Chapter 2

**The Shattered Hegemony & the Beginning of Hezbollah**

This chapter outlines the main features of Lebanon and its sociopolitical history as an arena, which has decisively contributed to the consolidation of the unique Muqawama project, in its current form, as represented by Hezbollah. To achieve this, I will refer to the centrality of the Maronite elites in the establishment of Lebanon and the formation of a hegemonic project that lasted for decades following the establishment of Lebanon, called “the Merchants and Bankers republic”. I will also refer to the marginal position that the Shiites occupied for many decades in the Lebanese history. Then I move to a brief review of the historical roots of Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the history of Shiites in Lebanon within the dominant state of hegemony in Lebanon at its very beginning.

1. **Lebanon: a historical, social and political background**

Lebanon developed its Christian character during Ottoman rule, the emirates period, and through the establishment of ‘Greater Lebanon’ in 1920 under the French Mandate, which enhanced the Christian Maronite dominance. The ruling and economic elite for many years was the Christian elite, dominated by the Maronites. Therefore, Lebanese identity, since its very beginning and up to the civil war in 1975, had a clear Maronite character.[[1]](#footnote-1)

France aimed to establish a political entity, loyal to the French interests in the region[[2]](#footnote-2). Therefore, for many years to come, it invested much effort in fostering economic relationships (the French investments in Syria and Lebanon before World War II reached an amount of 200 Million French franc, with 100 Million francs allocated to Mount Lebanon and Beirut)[[3]](#footnote-3). It also fostered the religious and cultural relationships with the Maronites and leaders of other religious groups in Lebanon, or in the region destined to be the Lebanese state.

The declaration of the “Great Lebanon” was not necessarily the only means to satisfy the Maronite elite’s requirement of establishing a state that would constitute a national home for the Maronite community. Part of the Maronite elite led by advocate Émile Eddé, president of the state under the French Mandate, were in favor of a state established in a smaller area, but with more stability at the religious level, and with a clear Maronite dominance. They meant Mount Lebanon or the Ottoman Mutasarrifate, where the Maronites constituted a majority of 58% of the Mount’s residents, and with the other Christian communities living there, they constituted 80%. On the other hand, the percentage of Christians in Great Lebanon dropped to 54%, while the Maronites’ dropped to 29% of new state’s population[[4]](#footnote-4). The decline in the percentage of Christians in the new homeland did not stop with the expansion of the borders, but rather continued with the passage of time, because of demographic changes, immigration and high fertility rates among Muslim communities, as reflected in the population census of 1932 (the last census to be conducted since then), showing that the percentage of the Christians declined to about 50%[[5]](#footnote-5).

In addition to the Maronite Christian character, Lebanon was shaped by the Greater Lebanon concept. It included all the regions that were historically ruled by Emirs Fakhr-al-Din ibn Maan (died 1633) and Bashir II (died 1840), the mythological fathers of the Lebanese state, whose emirates extended from Beirut and Mount Lebanon to Tripoli and Akkar in the North, Beqaa in the East and Jabal Amel in the South.[[6]](#footnote-6) These regions were crucial for providing the new state with the vital economic and geopolitical conditions for survival. Indeed, immediately following Lebanon’s independence, these regions provided 83% of the taxes, and they were mainly invested in Mount Lebanon.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The new state also depended upon an alliance between the Maronite elite, led by Bechara El-Khoury, the first president of Lebanon, and the Sunni elite composed of merchants and leaders from the coastal cities, represented by Riad al-Solh; together, they built the foundations for the establishment and survival of the Lebanese state. This alliance was the basis of the three-decade hegemonic project that prevailed in Lebanon, from its independence until the civil war during both turbulent and peaceful times.

This hegemonic project was based on two main layers: the distributive/socioeconomic layer and the conscious/symbolic one. It was characterised by radical liberalism at the economic/commercial level, while all intervention by the state in regularising the free market, especially foreign trade, was rejected while a minimalistic state was especially emphasised. As defined by Michel Chiha, the businessman and the organic intellectual of the ‘merchants republic’: ‘we need measured laws and a management that is solely concerned with basic needs: minimum procedures that are regulated by law, maximum opportunities and open horizons’.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Two prominent ideologists, Michel Chiha and Charles Corm – deemed the ideological backbones of the Maronite elite – formed the ideological basis of the project. Each adopted in his own way the ethos that served as the basis for the hegemonic project of Lebanon: Lebanon was the heir of the Phoenicians and a nation of merchants and bankers, known as the Switzerland of the East. Through this conscious/symbolic axis, Chiha, Corm, and others greatly succeeded in linking the (imagined) history of the Lebanese people with the present and articulated the distributive/socioeconomic dimension into the conscious/symbolic dimension of the same project. This articulation was made by the organic intellectuals of the ruling group (the merchants and bankers) within the historical-bloc that created the hegemonic project. These intellectuals relied upon parties (like al-Hizb al-Dusturi, the constitutional party), associations (such as the New Phoenicians), and newspapers (like *al-Hayat*), as well as individuals to enhance the dominance of their hegemonic project.

It is worth indicating that the historical-bloc whose center was occupied by merchants and bankers, especially from Beirut and the other cities, had also included subordinate groups, like the Maronite and Sunni middle class, which developed simultaneously with the advancement of trade in Lebanon. Lands owners and feudal chiefs, especially those pertaining to the Shiite community in the south, were also integrated in the hegemonic project by maintaining the status quo in their community, and assigning them undisputed ruling positions within their community, by supporting a minimalistic state, at the social and economic levels, and the non-intervention of the state in the internal politics and relations within these communities, in the South and the Beqaa, in addition to their minimal share in the ruling regime, at the national level.

1. **The project’s conscious layer- the ideological basis of the merchants republic**

The main perception that prevailed in Lebanon in the very first years following the establishment of the independent state was that of the unique Lebanon, based on the idea that Lebanon is the “Phoenicia” of the modern times, that the Lebanese people have “a global message to the human race”, similarly to the Phoenicians, thousands of years ago, and that trade is an integral part of the Lebanese identity, which constitutes a bridge between the nations, especially between East and West.

According to the national perception that prevailed in Lebanon at that time, Lebanon was not merely the Phoenicia of modern times, but also the “Switzerland of the East”, not only for being a small country neighboring larger ones, but also due to its economic competences and its intensely evolving banking sector, being the natural result of the tremendous development of trade. Hence the natural alliance between the commercial and the financial bourgeoisies, rendering Lebanon one of the major financial crossroads in the world. This was further enhanced due to the ultra-liberal[[9]](#footnote-9) economic perception and belief adopted by the Lebanese economic and political elites, versus the socialist and semi-socialist perceptions of the adjacent countries, like Syria, the Nasserite Egypt and Iraq after the revolution of 1958.

This ultra-liberal perception derived from the unique history of the Lebanese elites, especially the Maronites, who played a major role in the establishment of the independent Lebanon. It is also the result of the historical development of Mount Lebanon and of the coastal cities since the 19th century. This unique history includes the development and enhancement of trade between Mount Lebanon and Europe in general, and France in particular, and the latter’s great investment in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and the emergence of a Lebanese bourgeoisie largely dependent on its relationships with the Western empires, that were competitively eager to gain greater power in the Ottoman Empire[[10]](#footnote-10). It is worth indicating that several observers doubt the “ultra-liberalism” of the merchants and bankers’ elite, or as defined by Charles Riziq, this liberalism supported by the merchants was reflected in the control of Beirut’s bankers and merchants on the whole Lebanese state[[11]](#footnote-11).

The supporters of the popular-national belief that Lebanon was the Switzerland of the East compared the Swiss pluralism to the Lebanese religious pluralism and the beautiful mountainous landscape of Switzerland to that of Lebanon. The transformation of Lebanon into a first-class tourist destination, replete with ski resorts, helped foster this image.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Michel Chiha and Charles Corm were two organic thinkers and intellectuals of the ruling groups in Lebanon in the first decades following its independence, and each of them fostered the Phoenician, Swiss and Mediterranean ethos. They were both members of the “Phoenician alliance”, an association of intellectuals, particularly Maronite bourgeois from Beirut, who wanted to detach Lebanon from its Arab history and establish a new-old national identity based on ancient Phoenicians.

Corm was born in 1894 to a Lebanese bourgeois family. He believed that the Lebanese people are descendants of ancient Phoenicians, that they have a global mission to fulfill and a global message to disseminate. In 1934, at the age of 40, Charles Corm abandoned his commercial affairs to be fully dedicated to his cultural and ideological affairs, aiming to dedicate his energies to disseminating the Phoenician doctrine in Lebanon[[13]](#footnote-13). He established the “New Phoenicians”, an association of Maronite bourgeois intellectuals; together, they published the “Phoenician periodical” to segregate Lebanon from the surrounding Arab countries, and to emphasize the uniqueness of the Lebanese identity[[14]](#footnote-14). Corm wrote his articles and poetry in French and avoided using Arabic, to emphasize the differences between the Lebanese people and the neighboring Arab world. His political perception of Lebanon’s future was that of a state with a solid Christian and Maronite majority. In theory, Lebanon would be multi-religious, but in practice, the Maronites would be dominant in the state, not only because of their numerical and cultural superiority, but also for their unique relationships with France and Europe[[15]](#footnote-15).

Corm believed that the greatness of the Lebanese people as descendants of ancient Phoenicians is not related to their military power, but to their intellectual power, in the vividness and appeal of their exceptional culture[[16]](#footnote-16). Like to the Phoenicians who brought light to the world through the introduction of written alphabet, their Lebanese descendants are also assigned a global cultural message that they should disseminate to the whole world- this is the mission of the Lebanese people according to Corm and his peers. “The New Phoenicians” praised the immigration of the Lebanese people to every corner of the world. Unlike other intellectuals who criticized immigration from one’s homeland, Corm and his peers deemed these migration journeys an integral part of the dissemination of the Lebanese message to the whole world, and of the adventurous and free Lebanese spirit, and as one step forward towards the dissemination of the genuine religious beliefs to the whole world[[17]](#footnote-17).

The most influential figure in the formulation and establishment of the intellectual and ideological infrastructure of Lebanon between the independence and the Civil War was Michel Chiha. He had greater influence on the Lebanese history and the national Lebanese perception, that constituted the conceptual basis for the hegemonic project that prevailed in Lebanon for three decades. Chiha was a typical example of the organic intellectual of his social group in the transformation of the project from theory into practice.

Michel Chiha was born in 1891 to a Catholic bourgeois family. He studied at Saint-Joseph University in Beirut, one of the two leading universities in Lebanon (alongside the American University in Beirut). These two institutions were part of the hegemonic mechanisms (according to Gramsci) which produced a group of intellectuals who maintained the hegemonic project that dominated Lebanon for a few decades. Chiha was one of the owners of the Pharʿon-Chiha bank, which his father established together with his wife’s family, Chiha represented the central social class that led the historical bloc towards the establishment of the first Lebanese Republic, due to his familial and occupational background. This background molded his ideological thought, which was the basis for the Lebanese constitution that he formulated with other experts. Chiha was a businessman, a politician, a thinker, a journalist and a poet.

Unlike Corm, Chiha did not believe that the Lebanese people are the direct descendants of the Phoenicians, but the heirs of the Phoenician culture, for they live in the same geographical area that the Phoenicians lived in, therefore they were inspired by their cultural and economic spirit[[18]](#footnote-18). Chiha’s thinking included a clear determinist geographical dimension; he believed in the crucial influence of the geographical location on people and on their perceptions and missions. Chiha fostered the myth of the special attitude of the Lebanese people towards the Phoenicians to serve the function for which this myth was meant- developing a unique Lebanese national identity[[19]](#footnote-19).

The Mediterranean identity played a major role in Chiha’s ideological perception. Chiha, a businessman and a merchant, and the representative of the businessmen and merchants’ class in Lebanon, believed that Lebanon’s geographical location dictated its fate as a merchants’ country that is open to the whole world, especially the Western world. This openness was not only limited to trade, but also to cultures and ideologies. Lebanon, which embodies the myth of the merchants’ country and revives the Phoenician era, is an open country which inherently believes in the freedom and liberalism in the exchange of goods, ideas, cultures and services[[20]](#footnote-20). Or as stated by Chiha himself: “Lebanon would survive not only by trading goods and services, but also by exchanging ideas; and this would be achieved only through freedom of thought and pluralism”[[21]](#footnote-21).

This openess was also reflected in Chiha’s containement attitude towards the Arab neighbouring countries, and the Arab world in general, as opposed to Corm, who attempted to separate Lebanon and to detach it from the Arab world and from its Arab history. Chiha, who figured out Lebanon’s potential in terms of trade, and the role it could play as a bridge connecting between the East and the West, encouraged and legitimized the establishment of special relationships between Lebanon and the Arab world[[22]](#footnote-22). Together with his brother-in-law, the first post-independence president of Lebanon, Bechara El Khoury[[23]](#footnote-23), he agreed that Lebanon has an “Arab Face”, as indicated in the Lebanese National Pact, and in the historical compromise between the Christian bourgeoisie (especially the Maronite) and the Sunni merchants and Bourgeoisie, represented at that time by Riad al-Solh, who became later the first prime minister of Lebanon after its independence.

Chiha believed in the ability to guarantee Christian dominance within the Christian-Sunni bourgeois alliance, not through an external French intervention, but rather through a constitution that both elites agree upon, and which preserves the essentials interests of all the sects’ elites in Lebanon[[24]](#footnote-24).

The new-Phoenician ideology and the comparison of Lebanon to the “Switzerland of the East” had considerably constituted the ideological infrastructure of the independent Lebanon, or as called by different scholars, the first Republic of Lebanon, the republic of merchants and bankers. It came to an end during the blood-soaked civil war which led to the shattering of the Lebanese model and concept suggested by Charles Corm, Michel Chiha and others. Yet, for better understanding of the Lebanese history and of the hegemony that prevailed in Lebanon for a few decades, light should be shed on the socioeconomic background which served as a basis for the emergence of the Lebanese national perception, suggested by Corm and Chiha.

1. **The Republic of merchants and bankers- Phoenicia and the Switzerland of the East**

The new Phoenicia and the Switzerland of the East did not only accentuate the cultural aspect of Lebanon, as perceived by the elites and the general belief among the Lebanese people inside and outside the country. They also described economic structure of the new Lebanese state, a state that is founded on two economic bases. The first one being the fact that Lebanon was a country of commerce and a bridge between the industrial West and the East, the source of raw materials, especially the Arab petroleum and the petroleum Gulf Arab states, that made appearance in the international arena as a major source of energy, in the first half of the 20th century. The second base was banking, and the fact that Lebanon underwent a major change in its economic structure and became one of the most influential centers of banking, capital trading and stock exchange in the Middle East and the whole world.

Lebanon was a sort of a capitalist-liberal island in a semi-socialist surrounding, if compared to the neighboring Arab countries, especially Syria. The Lebanese Historian Pilip Hitti had well described the uniqueness of Lebanon in those years; and in the spirit of the times, he wrote the following paragraph in his book:

As opposed to Syria, Lebanon is a state of commerce and transit between East and West. Lebanon is a state of merchants that are not very different from their Phoenician ancestors. Therefore, Lebanon has favored, from ancient times, free trade, and the policy of free trade is the basis for its prosperity and wealth, for Lebanon is a small country, located on an aerial and terrestrial crossroad between East and West, and between North and South. As Lebanon is not rich with natural resources- if we do not include the magnificent landscape, the beautiful climate, the strategic location and the expertise, intelligence and diligence of its merchants- Lebanon is indeed founded on its being an agent of export, import and distribution in international trade[[25]](#footnote-25).

In the very first years following its independence (1943), Lebanon went through an accelerated process of economic progress and prosperity. It also underwent another significant process in which it replaced its old political guardian, namely France, by the United States of America, the emerging Great Power after World War I[[26]](#footnote-26).

Different scholars[[27]](#footnote-27) maintained that the accelerated progress of Lebanon’s liberal and capitalist economy was enhanced by several main factors:

1. The huge financial investments which the allies brought with them during World War II[[28]](#footnote-28) led to capital accumulation in Lebanon, rendering it a country with the highest per capita income among all Arab countries[[29]](#footnote-29).
2. The Lebanese economic system “profited” from the Palestinian Nakba and the establishment of the state of Israel, for it inherited the economic position of Palestine and its ports, especially the Port of Haifa[[30]](#footnote-30). Lebanon also absorbed the middle and high-class Palestinian refugees with a capital of 50 Million Palestine Pounds[[31]](#footnote-31), in addition to the 120,000 Palestinian refugees deemed a heavy economic burden for Lebanon, yet a cheap, skilled and educated labor force[[32]](#footnote-32).
3. The cancellation of the customs unity between Lebanon and Syria and freeing the Lebanese merchants from the Big Sister’s (Syria) tendency to raise the taxes and customs to preserve local merchants and industries, versus the free global tendency of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, which supported a more liberal approach and favored the enhancement of relationships with Western countries.
4. Lebanon benefited from an additional regional element- the discovery of huge oil reserves in the Gulf states, the gradual flow of the oil money and the role assigned to Lebanon as a mediator and an agent for the Arab countries in front of the industrialized western countries[[33]](#footnote-33). This had a great contribution to the development of the banking sector in Lebanon, and to the absorption of the Gulf states capital into this sector, in view of Lebanon’s readiness and advanced economic and financial system, as opposed to other countries in the region. The impact of the Gulf state’s money on the development of the banking sector in Lebanon is reflected in the increase in the number of banks in Lebanon from 9 in 1945, to 93 in 1966[[34]](#footnote-34).
5. In the fifties of the 20th century, and upon the adoption of the Nasserite semi-socialist approach in some Arab countries, like Syria and Iraq, Lebanon benefited from the departure of wealthy people from these countries, for they found refuge in Lebanon, known for its radical economic-liberal nature and its democratic ambiance, relatively to the other countries in the region[[35]](#footnote-35).

These factors, alongside others, accelerated the economic progress in Lebanon, and constituted a sort of a socioeconomic infrastructure for the conscious axis of the hegemonic project of the Lebanese bourgeoisie. The Lebanese economy developed at a rate of 7% in the fifties, and 6% in the sixties and early seventies. Yet, it was clear that the development of the Lebanese economy was mainly dependent on the services sector which grew at a tremendous pace, as opposed to the manufacturing sectors- agriculture and industry. The number of workers in these sectors also changed accordingly. In 1957, 68% of the labor force was integrated in the different manufacturing sectors, mainly agriculture, and this rate dropped to 44% in 1970. On the other hand, the rate of workers in the services sector increased from 32% in 1957 to 56% in 1970[[36]](#footnote-36), compatibly with the conscious decision made by the state’s leadership after the independence, which highlighted the need for building Lebanon as a service economy, and as a commercial and financial crossing point that realizes the ethos of Lebanon as the “Switzerland of the East” and the new Phoenicia, or probably the opposite- it is the ethos that sought to reinforce the policies and the interests of the ruling group[[37]](#footnote-37).

However, Lebanon’s immense progress and growth, known at that time as ‘an economic miracle’, did not benefit all the Lebanese people. Wealth was concentrated in the hands of thirty families, constituting a sort of oligarchy that aggressively controlled the state, syphoning into their bank accounts most of the income generated by the ultra-liberal Lebanese economy for which they had advocated.[[38]](#footnote-38)

These families and many others accumulated their wealth through 3 main resources: the first was the prosperous silk economy, and Lebanon was the center of this economy during the Mutasarrifate period. The second source was the profits that these families accumulated during World War II, especially between 1940-1944, when the Allies issued 76-Million-pound sterling in Syria and Lebanon. The third source was the massive wealth that they accumulated through the migration of some family members to West Africa, the Americas and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf[[39]](#footnote-39). The wealth of these families was estimated at 245 Million Lebanese pounds, nine times the Treasury of the Lebanese state[[40]](#footnote-40).

Within the groups constituting the historical-bloc that led the hegemonic project of Lebanon of the mid-twentieth century, a hierarchical structure was established, headed by the commercial bourgeoisie. It always had the upper hand in all tensions and controversies erupting with the industrial bourgeoisie. For instance, in the late forties and early fifties, tensions erupted between the industrial bourgeoisie that sought to raise the rate of customs for protecting local industries from imported ones, and the commercial bourgeoisie which fought eagerly to prevent such procedure. Eventually, the scale tended to weigh more in favor of the merchants, after being supported by the Lebanese government and officials, thus reinforcing the ethos of the “bankers and merchants’ republic”[[41]](#footnote-41).

The Lebanese people were not equally influenced by the economic wellbeing and the abundance of money. These resources were concentrated in specific sectors and geographical areas, and among certain classes. Beirut and Mount Lebanon witnessed the most impressive prosperity and benefited the most from this economic growth. This led to internal (and external) migration within Lebanon, and Beirut attracted larger numbers of Lebanese workers and residents of the marginalized areas in the South, the Beqaa and the North, thus leading to an increase in Beirut’s population from 50% in 1959 to more than 61% in 1970[[42]](#footnote-42) .

This mass movement from the Lebanese periphery into the capital city caused tremendous social and economic problems and challenges for the Lebanese state. The internal migration to Beirut created, in the city’s suburbs and surrounding areas, a “poverty belt” that included Lebanese residents from all areas and religions, who lived next to the Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps of Tel al-Zaatar eastward, and Sabra and Shatila and Bourj el-Barajneh westward[[43]](#footnote-43). Amidst this turmoil, the changes that occurred among the Shiite community were particularly interesting.

The Shiite community was mostly rural, dominated by traditional leaders and land owners; it was partially integrated in the hegemonic project, guaranteeing “industrial calmness” in the periphery, while patron-client relationships with the Shiite peasants were established in Beqaa and Southern Lebanon. In the seventies, the Shiite community settled in the urban areas, mainly in Beirut’s Southern suburbs, and following a long process started in the early seventies, its members started to liberate themselves from the control mechanism practiced by the traditional leaders in the rural areas[[44]](#footnote-44), as part of the disintegration of the hegemonic project initiated in the peripheries.

These social and demographic changes started to undermine the hegemonic project that prevailed for three decades. The economic alterations within Lebanon, and the regional developments outside it (like the defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war against Israel; the events of Black September which led to the movement of PLO and the Palestinian factions from Jordan to Lebanon; and the Israeli reprisals against the bases of the Palestinian resistance and the against civilians in Southern Lebanon) were extremely challenging for the merchant republic and the previous national Lebanese perception.

Sectarianism in Lebanon served was a very effective tool for religious leaders and chiefs, which helped them preserve their hegemony and that of the Lebanese elites, merchants, bankers and land owners, under the veil of the progressive Lebanese, the “Swiss” of Middle East and the open-minded Phoenician, who benefited from the free market’s profits that had somewhat permeated in different part of Lebanon. However, it soon became a burden that exploded in the face of these elites. The free and wild market economy continued concentrating the profits of the economic prosperity in the hands of the small elites and their cronies, and these elites were with sectarian features. The strongest 30 families that controlled the state’s economy, as mentioned previously, were religiously divided into 24 Christian families and 6 Muslim families (4 Sunni, 1 Shiite and 1 Druze)[[45]](#footnote-45).

The Lebanese system which maintained, according to Chiha, that merchants and bankers should be allowed to lead the state for the benefit of everyone, assigned the leader of the different religious communities the role of reconcilers in the parliament. The parliament was a sort of a balance council rather than a genuine “legislature” that is capable of interfering in the state’s economic policies. This situation was preferable for the leaders of the merchants and bankers project, who referred to ultra-liberalism as one comprehensive approach.

1. **The Maronites’ political, social and economic dominance in Lebanon**

The Lebanese “national pact” and constitution, based on the 1926 mandatory constitution, provided the main framework for the Lebanese political life throughout the whole period preceding the Civil War. The national pact, never a written document, but rather a “gentlemanly agreement” between the Zuʿaama (sectarian leaders in Lebanon) of the two major communities at that time (the Maronites represented by Bechara al-Khoury, and the Sunnis represented by Riad al-Solh), was, on the one hand, a sort of a compromise between the two communities, and on the other hand, a dam in the face of the radical camps within these communities, whose positions called for definite rejection (from the Maronite side) of any connection between Lebanon and the neighboring Arab world, and the refusal to recognize the Lebanese independence (from the Muslim part).

This compromise preserved, to a certain extent, the privileges which the Christians in general, and the Maronites in particular, enjoyed in Lebanon, with the following distribution of posts: the president was to be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni and the parliament’s speaker a Shiite. It was also decided to divide the parliament’s seats in a ratio of 5/6 between the Christians and other religious communities; thus, the former guaranteed a permanent majority in the parliament. The Christian dominance in Lebanon was not limited to the political arena. It also applied to the distribution of key positions and high bureaucracy in the state. The ratio of 5/6 also applied to these positions.

Among the factors that ignited the Lebanese explosive barrel was apparently the quasi-complete congruence between the sectarian gaps existing in the Lebanese society, and the socioeconomic ones. In 1961, a research conducted by a delegation of the French Organization IRFED, upon the request of the Lebanese president at the time, Fuad Chehab, showed that 4 percent of the Lebanese people controlled 33 percent of the national income, while 50 percent of them received only 18 percent of this income. Researcher Kamal Hamdan cites the summary of this report and writes: “Development started and proceeded only in Mount Lebanon, while the other areas remained faltering: The North lacked developmental initiatives, and the South witnessed a withdrawal”[[46]](#footnote-46) (most of the residents of Mount Lebanon were Maronite; most of the residents in the North were Sunni, while the Beqaa and South were mainly populated by Shiites).

The congruence between the sectarian gaps and the socioeconomic ones also appears in the data of the industrial survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Lebanon, in 1971. The survey showed that the major commercial and industrial institutions were mainly owned and operated by Christians, versus a smaller number of similar institutions owned and operated by Muslims of different communities. For example, 75 percent of the commercial companies and institutions, with more than 50 employees, were owned by Christians, versus 25% ones owned by Muslims. Two thirds of bank- managers were Christian, and three-quarters of the owners of commercial and insurance companies were Christian too. Moreover, out of the largest 25 financial institutions in Lebanon, 17 were owned by Christians and 7 by Muslims[[47]](#footnote-47).

These figures do not indicate that there existed a complete congruence between the religious and the class divisions. Moreover, there is no doubt that each religious community also experienced internal class division. A research cited by Hanf shows that among the Christian community, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie constituted 4%, the middle class 67%, the proletariat 21% while the “lower” strata of the proletariat constituted about 8%. On the other hand, the division among the Muslims was as follows: 2% bourgeoisie, 56% middle class, 23% proletariat and 19% low proletariat[[48]](#footnote-48).

These figures prove that there was an internal class division within each of the major religious groups in Lebanon. Nonetheless, an in-depth segmentation of these figures for examining the types of jobs occupied by members of the Christian middle class, as opposed to their Muslim counterparts, shows that Christians were mostly professional workers and educated clerks, while Muslims were mostly semiskilled laborers. The lower strata of the proletariat, including agricultural workers and temporary workers in the services sector, alongside the unemployed, is mostly Muslim, and especially Shiite[[49]](#footnote-49), according to the research. This division explains why most of the Shiites, prior to the civil war, went through a process of socialization and politicization by the different radical parties, trade unions and farmers movements, who explicitly called for a renewed division of the state’s wealth and resources. These figures also explain the devotion of the Christian and Sunni middle class, and its being a subordinate group within the merchant’s project.

At the economic level, this project benefited, to a certain extent, the Maronite middle class, and then the Sunni one, more than the other sectarian groups. At the ideological levels, members of these social classes (the intellectual graduates of the private universities in Lebanon) benefited from the idea that they were successors of the glorious history of the Phoenicians, and the “Swiss” of the Middle East. They adopted the chain of equivalences which the leaders and intellectuals of the hegemonic project established between the merchants’ signifier and the Lebanese people, the Phoenician history and the “Swiss” present of Lebanon.

The “divorce” which occurred between the Muslim masses and their leadership could be partly attributed to the distancing between the Muslim Sunni elite[[50]](#footnote-50) and the Muslim masses, many of whom, especially within the Shiite community, belonged to the proletariat and the low proletariat. This group experienced enhanced feelings of detachedness towards the constitutive ethos and strategy in Lebanon, mainly since they did not have a share in the long-waited wealth. This detachment did not occur so clearly among Christian Maronites, for the polarization between the bourgeois elite and the middle class, constituting two-thirds of the community, was not as sharp as the polarization within the Muslim community.

This polarity in the Lebanese system, and the thwarting of all attempts to modify the economic system through the intervention of the state, especially in the tenure of president Fuad Chehab in the sixties, and the exaggerated loyalty of the Lebanese leaders to “liberalismˮ and to the principles of the extreme free trade, urged the popular strata to cast doubt on the nature of the hegemony governing Lebanon for decades. These internal trends were also influenced by external factors, like the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict near Lebanon, and the movement of the Palestinian factions’ leaders into Lebanon. The ethos of “Lebanon’s power lying in its weakness”[[51]](#footnote-51) and its being the Switzerland of the East were called into question. On the other hand, other counter-hegemonic projects started to mature, undermining the hegemony existing in Lebanon at both the sociopolitical and economic levels.

Sectarian and socioeconomic disparities, alongside these regional conditions and changes, led to the outbreak of the blood-soaked civil war, which lasted for 15 years, described mostly as “a war of all against all”, with international external intervention.

1. **The shattering of hegemony- the Civil War**

The historian Ussama Makdisi argues that sectarianism as a political system is a modern story that opened the way for changing political structure.[[52]](#footnote-52) He accentuated the fact that the violence of 1860, didn’t take place between different sects (The Maronites and The Druze for example) but also within the communities in an attempt to define their own boundaries.[[53]](#footnote-53)

In a way we can understand the Lebanese civil war which started at the 1970s of the 20th century with the same approach, it was not a religious war. In its different phases, members of all the religious groups fought against each other, and at a certain point, fights erupted within the same religious groups. The internal tensions in Lebanon and within the Lebanese society, which the hegemonic project failed to mitigate, developed in 1975 into a war that continued until 1990. The war ended with the signature of the Taiʾf agreement between the disputing parties, with more than 70 thousand causalities, about 100 thousands injured, more than 820 thousand refugees expelled from their villages within Lebanon and about 900 thousand people who fled the war which spread all over the country[[54]](#footnote-54).

A combination of different reasons led to the eruption of the civil war. The social motives had greatly contributed to turning the increasing socioeconomic tensions into an extensive battle. It is also worth referring to the awakened social activism in the Lebanese society. During the years 1946-1970, only one general strike was declared, while in the pre-war years, upon the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation and the revival of the different trade unions, three strikes were declared between 1970 and 1975[[55]](#footnote-55). These strikes were accompanied with a rise in the inflation rate in Lebanon from 2 percent in the sixties to 18 percent in 1974[[56]](#footnote-56).

The Marxist thinker Mahdi Amel argued that the bourgeoisie would attempt to give a sectarian cover to the class struggle in order to maintain and to strengthen its control position.[[57]](#footnote-57) He accentuated the internal class negations inside each sect and in the the Lebanese society as a whole. He assumed that the sectarian approach helpes the dominant eilite in each sect to maintain its control upon the popular forces withen each community.[[58]](#footnote-58)

However, the socioeconomic problems do not sufficiently explain the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War, which mainly derived from the intersection between the socioeconomic gaps, the religious disparities, the Maronite Lebanese dominance fostered in Lebanon and the beginning of the gradual disintegration of the hegemonic project of merchants and bankers. All this resulted from the abstention of the ruling groups from introducing internal reforms and improvements in the Lebanese model, or leading a sort of a “passive revolution” that would make the needed corrections in the Lebanese system without making substantial changes.

Moreover, in the mid-sixties, new players came onto the scene in the complex Lebanese arena- the PLO, and the Palestinian militant organizations - that started to use Southern Lebanon as a stronghold for their ongoing struggle against Israel, especially after King Husayn’s loyal forces expelled the Palestinian factions from Jordan, in the evens of “Black September”.

To sum up the main reasons for the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, one would refer to the intersection between the socioeconomic tensions which peaked in the seventies, the enhanced feelings of oppression among the marginalized communities, because of the Lebanese system, and the radicalization process which the different religious groups went through. Added to this were the ongoing pressures exerted by the different external forces, both regionally and globally, in the Lebanese arena, and the transformation of Lebanon into a space for squaring accounts between the different regional forces.

1. **The Palestinians in Lebanon and the Shiites- Pockets of resistance to hegemony**

Like the other Arab countries neighboring mandatory Palestine, Lebanon absorbed part of the Palestinian refugees expelled after the 1948 “Nakba”. More than one hundred thousand Palestinian refugees passed the borders, heading towards Southern Lebanon. They were mostly from the northern Galilean villages, neighboring Acre, Bisan, Nazareth, Safad, Tiberias and Haifa’s suburbs[[59]](#footnote-59). In the very first years following the arrival of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, their relationships with the residents of Southern Lebanon, especially the Shiites, were very positive[[60]](#footnote-60). During those years, relationships were not established between the Palestinian refugees and the Christian community[[61]](#footnote-61).

Ironically, the Palestinian Nakba constituted an opportunity for the Lebanese state to develop economically for two main factors. Firstly, the services sector witnessed an unprecedented development, when the Arab countries cut off relationships (at least openly) with the new Israel. Thus, Beirut replaced Haifa as the main port for the Arab countries and the main point of contact between the Arab countries and Europe, Asia and parts of Africa[[62]](#footnote-62). The second factor contributing to the economic prosperity was the arrival of wealthy people, investors and Palestinian workers who provided cheap labor force. The Palestinians brought into the Lebanese economic circle about 50 million Palestinian pounds, but alongside 120 thousand refugees that needed to be taken care of[[63]](#footnote-63).

Lebanon, dominated by the Maronite elite and the ultraliberal capitalist approach, treated the Palestinian refugees as it did with its citizens, and sought to absorb them according to their abilities to integrate and enhance the hegemonic project of that time. It divided the refugees according to two main criteria- the socioeconomic status and the religious affiliation. The Christian refugees obtained the Lebanese citizenship “quite easily”, versus their Muslim counterparts. As for the latter, they obtained the Lebanese citizenship more easily if they were wealthy, or bourgeois, who could pay large sums of money to lawyers to handle their citizenship requests[[64]](#footnote-64).

In the very first years following their arrival to Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees mostly maintained a neutral political position. This could be demonstrated through their abstention from participation in the events of 1958, which constituted a sort of general rehearsal to the civil war, which erupted less than two decades later[[65]](#footnote-65). The same year witnessed confrontations between the supporters of Camille Chamoun, an ethno-Maronite pro-Western nationalist, and one of the prominent representatives of the hegemonic project of the merchants and bankers‘ coalition, and a coalition of pro-Eastern and pro- Arab nationalism forces, from the Nasserite school with the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. The direct reason behind the confrontation was Chimoun’s attempts to extend his tenure as a president for an additional period, as opposed to the Lebanese constitution[[66]](#footnote-66).

A special relationship was simultaneously established between the Palestinian refugees and the Shiite community, which proved hospitable to the refugees and provided them with support upon their arrival to the Southern towns. A link was established between two communities positioned on the margins of the hegemonic project that prevailed in Lebanon at that time. The clear majority of the Palestinians arrived into Lebanon after they had lost their lands and property in the mandatory Palestine, and had a low socioeconomic status, like the status of the Shiite community in Lebanon, endured for years.

Actually and as the researchers Rula and Malek Abisaab have showed in their research a very old and deep relation between the people of north Palestine and south Lebanon especially the Shiites was established well before the establishment of the independent Lebanon state: “For the southerners, it was Haifa not Beirut that was the center of commercial activities. Many had relatives in Haifa or traveled to it for business.”[[67]](#footnote-67)

The Shiite community was the most marginalized in Lebanon. Rates of poverty and employment were the highest, and it remained on the margins of the Lebanese society and the hegemonic project of the merchants and bankers’ republic. Despite the Shiite sympathy towards the Palestinians, the latter’s arrival into the Shiite areas in Southern Lebanon harmed the Shiites economically, as the Palestinians agreed to work in agriculture and simple works for wages lower than the (low) wages paid to the Shiite workers[[68]](#footnote-68).

The Palestinians gradually became a burden on the Lebanese state in terms of the delicate sectarian balances within the state. Unlike other countries, like Jordan which granted the Palestinians the Jordanian citizenship and allowed them to integrate and progress in the country, Lebanon deprived the vast majority of the Palestinians of the Lebanese citizenship and hindered their integration[[69]](#footnote-69). As for the Palestinians, they succumbed to the living conditions in the refugee camps, despite their dire economic situation, and worked so hard, that they were called "Ḥameer" (donkeys) by part of the Lebanese. Ain al- Hilweh refugee camp, the biggest among all Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, was called the "zoo”[[70]](#footnote-70).

Considering the continuous humiliation inflicted on the Palestinian refugees, who had first thought that their crisis would be temporary, and that they would ultimately return to their homes and lands, as promised by the Arab regimes prior to the 1948 war, Palestinians in Lebanon started to organize themselves militaristically and politically, and the Muqawama narrative started to mature among them. This trend received a special boost upon the declaration of the establishment of the PLO and the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) in the mid-sixties.

Following the total failure of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, the Palestinian organizations decided to take their fate into their own hands and adopted a strategy of Muqawama and armed struggle against Israel. The Lebanese arena, being always a calm zone in the Arab-Israeli conflict, started to heat up, and the Palestinian organizations started to operate in this arena too. It is likely that the ongoing pressures, humiliation and opposition from the part of Lebanon to grant the Palestinians a Lebanese citizenship, or to allow them appropriate integration into the Lebanese society, caused this unique counteraction on the part of the Palestinian organizations. At the very beginning, they succeeded in remaining neutral within a state already split between forces that supported the Palestinian Muqawama (including mainly leftist parties and other forces from Muslim communities) and forces resisting any attachment to the Arab surrounding, especially national forces with a Maronite dominance.

The Palestinian Muqawama forces and the fedaʾyeoun established their first bases in al-ʿArkoub area, South-East Lebanon, which became to be named “Fatah Land”[[71]](#footnote-71). Although part of the Lebanese youth joined the Palestinian Muqawama in the South in its very first years, and operated within it, the Christian right-wing forces did not approve of the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon and felt that this would pose a threat to the Lebanese ethos and to the stability of the Lebanese system. The first confrontation occurred in 1969, leading ultimately to the intervention of the Egyptian president Nasser, and the signature of “Cairo Agreement” between the PLO and Lebanon. This agreement was the first document in which the Lebanese state recognized the right of the Palestinian Muqawama to use the Lebanese lands to launch operations against Israel. As for the PLO, it recognized the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over its lands and committed to maintaining the security and the internal affairs within the Palestinian refugee camps, the home for tens of thousands of Palestinians[[72]](#footnote-72).

The Palestinian military presence in Lebanon was further enhanced following the events of “Black September” in Jordan, where the Palestinian organizations got involved into armed confrontations with the regime of King Husayn. Eventually, as king Husayn had the upper hand, most of the Palestinian Muqawama organizations and movements moved into Lebanon, which bordered Israel, and where the control of the central government was loose[[73]](#footnote-73).

The Shiites and the Palestinians suffered from disregard and neglect on the part of Lebanese state. They were resentful towards the state's structure and the right-wing Maronite dominance during those years[[74]](#footnote-74), and towards the founding of the dominant hegemony in Lebanon, the ethos of the “Switzerland of the East”. Their shared destiny also showed when the two populations became the targets of the reprisal operations carried out by Israel against the Palestinian Muqawama which assimilated in South Lebanon and in other places, mainly around Beirut. The poor neighborhoods of Beirut and its environs were resided by Palestinians and Shiites who fled from the South, firstly because of the economic deterioration and the neglect of the South and later due to the Israeli attacks targeting the South[[75]](#footnote-75). Palestinians and Shiites were both targeted by the Israeli attacks which hadn’t differentiated between them.  In the seventies, Israel and its ally the Lebanese officer Saʿad Haddad, the founder of "The Army of Free Lebanon" (the militia which was later called "South Lebanon Army-SLA) tried to recruit Shiite volunteers, under the leadership of Christian officers and under Israeli surveillance, to carry out operations against the Palestinian organizations; but this attempt failed[[76]](#footnote-76).

The Palestinian refugee camps and the military camps of the Palestinian Muqawama organizations became in due course training centers for the first Shiite[[77]](#footnote-77) militant movement "Harakat al-Mahrumin" (The Movement of the Deprived) which was led by Imam Musa as-Ṣadr, and its military wing "Amal" (meaning hope in Arabic; but also, the acronym of “Afawaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya”-battalions of the Lebanese resistance)[[78]](#footnote-78). It first wore the mantle of a social reform movement; but in fact, it was the first political movement whose leaders and main supporters were Shiite. Yet, it was not exactly a religious movement, as it had never prioritized the Sharia over the State of Lebanon.

The Palestinians, mainly Fatah and Arafat, tried to avoid involvement in the Lebanese Civil War turmoil, since the Jordanian experience and the events of Black September were still vivid in the Palestinian memory[[79]](#footnote-79). However, the more radical parties within the PLO (the Popular Front, the Democratic Front and others) pulled the Palestinians and the Muqawama movements into the war to fight alongside the Lebanese radical left and revolutionary forces there[[80]](#footnote-80), to create a large-scale revolutionary change in Lebanon, and subsequently in the Arab world[[81]](#footnote-81).

During the Lebanese Civil War, which turned into an all-out war, the relationships between the Palestinians and some Shiite leaders ran aground. Amal, which became the strongest movement among the Shiites, perceiving itself the representative of the Shiite interests, could not endure the Israeli harassments against the Shiites in the South as a result of the operations carried out by the Palestinian organizations against Israel. Despite its support to the Palestinian parties in their resistance against Israel- its lip service to the Muqawama ethos- Amal eventually began working against the Palestinians, particularly against the PLO[[82]](#footnote-82).

However, these operations did not put an end to the relationship between the Shiites and the Palestinian resistance movements. In fact, that period enhanced the perception of the shared destiny of the Palestinian resistance forces and the new resistance movements which began simmering among the Shiites. They were inspired by the radical resistive Islam which started to develop in Lebanon following the fracture that occurred between the dominant stream in Amal and "al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya" movement which fought alongside the Palestinians in the eighties and pulled the Muqawama flag out of their hands.

1. **Who were the Shiites in Lebanon?**

The Historian Kamal Salibi maintain that the Shiites in Lebanon are descendants of Arab tribes in Yemen: the first settled in Baalbek area, in the Beqaa, called Awzaʿa tribe. The second is ‘Aamilya, also a Yemenite tribe, settled in today’s Southern Lebanon. Another tribe referred to by Salibi, and which settled in Southern Lebanon, was “Bani Matawil”, originally from South Hijaz. Therefore, the Shiites of Southern Lebanon were called “Matawila”. It is important to note that these tribes came from Yemen and Hijaz long time before the emergence of Islam[[83]](#footnote-83).

The prevalent explanation among the Shiites themselves is that they originate from the activism of the Prophet’s companion, Abu Dharr Al-Ghiffari[[84]](#footnote-84), considered by some historians as one of the first “socialists” in Islam, for his positions that were supportive of the poor and critical of the conduct of the third caliph, ʿUthman ibn ʿAffan, whose rule witnessed the development of the Arab aristocracy in the new Islamic state. Shanahan argues that the Lebanese Shiites’ tendency, in their oral accounts, to associate themselves with Abu Dharr Al-Ghiffari, aimed to accentuate the authenticity of their Islam[[85]](#footnote-85).

In addition to the emphasis placed by the Lebanese Shiites and some researchers on the linkage to Abu Dharr Al-Ghiffari, who introduced the Shiite perception in Lebanon and Syria, they also insist on accentuating their Arabism and the fact that they originate from the Arab tribes of the Arabian peninsula and Yemen, thus refuting the claims of the researchers who cast doubt on the Arab identity of the Lebanese Shiites, maintaining that they are originally Persians.

On the other hand, Rula Abisaab argues that part of the Shiite tribes in Lebanon are originally from Yemen, for example “Bani Hamdan” tribe and “ʿAmel” tribe, after whom Jabal ʿAmel in Southern Lebanon was named and they were present in the region during the early centuries of Islam[[86]](#footnote-86).

Since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and its control over the whole area, that will be later called the Lebanese state, an attitude of hostility and skepticism prevailed between the Ottoman authorities (Sunni Orthodox) and the Shiite minority of the empire. This hostile and skeptic attitude was further enhanced due to the rivalry which developed between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Iran, which rendered the Shiʿa Islam (in its Twelver version) the religion of the state[[87]](#footnote-87). In those early years, Lebanese Shiite clerics and families started migrating from Lebanon to Iran, considering the hospitable treatment they enjoyed in the new Safavid state, and its need to establish and instill Shiʿa Islam; hence the deep historical relationships between Iran and the Lebanese Shiites[[88]](#footnote-88) .

For hundreds of years, the Shiites in Lebanon swung between buds of emerging resistance, inherent in the Shiite worldview, and a long history of fear and prudence (Taqiyya), as a result of the strict attitude of the different regimes towards the Shiites. The awareness of the Lebanese Shiites was particularly scalded during the rule of the Acre-based Ottoman governor, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (the butcher) in the 18th century, who massacred the Shiites and punished them for being the allies of Sheikh Ẓahir al-ʿUmar, the former governor of Acre, who aspired to achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire[[89]](#footnote-89).

The political and social situation of the Shiites worsened, and members of the Shiite community continued to live on the margins of the Ottoman Empire until its last days. The skeptical attitude of the central government in Istanbul towards this community, known to be distant from the religious orthodoxy, led to further exclusion of the Lebanese Shiites from power centers, and contributed to enhancing their inferior status, versus other communities, upon the establishment of the Great Lebanon[[90]](#footnote-90).

1. **The Shiites on the margins of the “Bankers and Merchants’ Republic”**

The Shiites constituted a large portion of the poor population in Lebanon, especially among the peasants in Southern Lebanon and the Beqaa. A large percentage of the downtrodden workers in the suburbs of Beirut were also Shiite.

The Shiite economy in Lebanon depended for many years on simple family-based agricultural economy. This economy contributed to strengthening familial bonds and enhancing internal unity among the Shiite families. However, Muhammad Murad maintains that it was based on *iqṭaʿa* (feudalism) as it enhanced the patron-client relations between poor families and the families of the *zuʿamā’*, the traditional leaders, whose status had been inherited since Ottoman rule.

As the Shiite *zuʿamā’* could obtain permits to grow tobacco – the main crop in the southern areas – and owned the largest plots of land in the South and the Beqaa, they had relations with both the peasants and the state authorities, hence their ability to maintain the peasants’ interests and to sell their production to the authorities.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The Shiite families of Southern Lebanon, whose economy depended on agriculture (about 90% of the labour force in the south worked in agriculture until the 1950s),[[92]](#footnote-92) helped the *zuʿamā’* to control the peasantry and impose their authority; and through the *zuʿamā’*, the central government controlled the south with relative efficiency. This system of dominance guaranteed the ruling hegemonic system, already in the very first year after Lebanon’s independence; that is, the subjugation of the Shiite community to the dominant ruling group, especially the Maronite elite.[[93]](#footnote-93)

This hegemonic system preserved the interests of the Shiite *zuʿamā’* by maintaining their leadership within their communities without creating substantial change to the political representation in general and among the Shiites in particular. The Maronite-Sunni elite, however, kept the Shiite community, including its leaders, on the margins of the hegemonic project, away from the real centres of power, in addition to minimising their role in Lebanon’s imagined community and history.[[94]](#footnote-94)

Like the Shiites themselves, subjugated to the hegemonic project of the merchants and bankers, mostly Maronite and Sunni, the agriculture was also dominated by the hegemony of the trade, the financial markets’ economy and the services economy that developed in Lebanon during those years[[95]](#footnote-95). Potent groups, commercial chains and banks also entered the agricultural sector and controlled it through loans, sale of fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, and by taking over the domain of refrigeration, packaging and distribution. For example, 25 of the owners of the biggest freezing works dominated two-thirds of the apples market; 20 dominated 81% of the citrus market, of whom 3 dominated one third of the market, while two other companies had a monopoly on the import of fertilizers and pesticides in Lebanon[[96]](#footnote-96).

The concentration of the agricultural sector in the hands of a small number of merchants, and the control of the importers over agriculture in the ways mentioned above, directed the Lebanese agriculture gradually towards international markets, and towards the mechanization of agriculture, thus urging many workers to leave this field and move into the cities looking for other sources of income. While 50 percent of the Lebanese people worked in agriculture in the fifties, the rated dropped to 20% in 1975, the year of the outbreak of the Civil War[[97]](#footnote-97). The same year, 60-65 percent of the villagers in Southern Lebanon and 40-45 percent in the Beqaa left their homes and migrated. The clear majority (75 percent) moved to Beirut and to the internal areas of Lebanon, while the other immigrated to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and to other countries around the world[[98]](#footnote-98).

The second area with the highest concentration of the Shiite population in Lebanon is the Beqaa, based on tribal values and on “tribalism”[[99]](#footnote-99), the roots of this “tribalism” is based on the special relations among the different members of each cluster of peasent families. “members of each cluster endorsed the informal authority of a senior leader or ‘chief’ from among its wealthier and more influential families”[[100]](#footnote-100) the lands that a senior leader owned seemd to be shared although unequally. This system, Abisaab & Abisaab argue, is differed significantly from the societal arrangements in the south where peasants worked on lands of unrelated families. And this is why that the Biqaʿi Shi’ites came to be perceived as organized into tribes.[[101]](#footnote-101)

In the meantime, families' income, especially since the fifties of the 20th century, depended on growing Cannabis and illegal drug trade, thus preventing the imposition of the state dominance[[102]](#footnote-102). However, this enabled the ruling groups in the Lebanese state to further deepen the marginality of the Shiites in this area, away from the hegemonic project dominating Beirut and the whole country.

This marginality of the Shiite community and its exclusion from the political, economic, and social centre of Lebanon (Beirut) further deepened the community’s social marginality and its economic subjugation. Even when Shiites started migrating and settling in Beirut in the mid-twentieth century, the key positions in Beirut had been already occupied by members of other communities who had arrived earlier.[[103]](#footnote-103)

Nevertheless, “Dahieh”, the southern suburb of Beirut, which over the decades absorbed hundreds of thousands of Shiites who fled the dire economic reality in the South and the Beqaa, became a new centre for the Shiites. Their migration increased as the relations between the PLO forces – who dominated vast areas in Southern Lebanon – and Israel flared up in the late 1970s. The Shiites’ move into Beirut, however, did not guarantee sharing control and hegemony in Lebanon but rather reiterated their subjugation and marginality. The community remained in the impoverished suburbs around Beirut, unable to infiltrate into the city’s core that represented the ruling hegemonic project in Lebanon for the past few decades.[[104]](#footnote-104)

This extensive migration of the Shiite population changed the traditional patronage relations within the community[[105]](#footnote-105) and led to a deep identity crisis. Therefore, the Shiites integrated into the Lebanese equation in a relatively late phase of the 20th century; yet their integration was coupled with the demand for compensations for the years of their forced absence from this equation.

1. **New forces versus traditional forces**

In the elections held in the late sixties and early seventies, the Shiite Zuʿaama still dominated the representation of the community in the Lebanese parliament, despite the extensive migration waves from the South to Beirut. Augustus Norton provided two explanations for the continuous dominance of the Shiite Zuʿaama. The first explanation is that most of the immigrants at that time were not acquainted with any other form of control and were still captives of the social system they knew in the South. The second explanation is related to the nature of the Lebanese political system at that time, which determined that the citizens should vote in the district they were born in, and not in their residence place[[106]](#footnote-106).

The tremendous economic power of the heads of the Shiite honorable families and their control over the sources of income of their people enhanced their political position and crowned them as the exclusive community leaders for decades- until the emergence of the new popular movements and parties, which started to compete with them, to take the reins of leadership.

New developments, including the socioeconomic change and the ongoing migration from the South and the Beqaa towards Beirut, alongside the emergence of Palestinian resistance organizations in the Lebanese arena in general, and the Shiite in particular, and the alliances developed between these organizations and the new parties, especially the radical left parties, led to the gradual erosion of the Shiite Zuʿaama status, and their position in the community leadership was gradually occupied by new forces. The emerging resistance to the political order prevalent in Lebanon did not spare the dominant traditional Shiite forces. The resistance to the Lebanese regime and to the long-term exploitation of the share of the poor Shiites reached the internal relations within the community.

The erosion of the status of notables and zuʿaama was greatly due to the appearance of Musa as-Ṣadr[[107]](#footnote-107), an Iranian cleric of Lebanese origins, who arrived into Lebanon in 1959 to serve as the Mufti of Tyre in Southern Lebanon. He started wakening the Shiites and transforming them into a consolidated community that demands its rights, according to the sectarian Lebanese equation[[108]](#footnote-108). In his very beginnings, as-Ṣadr was deemed by the Lebanese the envoy of the Shah in Lebanon; this impression was further enhanced since his election, like the elections of other clerics operation outside Iran, had to be approved by SAVAK (the secret police of the Shah regime)[[109]](#footnote-109). In any event, at the end of the Shah regime, and before as-Ṣadr’s disappearance in Libya, his relations with the former worsened, and he started established new relations with clerics who opposed to the Shah regime.

As-Ṣadr provided an active interpretation of the Shiite tradition and the Shiite symbols and myths, and he gradually succeeded in disseminating a reformative, but not revolutionary, message. He did not suggest changing the system fundamentally, but rather enhanced the feelings of deprivation among the members of the Shiite community, thus introducing an alternative to the traditional politics of the notables and Zuʿaama in the Shiite arena. However, for the radical left parties, which established a solid basis among the Shiite community at that time[[110]](#footnote-110), and as summarized by Hussein el-Husseini, cited by Fuad ‘Ajami: “it was a politics of polarization, of feudalism, on the one hand, and extremism, al-tataruf, on the other hand. Finding a new way was an urgent necessity”[[111]](#footnote-111). He proposed to the Shiites in Lebanon and to the whole country a new national perception, that would position the Shiites in a higher status, without full abolition of the existing Lebanese system. He operated according to the rules of the traditional Lebanese game and accepted the Maronite dominance; yet, within the framework of the same rules, he called for granting his community a bigger share of the “cake”.

As-Ṣadr greatly reflected the “political Maronism”, but in the Shiite version, for he did not call for the cancellation of the Lebanese sectarian system, but for introducing some amendments in favor the Shiites. Therefore, it was not surprising that Amal, the movement he established, and which continued his legacy after his disappearance from the Lebanese arena in 1977, was later involved in a blood-soaked confrontation with the Palestinian organizations. Amal too concluded that the Palestinians were “Ghurabaaʾ” (strangers) who brought destruction to Lebanon due to their ongoing fighting against Israel[[112]](#footnote-112). That was the same conclusion reached by the Maronite right-wing movements in Lebanon.

Supporting Amal movement meant supporting the return of the Lebanese state and the Lebanese army, and preventing the Palestinian organizations from using the southern areas as bases for their operations against Israel[[113]](#footnote-113). In fact, Amal movement was a conservative movement that sought to rebuild the Lebanese state with a few cosmetic changes[[114]](#footnote-114).

This conclusion apparently brought Nabih Berri (who became the leader of Amal movement during the Civil War) to agree on joining with the representatives of the Lebanese Phalanges and other representatives of the Maronite elite in the “Salvation Committee”, declared by president Elias Sarkis. This position was among the main reasons behind the split within Amal movement, and the establishment of a more radical movement, with a stronger Islamist emphasis, influenced by the Iranian revolution- and no less importantly, with a stronger emphasis on resistance.

1. **The beginnings of Hezbollah**

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Shiite community had matured and was ready for a new and radical force from within. It had undergone an accelerated process of urbanisation and migration from the periphery to Beirut, with all the accompanying implications: a social and economic blow and the disintegration of the traditional frameworks that had organised the social life in the Shiite villages, as well as of the traditional patronage relations within the community,[[115]](#footnote-115) leading to a deep identity crisis.

As a result, the Shiite community was ripe for political radicalisation by the radical left parties[[116]](#footnote-116), and later through cooperation and coexistence with the Palestinian resistance organisations in Lebanon.[[117]](#footnote-117) Moreover, it is evident that the events that decisively influenced the Shiite community were the Israeli invasion of Beirut and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and Khomeini’s dispatch of Iranian revolutionary guardsmen to the Beqaa.[[118]](#footnote-118)

However, the left movements and parties could not maintain dominance among the Shiite community, although a large part of the activists in these organizations up to the nineties were Shiites (for example, 41% of the participants of the Communist Party’s congress in 1993 were Shiite)[[119]](#footnote-119). This loss of dominance occurred for many reasons, including the eruption of the Civil War which enhanced sectarianism[[120]](#footnote-120); the revival of radical Islam and the entry of the Iranian revolution guards to the Beqaa, to recruit and train Shiite militias; the disagreements within the left movements; the ongoing intervention of the regional forces in the Lebanese events; the emerging tensions between the Palestinian organizations (allies of the left parties) and the residents of Southern Lebanon as a result of the Israeli reprisals; the feelings that prevailed among the Lebanese residents in the South that the Palestinians were taking over the region and so forth.

Moreover, the appearance of a new and unique cleric in the Lebanese arena, Musa as-Ṣadr, played a decisive role in the introduction of a “third way”. Waddah Shararh and Fuad Ajami splendidly describe the revulsion and the hostile attitude of the Shiite community, in the forties, fifties and sixties, towards the Shiite traditional clerics in Lebanon. The general perception was that these clerics were “submissive and conservative”, and totally dependent on the benevolence of the Zuʿaama. The Shiite society felt resentful and hateful towards the clerics, who were deemed honorable only under the auspice of the Zuʿaama.

‘Ajami presents a quote of a secular Shiite at that time, who became later a great admirer of Musa as-Ṣadr:

Our cleric wrapped himself with a mantle, put his head on his hand, and fell asleep. When he woke up, all he could do was telling others to go to sleep. He lived a passive life; and you should not be misled by his gestures, for they would lead you backward. A cleric would be the reason for two miseries: the first when he remains behind; and the second when he makes other follow him… a cleric’s head is full of baseless thoughts, miracles and myths[[121]](#footnote-121).

Musa as-Sadr played a decisive role in the introduction of a ‘third way’. As-Sadr was a charismatic, independent, and political cleric, and according to Waddah Shararah, he was not a ‘first-class’ clerics; yet, his strength lay in his social and political activism, his direct and continuous relations with the Shiite community, and the network of regional and intra-Lebanese relationships that he established.[[122]](#footnote-122) Using Gramsci’s contemplations, Musa as-Sadr would be deemed a new kind of cleric, who embodied the ‘organic intellectual’ of a certain social group and who operates and organises within his group. After his disappearance, other Shiite clerics continued his legacy and contributed to the development of the Shiite community’s religious-political awareness and unity.

Beside the intra-Lebanese developments that led to the emergence of a revolutionary Shiite force, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon had a decisive contribution to the birth of a new radical force[[123]](#footnote-123), and to the emergence of the Lebanese national resistance. Its first representative was “Jabhat al-muqawama al-waṭaniyya al-Lubnaniyya” (The Lebanese National Resistance Front), established by the Lebanese Communist Party and the Organization of Communist Action. It later moved to “Al- muqawma al-Islamiyya fi Lubnanˮ, which was ideologically different from the secular, leftist and Palestinian forces in the newly built Muqawama arena in Lebanon.

An additional factor that led to the emergence of the new player in the Shiite arena in Lebanon was the success of the Iranian revolution, which made Imam Khomeini, with all what he symbolized, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran[[124]](#footnote-124). The Iranian support for the clerics who split from Amal movement in Lebanon was decisive[[125]](#footnote-125).

As opposed to Amal, which demanded a share of the “sectarian cake” in Lebanon, Hezbollah introduced itself in its very beginnings as a radical organization that seeks to change the intra-Lebanese structure fundamentally. This goal was reflected in the name of the nascent organization “Hezbollah: athawra al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan” (the Party of God: the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon). In other words, the organization aimed to create a fundamental change in the political system in Lebanon, and to establish a revolutionary Islamic regime, in the version of Iran. This revolutionary aspiration was natural in the context of the civil war, which was at its peak when the movement first emerged, and which pushed all the Lebanese movements and organizations to their extreme.

Hezbollah’s first public appearance in the Lebanese arena (in the Open Letter, February 1985) was preceded by the birth of several organizations and movements, representing the radical Islam among the Lebanese Shiites, including the “Islamic Jihad”, the “Revolutionary Justice” organization and others. Hezbollah eventually emerged as an umbrella organization, taking under its wings different movements and organizations[[126]](#footnote-126). In an interview cited in Shanahan[[127]](#footnote-127), Hassan Nasrallah mentioned that the Committee of Nine, constituting Hezbollah’s founding leadership, was comprised of three members of the Daʿawa party in Lebanon, whose ideological roots are instilled in Iraq, especially in the philosophy of Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr; three members of the Islamic Amal movement headed by Husayn Mussawi, that split from Amal movement after the disappearance of Musa as-Ṣadr and the entry of Nabih Berri, As-Ṣadr’s successor, to the Salvation Committee, upon the request of president Elias Sarkis, together with the leader of the Lebanese Phalanges Party, Bachir Gemayel[[128]](#footnote-128); and three independent clerics.

In the 1980s, the revolutionary enthusiasm and the atmosphere of crisis that characterised Lebanon in general and the Shiite community in particular led many youths of different ideological backgrounds to unite and create substantial and revolutionary change in their reality. These included ʿAbbas Al-Musawi and Subhi al-Tufayli from al-Daʿwa party; Hassan Nasrallah, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, Naʿim al-Qassem, Muhammad Yazbak, and others from Amal; ʿImad Mughniyeh and Abu Hassan Khader Salameh from the Palestinian Fatah organisation; and ʿAbdel Hadi Hamadah from the Lebanese Communist Party.[[129]](#footnote-129)

1. **The new leaders- an example of the organic and frustrated intellectual**

The researcher Elie Kadourie raised an interesting hypothesis regarding nationalism as a product of a group of frustrated intellectuals, who lacked access to centers of power in the states and great empires that preceded the emergence of the national concept and the great force it gained before and after World War I; and that these intellectuals suggested the idea of nationalism as a tool through which they could divide the great empires into smaller “national units”, thus they would have a share of influence and power[[130]](#footnote-130).

This perception could be used (with a few adaptations) to analyze the appearance of the young clerics, destined to lead Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Shiite community in general, out of the sociopolitical marginality in the Lebanese arena, towards its center. Yet, this was not to be achieved through nationalist ideas, but through ideologies of the radical Islam, in the spirit of Ayatollah Khomeini, and with the decisive intention to create a genuine social change in Lebanon.

This group of young enthusiasts had common features. They were all in the twenties and thirties when Hezbollah was established in the late seventies and early eighties. They were clerics positioned at the bottom of the Shiite clergy hierarchy, in addition to being the first clerics in their families. They did not belong to the traditional clerics families who came mostly from Southern Lebanon. They mostly came from the Beqaa and Beirut, and only a few of them came from the South.

Another common denominator among these young leaders was that they were all influenced by the philosophy of Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr in Iraq, and his radical and activist Islamic thought, manifested in the Iraqi Daʿawa party (that operated secretly during the regime of the Ba’ath party in Iraq). Many of Hezbollah’s young leaders spent a few years in Iraq, in the religious school of Najaf, which was at that time a vigorous arena for religious Shiite activism, inspired by Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr and Khomeini[[131]](#footnote-131), who suggested a more activist and radical Islam, which drew the Shiite youth in Iraq and the Arab world, out of the radical secular organizations and parties. Rula Jurdi Abisaab argues that these clerics resemble Gramscian organic intellectuals “who are rooted in society and who serve and promote the interests of the lower class.”[[132]](#footnote-132)

The Lebanese students had to flee Iraq after the Iraqi authorities banned the activism of the Daʿawa party and expelled all the non-Iraqi Shiite clerics out of the country. This led to the return of a “critical mass” of approximately one hundred young, energetic and radical clerics to the stormy Lebanon, and who started creating substantial and radical changes, that peaked with the Civil war in the mid-seventies.

One of these young clerics was Abbas al-Musawi, born in 1952 to a secular family in the village of Al-Nabi Sheeth in the Bekaa Valley. In the late sixties, he met Musa as-Ṣadr and joined “Maʿahad al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya” (The Islamic Studies Institute) which as-Ṣadr established in Tyre. A year and a half later, Musawi travelled to Najaf, Iraq, to be tutored by Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr; nine years later, when he reached the level of Dars Kharij in his studies, he had to leave Iraq, because of the persecution led by the Iraqi authorities at that time. In 1978, when he returned to Lebanon, he established a “Hawza” (a seminary for religious studies) in Baalbek, a region that did not have many clerics[[133]](#footnote-133).

Subhi al-Tufayli, who would be later elected the first secretary-general of Hezbollah, was also born in a village in Baalbek, in Beqaa valley (Brital). He too was the first cleric in a secular multiple children family, whose breadwinner was a soldier in the Lebanese army. Tufayli was the only one among his siblings to pursue theological studies. He left for Najaf, Iraq, in 1965, and joined the disciples of Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr. He stayed there for nine years, until an arrest warrant was issued against him by the Iraqi authorities in 1974, and he was forced to leave, back to his village, Brital. Upon his arrival, he joined a group of clerics who opposed to Musa as-Ṣadr. In 1976, Al-Tufayli left for Qom, Iran, in the eve of the Iranian revolution. Al-Tufayli did not finish his studies, and reached the level of Dars Kharij; yet, he integrated into the activism against the Shah in Iran, and following the success of the revolution, he returned to Lebanon to contribute to the exportation of the revolution[[134]](#footnote-134).

Sheikh Muhammad Yazbak, who was the first cleric in his family, was born in Baalbek in 1950. He left for Najaf and studied there for seven years. After his expulsion from Iraq, he helped Abbas Mussawi establish the “Hawza” in Baalbek[[135]](#footnote-135).

Although their number was small, but Southern Lebanon was the home of some of Hezbollah’s founding leaders, whose profile matches the general profiles of the organization’s leaders, reviewed so far. One of these young leaders was Sheikh Ragheb Harb, called later “Sheikh ash-Shuhadaaʾ” after being assassinated by Israel on the 16th of February 1984.

Harb was born in the village of Jebchit in Southern Lebanon. He studied in al-Maʿahad al-Sharʿei al-Islami in Beirut (The Islamic Sharia Institute established by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in Beirut). A few years later, he moved to Najaf to pursue his studies. However, four years later, in 1974, he too was expelled from Iraq. He returned to Lebanon and became the Imam of his village, Jebchit. He succeeded gradually in recruiting a group of young religious Shiites who left Amal after the disappearance of Musa as-Sadr[[136]](#footnote-136).

The present secretary-general of the organization, Hassan Narallah, was born in 1960 in a family originally from Southern Lebanon. He was born and raised in the poor Karantina slum in Beirut. He is the eldest son among nine children. In the seventies, young Hassan left for Najaf, where he studied in the religious school of Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr. There, he made acquaintance with Abbas Musawi, and they became close friends. Nasrallah succeeded in completing the first part of his studies; but in 1978, he was expelled from Iraq and returned to Lebanon. There, he joined Amal movement, and became for a while member of the movement’s political bureau. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the internal dispute that erupted in the movement regarding the participation of its leader in the Salvation Committee, Nasrallah left the movements, together with a core group, and joined the founders of Hezbollah in Lebanon[[137]](#footnote-137).

One of the founding leaders with the most exceptional background was Husayn Musawi. He was originally a teacher of Arabic literature, who received secular education in Lebanon. Musawi was the deputy of Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal, but he resigned, following Berri’s entry to the Salvation Committee in 1982.

Musawi established the Islamic Amal movement, and claimed determinedly that it was the real Amal movement, preserving the tradition of Imam Musa as-Ṣadr. He took over part of Amal’s estate in the Beqaa, and succeeded, together with others, in establishing the military and logistic arm of the nascent organization of Hezbollah[[138]](#footnote-138).

There exist other examples of Hezbollah’s leaders, who clearly represent the far-reaching changes that occurred in the Shiite community in Lebanon, and the development of a new strata of young clerics, who deemed religion a radical refuge from their reality and marginality in the Lebanese arena. As maintained by Waddah Shararah, these young clerics were born to families that missed the formal, secular and Western Lebanese education train; and upon pursuing religious studies, they acquired the tools to take revenge on the Shiites[[139]](#footnote-139) who arrived first in Beirut and succeeded in integrating in the “original’’ Lebanese project of the bankers and merchants’ republic.

The new clerics, whose leaders’ biography was briefly reviewed in this chapter, were inspired by the activist clerics who matured in the fifties, sixties and seventies, and led a genuine revolution in the way Shiite clerics were perceived for many years. In Lebanon, the most prominent was definitely Musa as-Ṣadr, who did not only prepare the grounds, for two decades, for the consolidation of a stronger Shiite community, with a distinct nature, capable of demanding its share in the Lebanese regime. He also had a great contribution, within the context of Hezbollah’s emergence, to changing the image of Shiite clerics who were totally detached from the sociopolitical reality of most of the Shiites, especially the youth.

As-Ṣadr himself constituted for the young generation an example of a non-arrogant yet charismatic cleric, with an extensive network of social relations that helped him revive the status of clerics among the Shiite community. Through the Iranian support and the internal tribal synergy in the Beqaa, these new clerics succeeded in controlling large segments of the Shiite community, towards building a broader project that would challenge and attempt to destroy the sociopolitical regime that marginalized them in Lebanon for many decades.

To understand the ideological roots of these young clerics, one should shed light on the perceptions and innovations led by clerics and intellectuals like Musa as-Ṣadr, Muhammad Baqir as-Ṣadr, Ali Shariʿati, Ayatollah Khomeini and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.

A special emphasis should be also placed on the way each one of these intellectuals established and promoted the ideological basis on which Hezbollah would later build its own ideological infrastructure on the one hand. On the other hand, this infrastructure would be the basis for the flexibility and the changes that would enable Hezbollah to move from one political strategy into another.

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21. Cited in Hanf, *Lebanon: Coexistence in Times of War*, 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
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27. Like Kamal Hamdan, Fawzi Trabulsi, Theodor Hanf, David Gordon, Roger Owen and Kamal Deeb. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
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32. Gates, *The Merchant Republic of Lebanon*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*, 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Gates, *The Merchant Republic of Lebanon*, 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
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36. Ibid., 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Gates, *The Merchant Republic of Lebanon*, 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Trabulsi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*,196. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid., 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Gates, *The Merchant Republic of Lebanon*, 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Trabulsi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. This change will be further elaborated later. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*; Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*; Trabulsi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* and others. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Trabulsi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*,196. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*, 115 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Hanf, *Lebanon: Coexistence in wartime*, 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Cited in Ibid., 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Ibid., 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
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53. Ibid, 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
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69. Mackey, *Death of a Nation*, 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
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73. Siklawi, “Palestinian Political Enduranceˮ, 604-605. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*, 206-207. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
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98. Hamdan, *The Lebanese Crisis*, 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
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131. Zisser, *Blood in the Cedars*, 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Rula Jurdi Abisaab, “The Cleric as Organic Intellectual: Revolutionary Shi’ism in the Lebanese Hawzas,” in H. E. Chehabi (ed.), Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London and New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, 2006), 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Shapira, *Hizbullah between Iran and Lebanon*, 110-111. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Ibid., 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Ibid., 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Ibid., 120 [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Ibid., 117-119 [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Ibid., 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Shararah, *The State of Hizbullah,* 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)