CHAPTER 3

DIVERSITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: DIVIDENDS, DOWNSIDES, AND DEAD-ENDS

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Introduction

Canada is in the midst of a demographic revolution, one that is ushering in a great social transformation in the constitution of Canadian society. In this chapter I will show how this growing demographic, social, and cultural complexity paradoxically informs research both on the "upsides of diversity," including ingenuity, creativity, and innovation (Page 2015), and the "downsides of diversity," including undermining social trust and civic engagement (Putnam 2007). This great social transformation is shaped by diversity among Indigenous peoples, generations of established patterns of racial and ethnic diversity, and the intensification and complication of the latter through new waves of trans-border migration. These major demographic shifts are transforming Canadian society in indelible ways, and suggest a need to shift from often banal diversity thinking to an engagement with what has been termed "super-diversity" (Vertovec 2007) or "hyper-diversity" (Noble 2011), which increasingly characterize Canada's major cities and urban neighbourhoods. Despite this great social transformation, and the shifting diversity discourses, what remains remarkably resistant to change, particularly among Canada's ruling class and within its major governing institutions, is an "ethnic pecking order" (Woodsworth 1909) that preserves white normativity.

Many political scholars and policy-makers tend to focus on diversity primarily, if not exclusively, within the frame of immigration and how, over time, it has produced a racially and ethnically diverse citizenry. Few analyses engage societal diversity outside a migration frame and, consequently, ignore diversity that is indigenous to this territory we call Canada (Voyageur and Calliou 2000/2001). "Although there are many commonalties and beliefs held by Indigenous people, there are also many differences," Voyaguer and Callious

write, and this diversity is "not only geographical (some living in the high Arctic while others reside on the plains) and linguistic but also legal, cultural, and social" (2000/2001, 111; see also Statistics Canada 2010). Indigenous peoples, constituted by First Nations, Métis, Inuit, and Non-Status Indians, and an expanding urban Indigenous population, are among Canada's fastest-growing and youngest populations. They are igniting renewed social movements for intergenerational justice, land, sovereignty, and the protection of water and the environment. What diversity may mean for socially heterogeneous Indigenous peoples, relative to established and emerging racial/ethnically diverse communities, or newcomers, may be radically different. This "Indigenous biculturalism," as former Inuit Tapirit Kanatami leader Mary Simon (2011) put it, means that Indigenous peoples and nations are always navigating with non-Indigenous peoples in complex social spaces as they struggle to reinvigorate Indigenous knowledge, histories, cultures, and languages.

This Indigenous resurgence is taking place in the context of another great, indeed unprecedented, social transformation shaped by intensifying migration. Since the 1970s we have been witnessing one of the largest social experiments in modern history. In less than two generations Canadian society has undergone a fundamental transformation from being a predominantly white majority society to one increasingly constituted by a majority-minority dynamic (Jedwab 2016). While migration is how we tend to begin conversations on social diversity in Canada, linking diversity primarily to immigration re-enacts Indigenous dispossession and discursive marginality. This erasure, in turn, reinforces the conventional political and sociological conceptual lenses that underwrite the settler colonial narrative of a tripartite society constituted by "founding races"—as the English and French were called in the first book on Canadian politics, *Le Canada, les deux races : problèmes politiques contemporains* (Siegfried, 1906)—Indigenous nations, and "the other ethnic groups" (Haque 2012; Malinda Smith 2014). This tripartite social construct and conceptual framing reinforces racialized social hierarchies and the "ethnic pecking order" (Woodsworth 1909) that has dominated Canadian political life since its inception. It was further entrenched in the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission (1963–69) and subsequent legislation promoting multiculturalism and bilingualism. "Canada is a country characterized by a 'diversity of diversities.' It recognizes the contribution of its two founding cultures, while seeking to design a new place for Aboriginal people living within Canada . . . and recognizes a wide range of social and other axes of diversity" (Jenson and Papillon 2000, 1). This now common-sense formulation reproduces the social hierarchies of the white settler society and the political vocabulary of the English and French as "founding people" who want to craft a "new place for Aboriginal people" and for the "other axes of diversity." The idea of racial

and ethnic diversity here coexists with, and indeed maintains, the resilience of the white settler colonial ethnic pecking order.

From diversity to a "diversity of diversities," we have recently shifted to a new political vocabulary of super-diversity and hyper-diversity. Over the decade since the concept "super-diversity" was first coined (Vertovec 2005, 2007), research has explored these new social demographic dynamics at the level of the city and the neighbourhood, which are increasingly shaped by majority-minority contexts that include a substantial increase in both the number and size of ethnic groups (Crul 2006). While most research on super-diversity focuses on the intensification of racial and ethnic diversity— Canadians have reported over 200 different ethnicities in various censuses (Momani and Stirk 2017)—and the emergence of new racial and ethnic formations, the concept is meant to connote more, including "a world-wide diversification of migration channels, differentiations of legal statuses, diverging patterns of gender and age, and variance in migrants' human capital" (Meissner and Vertovec 2015, 542). Super-diversity is also meant to include different lifestyles, attitudes, and activities (van Kempen 2013, 2–3). The idea of hyper-diversity aims to move beyond the standard examination of differences *between* groups to account for differences *within* groups, and to evaluate the spaces they inhabit with respect to life chances and oppor-tunities "to develop relationships, businesses, lifestyles, [and] new activities" (van Kempen 2013, 3). Beyond recognizing identity differences and hybrid-ity, this emergent diversity thinking seeks to engage "a dynamism that alters processes of interethnic identification and connection" (Noble 2011, 830) in personal relations, neighbourhoods, workplaces, spaces, and flows, and in the process, engenders something novel.

In Canada, this super-diversity increasingly is constituted by diverse non-white—"visible" or "racialized"—minorities and Indigenous peoples living in Canada's major cities. While scholars have begun to reckon with super-diversity, few have attempted to grapple with the implications of this emergent racialized-Indigenous social dynamic for how we think about diversity and social justice in the twenty-first century. One in five Canadians is a racialized minority, and projections show that by 2031, immigrants or children of immi-grants will constitute 50 per cent of the population—up from 38.2 per cent in 2011 (Grant 2017). Racialized minorities will constitute one-third of the Canadian population, with the majority living in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal (Statistics Canada 2017). Prairie urban centres such as Calgary, Edmonton, and Winnipeg are similarly undergoing social transformations in terms of ethno-cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. While on a smaller scale, these same cities are experiencing an Indigenous resurgence. The rapid transformation from a primarily white and European majority to a primarily

non–white and non-European majority-minority compositional diversity is unprecedented in Canadian history, and it demands more innovative ways of thinking about social diversity. Calling it Canada's "diversity dividend," Bessma Momani and Jillian Stirk (2017) argue that, although diversity represents a significant global advantage, Canadians have not yet fully recognized or leveraged it. What we make of this growing social diversity and complexity will have profound implications for good relations with Indigenous peoples and for the future of Canada.

In the remainder of this chapter I explore three stories of why and how diversity matters in contemporary Canada. For lack of better terms, I call these stories "the good," "the bad," and "the ugly." The first story on "the good" or upside of diversity draws on business and management research that stresses how diversity can yield "diversity dividends" by making us smarter, better problem solvers, and more creative and innovative. The second "bad" or downside of diversity story draws on research from political science and sociology that suggest that diversity can erode social trust, political participation, and voluntarism in society. The third or "ugly" story reports on diversity data and exposes the social diversity dead ends that arise from the durability of a racial–ethnic pecking order and white normativity, despite the growing empirical reality of super-diversity. In fact, this final story may speak to how not to promote diversity in a rapidly changing demographic environment. This chapter concludes with a reflection on the challenges of shifting concepts of diversity for social justice at the intersections.

Story 1: "The Good" or Upside of Diversity Matters

What are the implications of diversity in the classrooms, courtrooms, boardrooms, and cabinets worldwide? In this story of how and why diversity matters, I explore "the good" or upside of diversity. The research on diversity in economics, business, management, and innovation studies map the productive and transformative potential of diversity in groups, firms, and organizations across sectors (Page 2015). Too often under neoliberalism, this potential is framed instrumentally in terms of the profit motive. As such, this approach may be juxtaposed with a human rights or social justice perspective that understands commitments to diversity in terms of anti–discrimination or normatively in terms of "doing the right thing." Katherine Phillips (2014) argues that decades of multidisciplinary social science research demonstrates that there is a "diversity dividend," which flows from being engaged with people who are unalike or different from us rather that those who are cultural clones or facsimiles of us. I outline three claims about diversity: first, diversity makes us smarter;

second, diversity makes us better problem solvers and decision-makers; and third, diversity fuels creativity and innovation.

Research conducted in multiple settings has shown that racial diversity can improve critical thinking, the quality of decision-making, and performance in groups. Diversity can make us smarter, "more creative, more diligent, and harder working," and, moreover, "socially diverse groups (comprised of assorted races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations) are more innovative than homogeneous groups" (Phillips 2014, n.p.). Let me provide a few illustrative examples. In 2014, Sheen Levine and colleagues conducted a cluster of comparative experiments on diversity in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Drawing on price bubbles, Levine wanted to assess whether diversity could mitigate ethnic homogeneity in the market. In a *Quartz* interview Levine explained, "Past research seemed to have involved situations that call for ethnic considerations. We wanted to take a setting that is completely unrelated to race—something that requires analytical thinking, where there is one correct answer, and see what role ethnicity could possibly play there" (quoted in Wang 2015, n.p.). In both the United States and Asia, the researchers constructed groups that were racially homogeneous and racially diverse. They found that racially and ethnically diverse groups demonstrated deeper and more critical thinking and overall outperformed homogeneous groups by 58 per cent (Wang 2015). Sheen Levine and David Stark (2015) further elaborated that diversity "brought cognitive friction that enhanced deliberation," while the more homogeneous groups demonstrated cultural cloning and copy-cat tendencies that ultimately generated less successful outcomes.

A comparative psychology study of racially homogeneous and racially diverse decision-making juries offers another illustrative example. Samuel R. Sommers's (2006) study found a significant difference in the decision-making of all-white juries in contrast to racially diverse jury compositions. Racially diverse juries that include, for example, white and Black members, tend to have more in-depth discussions than homogeneous juries with all-white jurors. As well, "diverse juries are often better decision makers than homogeneous ones," according to Sommers (2006, 599). In more diverse jury settings, the participants were less likely to voice racial prejudices that, for example, assumed the guilt of Black defendants or the innocence of white defendants. They were more likely to discuss whether race mattered and was, in fact, a factor in a particular outcome. The Sommers study suggests there is an exponential benefit or multiplier effect to decision-making in more racially diverse groups. Greater diversity in jury composition leads to a closer examination of the evidence, consideration of a wider range of explanatory factors, longer deliberations, and greater competency than more homogeneous jury compositions (Bailey 2006, 18; Marinakis 2015). Another study of 700 non-capital felony cases also

found that when there was an all-white jury it was likely to convict Black defendants 16 per cent more frequently when compared to juries with at least one Black member in which the racial conviction gap closed (Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson 2012).

Lu Hong and Scott E. Page (2004) examined the impact of diverse perspectives on collective problem solving and understanding, and on solving human organizational and computational challenges. They found that diverse groups not only performed better than homogeneous groups at complex problem solving but also that "diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers" (2004, 16385–89). The authors draw a distinction between identity diversity and functional diversity. Identity diversity, they explain, typically refers to differences in demographic characteristics, cultural identities and ethnicity, and training and expertise. Advocates of diversity in problem-solving groups claim a linkage among identity diversity and what Hong and Page term "functional diversity"—the differences in how people represent problems and how they go about solving them (2004, 16385).[1] In this study, Hong and Page shift the focus from identity diversity to functional diversity and a "perspective-heuristic approach," which focuses on "how people encode problems and attempt to solve them" (2004, 16385). The authors found that a randomly selected team of diverse, intelligent people can outperform the best-performing people (2004, 16389). Put differently, diversity can trump ability in some contexts because the interaction of individuals with different identities, perspectives, and functions "forces group members to prepare better, to anticipate alternative viewpoints, and to expect that reaching consensus will take an effort" (Phillips 2014, n.p.).

Diversity, particularly super-diversity, has been called "the mother of creativity" (Baumgartner 2010) and is widely recognized as a driver of innovation (Hewlett, Marshall, and Sherbin 2013). This relationship between diversity and creativity occurs in part because in diverse teams, individuals tend to ask more questions, thereby reducing groupthink, considering different possibilities and paths, and engaging in a wider range of critical thinking processes. Scott E. Page, author of *The Difference*, also argues that in contrast to affinity groups, "an outsider can be very helpful, not because they are necessarily smarter than you, but because they are different than you. And this difference is in how they naturally or innately think about what is important when they see a problem or situation." Page goes on to argue that divergent perspectives can "give you the equivalent of more brain power because they give you more search power. They give you more places you can look for ideas and solutions" (quoted in S. Kelly 2012, n.p.).

While some studies focus on friction in relation to interpersonal conflict, it is also a spark that can fuel creativity and the possibility of unexpected outcomes

(Higgs, Plewnia, and Ploch 2005). Organizations, firms, groups, and leadership teams that foster a diverse and inclusive culture are incubators for innovation because they encourage mavericks to swim against the tide, break down silos, promote cross-pollination of ideas, foster ingenuity, and strengthen intercultural intelligence and competency (Fan 2011). In *Leapfrogging*, Soren Kaplan (2012) explores the role of surprise and discomfort in creativity and argues that it is the unexpected that fuels creativity and discomfort and drives innovation. "The single most important factor in fostering true game changers," Kaplan argues, is "the way leaders and organizations handle the discomfort, the disorientation, and the thrill (and pain) of living with uncertainty, finding clarity from ambiguity, and being surprised" (2012, 10). Overall, these arguments suggest that being "comfortable with discomfort" and individual courage and risk-taking, rather than always playing it safe, are requisites for being competitive and innovative in a fast-changing world (Warrell 2009, 2013). Creativity and innovation thrive in uncomfortable environments that disrupt the familiar, unsettle old habits, and trouble the traditional status quo.

The aim of achieving diversity in the workplace, according to Yoram Solomon (2016), is to ensure equal opportunity for all, whatever their race or ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and the like. Diverse companies also better reflect their consumers, clientele, and the broader population. But how do we connect diversity to efforts to achieve better services, products, and more creativity and innovation? Solomon identifies nine diversity factors that increase team creativity and engender "diversity dividends": demographic, multidisciplinary and cross-functional, knowledge and education, experience, generalists and specialists (breadth versus depth), extra-curricular interests, cognitive preferences, risk-taking, and vision. While recognizing that diversity can be hard, can inhibit interpersonal communications and the development of social trust, and can delay team bonding—factors needed by teams in order to speak and act freely—it also significantly increases a team's ability to see problems and solutions from unconventional perspectives (Solomon 2016).

Diversity, particularly direct exposure to multicultural experiences, can also spark and enhance creativity in the learning environment. In one of the first studies to empirically test the hypothesis that exposure to diversity and multiple cultures enhances creativity, Leung and colleagues (2008) found that simple exposure to multiple cultures alone enhances creativity. We can assume that this assumption partly informs internationalization initiatives, studies abroad, and faculty and student exchange programs promoted by many universities and schools. Exposure to cultural diversity can be related to creativity in two instances: first, "extensiveness of multicultural experiences was positively related to both creative performance (insight learning, remote association, and idea generation)," and, second, "creativity-supporting cognitive processes (retrieval

of unconventional knowledge, recruitment of ideas from unfamiliar cultures for creative idea expansion)" (Leung et al. 2008, 169).

A correlation between diversity, productivity, and profitability is consistently confirmed across a range of studies. While correlation does not equal causation, another study of 366 public companies shows a "diversity dividend" and greater profitability for companies with a diverse workforce and corporate board (Hunt, Layton, and Prince 2015). In an examination of various metrics, including the companies' senior management, boards, and financial performance, Vivian Hunt and her colleagues (2015) found that more diverse companies outperform those that are socially homogeneous: "More diverse companies, we believe, are better able to win top talent and improve their customer orientation, employee satisfaction, and decisionmaking, and all that leads to a virtuous cycle of increasing returns" (Hunt, Layton, and Prince 2015, 1). In the United States, greater racial and ethnic diversity on senior executive teams yield better financial performance, whereas in the United Kingdom gender diversity appears to yield the best financial results. Hunt and her colleagues conclude that the unequal performance of companies in the same industry and the same country suggests diversity is a competitive differentiator that shifts market share toward more diverse companies. At the same time, however, they observe that while certain industries perform better on gender diversity and others on ethnic and racial diversity, no industry or company is in the top quartile on both dimensions (Hunt, Layton, and Prince 2015, 2–3). Similarly, the Catalyst Information Centre (a collective of educators committed to social justice education) found that companies with women in senior executive positions and as board directors financially outperform non-gender diverse boards in three areas: return on investment, sales, and equity (2013, 2). Gender-diverse boards also correlate with better corporate governance, lower corporate fraud, increased corporate social responsibility, and better corporate reputation (2013, 8–9).

Both gender and racial diversity matter to performance, yet many companies seem to focus either on gender or racial diversity rather than both. Despite the decades-old myth that because of diversity initiatives "men are endangered," as John Allan, the chair of Tesco, stated in Rawlinson (2017), there is no evidence from the past decades to support this claim (as the data below will show). There is even less evidence to support the corresponding myth that intersectional identities are privileged, as Allan also argued: "If you are female and from an ethnic background and preferably both, then you are in an extremely propitious period" (quoted in Rawlinson 2017, n.p.). Yet few, if any, companies report on diversity at the intersections; that is, whether the women and men on boards are racially diverse and what the research suggests about the implications of such difference for board governance, performance,

productivity, and innovation. What we do know generally, however, is that diversity ignites greater deliberative thought that leads to better decisions, and that multicultural friction can be a driver of creativity and innovation (Agrawal 2016). Overall, diversity is a social reality that can be good, whether in the workplace, groups or teams, classrooms, or boardrooms.

Story 2: "The Bad" or Downside of Diversity Matters

The political, economic, and sociological research on diversity is contested from a variety of perspectives, but these divergent positions generally tend to be ordered along a liberal–conservative continuum: Is diversity a strength and a source of excellence as liberals claim, or is diversity a source of division, mediocrity, and misery as conservatives tend to claim? How do we reconcile these competing stories of diversity? The stories told in this chapter suggest, instead, that the very same dynamics of diversity can produce either or both outcomes. Diversity is, in large part, what we make of it (or not). It is precisely because diversity is used in so many and often contradictory ways that we need to be attentive to its uses, and understand what is at stake when we use particular narratives about diversity.

It has become somewhat common sense to claim that "diversity is a strength." This relatively recent conception of diversity, however, is also a deeply contested and resisted claim, especially when tied to immigration in advanced democratic societies in the European Union and North America. For example, while appealing for religious and cultural tolerance in her 2004 Christmas address, Queen Elizabeth II told her subjects, "Discrimination still exists. Some people feel that their own beliefs are being threatened. Some are unhappy about unfamiliar cultures. They all need to be reassured that there is so much to be gained by reaching out to others; that diversity is indeed a strength and not a threat" (BBC News 2004, n.p.). "Everyone is our neighbour," she continued, "no matter what race, creed and colour."

Over a decade later, Anglo–American democracies like Canada continue to make this claim. "Diversity is Canada's strength" has become integral to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's vision of the country. In a November 2015 speech at Canada House in London, England, Trudeau stated that diversity was a fact of life and foundation of Canada, and was so much like "the air we breathe" that we may well take it for granted. Gesturing to Canada's international reputation for politeness, Trudeau insisted the contemporary "commitment to diversity and inclusion isn't about Canadians being nice and polite." Challenging critics of diversity, he argued that "diversity isn't a challenge to overcome or a difficulty to be tolerated. Rather, it's a tremendous source of strength." He acknowledged

that the diversity of peoples, cultures, languages, and complex histories have been shaped by what he called "dark moments," among them, Indigenous dispossession and its continuing legacies, Canada's own unacknowledged history of slavery, the Chinese head tax, the wartime internments of Japanese, Italians, and Ukrainians, the rejection of boats loaded with Punjabi and Jewish refugees, and policies and institutions of redress. Quoting African American civil rights legend Martin Luther King Jr., Trudeau explained that "the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice," though not always in a straightforward manner. Trudeau maintained that "Canada has learned how to be strong not in spite of our differences, but because of them." In Trudeau's vision, diversity is "a powerful and ambitious approach to making Canada, and the world, a better, and safer, place" (2015, n.p.).

In the economic realm, research by Bessma Momani and Jillian Stirk found "it is not enough to simply reap the dividends that come from attracting highly skilled immigrants to Canada" (2017, n.p.). It is necessary to go beyond the instrumental to offer the aspirational arguments for diversity, including that there is a societal dividend because we can "demonstrate how opening ourselves to the world benefits everyone" (2017, n.p.). Yet there is a yawning gap between the good that diversity does, or at least can do, and what diversity is able to do in practice. Despite all the recognized dividends of diversity, Momani and Stirk's research found that for many businesses there are fundamental "barriers to inclusion and what kind of policies and practices are needed so that diversity can be harnessed to drive innovation, productivity and global connectivity" (2017, n.p.). Examining 15,000 to 20,000 employees in 6,000 firms across 14 sectors, they found barriers, biases, and obstacles to a diverse workforce, including overqualified immigrants who were underemployed because of the failure to recognize their credentials or international experience, and because of businesses' "reliance on traditional networks, and unconscious bias in hiring. Underemployed highly skilled immigrants are in effect a stranded resource, something we cannot afford, in either economic or social terms" (Momani and Stirk 2017, n.p.).

This conception of diversity as a source of strength remains in large part aspirational, yet it has come under renewed scrutiny and contestation. When Prime Minister Justin Trudeau kept his commitment following the 2015 federal election to have gender parity in his 30-member cabinet, there was a notable pushback from conservative journalists and politicians who pre-judged that women and racial minorities necessarily meant less merit or competence and, by implication, reinforced the implicit bias that privileged white male normativity and preference for sameness. The response of many conservative critics was to argue that diversity would somehow impact merit or competence. Andrew Coyne (2015) wrote in the *National Post* that cabinet choices

should be based on merit and not gender, reinforcing the myth that women are not equally meritorious and competent compared to white men, but also that white men are imagined as universal and outside identity diversity discussions. Paradoxically, Coyne begins the commentary by arguing that strict merit has never shaped cabinet choices, and historically factors such as party affiliation, region, and language have been taken into account in the appointment process. Moreover, cabinet insiders and outsiders were always shaped by social networks, friendships, even grudges and flattery, and have resulted in "numbers of the incompetent, the venal, and the merely mediocre among Her Majesty's ministers, most of them white men" (Coyne 2015, n.p.).

In the months following the 2015 federal election, conservatives continued to disparage the practice of diversity and inclusion; that is, moving beyond rhetorically supporting the idea without following through with the commitment to it. Conservative leadership candidate Kevin O'Leary, a businessman and reality television star on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's *Dragons' Den*, claimed Trudeau "ended up with a mediocre cabinet because he was more concerned about diversity than competence" (Canadian Press 2017, n.p.). The unsubstantiated equation of diversity with unqualified and incompetent women and racial minorities serves a function: it reinforces white male normativity. This kind of commentary tends to arise when there are efforts to break from white male normativity, which often goes unnoticed and unremarked. In challenging arguments put forth by Coyne (2015), and equally applicable to O'Leary's remarks equating diversity with mediocrity, Michael Laxer noted that historically, "white men were afforded positions of power and privilege not due to 'merit,' but due solely to being white men" (2015, n.p.). Raising questions about merit and competence precisely at the moment when efforts are made to disrupt this tendency is, according to Laxer, "a call for little more than business as usual and a call, not for 'merit,' but for continuing the white male hegemony that defines 'merit' solely in terms of the privileged qualities that its male commentators see in the mirror" (2015, n.p.). It is a call for the social reproduction of sameness.

Despite the diversity rhetoric, empirical evidence reveals that the ethnic pecking order persists among Canada's elites, and durable barriers to diversity endure in all major governing institutions. In 2017, Canadian university leadership, and to a large extent the professoriate, has remained overwhelmingly white and male despite the diversity of the student body and broader population (Malinda Smith 2016; Henry et al. 2017a, 2017b). The Canadian judiciary has been characterized as a "judiciary of whiteness", with 96 per cent of judges white and primarily male (Griffith 2016). A similar social segmentation shaped by white normativity is evident among elected offices (Tolley 2015; Black 2013), the police (Marcoux et al. 2016), the major media (Mochama 2016), and corporate boards (McFarland, 2014, 2015).

The sociological research on "whitopia" (Benjamin 2009) and so-called ethnic enclaves (Jiménez 2007) also raises questions about how we think about diversity. Such spaces can be sources of social capital, entrepreneurship, and cultural vitality, as the vibrant Chinatown or Little Italy exemplify in many cities around the world. Yet, whatever the rationale for these socially homogeneous spaces, they reinforce the gap between diversity rhetoric and, perhaps, diversity aspiration and everyday lived realities. Despite claims of living "in a multicultural society" and self-congratulatory "claims of tolerance and diversity," pollster Allan Gregg noted, "the evidence suggests that fewer and fewer of us are living in multicultural neighbourhoods," residing, instead, in "self-segregated communities, isolated along ethnic lines" (quoted in Jiménez 2007).

The "inconvenient truth" of diversity's downside was alluded to in Robert Putnam's work on social capital and particularly in his 2007 publication "E. Pluribus Unum." Based on interviews of 30,000 people in 41 communities across the United States, Putnam (2007) concludes that, in the short run, diversity can present a serious challenge to democracy, although he suggests these challenges can be overcome with time. Putnam pointed to the following dynamic in contemporary super-diverse neighbourhoods: declining distrust among neighbours, less voluntarism and contributions to charity, cynicism about leaders, lower voter registration and participation in electoral politics, and the fact that although they agitate for social change and reforms they seemed to "have less faith that they can actually make a difference" (Putnam 2007, 150).

Putnam's research appears to contradict the liberal story of diversity as strength and the related multicultural story of the benefits of diversity, as well as the "contact hypotheses" in sociology, which holds that increased interaction among racially and ethnically diverse peoples engenders greater social understanding. In contrast, Putnam argued that "the more ethnically diverse the people we live around, the less we trust them" (2007, 142). Diversity may reduce social trust, social solidarity, and social cohesion. While this is all quite troubling for civic life, it is important to historicize these tendencies. Putnam suggests every generation experiences a level of social distrust and discomfort. This was certainly true among earlier European immigrants and it remains true today, although the sources of immigration have changed.

Arguably, the upside and downside of diversity are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, conservative critics of diversity drew on Putnam's arguments to suggest, for example, that "greater diversity equals more misery" (Mercer 2007), and that "racial polarisation increases with social contact" as flowing from human nature (Dreher 2016, n.p.). Conservatives also draw on Putnam's finding to suggest racism and xenophobia are rational responses to living with social diversity. Rather than imagining that "provincialism and xenophobia are a product of ignorance, and that when people

come into contact with one another they inevitably become more tolerant," Rod Dreher suggests this liberal view is "not at all representative of broader human nature" (2016, n.p.). On the other hand, and while insisting we cannot shy away from the challenges posed by diversity for democracy, Putnam insists diversity is good for society in the long run. Page also does not evade the challenges of diversity, insisting "when you interact with people who are different, it's difficult and trust goes down" (quoted in Greenblatt 2007, n.p.), but this is not an immutable condition. It can be overcome with time. Moreover, this very same difficulty and discomfort may have an upside in diverse workplaces and groups, because "there's strong empirical evidence that productivity goes up" (Page quoted in Greenblatt, 2007, n.p.). Diversity, indeed super-diversity, in the neighbourhood, the city, and workplace, is no more and no less than what we make of it.

Story 3: The "Ugly" or Diversity Data and Dead Ends

My third story examines institutional diversity initiatives which, paradoxically, function to reinforce white normativity. I draw on three illustrative examples from the public and private sector, which have long had diversity policies, programs, and even chief diversity officers. The evidence from the corporate sector, the judiciary, and police services reveal that diversity discourses and policies in private and public sector workplaces do not seem to produce results that reflect the everyday lived realities of super-diversity in cities and neighbourhoods. Rather—and despite four decades of equity policies—corporate boards, the judiciary, and the police continue to be shaped by racial and ethnic segregation, and remain overwhelmingly white and to a lesser extent male, thus maintaining the historic colour-coded ethnic pecking order even across gender and sexual difference. I have termed this social process "diversifying whiteness."

The data also suggest the need to examine social justice at the intersections, and to tease out how homosociality, cultural cloning, and imagined homogeneities can engender the "social injustice of sameness" (Essed and Goldberg 2002). The concept "intersectionality" was first coined by American critical legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, and since then it has been used as a metaphor, a sensibility, a frame, a method, and a social policy lens. "Intersectionality is an analytic sensibility, a way of thinking about identity and its relationship to power. Originally articulated on behalf of Black women, the term brought to light the invisibility of many constituents within groups that claim them as members, but often fail to represent them" (Crenshaw 2016, n.p.). Without the relevant frame or lens to address inequities among diverse

groups and within them, "the efforts to mobilize resources to address a social problem will be partial and exclusionary" and, moreover, "when there's no name for a problem, you can't see a problem. When you can't see a problem, you can't solve it" (Crenshaw 2016, n.p.). In this case, I am drawing on an intersectional sensibility and method to draw attention to how, for example, the category "women" can, and often does, obscure diversity among women, and how this may in turn obscure the fact that the only women represented are able-bodied white women.

Discussions of social cloning have been enabled by the normative assumption of social and cultural sameness that underpins modern thinking around politics, law, education, management, and processes of social reproduction and economic production (Essed and Goldberg 2002). Social and cultural cloning, like biotechnological cloning, leads to the repetitive reproduction of desired social characteristics (Essed and Schwab 2012), in this case the institutional tendency to selectively reproduce white male normativity. Consequently, we need to problematize the reproduction of racial and gender sameness in institutions not simply in terms of discrimination *against* women and racial minorities but, rather, "in terms of preference *for*, that is, practices sustaining imagined male homogeneity" (Essed 2004, 113). While Essed's 2004 work is centred on the university, it resonates across public and private institutions, particularly the author's account of how cultural cloning explains the durable persistence of the normative image of leaders as white and male. Despite decades of policies to achieve more equitable outcomes, cultural cloning and the privileging of white males continue to maintain senior management and leadership as socially and culturally homogeneous (Essed 2004). What this third story examines, then, is ongoing institutional cloning.

Diversity on Corporate Boards

Despite numerous studies that suggest boardroom diversity enhances productivity and profitability, and fuels creativity and innovation, corporate boardrooms remain socially homogenous. Studies by the Canadian Board Diversity Council (CBDC, n.d.) consistently show an under-representation of women, visible minorities, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities as corporate board directors. The term "visible minority" is a legal term used by the Canadian government to identify people who are not Indigenous and "non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour." While I use the term "visible minorities"[2] in this chapter, it is primarily because of its use for national data collection. It is used interchangeably with "racialized minorities," a concept that denotes the process by which groups are socially produced, and come to understand themselves, as distinct races despite the absence of correspondence with now disavowed preconceptions of biological races. For this reason, I also use "white"

instead of the erroneous and pseudo-scientific concept of "Caucasian" (Hui 2013; Khan 2011).

Overall, corporate board diversity, particularly racial diversity, is not increasing. Few corporate directors are visible minorities and even fewer are Indigenous, and if there is any trend, it is one of declining representational diversity and the reassertion of white male normativity. While the percentage of women on corporate boards has increased marginally, there is a corresponding decline of visible minorities and Indigenous peoples, especially visible minority and Indigenous women. The data on corporate boards reveal a picture of homogeneity and cultural cloning, in which boards remain astonishingly white and male despite the discourses of super-diversity, and the empirical reality of social diversity of the broader population. Recent statistics underline this stark reality. Consider the following:

- In 2010 visible minorities constituted 5.3 per cent of board directors of Canada's 500 largest companies, but this number declined to 2.0 percent in 2014 (McFarland 2013, 2014; Dhir 2015).
- The percentage of Indigenous directors stalled at 0.8 per cent of board seats between 2010 and 2014 (McFarland 2014).
- The percentage of women directors gradually increased from 13.7 per cent in 2009 to 19.5 per cent in 2015 (McFarland 2013, 2014, 2015).
- The percentage of board directors with disabilities has steadily declined from 2.9 per cent in 2010 to 1.4 per cent in 2014 (McFarland, 2014).

The decline in visible minorities and persons with disabilities, juxtaposed against an increase in gender equity, suggests a trade-off in which "diversity initiatives" have largely become "gender diversity initiatives" rather than any notion of super-diversity on corporate boards.

"So why do old white guys continue to dominate boardrooms?" asks Joanna Pachner (2016, n.p.). "Why aren't Canadian corporate boards getting any less male, or white?" Rebecca Walberg (2014, n.p.) similarly asks. The research on how the old-boys network is maintained, on affinity bias, and on cultural cloning all provide partial answers to these questions. For example, Pachner's research found that "because nine in 10 directors rely on their personal networks of other senior male executives to fill board vacancies," recruitment to corporate boards is often based on friendships and informal social networks, which tend to reinforce cultural cloning and white male homogeneity (2016, n.p.). While a number of companies have made gestures to diversify their boards, there is a sense that some of these efforts are nothing more than token gestures to avoid public shaming. This "tokenistic mindset—let's get a woman, a minority

and throw in some foreigners for good measure—misses the point" (Pachner 2016, n.d.). The vast majority of Canadian corporate boards not only lack significant diversity by gender, race, and ability—they also lack age diversity. In 2016, a full 93 per cent of board directors of the 500 biggest companies were over 50 years of age, while the average age for the S&P 500 companies was 63 years (Pachner 2016).

There is another dynamic at play here, one that requires us to pay closer attention to the uses and abuses of the language of diversity. Sara Ahmed argues that diversity-talk often only "supports existing organizational ideals or even organizational pride. What makes diversity useful also makes it limited: it can become detached from histories of struggle for equality" (2007b, 235). Institutions in the public and private sector have a vast discretion with respect to how they define or avoid defining what they mean by "diversity." It is thus no surprise, then, that despite the relatively small percentage of women, visible minorities, and Indigenous peoples on corporate boards, a CBDC survey found that 82 per cent of board directors thought their boards were diverse (McFarland 2015). As a result, as Christopher Chen of the Hay Group suggests, some companies define diversity in terms of perspectives or background, while most Canadian conversations on diversity focus almost exclusively on gender "with some attention paid secondarily to ethnicity" (quoted in Walberg 2014, n.p.).

The tokenistic diversity mindset, detached from the struggles for equality and social justice, has four significant implications: first, affinity bias and cultural cloning mean that boards maintain existing preference for sameness, thereby replicating and maintaining the status quo; second, the meanings of diversity and how and why diversity matters are highly contested but, also, not fully understood; third, the proliferating and inconsistent ways in which diversity is used across institutions means it often coexists with inequity; and fourth, growing evidence indicates that diversity recruitment strategies, where they exist, have yielded little change. This suggests the need for greater attention to rethinking the "value of diversity training that pins its hopes on educating people to rise above their prejudices" (Clegg 2017, n.p.). One suggestion by Harvard behavioural economist Iris Bohnet (2016) is the need to focus greater attention on designing processes that limit individual and group bias and cultural cloning tendencies.

Diversity in the Canadian Police Forces

What can we learn about diversity in Canada's major institutions when we examine it within the Canadian legal system? Here, again, we see the durability of white normativity across Canada's major institutions and power structures. Research on the Canadian justice system—the courts (Griffith 2016), the

legal profession (Canadian Centre for Diversity and Inclusion [CCDI] 2016a), and the police (Marcoux et al. 2016)—all reinforce similar white normativity dynamics we explored in the previous discussion of corporate board diversity. First, there has been slow progress on gender equity but also a persistence of white normativity across gender. Despite the rhetoric of diversity, the justice system is marked by representational homogeneity rather than social diversity. Second, we see that institutions are slow to change and lag significantly behind broader societal demographic diversity: the police force, the legal profession, and the courts do not reflect the demographic diversity of the populations they serve.

An investigative report by CBC News of 21 of Canada's largest municipal police forces found that with the exception of Halifax, "police diversity fails to keep pace with Canadian populations" (Marcoux et al. 2016, n.p.). Moreover, in some of the most socially diverse cities, police forces remain "overwhelmingly white" (Leavitt 2016a, 2016b). These findings are startling, especially when one considers that there is growing controversy about the relationship between minority communities and policing. Social movements like Idle No More and Black Lives Matter, both co-founded and led by women,[3] have drawn attention to the violence and abuse that Indigenous and racialized communities experience from law enforcement. Stop-and-frisk, carding, racial profiling, "starlight tours," missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls, and the disproportionate shootings and incarceration of Black and Indigenous peoples are obvious examples (Cole 2015; Palmater 2016). With the exception of Halifax, all "other major law enforcement agencies across the country fail to reflect their communities' diversity among their ranks, leaving large swaths of visible minorities and Indigenous populations without representation" (Marcoux et al. 2016, n.p.). Again, the statistics tell a disturbing story (Marcoux et al. 2016, n.p.):

- York region: 44 per cent of the population is non-white, but only 17 per cent of the police force is non-white.
- Edmonton: 35 per cent of the population is constituted by visible minorities or Indigenous peoples, but they make up less than 10 per cent of the police force.
- Vancouver: 54 per cent of the city's population are from social minority groups, but these groups make up only 22 per cent of the police force.
- Nunavut: 90 per cent of the territory is Indigenous, but only 12 per cent of the police force is Indigenous.
- Quebec City: just over 1 per cent of officers are racial minorities or Indigenous, whereas Quebec City is five times more racially diverse.

When we look at overwhelmingly white police forces that do not reflect the communities in which they serve then difficult questions need to be asked. A CBC investigative report found that over a nine-year period between 2007 and 2015, only five or 0.7 per cent of the 735 police officers hired by the Sûreté du Québec were visible minorities or Indigenous (Leavitt 2016b). The Quebec provincial police force is over 99 per cent white. This homogeneity leads to a credibility problem, argues Maria Peulso: "In any public office or public institution, it's important they reflect the diversity of the population that they serve" (quoted in Leavitt 2016b, n.p.).

Demographic diversity is necessary but insufficient for transforming socially homogeneous institutions like Canada's police forces. We already know from experience that approaches that attempt to change the face of police officers without a corresponding change to organizational culture have had limited benefits. As Sandy Hudson, a cofounder of Black Lives Matter Toronto, put it, "There has to be a real commitment to changing policy, to changing structure, and to changing the institution as a whole" (quoted in Marcoux et al. 2016, n.p.). The need to change the culture of policing in Canada, however, is easier said than done. While changing police culture is widely recognized as important for building social trust and transforming strained police-community relations (Leavitt 2016b), this message does not appear to be fully appreciated by police leadership and police unions. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, for example, seemed unconcerned by the numbers showing that police forces do not reflect the communities they serve. For example, in the CBC investigative report, Clive Weighill, Chief of the Saskatoon Police Service, instead chose to highlight the comparably better representation of visible minorities and Indigenous peoples in the police compared to other sectors: "I think we've made a lot of progress. If you would compare policing to private corporations or other civic or municipal corporations, I think you'd see our numbers are drastically ahead of most people" (quoted in Marcoux et al. 2016, n.p.).

Diversity in the Legal Profession

The legal profession in Canada is also changing at a glacial pace with respect to the representation of women, Indigenous peoples, and racialized minorities. Since the 1980s, law societies across Canada have embarked on employment equity initiatives to increase diversity within the legal profession. For more than three decades, law societies have produced a series of reports on the status of women and on equity and diversity, which have focused on a range of issues, such as obstacles to hiring, workplace environment, work–life balance, and barriers to retention and advancement. Examples of these

include the Law Society of Upper Canada's 1989 "Women and the Legal Profession" and 1996 "Barriers and Opportunities within Law" reports; the 2004 "Final Report on Equity and Diversity in Alberta's Legal Profession" by the Law Society of Alberta; the 2014 "Pour une profession inclusive—La diversité ethnoculturelle dans la profession juridique" by the Law Society of Quebec; and the 2016 Saskatchewan Justice Project's report on policies and practices to engender retention and advancement in the legal profession (CCDI 2016b, 18). However, while final reports were heralded for their significance upon their release, there has been a disjuncture between recommendations and outcomes. Too often, the reports and their expressed commitments are themselves taken as signs of success, reinforcing what Ahmed (2007c) refers to as "doing the document rather than doing the doing." Put differently, diversity advocacy requires us to pay attention to the politics of documentation and "how documents are taken up as signs of good performance, as expressions of commitment." Yet, beyond the document, little is done to effect change and this becomes clear when we "follow the documents around" to see how they are taken up by institutions or whether they are shelved. Yet Ahmed is right to argue that the production of the documents can be used strategically by diversity advocates, including to "expose the gaps between words and deeds" (Ahmed 2007c, 590) or "*how not to do things with words*" (Ahmed 2012, 1, emphasis in original).

Despite the efforts to generate reports and recommendations to improve the status of women in law and to socially diversify the profession, a study on demographic diversity by the Canadian Centre for Diversity and Inclusion (CCDI), in partnership with the Canadian Bar Association, found mostly stalled efforts to close the demographic diversity gaps. The objective of the report was to provide data that could better inform efforts to improve diversity and inclusion in the legal profession. As the CCDI noted, "The data does not tell us why a particular trend is happening or not happening," but drawing on experience and expertise, the report offers some potential reasons for particular trends. For example, between 2014 and 2016, the percentage of men among senior leaders in the legal profession increased, as did the percentage of senior leaders who are white (CCDI 2016a, 10):

- Male normativity: An increase from 2014 to 2016 in the percentage of senior leaders in the legal profession who were men: from 73.99 per cent in 2014, to 76.86 per cent in 2015, and 75.34 per cent in 2016.
- White normativity: An increase from 2014 to 2016 in the percentage of senior leaders in the legal profession who were white: from 89.78 per cent in 2014, to 88.91 per cent in 2015, and 90.78 per cent in 2016.

The CCDI's survey showed Indigenous peoples are under-represented, with barriers primarily being entry to the profession, and less so as obstacles to advancements once in the profession. In contrast, racialized minorities are entering the legal profession at increasing rates but remain absent at the top tiers of the profession. The CCDI report shows that women and racialized minorities are significantly under-represented among equity partners, income partners, and in senior leadership roles. Nevertheless, the report also found that regardless of gender, white lawyers were more likely to become an equity partner than a racialized person. When we look at equity at the intersections, white men had "the greatest odds of being an equity partner" and were "seven times more likely than racialized women" to secure such a status (CCDI 2016a, 10). This tendency reinforces structures of white normativity and suggests a racialized gendered social contract (Pateman and Mills 2007) that maintains power, privilege, and prestige among white men and secondarily white women. Regardless, there is a distinct social hierarchy and ethnic pecking order that is replicated across Canadian institutions and this will be clearer, still, from an examination of diversity in the Canadian judiciary.

Diversity in the Judiciary

Mi'kmaq lawyer Naiomi W. Metallic characterized the Canadian judicial system as a "judiciary of whiteness" (quoted in Tutton 2016, n.p.). This characterization is supported by the data from a study of diversity in the judiciary published in *Policy Options* in 2016, which showed that of the 2,160 judges in the provincial superior and lower courts, only 1 per cent were Indigenous and only 3 per cent were racial minorities (Tutton 2016). Conducted by Andrew Griffith, a former director of the Ministry of Citizenship and Multiculturalism, the study examined the backgrounds of federally and provincially appointed judges. Griffith found that provincially appointed judges were slightly more diverse than federally appointed judges but overall the results are dismal. There are no Indigenous or visible minorities on the Supreme Court or the Federal Court of Appeal. Indigenous judges make up 2.4 per cent of the Federal Court, and only 7.4 per cent of the Tax Court is composed of visible minorities. Women fare better in federal courts, comprising 44 per cent of the Supreme Court, 27 per cent of the Federal Court of Appeal, 31 per cent of the Federal Court, and 26 per cent of the Tax Court (Griffith 2016, Figure 1). These trends are reproduced in federal appointments to provincial courts. While women constitute approximately one-third of provincial Supreme Courts, Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts, visible minorities constitute less than 5 per cent of provincial Supreme Courts and less than 1 per cent of the other two provincial courts. Indigenous justices are

virtually absent from this critical layer in the Canadian justice system, constituting less than 1 per cent of all three federally appointed provincial courts (Griffith 2016, Figure 2).

Diversity is more apparent among provincially appointed justices but the picture is mixed across the provinces, and, as Griffith notes, "overall the provinces resemble each other in their under-representation of these groups" (2016, n.p.). For example, with the exception of Nova Scotia, there are no visible minority or Indigenous judges in Atlantic Canada. Quebec has a few visible minority judges but no Indigenous judges. Saskatchewan and Manitoba have few Indigenous judges, and in the North, despite a large Indigenous population, there are no Indigenous judges. With a few notable exceptions, the provinces differ but generally do better with respect to the appointment of women, with representation ranging from a low of 25 per cent in Alberta and New Brunswick to a high of 44 per cent in Manitoba and Quebec (Griffith 2016, Figure 3).

There are at least two takeaways from this data. First, despite the growing diversity of the population and the legal profession, the judiciary does not reflect the people it serves. Second, the data comport with my argument on cultural cloning, the durability of white normativity, and what I term as the diversification of whiteness. The diversification of the judiciary has meant inviting to the bench white women, but rarely visible minority or Indigenous lawyers. White normativity in the judiciary is maintained despite diversity policies because diversity has been reduced to gender, or perhaps even sexual diversity, which benefit primarily white women or white LGBT people within the profession. There is a notable absence of good data on representation and experiences of persons with disabilities.

Does it matter if the police, the legal profession, and judges do not reflect the diversity of the broader communities or the clientele who are most likely to come before them? Metallic insists, and I agree, that all "powerful institutions ought to reflect the societies they serve" (Metallic quoted in Tutton 2016, n.p.). Those who often come before the courts and need legal representation—for example, Indigenous people, Black people, and other visible minorities—are least well represented in authority positions within the justice system and thus risk being viewed as illegitimate to those communities. The current debate over murdered and missing Indigenous women and police carding practices exemplify this risk (Griffith 2016; Cole 2015).

Conclusion

Debates over the meaning and significance of diversity have been animated within public and private institutions and public policy-making in Canada for

over a generation. Most stories of diversity are framed in terms of immigration but, in doing so, they tend to obscure existing Indigenous diversity and to reinscribe white settler colonial social imaginaries. This chapter has examined shifting conceptions of diversity, including a "diversity of diversities," super-diversity and hyper-diversity, and the implications of these terms for how we think about Canadian society and polity at the level of the city and the neighbourhood. This chapter has argued that these shifting conceptions of diversity reflect a lived reality in which Canadian society is undergoing a great and unprecedented social transformation. Canada is rapidly transforming from a predominantly white European social formation with a few major ethno-cultural groups to a predominantly non-white and Indigenous majority-minority society.

This chapter has examined the multiple and contested meanings and uses of diversity, super-diversity, and hyper-diversity in theory, policy, and practices across various sectors and institutions through three stories of diversity. It framed these three stories as "the good" or upside of diversity, "the bad" or downside of diversity, and "the ugly" or dead end of diversity evident in data on diversity practice. In the first story, I looked at the "diversity dividends" in economics, business, and management, and the studies that show how diversity leads to better decision-making and fuels creativity, innovation, and productivity. The research in this area also shows that the same dynamics that fuel the upside of diversity—for example, social friction, surprise, uncertainty, discomfort—also can inform the downside of diversity. In the second story of diversity I delved into the political and sociological research that associates diversity with mediocrity, misery, and declining social cohesion and civic engagement. The paradoxes of diversity are also evident in this story, including how the same dynamics fuelling super-diversity, entrepreneurship, and cultural innovations can also engender lower social trust, civic engagement, and political participation. The extent to which these diversity dynamics are new, or reflect age-old migration patterns, is open to contestation. What is new, however, is the great social transformation that has given rise to majority-minority social dynamics in Canadian cities and neighbours, and to an emergent Indigenous, non-white sociality in cities like Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Edmonton. The ways in which Canada navigates this novel dynamic will shape its future in the years to come.

The third and final story this chapter examined the ugly or dead ends of diversity, focusing on the disjuncture between words and deeds, rhetoric and policies, as evident in the lack of diversity among Canadian elites and within all of its governing institutions. In this third story I looked at diversity data with three illustrative examples—the corporate sector, the legal profession and the judiciary, and the police—pointing to the fact that these institutions

do not reflect the identity diversity of Canada, and the communities and clienteles that they serve. This third story also revealed a durable tendency across time and space: Despite diversity talk and the emergent super-diversity majority-minority dynamic, white normativity and varied processes of socio-cultural cloning endure, and thus reproduce a durable racial-ethnic pecking order among elites and within major governing institutions. I also argued that dividing practices—the tendency to include either women *or* racial and ethnic minorities *and* Indigenous peoples—and inattention to intersectional-ity have given rise to the phenomenon in which diversity practices that often only benefit white women and thus only diversify whiteness. Individually, and together, these three stories reflect the productive possibilities of diversity. At the same time, they reflect the profound limits of the concept of diversity and the multiple and contradictory work it is drawn upon to do. It may well be the case that the productive possibilities of diversity have exceeded the perfor-mative capacity of the concept.

Further Readings

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Henry, Frances, Enakshi Dua, Carl E. James, Audrey Kobayashi, Peter Li, Howard Ramos, and Malinda S. Smith. 2017. *The Equity Myth: Racializa-tion and Indigeneity at Canadian Universities*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Notes

1 Hong and Page also note that "identity diversity has been shown to correlate with functional diversity" but "we need to be acutely aware that identity-diverse groups often have more conflict, more problems with communication, and less mutual respect and trust among members" (2004, 16385–86). This is the thread that connects the "benefits of diversity" to the "downside of diversity" research of Robert Putnam (2007), but also the comfort thesis on why boards remain relatively homogeneous. Katherine W. Phillips (2014, n.p.) also notes that "social diversity in a group can cause discomfort, rougher interactions, a lack of trust, greater perceived interpersonal conflict, lower communications, less cohesion, more concern about disrespect, and other problems," making it appropriate to ask, "So what is the upside?"

2 Visible minority populations according to the Employment Equity Act and Statistics Canada include the following 10 groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese, and Korean (Statistics Canada 2010).

3 Black Lives Matter (BLM) in the United States was cofounded by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tomati in 2013 following the killing of Trayvon Martin and the acquittal of George Zimmerman who shot him. Since then the movement has expanded to a decentralized network of over 30 chapters. BLM has become an international social justice movement known on social media by the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. BLM Canada has various chapters, including in Toronto, Vancouver, and Edmonton. The BLM Toronto chapter was cofounded by Janaya Khan and Yusra Ali in October 2015 following the police killing of Jermaine Carby during a traffic stop.