unite them under the banner of indigenist structures and ideas such as the communalism and reciprocity of the *allyu*, or an extensive familial group which subsumes real and fictive relations. In many ways, he sought to update traditional Andean practices by placing them in the structure of Marxist socialism.[[246]](#footnote-246)

While Mariátegui did influence the broad outlines of Sendero ideology, it was to a much greater degree steeped in Marxist/Leninist/Maoist concepts, where class struggle eclipsed the historical struggle of indigenous revindication.[[247]](#footnote-247) The influence of Mao on the movement came not only from Mao’s writings, but also from Guzmán’s residence in China in 1965 and 1967, during which he received both ideological and military training.[[248]](#footnote-248) The influence of “Maoist” thought on Sendero is most notable in its strategic focus on the rural peasantry.[[249]](#footnote-249) One aspect of Maoism that appealed to Guzmán was the Cultural Revolution, as a means of purging enemies, rejuvenating the party, and most importantly, maintaining an exclusive grip on power.[[250]](#footnote-250)

While Mao viewed violence as a necessary means to an end, Guzmán viewed it as “an end in itself;” as an almost intrinsically purifying force.[[251]](#footnote-251) This fixation on violence was also related to the Marxist idea of the “quota,” or the amount of blood that must be shed in order to achieve revolutionary objectives. Central to this idea was that in order to achieve victory, a revolutionary organization and its members must be willing to accept a higher cost in terms of lives lost than their military or civilian foes.[[252]](#footnote-252) This was among the keys to the communist victories in China, Russia and Vietnam, and required a steady stream of new and impressionable recruits, conscripted or otherwise.[[253]](#footnote-253)

Extreme violence also played an important role in compensating for Sendero’s small size relative to their adversaries, and as a means of instilling terror among the civilian population. Brutality did not require sophisticated weapons or extensive training, and often involved such practices as slitting victim’s throats or stoning them to death. Such actions also served as a means of initiating recruits, having them demonstrate their mettle and of marking a “before” and “after” in their lives. Violence was also effective in maintaining internal discipline and cohesion, especially in the latter part of the 1980s as Sendero increasingly relied on conscription to swell their ranks.[[254]](#footnote-254)

One area in which Guzmán misinterpreted Mao’s revolutionary precepts was in his characterization of Peru as a “semi-feudal” country.[[255]](#footnote-255) Post-World War II urban migration, and Velasco Alvarado’s land reform in the 1960s and 1970s, had undermined the primacy of the rural hacienda in Peru by 1980.[[256]](#footnote-256)Although the SAIS were inefficient, and their administrators corrupt, largely unaccountable, and often resented by the peasantry, they were not members of an independent landholding class.[[257]](#footnote-257) Another important distinction from Maoist thought, and communist insurgencies generally, was Guzmán’s insistence that the military apparatus of Sendero be rigidly subject to party dictates, following the adage that “the party commands the rifle, and never vice versa.”[[258]](#footnote-258) Terrorism and other armed actions were to achieve specific political goals. In other insurgencies, such as those led by both Mao and Castro, the military had primacy over political organizations.[[259]](#footnote-259) Indeed, Guzmán viewed this as one of his prime contributions to revolutionary theory, and one that he believed should be emulated by all communist parties.[[260]](#footnote-260)

Guzmán also diverged from Mao concerning the role, timing and relative weight of urban armed actions. While Mao did carry out urban operations, his primary orientation was to gradually dominate the countryside in order to isolate, weaken and overtake the cities, ultimately with a uniformed rebel army.[[261]](#footnote-261) In contrast, not only did Guzmán eschew uniforms, but he was active in cities, especially Lima, at a much earlier period of the insurgency than one would expect in a “Maoist” movement. For example, Sendero’s first attack in Lima was less than a month after the ballot burning in Chuschi. Indeed, others in the party hierarchy saw this as a dangerous ideological deviation from Maoist doctrine. Guzmán, however, insisted that rural and urban actions served as a “complement” to each other. Despite the tendency for Castroite insurgencies to operate in both urban and rural theaters, Guzmán insisted that such an approach was a refinement of Maoist doctrine, and thus another of his own contributions to revolutionary theory.[[262]](#footnote-262) Guzmán also deviated from Mao in his effort to establish “liberated zones” in rural areas prior to the capture of the capital city, as well as his unwillingness to enter into pragmatic alliances with other insurgent groups.[[263]](#footnote-263)

As the foregoing suggests, the philosophy professor turned insurgent leader was keen to highlight his interpretations of, and putative contributions to, communist thought. In his view, these were of such significance that he believed himself to be the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” after Marx, Lenin and Mao.[[264]](#footnote-264) This tendency became especially clear after the Second Party Conference in 1982, which consolidated Guzmán’s power and recast Mariategui’s ideas within a solidly Maoist, Marxist and Leninist framework, as interpreted by Guzmán.[[265]](#footnote-265) Underscoring Guzmán’s preeminence in the organization, was his abandonment of his earlier nom de guerre of “Comrade Álvaro,” and its replacement by “Chairman Gonzalo.”[[266]](#footnote-266)

By this time, Sendero was well on its way to becoming a “personality cult” based on quasi-religious belief in, and unquestioning obedience to, a messianic Guzmán.[[267]](#footnote-267) The development of Guzmán’s ideology and strategy were as methodical as they were rigid, oriented towards a mechanistic, sequential, and in his view, teleological, unfolding of processes and events. This should not, however, be seen as eschewing praxis, or the iterative integration of theory and practice. Guzmán was a precise planner and keen to analyze the execution and effects of armed actions in order to integrate the knowledge gained into subsequent actions.[[268]](#footnote-268)

While primarily inspired by Mao, Guzmán embraced Marxist, Leninist and Stalinist precepts. For example, he accepted Marx’s belief that, since the state reflected class interests, it could not be reformed, and instead had to be destroyed. He also accepted Lenin’s insistence that a revolutionary undertaking had to be led by a small vanguard of largely clandestine revolutionaries. He did, however, adapt it to a Maoist framework, substituting the central role of the industrial proletariat with that of the peasantry.[[269]](#footnote-269) “Gonzalo Thought” also included Stalinist elements, such as doctrinal inflexibility, strict discipline and the insistence that Sendero’s members blindly adhere to the dictates of the leader and subsume their identity to the movement.[[270]](#footnote-270)

The result of these influences was a hybrid ideology that principally derived from Guzmán’s interpretation, and elaboration, of communist ideology. To some extent, it reflected Guzmán more than either Mariátegui, Mao, Lenin or Stalin. It was militantly exclusivist and a form of secular Salafism: whatever organization or person that was not part of the movement was to be destroyed or killed. Such a violently monistic orientation, which had quasi-religious attributes, was inherently at odds with indigenous traditions such as polytheism, reciprocity, conciliation, traditional hierarchies and religious celebrations.[[271]](#footnote-271)

Among the consequences of this rigidly intellectual, mechanistic and bureaucratic orientation was that the peasantry became the objects, as opposed to the protagonists, of revolution; a factor which would in the end undermine Sendero’s appeal and success.[[272]](#footnote-272) Underscoring this tendency was the fact that although much of the conflict revolved around indigenous communities, Sendero’s rhetoric, and broader ideology, focused more on class than ethnicity.[[273]](#footnote-273) The fact that the core leadership of Sendero was mestizo, and had a paternalistic and utilitarian view of native people, further reflected the structural and ideological disconnect between Sendero and the peasantry even before the group’s earliest armed actions.[[274]](#footnote-274)

In another sense, this paternalism was also expressed through Guzmán’s role as a professor: an urban mestizo teaching students of rural and indigenous background.[[275]](#footnote-275) Within a broader context, as Degregori contends, Guzman and other leaders of Sendero were part of a longer trend in which regional elites sought to harness rural, indigenous aspirations to challenge the lighter-skinned social, economic and political elites based in Lima. Despite their ideological rhetoric, from the perspective of political culture nothing had changed: Sendero and its organizations merely sought to supplant other groups while perpetuating, and exacerbating, an exclusivist, ideological authoritarianism which claimed to be acting for the betterment of society.[[276]](#footnote-276)

**From Locked Out to Locked In: The Appeal of Revolution**

Like many cults and mass movements, Sendero’s adherents often shared certain characteristics. Many of those drawn to the movement were provincial mestizo “first generation” university students. Many felt blocked, alienated and resentful in a country where people with lighter skin, and who lived in Lima, had disproportional social, economic and political advantages. Many who embraced Sendero’s cause were neither rural nor fully urban, neither indigenous nor white and neither economically included nor fully excluded. In many ways they were “neither here nor there,” caught in a nether land of inefficacy, striving and aspirational deprivation where their limited opportunities in Peruvian society were made more painful by their hopes for, and hopelessness of, the future. Such desires for social and economic advancement were among the primary factors drawing people to the university, where many sought the certainty of an externally derived “truth.” Sendero filled the void, with Guzmán offering teleological clarity, totalistic certainty, an identity based on historical agency, and opportunity for social advancement, respect, and revenge for historical, and ongoing, injustices.[[277]](#footnote-277) To achieve this, those who joined had to abandon their previous lives, and families, and be willing to kill, and to die.[[278]](#footnote-278)

This depiction is corroborated by the characteristics of those arrested for terrorism during the conflict. Most of those detained were single men without children in their mid-twenties with some university education who grew up in a provincial capital and did not speak Quechua. Underscoring the rhetorical nature of Sendero’s emphasis on the peasantry, only fifteen percent of those apprehended were peasants or farmers.[[279]](#footnote-279) Among those with some university education, many were underemployed, like many of their non-rebel peers.[[280]](#footnote-280) The backgrounds of those from northern Peru were somewhat more diverse, with greater representation by peasants of different classes and former members of APRA.[[281]](#footnote-281)

Although most of those who were arrested for terrorism were men, women were involved in the insurgency since the beginning, and ultimately comprised about a third of Sendero’s membership and over half of the Central Committee membership.[[282]](#footnote-282) To some extent this resulted from deliberate efforts to recruit women, especially from the educational and medical professions.[[283]](#footnote-283) Like the men, women members were generally drawn from urban and middle-class backgrounds, however they were more likely to have post-graduate education. Among the rank and file, women were initially generally tasked with support activities, however as male recruits declined, women’s roles expanded to include propaganda, intelligence and combat.[[284]](#footnote-284)

Despite extensive female membership in all levels of Sendero, following the Marxist line the issue of women’s rights was consistently subordinated to issues of class, and thus largely neglected by Sendero leadership. Moreover, women who achieved positions of authority in Sendero often did so as a result of their association with Guzmán. Despite this, and Sendero’s ultimately patriarchal structure, life as a Sendero militant did offer a degree of agency and social mobility for women that they had been unable to find in Peruvian society.[[285]](#footnote-285)

The expansion of public education at the secondary and tertiary levels, and the hopes it reinforced, provided Guzmán with a plethora of potential recruits. Between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of eighteen to twenty-five year-olds who attended high school or university in Peru exploded: from nineteen percent to seventy-six percent.[[286]](#footnote-286) This often created, and continues to create, a generational division between this cohort and their parents, in terms of exposure to urban life, ideas, cultural hybridity and life expectations.[[287]](#footnote-287) A second level of self-selection occurred among those who sought to become teachers, they would not just be seekers of “truth,” but esteemed bearers of it.

Although Sendero’s emissaries of the new order in rural communities were often high school teachers, they also included itinerant university students, local converts and others with a connection to a given area. As early as the late 1970s, they were spreading their atheistic gospel to students and the wider community in the highlands, many of whom would follow their example and impart their ideas of social justice, national inclusion and the wholesale destruction of the old order more widely.[[288]](#footnote-288) Other propaganda work could include tracing a hammer and sickle with fuel and igniting it at night on hillsides, painting Sendero’s logo on buildings, raising their flag on village plazas or atop surrounding hills, and forced community meetings.[[289]](#footnote-289) Although their views and discourse were radical, early propagandists were often keen to listen to local grievances, and link them to the solutions their ideology promised. The early evangelist’s central message of social justice, inclusion and administrative honesty were usually respectfully delivered and appealed to many, even if comuneros did not understand the finer aspects of the ideology.[[290]](#footnote-290)

Even after the ballot burning of Chuschi, Sendero did not generally target local civil authorities through 1980, and instead focused their armed attacks on police as the “strategic defense” phase of the insurgency gained steam. The progressive withdrawal of police from rural posts, and with it the literal ceding of ground to Sendero, coincided with a more aggressive and insistent approach by Sendero’s agents in communities. By 1981, the insurgents increasingly demanded that local civil authorities, such as traditional community leaders, justices of the peace, mayors, council people and lieutenant governors, resign, leave or die; that the tarnished and decrepit old order yield to the new, youthful and vigorous one.[[291]](#footnote-291) In this sense, Sendero was not innovative; attacks on infrastructure and efforts to rout government authorities from rural areas to create a power vacuum and seize weapons reflected conventional insurgency tactics.[[292]](#footnote-292)

There was also a certain romantic appeal to becoming a rebel, a courageous, feared prophet of the inexorable utopia.[[293]](#footnote-293) This was especially notable among the youth, who were targeted for indoctrination and recruitment. For example, by 1983 in San José de Acobambilla,[[294]](#footnote-294) Sendero had already executed the local authorities, and, with the support of local teachers, followed it up with an aggressive propagandizing and enlistment campaign. “Daniel,” who was a child at the time, related how almost every week

the Senderos would come to town to raise awareness in the high school, in the grade school … and what called my attention was how … this terrorist gathered together all of the high school, professors and everyone and they put us all in the large classroom and he began to speak and I admired his ability to speak because this Sendero was a peasant and was not a professional … so then I tried to listen [but] don’t remember much but he made drawings on the blackboard and all such things … we children listened then about the issue of power, the people … and how they had to control the state and all that … and well at that age I was also a bit sensitized as well because it seems to be something special, as if he was training us to be leaders … [we] were all there quietly listening to the speech and the most curious thing was that it was a speech by a peasant terrorist.[[295]](#footnote-295)

“Gregorio,” another youth at that time in Jerusalem,[[296]](#footnote-296) mused how “our teachers, they got us all involved … as a youngster, yes, I loved it also.”[[297]](#footnote-297) Such recruitment did not just happen in schools. In the region of Lachocc,[[298]](#footnote-298) “Dámaso,” remembered when as a child a Sendero patrol had entered his hamlet, asking for a place to sleep and for a sheep to eat. Although such requests carried an implicit threat, “they did not ask for things by force.”[[299]](#footnote-299)A fearful comunero obliged, a sheep was slaughtered, and soon there was a degree of at least superficial conviviality. As Dámaso’s apprehensions gave way to inquisitiveness, the youngster began to converse with the insurgents, recalling “as a child I had the curiosity of holding a weapon, to see with binoculars, everything … [I would ask] ‘Can you loan them to me?”[[300]](#footnote-300)

Areas where the military regime had established SAIS offered additional opportunities for recruitment to the insurgent cause. The creation of these agricultural organizations was the centerpiece of Velasco Alvarado’s land reform. Rather than redistributing the land to be owned individually or by communities, however, the SAIS model essentially fused large haciendas into even larger state-controlled enterprises. SAIS administrators became a new locus of power and class differentiation, and their authority, attitudes and expectations were often hardly distinguishable from the hacendados whom they had replaced. By 1980, thirty percent of the arable land in the region of Huancavelica was controlled by SAIS. Their dominion over, and exploitation of, surrounding communities was widely resented; tensions which were often exacerbated by conflicts over grazing rights. As a result, attacks on SAIS by Sendero were often viewed favorably by surrounding communities.[[301]](#footnote-301) Other than attacking a state agency which was often poorly regarded by locals, “spreading the wealth” of the SAIS could have additional propaganda value. For example, the assault on the SAIS in Cinto,[[302]](#footnote-302) in August, 1985, resulted not only in the destruction of the infrastructure, but also involved the distribution of over 4,600 head of sheep and cattle to locals.[[303]](#footnote-303)

Generally, Sendero encountered more success in areas that were long neglected by the state, especially the highlands, and had weak local organizations or severely divided communities.[[304]](#footnote-304) For example, in areas where unions and evangelical groups were active, and valley communities more closely tied to regional markets, both Sendero and the MRTA had difficulty gaining traction.[[305]](#footnote-305) In the north of Peru, where *Senderistas* (Sendero adherents), tended to be somewhat older and less educated than the norm, the insurgency also encountered a stronger presence of unions and APRA, which impeded the spread of the movement.[[306]](#footnote-306)

Sendero’s expansion was also impeded in areas with strong institutions, such as unions and religious organizations. As a result, union leaders, priests and pastors were frequent targets of the rebels, such as when, in February, 1990, a four-person Sendero hit squad assassinated the priest of Izcuchaca,[[307]](#footnote-307) Reynaldo Sáenz Tascano, as he was traveling to Huancayo.[[308]](#footnote-308) As with the Catholic Church, evangelical groups were also active in their opposition to the insurgency and paid an especially high price in the conflict: in Huancavelica and Ayacucho, 529 Protestants were killed between 1983-1984 and 1988-91.[[309]](#footnote-309)

Farrell notes several areas of overlap between the two movements, such as stringent moral codes, a strong sense of identity, community, and agency as well as non-traditional roles for youths and women and a deep criticism of the existing social and political order. Added to this, both share a Manichean worldview, and offer a means of comprehending the disintegration around them while serving as a bulwark against external violence and aggression.[[310]](#footnote-310) Unlike Sendero, however, Andean Pentecostalism subsumed elements of traditional Andean cosmovision, such as the primacy of experience over knowledge, a cyclical, apocalyptic view of change, and the belief that the divine inhabits all beings and objects.[[311]](#footnote-311)

**From Chuschi to Lima: The Revolutionary Road**

Guzmán began the insurgency with little more than revolutionary ideas, audacious actions and the cards stacked against him as no recent insurgency in Latin America had overthrown an elected government.[[312]](#footnote-312) Although he had received some military training during his visit to China in 1965, almost all of his followers were at the outset untrained. In many ways his was a “do it yourself” insurgency, created in his mind, patiently planned, and launched with minimal, and often primitive weapons, such as knives, stones and hand grenades crafted from dynamite placed in a sock.[[313]](#footnote-313) Such limitations were, to some extent, compensated by the discipline and cohesion of the organization.[[314]](#footnote-314)

Guzmán envisioned three phases of the insurgency which, he believed, would culminate in victory for Sendero. Reflecting his methodical and bureaucratic orientation, each phase had certain objectives which had to be met before advancing to the next level.[[315]](#footnote-315) The phases of the war included that of “Strategic Defense,” which was the initial and longest phase, and focused on propagandizing, armed actions and attacks on infrastructure of increasing scope. This would lead to a “Strategic Equilibrium” of power between Sendero and the state, and would culminate in a final “Strategic Offensive” to achieve victory. In this final stage, the objective was to precipitate a military coup and then turn the conflict into a showdown between a deeply repressive military government and the “trinity” of the Communist Party of Peru - Sendero Luminoso, the military wing of Sendero and a “united front” of peasants and petit bourgeois. By the late 1980s, this did not seem so farfetched as the economy unraveled during President Alan García’s chaotic first term (1985-1990) and seemingly endless waves of violence engulfed the country.[[316]](#footnote-316)

The objectives of the multi-faceted “Strategic Defense” phase centered on fomenting unrest through propaganda activities and agitation, acquiring weapons and explosives, and using them to attack infrastructure and create an authority void in given regions.[[317]](#footnote-317) This was to occur between 1980 and 1989, and anticipated establishing and then expanding the areas in which Sendero operated. These activities would culminate in the establishment and proliferation of “bases of support” which would enable the direct administration of communities through open or semi-open “popular committees.”[[318]](#footnote-318)

Facilitating this process were “generated organisms,” which were compact organizations embedded within the larger one, such as social movements and unions. Directly tied and subject to Sendero both ideologically and administratively, they played an important role in intelligence gathering and were a component of the much feared “thousand eyes and a thousand ears” of the party.[[319]](#footnote-319) Among such “generated organisms” were ostensibly innocuous “popular schools” which were established in rural areas as early as 1973. Although the new teachers offered classes in exchange for food and lodging, community members soon discovered that there was a “catch,” as the new teachers forsook the formal curriculum for political indoctrination of their students. By 1978, such schools were firmly established as places of ideological and military training in many Andean communities.[[320]](#footnote-320)

Reflecting Guzmán’s quasi-obsessive schematic orientation and his approach of “strategically centralized and tactically decentralized” operations, Sendero had three categories of zones in which they carried out attacks. Each zone was subsumed in a “region” in which Sendero had a presence, with the regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac playing the central role in the effort under the direction of the Principal Regional Committee.[[321]](#footnote-321) Coincidently, the majority of mitayos conscripted to toil in Huancavelica’s mines and mercury refining smelters during the colonial era were drawn from these regions, along with Junín.[[322]](#footnote-322)

Strategically, part of Huancavelica’s significance lay in the fact that it straddled Junín to the north and Ayacucho to the east, while providing ready access to refuge in the lowlands. All three regions were important sources of food for Lima, and had mining operations which contained copious stocks of dynamite and often weapons.[[323]](#footnote-323) Even before the attack on Chuschi, attacks on Huancavelica’s mines provided a source of explosives for the insurgents.[[324]](#footnote-324) Sendero also used extortion against mining and other interests to obtain dynamite and money in exchange for them being spared attack.[[325]](#footnote-325) Adding to Huancavelica’s strategic importance is the Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo hydroelectric plant and transmission system which provides electricity to Lima.[[326]](#footnote-326)

Within Huancavelica, the provinces of Angaraes and Acobamba were of special importance to Sendero, as they were adjacent to Sendero’s heartland of Ayacucho. In these provinces, from 1980 to 1986 insurgent activities focused on rural actions involving recruitment, propaganda, village occupations, selective assassinations and attacks on the electrical, communications and transport infrastructure such as bridges. Attacks on the electrical grid were cost effective and offered low risks and high rewards. While transmission lines traversed remote and unprotected areas, the blackouts they caused were felt as far away as Lima and affected thousands of people in a very direct and personal way.[[327]](#footnote-327)

Each region was divided into zones, which included “operation zones” where Sendero was established but not entrenched, and in which they could launch “hit and run” attacks. “Guerrilla zones” were areas where Sendero was more firmly established and could leverage their military actions to achieve political influence. Finally, “support bases” of guerrilla groups were established in areas where Sendero had removed representatives of the state and traditional community authorities. Such bases served as springboards for the creation of *Comités Populares* (Popular Committees) to govern communities they had taken over, and were expected to radiate outward to create new operation and guerrilla zones.[[328]](#footnote-328) All of these activities were facilitated by a logistical network of “support groups” which enabled the transport of weapons and explosives, as well as providing rebels with food, shelter and medical care.[[329]](#footnote-329)

Different categories of guerrillas operated in each zone. These included the “principal force,” which was the core rebel contingent which was supported by smaller and more dispersed “regional forces.” These were complemented by a lightly trained standby force known as the “base force.”[[330]](#footnote-330) Each served as a feeder for the more experienced one above it, and regional forces were usually led by people from the area in which they operated and had more training than the base forces. Different forces could also be combined to maximize the impact of specific actions, enabling them to follow the Maoist axiom of “numerical inferiority at the strategic level, numerical superiority at the tactical level.”[[331]](#footnote-331)

The “Popular Committees” established by Sendero to govern areas under their control were usually led by people in their twenties and operated either overtly as “open” committees or in semi-clandestinity as a “shadow” government. Both were composed of various secretariats which included the secretary general, or leader, who oversaw the secretaries of security, production, community affairs and popular organizations. The secretary of security oversaw military and intelligence work, including uncovering informants, while that of production managed agriculture, and through limiting production sought to exclude the community from the market. The secretary of community affairs was concerned with political indoctrination and health, while the secretary of popular organizations directed the “generated” organizations, such as those of peasants, women and youth.[[332]](#footnote-332)

Sendero offered only a zero-sum game proposition: in indigenous communities the establishment of Open Popular Committees was predicated on the removal or execution of traditional leaders. Thus, the historic and protracted process which led to an individual advancing in village hierarchy and assuming a position of authority in a community was eliminated. The removal or execution of traditional leaders, and the abolition of the community governance structure that they led, would in the end play a large role in the alienation of indigenous communities from Sendero.[[333]](#footnote-333) The various regions and zones, and the forces which operated within them were under the exclusive direction of the *Comité Central Nacional* (National Central Committee, CCN), which, after the second party congress in 1982, was firmly under the control of Guzmán. Through the CCN, which was urban-based and of middle-class origins, Guzmán directed military and political strategy and operations, was well as matters of economics, ideology and discipline.[[334]](#footnote-334)

Extreme internal discipline became a hallmark of Sendero, and distinguished it from other insurgent groups in the region. Drawing on Mao and Stalin, Guzmán found that surreptitious observation, critical evaluation and self-criticism were highly effective in maintaining compliance, cohesion and internal order. Once a Senderista was accused of some transgression, whether it be ideological, military or disciplinary, guilt was generally assumed based on whatever evidence was presented or supposed. The respondent was then forced to acknowledge their guilt, engage in self-criticism, be shamed and then atone for their errors.[[335]](#footnote-335) No one, except Guzmán, was exempt, and even operational success did not protect one from punishment. For example, following a sensational jailbreak organized by Sendero in Ayacucho in March, 1982, its leader, “Cesar,” was subject to this process for not precisely adhering to Guzmán’s operational plan. His humiliation served as an example to all in the organization of just how quickly one could fall from grace, and how arbitrary disciplinary processes could be used to keep potential rivals in check.[[336]](#footnote-336)

Given the widespread poverty and colonial and post-colonial social, economic, political and cultural exclusion experienced by the indigenous people of Peru, the appeal of a revolutionary utopia is understandable. This is all the more the case when one considers the idea of a pachacuti, or inevitable cycles of cataclysmic destruction, which informs Andean cosmovision.[[337]](#footnote-337) On the other hand, when one looks at the indigenous experience since the conquest, ideas brought from the outside have consistently undermined their culture, language, religion, and economic and political systems. Sendero’s ideology and methods were no different.

In many ways Sendero was just one more evangelical influence, using the pulpit of education to promise a just, earthly paradise free of corrupt mestizo overlords, yet ultimately bringing terror, despair and death. Part of the early appeal of Sendero was a respect for cultural norms and assistance in enforcing them.[[338]](#footnote-338) Community members noted how Sendero initially appeared to respect traditional practices such as the *minka* (communal labor for projects of community benefit). Sendero’s initial adherence to traditional norms of punishment for crimes such as theft, livestock rustling, drunkenness and adultery by cutting the hair or flogging the perpetrator also engendered respect. Many villages resented the corruption, theft and abuse of the local police, officials and SAIS administrators, and their departure in the face of Sendero threats and attacks was often welcome.[[339]](#footnote-339) Sendero promises to defend subject communities from the counterinsurgency operations of the police, and later the military, also were reassuring.[[340]](#footnote-340)

By the late 1970s, Guzmán’s positions in the university, along with his heterodox ideology and mechanistic approach to planning and organization, had created the infrastructure for the insurgency. Propagandizing and little noticed attacks on mining installations to secure armament had already begun, and scores of supporters were positioned in schools and elsewhere throughout Huancavelica and the highlands, ready to act. To those who joined, he offered social inclusion, purpose and agency in what he promised would be an inexorable movement which would transform Peruvian society and serve as a model for revolution elsewhere. While Sendero’s ideology was clearly not indigenous, it did not at first appear discordant with traditional ways. Moreover, as Sendero tightened its grip on communities, many subject to their dominion approached it pragmatically. Some acquiesced to avoid conflict or death, while others viewed the rebel presence as a welcome opportunity to create a new society, settle a score or land dispute or to derive some individual or familial benefit in often highly fractious communities.[[341]](#footnote-341)

**Chapter Three: From Optimism to Despair, 1980-1984**

Having spent years planning and developing his revolutionary project, Guzmán selected what seemed to be an inauspicious moment to overtly launch the insurgency with the ballot burning in Chuschi. Despite an economy worn down by over a decade of corruption and mismanagement, there was a general sense of optimism and widespread support for the restoration of democracy. Moreover, under Peru’s new constitution, which had been promulgated in 1979, the franchise had been expanded to all citizens over eighteen years old. As a result, for the first time in Peru’s history, illiterate, and often rural, citizens were integrated into the national polity.[[342]](#footnote-342) Within this context, the Chuschi attack seemed incongruous.[[343]](#footnote-343)

**The Search for a Strategy, and Sendero**

The 1980 election of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), a widely-respected reformist whom had been overthrown by Velasco Alvarado fifteen years before, augured economic growth, public works, social reform and political inclusion. Although the *Partido Comunista- Unida* (Communist Party-United) had been largely discredited following their alliance with the military regime, the most prominent Maoist party, Patria Roja, participated in the 1980 elections. Their strong showing, especially in Ayacucho and Arequipa, surprised many, as did their ever less revolutionary orientation. In this context of democratic convergence, political inclusion and optimism, Sendero seemed to be swimming against the social and political tide.[[344]](#footnote-344)

Since the late 1970s, the Morales Bermúdez regime (1975-80), had known that Sendero posed a threat as a result of intelligence reports and rebel attacks on infrastructure and mining operations, some of which occurred in Huancavelica. Despite the obvious risk, the military largely ignored, and gravely underestimated, it. Part of the reason for this was their focus on what they perceived to be larger threats from leftist organizations. In addition, they wanted to have it appear that when they handed over power to the civilian administration they did so without lingering subversive threats, thus forestalling more damage to their battered reputation.[[345]](#footnote-345) This policy allowed Sendero to prosper, and was reinforced by the military government’s withholding of intelligence concerning the movement from incoming President Belaúnde, handing him a figurative time bomb.[[346]](#footnote-346) By the time of his inauguration in July, 1980, the frequency and increasing audacity of rebel attacks left no doubt that an insurgency was well underway.[[347]](#footnote-347)

The military government’s policy of quasi-benign neglect of Sendero had set the stage for, and would be compounded by, the ensuing policies of the Belaúnde administration. The president did not grasp the seriousness of the threat, and, as Guzmán predicted, was loathe to involve the military and thereby tarnish his democratic credentials or risk being overthrown again. Moreover, Belaúnde rightly believed that military involvement would lead to an excessively heavy-handed response while making him appear to be unable to control the situation.[[348]](#footnote-348) His response to the insurgency would thus be marked by a slow and tepid response, misguided strategy and tactics, heavy reliance on poorly equipped and abusive police commandos, pernicious bureaucratic infighting, corruption, poor discipline, economic policies and institutional disarray.[[349]](#footnote-349)

The initial approach to dealing with the insurgency entailed the methods employed against the ELN and MIR in the 1960s, based on French and American counterinsurgency doctrine.[[350]](#footnote-350) This “enemy-centric” approach, which relies heavily on the indiscriminate application of force, did succeed in defeating the earlier, small Castroite rebel organizations. It would, however, prove to be largely ineffective against a group such as Sendero, which preferred civilian garb to uniforms, avoided direct engagement with the Peruvian armed forces, and was marked by extraordinary discipline. Among the greatest weaknesses of the government’s approach at this early stage was that they did not recognize the critical importance of garnering local support from the peasantry and underestimated the importance of gathering, analyzing and applying the results of intelligence. Moreover, beyond the shortcomings of their counterinsurgency model, and despite the practical experience gained from the ELN and MIR campaigns, military training was generally oriented towards external threats.[[351]](#footnote-351)

Even with the intelligence that the armed forces gathered, or perhaps because of it, the military saw Sendero as an outlier with little chance of developing a large following, and a movement that could be easily crushed.[[352]](#footnote-352) Tactics such as hanging dogs from lampposts in Lima to protest revisionism in China did little else but inspire ridicule among the military, and bewilderment among Peruvians. Indeed, the bizarreness of some of Sendero’s actions, and their unprecedented brutality as an insurgent organization, only served to reinforce the belief held by Belaúnde and many in the military that the group was backed, if not led, but foreigners. It just did not fit the image many had of a “homegrown” insurgency.[[353]](#footnote-353)

The inefficacy of the government’s response became clear with Sendero’s increasing attacks on police stations as part of their effort to substitute their presence for that of the government in rural areas. Following a string of such attacks, on October 11, 1981, an emboldened Sendero assaulted the police station in the Ayacuchan village of Tambo. In the attack, insurgents killed several police officers and civilians, seized arms, and briefly occupied the town before withdrawing. Initially, the government saw it as further evidence of the ineptitude of the Minister of the Interior, José María de la Jara, to snuff out a marginal movement.[[354]](#footnote-354) The attack on Tambo would, however, prove to be a watershed event in the insurgency as it precipitated a state of emergency in the region of Ayacucho. The measure, which raised the curtain on the cascade of military abuses which would follow, imposed a curfew from 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM and allowed warrantless searches, detentions without a judicial order and the suspension of the right of assembly.[[355]](#footnote-355)

Although the state of emergency marked a clear escalation of the government’s response to Sendero, it was nevertheless a measured one as Belaúnde was reluctant to limit civil rights or involve the military in issues of domestic order. As a result, the restrictions were to last two months and be limited to five provinces in Ayacucho, including that of the eponymous capital. Moreover, the response was led not by the military, but rather by the national police force’s *Guardia Civil* (Civil Guard), under the leadership of their tactical unit known as the *Sinchis* (the “brave ones” in Quechua). Their effectiveness would be hampered, however, by a lack of intelligence, limited troops, munitions and transport, and the continuing belief that the attacks reflected international involvement. The fact that Sendero effectively ceded the theater to the government by redeploying elsewhere also made them that much harder to combat.[[356]](#footnote-356) Withdrawing in the face of the police, and later the military, would prove to be a hallmark of Sendero, copied from the Maoist playbook. Despite Sendero’s vehement rhetoric of resistance, abandoning villages they had occupied in the face of attack and leaving the hapless residents to become victims of a military onslaught would severely undermine their support in rural areas.[[357]](#footnote-357)

Although the CIA-trained Sinchis were part of the Guardia Civil as opposed to the armed forces, they were essentially commandos. Beyond the impediments posed by a mismatched counterinsurgency strategy and limited troops and hardware, the Sinchis undermined themselves through routine human rights abuses, drunken violence and the extensive use of prostitutes in Ayacucho’s bars. While such practices alienated those they were sent to defend, roundups of suspected rebels or sympathizers did produce useful intelligence. What it revealed was that Sendero, and the menace it posed, was much larger and better organized than the government had originally thought.[[358]](#footnote-358)

In the first two years of the conflict, events appeared to be going according to Sendero’s plan. In early 1981, months before the attack on Tambo, they were active in almost all regions of Peru, and their actions against police stations and mining operations had rendered considerable war materiel.[[359]](#footnote-359) By mid-1982, Peru’s Ministry of the Interior estimated that the insurgents were in possession of fifty-six machine guns of different types as well as an assortment of lighter arms, and several thousand sticks of dynamite. Beyond materiel, Sendero had an effective system for transporting weapons throughout the country, which included public busses.[[360]](#footnote-360) Having acquired weapons, Sendero utilized them to step up their efforts to create, and then fill, a political and military void by forcing civil authorities and police to abandon rural areas. Although their control of such areas was by default, and quite tentative, the strategy of ruthlessly attacking government and community authorities was highly effective.[[361]](#footnote-361)

**“The terrorist was there on the inside:” Gaining Ground in Huancavelica [[362]](#footnote-362)**

Among the places where Sendero had considerable early success was in the region of Huancavelica. As elsewhere, the rebel leadership had dispatched groups of two or three teachers as agents of insurgency to Tayacaja and Churcampa provinces in 1980, if not before, to spearhead the process of propagandizing and recruitment. In Churcampa, they focused on the districts of San Miguel de Mayocc and La Merced de Ccasir, both of which border Huanta province in Ayacucho.[[363]](#footnote-363) Beyond serving as a point of entry into the region of Huancavelica, Churcampa and Tayacaja were strategically important for Sendero due to the size of their populations, which, combined, accounted for almost forty percent of the population in the region at that time. While Tayacaja is in Huancayo’s economic orbit, that of Churcampa is more closely tied to Huanta province in Ayacucho.[[364]](#footnote-364) Moreover, the region is home to numerous mining operations and integrated into the national electrical grid, which provided an abundance of targets.[[365]](#footnote-365)

It was in this context that Sendero focused on achieving their goals for the first phase of the conflict in Huancavelica; unleashing a barrage of attacks which focused on places of governmental authority, assassination, and sabotage, especially on electrical infrastructure. Extortion from mining and other companies, notably in Acobamba and Angaraes provinces, also provided revenue.[[366]](#footnote-366) As early as July 28, 1980, Peru’s independence day, Sendero dynamited electrical transmission towers drawing from the Antúnez de Mayolo hydroelectric plant, and also sabotaged the urban power grid in the city of Huancavelica. They followed up these actions in mid-October with a brazen dynamite attack on the headquarters of the plainclothes *Policía de Investigaciones del Perú* (Peruvian Investigative Police, PIP) in Huancavelica city. A few days later they launched an attack on the Antúnez de Mayolo hydroelectric plant hydroelectric plant.[[367]](#footnote-367)

The attacks continued in March, 1981, when rebels sabotaged the railroad connecting Huancavelica to Huancayo, and in November, 1981 they attacked the Campo Armiño hydroelectric plant in Tayacaja province, and in December they launched yet another attack on the Antúnez de Mayolo plant.[[368]](#footnote-368)

In some ways, the attacks in 1980 and 1981 were training exercises. While Sendero’s strong organization was enhanced by disciplined and highly cohesive militants, most of those in the region at this point had minimal military training and experience.[[369]](#footnote-369) This was evident during the April 18, 1981 assault on the Yauli[[370]](#footnote-370) police station. Not only was it repulsed by the local police, but authorities captured several rebels and discovered plans for more operations, including another targeting the PIP headquarters in Huancavelica.[[371]](#footnote-371) Beyond intelligence information, it led to a reprisal attack by the police on the village of Sacsamarca, which was the home town of Justo Gutiérrerz Poma, a regional rebel leader who adopted the *nom de guerre* of “Comrade Santos.”[[372]](#footnote-372)

Born in Sacsamarca in 1950, Gutiérrerz became a peasant leader in the 1960s. With a house on the plaza, his family was relatively better off than many of the residents in the village, as his father Valeriano Gutiérrez owned livestock and operated a mule train enterprise. Justo received his primary education in Sacsamarca’s village school, and then attended high school in Huancavelica and Lima. Unable to gain admittance to university in Lima, he returned to Huancavelica, married and began a family.[[373]](#footnote-373) Gutierrez Poma was from an activist family, as his uncle Sebastián was among the founders, in 1965, of the Federación Departamental de Comuneros y Campesinos de Huancavelica (Departmental Federation of Community Members and Peasants of Huancavelica, FEDECCH), which had communist leanings. His cousin Zenón was a member of the Front for the Defense of Huancavelica, and Justo would later serve as its secretary general. Both would later join Sendero.[[374]](#footnote-374)

Following the attack on Yauli, by early 1982, Gutiérrez had established himself as the leader of a Sendero group operating in Manyacc, which counted among their rank’s former prisoners whom Sendero had freed in a spectacular jailbreak Ayacucho in March, 1982. His work there included recruitment, indoctrination of the local population, and forcing the withdrawal of the local police force in the remote village.[[375]](#footnote-375) To some extent his rebel band was a family affair, as his adherents included his sister, brother-in-law, and wife Marcelina.[[376]](#footnote-376) Gutiérrez’ father would ultimately be killed by the military in 1984, and his wife Marcelina would die in an army ambush at the end of 1985, which her husband survived. These reverses led him to reconsider his role in the conflict, and he traveled to Lima to meet with party leaders. It appears that as a result of his change of heart, he was kidnapped and killed by members of Sendero.[[377]](#footnote-377)

By late 1982, Sendero had gained adherents among local youth and teachers throughout Huancavelica, and demands that representatives of the old order resign increased markedly, as did compliance. The evisceration of traditional community organization and practices had begun. Following Guzmán’s schematic approach, the successful establishment of support bases opened the way to direct control over communities through the establishment of popular committees.[[378]](#footnote-378) This effort was especially successful by 1983 in the districts of Espiritu Santo and Marcas in Acobamba province, which adjoin the region of Ayacucho.[[379]](#footnote-379)

By the end of 1982, the frequency of attacks on police stations and civil authorities, especially in San Miguel de Mayocc,[[380]](#footnote-380) Anco[[381]](#footnote-381) and Colcabamba[[382]](#footnote-382) bore fruit as parts of Tayacaja and Churcampa were devoid of government authorities, and support bases and popular committees had emerged in their place.[[383]](#footnote-383) The deployment of the military in January, 1983 signaled a new phase of violence in these provinces, and led to peaks of violence in 1983-1984, and in 1990.[[384]](#footnote-384) Despite this, Sendero continued to expand their influence in region, such as when in February, 1982, a group of 200 insurgents attacked five villages in Pampas district of Tayacaja, killing fifteen people, three of whom were government officials.[[385]](#footnote-385)

One community that would suffer immensely in the conflict is that of Santa Bárbara, just outside of the city of Huancavelica. Historically, it has been located near the eponymous cinnabar mine which provided the mercury which powered Andean silver production during the colonial era. Like many communities in the region, their residents were drafted into toxic mining and refining activities through the colonial mita. The ensuing oppression, death and dislocation had a defining effect upon their collective experience. With independence, following centuries of exploitation and declining mine production, Santa Bárbara was, like many Quechua-speaking communities, largely abandoned by the state. The historic relationship between the community of Santa Bárbara and mercury production, and the manner in which they endured, processed and resisted the abuses associated with it, has played a central role in the development of the community’s identity.[[386]](#footnote-386)

By 1980, just as the legitimacy of the state was compromised by its abandonment of the region, so too was that of the Catholic Church. Archbishops of the Huancavelica diocese were commonly drawn from the conservative Opus Dei movement, the Church focused more on education than social action or works. In the case of Santa Bárbara, by the 1980s the Church had largely withdrawn from the community. Although the village’s two schools did offer religious education, there was no resident priest. Mass was only celebrated annually in the historic and severely dilapidated church on the plaza near the mine entrance, itself a reminder of the Church’s role in the colonial exploitation of the local population.[[387]](#footnote-387) The combination of historical experience, abysmal poverty, and the absence of two pillars of traditional social order, the state and Catholic Church, as well as Sendero’s promises of social justice, political integrity and order, provided fertile ground for Sendero to plant the seeds of insurrection.[[388]](#footnote-388) As one comunero put it, “the armed struggle came to Santa Bárbara as if it were a new religion.”[[389]](#footnote-389)

In Santa Bárbara, the tide in the early 1980s was in Sendero’s favor, as much of the community was initially receptive to or supportive of their goals.[[390]](#footnote-390) Despite this, the traditional authorities of the community refused to resign their posts, and seven were murdered prior to 1985. Overall, however, Sendero did not need to engage in as much violence there as in other areas to establish and consolidate their power in the community.[[391]](#footnote-391) Beyond the demonstrable threat by Sendero, potential local leaders, there and elsewhere, were also reluctant to seek positions of authority as they were among the first to be targeted by the military for interrogation.[[392]](#footnote-392)

Reflecting the support Sendero had in Santa Bárbara, both in terms of recruits and logistics, and the familial links that these often embodied, their exercise of power there was less rigid than many other places, at least before 1990.[[393]](#footnote-393) Given the strength of, and to some degree support for, Sendero in the community, it did not organize a ronda. As one resident put it “no one wanted to fight for the government.”[[394]](#footnote-394) That helps to explain the death of over 100 community members between 1981 and 1995, many of whom were killed by government forces, and the flight of most of the community to Huancavelica, Huancayo, Ica and elsewhere.[[395]](#footnote-395)

By the end of 1982, Sendero was active in the Huancavelican provinces of Tayacaja, Churcampa, Angaraes, Acobamba, Castrovirreyna, as well as that of the capital, Huancavelica.[[396]](#footnote-396) Reflecting the importance of these provinces to Sendero, and their activity in them, among those from Huancavelica who would later be convicted of terrorism, most were from these provinces, as well as that of Castrovirreyna.[[397]](#footnote-397) Within the province of Huancavelica, much of Sendero’s work focused on establishing and building their presence in the Vilcas watershed, an area that would become a vital base for them and which subsumes the districts of Manta, Moya, Vilca, Acobambilla and Huayllahuara.[[398]](#footnote-398)

An initial preparatory phase of propagandizing in this region in if not before 1980 was followed by village occupations and demands that local governmental officials resign, flee or be executed. Throughout the second half of 1982, attacks in this region increased in frequency and geographical scope. In July, 1982, Sendero bombed the SAIS warehouse in the city of Huancavelica and overran the hamlet of Ñuñungayo,[[399]](#footnote-399) looting the community store. Just before Christmas, they followed up these actions with a strike on the Colqui mine which yielded 1,500 sticks of dynamite.[[400]](#footnote-400) Sendero’s influence, and support, consistently expanded in the Vilcas watershed as they countered the state’s neglect of the region with utopian promises, while extracting vengeance for supporters from local overlords or even neighbors. According to one comunero who lived in the region at the time, “a majority” of the residents would ultimately support Sendero at one time or another. “The terrorist was there on the inside… little by little they had been gaining influence.”[[401]](#footnote-401)

In the town of San José de Acobambilla, as elsewhere, traditional community leaders were warned to resign or face death. In this case, the leaders did not heed the warning. One day, a “quite mischievous” nine-year-old boy was in the village school and saw masked men entering the town.[[402]](#footnote-402) Looking back as an adult, “Daniel” he recalled how

people from out of town … in a small town are easy to recognize … so these masked people arrived … peasants, wearing ponchos, and I was in the school … they were strange, suspicious … with a scarf covering their face.[[403]](#footnote-403)

Outgoing and irrepressibly curious, he asked the mayor who the newcomers were and was told that they were visitors, and that he should go home. Upon arriving home, he told his father, also an authority, what he had seen, and

my father became worried, and a little speechless … It turns out that these people had come directly to kill the mayor and all of his councilmen, so given this what my father did was to escape in the middle of the night … more or less at 11:00 and meanwhile they had already cornered the mayor and had tied him up along with all the others … Nevertheless, the mayor [offered] a good sheep … in order to negotiate with these people, but this was not well received with the result that in the night … they … killed the mayor and not only the mayor but rather other prominent people as well … more or less around midnight they came into my house … looking for my father but my father had already fled … this is how the calamity of Sendero began [and people began to flee the town].[[404]](#footnote-404)

He recalled how

They had kept track of my father and many other people as well, [and] … when my father came back from the city of Huancayo … things had already calmed down … so it turns out that my father arrives in March in the district and they were already tailing him because by then many people were already on board [and] Sendero had ears everywhere … people who would gossip etcetera, so they caught my father … during this I was on the ranch in the heights … and then came the news that there was going to be a confrontation between the guerrillas and the Sinchis … for Acobambilla, this was something new … then who are the Sinchis? It was a morning and the root of this confrontation was that the son of one of the residents had been killed by Sendero in the heights … and when my father returned … they cornered him … when there was a firefight between the Senderos and the Sinchis … in the confusion … my father fell, but all the same … my father had been persecuted by Sendero for being a public authority.[[405]](#footnote-405)

His father’s death was only one of the casualties of that day, as the Sinchis were

more prepared in terms of their armament and all that … and consequently on that same day they burned the town because before in this district all of the roofs were pure straw … the army totally abused the whole town.[[406]](#footnote-406)

In the village of Jerusalem,[[407]](#footnote-407) the arrival of Sendero was met with mixed emotions, ranging from support, to uncertainty, and fear. As “Gregorio” related, Sendero’s arrival offered “something quite new … from town to town people listened to them … little by little they penetrated every town.” This often generated a degree of confusion, and discussion, concerning their objectives and how they would make “a step towards Socialism, towards Communism.”[[408]](#footnote-408) What was clear was the assertion by Sendero’s evangelists that “this situation has to change [for] the dispossessed [and one must act] against exploitation and the big ones in the United States.”[[409]](#footnote-409) In the district of Acobambilla, they slowly gained control and assigned a political and military leader in each community.[[410]](#footnote-410)

In this region, the fact that Sendero appointed people from their own community to maintain a permanent presence and govern in their stead reinforced a degree of local support for the insurgency. Although many residents would flee to Huancayo, those who remained until 1982 would live in relative peace. As time passed, people’s fear and uncertainty subsided. “Gregorio” would recall they were all

getting along … things were calm … nothing [bad] was happening on account of them … it was not at all bad for the town. The people of the town were mostly in agreement thinking that this policy could be good … Sendero was organizing well against delinquency, against all immorality, against other things that should not be.[[411]](#footnote-411)

The sentiment was not unanimous, however. Some of those who fled Jerusalem had reported Sendero’s growing influence to government authorities in Huancayo, and the people behind it. Among the results was the establishment of the Manta counterinsurgency base, just over the valley from the village, constructed with labor conscripted from surrounding communities.[[412]](#footnote-412) Thus, in March, 1983, began a “difficult life” as the military stormed from town to town with a “tremendous list” of suspects whom they moved aggressively to root out, interrogate and kill.[[413]](#footnote-413) As one community member recalled, “They did atrocious acts … they acted inhumanly,” burning homes, and killing and abducting suspected Senderistas and routinely raping women.[[414]](#footnote-414)

Farther to the east, Sendero targeted the district of Julcamarca, as well as those of Chincho and Santo Tomás de Pata, in Angaraes province. These higher elevation regions were strategically important to Sendero as they provided a link with forces based in neighboring Ayacucho, from where they could stage attacks. Moreover, although the region of Huancavelica came under a state of emergency in March, 1982, these districts nevertheless served as places of refuge and redeployment for Sendero in the face of heightened operations by the Sinchis in neighboring Huanta, and elsewhere, in Ayacucho.[[415]](#footnote-415) With this in mind, in October, 1982, Sendero launched a preparatory raid on the town of Santo Tomás de Pata. Their brief occupation of the town followed a familiar script as they engaged in propaganda, looted stores, and destroyed an agricultural research station and associated machinery. This precipitated the first incursion of the Sinchis to the village, who arrested and tortured five residents, accusing them of being members of Sendero. Although they were subsequently released, beyond the individual consequences, the Sinchis’ actions alienated the residents, as did those of Sendero.[[416]](#footnote-416)

**Enter the Military: 1983-1984**

By the end of 1982, attacks such as that in Santo Tomás de Pata had made it clear that the government had been unable to gain control over the situation, and had alienated much of the rural and provincial population in their effort to do so. For many, the last straw was the attempted assassination of the mayor of Ayacucho on December 9, 1982, which prompted many residents, both rural and urban, to flee to the comparative safety of Lima.[[417]](#footnote-417) On December 29, President Belaúnde ordered the marines to take the lead in suppressing the insurgency, placing the leader of the second Infantry Division, General Clemente Noel Moral, in charge of the Military-Political Command, which had jurisdiction not only in Ayacucho but also in Apurímac and parts of Huancavelica.[[418]](#footnote-418) They also maintained a command center in Pampas, which is the capital of Tayacaja province. The military also established sub-bases, dependent on that of Pampas, to extend their reach in the region.[[419]](#footnote-419) This freed up police to guard the Antúnez de Mayolo hydroelectric plant, while control was reinforced by a curfew in the surrounding area including Colcabamba, Quichuas and Armiño.[[420]](#footnote-420) The military also established a counterinsurgency base in 1983 in Millpo, which is in the higher elevations of the district of Paucarbamba in Churcampa province, carrying out patrols and abductions of suspected insurgents.[[421]](#footnote-421) The abuses perpetrated by the Sinchis which many communities had become all too familiar with in the previous two years only foreshadowed what would come with the deployment of the military.[[422]](#footnote-422)

Noel’s racist and undifferentiating approach, like many in the military at the time, included equating speaking Quechua with being a rebel or rebel sympathizer, holding communities collectively responsible for local unrest and applying a “scorched-earth” policy.[[423]](#footnote-423) Unsurprisingly, his two-year tenure would be marked by increased human rights abuses and generalized repression; tactics which only served to further alienate the peasantry and make Sendero that much more appealing.[[424]](#footnote-424)

Between 1983 and 1985, increased military repression did, however, reduce the number of attacks in Huancavelica, Ayacucho and Apurímac. As with the initial deployment of the Sinchis, this precipitated a strategic withdrawal whereby Sendero ceded ground they could not defend and redeployed to other regions such as Cuzco, Junín, Pasco and Lima. Despite having to relinquish areas they had controlled, such military offensives played into Sendero’s hands as the indiscriminate brutality of the military response created pools of new rebel recruits.[[425]](#footnote-425)

One village that would bear the brunt of both Sendero and the armed forces is the village of Chupacc.[[426]](#footnote-426) When Sendero first arrived in the town, they convoked the people, explaining that they were the Communist Party of Peru, their goals of equality and social justice, and that they would inevitably seize power.[[427]](#footnote-427) They managed to recruit some adherents, and as they gained dominance over the community in 1981 they initially allowed some traditional authorities to remain in office.[[428]](#footnote-428) Soon, however, they demanded that they resign or be killed. As in so many other places, once these traditional authorities had been killed, no one wanted to take their place.[[429]](#footnote-429)

Later, they imposed a collective system of farming and forbade peasants from bringing their products to market. Initially, those who resisted their demands or strayed from their dictates were, by Sendero standards, punished lightly; by traditional methods such as floggings or having one’s head shaven. As the months passed, however, their rule become deeply repressive as they forbade people, with very few exceptions, from leaving the village for any reason; effectively turning their community into a prison. By 1984, with a Sendero popular committee of local appointees entrenched, “people’s courts” and executions became the primary form of punishment, and five villagers were murdered for opposing them. Adding to their isolation and desperation, the residents were directed to plant only half of what they normally did, so that there would be no possibility of products reaching the market.[[430]](#footnote-430) As “Eduardo,” a comunero recalled “there was no product, nothing to sell … simply that [Sendero] always asked for contributions” which would include livestock.[[431]](#footnote-431) Although the rebels had completely subjected the town, they demanded community members keep quiet about it. “Eduardo” added that the “Senderistas would say that if you have seen us, … you will never say anything about it … when we had meetings, when we came through here, they should never speak of it.”[[432]](#footnote-432)

When the military did come to root out Sendero from the town, and the heights above, it was a multi-day affair, replete with firefights and helicopters flying over the village. “Rosalia,” an eight-year-old girl at the time, recalled the confusion that day. The Senderistas had come to her school, gathering up the eighty or so students there, one of whom would later become her husband.[[433]](#footnote-433) As her future husband would recall

I was at the school and the terrorists were there … they made us sing … they taught us the song, so that we would not realize [what was going on outside] … we filled up the school … there was a meeting going on [outside], a community meeting in which shots rang out … with this notice they made us sing … we didn’t hear the bullet up by the lagoon, the one which killed the father of my wife … after a while … the military appeared, they were already coming down, so the people inside left … the police were coming down, without shooting, without doing anything to make the people run [but they ran] over here, over there, up to the hills, to the ravines … and then from there they arrived here [and] … grabbed my uncle … they ordered him from here, ‘Go and see where the sound is coming from’ they told him, by force, ‘So as a soldier how are you going to be afraid. Walk, or what do you want, or do you want to go to [meet] Saint Peter’ they said to him, so my uncle goes then, and just at the rise they encountered soldiers and they grab him, they kick him down and tied him [and] made him carry their backpack, they led him away and they killed him with only stones, the military also.[[434]](#footnote-434)

In the aftermath that day, they learned that the Rosalia’s father had been killed by the military as a suspected terrorist, and his body would be left to rot and be eaten by dogs for four days before Senderistas recovered and buried it. After this, her mother abandoned her and her two younger sisters, leaving town with another man. With no means of support, and her two sisters dependent on her, they spent time living in caves and ravines.[[435]](#footnote-435)

The counterproductive nature of such a counterinsurgency approach was patent. Wholesale repression involving the abduction, murder and rape of civilians, and the theft of their possessions, livestock and crops, only alienated those the military was supposedly defending. To some extent it was an example of the “destroy the village to save it” mentality. Recognizing this, in January, 1984, Belaúnde replaced Noel with General Adrián Huamán Centeno. Huamán spoke Quechua, and had a much better understanding of rural nuance and the role that historic social, political and economic exclusion and exploitation played in the conflict. Seeking to engage communities in their own defense, he was an early proponent of the rondas which would in the end play a decisive role in the defeat of Sendero. Despite this, Huamán was no less brutal than his predecessor and presided over the bloodiest year of the insurgency.[[436]](#footnote-436)

Huamán was, however, openly critical of the government for not comprehending highland realities, and for seeking a solution only through military means. After going public with his views, he was relieved of his position in August, 1984. His replacement, General Wilfredo Mori, marked a strategic change in the counterinsurgency effort. Henceforth, military action would increasingly be marked by more targeted repression, and in a tacit acknowledgement of Huamán’s criticism, efforts to improve relations with indigenous communities, and the further expansion of the rondas.[[437]](#footnote-437)

Beyond strategic and tactical issues, the government’s response was further undermined by generalized corruption and schisms both within and among the military, police and intelligence branches. It was not simply that Belaúnde was initially poorly informed of the severity of the threat by the outgoing military government, a much larger zero-sum game was at play. There was a striking lack of information sharing and coordination among different government agencies that resented and sought to undermine each other’s power while competing for resources. In such a context, Belaúnde’s decision to reduce the budget for the intelligence services only exacerbated the situation and further impeded the counterinsurgency effort.[[438]](#footnote-438)

Not only was the military riddled with service rivalries, so too were the police forces. The relationship between the Guardia Civil, the plainclothes Policía de Investigaciones del Perú (PIP) and the Guardia Republicana, were fraught with division as each feared dominance and espionage by the other.[[439]](#footnote-439) Moreover, the PIP was heavily infiltrated by drug traffickers, largely ineffective against Sendero, and beset with violent internal divisions.[[440]](#footnote-440) Competing interests among these groups also reflected distinct and strong institutional identities and customs; a broader tendency with colonial roots.[[441]](#footnote-441) In an effort to create a more coherent police force, in December, 1986 Belaúnde’s successor, Alan García (1985-1990), fused the PIP, the Guardia Civil and the Guardia Republicana into the *Policia Nacional de Peru* (National Police of Peru, PNP).[[442]](#footnote-442)

Beyond Belaúnde’s budget reductions, concerted intelligence gathering was also undermined as a result of the policies of the previous military government which favored the military intelligence service over that of the civilian *Servicio de Intelligencia Nacional* (National Intelligence Service, SIN). About the only thing that the civilian intelligence agencies could agree on was mutual suspicion and an intense distain for the military intelligence service. Although Morales Bermúdez was not successful in his bid to effectively abolish the SIN towards the end of his rule, he had almost mortally wounded it. For their part, the SIN had been active in anti-subversive activities in the 1960s and 1970s, often acting in coordination with their counterparts in neighboring countries and Argentina. Like the military intelligence services, while the methods employed against their adversaries during this earlier period were effective, they were not geared to defeating Sendero.[[443]](#footnote-443) Although the intelligence service of the Guardia Civil was also institutionally weak and lacking resources, they were nevertheless relatively effective. Indeed, this helps explain Sendero’s determination to force their withdrawal from the countryside, along with other representatives of the state. Beyond the challenges of intelligence gathering was that of analysis, and actions based on it, which were limited in all of the intelligence branches.[[444]](#footnote-444)

1983 and 1984 proved to be the most violent years of the conflict in the provinces of Acobamba and Angaraes, which were under the jurisdiction of the Political-Military command based in neighboring Ayacucho. In August of 1983, Sendero attacked the town of Acobamba, focusing on the local court, as well as other public buildings and five homes. These attacks, as with others in Llamacancha in Tayacaja province as well as Julcamarca, Lircay, Cuticsa, Mesaccocha and Cahua in Angaraes province, were expressions of Sendero’s successful strategy of expanding their influence by creating a void of public authority which they would then fill.[[445]](#footnote-445) Throughout the region, Sendero had gone beyond the “ingratiation” period with local communities, and now violently enforced their dictates. The often brutal murder of civilians and public officials alike, combined with the wanton destruction of public and private buildings such as health centers, community buildings, post offices, civil registries and churches, progressively undermined the support that Sendero had previously enjoyed in some regions.[[446]](#footnote-446) Elsewhere within Acobamba province, the districts of Anta, Caja and Marcas, which border Huanta province in Ayacucho, were ravaged in the conflict, causing many of their residents to flee to Huanta, Huancayo or other more populated areas.[[447]](#footnote-447)

As elsewhere, in the leadup to the municipal elections of November 13, 1983, Sendero stepped up their threats and attacks in a largely successful effort not only to prevent people from being candidates, but also from voting. Demonstrating their control over Vilca, Manta, Acobambilla, Pilchaca and Occoro,[[448]](#footnote-448) elections were not held in these districts.[[449]](#footnote-449) Efforts to impede the elections were not restricted to rural areas, and on election eve in the city of Huancavelica they set off ten explosions, targeting the neighborhoods of Santa Ana, Yananaco, San Cristóbal, Santa Inés de Pata and Pucachaca, in an effort to dissuade people from voting the following day.[[450]](#footnote-450) During elections, to impede double voting, those who voted would have a ink-stain on their finger. This carried a risk for the voter, as in this election and others Sendero would punish voters they encountered by amputating the marked fingers, as happened in Conayca, Acobamba and Marcas.[[451]](#footnote-451)

While much of the conflict in Huancavelica played out in Angaraes, Acobamba, Tayacaja and Churcampa provinces, the area surrounding the capital city also was heavily contested by Sendero and the military. In 1984, not far from the Santa Bárbara community, the military surprised and killed forty-five rebels, including several leaders. This, combined with the efforts of *ronderos* (ronda members) was effective in stemming Sendero activity in the area, and forcing Sendero to redeploy their forces to Junín at the end of 1984.[[452]](#footnote-452) Despite these setbacks, Sendero did continue their attacks on the electrical distribution infrastructure, such as that of August 1, 1984, in Pazos district in Tayacaja.[[453]](#footnote-453)

In Acobambilla district in the province of Huancavelica, by 1983 the community of San Antonio,[[454]](#footnote-454) an annex of Anccapa, was largely controlled by Sendero. Insurgents had forced all of what they referred to as the “great bourgeois” of local authorities to resign, often publicly on the plaza after being beaten and threatened with death.[[455]](#footnote-455) As elsewhere, this caused people to flee, including the local school teachers, leaving the community without a school and the long-term consequences of their absence. The herds of livestock of the more prosperous comuneros, most of whom fled, were seized and redistributed. Others, with only their animals for sustenance, stayed. Having experienced political decapitation, seizure of their property and depopulation at the hands of Sendero, the arrival of the military in San Antonio 1984 was “another terror … a disaster for us.”[[456]](#footnote-456) Despite the fear the military inspired, San Antonio did not organize a ronda, fearing Sendero’s response even more.[[457]](#footnote-457)

Events in the area around the Santa Bárbara mine, including the rural community of the same name and the village of Sacsamarca, are in many ways emblematic of the dynamics which played out throughout the department. As one community leader in Sacsamarca recalled, around 1977 there was a three-day meeting of political activists who arrived in the village, which he believes was probably associated with Sendero’s organizational efforts during this time.[[458]](#footnote-458) Such an event would have been almost impossible to conceal, given the small size and population of the town, and people’s familiarity with each other.[[459]](#footnote-459)

The area was a ripe target for Sendero, and an area where they enjoyed a degree of support sufficient to establish a local base of operations.[[460]](#footnote-460) Indeed, there are even reports that both Abimael Guzmán and Oscar Ramírez Durand, also known as “Comrade Feliciano,” spent some in the area in the early 1980s. Aside from the revolutionary potential that the area’s extreme poverty and discontent offered, the numerous mines and caves in the area provided refuge for insurgents. Moreover, the ranches in the area provided a ready source of food, all while positioning them close to the city of Huancavelica and the resources, and targets, it offered.[[461]](#footnote-461) Sendero moved forcefully to take advantage of these opportunities. In the early evening of February 7, 1984, Sendero entered the village of Sacsamarca, captured the former president of the community, accused him of being a government informant, and after a “people’s court,” executed him.[[462]](#footnote-462)

Barely two months later, they were back. A column of between thirty and forty rebels infiltrated the town, their faces covered in the trademark black balaclava, which gave rise to them being called “*yana una*,” or “black heads.” They lost little time going to the home of the village president, Rudicindo Jurado, as well as that of Sebastian Poma, a son of the justice of the peace who was suspected of being an informer. Despite the pleas and cries of grief of their families, the rebels took them away, interrogated and then murdered them. Simultaneously, another group of rebels located Justiciano Cayetano Escobar, a local authority, in his mine, and brought him to his home. Aside from being an authority, he was accused of corruption and adultery. After interrogating him and looting his home, the insurgents cut his throat as they did their other two victims that night. When dawn came, the villagers awoke to find their stabbed bodies had been dumped on the four corners of the plaza, which served as a “mute witness” to the events of that day.[[463]](#footnote-463)

Meanwhile, other rebels convoked the community to the plaza. There, before their bewildered and captive audience, one of the rebels gave a speech, promising that their poverty would end with Sendero’s, and communism’s, triumph, urging the youths present to join them, and demanding that they shout cheers of support for the rebel cause. [[464]](#footnote-464) To drive home the point about the new society they were seeking to create, they broke into the town’s archive, where birth, marriage, property and other records were stored, throwing some documents into the river, and burning the archive. The community store, upon which the village depended for basic necessities, was also looted.[[465]](#footnote-465)

Such acts were not carried out without resistance and defiance, as people begged for the lives of those marked for death, and many women insisted that they would die defending their children before they would permit them to join Sendero. Ignoring such protest, and shouting praises to communism, they left towards their base near the Santa Bárbara community. Despite the intermittent and fleeting nature of Sendero’s physical presence, not only was Sacsamarca deprived of its traditional leadership structure, but they were isolated and under watch by Sendero supporters. As a consequence, although they were close to the city of Huancavelica, Sendero’s control of the roads prevented them from immediately reporting the assault to local authorities.[[466]](#footnote-466)

Theft by Sendero in this region was not limited to the community store and people’s homes, but also involved livestock. In Aparipata, a community pasturage in the heights above Sacsamarca, they combined theft with propaganda. Having called on local comuneros to join them there, they incited them to support if not join them, criticized the corruption of local authorities, threatened those who would betray them, and promised a new era of abundance as they distributed the animals they had stolen.[[467]](#footnote-467)

In many ways, the shock and dismay of these events was the overt beginning of the end of the Sacsamarca that its 150 or so residents had known all of their lives. In the ensuing months, two thirds of the population would leave, most to Huancavelica, but also to Huancayo, Ica, Ayacucho and Lima.[[468]](#footnote-468) As “Valeria,” an elderly comunero, related, “Only we brave ones stayed.”[[469]](#footnote-469) No longer were children’s playful voices heard in what had become a ghost town. The price for staying was fear, and sometimes death, as the village’s now reduced population of fifty or sixty people lived under a 6:00 PM curfew, and in fear, darkness and suspense, never knowing when either the military or Sendero would surge into town. Although the *resistentes* (those who did not flee their towns during the conflict) did organize a ronda, it existed mostly in a formal, as opposed to operational, sense. In this way residents sought to appease the military and not provoke reprisals from Sendero, who maintained a covert presence in the village.[[470]](#footnote-470)

When Sendero arrived in search of authorities whom had not given up their posts, and could not apprehend them, their lethal focus could shift to other family members. This is what happened in Sacsamarca on July 6, 1986, when Sendero arrived around 10:00 P.M. looking for a justice of the peace, who also was a Protestant. Knowing he had been marked for death, he had taken refuge in a mine that he worked. His wife, having attended a religious service earlier in the day, was asleep in bed when rebels broke into their home, murdered her and looted her property. Her son, “Efraín,” who had earlier sought refuge in the city of Huancavelica, came running home when he was told that “your mother has left us,” only to find her body on the floor of their home. Sendero had made their point, as after that, he recalled, no one was willing to serve in any official capacity in the village, fearing not only their own lives, but those of their family members.[[471]](#footnote-471)

Sendero’s burning of Sacsamarca’s civil registry and archive, which contained birth, marriage, property and other records, was not an isolated incident and underscored their commitment to complete revolutionary transformation of Peru. Similar events transpired in Anccapa,[[472]](#footnote-472) Marcas,[[473]](#footnote-473) Conayca,[[474]](#footnote-474) Anta,[[475]](#footnote-475) Palca,[[476]](#footnote-476) Laria,[[477]](#footnote-477) Callanmarca,[[478]](#footnote-478) Pachamarca,[[479]](#footnote-479) and Pilpichaca[[480]](#footnote-480) and elsewhere in Peru.[[481]](#footnote-481) This was a direct, and also symbolic, attack on a person’s, and community’s, identity, and even legal existence, symbolically “invisibilizing” them.[[482]](#footnote-482) Reconstructing such documents was an immensely time consuming, bureaucratic and sometimes unsuccessful process. In some cases, bureaucratic errors exacerbated the problem, such as omitting part of a name from a birth certificate, which then did not match a document indicating that the person had completed their obligatory military service.[[483]](#footnote-483) The problem continued long after the conflict, as at least half of the civil registries in Huancavelica were damaged and destroyed, and over 5,000 people were left without a birth certificate. These are necessary to obtain a national identity card, and legal standing to benefit from social services. Likewise, death certificates are necessary to settle estates. This situation prompted the post-conflict establishment of the National Plan for Identity Restitution and a campaign in 2011 to restore the identity documents to victims of the conflict in Huancavelica.[[484]](#footnote-484)

The arrival of the police in Sacsamarca, or elsewhere for that matter, would bring a second wave of abuse and grief. In the case of Sacsamarca, such incursions usually involved around sixty people, who would roll into town shooting in the air before beating, raping, terrorizing and stealing from the residents, usually over two or three days, before departing with suspected sympathizers and any loot they had seized. Simply being in your village was enough to make someone a suspected guerilla or sympathizer.[[485]](#footnote-485) Former authorities who resigned to avoid being targeted by Sendero instead found that such an act of self-preservation was sufficient for them to be accused by the military of supporting the insurgents. In Sacsamarca, “Miguel,” a resistente, recalled “From both doors we the authorities were screwed … how can we be without authorities?”[[486]](#footnote-486) During one incursion into Sacsamarca, the police brought the men, naked, to the plaza where they were lined up. There they were harangued, with the police promising that they would root out and catch the rebels, and hang them on a hill in view of the town. In at least this instance, the police were accompanied by an Evangelical pastor, who handed out bibles to his cold, naked and terrified would be converts.[[487]](#footnote-487)

The conflict had brought the worst out in many people, serving as a stage on which long simmering resentments, conflicts and rivalries played out, with individuals being reported to the military as rebels, or to the rebels as informants, both of which usually led to interrogation, torture and death.[[488]](#footnote-488) “Luis” in Uralla recalled how such tensions found expression through Sendero. “The problem was in the very community … the community was not, as they say, well organized, they did not live in harmony … there was … rivalry, hate, egoism, there was also vengeance.”[[489]](#footnote-489) Similarly, “Miguel,” a former resident of Yauricocha, recalled how rivalries over pasturage were the source of discord among many families. This led to people being falsely accused of being Senderistas, as a means of forcing them to hastily sell their livestock before fleeing the community. In many cases Sendero would also seize livestock for consumption and as a means of targeting people’s wealth for redistribution and exacting vengeance for their supporters.[[490]](#footnote-490)

As the 1985 presidential elections loomed, it appeared that Sendero was gaining the upper hand. The outgoing military government of Morales-Bermúdez had deliberately withheld information concerning the movement from President Belaúnde. Even once the severity of the insurgent threat was apparent, Belaúnde was slow to respond and reluctant to limit civil liberties. Further complications derived from ill-suited counterinsurgency tactics, which were further undermined by corruption, poor coordination and rivalries between different branches of the military, intelligence and police forces. As Belaúnde’s term drew to a close, the Sinchi’s had alienated the populations they were sent to defend, while Sendero was making steady progress in ridding Huancavelica’s countryside both of government representatives and traditional authorities. As Guzmán viewed it, the revolution was advancing, on schedule.

**Chapter Four: The Abyss of Insurgency, 1985-92**

**A Nation Unraveling**

As the 1985 presidential elections approached, the hopefulness which had characterized Belaúnde’s inauguration had long sense evaporated. Not only was Sendero literally gaining ground throughout Huancavelica and much of the highlands, but they launched a concerted, and bloody, effort to derail the electoral process. To some extent, it was successful, for as a result of their own campaign of propaganda, threats and assassinations, the elections in Huancavelica that year were carried out only in the provinces of Huancavelica, Churcampa and Tayacaja.[[491]](#footnote-491)

Despite the effective disenfranchisement of thousands of Huancavelican residents, Alan García was elected president in 1985. If Peru had been slowly drifting towards a cascade of disaster under Belaúnde, with the election of García they approached the watery precipice. García’s party, the APRA, had a long history of antagonism with the military dating back to a bloody APRA-related naval mutiny in 1948.[[492]](#footnote-492) For the military, García’s election was hard to accept as they would have to take orders from the leader of a party that was, in the minds of many military leaders, their sworn enemy. Beyond that, the hierarchy did not embrace his left-wing, populist views nor his calls for protecting human rights, especially in the context of a ruthless insurgency that was increasingly active in Lima. Their distrust was seemingly confirmed when García initiated probes into human rights abuses, replaced the military chief of staff and intervened in the military promotion process.[[493]](#footnote-493)

Highlighting the tensions concerning human rights between the executive and armed forces, in late September, 1985 the military essentially went on a short-lived strike, refusing to continue the fight against Sendero until they had protection from prosecution on human rights charges. Negotiations led to the resumption of military operations against Sendero, however on a reduced scale and in a climate of mutual suspicion.[[494]](#footnote-494)

García’s fractious relations with the military would only worsen following the coordinated rebellions of imprisoned Senderistas in El Frontón, Luringancho and Castro prisons from June 18-20, 1986. Their violent repression by the military, in which all of the rebels in Luringancho were killed, was decried by García, while the military insisted it had implemented the president’s orders. Following this episode, the military refused to act without written orders, and occasionally delayed implementing them once received. Despite the acrimony between García and the military, and the mutual recriminations following the prison massacres, García largely ceded the direction of the counterinsurgency effort to a demoralized and recalcitrant armed forces.[[495]](#footnote-495)

Reinforcing the antagonism between García and the military, in 1987 the president folded the Ministries of War, Navy and Aeronautics into the Ministry of Defense. Not only did the armed forces lose three ministerial portfolios, but they were now subject to a civilian-led ministry.[[496]](#footnote-496) Similarly, as noted before, at the end of 1986, García joined the Guardia Republicana, Guardia Civil and PIP, creating the Policia Nacional de Peru (PNP).[[497]](#footnote-497)

By the late 1980s, the seemingly ever-increasing strength of Sendero highlighted the fact that the coercion-centered counterinsurgency approach that the Peruvian government and military had employed since 1980 was not only ineffective, but counterproductive. In both military and civilian circles, there was an increasing recognition that as long as the underlying issues of poverty and social and cultural exclusion were not addressed, Sendero would continue to prosper. As a consequence, there were increasing calls for a more integrated strategy which combined military operations, increased use of rondas, and development projects in an effort to win the “hearts and minds” of highland residents while minimizing human rights abuses. These ideas were not new, but given the dire situation, they increasingly influenced Peruvian counterinsurgency doctrine, if not practice. This reassessment, which García advocated, was cut short with the acrimony and political fallout which ensued from the prison massacres, but foreshadowed the policies which President Alberto Fujimori would implement beginning in 1990.[[498]](#footnote-498)

One revision of counterinsurgency strategy which did take hold involved the reorganization of the intelligence services, which sought the improved collection, and more effective application, of intelligence. The *Dirección Contra el Terrorismo* (Directorate of Counterterrorism, DIRCOTE) assumed a greater role in the effort. Within DIRCOTE, in 1990 García established a group dedicated to clandestine intelligence gathering, the *Grupo Especial de Intelligencia* (Special Intelligence Group, GEIN). It was this group that would ultimately capture Guzmán in 1992.[[499]](#footnote-499) The importance and enormity of their task was not, however, reflected in their budget, as the GEIN initially did not have a telephone, two-way radios or a functioning vehicle. This lack of resources made it a very unappealing agency to work for, as both their abilities, and also opportunities for illicit enrichment, were limited.[[500]](#footnote-500)

Viewed from any perspective, García’s first administration was a disaster, characterized by a significant expansion in the number, frequency and scope of Sendero attacks and increasing power granted to, and human rights abuses by, the military. The counterinsurgency effort was unsparing and the routine use of torture and forced disappearances continued. In many cases, it appeared that the military was competing with Sendero to prove that they were more capable of brutality and instilling terror, especially among the oft-denigrated Quechua-speaking highland peasants.[[501]](#footnote-501) For his part, Guzmán complained that Sendero assaults were being undercounted. Between 1980 and 1985, he asserted that they had carried out around 30,000 attacks in all but two of Peru’s twenty-four regions, accusing the Ministry of the Interior of an undercount in their report of 6,758 attacks during that period.[[502]](#footnote-502)

This grim military and human rights situation were compounded by García’s inept economic policies, which led to hyperinflation rates of over 2,700 per cent in 1989, and 7,650 per cent in 1990, the end of his term. As the 1990 presidential elections loomed, Sendero was stronger than ever. Not only did they effectively control considerable swaths of the highlands, but they had expanded their operations, and revenue from the drugs trade, in the Upper Huallaga Vally, leading them to believe that they were on the cusp of “strategic equilibrium” with the military. In their campaign to prevent the elections, they carried out numerous high-profile attacks in Lima, killed over 300 government officials nationwide and forced scores of candidates to abandon their campaigns. Indicative of the depth of the crisis, about a third of the national territory, containing almost half of the nation’s population, was subject to military rule.[[503]](#footnote-503)

**From Insertion to Assertion: Sendero in Huancavelica**

Demonstrating their increasing power, and confidence, during García’s administration, on August 9-10, 1987, Sendero perpetrated a large-scale attack on the expansive Lachocc camelid research station. Located in Acobambilla district in Huancavelica province, this SAIS formed part of the *Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria* (National Institute of Agricultural and Livestock Research, INIA).[[504]](#footnote-504) Not unlike other Sendero assaults on SAIS, that on Lachocc reflected longstanding tensions between its administrators and neighboring communities. In this case, it revolved around the encroachment of local peasant livestock on cooperative lands for grazing, and the overseer’s abusive responses. Seeking to use this issue to build their support, Sendero had allied themselves with the local peasanty, some of whom had joined the movement.[[505]](#footnote-505)

On the afternoon of the attack, one of the employees and his wife were pasturing the animals under their care, when two strangers approached them, one of whom was carrying a package that appeared to contain a weapon. The outsiders told them that they had been sent by the administrator to herd the animals back to the main corral. The same thing was happening elsewhere on the SAIS, as Sendero had divided their force of thirty-two insurgents into teams to corral all of the animals, while other rebels kept watch from the surrounding heights. At the administrative complex, another group of insurgents gathered up the employees, locking up the men and women in different rooms in one of the buildings on the facility.[[506]](#footnote-506)

With the complex under their control, the rebels began to wantonly slaughter 1,907 alpacas, mostly by slitting their throats. “Dámaso,” the son of one of the employees who was there that day, recounted that Sendero did a poor job dispatching the animals, “some … were circling in pain, they had not done it well, they had not killed them properly… some… were walking around with their neck hanging.”[[507]](#footnote-507) Once the slaughter was largely complete, and having dynamited most of the buildings, “all night they had their party and by dawn the next morning they had already disappeared, and a great number of animals were strewn around, some were alive, some were dead, injured, everything.”[[508]](#footnote-508) Before they left, they warned their captives that “the pasturage is of everyone and for everyone.[[509]](#footnote-509)

Nine people were murdered that day, including the manager and overseer.[[510]](#footnote-510) The latter, who was especially despised by members of the surrounding communities, was captured and led barefoot to an isolated pasture about a mile away. There the rebels “killed the man … with a rock they had crushed his head and had stuck grass in his mouth … then they wrote a note which they put on him mentioning that ‘Here you have what you so much complain about … and now you die eating the grass’… and that’s how they found him the next morning.”[[511]](#footnote-511) The manager suffered a similar fate, for beyond antagonizing the surrounding communities he was reputed to be a womanizer, and had been previously warned by Sendero to desist. The attack that day was the end of the SAIS, and a victory for Sendero as for the next decade the lands served as pasturage for neighboring communities.[[512]](#footnote-512)

Sendero was also well-entrenched in Acobambilla during this time, and their power was on full display in the district’s namesake capital in November, 1989. As “Daniel” recalled

For sure, that was a low blow. I remember very well one morning, one Sunday, where the army had instructed us to hoist the national flag of the state every Sunday in honor and in respect of our country. But this was not just a flag raising but rather it was also like a … weekly fair because some merchants and producers from the zone did their modest business, almost obliged by the military … because the army was in the base in Manta… I remember that I was making my breakfast then around eight in the morning … when people dressed in army uniforms began to come into town, at that time people were also arriving for the raising of the flag… and fair and … around twenty people dressed as soldiers [arrived] and … I noticed when they crossed the bridge because I have my house close to the bridge … [that] they were dressed as soldiers but with shoes and rubber boots … and in my mind I was saying to myself that the soldiers almost never use rubber boots … and as a result I already realized that they were probably from Sendero because, how strange … it was very strange, and one of them said to the people ‘Dammit, move forward, move forward to the plaza so that they can raise the flag, [it’s] very late, very late.’ So I was preparing my breakfast for my mother and all the family and I went to the plaza also to listen … and … on the plaza each town of Acobambilla was lined up, Acombambilla has thirteen communities … and then we also got in a specific line … there was a boss there, they called him “sergeant,” they called him ‘Boss’… ‘Tiger’… some appeared to be from the army, but some others were not from the army, it was easy to recognize … one of the bosses … was saying … that ‘We have come to the flag raising… we are from the army,’ etcetera, and I, in my mind was saying how strange, how strange … but the majority of the people, even until now, say that they had not recognized them and everyone thought that they were from the army, the governor of the town arrived very late … and [the boss] said to him ‘Shit, is this the time to arrive? You as governor should be here first … to raise the flag, you are a representative of the state,’ he says … and the poor governor greets them with his little hat and walks in front of the people and goes directly to his office. Then, in this moment another two companions of this supposed army arrive tied up … very bloody and many people were asking, and I myself was asking, but how strange I said because apparently they brought them in by kicking them along but they were not making them arrive by real kicks … they were simulated kicks and with the blood on their face and all their body bloodied, and then the boss said ‘Gentlemen, we have captured two terrorists and these terrorists we have to kill in front of you, this is how terrorists die, yes or no, what do the people say?’ and the people say yes … well, the majority said yes, and the boss began to talk and after a while after making his fake speech the boss says then ‘With what are you going to kill Sendero, the terrorist? *We* are Sendero,’ he says … my suspicion was correct, and then they took out their list … ‘These people I am going to call,’ he began to call all these people, there were more than twenty people that they began to call … many of them saved themselves by not talking, but many of them entered this very calamitous, very tragic, case by the insistence of some of the very residents in the village who identified them ... It seems that among the population were some from Sendero who were coordinating and knew something about this plan.[[513]](#footnote-513)

With their targets in their hands, Sendero massacred around twenty people that day and dynamited the municipal building. Although at least one person escaped to alert the authorities at the Manta counterinsurgency base, the rebels could take their time as the military’s response was hampered by the need to go up the chain of command in Ayacucho for approval to act.[[514]](#footnote-514)

Reflecting upon that day, the “Daniel” added that the origins of this “tragic moment” lay a few months back in livestock theft. Some people accused of rustling had been captured and brought to the governor, punished, and released. Resentful, they had gone to a Sendero camp and persuaded the rebels to exact vengeance.[[515]](#footnote-515) He added,

from this we can reach the conclusion that at the beginning perhaps Sendero came with a plan to build awareness, to persecute those who are authorities of the state … afterwards as the years passed … there was not this awareness building, but rather they began to act like criminals.[[516]](#footnote-516)

Increased violence was enabled by their increasing arsenal. When Sendero first came to Acobambilla in 1983, they had some shotguns and home-made grenades. When they arrived in 1989, however, they had machine guns, which also helped them pass themselves off as the Peruvian military. By 1991, their local support, and armament had diminished, at least in the region of Acobambilla. During a firefight with the miliary they had less sophisticated weapons and “it appears that Sendero had already lost strength because they did not have logistics, they had lost the trust of the people due to the massacres they had done.”[[517]](#footnote-517)

Sendero’s use of military uniforms to deceive and entrap villagers was part of their tactical repertoire. In December, 1989, the month after the massacre in Acobambilla, a strikingly similar event played out in nearby Saccapampa,[[518]](#footnote-518) perhaps by the same group. There, just outside of town, sixty Senderistas dressed in military uniform had gathered and killed a sheep, using its blood to paint one of their female rebels’ face and hands to play the part of the captive. As “Amador” recalled that day

they came to the town, raised the national flag making all the residents be in formation; they then chose the authorities, immediately enclosing them in one of the state government’s buildings, where they threw a grenade and while they agonized, they … killed them with knives … there died 30 people between authorities and residents.[[519]](#footnote-519)

Likewise, in 1989, in Yurac Cancha[[520]](#footnote-520) nine members of the local ronda were killed after encountering Senderistas dressed as soldiers, while similar events had occurred in Castrovirreyna and the villages of Arcuilla and Chacapunco.[[521]](#footnote-521)

Such ruses also occurred to the east in Angaraes province. The establishment of the Santo Tomás de Pata counterinsurgency base and local rondas had spurred Sendero to redeploy to other regions. This appears to have led the military to believe things were more contained than they were, and in 1988 the military closed the base. This, however, only served as an invitation for Sendero to fill the void and uncover those who had opposed them.[[522]](#footnote-522) In June of that year, a group of rebels arrived in Cuticsa,[[523]](#footnote-523) disguised as the Peruvian armed forces and ostensibly seeking information about Sendero. Having identified those who opposed them, they then held a “people’s court” before executing eleven comuneros.[[524]](#footnote-524) Such incursions by Sendero, and the military, with their inevitable abuses and destruction of property, ultimately led to the abandonment of the village, with all but a few elderly resistentes seeking refuge in Lircay, Ayacucho, Huancayo and the lowlands.[[525]](#footnote-525)

By 1989, from Guzmán’s perspective in his Lima safehouse, the first “strategic defense” phase of the conflict, had gone largely according to plan. For their part, many Peruvians wondered if things could get much worse. Fear and violence were omnipresent, Lima had long since been engulfed by the conflict and the economy, gripped by hyperinflation, was in ruins. Moreover, Sendero appeared to be reversing many of the earlier gains made by the military and rondas in the region. For example, in February, 1988 in Lachocc, Sendero killed nine soldiers and two civilians in an ambush. Less than a week later, they brazenly brought the fight to the streets of the city of Huancavelica, attacking a police command post and killing two officers.[[526]](#footnote-526)

Beyond armed attacks, Sendero had by the late 1980s infiltrated scores of political parties and popular organizations, including those providing assistance to Lima’s 200,000 internal refugees.[[527]](#footnote-527) Although military and civil authorities had grossly underestimated Sendero’s threat and failed to contain the insurgency, Sendero’s control of areas was tenuous at best. Although Sendero had at most 10,000 fighters, many of whom were poorly armed, Guzmán nevertheless concluded in 1989 that the group had reached the point of “strategic equilibrium” with the state, on schedule. [[528]](#footnote-528)

**The 1990 Presidential Elections: Turmoil and an Unlikely Triumph**

With this in mind, and seeking to disrupt if not prevent the 1990 elections, Sendero launched a new offensive in Huancavelica between August 1989 and February 1990. The presidential election that year pitted the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who was the favored and more conservative candidate, against Alberto Fujimori, a largely unknown former agronomy professor, dean and rector of the National Agrarian University of Japanese descent. Fujimori made good use of the fact that he was a political, and in some ways a social, outsider to appeal to both indigenous highlanders, who were most affected by the violence, and the middle class, who like all Peruvians suffered economically under García. His dress, manner of expression and penchant for traveling to isolated areas ravaged by violence enhanced his appeal and provided his supporters with a sense of social inclusion.[[529]](#footnote-529)

Just as Vargas Llosa and Fujimori campaigned, so too did Sendero, in their own way.

The wave of 463 attacks in late 1989 and early 1990 would mark a new height of violence in the region, which included acts of sabotage, crop seizures, occupations of towns, prohibitions on mobility, assassinations and increased conscription. The result was that during this period Huancavelica became the third most violent place in the country.[[530]](#footnote-530) For example, in early October, Sendero assassinated the APRA-affiliated mayor of Churcampa province, who was killed along with her husband as they travelled to Ayacucho. Ironically, the military suspected their son was a rebel sympathizer, and a month after his parent’s death, he was murdered on the town’s main square by forces based at the local military base.[[531]](#footnote-531) It was in this internecine context that a new factor in the conflict emerged: the right-wing *Comando Rodrigo Franco*, a death squad, named after an APRA member killed by Sendero. Among their early actions, in September, 1988, were a series of explosions in Churcampa, where they had also posted lists of those whom they had marked for death.[[532]](#footnote-532)

Sendero nevertheless kept up the pressure throughout the region, and in late October, 1989 they again invaded Palca. The rebels had previously demanded that authorities resign, and that no one run for office. As “Augusto” explained

The subversives arrived and they rounded [people] up, house by house, gathering like 200 residents… locking them in the civic center … all of the authorities when they found out, had escaped; there were only the candidates for that year … they then began to explain about the armed struggle, and when all that was done, they called names from a list, finding only five authorities present; they reminded them that they had been warned and now there was no pardon and they began to kill them and the next day we found them covered with papers with the sickle and cross stuck on them.[[533]](#footnote-533)

Similarly, in late November, 1989, Sendero occupied Pilchaca, gathered up the residents, and executed the mayor in front of them. Not only did they prohibit anyone from removing the body, but they banned people from leaving the town.[[534]](#footnote-534) Similar events transpired the next month when they killed the mayor-elect of the district of Huachocolpa,[[535]](#footnote-535) as well as a teacher and justice of the peace in the district of Moya, and seven comuneros in Chopcca.[[536]](#footnote-536)

Sendero’s proscription concerning holding local office did on occasion encounter opposition. In Capilla[[537]](#footnote-537) on October 28, 1989 “Abel” related how

18 members of SL arrived, calling people for a meeting for their talks, as they always did … besides it was the eve of the elections … and they threatened people not to vote. In the middle of this, Mr. Liduvino Cabezas Trillo spoke up: ‘Why do you have to force us? Yes, we know you give the orders and when the military find out they come and mistreat us.’ For these words they ordered two subversives to take the man out of the building; and unhappy that the man began to argue and scuffle with the subversives behind the building, stabbing one of the subversives; the others, upon seeing this, shot him in the head, killing him instantly, and likewise the stabbed subversive died.[[538]](#footnote-538)

Despite the heightened violence, the second round of presidential elections were held, as scheduled, on June 10, 1990. Fujimori’s victory surprised many, and was to some degree a result of his reticence concerning his proposed economic strategy. While Vargas Llosa stated that he would impose economic austerity measures, Fujimori sidestepped the issue, thus avoiding telling voters what they did not want to hear. Despite this, once elected, he lost little time in, and had few other options than, implementing such measures which stabilized the economy.[[539]](#footnote-539)

**Anything But Academic: Professor Fujimori vs. Professor Guzmán**

The election of Fujimori coincided with a Sendero that was stronger than ever, and heralded a new, aggressive phase of the conflict. Underscoring Sendero’s power was the fact that by 1990, in the departments of Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica, Sendero had established 784 popular committees controlling the lives of over 91,000 people.[[540]](#footnote-540) Although only eighteen of these committees, which controlled around 1,100 people, were located in Huancavelica, to some extent this reflected the fact that the insurgents in Huancavelica were the least armed in the so-called Principal Zone.[[541]](#footnote-541) Sendero had also made significant inroads into Lima. This was most notable in the industrial, and economically important, Ate-Vitarte district which includes the port of Callao, however they were also active in Villa El Salvador. This poverty-stricken area south of Lima was contested by the Izquierda Unida, which had considerable support, and Sendero, which sought control of the Pan American highway.[[542]](#footnote-542)

Sendero’s gains, and Fujimori’s election, unleashed a wave of military repression, forced disappearances and human rights abuses throughout Peru. Indicative of this in Huancavelica was that in the first five months of his administration, at least 200 people disappeared in the department.[[543]](#footnote-543) Among them was Ángel Escóbar, a human rights leader and head of the *Federación de Comunidades Campesinas de Huancavelica* (Federation of Peasant Communities of Huancavelica, FCCH). In February, 1990, just after leaving his office in the city, he was abducted by government agents and disappeared.[[544]](#footnote-544) The government’s “no holds barred” response progressively eroded Sendero’s previous gains, which were as shaky as they were impressive.[[545]](#footnote-545)

Indicative of the complete collapse of human rights during this time were the events near the village of Santa Bárbara in July, 1991. Sendero had long maintained a semi-clandestine presence in the ranches and hamlets above the city of Huancavelica, benefitting from a degree of support from members of the community.[[546]](#footnote-546) The counterinsurgency effort, code named Apolonia, was spearheaded by troops from the Santa Teresita base just outside of the city of Huancavelica as well as those from bases in Lircay. Infantry Lieutenant Javier Bendezú Vargas led the “Scorpion” patrol, while Lt. Abel Hipólito Gallo Coca led the “Angel” patrol. In a pincer movement, they took differing routes towards Santa Bárbara and converged on Radio Pampa at dawn on July 4, 1991.[[547]](#footnote-547)

As one community member explained, the military approached

the home of the Hilario family… they knew more or less that the base was around there, but they did not know exactly whether it was that house or the other house ... in the yard [of the Hilario family’s] house there was a [grinding] stone … so one of the soldiers sat on it and the stone was unsteady and so the stone sunk …‘What’s here?’ They picked up the stone and this stone was like a cover for … underground storage and so inside of it they found food, medicine, supposedly weapons they say.[[548]](#footnote-548)

The family was then brought naked outside, and the soldiers set their home aflame, the first of several to be burned that day. That was just the beginning, as they raped women, detained and abused villagers, killed a child and seized livestock and other property.[[549]](#footnote-549) Having apprehended fourteen people, half of whom were children, they tied their hands and joined them by ropes to their necks before marching them for hours to the historic Misteriosa cinnabar mine in the Huachocolpa community. During this time, they were repeatedly beaten and deprived of water or food. On the way, they encountered and took prisoner Elihoref Huamani Vergara, who had recently completed two years of service in the Peruvian military.[[550]](#footnote-550)

Once they arrived at the mine, the prisoners were forced inside, and executed by bursts of machine gun fire. To cover their crime, the soldiers dynamited it shut, further mutilating the corpses in the process.[[551]](#footnote-551) The killings were ordered by Lt. Bendezú Vargas, who would later implausibly claim that, in desperation, the group had committed mass suicide by jumping to their deaths from a cliff. Despite this and other efforts of dissimulation, the shattered remains of the victims were discovered in the mine on July 18, 1991.[[552]](#footnote-552) Lieutenants Bendezú and Gallo, and three other lesser ranking soldiers were subsequently accused of murder, rape and robbery and other crimes.[[553]](#footnote-553) On October 16, 1992, all were declared innocent of homicide, negligence, disobedience and rape by the Second Military Judicial Zone Permanent Council of War. They did, however, find Bendezú and Gallo guilty of lesser crimes, such as abuse of authority, disobedience and theft. As a result, Bendezú was sentenced to a year and a half in prison, and Gallo to ten months, in addition to paying modest fines.[[554]](#footnote-554)

Seeking to maintain the momentum against Sendero, and consolidate his power, two years after his election, Fujimori closed congress and led a “self-coup” with the support of the military.[[555]](#footnote-555) While heavily criticized abroad, the self-coup was supported by around seventy percent of Peruvians at the time given the dire political and economic situation.[[556]](#footnote-556) Although Fujimori was more interventionist in “internal” military affairs than García, he did not have his predecessor’s political baggage, ensured that the armed forces were well-funded, and shared a common counterinsurgency strategy.[[557]](#footnote-557) A lot had changed since the coup in 1968, as the military had, ironically, gone from supporting the statist economic and political policies of Velasco, to opposing García’s populism, to being a staunch defender of Fujimori and his neoliberal policies.[[558]](#footnote-558)

**Coca and the Insurgent Enterprise**

Although geographically and culturally distinct from the highlands, the jungles of Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM) played a key role in underwriting Sendero’s ability to significantly expand the scope and intensity of the conflict. Beyond financing ongoing efforts, the revenue generated in the region allowed Sendero to acquire more sophisticated weaponry than the predominantly “low-tech” means they had employed in the early 1980s.[[559]](#footnote-559) To the inherent opportunities presented by a weak state and extant cocaine producing economy were added an expanding market for the product, especially in the United States.[[560]](#footnote-560)

While the financial opportunities in the UHV were a “pull factor” in Sendero’s effort to establish operations in the region, effective advances by the Peruvian military in Huancavelica and elsewhere in the mid-1980s served as a strong “push factor” impelling the rebels to regroup in areas less subject to state control. Despite the lack of government presence in the UHV and VRAEM, Sendero had to contend with established, and armed, regional drug producing and trafficking organizations that had coopted local police forces. The challenge, however, also offered an opportunity for Sendero, for traffickers maintained the low prices they paid to local *cocaleros*, or coca leaf producers, through violence or the threat of it against those who resisted.[[561]](#footnote-561)

It was into this context which Sendero thrust itself, and was able to gain control of the UHV region by 1987 and create the Huallaga Regional Committee. This was achieved through selective assassination of cocalero leaders and subsequently anointing themselves as the “representatives” of the interests of the cocaleros, just as they had done with traditional authorities in the highlands. This enabled them to demand higher prices from the traffickers for the growers, and also to impose a “revolutionary tax” of twenty percent (known in the colonial period as the “royal fifth”) on growers for this service and for the protection they promised from traffickers, the state and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.[[562]](#footnote-562)

Producers of semi-refined cocaine paste and transporters also benefitted from greater security in their operations, which increasingly relied on land routes, despite their attendant risks, as a result of increased aerial interdiction operations. Sendero’s provision of order, security and predictability in production and transport had an additional cost, as Sendero levied a tax of about $2.00 USD per kilogram of semi-refined cocaine paste on local refiners.[[563]](#footnote-563) Other revenue streams from Sendero’s diversified portfolio of extortion included landing “fees” for drug-running aircraft in scores of jungle runways, which could reach $10,000 per flight, and “taxes” on illegal timber operations and informal placer gold mining in the region.[[564]](#footnote-564)

The Sendero groups in both the UHV and VRAEM encountered and adapted to different social and economic contexts than in the highlands. As a result, they adopted a more pragmatic than ideological approach towards civilians, a characteristic which would prove to be enduring in the region.[[565]](#footnote-565) Much of the coca was produced by indigenous smallholders whom had migrated from the Andes, leaving their communities, and the traditional authority structures associated with them, behind. Although they abandoned their hometowns, they did not escape Sendero. The rebel movement’s insertion in the region was, however, less destabilizing, both socially and culturally, than it had previously been in the highlands. Not only had Sendero learned the counterproductive effect of excess violence, but they offered growers a degree of security, both of which mitigated violence.[[566]](#footnote-566)

All of this engendered a degree of popular local support, which, when complemented by forced recruitment, allowed Sendero to assemble a regional military force of at least 1,000 followers in the region by the late 1980s.[[567]](#footnote-567) As a result of their efforts in the UHV, the Huallaga Regional Committee became one of the most important of the rebel enterprise, generating perhaps up to a quarter billion dollars between 1987-1993 and playing a leading role in the financing of the insurgency.[[568]](#footnote-568) The revenue generated through these activities also promoted internal cohesion among militants in the region, offering not only status as a rebel, but a generous income of up to $500 a month.[[569]](#footnote-569)

Just as the less ideological approach to community relations taken by Sendero in the region reflected “lessons learned” from the highlands and paid dividends, so too did the military take a more nuanced approach when, in July 1984, they assumed command over the UHV. Recognizing that many cocaleros were in essence economic and war refugees, the military initially did not directly confront them. Instead, they viewed cocaleros as peasant farmers producing an unsanctioned crop. By sidestepping this delicate issue and significantly reducing eradication efforts, the military was able to prevent a united front of cocaleros and Sendero, reduce the flow of information to the rebels, and focus their efforts on counterinsurgency.[[570]](#footnote-570)

Despite the clear benefits of this approach, the administration of President García resumed eradication efforts and reduced the military autonomy in an effort to ensure greater accountability, especially concerning human rights. The result of renewed eradication was that Sendero was again able to offer something of value to cocaleros, and thereby reassert their position in the cocaine production and export business.[[571]](#footnote-571) The panorama further changed in 1985 as the MRTA established bases in the UHV. Their prospects for expansion were limited, however, by their intolerance of coca production and drug trafficking which precluded local support and led to them being besieged by three enemies: Sendero, the Peruvian military and trafficking organizations.[[572]](#footnote-572)

In 1989, as the economy imploded and Sendero seemed to be getting the upper hand on a national scale, García reverted to the previous policy of tolerance of coca cultivation in concert with development projects and counterinsurgency measures by declaring the region an emergency zone.[[573]](#footnote-573) Such policies were expanded during the administration of Alberto Fujimori, who increased the emphasis on developmental approaches and crop substitution, prioritized drug interdiction over coca eradication, expanded the military presence in the region, prioritized the armed forces over the police in counternarcotics operations, and promoted the organization of and participation in rondas in the region. Increasing air interdiction efforts, with participation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Colombian forces, spurred the expansion of more dispersed cultivation into areas that were more integrated into the national polity. This resulted in more decentralized terrestrial and riverine transport routes, over which Sendero had much less control.[[574]](#footnote-574) Also contributing to the geographical shift in production was the spread of a fungus (*fusarium oxysporum*) which killed coca plants.[[575]](#footnote-575) By the mid-1990’s, these factors, in concert with an increased state presence, the disruption caused by Guzmán’s capture and the establishment of rondas in the UHV, eroded Sendero’s financial and military capacity while highlighting the fragility of the insurgent/cocalero/trafficker alliance.[[576]](#footnote-576)

From a government point of view, part of the price paid for this was increased corruption, especially after 1991 when the armed forces were put in charge of the counternarcotics effort in the UHV.[[577]](#footnote-577) The opportunities for illicit enrichment through extortion and bribes were so great that not only was a posting in the UHV seen by many officers as an economic opportunity, but the members of the Fujimori administration became actively involved in drug trafficking.[[578]](#footnote-578)

**Death, Displacement and the Implosion of Indigenous Communities**

While Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) documented 23,969 deaths in the insurgency, they estimated that in total 69,280 people were killed and 600,000 displaced. In addition, the insurgency left 40,000 children without parents, 20,000 widows, and 435 communities in ruins.[[579]](#footnote-579) Of the dead, the CVR calculated that fifty-four percent were killed by Sendero, thirty-five percent by the military and police forces, and about five percent by ronderos. Of the documented deaths, they were concentrated in the departments of Ayacucho, Junín, Huánuco and Huancavelica. During most of the conflict, from 1983 to 1992, Huancavelica ranked third in conflict related mortality, behind Ayacucho and Junín. Women in Huancavelica were the second most sexually victimized in the country, with eighty-three percent of rapes carried out by representatives of the Peruvian government, especially in the counterinsurgency bases of Manta and Vilca. These bases were also the final destination of the many *Huancavelicanos* (Huancavelica residents) whom were abducted by the government. The CVR also noted that the victims of the conflict generally suffered from “social exclusion,” and tended to be rural agriculturalists. They were also disproportionately Quechua speakers; while in Peru twenty percent of the population speaks Quechua, they represented three-quarters of those killed.[[580]](#footnote-580)

Within the region of Huancavelica, the most lethal years of the conflict were from 1983-1984, with the provinces of Acobamba, Angaraes, Churcampa and Tayacaja especially affected. During this time, Sendero, and to a lesser extent the MRTA, perpetrated around 200 attacks in the region. Only Ayacucho, essentially “ground zero” of the insurgency, experienced more rebel attacks. Peruvian military operations led to a decline in subversive attacks in Huancavelica between 1985 and 1988, especially following the arrest of over forty suspected rebels in the city of Huancavelica on July 24, 1983. This precipitated a redeployment of Sendero forces and increased attacks in other regions, such as Lima, Cuzco, and Junín.[[581]](#footnote-581)

Violence in Huancavelica, especially in its namesake province, peaked again from 1989 to 1991 during which time Sendero sought “strategic equilibrium” and carried out approximately 100 insurgent attacks in the region.[[582]](#footnote-582) Reflecting this, the province of Huancavelica accounted for just over one-third of the deaths in the department.[[583]](#footnote-583) The state of emergency and militarization of the city, and the violent entries into homes, rapes and disappearances which came with it, did not prevent rebel actions there, although they were mostly of a propagandistic nature or focused on police stations.[[584]](#footnote-584)

Nationwide, at fifty-five percent of the total, most of those who perished were males between the ages of twenty and forty-nine years old, although when one factors in the disappeared, the figure rises to sixty-six percent. Again, this is disproportionate when one considers that this age group represented thirty-eight percent of the national population at the time. Among known fatalities, women accounted for twenty percent of the total.[[585]](#footnote-585) In terms of the occupations of victims, peasants accounted for fifty-seven percent, followed by civil authorities and community leaders, who together accounted for twenty-one percent.[[586]](#footnote-586) Among those who were killed by the military, many were under thirty years old, and almost two-thirds were disappeared.[[587]](#footnote-587) In contrast, those who were over forty years old and killed in the conflict were more likely to be victims of Sendero.[[588]](#footnote-588)

Among the 600,000 internal refugees, most escaped with their lives and little else. This mass migration occurred in two waves: the first was from Ayacucho and the highlands between 1983 and 1985, usually as a result of actions by Peru’s armed forces. The second wave, from 1987 to 1991, occurred in the midst of the economic implosion during the García administration and was made up of people from more diverse regions, usually as a result of Sendero actions. Chain migration usually prevailed, with refugees settling in places where others from their community or region had gone to form “recentralized” communities, often bringing local divisions and disputes with them.[[589]](#footnote-589) In contrast to “recentralized” communities were those that were “dispersed” and/or “itinerant,” and composed of members from diverse origins.[[590]](#footnote-590) Beyond migration to urban areas, the military also established fortified communities, where people could, or would be forced to, live.[[591]](#footnote-591)

Reflecting the level of generalized violence throughout Huancavelica, between May, 1980 and June, 1997, at least 70,000 people fled their homes. The largest exodus was, however, between 1986 and 1989. It did not take much to be marked for death by Sendero. In Yanama,[[592]](#footnote-592) “Donato,” a *retornante* (person who returned to their home town), related how

if you showed any resistance … you were eliminated [on the spot] or if not, they marked you and that was it … I left the community … for the reason that Sendero came after me because one afternoon we were in a meeting in the community building, and I disagreed with one of their questions … [saying] that I could not act in that way … so from there they marked me and a family member got word to me at night, so that same night I got up and … grabbed my family” and fled to Huancayo.[[593]](#footnote-593)

About a quarter of refugees migrated within the department, often to the capital, while thousands of others sought refuge in Lima and Huancayo, both of which were, however, far from immune to the conflict.[[594]](#footnote-594) Lima had been the target of Sendero attacks since early in the insurgency, and, beginning in 1986 Huancayo was contested by both Sendero and the MRTA, which had a strong base in the university. The violence associated with their bitter rivalry for dominance, much of which was carried out through assassinations, was compounded by disappearances carried out by the military.[[595]](#footnote-595) Even after the violence subsided, many people were reluctant to return to their communities in Huancavelica, and by 1997 only 2,200, or three percent, had returned to what was left of their homes.[[596]](#footnote-596)

Among those who fled, most did so either as a result of attacks on their home or community, or because their village had been occupied by Sendero or the military. Other push factors included conscription pressures from Sendero, the death or theft of livestock, the inability to plant or theft of harvests, and the difficulty in bringing products to market.[[597]](#footnote-597) Still others left their hometowns preemptively to avoid violence. Flight often proved to be a prudent, if difficult, choice as most of Peru’s internal refugees at this time were between twenty-six and forty-five years old, which also roughly corresponds to the age of most of the male victims of the conflict.[[598]](#footnote-598)

In their struggle to adapt and survive, many refugees received limited assistance from religious organizations, and after 1992, from the government of Peru.[[599]](#footnote-599) Some people fled for short periods, often as a result of a village invasion by either Sendero or the military, during which they sought refuge in caves, ravines or the eastern slopes of the Andes, often surviving on local plants and roots. Others departed with a more long-term orientation, but found survival difficult. Often with limited education, many found their skills as farmers or pastoralists were useless when it came to getting by in an urban area. As “Jorge,” a comunero of San Antonio, recalled his and his parent’s travails in Huancayo, “they did not know how to live in the city … they could not get what they needed to live.”[[600]](#footnote-600) They were not alone. Many refugees, having exhausted their scant resources in an alien environment, and unable to survive by working informally, returned home destitute in the hope that they could resume their lives.[[601]](#footnote-601) As “David,” a retornante to the community of San Antonio, explained, “I feel like my town is my mother, as my mother, I feel my town.”[[602]](#footnote-602) Other refugees learned that flight from one’s hometown did not always mean an escape from the violence. “Jorge,” who had fled San Antonio to Satipo in the region of Junín, found things were not much different there, recalling that “there was not a day… of tranquility … worse things happened in the jungle.”[[603]](#footnote-603)

In a cruelly ironic twist, the displaced shared something in common with many of the insurgents who were responsible for their dislocation: they were neither “here nor there.” They were within Peruvian society yet simultaneously economically, culturally and socially excluded from it. Worse, they were commonly viewed as rebel sympathizers where they resettled, and were victims of anti-highland racism.[[604]](#footnote-604) As one refugee explained “In Lima at that time, if you were from Huancavelica, they suspected you of being a terrorist. In Huancavelica, if you were from Santa Bárbara or Sacsamarca, worse! Terrorist, out! That’s how it was.”[[605]](#footnote-605) Many would go on to experience a third level of prejudice if they returned home during the conflict, where they were often seen as deserters of their communities or spies by Sendero.[[606]](#footnote-606)

The years of García’s first presidency, from 1985-1990, were some of the darkest times in Peru’s twentieth century history. Ministerial restructuring and other administrative reforms, while important, were too little, too late. Economic collapse, hyperinflation and unbridled violence by both Sendero and government forces led to an ever-increasing death toll and tens of thousands of people fleeing Huancavelica’s countryside. Although Sendero was unable to prevent the 1990 elections, they had disrupted them, infiltrated numerous professional and other civil society organizations, effectively controlled swathes of Huancavelica, and derived considerable revenue to fund the effort as a result of extortion of mining and other interests as well as their involvement in the cocaine trade. Even with the election of Fujimori, Sendero, at least initially, appeared to have the upper hand. This would soon change, however, as Fujimori instituted an economic shock program to reset the economy, enhanced military and intelligence operations, and made a strategic decision to more effectively support the efforts of highland communities to better defend themselves.

**Chapter Five: Turning the Red Tide**

**They “thought themselves as kings:” Counterinsurgency Bases and Indigenous Communities[[607]](#footnote-607)**

The establishment of counterinsurgency bases throughout Huancavelica, and elsewhere, was a central component in the war against Sendero. The continuity of their presence in a region, and the tactical agility they provided, played a vital role in gathering, and acting upon, intelligence. With this, however, came markedly increased repression and rampant abuses of human rights, with Huancavelica’s indigenous communities yet again suffering the consequences. These did not just include abductions, rape, torture and extrajudicial executions, but also the active involvement of locals in provisioning the bases with foodstuffs and other supplies, which drained them of their already meager resources.[[608]](#footnote-608)

More importantly, base commanders expected, and demanded, that communities organize rondas to assist with their own defense. By the mid-1980s, Sendero’s extreme violence, unwavering dogmatism and rejection of indigenous culture would pave the way to their own defeat. In many cases, rondas were an expression of this rejection of Sendero, and members would also patrol with the armed forces. Joint patrols were often not a model of collaboration, as poorly armed ronderos commonly served as a foil for the military, and relations between the two were uneasy at best. Nevertheless, the rondas and the bases which oversaw them, would play a critical role in the defeat of the insurgency, albeit at a high cost in lives. Combined with efforts to better integrate intelligence gathering and its application, the government slowly peeled back Sendero’s presence in the highlands, and closed in on Guzmán in Lima.[[609]](#footnote-609)

The establishment of counterinsurgency bases in Huancavelica responded to Sendero’s initial support, and success, in the region in the early 1980s. Although Angaraes province was considered by the military to be a “Red Bastion” given Sendero’s influence there, the rebels had also made significant inroads in Tayacaja, Acobamba, Churcampa and Huancavelica provinces. This led in the early to mid-1980s to the expansion of the military base in the city of Huancavelica, as well as the establishment of counterinsurgency bases in Julcamarca and Santo Tomás de Pata in Angaraes province, and in Churcampa in the namesake province.[[610]](#footnote-610) Other bases were established in Manta,[[611]](#footnote-611) near the San Genaro mine; in Santa Teresita in the district of Huachocolpa;[[612]](#footnote-612) in Lachocc; in Coricocha in the district of Vilca; as well as in Lircay and Pampas.[[613]](#footnote-613) Such bases served as springboards for military incursions in areas where Sendero was active, and were effective in preventing their expansion and disrupting their logistical network.[[614]](#footnote-614) They were also places of interrogation, sexual abuse and execution, as evidenced by the five mass graves of suspected rebels unearthed after the conflict near the Millpo base in Churcampa.[[615]](#footnote-615)

Having suffered at the hands of Sendero, some communities sought and initially welcomed the establishment of counterinsurgency bases. But rather than reducing the levels of violence in communities, they instead increased it. In the community of Marcas, in Acobamba, “Martín” related that

we asked that a military base be installed, without imagining that things would get worse … they were the cruelest and most bloodthirsty … they sexually abused women without regard for age, impoverishing us with constant sackings of stores, carrying off animals to eat, and the worst thing was that they disappeared many people and we know nothing about them until now … currently one finds many widows, orphans and children who are not recognized [by their fathers].[[616]](#footnote-616)

The military operated much like Sendero, but with better equipment. Leading forays from counterinsurgency bases, they too would occupy villages, detain the population, and chastise, threaten, interrogate, torture, rape, kill or abduct members of the community, either in the communities or back at the base.[[617]](#footnote-617) As a result, irrespective as to whether someone supported the insurgency or not, the arrival of the military would often provoke mass flight.[[618]](#footnote-618) Extrajudicial executions by the military were commonplace. One such victim was the elderly Félix Aparco Pineda, who was captured on a farm outside of Sacsamarca on August 25, 1984. A plainclothes military detachment accused him of harboring and supporting insurgents before torturing and executing him. His corpse, cast in a cave near the community, would only to be found several months later.[[619]](#footnote-619)

Disappearances also occurred in daylight in the city of Huancavelica, such as on September 20, 1984 when Hilario Ayuque Zuñiga was taken from his home by undercover agents, placed in a vehicle on the city’s main plaza, and later killed. His position as secretary general of *the Confederación Intersectorial de Trabajadores Estatales* (Intersectoral Confederation of State Employees, CITE)*,* and a member of the *Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Huancavelica* (Human Rights Commission of Huancavelica, CDHH)had brought him to the attention of, and suspicion by, authorities.[[620]](#footnote-620) Military abductions on the streets of the city of Huancavelica continued in the late 1980s. For example, on June 30, 1989, Ronald Rojas Muñoz was arrested, brought to the Santa Ana military base, and subsequently disappeared. A few days later, on July 3, 1989, six other residents were disappeared from the city, acts which were repeated on July 12, with the disappearance of Alejandro Tutaya, a professor at the city’s normal school.[[621]](#footnote-621)

Sendero’s presence in a community was often transient or maintained by a local committee, and as a result their economic demands on them were in these cases limited and dispersed unless they restricted planting. In contrast, the establishment of a counterinsurgency base represented a larger and continuing resource demand on surrounding communities. Just as corregidors, priests and hacendados had historically drained villages of their resources, counterinsurgency bases were sustained, and often constructed, by the communities they oppressed. In Jerusalem, “Gregorio,” related that in order to help support counterinsurgency operations, military leaders, such as those at the Manta base, “demanded lots of work … lots of obligation, firewood, sheep, in sum work … and they made all of the community work like that, without pay or anything, obligated … pure punishment, pure blows.”[[622]](#footnote-622) In nearby San Antonio, “David” asked, in addition to the firewood and potatoes they provided, “how many sheep did we take from the town … not raised for them, this is how we all were.“[[623]](#footnote-623) In Acobambilla, “Daniel,” recalled the “tyranny” by and fear of the military at the Manta base. They were “very abusive … because imagine arriving at one in the morning and they take everyone out of their beds … barefoot … the resident had to go bringing his firewood, bringing his meat to the base … it was exploitation.”[[624]](#footnote-624)

Farther to the east, in Seccla, Angaraes, another comunero, “Fermín,” recalled how the

military, every fifteen days asked for 20, 25, up to 30 horses per community, this to go on patrol, and if we did not comply, they punished us, they even brought me to the dungeon. To this day I suffer from the blows the soldiers gave me. They also requested seven goats per community, until we had no animals left.[[625]](#footnote-625)

Similarly, in Pichccapunco, Tayacaja province, “Mauricio” recalled how

the soldiers … did what they wanted … they arrived, gathered the people up, made them prepare a common pot, they did everything … the soldiers already thought themselves as kings, that really [if] the soldiers ordered something … the residents had to do it. So, there was really … was a terrible fear. The only thing you had to do was to obey the soldiers.[[626]](#footnote-626)

Inside the base lay a world of utter depravity. “Manuel,” from Anco[[627]](#footnote-627) volunteered to serve in the military, and described his fellow soldiers. Overcoming military suspicions due to his highland origins, he eventually served in the Pampas base and explained that

I was the only soldier from the highlands. At that time, 750 recruits had come from Lima,

all types of people of ill repute, delinquents, with scars on their face, on their body […] there was even one person who had been in jail for 15 years; so, then it is easy to understand [what happened when] these soldiers came to the communities at night and the came into the homes of the residents and robbed […] they did not even understand Quechua.[[628]](#footnote-628)

At the Manta base, after being interrogated and tortured, many victims were cast into a watery pit teeming with toads.[[629]](#footnote-629) This practice had a symbolic component, as in Andean cosmology the toad is an ominous creature associated with the devil and the pachacuti.[[630]](#footnote-630) Thus, by enclosing captives in a toad-filled cavity, they were symbolically casting them into hell. Sexual abuse was also rampant at the bases, and women were routinely abducted for that purpose. “David,” in San Antonio related how at the Manta base there were “women also … wow, how much partying, how many sons have been left by the soldiers, many, even my sister … when my sister visited me, they grabbed her.”[[631]](#footnote-631) Captives were also forced to entertain the troops by presenting musical and dance performances, or providing ducks so that the troops could be entertained by playing “*jalapato*,” or “pull the duck.” This consists of stringing up a live duck by its feet on a rope between two poles, the height of which can be raised and lowered by a person pulling on one end of the rope via a pulley. People, either on foot, mule or horse, then try to tear the duck off of the rope, while the person controlling the rope pulls the rope to keep the flailing waterfowl just out of their reach. [[632]](#footnote-632)

Just being male, and worse, with long hair, was sufficient pretext for the military to kidnap, torture and interrogate people, as was the case of sixteen-year-old “David.” He had recently returned from Cañete where he had sought work to support his mother in San Antonio. One Sunday afternoon, having gone to a neighboring market to sell one of his sheep, he was walking home when an army patrol drove by. A soldier called out to him, “Hey kid, come with us” to Jerusalem, and he boarded the truck. Once they arrived there, the soldiers would not let him go. Beating him, they demanded that he accompany them to their base in Manta, where he encountered around thirty soldiers and forty prisoners. As he explained, “they captured me that way with a lie.” Having secured their prisoner, they began to interrogate him, seeking to extract information concerning who in San Antonio supported Sendero. He recalled that “they tortured me, they wanted to waterboard me … they tortured us there at night, they beat us and left us” unable to speak.[[633]](#footnote-633) He would remain there for the next two weeks, during which time they administered soporifics, while on other occasions “they made me stay up all night, they made me sing.” This horrific experience inspired him to defend, and become a leader of, his community.[[634]](#footnote-634) Indeed, many post-conflict local authorities or civil society leaders had formative experiences as youths during the conflict which reaffirmed their commitment to their communities.[[635]](#footnote-635)

In Manta, the base became a theater of the surreal. “Daniel,” from Acobambilla, recalled how as a child

Those of us who were studying in the little schools … for the anniversary of the base we all had to go and parade from very far away, leave at one in the morning to arrive at the base at ten and then parade… I was in sixth grade… and the lieutenant had got drunk because it was the anniversary and then at eight in the morning the ceremony began and then … the lieutenant said to one of his subordinates ‘Since it is the special day for the base, throw the grenade’… and the subordinate throws the grenade right where the people were [making sound of explosion] … everyone was covered in blood [and] many people later died … there were many seriously wounded, from the headquarters came the helicopter to help us, I myself was injured in the knee … they brought me from there to Huancayo, it was a little bit abusive, no? And the curious thing was that [the lieutenant] was close to the bomb and it did not reach him but it did many other people, including his subordinate [who] had to obey, because after the act the lieutenant said ‘Shit, why are you moving, why’ because the people were already covered in blood it was to ask for help … and after seeing so much blood then the lieutenant I think sobered up … I think they removed him from that post because … he had practically committed a crime.[[636]](#footnote-636)

Just as Sendero targeted people based on their relation to their enemies, such as when they killed the wife of Sacsamarca’s justice of the peace in the absence of their original target, so too did the military. One resistente there, “Miguel," was repeatedly arrested and abused by the military because he was a relative of Justo Gutíerrez, Sacsamarca’s home grown rebel leader. What he repeatedly tried to explain to his captors was that although Gutíerrez was his relative, there was a life-long enmity between them. As a young man, “Miguel” had a romantic interest in a local girl. In an effort to prepare himself for the future he hoped to spend with her, he had ventured to the lowlands in search of work. After a period away and having saved his money, he returned to Sacsamarca, hoping to surprise his girlfriend. In the end, she was not the only one who was surprised, as “Miguel” encountered her in bed with Justo Gutíerrez. The betrayal was the end of his relationship with them both, and, the source of their discord. On one occasion, when the armed forces came to town, they killed the father of Justo Gutíerrez on his ranch, and also arrested “Miguel” as a rebel supporter. On another occasion he was abducted, interrogated and tortured for forty days at Huancavelica’s military base.[[637]](#footnote-637)

Just as being related to a rebel could make someone a suspect, so too could sharing part of a name with an insurgent. As one resident in Churcampa recalled

That year 1988 I went … to my mother’s community. From one moment to the next, the military arrived and they asked me “Who is Félix, and I told him “I am, sir, what is this about?” And they told me “Ah, now, shit, come over here!” and… immediately they tied me up … They brought me here to the Churcampa military base … and began to beat me up, to torture me. I would ask them why they were doing this … and they told me I was a subversive. These soldiers had the name of a subversive that was the same as my paternal last name, but not my maternal last name. I was detained for two weeks and afterwards they sent me to Ayacucho, there in the base in Ayacucho they totally tortured me … and they said to me “Shit! Are you going to talk or not? What was I going to say! If I did not know anything! I even told them to just kill me and get it over with and they said “No, shit, you need to talk!” They tortured me for five afternoons, sticking me in a cylinder filled with water. The last afternoon they beat me until I passed out … and after 20 or 25 days they say “This one doesn’t know anything” and just then a high commander ordered that they take me to Pampas. And in Pampas, another big beating, and they sent to check my record at the national level and I had no record, and for this reason they set me free.[[638]](#footnote-638)

Although such bases would play an important role in gathering intelligence and ultimately turning the tide of the insurgency, the human cost was immense. Moreover, the initial result was an increase of attacks and fatalities perpetrated by both Sendero and the military.[[639]](#footnote-639)

**“So, what do we do here then?” The Expansion of the Rondas[[640]](#footnote-640)**

By 1983, there was an emerging realization that not all Quechua-speakers were rebels or rebel sympathizers.[[641]](#footnote-641) Rural highlanders increasingly realized that Sendero’s initial tolerance for indigenous culture and traditional practices had simply been the short end of the proverbial wedge. The more they learned about Sendero ideology, and experienced its application firsthand, the less they found it had in common with them culturally, politically and economically. With the appointment of new, young cadres in the place of traditional community leaders, extortion replaced reciprocity and executions replaced floggings. As Sendero sought to restrict the quantity of crops planted, seized or prevented the sale of harvests at regional markets, and restricted movement, many sympathizers or supporters began to question whose interests were being served. Rebel conscription of children and Sendero’s insistence that peasants no longer hold customary fiestas, were additional factors precipitating the rupture between rural communities and their new overlords.[[642]](#footnote-642)

Beyond deculturation, market exclusion, strict social control and harsh and summary justice, groups under rebel control also experienced forced marriages, the separation of children from their parents, and unhealthy conditions.[[643]](#footnote-643) As a leader of the community of Cuñi,[[644]](#footnote-644) explained

in the beginning the Senderistas were promoting their ideology of converting the state into a perhaps socialist state, so they went around indoctrinating, confiscating [property]. The fault was when they began to harm innocent people, the humble people of the countryside … from there came the reaction … [and] the failure of Sendero.[[645]](#footnote-645)

In the late 1980s, as Sendero sought to achieve “strategic equilibrium” with the government, the fanaticism, conscription, material demands, hegemony and terror that Sendero visited upon highland and other communities increased dramatically, while any local support which they had enjoyed progressively evaporated.[[646]](#footnote-646) Practices such as having a family member execute a deserter or informant went far beyond what villagers could accept.[[647]](#footnote-647) For many communities, the tipping point towards outright resistance came after a police or military incursion. This almost inevitably prompted the flight of the rebels and left the local residents subject to unsparing and brutal reprisals for having, at the least, harbored the insurgents, even unwillingly.[[648]](#footnote-648) By fleeing in the face of the enemy, Sendero had violated their own promises. Through the historical lens of the patron-client relationship which had prevailed for centuries on haciendas and elsewhere, Sendero had violated the central tenet of being a patron: protection in exchange for loyalty.[[649]](#footnote-649) When the military left the community and the Popular Committee returned, a climate of local dismay and resentment against Sendero prevailed, as did distrust, reprisals, and increasing abuse by the Committee members.[[650]](#footnote-650)

Even during García’s term it was evident, and increasingly accepted, that both the early, police-led, and subsequently military-led, efforts which relied on indiscriminate force to contain the conflict had failed. Civil and military leaders began to acknowledge that Peru’s indigenous population had legitimate complaints concerning economic, social and political exclusion, along with those concerning rampant human rights abuses. They increasingly recognized that not all Quechua speakers were subversives, and that many communities were hostages to, not sympathizers with, Sendero. They also saw the counterproductive nature of their tactics, which often were not much different that Sendero’s. As a result, by the late 1980s the military had begun to adapt their approach in an effort to build a more productive relationship with Andean communities.[[651]](#footnote-651) In effect, they recognized that General Huamán’s critique of the counterinsurgency, which had led to his dismissal in 1984, had been correct. Sendero would not be defeated by military force alone; it would require a more “population-centric” approach that included development assistance, greater respect for human rights, and a more selective approach to the use of repression.[[652]](#footnote-652)

Moreover, they began to realize that indigenous communities, which they had seen as part of the problem, could in fact be an integral part of the solution. Sendero’s wanton excesses had, like the military’s, alienated much of the peasantry. Increasingly, military leaders embraced the idea of involving communities in their own defense through the establishment of rondas. These groups first emerged as local initiatives in northern Peru in the mid-1970s in response to livestock rustling, and developed into organizations focused on conflict resolution, maintaining order and on occasion challenging corrupt local officials.[[653]](#footnote-653) By the early 1980s, they had developed into Peru’s largest rural social movement and were an expression of community identity and efficacy in managing their own affairs, often in the context of a weak, absent or corrupt state.[[654]](#footnote-654)

In contrast to those in the north, the rondas in the central Andean conflict zone were oriented towards defending their communities from Sendero attacks, and were also known as the *Defensa Civil Antisubversiva* (Antisubversive Civil Defense, DECAS). They first emerged in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac in the early and mid-1980s. Despite a woeful lack of training and armament, ronderos quickly demonstrated their determination and effectiveness, and many died in combat or through selective assassination by Sendero hit squads. Underscoring Sendero’s recognition of the threat they posed, in early June, 1989, Sendero executed forty-five ronderos in the region of Castrovirreyna, and in early October, 1989 they executed twenty-seven ronderos in the region of Angaraes.[[655]](#footnote-655) Family members of ronderos were also targeted, such as when, in August, 1984, a Sendero column murdered the wife of a ronda leader in the village of Pachaclla.[[656]](#footnote-656)

Given a situation which the neither the military nor police had been able to control, it was increasingly apparent that the rondas should be expanded to complement the actions of the military.[[657]](#footnote-657) For their part, highland residents had to decide not whom they were going to stand for, but rather whom they were going to stand against. Many ultimately choose to support the establishment of rondas to resist Sendero, although others were formed under pressure from the military operating from counterinsurgency bases.[[658]](#footnote-658) Some communities, however refused to organize rondas, such as Choclococha, Pomacocha, Cuñi and Parisa.[[659]](#footnote-659) As elsewhere, comuneros often feared Sendero’s response to their formation more than the military’s suspicion for not organizing them, or supported the insurgents.[[660]](#footnote-660)

One of the advantages of organizing and participating in a ronda was that the military had more firepower and did a better job of protecting villages than Sendero, and they did not demand that they abandon their customs, culture, harvests and markets. Moreover, rondas gave comuneros a sense of efficacy and were a means to defend, and express, their identity.[[661]](#footnote-661) Among the ranks of ronderos were former Senderistas conscripted as a form of atonement, and others who joined voluntarily after having become disillusioned with the movement. In either case, they were often in a position to identify their erstwhile comrades.[[662]](#footnote-662) Whatever their composition, as “Fermín,” a rondero in the region of Santo Tomás de Pata recalled “the army used [us] as a protective shield … when you went out to patrol, they sent the ronderos before them.”[[663]](#footnote-663) Rondas that patrolled alone were also effective, and would kill or turn in those they could capture to counterinsurgency bases where they would be interrogated, tortured, and usually killed. Despite the efficacy of the such citizen patrols, their relationship with the military was fractious. Locals resented the imperious, abusive and often distrusting actions and attitudes of the armed forces, who were usually from the lowlands, did not speak Quechua, and placed seemingly endless demands upon the community.[[664]](#footnote-664)

Near the border with Ayacucho in the village of Chupacc, from the military’s perspective Sendero’s earlier success in the area could not have occurred without the support of the local population. As a result, while the community was not given a choice by the military in organizing a ronda in 1984, they did not need much persuasion either given the killings they had experienced from both sides. As “Eduardo” recalled, the community was

too tired … the military came, killing, Sendero came, killing … the police would come, already with ash, with sticks … [Sendero] killed house by house, all night to the morning, they arrived … they grabbed, killed, burned … they would say that they have four eyes … four ears … they killed with a stone, a knife, rope.[[665]](#footnote-665)

He added,

the community could no longer support the massacres, the other comes, kill, the other comes, kill, so, what do we do here then? … If we analyze it well, the Senderistas go around with arms and munitions, with a knife, but the other comes completely equipped so how do you think that we of the community and also from the countryside are going to … stop it? So, there was then another change, another …thought … it is better that we organize the people here.[[666]](#footnote-666)

Such resolve and organization paid off as the ronda was key to their retaking of their village, although at a heavy price.[[667]](#footnote-667) For example, in October, 1989, Sendero moved in on Chupacc, held a “people’s court” and subsequently executed twenty-six people in the village, leaving only 180 residents. The next year, more were killed in an effort to prevent participation in the national elections.[[668]](#footnote-668)

On patrol, ronderos from Chupacc, and elsewhere, were a relatively easy target. Composed of men, women and children, initially they were armed only with traditional woven slings, stones and machetes.[[669]](#footnote-669) Having organized a detail to escape and alert the authorities, and communicating with whistles and sounds they would make by spinning their slings “[T]hey patrolled all night long, day and night, we would put a spy on the hill, and others stayed in the ravines … we organized … no more would we let them come in” to town.[[670]](#footnote-670) In 1990, in Pata Coral, there was a camp of ronderos from Chupacc and other communities, and at around 4:00 A.M. an alarm was sounded as Sendero attacked. Although one rondero escaped to alert the military, the rebels soon broke through their fence and killed thirty-six people with “only stones [and] knives.”[[671]](#footnote-671) By February 1991, the military had provided the ronderos with twenty shotguns. This was not enough, as on May 25, Sendero killed eight more ronderos from Chupacc.[[672]](#footnote-672)

Rondas were active elsewhere in Angaraes province, such as in the communities of Julcamarca, Yuraccocha, Atunakihuay, Anchahuay, Seccla and Cuticsa. In Cuticsa, which was ravaged by Sendero, ronderos would go so far as to burn *ichu*, a straw-like plant that grows on the altiplano, to keep Sendero at bay at night and deny them the ability to conceal themselves.[[673]](#footnote-673) Defensive measures often proved insufficient, as in 1989 when Sendero defeated the local ronda in Seccla,[[674]](#footnote-674) and set the town ablaze, burning forty-two homes.[[675]](#footnote-675)

In Huancavelica province, communities formed rondas in the vicinity of Chopcca, which was highly contested by both Sendero and the military. Its strategic value lay in the fact that it is near where the provinces of Huancavelica, Angaraes and Acobamba meet.[[676]](#footnote-676) While rondas generally were led by men, a group of women organized thirty-four communities in this region to form a ronda. As one organizer, “Yolanda,” explained

Given the facts, the men felt incapable to defend themselves and we the women began to walk in order to organize ourselves, community by community … we were fearless, and in this way we succeeded in strengthening the organization to defend our husbands … joining together as a shield for the men, without fear of death … we were always alert, even at night we slept with sticks, stones and slings, [at] the slightest alert, we would all come out ready to fight.[[677]](#footnote-677)

Rondas were also active in Churcampa province, such as in the community of Maraypata. There, in late December, 1983, the local ronda, with help from that of nearby Paccay, repelled a twenty-strong Sendero assault. Employing a traditional, and effective, approach, they used a hail of stones to stop the column, killing four rebels, and enabling them to capture the rest and hand them over to the Millpo military base in Churcampa.[[678]](#footnote-678) Throughout the region, ronderos soon saw the benefit of their initiative. Not only did they reduce Sendero attacks, largely displacing the insurgents to other parts of the region as well as Junín, but it also led to fewer violent military incursions into their villages.[[679]](#footnote-679)

The ranks of ronderos expanded considerably in the late 1980s, and by the 1990 elections approximately 3,000 villages had organized rondas in the departments of Ayacucho, Apurímac, Junín and Huancavelica. With the election of Fujimori came significantly greater legal, moral and material support for rondas. In 1991, Fujimori issued a law which gave rondas legal standing and also distributed 10,000 shotguns to further increase their ability to defend their villages.[[680]](#footnote-680) This marked a turning point in the conflict, as by 1992 there would be at least 25,000 men and women organized into rondas, far eclipsing Sendero’s estimated 6,000 guerrillas.[[681]](#footnote-681)

Despite upgraded, if basic, weapons, and some military training, ronderos continued to pay a high price in the conflict. As part of Fujimori’s support for rondas, that of Chupacc received twenty shotguns in February, 1991. It was not enough. In November of that year, Sendero reappeared, determined to punish the community for their cooperation with the government and military. The ronderos were unable to repel the assault, and rebels killed thirty-seven comuneros, including the elderly, women and children, and set fire to the village. The survivors abandoned the ruins, making the four-hour trek to the nearest police station.[[682]](#footnote-682) Ironically, several sons of more prosperous villagers there had gone to study at the San Cristóbal de Guamanga National University in Ayacucho, and would ultimately join Sendero. What their parents thought would be the key to advancement instead led to the ruin of their village.[[683]](#footnote-683) Similar events played out in Santo Tomás de Pata, wheresixty-two ronderos were killed, and elsewhere in the region.[[684]](#footnote-684) Towns also went up in flames, such as in June 1991 when fifty rebels invaded Santo Tomás de Pata, blew up the health post and burned forty homes.[[685]](#footnote-685)

Between 1989 and 1992, violence reached a new peak in the region, as Sendero claimed to have achieved “strategic equilibrium” with the military. This was a mistaken belief, as Sendero’s modus operandi of assassinations, removing traditional authorities, preventing access to markets, looting, and not defending villages they had controlled had largely eliminated any local support they had. This erosion of support, combined with the expansion of and better training for ronderos, had paved the way for more effective operations of both rondas and military.[[686]](#footnote-686) This was a development which Guzmán did not anticipate and fundamentally changed the nature and course of the conflict. Moreover, not only did rondas provide communities with a long absent sense of efficacy, they helped to fill the void created by the absence of the state in many regions.[[687]](#footnote-687) Even after the conflict many would continue to provide services to their communities and serve as an interlocutor in community relations with the state.[[688]](#footnote-688)

**Cornered in the Capital**

Apart from the rondas, another development which Guzmán did not account for was enhanced intelligence gathering and application, especially by that of the police-run GEIN. Their patience and persistence brought them ever closer to Guzmán, with their raids resulting in narrow escapes for Guzmán and troves of information on the movement for the government. When he and Elena Iparraguirre were finally captured, they were living in the upper middle-class Surquillo neighborhood, in the home of Carlos Incháustegui and Maritza Corrido Lecca. Corrido Lecca was a dance instructor, and their home also served as an academy. Intelligence operations had raised suspicions about the home, which were seemingly confirmed by the amount of food brought in for, and garbage produced by, only two supposed residents. Further examination confirmed this when the trash was found to contain hair from numerous people. Once the home was under surveillance, they noticed that Corrido Lecca would on some occasions deposit trash a few blocks away from their home. Repeated examination of the home’s refuse turned up Winston Lights cigarette butts, and Tigason brand psoriasis medication. This seemed to confirm their suspicions as Guzmán was known to smoke that brand and to use Tigason to treat his skin ailment.[[689]](#footnote-689) When the DIRCOTE agents, under the command of Antonio Ketín Vidal, stormed the residence on September 12, 1992, they found Guzmán in his library watching television, without weapons or bodyguards.[[690]](#footnote-690)

Along with Guzmán and Iparraguirre, the government also apprehended two other Permanent Central Committee members, and a plethora of documents. Within months, nineteen of the twenty-two members of the Central Committee had been captured.[[691]](#footnote-691) Guzmán, while versed in Marxist dialectical views of history, had failed to see the dialectical process which would result in the undoing of his movement. The incessant use of extreme violence, so central to “Gonzalo Thought,” in the end only served to undermine any widespread popular support Sendero had or may otherwise have garnered. Similarly, the highly centralized and personalistic leadership of the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” proved to be double-edged. The fact that Sendero’s ideology, strategy, tactics, organization and operations, and even documents, were to such a large extent centered on or held by Guzmán meant that with his capture, there was no one prepared to take his place.[[692]](#footnote-692) Moreover, just as indigenous communities were often prisoners to Sendero, Sendero was a prisoner of its own ideology. Guzmán and his acolytes failed to understand the aspirations of many peasants, which included not just education and health, but social and political inclusion and modernity in the form of electricity, roads, irrigation, agricultural and livestock extension and access to markets for their products.[[693]](#footnote-693) Despite Guzmán’s ideological affinity to Mariátegui, he did not take heed of his admonition that “A society cannot be transformed artificially, still less a peasant society deeply attached to its traditions and its legal institutions.” (7 interpretive essays, Austin 1971, 53-55.[[694]](#footnote-694)

Once Guzmán was captive, the government orchestrated an elaborate plan to convince him to urge his followers to lay down their arms. Using concocted news accounts, and five captive Central Committee members whom the government had persuaded to support their plan, they prevailed on Guzmán to support an agreement to end the armed conflict and pursue change through political means. The result was a letter, drafted by intelligence officials, from Guzmán to Fujimori seeking a peace agreement, which was utilized by the government to maximal political benefit.[[695]](#footnote-695) In 1992, seeking to promote a definitive end to the conflict, the Peruvian congress passed the Repentance Law, which offered lenient sentences for insurgents, either from Sendero or the MRTA, who surrendered in exchange for information concerning insurgent operations and members. This requirement would in some cases lead to false accusations against innocent people.[[696]](#footnote-696)

**A Persistent Conflict**

While the capture of Guzmán in September, 1992, largely ended the conflict on a national scale, sporadic attacks continued in Huancavelica, such as that of July 25, 1995 on the road from Lachocc to the city of Huancavelica in which ten police officers and their civilian driver were killed.[[697]](#footnote-697) Overall, throughout Huancavelica, between Guzmán’s capture and 1999, Sendero led over twenty-eight attacks.[[698]](#footnote-698)

Regionally, two rural vestigial armed movements endured, one based in the UHV, and the other in the VRAEM. As we have seen, both regions had been of strategic importance to Sendero in the 1980s and early 1990s due to their remoteness from government authority, and the revenue which could be derived through their insertion into the cocaine trade.[[699]](#footnote-699) This enabled the remnant factions of Sendero to carry out a sustained, low-intensity insurgency.[[700]](#footnote-700)

The group in the UHV was commanded by Oscar Ramírez Durand, and initially called *Sendero Rojo* (Red Path), before being rebranded as *Proseguir* (Persevere).[[701]](#footnote-701) Ramírez Durand, also known as “Comrade Feliciano,” ostensibly respected Guzmán’s call to negotiate a settlement with the government, if only to “buy time” for the revolutionary endeavor. Durand’s hardline ideological stance was matched by the strict discipline he demanded from his followers, some of whom were executed for insubordination. This alienated many within his faction and ultimately led to his betrayal and capture in July, 1999.[[702]](#footnote-702) Unlike the UHV faction, that of the VRAEM, which calls itself the *Militarizado Partido Comunista del Peru* (Militarized Communist Party of Peru, MPCP) is led by Victor Quispe Palomino, also known as “Comrade José.” Palomino repudiated Guzmán’s call to negotiate, viewing it as nothing more than evidence of the government’s manipulation of the captive Guzmán.[[703]](#footnote-703)

Following Durand’s capture in 1999, the UHV faction was led by Florindo Eleuterio Flores, who adopted the *nom de guerre* of “Comandante Artemio.”[[704]](#footnote-704) He had created an alliance with Eduardo Ticerán, who had previously led the *Central Nacional Agropecuaria Cocalera del Perú* (Peruvian National Coca Farmers Union, CENACOP). Together, they coordinated the production and transport of coca leaf and its derivatives, and collected taxes from approximately 13,000 coca producers in the Monzón Valley.[[705]](#footnote-705) In February, 2012, following an intelligence operation during the administration of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), security forces captured Eleuterio Flores, who was held responsible for 131 deaths since 1985. As was the case with Ramírez Durand, Flores was betrayed by an erstwhile follower, injured in a firefight and subsequently captured. Beyond the military value of his capture, it had symbolic value as Flores had been the last of the Sendero Central Committee members still at large.[[706]](#footnote-706) Despite his remarkable trajectory and tenure as a rebel, he recognized that the tide had long since turned against the insurgency when, only months before his capture, he sought a negotiated solution with the government. As with Guzmán, his capture was followed in 2012 and 2013 by that of much of the UHV faction hierarchy, in effect defeating them. This allowed security forces to focus squarely on the MPCP in the VRAEM, which continues to derive its revenue from activities associated with cocaine production.[[707]](#footnote-707)

The MPCP is strategically based in the district of Vizcatán del Ene, in Junín’s Satipo province, which lies close to the border of the region of Huancavelica and provides access to Bolivia and Brazil. The area encompasses up to 200,000 people, most of whom are involved in small-scale coca cultivation and subsistence agriculture.[[708]](#footnote-708) Quispe Palomino has generally viewed the killing of civilians as counterproductive unless they are suspected government informants, and instead has focused armed actions on state security agents.[[709]](#footnote-709) Given the lack of roads in the region, the military and police use helicopters to transport personnel, provisions and armament to their dozens of jungle outposts. Their vulnerability, especially when landing and taking off, has provided a steady stream of targets for the militants, and in some cases a source of arms and other supplies from downed aircraft.[[710]](#footnote-710)

As in the 1980s and early 1990s, the militants offer something of value to the local population: better prices for cocalero’s product which MPCP leaders negotiate with local trafficking organizations, a degree of protection from trafficker-enforcers, the imposition of greater social order in the region, and a concerted response to government efforts to curb coca and cocaine production.[[711]](#footnote-711) The use of land routes, which had increased in the 1990s, began to taper off after 2013 as traffickers took advantage of limited aerial interdiction by Peruvian and Bolivian authorities. Local militants also continue to levy fees to protect airstrips in areas they control. While the coca economy remains the primary source of revenue for Sendero in the region, other illegal activities, such as unregulated timber and placer gold extraction, continue to provide additional revenue under similar schemes.[[712]](#footnote-712)

While the MPCP leadership has succeeded in creating a profitable enterprise in the region, and maintained a limited military capacity, they have had less success in attracting any widespread popular support for their larger revolutionary objectives. They have also been unsuccessful in significantly expanding their militant activities into new regions.[[713]](#footnote-713) For their part, the Peruvian military has maintained their lenient view of coca producers. Rather than viewing them as rebels or delinquents, they recognize that many of them were displaced to the region as a result of the violence and economic collapse during the 1980s and 1990s, and that coca production is a survival strategy. Just as before, their livelihood continues to be conditioned by what at the end of the day are extortionate policies of the MPCP.[[714]](#footnote-714)

Reflecting this view, the government has continued to place greater emphasis on “crop substitution” programs, in which peasants are encouraged to produce new, legal crops in lieu of coca. Such policies are undertaken in concert with infrastructural and social investments in the region, along with efforts to limit access to inputs vital for the production of cocaine. The success of such efforts has varied with the price fluctuations of coca, and has also been inhibited by frequent troop rotations. While rotations every few months limit opportunities for corruption, they also impede the development of local relationships which are vital to intelligence collection.[[715]](#footnote-715)

Intelligence and military operations in the region are conducted under the aegis of the army’s VRAEM Special Command, which was established in 2008. The Special Command, and the policies it pursues, is the product of the reassessment of Peruvian counterinsurgency strategy which began in the mid-1980s. This has resulted in a more “population-centric” approach to confronting insurgency which complements selective military action with development assistance, improved intelligence collection and application, enhanced coordination among civilian, law enforcement, intelligence and military officials, and maintaining a more rooted presence in affected areas. Despite this, the Peruvian military continues to grapple with issues of local level troop resourcefulness and agility.[[716]](#footnote-716)

Operating under a state of emergency since 2016, the operations of the Special Command have proven effective in eroding the capacity and morale of the MPCP. For example, in August, 2013, they dealt the organization a severe blow by killing two of its most important leaders. Its military leader, Orlando Alejandro Borda Casafranca, also known as "Comrade Alipio," and its political leader, Marco Antonio Quispe Palomino, also known as "Comrade Gabriel,” fourth in the MPCP hierarchy, were killed in the town of Pampas following their betrayal by a member of a local drug gang. The death of “Gabriel” had a degree of symbolic value, as he was the brother of the group’s leader, Victor Quispe Palomino. Beyond weakening the MPCP leadership, the death of these militants eroded the group’s morale and spurred militants to quit the fight.[[717]](#footnote-717)

Following this loss, Victor Quispe Palomino placed the military leadership under the command of Tarcela Loya Vilchez, known by her nom de guerre of “Comrade Olga,” and replaced his deceased brother with another brother, Jorge Quispe Palomino, also known as “Comrade Raúl.” In a further blow to their forces, and morale, in March, 2021 security forces announced that “Raúl” had died from a wound, kidney ailment, or both.[[718]](#footnote-718) Also contributing to the deterioration of their military capacity has been an erosion of rebel ranks. By 2021, the MPCP had an estimated active membership of about 350-500 people, with fewer than 100 engaged in armed actions.[[719]](#footnote-719) Overall, MPCP rebels are in a much weaker position than in the late 1980s or early 1990s, economically, militarily, and in terms of their relevance, and appeal, to local residents or wider polity.[[720]](#footnote-720)

Despite the success of the VRAEM Special Command in targeting leadership and largely confining insurgent actions to the VRAEM, the MPCP has not been eliminated.[[721]](#footnote-721) Most rebel activities are focused on propaganda efforts in the departments of Huancavelica, Junín, and San Martín. There are also occasional attacks on Peruvian security forces as well as on mining and other commercial activities in the region, usually as a result of resisting extortion.[[722]](#footnote-722) Although weakened, the MPCP was able to launch an attack in the village of San Miguel del Ene,[[723]](#footnote-723)in May, 2021, in which sixteen civilians were killed in an effort to dissuade inhabitants from voting for Keiko Fujimori in the presidential runoff elections the following month.[[724]](#footnote-724)

On August 11, 2022, a military operation code named “*Operación Patriota*” (Operation Patriot) led by the VRAEM Special Command attacked what was believed to be Quispe Palomino’s stronghold in the VRAEM. Despite fierce resistance, Peruvian forces were able to overrun the rebel lair, which included a complex tunnel network. Although the military lost two of their own and was unable to capture Quispe over the multi-day operation, radio intercepts led them to believe that he was injured in the operation.[[725]](#footnote-725) If so, then like the vestigial movement he leads, he is down, but not out.

**Chapter Six: Legacies of Invisibility and Loss**

Thirty years after the capture of Abimael Guzmán, the underlying and historical dynamics of widespread poverty, social and cultural exclusion and internal community divisions which gave rise to the conflict persist in the region. Throughout Huancavelica, many rural communities remain shattered, as their leaders struggle in their quest for repopulation and to overcome what is perhaps the most significant legacy of the conflict. Public investment in roads, schools and health posts offer the trappings of development, but also mask centuries of neglect and have done little to mitigate resident’s feelings of invisibility or contribute directly to improved standards of living. Such investment also does not address the intangible costs of the war, such as lost educational opportunities and cultural erosion. Other invisible consequences continue to reverberate for many victims, as feelings of powerlessness, low self-esteem, personal and social distrust and other psychological effects of loss have impeded them from developing relationships and reconstructing their lives in a productive manner.[[726]](#footnote-726)

**From a Colonial to Modern Genocide**

As we have seen, the origins of the conflict stretch back to the colonial period. With the arrival of the Spanish, original peoples were forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism by clergy who claimed to be saving their souls, and many were forced to live in villages where they were kept under the vigilance of, and exploited by, their local priest and Spanish colonists. This paved the way for those who survived the demographic collapse to be forcibly inducted into capitalism through the imposition of the repartimiento de mercancías and various forced and quasi-forced labor systems, along with a bevy of exactions which could generally only be paid for in specie. Native toil, whether it was in Huancavelica’s toxic mines and refining operations, countless silver mining centers, or in the haciendas, ranches and textile mills which sustained them, was a critical component of the emergence of global economic networks.[[727]](#footnote-727)

At the same time, indigenous people were, and often continue to be, structurally excluded from the benefits of the highly ascriptive system into which they had been conscripted, whether it be in terms of economic, social or political advancement. Spiritually, although they were integrated into the Catholic Church, indigenous people were prevented from becoming priests or assuming meaningful positions of religious responsibility. Physical violence, monistic political structures, the forcible extraction of indigenous surplus and a denigratory narrative which placed Indians at or near the level of animals, acted synergistically to legitimate and perpetuate the zero-sum game system to which they were subject.[[728]](#footnote-728) Systematically exploited and subject to unremitting deculturizing efforts, they were treated as little more than an expendable “natural resource.”[[729]](#footnote-729)

With independence, the veneer of colonial paternalism was removed. By the 1840s, liberal governments sought greater integration into the global economy through expanding the extraction and export of natural resources, and the development of the infrastructure to enable it, often with coerced labor. Seeking to bring more land into production for export products, pressures on indigenous community, and church, lands increased as the hacendado class expanded its control over both land and rural labor.[[730]](#footnote-730) Despite frictions with nineteenth-century Liberal governments, on the whole the Catholic Church continued to uphold the system. Rural areas were largely excluded from public investment except for railroads and other projects which facilitated resource extraction. Racist narratives, updated with Positivisitc beliefs, continued to reinforce social and cultural exclusion in a caste society where authoritarianism, patron-client relations, indigenous subservience and a zero-sum game mentality prevailed. The result was social, political and economic exclusion, where for most comuneros economic advancement, much less security, remained an illusion.

Oppressed and largely invisibilized, indigenous communities in Huancavelica and elsewhere nevertheless proved remarkably resilient, buoyed by traditions of reciprocity, communal work, and time-honored patterns of local governance; all of which reinforced their identity. The insurgency changed this, as Quechua speakers faced unprecedented violence, the theft of their livestock, crops and property, and restrictions imposed by Sendero on what and how much they produced. The massive outmigration which this provoked rivaled, if not exceeded, that associated with fleeing the colonial mita. For the rural people of Huancavelica and elsewhere, the conflict was not just an insurgency, it was another pachacuti.[[731]](#footnote-731)

It was also another genocide.[[732]](#footnote-732) During the colonial period, beyond the denotative genocide associated with the demographic collapse, genocidal policies reflected dehumanizing views of native peoples and entailed the legally sanctioned forced relocation of people into reducciones. To this was added a concerted, multifaceted and systematic effort to destroy their material and spiritual culture and language. These practices, along with forced labor and the familial separation associated with the mita also affected human reproduction.[[733]](#footnote-733) Such policies in Latin America influenced Rafael Lemkin’s development of the concept and term of “genocide” in his classic work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. In it, he defines genocide “the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group … effected through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive people.”[[734]](#footnote-734) This is implemented through actions which destroy the

essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan are the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.[[735]](#footnote-735)

He noted that “Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group: the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor,” often via colonialism.[[736]](#footnote-736) Lemkin delineated differing forms of genocide, such as “physical” genocide, which subsumed “massacre and mutilation, deprivation of livelihood, slavery;” “biological” genocide entailing the “separation of families [and] sterilization;” and “cultural genocide” as a result of “desecration and destruction of cultural symbols … cultural leadership … cultural centers, prohibition of cultural activities, [and] forceful conversion.”[[737]](#footnote-737) In Lemkin’s framework, and the International Convention on Genocide subsequently adopted at his urging by the United Nations, the deliberate extermination of people was not a requisite of genocide.[[738]](#footnote-738) Within this context, Spanish colonial policies involved an intentional effort to “destroy, in whole or in part, a[n] … ethnical, racial … group” by “[k]illing members of the group … [and] [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” and are consistent with the United Nations definition of genocide.[[739]](#footnote-739)

The Sendero Luminoso insurgency led to another highland genocidal experience; another pachacuti for Peru’s indigenous people. In some aspects this was worse than the colonial experience. While the conquest precipitated the demographic implosion, and Spanish authorities sought to subjugate and exploit the native population by destroying their culture, language and ability to resist, Spanish dependence on indigenous labor precluded deliberate and widespread physical extermination except in cases of organized resistance.[[740]](#footnote-740) In contrast, the insurgency in Huancavelica, and the highlands generally, revolved around physical extermination based on physical characteristics, language or socio-political status. Whether it was the military or Sendero, each came with their list, ready to call out the names of those marked for death. Peru’s Minister of War from 1981-1983, General Luís Cisneros articulated the government’s initial indiscriminate, and genocidal, approach to counterinsurgency when he stated that

For the police force to have any success they would have to begin to kill senderistas and non-senderistas, because this is the only way they could ensure success. They kill sixty people and at most there are three senderistas among them.[[741]](#footnote-741)

Later, he added “If to kill two or three senderistas it is necessary to kill 80 innocents, then it does not matter ... The peasants have to decide where they wish to die: with Sendero or the armed forces.”[[742]](#footnote-742)

In their analysis of Sendero’s policies, the CVR noted that among the movement’s explicit objectives was to “induce genocide” and cause “a million deaths.”[[743]](#footnote-743) For his part, Guzmán repeatedly, and hypocritically, accused the government of genocide, asserting that Peru’s armed forces sought “the systematic destruction of a social group for reasons of race, politics, or religion.”[[744]](#footnote-744) Both Degregori and Manrique also refer generically to the military’s “genocidal” war against highlanders during the conflict.[[745]](#footnote-745) Farrell supports this view, noting that the military “in various regions, tried to eliminate entire indigenous populations, simply because the indigenous and terrorists “looked alike.””[[746]](#footnote-746)

While this view is consistent with the International Convention on Genocide, it should also be recognized that the United Nations’ definition has been criticized, especially by scholars from Latin America, for not recognizing mass killings of a political nature such as those in Guatemala and Argentina.[[747]](#footnote-747) Prior to the adoption of the Convention on Genocide, in 1946 the United Nations passed Resolution 96 (1) which recognized intentional killing based on political beliefs as a form of genocide. Such practices were not included in the Convention primarily for two reasons. One was that political views and affiliations are more fluid and variable that that of ethnicity and race. The other was that given Stalin’s efforts to systematically eliminate his political rivals, real or imagined, the Soviet Union opposed the inclusion of political groups in the Convention.[[748]](#footnote-748)

Advocates for the inclusion of the systematic elimination of political groups in the Convention point out that religious beliefs can also change, just as political ones. Moreover, the experiences of Latin America, especially Guatemala (1960-1996) and Argentina (1976-81) underscore how political criteria can be utilized in an effort to identify and exterminate specific groups of people. To that we can add Peru. Just as in Guatemala, where almost a quarter million people perished as a result of military repression, ethnicity became a presumed signifier of political belief.[[749]](#footnote-749)

As the preceding pages make clear, there were clearly deliberate efforts on both sides of the conflict to

destroy, in whole or in part, a[n]… ethnical, racial… group [by] by “[k]illing members of the group … [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group … [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part … [and] [f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[[750]](#footnote-750)

While the forgoing discussion centers on the definition of genocide as developed by Lemkin and applied in international law, other definitions have emerged from the academic literature.[[751]](#footnote-751) For example, while Peter du Preez defines genocide as “the deliberate killing of people primarily because they are categorized as being of a certain kind, with certain attributes,” Pieter Drost asserts that genocide consists of “the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such.”[[752]](#footnote-752) Recognizing that extermination is the consistent thread of definitions of genocide, one can also characterize “exterminatory movements” as “undertakings which had or have as their object, or result in, the total or practical elimination of a people, ethnically or racially defined, class, group, culture, belief system or language.”[[753]](#footnote-753)

Despite differing definitions of genocide, it is clear that highland indigenous communities in Huancavelica and elsewhere were the focus, and victims, of a multidimensional exterminatory and genocidal conflict. While the military, through much of the 1980s, in practice equated rural/indigenous with subversive, Sendero sought to exterminate not only traditional leaders, but the political, social and cultural patterns which they upheld. This last point highlights an unexpected parallel with both Nazi Germany and Argentina’s military dictatorship between 1976 and 1981. In all cases, the actors, be they insurgents or the state, carried out an internally directed ”reorganizing genocide” which sought a fundamental restructuring of society and the values upon which it rested.[[754]](#footnote-754) In Germany, the goal was to create a new “People’s Community,” while in Argentina, the military leaders were committed to the ”Process of National Reorganization.” In the case of Sendero, unlike the Peruvian military, they targeted many highland victims not due to their ethnicity, but rather because they were seen as obstacles to the creation of the new social, political and economic order they sought to impose.[[755]](#footnote-755)

**Conservative Consolidation**

Ironically, far from advancing the Left, Sendero not only delegitimated it, but spurred a conservative shift at many levels of society. Among the political legacies of the conflict is the 1993 constitution. Relative to that of 1979, Peru’s current constitution enhanced presidential power relative to other branches, significantly reduced the economic role of the state, limited labor rights and protections on indigenous lands, favored international capital and more broadly affirmed the neoliberal foundations of the post-conflict state.[[756]](#footnote-756)

In so doing, it both reflected and reinforced the political Right, in both relative and absolute terms. Although this group has lacked a unified political party in the post-conflict era, its members in the business elite, political class and allied media constitute what Vergara and Encinas refer to as a “conservative archipelago.” This alliance has effectively forestalled attempts to weaken the primacy of neoliberal economic policies in Peru.[[757]](#footnote-757) The ability of conservative forces to discredit progressive or left-wing leaders was on full display in the media during the 2021 runoff presidential elections, when many outlets sought to present Pedro Castillo, an indigenous former teacher and union leader from the region of Cajamarca, as an ally of Sendero. Although this effort was not ultimately successful, it sought to take advantage of the tendency of voters, especially those who lived through the violence, to support conservative and hardline approaches to social order when beset by concerns of terroristic violence.[[758]](#footnote-758)

As with the Peruvian Right, the armed forces also emerged from the conflict stronger, with much-improved counterinsurgency strategies, capacities and techniques, and the ability to project them nationally. As we have seen, Peruvian counterinsurgency doctrine has evolved considerably since 1980, as the “old school” approach of relying exclusively on coercion carried out by disjointed and often competing agencies has been supplanted by “population-centric” strategies which combine military and development initiatives. In addition, today’s Peruvian military and intelligence agencies are much more cohesive, coordinated and effective in maintaining and exercising state power in formerly “stateless” areas, all to the detriment of the MPCP.[[759]](#footnote-759) These changes, along with the development of new surveillance technologies, have served to consolidate the power of the state while presenting new challenges to insurgents.

This rightward shift was also facilitated by the decay and disorganization of the Left, first as a result of the conflict and subsequently following the ouster of Pedro Castillo in December, 2022. While a plethora of leftist ideologies has long spawned rivalries and factionalization in Peru, the conflict exacerbated this tendency. Various leftist parties and organizations lost membership to Sendero, the MRTA and even to Fujimori’s political project. In addition, leaders and members of leftist parties were targeted by Sendero, the military and the Comando Redrigo Franco. Beyond delegitimization, disorganization and internal division and decay, the Peruvian Left had earlier been undermined by the global collapse of communism.[[760]](#footnote-760)

It is within this context that the *Movimiento por Amnestía y Derechos Fundamentales* (Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights, MOVADEF) emerged. Founded on instructions of an imprisoned Guzmán in 2009 by senderiastas whom had completed their prison sentences, MOVADEF is a Senderista organization ostensibly dedicated to securing a general amnesty for individuals accused or convicted of terrorism and human rights violations. Their focus has been on securing the release of imprisoned rebels, including Guzmán prior to his death on September 11, 2021. With over 3,000 members and reputed connections to teacher’s unions, MOVADEF is widely reviled in Peruvian society. Unsurprisingly, in 2011, it was denied approval to register as a political party by Peru’s electoral authority.[[761]](#footnote-761)

This political constellation largely precluded the rise of the “New Left” in Peru as was seen in the 2000s in other countries in the region, such as Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina.[[762]](#footnote-762) With the election of Pedro Castillo as president of Peru in 2021, and his advocacy of rewriting the constitution, it appeared that some of the impediments to a resurgent left had been overcome. Rather than invigorating the Left in Peru, however, accusations of associations and sympathies for Sendero and MOVADEF leveled against Castillo and many of his appointees, the widespread corruption of his administration, its inability to effectively govern, and a united Right undermined it.[[763]](#footnote-763)

The conflict also had an immense effect on civil society, especially in rural areas. Almost a quarter of those killed by Sendero were elected officials or leaders of civil society organizations, and slightly more were killed in the conflict than members of the military and police. This had a ripple effect, reducing the pool of leaders available to civil society organizations and political parties in the post-conflict period.[[764]](#footnote-764) Despite this, following the conflict Peru witnessed the creation of numerous organizations dedicated to human rights, often led by advocates with legal training with connections to and support from international organizations. Moreover, the efficacy of such organizations was enhanced by the increase of the legal tools at their disposal, such as the Law of Prior Consultation, which is designed to include affected communities in decisions concerning mineral and hydrocarbon extraction, and the post-conflict creation of the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (national ombuds office), and the Ministry of Interculturality.[[765]](#footnote-765)

The increased concern for human rights also found expression in the establishment of the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación in 2001. Over the next two years, the Commission would gather and publish a multivolume collection of testimonies, statistics and analysis of the insurgency and the government’s response to it. Subsequently, other projects emerged, some of which had CVR participation, involving communities in projects and workshops to explore and document memories of the period, and victim’s aspirations for the future. In so doing, they employed various media such as visual arts, songs, photographs, and interviews of those affected by the conflict.[[766]](#footnote-766) Engaging traumatized communities was often a difficult task, as some residents feared that their testimony could be used against them, or their family or friends. In addition, some of those who survived the conflict found themselves in a “gray zone” concerning their and other’s role in it, which could straddle coercion and complicity. Many had worked through their emotions and come to terms with their and other’s actions in the insurgency, and had little interest in opening old wounds.[[767]](#footnote-767) There was, as González notes, a degree of “social amnesia” resulting from “public secrecy, that which is known but can’t be articulated.”[[768]](#footnote-768)

**“We live ignored:” Legacies of Invisibility[[769]](#footnote-769)**

In Huancavelica today, on the surface there has been considerable change, and improvement, since the effective defeat of the Shining Path in 1992. One major change is the use of the mining canon, or intergovernmental mining revenue transfers which redistribute income from mining (and hydrocarbon) activities to regional and municipal governments, and universities, in the respective regions where the minerals are extracted. Of mining revenues, one-half of the income tax paid by mining companies has been distributed since 2001 via the mining canon, while additional transfers include royalties, distributed since 2004, and certain fees, shared since 1992. Municipalities are the principal beneficiaries, receiving around seventy-five percent of the mining canon, and around eighty-five percent of the royalties.[[770]](#footnote-770)

The mining canon has served as an important means to ensure that mineral and hydrocarbon producing regions derive direct benefits from that which is extracted from their regions. In the case of Huancavelica, such transfers, while important, have paled relative to other regions, reflecting comparatively limited mining in the region. Despite this, they share the same challenges associated with such revenue sharing initiatives, including the limited capacity of regional and local governments to effectively, transparently, meaningfully and equitably invest these funds. This may help to explain why such transfers have not translated into reduced levels of social conflict, which was among the reasons for instituting the system.[[771]](#footnote-771) The issue of governmental corruption also figures in this regard. A 2021 study revealed that public perceptions of corruption in Peru are the highest in Latin America, with more than eighty percent of respondents expressing their view that most or all politicians are corrupt.[[772]](#footnote-772)

Although it remains the poorest regional capital in Peru, the population of the city of Huancavelica grew during the conflict as thousands of refugees sought shelter there from the violence. In the city, streets are increasingly being paved, homes are being constructed of brick as opposed to adobe, and the city has regained its tranquility. The cellular telephone and Internet have connected geographically dispersed families, and the establishment of the National University of Huancavelica in 1990 has provided education to thousands of young urban and rural residents. With its founding, the university also took possession of the abandoned Lachocc SAIS, creating the *Centro de Investigación y Desarollo de Camelidos Sudamericnaos* (Lachocc South American Camelids Research and Development Center). Although tensions concerning pasturage still persist with neighboring communities, the expansive operation is dedicated to improving alpaca breeds and products.[[773]](#footnote-773)

State penetration of rural areas has also increased markedly throughout the region.[[774]](#footnote-774)

Even small towns, such as Huachocolpa, Pilchaca and Moya, as well as remote villages such as San Antonio and Santo Tomás de Pata, boast improved plazas, electricity, schools, health posts and some paved roads.[[775]](#footnote-775) In Manta, the former counterinsurgency base lies abandoned, as a road is constructed through what was part of the complex. The scene of so much torment and despair, its watchtower, central patio and the rooms surrounding it, are still standing. Outside of Huachocolpa, only the watchtower remains of the facility near the Recuperada mine that it was constructed to protect, a lonely, eroded specter on a desolate landscape. In Santo Tomás de Pata, the former counterinsurgency base alongside the church is now a health center, transformed from a place to kill into a place to cure.[[776]](#footnote-776)

Change has come slowly, in no small part as a result of the commitment and tenacity of village leaders. In San Antonio, “Miguel,” described how when he returned in 1999 “the whole town was in pieces, there were no homes with metal roofs, total silence, no light, no park, nothing.”[[777]](#footnote-777) Although San Antonio was only integrated into the national electrical grid in 2004, and the former path to town was converted to a dirt road in 2022, conditions in these respects are better than they were.[[778]](#footnote-778) In Yanama, where the road up from Moya was paved in 2022, “Donato” noted, “there is total change, because before we did not have this road … sometimes from Huancayo they would bring their animals here by foot.”[[779]](#footnote-779) He shares his optimism, adding that “I think the situation is improving from what it was before … little by little.”[[780]](#footnote-780) Similarly, in the town of Acobambilla, home to around 4,000 people, there is “new infrastructure, the houses now [have roofs] of tin … the parks are improved, [there is] the police station … now there is … the primary school, the secondary school, [the] health post.”[[781]](#footnote-781)

In some ways, these are jewels on a crown of tin. Despite advancements, the city of Huancavelica remains Peru’s most impoverished regional capital, and overall the region has the highest levels of poverty and extreme poverty in Peru.[[782]](#footnote-782) Even before the conflict, it was experiencing depopulation, with a net decline in 1981 as 125,000 people left in search of a better life.[[783]](#footnote-783) Throughout Huancavelica, and many rural areas of Peru, comuneros remain largely excluded from the benefits of the modern society in which they live, with many condemned to a life characterized by a precarious subsistence. As we have seen, much of this precedes the insurgency, however the conflict exacerbated the underlying tendencies of abusive power relationships, racism, and multifaceted exclusion. Among the greatest legacies of the conflict, however, is its corrosive effects on indigenous communities, much of which appears irreversible due to depopulation. Beyond this, the conflict also undermined and further divided indigenous communities through upending traditional governance patterns and tearing the social fabric which was woven through community rites and reciprocity.

Those living in the city of Huancavelica, and the nearby community of Sacsamarca, face an additional challenge: widespread polymetallic contamination as a result of centuries of cinnabar mining and mercury production. As a consequence, the city is one of the world’s most mercury-contaminated urban areas, where ambient mercury vapor levels are ten times above the global average for non-industrial areas.[[784]](#footnote-784) Compounding the problem is the fact that around one-half of the city’s population of around 50,000 live in adobe homes, which studies have demonstrated contain mercury, lead and arsenic at alarming levels. Many homes are so contaminated that the walls and floors emanate mercury vapors.[[785]](#footnote-785) Similarly, among the city’s public schools, eight of nine have heavy metals above screening levels in their playgrounds.[[786]](#footnote-786)

In Sacsamarca, things are similar. In a sample of twenty-nine homes assessed for heavy metals, eighty percent exceeded Peru’s permissible levels for mercury, fifty-eight percent for arsenic, and forty percent for lead. The historic main plaza of the town, which doubles as a soccer pitch, has lead levels of 6,890 milligrams per kilogram, forty-nine times above the Peruvian environmental standard.[[787]](#footnote-787) The problem lies not just in the soils of Sacsamarca and Huancavelica, but also in the water of the Ichu River which wends through the city. In a government study of eleven sampling points, ten were unsuitable for either animal consumption or even irrigation, in part the result of a lack of an adequate urban sewer treatment facility.[[788]](#footnote-788)

Huancavelica as a region leads Peru, but in some of the most unenviable categories. These include having the highest rates of infant mortality, overall illiteracy, female illiteracy, homes built of earth and with dirt floors, rural dwellers, and people who do not live with a family. They also have the lowest rates of people who have electricity in their homes or use gas for cooking, overall education and of people of working age with higher education.[[789]](#footnote-789) Homes continue to be the scenes of violence in the region, with over one-half of women between fifteen and forty-nine years old indicating that they were victims of physical abuse by their spouse or companion.[[790]](#footnote-790) Reflecting, and responding to, these conditions, between 2007 and 2017, the region lost more population, and had the least number of immigrants, than any other part of Peru.[[791]](#footnote-791)

Given this, it is hardly surprising that many community leaders express a continuing sense of abandonment by both the regional government as well as that in Lima. The tendency for rural residents to feel socially excluded and culturally stigmatized also does not appear to have abated since the insurgency.[[792]](#footnote-792) Communities throughout the regions, such as Sacsamarca, Uralla, Yanama and Chupacc continue their quest for “repopulation.” Seeking to overcome the most visible legacy of the insurgency, many communities offer building plots and access to community lands to induce former comuneros to return. The task is Herculean. For example, when the conflict broke out in 1982, Sacsamarca had a population of around 350 families, however in mid-2019, there were only about forty families living there. As “Efraín,” a local authority put it, despite being just outside of the city of Huancavelica, “we live ignored … there is no state presence [we are the] little ugly duckling.”[[793]](#footnote-793) Another resident, “Miguel,” added, “They don’t give us any importance.”[[794]](#footnote-794) In the village of Ayaccocha[[795]](#footnote-795), a community leader reflected upon the “consequences that … [the conflict] left in the community: massacres, orphan children, widows with much mourning, sadness, depopulation, totally depopulated … some came back and others have not returned to this day.”[[796]](#footnote-796)

Similarly, in Uralla, whereas in 1980 there were around seventy families, by 2006 only fifteen remained. As elsewhere, depopulation has undermined agricultural and livestock production, along with communal traditions and the identities which they sustain.[[797]](#footnote-797) Likewise, prior to the conflict, the community of Yanama was home to around fifty families, while today there are around twenty. Agricultural lands above the town lay abandoned for lack of people to work them, and the village lacks potable water and irrigation. There are few incentives for people to return, as many emigrants have created new lives, and found opportunities, elsewhere. The Cahuide livestock cooperative, which provided jobs, milk, meat and wool to local residents and was destroyed by Sendero, has never been reactivated.[[798]](#footnote-798) Despite a new road and electricity, “Donato” explained that

the biggest challenge is practically to have a town reorganized, as right now we are spread out in all places … in Huancayo, Lima, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, the people are in all places … we need improvements to the sewer system, we need water, we need a lot of things … we need the improvement of our mule roads which sincerely are a shame to travel on.[[799]](#footnote-799)

Other towns remain in a type of suspended animation, like Chupacc, near the border with Ayacucho. Sendero not only killed scores of residents and ronderos, but largely burned the village to the ground, leaving it little more than a ghost town by 1991.[[800]](#footnote-800) Even before the conflict, the village did not have electricity, potable water or a transitable access road. Today, although it has electricity and water, it remains isolated, and repeated efforts to secure public investment for irrigation, and participation in the state-sponsored “Your Own Roof” home ownership program, have, as a community leader remarked, yielded “nothing.”[[801]](#footnote-801) In some cases, resentments have emerged as those who returned to their communities received state support through the Repopulation Support Program, while those who stayed, endured the worst of the conflict and served as ronderos, were not eligible for such benefits.[[802]](#footnote-802)

Beyond divisions between retornantes and resistentes, intra-community frictions have increased throughout Huancavelica since the conflict. An increase of individualism, familial and social fragmentation, and political and religious division have eroded traditional community rites, communal work and reciprocity, especially among youth, who have no direct memory of the conflict. Noting the plethora of political parties, “Gregorio,” a resident of Jerusalem, observed that it is “much worse now, every family, everyone with their party … to speak of a change … I have no idea how we can do it because we are disorganized… [there are] many quarrels, many fights.”[[803]](#footnote-803)

The devastating and long-term effects of the conflict on the community of Santa Bárbara are in many ways representative of many others in the region. The community was originally based in the vicinity of the Santa Bárbara mine, and incursions and associated violence by the military and Sendero led to the death of over 100 comuneros and the theft of thousands of heads of livestock and numerous harvests. Other residents were kidnapped, tortured, raped, or conscripted during the conflict. In the face of such violence, the majority of the population relocated to what was then the periphery of the city of Huancavelica. The proximity between the locations of the original and new communities enabled migrants to maintain their pasturage above the city. The result of this process, however, is a disaggregated community riddled with conflict; one that is fractured not only physically, but also economically, socially, culturally, spiritually and generationally.[[804]](#footnote-804) Beyond competition for pasturage, water and external resources, conflicts also reflect deeper historical divisions as Santa Bárbara was originally composed of ten different ethnic groups forced to work the cinnabar mines.[[805]](#footnote-805)

By community member’s own reckoning, Santa Bárbara’s collective identity has eroded since 1980. While the conflict, and Sendero’s rejection of indigenous culture, began this process, it has been spurred on by greater access to information, whether it be from the television, radio, or Internet, and the cultural homogenization which media and globalization produce.[[806]](#footnote-806) Among the results is the decline of respect for traditional forms of authority and justice, and the rise of individualism. The latter has had a multifaceted impact, ranging from a decrease in participation in traditional community rites such as communal meetings, collective agricultural work and vicuña shearing rites, to the rise of community and familial conflict and an erosion of reciprocity, barter and the status of the elderly.[[807]](#footnote-807)

Among other intangible repercussions of the insurgency is its effect on education and people’s upbringing. Displacement of families and rural teachers interrupted the education of thousands of children. In some cases, with the death of, or abandonment by, one or both parents, children were suddenly cast into the roles of breadwinners and parents for their younger siblings, which prevented them from continuing their studies.[[808]](#footnote-808) In other cases, life as a refugee living in caves, ravines and the jungle precluded attending school.[[809]](#footnote-809) The school building itself can also call up horrific memories, as in Sacsamarca when it was the scene of executions by Sendero, and now lies abandoned.[[810]](#footnote-810)

Many survivors of the conflict struggled to overcome seemingly impossible odds, such as “Efraín” in Sacsamarca. His mother was murdered when Sendero arrived looking for his father, a local authority whom had already fled. After living in a cave for a time, “Efraín” effectively became a parent as he and his two younger sisters took refuge in the city of Huancavelica. There, he did day work and sold off his family’s modest assets to get by while raising his sisters and studying at night.[[811]](#footnote-811) Similarly, after “Rosalia’s” father was killed by the military outside of Chupacc and left to be eaten by dogs, and her mother abandoned them to run off with another man, she too was left to raise her two younger sisters. Thinking back, she tearfully wonders what her life would have been like had the conflict not occurred, what it would have been like to have had parents, instead of being one, while growing up.[[812]](#footnote-812)

Despite the upheaval of displacement, it could also expand people’s horizons and economic opportunities. Today many former rural residents financially support their relatives in their hometowns, a twist on the pre-Hispanic pattern of mutual assistance based on ecological zones.[[813]](#footnote-813) As “Daniel,” a resident of Acobambilla reflected, although many former residents have not returned,

Now Acobambilla is completely different … in some respect … thanks to Sendero many people had left to other cities, and from other cities they have returned with other mind sets … [that] are more innovative … people who were dedicated to study, because before Sendero people were dedicated to their agriculture, to their livestock and that was everything … you grew up, finished primary school and barely high school and you already ended up married with family and everything. But after everything with this social movement many people have left and returned with a different mentality, so then … their minds are more open.[[814]](#footnote-814)

Another intangible effect of the conflict is its psychological impact on people’s personality. In many communities the legacy of violence and dislocation has undermined people’s self-esteem, as well as social trust, and with it their ability have productive relationships whether at a personal or institutional level.[[815]](#footnote-815) As “David,” a former prisoner and torture victim of the Manta counterinsurgency base, explained, “with this … fear, we are growing up to this day and we are shy,” adding that “since childhood we have grown up a little troubled.”[[816]](#footnote-816) The vast majority of those responsible for this genocide have never prosecuted. Although free from the law, they must nevertheless live with themselves, the memories of their actions and consequences, and to the degree it exists, their conscience. Others had to confront a new form of trauma when “all the dirty laundry was aired,” after the conflict as people began to learn more about those who supported Sendero, and whom they believed were responsible for the deaths of family members.[[817]](#footnote-817) Throughout much of this runs a degree of ambiguity; of “not knowing” who or where one’s parents are, or what happened to loved ones who disappeared, either at the hands of the military or Sendero.

Others, experiencing the loss of loved ones, were burdened by pain and anger. As “Daniel,” who lost his father in the conflict shared

I grew up with this insecurity in my town, I grew up with that repudiation of Sendero, it hurt me very much, to the point that I wanted to go to the [military] barracks and train … there was much pain in those moments as an adolescent.[[818]](#footnote-818)

He added how orphans

have grown up without the love of their father, without a whole family and many times over time you see that there is a bit of rejection of consolidating … their family … there is not a stable family, on the contrary perhaps… a mentality a little, I say, psychologically ill because there are people who have not overcome [the trauma of the conflict] … the great majority have been left with this mentality of frustration, of resentment.[[819]](#footnote-819)

In the face of this, and in conversations with other victims of the conflict, he urges a different path: “the mentality of the past stays there and then from there we go forward.”[[820]](#footnote-820) The pain for many is not just mental, but physical. As “David” in San Antonio put it, “until now we suffer, bad, to our arms, our hearts, our bodies, we feel bad.”[[821]](#footnote-821)

Among the results of this conflict has been the rise of Protestantism in Huancavelica, where regionwide a quarter of the population over twelve years old identified as Protestant in 2017.[[822]](#footnote-822) Nationwide, Huancavelica has the lowest rate of atheism and the third highest number of Protestants.[[823]](#footnote-823) Throughout Peru, communities in which Protestantism was the dominant religion more effectively challenged, and resisted, Sendero’s presence, thus reinforcing belief patterns. Evangelicals operated in a context where peasants had long felt ignored or neglected by the Peruvian state, and then were violently abused by it through the military, police, as well as by Sendero. Similarly, the Catholic Church lacked legitimacy, having been a central player, and beneficiary, of indigenous exploitation, during both the colonial and national periods. In Huancavelica, the prominence of Opus Dei in the church hierarchy reflected a deeply conservative orientation, and one that had little focus on the tangible needs of parishioners.[[824]](#footnote-824)

These factors opened the door to Protestant, and especially Pentecostal, churches. Their apocalyptic worldview provided a lens to comprehend the chaos around them and meshed with indigenous concepts of the pachacuti. Moreover, their belief in a direct relationship with God and the omnipresence of the divine paralleled indigenous beliefs.[[825]](#footnote-825) At a certain level, evangelical churches and Sendero offered similar things; such as a new identity and community based on firm morals, an anti-elitist discourse, a feeling of agency, a globalist ideology, and new opportunities for youth and women.[[826]](#footnote-826) The rise of Protestantism has also contributed to the erosion of the traditional social and cultural fabric of indigenous communities, along with an increase in wealth disparities and intra-communal discord between Protestants and Catholics. To some degree, this has come about through Protestants not participating in Catholic rites such as saint’s day celebrations, which have traditionally served as a community-based socio-economic leveling mechanism.[[827]](#footnote-827)

In many ways, evangelical movements filled a void created by exclusion, violence and social upheaval. Referring to conditions in the 1970s and 1980s, in 2006 “Rodolfo,” a resident of Lircay recalled how

there wasn’t any justice, money did not reach the communities, for that reason the Senderistas rose up to fight, as a result of all this the Huancavelican residents … have suffered terribly [from] all the massacres by the military, [the] ronderos and by Sendero Luminoso.[[828]](#footnote-828)

Since then, despite public investment, expanded education, improved infrastructure and a rhetoric of inclusion, many residents of Huancavelica feel little has changed, and that they have yet again been left to their own fate. In this sense, the appeal, and potential of, revolutionary proposals in the region continue in a context where community leaders feel a mixture of neglect, exploitation, hopelessness and sometimes resentment.[[829]](#footnote-829)

As “Eduardo” in Chupacc, put it:

I would like to request that our higher authorities remember us, [but] they do not pay attention, how many times now have we requested irrigation … I would like that they support us [with] homes … in congress it appears that they do not hear us [although candidates say] “I will be with you,” … in the end nothing arrives … they do not pay attention to us.[[830]](#footnote-830)

The deception does not stop with the political campaigns, as corruption exacerbates the situation. With considerable effort, the village had won a public competition to establish a guinea pig nursery, which was to be funded by mining canon funds. Although it was to be populated by thirty-five animals, they received “not a single” one. Likewise, the regional government had promised to deliver corrugated tin for roofs, but what they sent was not as thick as specified, and was “as thin as … paper.” His request to public officials is simple: “Please support us.”[[831]](#footnote-831)

Such views are not uncommon in the region. Although just shy of eighty-five percent of Huancavelica’s population voted for the leftist *Perú Libre* (Free Peru), party which brought President Pedro Castillo to power in 2021, many expressed great disappointment in his administration, and in government generally.[[832]](#footnote-832) In Acobambilla, “Daniel” described the “loss of confidence in the politicians … we wanted change but [the politicians] don’t know how to lead it well, it’s not turning out then as hoped.”[[833]](#footnote-833) Similarly, “Miguel” in San Antonio explained,

here, the president, again … [is] a failure … things are increasing [in cost] … as a peasant, as a farmer, we are fighting for life … we feel forgotten … who will support our town here? … The regional government always does not attend to us very much … we need many things.[[834]](#footnote-834)

“Jorge,” another resident there added that in “the area of Huancavelica we are the most forgotten… the most forgotten we are.”[[835]](#footnote-835) In Jerusalem, “Gregorio” summed up his experience as an advocate for his community, stating that if someone thought “that something [would] be done, development… improvement in the towns, forget it…we are not answered.” Expressing the views of many Huancavelicanos, he added,

I am very indignant of our society … from my youth, from my grandparents, I know the reality of our society … In thirty years … instead of overcoming, instead of support, instead of improvement, how was it with the politicians? They looked out for their interests … It makes me indignant … what can I say? It is not going to change …There will be a big revolution, for that reason I say it will be then our grandchildren, great grandchildren, at some time … it will be … the people … This situation I tell you is very outrageous … It makes me angry … our reality, our Peru …there is no attention, there is no justice … the justice system, the legislature, the executive, it’s all bad.”[[836]](#footnote-836)

**Epilogue**

On December 7, 2023 Peruvians witnessed the dramatic denouement of a political saga that had begun three years earlier when Pedro Castillo announced his candidacy for president under the banner of the Perú Libre party. Those watching their televisions that morning saw President Castillo read a statement, with trembling hands, in which he ordered the closure of the congress, the majority of which had opposed him at every quarter during his administration. While the immediate goal was to prevent a congressional vote on his impeachment that day, the larger goal was to rule by decree, restructure the judiciary and begin the process of drafting a new constitution. It was a poorly calculated risk on his part, based on the mistaken belief that his “self-coup” would elicit support both from the armed forces and popular sectors.[[837]](#footnote-837)

One of the peculiarities of the Peruvian political system is that a president may legally close congress, and Peruvians did not need to look far into their history to find precedent: President Martín Vizcarra successfully did the same thing only four years previously after being stymied in his efforts to hold early general elections to replace the deeply unpopular legislature. Although Vizcarra and Castillo were both facing impeachment votes, the difference between the two lay in the manner in which congress was closed: the executive may exercise this prerogative when a proposed cabinet has been rejected twice by congress. Because this was the case with Vizcarra, the armed forces supported the move. In the case of Castillo, his cabinet had not been rejected twice by congress, and he consequently lacked the legal authority to dissolve congress, and even before then had minimal military support.[[838]](#footnote-838)

For their part, the congress rejected Castillo’s maneuver, impeached him only hours after his televised proclamation, and installed his vice-president, Dina Boluarte, as president. It did not take long for Castillo to realize that military or other support would not be immediately forthcoming, and his gambit had failed. The drama then spilled out onto the streets of Lima, as Castillo and his family sought to make their way to the Mexican embassy where they expected refuge. On the way, police intercepted his vehicle, and in front of astonished bystanders, took him into custody. In a matter of only a few hours, he had gone from being president to a prisoner.[[839]](#footnote-839)

If when attempting to dissolve congress Castillo went off the political cliff, it had been a rocky road to the literal and figurative bluff. During his campaign, Castillo captured the imagination and embodied the hopes of many poor Peruvians, and especially indigenous highlanders, with his promise to call a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution which would mark a definitive break with that promulgated in 1992 under the regime of Alberto Fujimori. The fact that an indigenous outsider had made it into the runoff election with Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, surprised many, and his narrow victory over her underscored the electoral power of the highlands. Throughout the campaign, much of the media consistently portrayed him as a sympathizer of Shining Path committed to installing a revolutionary regime in Peru. The fact that the Free Peru party, under whose banner he campaigned, was avowedly Marxist/Leninist gave a certain credence to the claims. Once elected, his insular and reticent political style combined with his choice of leftists for his cabinet who were tainted by putative connections to Sendero seemed to further buttress such views. It was not just the radical beliefs and links of some of his appointees; many were previously accused of corruption or had questionable qualifications. For example, Vladimir Cerrón, head of the Free Peru party, was convicted of corruption in his home region of Junín, while one of Castillo’s selections for minister of health, Hernán Condori, had previously sold so-called “miracle water” online.[[840]](#footnote-840)

It did not take long for accusations of corruption against Castillo and his family to emerge, with reports of secret meetings in private homes to award various contracts in exchange for payoffs, and unregistered guests in the presidential palace seeking and receiving favors. A search of the palace by the Attorney General’s office turned up an unexplained $20,000 hidden in a toilet, and officials, friends and family members were increasingly ensnarled in accusations of influence peddling, prompting some to go into hiding.[[841]](#footnote-841) With the media squarely against him from the beginning, an unending storm of salacious accusations of impropriety, a stream of ill-chosen officials, inflation and capital flight, Castillo was hamstrung by his own and others doing. He was not just in a policy battle with congress, but seemingly in a race to the bottom in terms of public disapproval. The prospect of organizing a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution became ever more distant, yet no less divisive. The revolving door of Castillo’s cabinet led to several showdowns with congress, always with the threat that he could dissolve the body if they did not approve his nominees. It was in this context that Castillo, and congress, sought to definitively break the impasse on the day in which his administration imploded.[[842]](#footnote-842)

Although the masses did not take to the streets on December 7, the following weeks would demonstrate the depth to which leftist groups still can mobilize in Peru, and the lengths that the Boluarte administration and the armed forces will go to suppress them. Discontent reflected divergent views: some continued to support Castillo, and viewed him as a legitimate president unjustly held prisoner; a view publicly echoed by Mexico’s president Manuel López Obrador, and Bolivia’s former president Evo Morales. Others were relieved to see Castillo removed from the political stage, and wanted a clean sweep of congress as well with early national elections. These different currents came together during the demonstrations which swept the country, in places like Arequipa, Puno, where Evo Morales visited to incite the protests, and Ayacucho, where the Shining Path had been born.[[843]](#footnote-843)

Although a political ally of Castillo while he was in office, his former vice-president and now president Dina Boluarte grasped the political conjuncture, soon dismissed the idea of early general elections, and insisted she would serve the remainder of Castillo’s term. Despite having run on the ticket of the Perú Libre party, she lost little time coming to terms with the armed forces, naming former defense minister Alberto Otárola Peñarnada as prime minister, and supported a harsh response to the unrest. Among the results of this was the killing of ten unarmed protesters in Ayacucho, and eighteen in Juliaca, which left no doubt as to the resolve of the executive and military, and the risks of participating in the unrest. The deaths of protesters and police alike did not initially stop the strife, which led to the “Taking of Lima” by rural and urban protesters in January and, with less effect, July 2023.[[844]](#footnote-844)

This phase of Boluarte’s administration underscored two dynamics. One is the preponderant strength of conservative “archipelago” in Peru. They had rounded the wagons as soon as they realized that Castillo was a viable presidential candidate, and were unrelenting and unsparing in their opposition to him. His poor choices of cabinet members and clumsy embrace of the illicit rewards of office offered his enemies a steady stream of fodder to inexorably wear him down and politically corner him. With his removal from office, the “conservative archipelago” could do more than breathe a sigh of relief, they could celebrate. Castillo achieved what they wanted but could not effect: the further fragmentation and delegitimization of the democratic and non-democratic Left in Peru.[[845]](#footnote-845)

The unrest following his failed “self-coup” did, however, show the degree to which there is a mobilizable and in some cases radical undercurrent of leftist networks in Peru, both overt and subversive. Some of these have been related to Sendero, such as the politically oriented *Nueva Facción Roja* (New Red Faction, NFR), reportedly linked to MOVADEF and led or at least inspired by Guzmán’s imprisoned widow, Elena Iparraguirre. The NFR has been accused of involvement in organizing and leading demonstrations in Ayacucho in March, 2023, against the presidency of Dina Boluarte, during which several protesters were killed by the Peruvian military.[[846]](#footnote-846) The leader of the MPCP, Victor Quispe Palomino, also expressed his support for the unrest in May, 2023.[[847]](#footnote-847)

While some leftist organizations, such as the *Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho* (Front for the Defense of the People of Ayacucho, FREDEPA) and the *Federación Nacional de Trabajadores en Educación del Perú* (National Federation of Education Workers of Peru, FENATEP), are often portrayed by the government and media as Sendero front organizations, the degree to this is actually the case is unclear.[[848]](#footnote-848) Moreover, infiltration does not necessarily mean control. What is clear is that there are domestic and transnational leftist networks operating overtly and covertly in Peru which seek to implement radical change from below. The transnational element was perhaps best illustrated by Evo Morales’ blatant intervention in Puno in which he supported protester’s calls for Castillo’s release and the adoption of a new constitution in Peru. As a result, he was declared persona non grata and charged in absentia for criminal offenses.[[849]](#footnote-849)

In late 2023, both President Boluarte and its congress are widely repudiated in Peru, with eighty percent of rural and urban respondents disapproving of the president, and ninety-four percent disapproving of the congress as of June, 2023. Likewise, eighty percent of those surveyed view Boluarte’s administration as the same or worse than that of Castillo. The support by a slight majority on both the right and the left for an authoritarian leader who can effectively confront crime in the country, even at the cost of human rights, does not bode well for the future of democracy in Peru.[[850]](#footnote-850)

Meanwhile, in the midst of widespread popular discontent, economic malaise, and political division and uncertainty, Peru’s military continues to make inroads in its decades-long war against the MPCP in the Junín region. Not only did they overrun Victor Quispe Palomino’s headquarters in Junín region in August, 2022, but they captured long-time member and Sendero hitman “Comrade Carlos” in June, 2023.[[851]](#footnote-851) The continuing presence of the Senderistas in the region is also suggested by the capture of Zósimo Cóndor Fernández in late June, 2023, who is accused of having previously been a leader of Sendero in Huancavelica.[[852]](#footnote-852) Just as in 1992, when Sendero’s decapitation with the capture of Guzmán did not definitively end the insurgency, the eventual capture or death of Quispe Palomino and the MPCP in Junín, may yet again demonstrate the hydra-like nature of the Sendero Luminoso.

**Glossary**

Allyu: An extensive familial group in the Andes which subsumes real and fictive relations.

Amnestía General General Amnesty, the title of the publication of MOVADEF.

APRA: Alianza Popular Revoluciónaria Americana- Partido Aprista Peruana, or American Popular Revolutionary Alliance- Peruvian Aprista Party, a Peruvian center-left political party with a pan-American vision founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in 1924.

Autogolpe: A “self-coup” in which an individual already in office seizes power from other branches to extend their rule.

Ayacuchano: A resident of Ayacucho.

Campesino: A peasant, or rural smallholder.

Caudillo: A military leader or strongman.

Caudillismo: Rule by a caudillo.

Central Nacional Agropecuaria

Cocalera del Perú: Peruvian National Coca Farmers Union, or

CENACOP.

Centro de Información para

la Memoria Colectiva y Derechos

Humanos The Information Center for Collective Memory and Human Rights is a documentary collection concerning human rights in Peru administered by the Defensoría del Pueblo.

Centro de Investigación y

Desarollo de Camelidos

Sudamericnaos South American Camelids Research and Development Center, operated by the National University of Huancavelica on the site of the former SAIS operated by the National Institute of Agricultural and Livestock Research.

Cocalero: A producer of coca leaf.

Comisión de Derechos

Humanos de

Huancavelica: Human Rights Commission of Huancavelica, or CDHH.

Chuño: Freeze-dried potatoes.

Comité Popular: A “Popular Committee” established by Sendero to

administer the areas under their control.

Confederación Intersectorial

de Trabajadores Estatales: Intersectoral Confederation of State Employees, or CITE

Comando Rodrigo Franco: An anti-Sendero death squad operating in Peru in the

late 1980s named after an APRA member killed by the insurgents.

Comisión de la Verdad

y Reconciliación: Peru’s post-conflict Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2002.

Comité Central Nacional: The National Central Committee, or CCN, was Sendero’s highest decision-making body, presided over by Abimael Guzmán.

Comunero: A member of a rural, and often indigenous, community.

Curaca: The leader of an indigenous community.

Defensa Civil Antisubversiva

(DECAS): Antisubversive Civil Defense, or a ronda.

Defensoría del Pueblo: Peru’s Ombuds office.

Dirección Contra

el Terrorismo : Peru’s Directorate of Counterterrorism (DIRCOTE)

Ejército de

Liberación Nacional: The National Liberation Movement, a Peruvian

insurgency group active between 1962-1965.

Encomendero: A person who held an encomienda.

Encomienda: A grant of hereditary indigenous labor rights to a Spaniard in return for their willingness to defend the kingdom and ensuring the conversion of their subjects to Catholicism.

Federación Departamental de

Comuneros y Campesinos de

Hacendado: An owner of an hacienda.

Hacienda: An agricultural and/or pastoral estate.

Huancavelica: Departmental Federation of Communities and Peasants of Huancavelica, FEDECCH.

Federación Nacional de

Trabajadores en la Educación

del Perú (National Federation of Education Workers of Peru,

FENATEP)

Federación de Trabajadores

Mineros y Metalúrgicos: Federation of Mine and Metallurgical Workers, FTMM.

Forastero: An indigenous person who does not live in the town in which he or she was born.

Frente de Defensa del

Pueblo de Ayacucho Front for the Defense of the People fo Ayacucho,

FREDEPA

Frente de Defensa del

Pueblo de Huancavelica:  Front for the Defense of the People of Huancavelica, FDPH.

Frente Estudiantil

Revolutionario: Revolutionary Student Front, or FER, a radical student organization based at the San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University in Ayacucho.

Gamonal: A large landowner.

GEIN: The Grupo Especial de Inteligencia or Special Intelligence Group, a clandestine group which was tasked with, and ultimately captured, Abimael Guzmán.

Guano Bird dung, largely extracted from the Islas Ballestas

offshore from Chincha, which was exported as fertilizer to Europe.

Guardia Civil: The Civil Guard, a quasi-military police force in Peru which subsumed the Sinchis.

Guardia Republicana: The Republican Guard, a police force in Peru with extensive military training.

Hacienda: An agricultural estate.

Hacendado: An owner of an hacienda.

Huancavelicano: A resident or person from Huancavelica.

Humanchi: An informal, independent cinnabar miner or refiner.

Ichu: *Stirpa ichu*, a straw-like plant that grows on the altiplano.

Instituto Superior

Pedagógico de

Huancavelica: Higher Pedagogical Institute of Huancavelica, ISPH.

Izquierda Revolutionario: Revolutionary Left Movement, a Peruvian

insurgency group was active from 1962-1965.

Izquierda Unida: The “United Left,” a grouping of moderate, left wing Peruvian political organizations.

Jalapato: A game in which a live duck is strung up by its feet on a rope between two poles, while the height of the rope can be raised and lowered by a person pulling on one end of the rope via a pulley. People then try to tear the duck off of the rope, while the person controlling the rope pulls it to keep the animal just out of their reach.

Latifundista: An owner of large private landholdings.

Lugar de Memoria, la Tolerencia

y la Inclusión Social The Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion (LUM) is a museum in Lima dedicated to the memory of, and education about, the conflict.

Mestizo: A person of Spanish and indigenous descent.

Minka: Communal labor for projects of community benefit.

Mita: A rotating draft labor system utilized by the Inca, which was reconfigured by the Spanish.

Mitayo: A mita worker.

Movimiento por Amnestia y

Derechos Fundamentales The Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights, also known as MOVADEF, is a Senderista political party which calls for amnesty for those accused or convicted of terrorism.

Movimiento Revolutionario

Túpac Amaru: Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement Front, MRTA.

Militarizado Partido

Comunista del Peru.

MPCP: The Militarized Communist Party of Peru, the last armed Senderista group.

Nueva Facción Roja The “New Red Faction,” a political faction of remnanat Sendero Luminoso linked to MOVADEF.

Operación Patriota: Operation Patriot, a military operation led by the VRAEM Special Command which began on August 11, 2022, which sought to capture Victór Quispe Palomino.

Originario: An Indian who lives in the town of their birth,

Partido Comunista del

Peru en el Sendero

Luminoso de

José Carlos Mariátegui: The official name of the insurgent organization led by Abimael Guzmán.

Partido Comunista del

Peru- Patria Roja: Red Fatherland, a Peruvian Maoist political party.

Partido Comunista del

Peru- Bandera Roja: The Communist Party of Peru: Red Flag, a Maoist group which splintered from the Communist Party of Peru in 1964.

Partido Comunista- Unida: The Communist Party in Peru which allied with the military government which ruled from 1968-1980.

Pachacuti: Literally a “turning of the earth,” which in Andean cosmology refers to a periodic and inevitable cataclysmic destruction of the world.[[853]](#footnote-853)

Perú Libre: Free Peru, the political party with which President Pedro Castillo was elected in 2021.

Policía de Investigaciones

del Perú (PIP): The Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), a

non-uniformed national police force tasked with intelligence gathering and investigation.

Policia Nacional de Peru: The National Police of Peru, also known as the PNP.

Proseguir: A splinter faction of Sendero Luminoso led by Oscar Ramírez Durand after Guzmán’s capture, previously known as Sendero Rojo.

Reducción: A Spanish-style settlement where indigenous people were relocated in the early colonial period to facilitate religious conversion, control and labor exploitation.

Repartimiento de

Mercancías: The system operated by Spanish governors in which Indians were forced to purchase goods.

Resistente: Literally, a “resister,” or one who remained in their village throughout the conflict.

Retornante: Literally, a “returner,” or one who left their hometowns during the conflict and returned afterwards.

Ronda: A community-based self-defense patrol.

Rondero: A member of a ronda.

Sociedades agrícolas de interés

Social (SAIS): Social Interest Agrarian Societies, were agrarian enterprises established under the Velasco Alvarado regime which administered lands seized under the land reform initiative.

Senderista: A member of Sendero Luminoso.

Sendero Luminoso: The insurgent group led by Abimael Guzmán, Shining Path.

Sendero Rojo: The “Red Path,” a splinter faction of Sendero Luminoso led by Oscar Ramírez Durand after Guzmáns capture.

Servicio de Intelligencia

Nacional: Peru’s National Intelligence Service.

Sindicato Único de

Trabajadores de

Educación del Perú: Educational Workers Union of Perú , SUTEP

Sinchis: Tactical combat unit of the Guardia Civil, meaning the “brave ones” in Quechua.

Socorro Rojo: Red Support, a Sendero assassination and support squad mostly active in Lima.

VRAEM: The “Valle de los Rios Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro,” or the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro River Valleys, where the remnants of the Shining Path operate as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru.

Yana uma: A Quechua word which translates as, “black head,” which refers to the black balaclavas often worn by members or Sendero.

[Insert Map of Huancavelica Here]

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219. Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, 121-22. Overall, the MRTA were more tolerant of indigenous culture and traditional authority structures than Sendero. Reflecting their smaller size, less sophisticated organization and more conventional approach to guerrilla war relative to Sendero, they were also much less lethal, with under two percent of the disappearances and fatalities being attributed to them by the CVR. These factors also enabled the counterinsurgency approach taken by the government to be considerably more effective than against Sendero. In February, 1989, the military captured its leader, Victor Polay, who went by the *nom de guerre* of “Comrade Rolando” and had earlier been a member of APRA. Following Polay’s capture in Huancayo, the movement was led by Néstor Cerpa, who reinvigorated the movement by developing urban cells and also orchestrated the takeover of the town of Moyobamba in the department of San Martin. Polay, and forty-eight comrades, would ultimately rejoin the group following a tunnel-based jailbreak from the Canto Grande prision on July 19, 1990, before being recaptured in 1992. With Polay again behind bars, and military pressue on the MRTA only increasing, in October, 1993, they proposed a peace accord with the Fujimori administration. This proved to have little consequence other than providing political dividends to Fujimori in his successful effort to pass a referendum on a new constitution which strengthened the powers of the presidency and in essence enshrined neoliberal economic policies. Seeking to regain the initiative, they led the takeover of the Japanese ambassador’s residence on December 19, 1996, seizing seventy-two diplomats and dignitaries, including Fujimori’s mother, two sisters and brother. The operation was led by Cerpa, and captured international headlines for four months until a military raid on April 19, 1997. The assault, code-named Chavín de Huátar, freed all but one of the hostages and led to the death of two commandos. It also resulted in the death of all of the rebels, and despite reports that some of them were executed, the success of the raid generated an immense amount of political capital for Fujimori. See La Serna, *With Masses and Arms*, pp. 10-11, 238; Poole and Rénique, pp. 182, 185; Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, pp. 69, 73, 75-77, 121-22, 126, 265,289; Ahmadzadeh, et. al., p. 34; Obando, p. 97; Cameron, p. 79; Ahmadzadeh, et. al., p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
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283. Roncagliolo, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Castro, “The Iron Legions,” pp. 191-192, 194-195; Chávez de Paz, p. 43; Isabel Coral Cordero, “Women in War, pp. 349-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
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286. Jara, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
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377. Caro Cárdenas, pp. 267, 285. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, *“*[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p.116. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 116; Gorriti, “Profesor Huancavelicano,” p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Churcampa province. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Churcampa province [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. Tayacaja province. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 218; Gorriti, “Profesor Huancavelicano,” p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Las organizaciones sociales,” p. 429. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. Farrell, pp. 97, 105, 113, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. Farrell, p. 151. “Los sentimientos de abandono y resentimiento de parte de los comuneros son profundos” [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Farrell, pp. 119, 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Farrell, p. 184. “la lucha armada entra en Santa Bárbara como si fuera una nueva religión” [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. Farrell, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. Farrell, pp. 127, 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Farrell, pp. 127, 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Farrell, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Farrell, p. 184. “nadie quería pelear por el Gobierno” [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 213; Farrell, pp. 104, 112, 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, p. 53. Within the following provinces, Sendero was operating in the following districts: in Tayacaja: districts of Pampas and Colcabamba, in the province and district of Churcampa, in Angaraes: district of Lircay; in Acobamba: districts of Acobamba, Anta, Caja and Marcas; in Huancavelica: districts of Acobambilla, Huachocolpa, Huayllahuara, Manta, Moya, Occoro, Pilchaca, and Vilca; in Castrovirreyna, district of Huaymatambo, and in Angares, districts of Congalla, Callanmarca, Chincho, Antaparco, Santo Tomás de Pata and Seclla. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. Chávez de Paz, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *“*[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *“*[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. Quote is “Gregorio”: [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 102; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Ejecuciones extrajudiciales comprobadas en las fosa de Pucayacu (1984),” in *Informe final*, vol. 7 (Lima: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003), p. 129; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 102; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Ejecuciones extrajudiciales comprobadas en las fosa de Pucayacu (1984),” p. 129; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “El despliegue regional,” 100; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 59; Gorriti, *Shining Path*, pp. 248, 250, 253, 258-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 211, 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. [Aldo Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas,” p. 146; Idem, “Youth, Peasants and Political Violence,” p. 124; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 50; Koc-Menard, pp. 332-33; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, pp. 83, 86-88; Del Pino, “Family, Culture and “Revolution,” pp. 161, 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. Angares province. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. “Rosalia” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. “Rosalia” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Los periodos de la violencia,” pp. 59, 67, 72; Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*, pp. 50, 54-55; Carlos Iván Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” in *How Difficult It Is To Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999*. Carlos Iván Degregori (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 22; Palmer, “Conclusion,” pp. 269, 272; Alberto Flores Galindo, “La Guerra Silenciosa,” in *Violencia y campesinado*. Alberto Flores Galindo and Nelson Manrique, eds. (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1986), p. 32; Nelson Manrique, “Democracia y campesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo,” in *Violencia y campesinado*. Alberto Flores Galindo and Nelson Manrique, eds., pp. 9-10, 16; Obando, p. 387; Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” p. 193; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” p. 146; Taylor, *Shining Path*, p. 99; Idem, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 43; Manyari Galván, p. 143; Rénique and Lerner, pp. 34-35; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 141; Rubio Escolar, pp. 21-22, 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 67; Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*, p. 55; Rénique and Lerner, pp. 35; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 54; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 45; Koc-Menard, p. 336. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Palmer, “Conclusion,” p. 270; Obando, p. 385; Gorriti, *Shining Path*, p. 114; Guzmán Reynoso, p. 145; Rénique and Lerner, pp. 19, 26; Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 78; Farrel, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. ## Gorriti, *Shining Path*, pp. 73, 114-15, 199; Rénique and Lerner, p. 26; Soifer and Vieira, p. 114; Walker, “Innocencia,” p. 1033; Durán-Martínez and Soifer, p. 104.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, pp. 114, 205; Starn and La Serna, p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, p. 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. Boyle Bianchi, p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, pp. 199- Capacity 202, 206, 211, 240; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” p. 144; Soifer and Vieira, pp. 114-15; Miron, p. 165; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 117-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf)*,*” p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf)*,*” p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. All in Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 110; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 212, 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp.178, 246. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” pp. 110; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. In Huancavelica Province. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. “grandes burgeses” [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. Elsewhere, on Oct 18 1984, in Paucarbamba, Chinchihuasi, Pachamarca and surrounding hamlets, ninety teachers resigned their posts to avoid being confused with the insurgents. See Ahmadzadeh, et al., 229. Quote is from “Jorge:” “otro terror… un desastre para nosostros.” [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; Caro Cárdenas, p. 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym).Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. “Miguel,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019; Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” pp. 27, 33, 35; Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, p. 257; Starn and La Serna, pp. 302-03; Kay, p. 117; Dreyfus, p. 387; Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” pp. 110-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 248; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” 117; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. See also Rubio Escolar, p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019. “solo quedamos los valientes.” [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214;Ahmadzadeh, p. 257; Synthya Rubio Escolar, *La reparación de las víctimas del conflict armado en el Perú: La voz de las víctimas* (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 2013), p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. Acobamba province. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. Acobamba province. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. Angaraes province. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. Churcampa province. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. Huaytará Province [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. “Efraín” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019; “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 49-50, 80-82, 244, 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Government of Peru, Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil and Instituto de Defensa Legal, *Experiencia de documentación de poblaciones en escenarios postconflicto Caso: Huancavelica - Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 2011), p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. Government of Peru, Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil and Instituto de Defensa Legal, *Experiencia de documentación de poblaciones en escenarios postconflicto Caso: Huancavelica – Perú*, pp. 7, 11, 17-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. “Miguel,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. “Valeria” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Marcelina” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; Ahmadzadeh et al., pp. 111-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2. 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. Masterson, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*, pp. 59-60; Obando, pp. 385, 390; Mucha, “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared,” p. 156; McCormick, p. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. Koc-Menard, p. 343. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 71; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Conclusiones generales,” p. 330; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 60; Obando, p. 390-392; Soifer and Vieira, p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. Boyle Bianchi, p. 22; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104, Miron, p. 167; Marks and Palmer, p. 5; Koven, “Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” pp. 884, 879; Spencer, p. 243; Koc-Menard, p. 337. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 73; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Gorriti, *Shining Path*, pp. 207-10; Starn and La Serna, p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. Manrique, “Democracia y cempesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo,” p. 5; Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*,” pp. 55; Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” p. 25; Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, p.67;Palmer, “Conclusion,” pp. 269, 271; Flores Galindo, p. 22; Farrell, pp. 79, 134; Koc-Menard, p. 336; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 102; Mucha. “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared,” p. 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. ## Guzmán Reynoso, p. 129.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los periodos de la violencia,” p. 56; Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 108; Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” p. 24; Idem, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas*p. 145; Flores Galindo, p. 38; Manrique, “Democracia y cempesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo,” p. 15; Starn and La Serna, pp. 151, 202; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 107-08; Mucha. “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared,” p. 156; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” pp. 51-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 261. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 261. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. “Dámaso,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214; Ahmadzadeh, et al.,p. 261. Quote is “Dámaso,” (pseudonym). [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022. Sendero also used mutilation in a symbolic manner, such as in October, 1989, when they killed and then cut out the tongue of a rondero/informant in Marcas. In other regions, they castrated victims and, perhaps also as a punishment for informants, stitched their mouths closed. See Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 184 and Paul, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. In Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. Castrovirreyna province. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 116-17, 119; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 96, 201, 203, 207; Rubio Escolar, p. 26.Arcuilla and Chacapunco are in Angaraes province. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. Angaraes province. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 116-17, 119. Sendero would repeat their impersonation of the Peruvian military in Cuticsa on New Year’s Day, 1991, executing eighteen people,and leaving their bodies on the main plaza. See Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. Smith, pp. 146, 160-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros,* pp. 128-29, 132-33, 135, 139-40; Starn and La Serna, p. 22 Rénique and Lerner, p. 17; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” p. 145; Paul et al., p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. Patricia Oliart, “Alberto Fujimori: “The Man Peru Needed?,” in *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*. Steve Stern, ed., p. 412; Starn and La Serna, p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 222; Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 222; Ahmadzadeh, p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 221; [Aldo Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), p. 41. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 60-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. Tayacaja province. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 215. Chopcca is in Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. Castrovirreyna province. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 91-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. Starn and La Serna, pp. 207-08; Miron, p. 171; Marks and Palmer, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, pp. 117-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, pp. 53, 117-118, 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. Burt, pp. 268-69, 271, 284-85, 294, 296. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los actores armados,” p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 215; Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report Number 42/97, Case 10.521. Angel Escobar Jurado. Perú 19 de febrero de 1998*, (Washignton, D.C.: OAS, 1998), p, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. Farell, pp. 110, 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” pp. 532-533, 536; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 216; Farrell, p. 107; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. Farrell, p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” pp. 532, 534. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” pp. 532-533, 536; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” p. 543; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Las organizaciones sociales,” p. 429; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Patrones en la perpetración de los crímenes y de las violaciones de los derechos humanos,” p. 356; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” p. 534. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Patrones en la perpetración de los crímenes y de las violaciones de los derechos humanos,” p. 356; National Security Archive, “Army Officer and NCO Charged With Human Rights Abuses in Santa Barbara, Huancavelica Case/Oficial del Ejército y Oficial No Comisionado Acusados con Abusos de Derechos Humanos en el Caso de Santa Bárbara, Huancavelica,” (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1991), 1-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Santa Bárbara (1991),” p. 540. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*, pp. 65-66, 69, 72-73, 91; Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” p. 25; Starn and La Serna, pp. 207-08; Palmer, “Conclusion,” pp. 271-272; Miron, p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. Carlos Iván Degregori, “Epilogue Open Wounds and Elusive Rights: Reflections on the

     Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in *How Difficult It Is To Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999*. Carlos Iván Degregori, p. 173; Idem, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” p. 25; Oliart, p. 411; Starn and La Serna, p. 279; Rénique and Lerner, p. 48; Cameron, p. 90; Colby, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. Obando, pp. 385, 396; Miron, pp. 170-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. Obando, p. 406. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. Kay, pp. 97, 100, 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. Kay, pp. 101-03. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. Kay, pp. 102-03; Durán-Martinez and Soifer,p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. Kay, p. 103; Dreyfus, p. 382; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 102; Marks and Palmer, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. Kay, p. 103; Dreyfus, p. 382; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. Kay, pp. 103-4; Dreyfus, p. 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. Kay, p. 103; Dreyfus, p. 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. Kay, p. 103; Dreyfus, p. 382; Marks and Palmer, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. Kay, p. 104; Dreyfus, p. 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. Kay, p. 105; Dreyfus, pp. 370, 377, 383; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104; Koven. Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” pp. 879, 883-85; Burgoyne, p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. Dreyfus, p. 383. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. Dreyfus, p. 384. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. Dreyfus, p. 385; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. # Kay, p. 111; Dreyfus, p. 387; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, pp. 105,107; Marks and Palmer, p. 5. Aerial interdiction is set to resume in 2023. See Ricardo Mc Cubben, “Perú podrá interceptar aeronaves sospechosas por narcotráfico tras 20 años de bloqueo de EE. UU,” in *La República*. August 13, 2023. Available at <https://larepublica.pe/politica/actualidad/2023/08/12/peru-podra-interceptar-aeronaves-sospechosas-por-narcotrafico-tras-20-anos-de-bloqueo-de-ee-uu-alberto-otarola-estados-unidos-vraem-1117704>. Accessed September 18, 2023.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. Dreyfus, pp. 386-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. Dreyfus, pp. 385-87; Kay, pp. 117, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 115; Paul et al., pp. 41, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, p. 21; Starn and La Serna, p. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” pp. 155, 158-60, 162; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Conclusiones generales,” p. 316; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Patrones en la perpetración de los crímenes y de las violaciones de los derechos humanos,” pp. 277-78, 312, 374; Boesten, “Peace for Whom?,” p.159. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 116, 144-45, 211, 218; Manrique, *El tiempo de miedo*, p. 83; Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” pp. 194-95, 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 211; Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” pp. 194-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2. 2022; Ahmadzadeh, et al., 183, 199, 251, 282; “Dámaso” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 5, 2022; Rubio Escolar, p. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” p. 164-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” pp. 169, 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” pp. 172-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, pp. 15, 17; Kirk, pp. 3, 5-7, 12, 15, 19-20, 27; Jessaca Leinaweaver,*The Circulation of Children: Kinship, Adoption, and Morality in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, p. 10; Kirk, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. In Huancavelica Province [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. “Donato” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 7, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. Coral Cordero, pp. 11, 15; Kirk, p. 19; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” p. 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
596. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Patrones en la perpetración de los crímenes y de las violaciones de los derechos humanos,” pp. 640-41, 653. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
597. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 221; Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, p. 9; Farrell, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
598. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Los rostros y perfiles de la violencia,” pp. 164-65; Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
599. Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, pp. 25-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
600. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; Rubio Escolar, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
601. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 85; “Rosalia” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
602. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
603. “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
604. Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia*, p. 17; Kirk, pp. 5, 16, 21; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 85; Farrell, pp. 13, 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
605. Farrell, pp. 20, 140. Quote is p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
606. Kirk, pp. 18, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
607. Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 111. “se creían ya como reyes.” [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
608. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional, p. 110; ”Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Julio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 77, 111; [Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), p. 40; Boesten, pp. 158-59; Rubio Escolar, p. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
609. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 130; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 220; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” p. 146;Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 55,114; Del Pino, p. 164; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 46; Rubio Escolar, p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
610. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 117, 119; [Gorriti, “Profesor Huancavelicano,” p. 1; Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), p. 40; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
611. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
612. Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
613. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 211-12, 213; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “Patrones en la perpetración de los crímenes y de las violaciones de los derechos humanos,” in *Informe final*, vol. 6 (Lima: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003), pp. 312, 332. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
614. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
615. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional, pp. 110, 20-21; [Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), pp. 39-40; Boesten, pp. 158-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
616. Ahmadzadeh et al., pp. 54-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
617. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional, p. 110; [Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), pp. 39-40; Boesten, pp. 158-59; Rubio Escolar, p. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
618. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 213; “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
619. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
620. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
621. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
622. “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Julio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Jorge” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. Saenz Quinte quote: “exigia muchos trabajos… muchas… obligaciones, lena, carnero, en fin trabajo, percca wasi (casa de adobe) se llamaba esta base… y toda la comunidad obligaban trabajaban asi, sin pago ni nada, obligados….puro castigo, puro golpe.” [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
623. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
624. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
625. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
626. Ahmadzadeh et al., p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
627. Churcampa province. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
628. Ahmadzadeh et al., pp. 69-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
629. “Julio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022, Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
630. Urton, pp. 118-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
631. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
632. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
633. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
634. “David” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
635. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022; “Efraín,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9, 2019; “Gregorio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Julio” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2, 2022; “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 2. 2022; “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
636. “Daniel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. August 17, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
637. “Miguel” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 9. 2019; Rubio Escolar, p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
638. Ahmadzadeh et al., pp. 67-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
639. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 211, 213, 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
640. Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. “entonces que hagamos aca?” [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
641. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 118-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
642. Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 108; Idem, *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands,* pp. 23, 25, 38, 194; Tapia, [*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295), p. 20; Degregori, “Youth, Peasants and Political Violence,” pp. 119-21, 123; Idem, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho,” p. 135; Rojas Rodríguez, pp. 18-20; Kirk, p. 8; Starn, “Villagers at Arms,” p. 237; Del Pino, pp. 178, 185, 189; Sánchez, pp. 342-44; 65.Yezer, pp. 64-65; Isbell, p. 79; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 49, 195, 248. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
643. Rojas Rodríguez, p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
644. Acobamba province. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
645. Ahmadzadeh et al., pp. 116-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
646. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “El despliegue regional,” pp. 150-51; Taylor, *Shining Path*,p. 38; Starn, “Villagers at Arms,” p. 237; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
647. Del Pino, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
648. Tapia, [*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295), pp. 18-19, 119-20, 122; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” pp. 131, 133, 141; Idem, “Youth, Peasants and Political Violence,” pp. 119, 122-23; Kirk, p. 8; Starn, p. 236; González, p. 45; Isbell, pp. 79, 90, 94; Masterson, p. 182; Del Pino, pp. 178-79; Sánchez, pp. 342-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
649. Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado,* p. 12; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” pp. 131, 141; Idem, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, p. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
650. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” pp. 150-51; Tapia, [*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295), p. 18; Isbell, p. 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
651. Taylor, *Shining Path*, p.38; Starn, “Villagers at Arms,” p. 237; Stern, “Introduction. Beyond Enigma,” p. 4; Sánchez, p. 345; Starn and La Serna, pp. 126, 228; Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104; Miron, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
652. Durán-Martinez and Soifer, p. 104, Miron, pp. 159, 167, 172; Colby, pp. 40, 44; Mucha, “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared,” p. 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
653. Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, p. 43; Starn, *Nightwatch*, pp. 47, 71, 97-99; Huber, *Depués de dios y la virgen está la* ronda, pp. 18-21, 24, 30, 42, 63-64; Yezer, p. 129; Miron, p. 167; Marks and Palmer, p. 5; Paul et al., pp. 44-45; Colby, pp. 40-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
654. Starn, *Nightwatch*, pp. 19, 37, 51, 88, 90, 106, 132, 134, 147, 203, 268; Huber, pp. 22, 24, 38, 41, 63, 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
655. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 118-19, 212; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 198, 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
656. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 212. Pachaclla is in Huancavelica province. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
657. Tapia, *Tiempos Oscuros*, pp. 65-66, 69, 72, 91, 147; Starn and La Serna, p. 231; Palmer, “Conclusion,” pp. 271-272; Manrique, “Democracia y cempesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo,” p. 8; Idem, *El tiempo del miedo,* p. 119; McClintock, p. 248; Carlos Basombrío Iglesias, “Sendero Luminoso and Human Rights: A Perverse Logic that Captured the Country,” in *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*. Steve Stern, ed., p. 426; Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” p. 143; Falconí, pp. 115-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
658. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” pp. 100, 151; Taylor, *Shining Path*, p. 35; Coral Cordero, *Desplazamiento por violencia política en el Perú*, p. 6; Stern, “Introduction. Beyond Enigma,” p. 4; Falconí et al., p. 105; Del Pino, pp. 178-79; Sánchez, pp. 342-44; Isbell, p. 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
659. All are in Acobamba province. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
660. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 119, 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
661. Degregori, “Harvesting Storms,” 141, 147; Starn and La Serna, 231; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 51, 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
662. Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, p. 122; Fumerton, p. 73; Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 55-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
663. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
664. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 130; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 220; Rubio Escolar, p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
665. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
666. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. See also Rubio Escolar, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
667. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
668. “Rosalia,” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
669. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; “Rosalia” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
670. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
671. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
672. “Eduardo” (pseudonym). Interview. Conducted by Nicholas Robins. July 6, 2022; Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, p. 29; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 119-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
673. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 118; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
674. Angaraes province. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
675. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
676. Government of Peru, Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
677. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 98-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
678. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 221; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
679. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” 119, 213, 222; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “El despliegue regional,” p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
680. [Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), p. 43; Starn and La Serna, p. 227; Paul et.al., pp. 44-45; Mucha, “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” p. 331; Idem, “Does Counterinsurgency Fuel Civil War: Peru and Syria Compared,” p. 158; Colby, p. 41; Miron, p. 171; Marks and Palmer, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
681. Starn, “Villagers at Arms,” p. 225; Starn and La Serna, p. 227; Tapia, *Tiempos oscuros*, p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
682. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “Las organizaciones sociales,”p. 429; Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú. “[*La violencia en las regiones*](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 119; Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, pp. 24-25; Miron, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
683. Tapia, *Autodefensa armada del campesinado*, p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
684. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 119-20, Tapia,[*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295), pp. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
685. Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
686. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” p. 222; Marks and Palmer, pp. 5-6; Paul et al., p. 45; Colby, p. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
687. Government of Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Perú, “[La violencia en las regiones](http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IV/SECCION%20TERCERA-Los%20Escenarios%20de%20la%20Violencia/Historias%20Regionales/1.0.INTRODUCCION.pdf),” pp. 119-20, 220; Tapia,[*Autodefensa armada del campesinado*](https://find.library.duke.edu/catalog/DUKE002030295), pp. 24-25; Idem, *Tiempos oscuros*, pp. 40, 147, 151; [Panfichi](https://ncsu-on-worldcat-org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/search?queryString=au%3DPanfichi%2C%20Aldo.&databaseList=638), pp. 42-43; Taylor, *Shining Path*, p. 38; Starn, “Villagers at Arms,” pp. 228-29, 232, 240, 243-45, 247; Del Pino, p. 164; Yezer, p. 131; Marks and Palmer, p. 5-6; Paul et al., p. 45; Mucha, “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” p. 339; Colby, p. 44; Miron, p. 171; Taylor, “Counter-Insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996,” p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
688. Schubiger and Sulmon,” p. 67; Fumerton, p. 69; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 146. For a discussion of the longer-term effects of rondas in communities, see Witold Mucha. “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 16 (August, 2016), no. 4, pp. 327-346. [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
689. Starn and La Serna, pp. 222, 249, 283-89; Roncagliolo, p. 162; Camino, p. 187. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
690. Starn and La Serna, pp. 289-90; Roncagliolo, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
691. Degregori, “The Years We Lived in Danger,” pp. 27, 33, 35; Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, p. 257; Koven, “Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” p. 882. [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
692. Taylor, *Shining Path*, p. 212; Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*, p. 246; Englund and Stoha, p. 26. For a discussion of the capture of Guzmán, see Guillermo Bonilla Arévalo, *Golpe mortal: la verdadera historia de la pacificación nacional: rompiendo mitos* (Peru: Guillermo Bonilla Arévalo, 2015) , pp.158-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
693. Starn and La Serna, p. 235; Masterson, p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
694. Quoted in Jacobsen. “Liberalism and Indian Communities in Peru, 1821-1920,” 153; see José Carlos Mariátegui, *Seven Interpretiave Essays on Peruvian Reality*, Translated by Marjory Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 53-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
695. Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 110; Kay, p. 117; Starn and La Serna, pp. 302-03. [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
696. Taylor, “Sendero Luminoso in the New Millennium,” p. 109;Boyle Bianchi, p. 128; Kay, p. 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
697. Nicholas Robins, Field Research Notes, July 5, 2022; Ahmadzadeh, et al., p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
698. Ahmadzadeh, et al., pp. 185-86, 203, 217-18, 240, 280-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
699. Taylor, “Shining Path in the New Millennium,” p. 111; Starn and La Serna, p. 301; Kay, pp. 99, 103; Fitch Solutions Group Limited, *Peru Operational Risk Report- Q 2 2020* (London: Fitch Solutions Group, 2020), pp. 5, 88, 90; Insight Crime, “Shining Path,” May 23, 2021. Available at

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     (a) Killing members of the group;

     (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

     (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

     (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

     (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. [↑](#footnote-ref-732)
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