The book is dedicated to *Aviva Rakover*, the woman of my life, and to Professor *Yeshayahu Leibowitz*, my teacher, who presented me in my first year of studying psychology the mind/body problem that I have not stopped thinking about since then. In one of my meetings with Prof. Leibowitz, I told him that I met Aviva at his lecture on the mind and body, and he replied and said that “finally something good came out of all my lectures”.

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**Given the above information, I end the preface with a list of the basic ideas about CΨ that guided me in writing this book.**

**(1) The book does not offer a solution to the question of how CΨ, as an existing subjective phenomenon, is created by the brain. However, it does offer a theory of how a non-conscious mental-state (MS) becomes a conscious one.**

**(2) Based on everyday observations the following intuitive generalization can be reached. Consciousness appears in biological live creatures (human and animals) and not in plants and inanimate materials (call it the “live-creatures correlation”).**

**(3) Consciousness does not correlate with or depend on either intelligence or brain complexity.**

**(4) It is hypothesized that CΨ is a certain indivisible type of energy required for the continued normal functioning of humans and animals. Without CΨ, the individual loses almost all the normal functions (and usually the cessation of CΨ is death).**

**(5) Without CΨ there is no understanding, no meaning of life and the environment in which one lives is meaningless.**

**(6) Consciousness is expressed in a state of aliveness-feeling, which appears in every living being that has at least a very primitive brain and nervous system, and has a primitive sensory system that allows interaction with the environment.**

**(7) Without offering a mentalistic explanation (based on CΨ) in addition to the mechanistic explanation (used in science and psychology) understanding of behavior is only partial, because most of behavior is saturated with CΨ.**

**(8) So far no method has been discovered for direct measurement of CΨ. Therefore, it is difficult to apply the accepted methodology (developed in science and adopted by psychology) to the study of CΨ. This methodology is based on discovering the functional relations among several measurable variables. In contrast, CΨ is not measurable.**

**(9) Consciousness can be treated as a theoretical concept. However, unlike the sciences, in psychology the connection between this concept and observations is extremely loose since CΨ cannot be measured directly.**

**(10) Consciousness conceived of as an energy-field is induced on any MS or mental process that fulfills a certain condition. Without fulfilling this condition, they remain outside of CΨ. Consciousness appears only when it is induced on a mental state or process.**

**(11) It is hypothesized that CΨ interacts multiplicatively with a MS.**

**(12) The changes in the level of CΨ of a given behavior are not related to CΨ itself, but to the mechanisms that generate the behavior on which CΨ is induced. For example, in problem solving, the decrease in the sharpness of CΨ as a result of fatigue (or drug) is caused by the decrease in the functioning of the cognitive system that handles this behavior.**

**As a dessert to the chapter, let's have fun with the "paradox of consciousness". This paradox is a variation on the 'liar's paradox'. Accordingly, it is not possible to decide whether the Greek, who said, "all Greeks are liars", was telling the truth or not. If we assume that he spoke the *truth*, then he lied, because all Greeks are liars. If we assume that he *lied*, then he spoke the truth, because it is true that all Greeks lie. And now to the 'paradox of CΨ': "All CΨs are incapable of investigating themselves" said CΨ. If CΨ spoke the *truth*, then it was lying, because CΨ is unable to investigate itself (and therefore CΨ did not understand itself). If it *lied*, then it was telling the truth, because its lie is rooted in the truth that CΨ is incapable of investigating itself. Thus, just as the liar's paradox raises questions about the possibility of attributing a value of truth or falsity to any argument, so the paradox of CΨ raises the question whether CΨ (of each one of us) can understand its own nature.**

**There are four possible relations between (A) Does a human have consciousness (**CΨ**)? Yes/No , and (B) Does a robot (computer) have** CΨ? **Yes/No. First possibility: A-yes, B-yes, the researchers has to prove that the robot has** CΨ**. As far as I know, they haven't been able to show it yet. Second possibility: A-yes, B-no, the option I believe in, the current chapter presents a number of arguments that try to convince the reader in this option. Third possibility: A-no, B-yes, it seems to me that no one believes in it. Last possibility: A-no, B-no, Dennett (1991) believes in it. However, since Searle's (1997) criticism of Dennett’s approach is acceptable to me, I will not address Dennett’s approach in the present chapter.**

**Given the second option, A-yes, B-no, the option I believe in, I will present here the "simulation" argument, which shows that a simulation of the Mind/Brain will not necessarily determine that this simulation (robot, computer) will have** CΨ**. Given the assumption that the brain mechanism that generate** CΨ **(BM-** CΨ**) has been discovered; and assuming that we were able to construct a robotic brain, which is built of inorganic material, and which precisely simulate BM-C, the following question arises: Will this robot necessarily develop** CΨ**? The answer is negative. Why? Because from the very fact that there is a difference between BM-C and its exact simulation (e.g., it is constructed from inorganic material) the following reasonable possibility arises: the robot will be devoid of** CΨ**. (Even the formula of dynamite does not explode when the paper on which the formula is written catches fire.) In this respect, my opinion differs from that of Searle (1997), who suggests that a machine can have** CΨ **including the mind because the mind is a machine. (It is worth mentioning that Minsky called the mind a "meat machine". See McCorduck, 1979, p. 70.) Furthermore, Searle added that, "... there is no known obstacle in principle to building an artificial machine that can be conscious and can think." (p. 110). I do not agree with this statement. The main reason is my belief in "live-creatures correlation", which suggests that only animals (even with the lowest degree of brain and nervous system) are endowed with** CΨ**. Another supportive observation of this suggests that all animals that in one way or another enter a state of sleep have** CΨ**, because sleep is nothing but a special form of** CΨ**.**

**Here is the place to comment that the methodology related to theory testing raises a number of difficult problems. Not only are observations being “theory laden” (e.g., Rakover, 1990), but also a theory with great explanatory power casts doubt on experimental results that contradict it (e.g., Schindler, 2024). I will not be able to discuss these problems here for obvious reasons and will move on to the discussion of my methodological proposal.**