## **Title: Can the Public be Trusted?**

**Subtitle**: On the promise and perils of Voluntarily Compliance

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## **Introduction**

While most research on trust in the context of regulation and compliance focuses on the decline of public trust in institutions, this book challenges this prevailing narrative by highlighting a neglected issue: the inability of governments to gauge the extent and quality of public cooperation with their policies. The book examines why voluntary compliance (VC), despite being viewed as more sustainable, beneficial to society, and higher quality than coerced compliance, remains largely an unrealized ideal rather than a realistic normative and practical paradigm.

To what extent can states trust their citizens to cooperate with laws and regulations with the least possible use of coercive measures? What will the state and public earn from such approaches and to what extent this is a desired goal?

This book will address these fundamental questions that arise in nearly every aspect of legal and social policy making and that affects a wide range of issues, including compliance with tax laws, environmental regulations, traffic and driving laws, commercial ethics and more recently COVID-19 regulations.

The idea of citizens’ voluntary compliance[[1]](#footnote-1) and cooperative behavior[[2]](#footnote-2) is discussed from different perspectives in nearly all of the social sciences (psychology, sociology economics, political science, criminology, and more) as well as in the literature of law and even philosophy. From the outset, it seems safe to argue that obtaining voluntary compliance from citizens, especially if it is driven by intrinsic motivation, is the most desirable form of governance[[3]](#footnote-3). However, in many ways this perception of policy makers is that in order to trust the public and uphold their commitment to protect the public interest, they need strong indications that those regulated will indeed behave according to the law. Without such a clear belief of what to expect from such reliance on voluntary compliance, they are afraid that they might end up harming the public they are supposed to protect, losing power and getting inferior results. Thus both states and their citizens end up in some prisoner dilemma, where regulators behave in a suboptimal way, which will push even more people to feel that they are not trustworthy, simply because they can’t know in advance when and how the public could be trusted to cooperate.

By and large, much of this deficit is related to the empirical basis of our understanding of when people can be trusted in a given situation is weak and limited. As a result, risk-averse policy makers resort to monitoring and coercive measures, simply because it is very challenging and complicated to identify in advance, the proportion of people in the population who will engage in more voluntary forms of cooperation in a given situation.[[4]](#footnote-4) The current COVID-19 pandemic crisis led some countries to resort to sanctions and fear-based rhetoric to gain public cooperation, and offers an excellent example of how the more coercive process occurs. These coercive measures were employed despite the overwhelming and recognized evidence of the short-term and long-term advantages of softer, less coercive regulatory measures, which have been shown to motivate people to engage in better quality compliance even in areas and contexts in which monitoring is impossible. However, despite these advantages, because of the constant risk and lack of knowledge of what exactly is known with regards to the likelihood of cooperation in many contexts, regulators resort to traditional approaches, happens in more contexts than assumed before.

Better insights into the likelihood and quality of voluntary compliance can help advance the theoretical understanding of the nature of the interaction between democratic governments their residents, as well as improve policy making in cases where the quality of voluntary cooperation is superior to coerced compliance or when the means policy makers could employ to coerce cooperation are limited, disruptive or too costly. Much of the discussion in this book will demonstrate the extent to which voluntary cooperation could and should be sought and the optimal ways to achieve it. The different costs of voluntary compliance in aspects such as equality, communication, uncertainty, and increased risk to the public will be explored in this book. Additionally, the benefits of voluntary compliance in terms of its effect on autonomy, resilience, quality of compliance, and enhanced trust relationships will also be discussed.[[5]](#footnote-5)

The voluntary compliance paradigm developed here will enable researchers and policy makers to make more informed decisions about when, how and to what extent states *could* resort to less coercive measures when trying to change the short term and long terms behavior of the public. Since part of the focus associated with voluntary compliance is related to intrinsic motivation, where people truly believe in the purpose of the relevant law or regulation, we will need to examine if states are even allowed to engage in practices which might shift people intrinsic motivation in the “desirable” direction. The behavioral analysis on when states can trust members of the public will be accompanied by a normative discussion on when and to what extent, states *should* do so, given the potential broader effect of such an approach on the public and other players. Clearly, to evaluate these effects, knowledge on who will cooperate voluntarily and to what extent will be needed[[6]](#footnote-6).

The different chapters of the book will address issues such as what regulatory approach is more likely to elicit VC, what could undermine it, and what needs to be done to understand how the individual, situational, regulatory, and cultural dimensions of the behavioral regulatory policy paradigm interact. In addition, we will review and analyze methods balancing the risk to the public of reduced regulatory coercion and monitoring with the potential long-terms advantages to the public arising from a cooperative regulatory approach in which deserving regulatees feel trustworthy. The nature of this analysis is inevitably malleable, depending on the distinct types of behaviorally based regulatory tools, and with different target populations with diverse backgrounds and ethical preferences.

Part of the problem with voluntary compliance is related to understanding what exactly does voluntary in voluntary compliance mean. Part of the discussion which needs to be done to advance our understanding of voluntary compliance is to distinct between various optional dichotomies which help understand what is spontaneous or induced, the regulatee’s consciousness of the decision to comply as in the case of many nudges, the relationship between voluntary and extrinsic measures such as positive incentives where the individual free decision might be relate to the , and how coercion free VC measures actually are.

Such discussion could lead to a much more nuanced and meaningful understanding of the antecedents of cross-sectional variation in levels and types of VC. Such understanding may be promoted by focusing on dependent variables, focusing on dependent variables (DV) beyond the classical regulatory and compliance measures of impact (e.g., proportion and typology of cooperators, broad-term[[7]](#footnote-7) impact of regulatory tools, quality of cooperation, beyond compliance measures of cooperation, and the likelihood of internalization processes following the regulatory intervention) as well as on the long-term effect of regulation (by measuring attitudes repeatedly on the same panel).

## Reversing the trust paradigm

In research and policy analysis, “trust” is typically studied in the context of the trust of the public in institutions.[[8]](#footnote-8) This book seeks to reverse the trust paradigm and examine how we can identify ex-ante when governments can trust the public, to what extent, and how trust should affect the regulatory style and governments’ efforts to foster voluntary cooperation of the public. The apparently unambiguous goal of states to have their citizens engage in VC is examined from different social science perspectives (psychology,[[9]](#footnote-9) sociology economics,[[10]](#footnote-10) political science,[[11]](#footnote-11) criminology,[[12]](#footnote-12) law,[[13]](#footnote-13) and philosophy[[14]](#footnote-14)).

To date, the empirical basis of our understanding of when and to what extent the public can be trusted in a given situation is weak both theoretically and normatively. Theoretically, since most of the relevant literatures (compliance, ethics cooperation, and more) rarely intersect. Empirically, since most studies focus on one type of behavior in one regulatory context and fail to examine broader questions regarding the distributive effects in the context of a heterogeneity in a population, or sustainability in terms of duration of regulatory effects on behavior. Various meta-analyses studies show that most people don’t cheat most of the time.[[15]](#footnote-15) While we now know to identify the contexts in which even self-perceived “good” people can cheat,[[16]](#footnote-16) we still do not know enough to accurately predict ex ante in what regulatory contexts such unethicality will dominate.[[17]](#footnote-17) Furthermore, the related literature in behavioral public policy[[18]](#footnote-18) usually focuses on the extent of the effect of certain interventions (e.g., nudges, incentives), but rarely discuss theoretically, empirically, or normatively all other dimensions, such as the population heterogeneity of the effect, the long-term effect on trust, and the quality and intensity of the compliance. As a result, risk-averse policy makers resort to monitoring and to coercive measures, simply because there is not enough information about the benefits of VC, in terms of its effect on autonomy, resilience, quality of compliance, and enhanced trust relationships, or about its costs, in terms of resulting inequality, communication costs, uncertainty, and increased risk to the public.[[19]](#footnote-19) For example, the recent COVID-19 pandemic led many countries to resort to sanctions and fear-based rhetoric to gain public cooperation given the first signs of certain levels of non-compliance, with limited ability to understand whether fear-based rhetoric and taking harsher steps actually improved all aspects of compliance, not to mention the possible negative effect on intrinsic motivation.

## Current research on voluntary compliance

While literature on voluntary cooperation does exist, it suffers from a number of weaknesses, which this project aims to address. First, they all suffer from the lack of any discussion about how they interact with regulatory policy or about whether they are able to contribute to a systematic shift in states’ regulatory policies. In fact, all the literatures provide only partial contributions to the most important questions of compliance theory. Literatures that explore concepts such as trust, efficacy of incentives, behavioral ethics, compliance, nudges, the regulatory toolbox, experimental legislation, behavioral approaches to law, cross-cultural differences in solidarity, and rule of law, rarely ask, for example, about the long-term effect of different regulatory interventions on trust or solidarity. This project will be the first to combine regulatory policy theory and behavioral theories to answer the most fundamental questions of compliance – when and to what extent states should trust the public to cooperate and what regulatory policies are likely to contribute to the creation of VC. This book’s premise is that the motivation to cooperate voluntarily with a regulatory requirement cannot be understood by using only a single perspective, and that there is a need to combine behavioral, institutional, and cultural contexts across many types of doctrines, cultures and behaviors to help create a regulatory balance which can offer insights into the advantages and disadvantages of trying to achieve voluntary compliance.

In the next few paragraphs, we wish to examine in short the perspective on voluntary compliance from multiple views we will make a short review of some to the main parts of the literature, some of these bodies of literature will receive more attention in later chapters, but at this point, we are merely interested in portraying using broad brushes the scope of the voluntary compliance dilemma.

## Regulation and Trust

The Regulation Literaturehas been studying in last years growing numbers of softer approaches aimed at reducing the excessive regulatory burden and eliciting voluntary compliance[[20]](#footnote-20). Two especially relevant paradigms are responsive regulation,[[21]](#footnote-21) a widely discussed paradigm that advances a more flexible and customized approach whereby smarter, less coercive regulatory measures are targeted at those parts of the population for which coercive measures are not needed. Another emerging paradigm is that of self-regulation,[[22]](#footnote-22) which focuses on transferring responsibility for the creation of standards and their enforcement to the regulated parties or businesses. However, these paradigms also fail to deal with a fundamental question of whether compliers and whether comply all the time and non-compliers fail to comply all the time?

Part of the complexity is reflected in the growing research on compliance motivation,[[23]](#footnote-23) where scholars differ in their perceptions of what can be considered the leading motivation for compliance, whether procedural legitimacy,[[24]](#footnote-24) costs of compliance,[[25]](#footnote-25) deterrence,[[26]](#footnote-26) obligation to obey the law.[[27]](#footnote-27) and political orientation.[[28]](#footnote-28) As part of its conceptual work regarding regulatory theory, we will create a taxonomy in the book which will examine to what extent, not just what is voluntary compliance but also from the regulatory perspective, what regulatory tool could be treated as *cooperative*  (e.g., how to define large incentives or system 1 nudges), with a special focus on trust based and behavioral-based regulation.

Defining regulatory tools based on their level of cooperativeness becomes more complicated because Incorporating behavioral approaches, has led to a dramatic increase in the variety of regulatory tools available to policy makers (e.g., nudges, framing, pledges, etc.). While the greater number of tools available render the instrument choice dilemma more difficult, they do offer concrete, quantitative means to measure and compare their efficacy.[[29]](#footnote-29) The nudge approach[[30]](#footnote-30), based on the influential work of Thaler and Sunstein,[[31]](#footnote-31) represents an important addition to the regulatory choice dilemma, leading numerous scholars to examine when nudges can be relied upon to replace more mandatory rules.[[32]](#footnote-32)

## Intrinsic compliance motivations

As suggested above, the advantages of voluntary compliance and its importance have been recognized across a number of dimensions.[[33]](#footnote-33) VC, especially if driven by intrinsic motivation,[[34]](#footnote-34) is usually considered more sustainable and of higher quality than coerced compliance when the government is afraid to trust the likelihood of public cooperation with coercive measures, which tends to be short-term and sensitive to the existence of sanctions.[[35]](#footnote-35) In addition, reliance on VC is more likely to increase feelings of trust and trustworthiness among regulatees,[[36]](#footnote-36) entail lower enforcement costs,[[37]](#footnote-37) and result in a higher quality of cooperation.[[38]](#footnote-38) Compliance which is more voluntary is also more likely to lead to greater resilience,[[39]](#footnote-39) as evidenced in findings from research on therapeutic jurisprudence[[40]](#footnote-40) and on happiness.[[41]](#footnote-41)

Efforts to understand how to stimulate and encourage VC have acknowledged that factors related to fairness,[[42]](#footnote-42) morality,[[43]](#footnote-43) duty to obey, and trust[[44]](#footnote-44) play an important role in compliance in areas from environmental and health regulations (including COVID-19 measures)[[45]](#footnote-45) to traffic and tax laws.

This focus on voluntary compliance has also been highly relevant to the growing recognition of the importance of intrinsic compliance motivations,[[46]](#footnote-46) and supports the preference for tailoring the focus of compliance measures to individuals’ motivations.[[47]](#footnote-47) By and large, it has been shown that extrinsic motivators, such as deterrence, are not only less effective than was once assumed, but that they also undermine the ability of intrinsic motivation to enhance compliance with regulation efforts.[[48]](#footnote-48)

However, as will be discussed in more details in chapter 4 that focuses on crowding out motivation, it is not fully clear from the literature whether compliance can be considered voluntary only when people *want* to cooperate. Or is compliance voluntary also when people are not being coerced, but, rather, motivated to act in a certain way directly through incentives, or indirectly, through community norms or reputational mechanisms? Finally, the literature on VC assumes its desirability, but rarely examines its effect on the distribution, sustainability, and quality of compliance. It also fails to account for any research on the societal externalities of compliance such as lack of trust and crowding out as discussed in chapter 3.

Another evolving area of study on the issue of regulatory compliance,[[49]](#footnote-49) has emphasized how voluntary compliance and its importance have been recognized across a number of dimensions.[[50]](#footnote-50) Voluntary compliance, especially if driven by intrinsic motivation,[[51]](#footnote-51) is usually considered preferable and more sustainable than coerced compliance, which tends to be short-term and sensitive to the existence of sanctions.[[52]](#footnote-52) In addition, reliance on voluntary compliance is more likely to increase trust among regulates,[[53]](#footnote-53) entail lower enforcement costs,[[54]](#footnote-54) and is likely to result in a higher quality of cooperation.[[55]](#footnote-55) Factors related to fairness, morality, duty to obey, and trust have been acknowledged as playing an important role in compliance in areas from environmental and health regulations (including COVID-19 measures)[[56]](#footnote-56) to traffic and tax laws. This focus on voluntary compliance has also been highly relevant to the growing recognition of the importance of intrinsic motivations across many types of compliance behaviors[[57]](#footnote-57) and supports the preference for shifting the focus of compliance to that of individuals’ motivations.[[58]](#footnote-58).[[59]](#footnote-59)

## Voluntary compliance vs. Honesty

Behavioral Ethics is another relatively new field exploring peoples’ ethical decision-making processes.[[60]](#footnote-60) My recent book, *The Law of Good People*,[[61]](#footnote-61) examines the challenges faced by governments that need to regulate people who don’t view themselves as needing regulation in view of their ethical and legal perceptions, or, more accurately, misperceptions, of their own behavior[[62]](#footnote-62). Scientific research on honesty and dishonesty has spiked in recent years.[[63]](#footnote-63) In most studies, “dishonesty” is typically mentioned in the context of rule following or rule violation.[[64]](#footnote-64) Laboratory studies of dishonesty have shown dishonesty in games to be related to various types of unethical behaviors outside the laboratory. For example, dishonesty in dice role and coin toss tasks has been associated with free-riding on buses,[[65]](#footnote-65) not returning undeserved pay,[[66]](#footnote-66) and being late to work.[[67]](#footnote-67) Presumably, this line of research is such that it might shed some pessimism on the that government can actually trust people, as in some of the studies, percentage of However, because a connection between honesty and compliance to rules which are not solely related to honesty has not been studied, it is not clear to what extent honest people differ from cooperators or compliers. For example, are honest people more likely to care for the environment? In addition, current dishonesty research, while focusing on the notion of the proportion of dishonest people,[[68]](#footnote-68) nonetheless fails to predict the distributive effect of the situational factors which might undermine honesty.[[69]](#footnote-69) Recognizing that different people engage in misconduct on different levels of awareness and intentionality is an important contribution to understanding the likelihood of coercive vs. cooperative regulatory styles succeeding in creating voluntary compliance in different segments of the population. Reviewing this literature is also important to help discern the proportion of “good” people in a given population, who might be more likely to react to trust-enhancing cooperative regulatory measures.

According to this approach, if even moral people cannot be completely trusted, given their ability to misperceive their own behavior, how can states trust the entirety of the public?

Along those line, in related works, I have endeavored to create a taxonomy of the situations in which government should be more concerned about the likelihood of non-deliberative and unintended unethicality.[[70]](#footnote-70) In addition, in collaboration with others I have also examined various ways in which a design aimed at inducing people to self-deceive themselves might work,[[71]](#footnote-71) and the “self-imposed red lines” that people adopt for their own self-serving interpretations of the law.[[72]](#footnote-72)

## Between Honesty and Compliance

Another important angle that will be examined throughout the book is related to the ability to learn from literatures related to cooperation and honesty on the likelihood that voluntary compliance will work. For example in chapter 9 and 10 we focus on taxation and environmental behavior respectively. In chapter 10 that focuses on environmental compliance, we will focus mostly on finding from the cooperation and pro-social research to understand when is compliance likely to occur. However, when it comes to taxation tax morale as discussed in chapter 9, we focus mostly on the resemblance with research about honesty and try to examine to what extent the predictions from honesty research are relevant to compliance. Finally, when we talk on public health in chapter 8 we focus mostly on cooperation. While this distinction is not mutually exclusive, it is possible to recognize that there are systematic differences between these three regulatory domains. Thus, for example, when we talk about taxation we can compare the notion of whether you can trust people to declare their donations without attaching the receipts why can't you trust Israelis to turn right on red or turn left. is it better to covid - whether countries that use more responsible behavior approach were more successful relative to countries that used covid- when your community is not in line with the government requests[[73]](#footnote-73)

## How many cooperators do we need?

The relevancy of the honesty literatures discussed above, become especially important when it comes to the question of the ability of countries to trust the public. While there are many differences between compliance and honesty in terms of the importance of factors such as institutions and external regulatory contexts. However, since there is some room to think of the correlations between honesty and compliance, it is important to understand from current research how many people we know are lying and as a consequence at least have some preliminary accounts of how many people cheat. In that regard when looking at the literature, the results seems to be mixed. On one hand there is an extensive meta analysis[[74]](#footnote-74) which makes up think that with the averaging of all experiments done on honesty, we see something like 50 percent of the people lie. On the other hand, in another highly influential economics paper[[75]](#footnote-75) that focused on trust telling the numbers of liars seems to be much smaller. This inconsistency which seems to emerge also from other studies that focus on honesty, raise an important aspect related to the likelihood that we will have enough people who cooperate even without the coercion. It is also suggest how impotant it is to collect data with regard to a new regulation or law before attempting to decide how coercive should be the regulatory approach.

## Voluntary compliance and Trust

The fourth body of literature involves the growing recognition of the importance of trust and legitimacy in achieving voluntary compliance. Numerous studies across almost all the social sciences have sought to understand what builds trust[[76]](#footnote-76) and how trust contributes to the creation of a just and functioning society.[[77]](#footnote-77) However, most of this literature focuses on the ways by which people can trust public and legal institutions,[[78]](#footnote-78) and overlooks the mechanisms state institutions need in order to trust the public. A prime example of the importance of trust and reputation in commercial transactions can be found in classic studies of the diamond industry, which has long relied on the extralegal enforcement of its business norms.[[79]](#footnote-79) Similar situations can be found in the cotton industry,[[80]](#footnote-80) and among farmers in Shasta County.[[81]](#footnote-81) While clearly there are some reciprocal relationship in places, many of the mechanisms related to the ability of states to trust its own citizens[[82]](#footnote-82) involve concepts such as social capital[[83]](#footnote-83) and interpersonal trust.[[84]](#footnote-84)

## Voluntary Compliance without Law?

As mentioned in the early parts of the chapter, it is possible to think about voluntary compliance, where there is no particular law that one needs to obey but rather a social norms. Th order without law literature offers an additional theoretical perspective on voluntary compliance, indicating that behavioral change can be achieved even with limited involvement of the state is related to the order without law literature. This type of literature, usually emphasize that in many contexts, people can find alternative arrangements to those imposed by the law. However, the focus of this book will mostly attempt to understand in what ways the interaction between people could be done in a way which would allow the state to take a step back and trust that existing reactions by the public would by sufficient and stable enough over time to reduce the need for alternative mechanisms. Such approach by the state could be taken in the context of response to regulation (as in cases such as using children’s car seats, where VC was achieved by applying reason and science),[[85]](#footnote-85) or even in the absence of regulation, where the social and community norms emerged without any state involvement (as in the case of allocating fencing costs among the farmers in Shasta County, California[[86]](#footnote-86)). Nonetheless, not only is it unclear whether one can even define compliance with social and community norms as voluntary, but it is impossible to generalize from the few well-known examples, such as that of people learning not to smoke in public places, or the changing norms with regard to sexual harassment,[[87]](#footnote-87) and then apply them to other contexts.

When discussing the concept of voluntary compliance, an outstanding study is that related to the emergence of social norms as governing the behavior of people with limited involvement of the state, either as a consequence of regulation (as in cases such as using children’s car seats, where voluntary compliance was achieved by applying reason and science).[[88]](#footnote-88) While these studies are novel, it is impossible to generalize from the few well-known examples, such as that of people learning not to smoke in public places, or the changing norms with regard to sexual harassment[[89]](#footnote-89) and apply them to other contexts. These few cases do not enable us to build a comprehensive account of when monitoring and sanctioning are not needed. Nor do they help us understand the mechanisms of why voluntary compliance succeeded in these cases. In fact, these few cases have provided a very limited view of the social norm of voluntary compliance.

For example, according to Bernstein, who was mentioned above and conducted studies in the diamond[[90]](#footnote-90) and the cotton industries,[[91]](#footnote-91) close social groups with shared values could function with only limited formal legal intervention. Even when discussing approaches beyond command and control, it should be recognized that there are different, sometimes competing, approaches which could lead to voluntary compliance, such as nudges, internalization, social norms, moral persuasion, procedural fairness, and self-regulation mechanisms. These beyond-compliance mechanisms, which differ significantly, are likely to lead to different behaviors. Consequently, it is important to understand which non-coercive measure is more effective in enhancing voluntary compliance. Can people who are nudged to behave a certain way be considered as complying voluntarily? In addition, given that compliance nudges could result in what could be termed mindless cooperation, can the resulting behavior be viewed as voluntary? Even in cases where the law successfully changes people’s attitudes and preferences, it is questionable how stable this change is. Finally, it needs to be examined to what extent sanctions are or are not part of a process which might create voluntary compliance.

Furthermore, because this literature has not traditionally been considered part of the regulatory and behavioral ethics literature, many important questions on the interaction between regulatory choices and the response of communities have not been studied. For example, what regulatory interventions are more likely to lead to change, if at all, in a sustainable way within the social norms of a given community? To what extent can a strong sense of solidarity with one’s community lead one to comply with states’ laws and regulations? These questions are of particular interest in contexts in which the greater good (global warming or enriching the state treasury) is not seen as being aligned with that of the community, thus raising the need to adjust the regulation to account for community as well as behavioral factors. Insights from the social norms literature also has great importance because it, too, weakens the dichotomy between external vs. internal measures, as people’s reaction to their surrounding communities represents a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.[[92]](#footnote-92)

## Behavioral Public Policy and Voluntary Compliance

This Literature serves as one of the basic foundations of this book, with its emphasis on the recognition that people cannot comply solely by reacting to prices. Behavioral public policy has contributed to the greater variety of regulatory tools available to policy makers (e.g., nudges, framing, pledges,[[93]](#footnote-93) etc.) aimed at changing people’s behavior through means other than coercion. However, BPP suffers from the fact that they lack any normative perspective

Nudges are indeed somewhere in the middle between the more intrinsically oriented intervention such as morality and reason to the more extrinsically oriented measures such as incentives and sanctions. Nudges themselves can of course move between educating people or reminding them of their morality and the likelihood of getting a sanction or simply somewhere in the middle where the simply change the choice architecture[[94]](#footnote-94).

As suggested above, while we see a grow in the amount of interventions in the behavioral regulatory era and there are some comparative studies, most of them they do allow for concrete, quantitative measurements and comparisons of their efficacy.[[95]](#footnote-95) The nudge approach, based on the influential work of Thaler and Sunstein,[[96]](#footnote-96) represents an important addition to the regulatory choice dilemma, leading numerous scholars to examine when nudges can be relied upon to replace more mandatory rules.[[97]](#footnote-97) Famous studies by Milkman for example show negative correlation between expert predictions of what regulatory intervention works better and this is happening only when it comes to short terms change in behavior[[98]](#footnote-98). The comparison between An important goal of this project is distinguishing the long-term impacts of the vast array of behavioral regulatory tools, which lie somewhere on the spectrum between intrinsic and extrinsic measures, in the context of the above-mentioned dimensions.

## The importance of culture in Voluntary Compliance

To better clarify the issue of compliance, it is critical to understand how trust, social diversity, social inclusiveness, solidarity, and helpfulness affect the different levels of cohesion and solidarity in European countries. Generally, countries with a higher value of social cohesion are more likely to have a higher level of innovation and social progress.[[99]](#footnote-99) In chapter 6 of the book that focus on culture and voluntary compliance we examine the huge variation that exists between the countries with regard to trust[[100]](#footnote-100), power, collectivist culture vs. individualistic ones[[101]](#footnote-101)solidarity and other values which seems to predict the likelihood of voluntary compliance.

## What Current Literature Does Not Explain about Voluntary Compliance

As described above, relevant literature has emerged that identifies voluntary compliance and self-regulation as the optimal guiding principles of regulatory governance. However, these concepts can be elusive and thus difficult to fully understand conceptually and practically on both the individual level and the aggregate level, which is of interest for the regulatory state. Part of the argument to be developed in the proposed book is that many of the studies on voluntary compliance were carried out in very contextualized circumstances, thus limiting the possibility of generalizing from them to the realm of broader policies.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Voluntariness | Regulatory approach | Type of definition |  |  |
| Spontaneous | Order without law | Narrowest definition |  |  |
| Not-coerced | Sanction / monitoring | Broadest definition |  |  |
| incentivized | Positive/negative | Depends on size and social meaning |  |  |
| Intrinsically motivation | Reasoning |  |  |  |
| Aware | Nudge? | Choice without aware |  |  |
| Mandated | Duty |  |  |  |
| Reputation | Social norms |  |  |  |
| Citizenship | Legitimacy/ trust | Less related |  |  |
| Moralistic | Guilt | Could be quite coercive |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## 

## What is Non-Voluntary Compliance

Clearly, as suggested above, when we tried to define the voluntariness of behaviors which are driven by nudges, when people comply to avoid sanctions, they do not do so voluntarily. Fully understanding the effect of sanctions becomes even more complicated when we move from a behavioral perspective to a less direct one -- sociological (e.g., Durkheim), according to which punishment is viewed as solidarity producing mechanism,[[102]](#footnote-102) although the actual punishment effect is more indirect. However, what is not fully clear from the literature is whether voluntary compliance includes more ambiguous situations where people react to positive incentives or when people are nudged to behave in a pro-social manner. Although coercion is usually considered the opposite of voluntary compliance, such is not always the case. For example, if a reputational mechanism is put in place which will increase the reputational cost that people will pay for not cooperating with a certain norm, can their ensuing compliance be considered voluntary because people want to belong to a certain community in which certain behavior is seen as a desirable one? In essence, as we will examine in the next chapter that discuss intrinsic motivation, our question is whether compliance can be considered voluntary only when people autonomously *want* to cooperate? Or is compliance voluntary also when people are not being coerced, but, rather, incentivized to act in a certain way directly through incentives, or indirectly, through reputational mechanisms? Similarly, when non-voluntary interventions are used to induce voluntary compliance, how long do they successfully affect people’s choices to cooperate? Some of these questions will be examined in chapter 3 which attempt to examine the connection between regulatory tools used and the likelihood that voluntary compliance will emerge from them.

## Spontaneous compliance

The first approach could differentiate between induced vs. spontaneous, where the focus on this definition is related to the process though which people choose to comply. According to this approach, any time the compliance is a process through which the individual has chosen to comply without any intervention that triggered it, could be seen as a voluntary. Examples for such as an approach are various social practices which have evolved in legal institutions. In addition, this is the situation also with regard to various environmental contents such as not eating meat or buying recycled product[[103]](#footnote-103) where the behavior is not induced in any way but rather is voluntary because this is what the person wants to do. Such definition of voluntary limits the contexts in which they are possible, as in areas such as taxation, there is no expectation of people wanting to pay a tax which does not exist.

## Voluntary as awareness

A second approach, following our previous discussion regarding nudges might focus on awareness to the decision, where voluntary will be seen as such, only when people are fully aware to their action. When they are engaging mindlessly in compliance because of some shift in the default, the voluntary aspect of it is absent. Embedded in this approach is some criticism on nudge approaches which are seen as non-coercive but at the same time do call for some mindless processes, in a similar way where people might engage in binge watching on Netflix and other streaming service, because of the default created by the next episode in 10 seconds feature[[104]](#footnote-104).

## Voluntary as autonomous choice

Another related approach is related to the question of whether we are talking on a subjective feeling or an objective one[[105]](#footnote-105). One might argue that if people subjectively feel that they have the freedom not to comply, then this this falls under the definition of voluntary even though it is not the case objectively[[106]](#footnote-106). A different approach might suggest that if we see for example that people in a certain group, make similar compliance choices, then there might be some social mechanism that cause people to comply, even if they think that this is their choice.

## Voluntary compliance as discretion

Another possibility to understand the meaning of voluntary compliance is related to the amount of discretion that states give people. The more discretion people get, the more room they have to bring their own interpretation to what is expected from them[[107]](#footnote-107). While by most accounts, giving people discretion could not be seen as voluntary compliance, to the extent that within certain requirements, people have more than one behaviors they can choose from, definitely have an effect on people[[108]](#footnote-108). Wearing mask always or only near people? Never turn on red, or turn on when traffic allows for it.

Much of the inspiration for writing this book, came from the covid crisis, during which states came to understand the classical limits of compliance. One classical dilemmas that many countries, faced is related to whether to trust people with the decision whether to wear the mask all the time or only when there are people near them[[109]](#footnote-109). Since the definition of what it means to be near people, could be explained in more than one way, people have some leverage to decide what is their level of compliance and how careull they want to be and define terms like crowded or near people accordingly. In Israel for example in the early days for covid, people had to be with a masks all the time, as if their discretion is not to be trusted. A similar theme in Israeli culture views for example the fact that there are not right on red light, like the one which exists in most other counties. A similar debated in the literature is related to sex education for adolescences between safe sex and absenteeism.

## Voluntary compliance motivation

A third approach, which is the most classical one, focuses on the motivation behind the compliance is it coerced by state sanctions or by other barriers which makes compliance impossible. For example, people might comply with some public transportation rules, in some countries, where there is simply no way to got on without a ticket, in such contexts

In some cases, enforcing the payment for the fare is being done by administrative tools, such as fines. There are several enforcement strategies such as: increasing the fine amount; improving the fine collection procedure; changing the offence from civil to criminal; improving the ability to identify the identity of the passengers; adopting a joint fast track justice procedure in order to pay fines.[[110]](#footnote-110)

In other public transportation systems, the enforcement is done via inspectors,[[111]](#footnote-111) hence the compliance is voluntary but there is some probabilistic risk that people take into account[[112]](#footnote-112). Clearly, current research makes this distinction but it is entirely clear, what level of expected sanction could be seen as taking from the individual, her perceived or actual voluntarism.

## Voluntary compliance and intrinsic motivation

While one might associate voluntary compliance with intrinsic motivation, for some of the definitions, this might be seen as harming voluntary compliance, given self imposed constrains created by guilt[[113]](#footnote-113) On the other hand, possible a normative perceptive on a rule of law, will want normative members of society to have gut feelings associated with engaging in wrongful behavior. The harder question is about things which hare not clear moral violation – malla per se[[114]](#footnote-114) – where we might then want to have a situation, where its not a moral violation but rather a legal one but by adding explanation for why it is important to obey the law might enhance guilt which would prevent people from making fully free choices.

From many perspectives the fact that someone is making a choice because he himself wants to do it and no external measure, positive or negative is imposed upon him, might seem as the most complete representation of voluntary compliance. However, it is possible to think of many examples in which being intrinsically motivated might actually reduce your choice with regard to a specific behavior. For example, If someone want to improve their social image by complying to a certain rule, it might be possible to question whether this is not voluntary only because it is done for extrinsic reason? And the same is true for the opposite context, where for example, individual whose compliance is driven by guilt.

## Incentives and voluntary compliance

An additional regulatory approach which is based on incentives and will be discussed in more details in chapter 3 and also in chapter on environmental compliance is related to increasing usage of incentives[[115]](#footnote-115). Incentives such as subsidies and tax breaks have various advantages over sanctions since they are seen as being better suited in fostering cooperation, encouraging innovation, and reducing enforcement costs. Part of the advantages of incentives seems to be in the fact that they cause people to want to comply even when they do it for financial extrinsic reasons. However, especially when incentives become high and in competitive environments, maybe people don’t really have a real choice rather than to behave in a way which will maximize the regulatory incentives they get for compliance. In such situations, one might question whether incentivized compliance which many might view as voluntary, as it seems to be a replica of the behavior of people in the market context which is always seems as the best example of market relations. Especially if we remember that part of the attempt to clarify what is voluntary compliance is related to the examination of when it might be enduring, leading to positive externalities and causing people to engage in beyond compliance

## Voluntary compliance and self-regulation

As described above, relevant literature has emerged that identifies voluntary compliance and self-regulation as the optimal guiding principles of regulatory governance. Both processes are heavily conditioned upon the emergence of trust both between people and between people and their governments. However, these concepts can be elusive, and therefore it is difficult to fully capture important behavioral and institutional factors that moderate the behavioral effect of different regulatory governance measures[[116]](#footnote-116). Considering the range of situations in which there is public interest in promoting honest and ethical behavior, this lacuna is especially significant for legal and public policy, as such behavior goes beyond mere compliance with the rules.[[117]](#footnote-117) While a liberal democratic state may only be able to expect and demand compliance with respect to what is required by the law, it is invaluable to understand not only what underlies questions of compliance, but also behavior that goes beyond the compliance with explicit rules. Our ability to accurately predict such behavior influences policy regarding how to best encourage both accounts of honesty vis-à-vis compliance and vis-à-vis other aspects of ethicality can contribute to better theoretical predictions about voluntary cooperation with different regulatory measures.

Thus, the main purpose of this book is to create a new conceptual language and an integrated concept of voluntary compliance which will combine concepts from different literatures, such as being honest, trustworthy, moral, compliant, and cooperative and examine to what extent findings from the different literatures can help explain and accurately predict voluntary compliance and in what contexts. Clearly, there are many situations in life where one is required to comply. These include contexts where, for example, honesty doesn’t play an important part (e.g. environmental compliance), some contexts within which compliance and honesty are far more tightly intertwined (e.g., misreporting income on tax forms), and still more contexts within which the relevant behavior appears to be linked primarily to rule-surpassing honesty, or some other aspect of substantive ethicality, as distinct from mere compliance (e.g., reporting problems in the sale of property, withholding information that could help a customer find a less costly solution, or that the price will go down tomorrow)[[118]](#footnote-118).

## The Desired Proportion of Voluntary Cooperators and Regulators’ Dilemma

In light of these dilemmas about non-voluntary interventions, other issues to be examined at the group level are the proportion of people who are likely to cooperate and their characteristics relative to the group: whether they are part of the weaker or stronger parts of the group.[[119]](#footnote-119) In addition, how can regulators determine in advance whether or not the advantages from voluntary compliance will be outperformed by a complete lack of compliance? How likely it is that people will hold moral views that reflect those of the state? Are there people who are more likely to engage in voluntary compliance across all disciplines? These issues become important at the level of the regulatory toolbox available to policy makers, where there are numerous barriers to reliance on regulatory tools aimed at enhancing voluntary compliance with respect to creating an effect of compliance cultures and with respect to the emergence of trust within states. Indeed, many models have attempted to offer various taxonomies of compliance, for example Vallery Braithwaite[[120]](#footnote-120) motivational postures of commitment differentiate between the following modes of compliance capitulation, resistance, disengagement and game-playing are helpful for thinking about such variation.

## Situational Analysis of Voluntary Compliance

The variation in compliance motivation discussed above with regard to the likelihood of voluntary compliance may not depend just on who the particular individual is, but also the environment in which that individual is operating.[[121]](#footnote-121) Behavioral ethics research indicates that most people are capable of engaging in ordinary unethicality if they are able to deceive themselves, either deliberately by finding a justification for non-compliance, or with limited deliberation, that is, engaging in motivated reasoning in ambiguous situations. Thus, according to this approach, when policy makers are interested in understanding when can they trust people to exhibit a greater likelihood of cooperation, they need to pay special attention to the situational characteristics which might enhance the likelihood that more people will cooperate voluntarily with the government’s approach. These characteristics include lack of ambiguity, clear victims, the logic behind the regulation, and visible compliance behavior.[[122]](#footnote-122)

## The Lack of Research on Contextual Factors

While as suggested the literature on voluntary compliance is vast and is related to many different literatures, it fails dramatically in its ability to generalize beyond the specific context being studied. There are indeed quite a number of predictors indicating that in a given regulatory context, more lenient regulatory measures are likely to be at least as effective as more coercive ones. It is known that the efficacy of voluntary compliance is based upon numerous indicators, such as cultural and social norms, personality, institutions, characteristics of the regulatory environment, and more. However, there is limited data about how these factors interact, which thus limits the ability of regulators to identify the situations in which less coercive measures are more likely to be effective. For example, it is known that in certain countries, people can be trusted to pay their public transportation fares without coercion.[[123]](#footnote-123) The problem is that these anecdotal findings are not consistent and hence offer little to no evidence about what mechanisms drive the success of this voluntary compliance, and thus offer no guidance as to how similar trust-based systems might work in other countries or contexts.

## Could nudges be counted as voluntary compliance

Another regulatory approach, which will be discussed more extensively in chapter 2 and 3 is related to role of nudges in shifting peoples' behavior. Much of the original research regarding nudges was related to the notion of how they are not paternalistic despite being used in the early days to areas such as nutrition, consumerism and long terms saving[[124]](#footnote-124). Nudges are perceived as a tool that maintains people’s freedom of choice and the fact that they are employed with limited awareness by the public could potentially lead to their being viewed as a more sophisticated form of coercion.[[125]](#footnote-125) The salience of this literature in the context of compliance research is that it unravels many of the dichotomies usually seen in the regulation literature, whereby government either attempts to focus on external factors, such as prices, or on internal factors, such as morality.[[126]](#footnote-126)

On one hand, the whole debate around liberal paternalism[[127]](#footnote-127), is based on the argument that people are free to choose and that nudges do not force them to choose what to do[[128]](#footnote-128). On the other hand, much of the research on the mindlessness and lack of transparency associated with nudges[[129]](#footnote-129) and with the fact that many nudges, even the basic ones, focus on biases such as status quo could basically seen as supporting a regime with limited deliberation.

Clearly when people are being “gently pushed” to behave in a certain way due some a default rule choice architecture it is very hard to define whether their compliance motivation is voluntary. When we define voluntary as non-coerced, then clearly behaving in a certain way due to the default rule, doesn’t involve coercion. However, if people don’t know why they behave in a certain way, than their self perception of voluntary choice is of course missing[[130]](#footnote-130).

At the same time, one cannot ignore the importance of nudges in the process of sanctions and monitoring-free regulation. Nudges are used in many cases where you cannot use laws. to boost vaccination, encourage organ donation, diet and long term saving, laws are naturally less likely to work in context where the preservation of [[131]](#footnote-131)choice is crucial. Nonetheless, it is increasingly used in areas where it is possible to but nudges are increasingly used in contexts such as employment discrimination[[132]](#footnote-132) or tax compliance[[133]](#footnote-133), where laws could have been used.

In such situation it is important to discuss also the expressive value, we use, where we want people not to discriminate not just to hire minorities through some choice architecture modifications[[134]](#footnote-134). So in areas where we have no alternative, nudges are obviously better than simply ask the public to do it nicely. However, we have to recognize from the perspective of the book, which is interested in long term effect on compliance, short term compliance which is achieved thorough nudges has its limitations[[135]](#footnote-135).

Indeed in recent years behavioral public policy scholars have discussed agency preserving nudges such as the nudge plus approach[[136]](#footnote-136) were discussed, as a way to enhance peoples’ reflection following the nudge, this might enhance our ability to combine the efficacy of nudges with some advantages, with regard to a process of reflection and internalization.

## Responsive Regulation[[137]](#footnote-137) and the Challenge of the Heterogeneity of Intrinsic Motivation

An important paradigm with which any behavioral approach recognizes is related to responsive regulation which takes into account behavioral predictions combined with , which represents the broadest interpretation of a regulatory approach, and which is sensitive to the characteristics of the people and organizations requiring regulation. This expansive paradigm is balanced with the recognition of the need to understand that incentives and deterrence are still needed. This kind of analysis can help advance the understanding of the advantages of non-coercive regulation and can underscore the fact that states cannot use identical regulatory measures to deal with different types of people. According to this analysis, states must instead rely on a sequential approach where softer means precedes harsher and harsher steps towards those who refuse to engage in voluntary cooperation. This book will examine some of the aspects of responsive and agile regulation paradigms in order to identify and classify the factors that need to be addressed when determining how to reach a level of voluntary compliance which will be sensitive to the risks to the public associated with different regulatory settings.

## Healthy Compliance and Therapeutic Jurisprudence

Part of the potential advantage of voluntary compliance involves not just increased personal commitment by people and the perception of better compliance by the public, but also their well-being. If people are given the choice to comply, they will have better cognitive and emotional capacities to deal with uncertainties, to adapt, and to demonstrate greater resilience[[138]](#footnote-138). This aspect of the book’s examination of voluntary compliance will draw on the classical literature about therapeutic jurisprudence,[[139]](#footnote-139) as well on the data accumulated in research on happiness,[[140]](#footnote-140) to try to improve our understanding of the mental advantages of having people comply voluntarily and not as a response to external pressure. Understanding the causal relationships is highly complicated given that the government’s ability to rely upon non-coercive mechanisms is highly connected to the type of society in which such mechanisms are likely to work, as well to policymakers’ heavy reliance on expectations that people are more likely to benefit from being able to cooperate voluntarily.

## Can Corporations be Trusted?

Another important issue which is of high importance from a regulatory standpoint is whether corporations can be trusted by regulators and policy makers, as much of the debate on self-regulation involves businesses and corporations. Much of the research today, emphasizes the importance of understanding corporations impact on the environment, rather than to spending all of the effort of the public on individual behavior[[141]](#footnote-141) Their ethical behavior has come to be considered an aspect of their performance,[[142]](#footnote-142) and, as a result, has been subject to increasing interest. Some aspects of my research indicate that corporations might be hotbeds for unethicality.[[143]](#footnote-143) Nonetheless, there are many reasons to believe that the bureaucratic and transparent nature of how corporations operates, especially the larger ones, as well as their greater sensitivity to reputational mechanisms than individuals,[[144]](#footnote-144) might make them better candidates to adhere in a consistent way to self-regulation. Another aspect of the focus on the corporate culture involves examining data about corporate behavior with regard to trusting their own employees and customers.[[145]](#footnote-145) . In many ways, part of what the book tries to examine, is whether, some of what can be achieved in the organizational context to be moved to the state context. Hence, this book will analyze various case studies on this issue dealing with the prevalence of dishonesty in the relationship between corporations and their clients. For example, what can be learned from the success of the Lemonade insurance company’s trust-based approach and possibly applied to the ability of states to trust their publics? While many corporations engage in various ways to enhance the feeling of trust by their customers and employees, using various practices which attempt to elicit trustworthiness[[146]](#footnote-146), it is rarely the case that states feel given their size and limited ability to know how their citizens behave.

## The Normative Dilemma with regard to voluntary compliance

Throughout the book and mainly towards the last chapters, we will develop in the book a new conceptual paradigm which will examine the desirability of voluntary compliance for democratic states across few regulatory domains. We will examine the under what factors, the attempt of state to achieve voluntary compliance might be inadvertent or undermine it, and what needs to be done to better understand the interaction between individual, situational, regulatory, and cultural dimensions in order to maintain it. In addition, the book will suggest methods for considering how to balance the risk to the public of reduced monitoring with the advantages to the public deriving from regulatees who feel trustworthy by the state. The nature of this analysis inevitably changes when discussing more extensive types of regulations where the target population includes broad layers of the public. Some of the questions to be raised include: What are the contextual factors which would help regulators and experts decide what approach to adopt? What factors are they allowed to take into account when we want to know what proportion of the public we can trust? In particular, based on what individual and group related factors are we allowed to consider when trying to assess the likelihood that trusting a certain individual or a segment of the population is likely to cooperate with more trusting regulatory approaches[[147]](#footnote-147). How do these factors influence the responsive regulation approach? In addition, how do the current empirical data and theories on how voluntary compliance might enhance people’s mental well-being intersect with the therapeutic jurisprudence literature?

## Is it really clear what regulatory mechanism are more likely to lead to voluntary compliance?

An important question that will be dealt with throughout the chapters that attempt to connect regulation and trust is to examine and explain what regulatory interventions are more likely to lead to voluntary compliance. As explained in the beginning of the chapter, it is not compleltly clear, whether indeed focusing on intrinsic motivation is more likely to lead to voluntary compliance. The distinction between the different instruments is not clear enough. in many cases, nudges are such that we view as doing one thing is in fact working through a different mechanisms. is it always the case that market mechanisms are not likely to lead to voluntary compliance in the long run? Think for example on the type of work created by Milkman in the context of habit formation[[148]](#footnote-148), in which the process through which people adopt behavior in a consistent way seems to be relatively mechanic without any focus on trust or on reflection of knowledge or other types of moral reasoning. In chapter 3, where the idea is that to argue that it is not clear at all which legal instrument leads to more coercion, argue that the boundaries between the different instruments is not clear. Furthermore as will be discussed in chapter 5 which focus on the limitations of voluntary compliance, it is possible to argue that voluntary compliance might lead states to engage in shady manipulative influencing practices to lead to attitude change which might end up limiting peoples' voluntary choices.

Furthermore, it is possible by imposing guilt on people through the usage of moral based reasoning mechanisms, which will ensure voluntary compliance, we might make people worse off in terms of the mental costs imposed on them by such situations where not complying might cause them to feel worse about themselves[[149]](#footnote-149). While there are many advantages from state perspective, to focus on such guilt based motivation in a very similar way to how religion affects people’s behavior[[150]](#footnote-150). However, as we know for example from studies in education, from the perspective of the overall welfare of people, it is not fully clear that such approach should be adopted by liberal state even if by doing that they can reduced monitoring costs and enhance trustworthiness and social capital in society.

## What are we interested in changing?, compliance behavior or compliance motivation?

Another important topic which will be examined in chapter 3, is related to the question of what are we actually trying to change? Are we trying to change people motivation which basically means also their preferences, attitudes and habits? As suggested above, intrinsic motivation and voluntary compliance, while might be seen as related are in fact different concepts. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that we have to change peoples' intrinsic motivation in order to achieve voluntary compliance. The different views suggested above about what is voluntary compliance, do tell us that we don't have to view this relationships as mutually exclusive. Furthermore even to the approaches that when speaking about intrinsically motivated voluntary compliance, we are not necessarily, talking about changing people intrinsic motivation, it can definitely be the case that we can just prime or stimulate people pre-existing intrinsic motivation but telling them for example that the doing the moral thing, in a given context is complying with the law[[151]](#footnote-151). Such approach as common in many of the field studies done in tax context[[152]](#footnote-152), don't attempt to change people morality, but rather build on the existence of an existing moral sentiment to improve compliance by people. Nonetheless even with such distinction in place as will be discussed in chapter 5 there are many problem with such an approach.

## Is culture malleable?

A similar question is in place with regards to culture. If we want to examine the ability of governments to trust the public, do we need to change culture for that or is enough just to understand the culture, in order for us to know whether voluntary compliance could work. A third option might be that, we might want to make small modification in a culture to allow for certain voluntary practices to work. For example, changing something with regard to voluntary tax compliance doesn’t necessarily require making a broader change with regard to all factors that we know about. In chapter 6 we dedicated the chapter to a discussion on the interaction between culture and voluntary compliance and the debate between scholars[[153]](#footnote-153) on the ability of policy makers to gradually lead to a cultural change either directly by focusing on policies related to solidarity (as was done in the Nordic counties) immigration (related to the research by Putnam on diversity and social capital)

## Technology and voluntary compliance

In chapter 6 of the book we will also examine what is the contribution of technology to the emergence of voluntary compliance given it is ability to improve monitoring and hide its presence making it less noticeable. What technology is trying to achieve is to make it easier for states to trust people or the other way around because they trust them but because there is an algorithm that suggests so they can be more laid back in the risk they take in trusting people. Possibly, technology can allow for surveillance which might be less threatening behaviorally. Which requires the need to learn when we can reduce the negative effect of technological surveillance. can we raise the bar so that smaller misdemeanors will be tolerated? The anti-cash revolution is an example for a world which is more advanced technologically which might change the need for trust in taxation. did it work so far. do we prefer nudges to technological revolution. However what we have learned from covid, was that there was a huge public resistance to the usage of tracing apps and people didn't view them as "working in the background". Part of what will be discussed in that chapter is to what types of apps and technological monitoring, people are more likely to resists.

## Don’t edit byond this point

## Trustworthiness

First, a crucial step is to assess whether expectations about the counterpart are favourable. This assessment of trustworthiness of the counterpart focuses on particular dimensions, of which several have been proposed. Mayer et al’s (1995) ABI-model is possibly the most often cited, referring to Ability (expectations  
that the other party has the competence to successfully complete its tasks), Benevolence (the expectation that the other party cares about the trustor’s interests and needs) and Integrity (the expectation that the other party will act in a just and fair way). However, in another prominent classification, benevolence and integrity are taken together, referring to intentions, as empirically there is often not a clear distinction between these two dimensions, especially in organizational or system trust (Dekker, 2004; Sako, 1998; Searle et al., 2011). Besides benevolence and integrity, competence as a manifestation of ability takes a central place in most conceptualizations of trustworthiness (see Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006 who additionally it is interesting to think about the trustworthiness of the public ability, integrity, benovolence mention predictability as element of trustworthiness).

## What is intrinsic motivation?

Chapter 2 discuss the related concept of intrinsic motivation which seems in many way the classical understanding of voluntary compliance.

We discuss in that chapter few different forms of voluntary compliance. Such as morality, fairness legitimacy trust and reason. Each of these concept could carry more than one meaning for example, trust in science is basically intrinsic motivation based compliance which is related to the envirometn or to covid, where we are concinced to believe that recycling or using electrical cars are a good way to stop climate change.   
state should aspire voluntary compliance, although this is unlikely to succeed. it is obliged to do so as part of the democratic situation and as a way to signal to the good people that it trusts them.

## Crowding out of what type intrinsic motivation?

Another problem, which is discussed in chapter 3 is related to the with the arguments on crowding out effect intrinsic motivation, due to regulatory intervention. This approach is far from being clear and there are various accounts that attempt to explain what is intrinsic motivation, clearly for example that intrinsic motivation such as pro social motivation is more likely to suffer from external interventions, however if one things that a certain institution is legitimate and she likely to comply with it, is it really the case that because of some legal reliance on external measures, it will be crowded out and he will no longer believe that the legal institution is legitimate? Hence there is a need to focus extensively on understanding what intrinsic motivations we are talking about.


The information we have about people is huge but not satisfying


So most people are honest but not if they have excuses than many cheat

when we talk about cooperation, we have this assumption that we don't want the bare minimum but is the case across all  
so in taxes maybe its fine for people to pay the bare minimum but in the enviorometn maybe it is not the same? maybe we need to create a different threshhold for every doctrine there are many aspects of motivation we have intrinsic and we have extrinsic but intrinsic could mean a lot of things so for example trust in a sense is related to the source and not to the content that is I am complying not because I believe in the content but because I believe in the source and that regard legitimacy could also be seen as not related to the actual content reciprocity is also source related not content related when we talk about extrinsic we also need to differentiate between probabilistic and actual so in probabilistic doing it might lead to a benefit or cost relative to a situation where I actually have to do it so I don't know to get into a parking you need to swipe your card this is not giving you an option whether to cooperate or you have to do it in many text situation we don't give you that option so it's actual versus probabilistic or

## A threshold approach?

is it enoguh to give poeple choices without risking the botom line for the state- in a similar way to how poeple with eating disorders are being treated, they can choose what to eat but need to get to s certain level  
do we want to say sometihng similar with regard to income - that people will need to pass some threshhold and when poeple pass it they will not be criminally sanctioned? why do we do it only in speed enforcement. maybe it is best if we anounce it?   
. An equally widely replicated finding, however, is that the fair process effect does not emerge when people have a moral stake in outcomes (see Skitka et al., 2008 for a review). For example, people see vigilantism to be equally fair as due process of law in leading to the death of a defendant in a murder case if they have strong moral clarity about the defendant’s guilt (Skitka & Houston, 2001).





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6. Chapter \_\_ which focus on technological enforcement is [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
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