**Introduction: The Quest for Lasting Power**

The Knesset seeks to bury us in legislation, and the court assumes roles that extend beyond its duty. The conduct of some of our authorities threatens more and more of our liberties and the governability of our elected officials. We have to quickly return the train of governability to its proper track – based on the definition of Israel as Jewish and democratic.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu is the longest-serving prime minister of Israel. Longevity in power is perhaps the feature most identified with Netanyahu. Nevertheless, loyalists from the right and adversaries from the left would both find it hard to say what Netanyahu’s regime actually stand for. The myth – and power – of the Netanyahu regime, which has dominated Israeli politics for the last two decades, transforming Israeli democracy beyond recognition, has yet to be deciphered. Brute force, opportunism, the will to power, tyranny of the majority – these are the kind of answers offered by the media, rival politicians and scholars to explain the driving force of Netanyahu’s government. Even the president of Israel, Reuven Rivlin, in a speech at the Knesset’s opening session in October 2017, referred to the Netanyahu government as generating an “everything is political” revolution:

Majority rule – is the only ruler… a reality where “everything is political” is developing. The media – political; the democratic institutions, all of them, from the professional bureaucracy to the state comptroller – political; the Supreme Court – political; the security forces – political. Is even the IDF, our defense force, political? All the country and its institutions – political. This revolution apparently attempts to tear, at last, the mask of hypocrisy from the gatekeepers. In this revolution, the ruler is also the victim. “We will show you what it really is” – that’s the voice of this revolution, there is no more statehood. After us, the deluge.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The sentiment of over-politicization, identified by the president – once a true-blue member of the right-wing camp – is correct. But every struggle for power is also a struggle over perceptions, ideas and worldviews. Beneath the will to power and the desire for pure, unrestrained control, an ideology emerges, a different vision of rule for the Jewish state. This ideology, translated into legislation and policies, is not just a different way to follow the rules of the game; it changes the rules of the game, and with it the democratic game itself.

This book offers a first ideological exposition of the makeup of Netanyahu’s right-wing governments in Israel, highlighting the profound transformation of the once-shared worldview that saw Israel as equally Jewish and democratic. The Netanyahu regime took Israeli society from a representative democracy, an egalitarian state with universal welfare and public education based on a collective Israeli identity, to a neoliberal Jewish state. Israel is perhaps a “start-up nation,” but it is also a fragmented, ethnically divided society with high child poverty rates. The Netanyahu regime has made the cornerstones of Israeli democracy – the judicial system, the civil service, the attorney general, the state comptroller, unions, the public media and the universities – into the people’s enemies. But in the name of what? What does ‘political’ stand for in this ‘everything is political’ revolution?

Two key concepts in understanding this transformation are *people* and *governability*, going back to basics – demos and kratia – the rule of the people. Yet these fundaments of democracy are precisely at the heart of the ideological change of the Netanyahu era: challenging both the concept of the Israeli state, and the balance between the people and the party system – particularly the ruling party and its leader. The ideal of an Israeli democracy has transformed into the majoritarian notion of the Jewish people. The system of a democratic regime with checks and balances is replaced by a government-centered notion of power and a preoccupation with governability and “eliminating the obstacles” – that is, weakening the judicial system, regulation, the public service, civil rights organizations, the media and other critics of the regime. This government is loath to interfere in the market, thus encouraging the private market to take over state functions, while eager to engage in promoting Judaism as a collective identity – the classic neoliberal/neoconservative contradictions of the new right.[[3]](#footnote-3) The main question is whether the Netanyahu regime merely offers an alternative, legitimate vision of Israeli democracy, or whether it undermines the democratic character of the sole democracy in the Middle East.

1. **How Ideas transform Political Reality: Telling a Manifold Story of Israeliness**

What ideology centers around the idea of the people? A clue as to Netanyahu’s own interpretation came from his campaign during the super-election year – four electoral systems within a few months from one another, 2019-2021. One theme dominated Netanyahu’s campaign: A League of His Own. Netanyahu, the only world-class statesman, the leader chosen by the Jewish people, the ‘magician’ of Israeli politics, savior of his people from nuclear extermination by Iran, was not portrayed in solitude in that league of his own: Netanyahu was not isolated, Israel was not isolated. On the contrary, despite the prophecy of his political rivals – former prime minister Ehud Barak, Zipi Livni and others – that warned time and again that ignoring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would lead Israel into full isolation – it is Netanyahu that re-opened Israel to the world. It is his regime which established connections bringing ‘peace from power’ as he framed already in his book ‘A Place under the Sun’ 25 years before the Abraham Accord. Netanyahu, in his self-narrated tale, has turned Israel into an empire, as a book title by the op ed editor of Israel Hayom read.[[4]](#footnote-4) skyscraper long billboards dominated the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv streets during the election year: Netanyahu and Trump; Netanyahu and Putin; Netanyahu and Modi. Indeed, in his list of ‘special relations’ Netanyahu has often taken pride in his world-class club: Trump, Bolsnaro, Modi, Orban were his favorite club mates and personal friends. What united these men, the exclusivist circle of world leaders, is their reinvention of their own people, the *Volk*, the nation, and the fact they were rightwing leaders that did not talk to the soft right and the median voter: they were unabashedly nationalists, hardcore right-wingers, putting the majority nation, the will of the people, at the core – against minorities, against multiculturalism, against immigrants, against human rights discourse, against liberal democracy. Whether it was Trump’s ‘Making America Great Again’, or Bolsenaro’s "Brazil above everything, God above everyone" or Orban’s illiberal democracy, they have taken the right positions to the extreme. The main concept was indeed the people. Their personal leadership, as they were directly chosen by the people, was positioned against the economic and intellectual elites who ruled the ‘deep state’ of the country. Popular democracy was antagonistic to the mediating institutions of liberal democracies – the courts, the NGOs, the opposition, the judicial system, the bureaucrats, the public media – those were all designated as enemies of the people persecuting the leader who was chosen by popular choice.

1. **Theorizing the People: Populism, Nationalism and Conservatism Revisited**

In terms of theory, the single most effective theory in explaining the phenomenon of the rise of these leaders, was the approach of populism.[[5]](#footnote-5) The themes of the people, the stress on the will of the people as expressed in elections, the distrust of the old elites and the bond between the leader and his people are all common themes shared by the autocratic club Netanyahu has associated himself with. However, among theorists there are disagreements about populism as an ideology. While some scholars argue populism is a movement, a sentiment or grassroots articulation of distrust towards the established system, the debate among analysts who take populism to be a worldview, was about it being a thin-centered ideology.

Cas Mudde, one of the world’s leading scholars on the subject of European populism defines populism as a thin-centered ideology, meaning “populism has a restricted morphology, which necessarily appears attached to—and sometimes is even assimilated into—existing ideological families.”[[6]](#footnote-6) Its thin core consists of three central ideas: the first is the contrast between the pure and good people and the corrupt and bad elites. The elites, according to populist ideology, serve their own private interests, while populist politics give voice to general interests, to the will of the people. The sovereignty of the people and majority rule are the essential building blocks of populism, as opposed to protection of minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers, which are the essential building blocks of liberal democracy. In other words, populism presumes antagonism between the people and the old ruling elite. The second fundamental idea of populism is authoritarianism, or what we may call “majoritarian democracy.” The majority is always the dominant nation, posing itself against internal and external minorities, and against the future (imagined?) danger of immigration. The third is nativism or autochthonism, the assumption that the people constitutes one hermetic unit into which one can only be born and which it is almost impossible to join, otherwise known as ethnic nationalism.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In the European context, Mudde analyzes the rise of illiberal democracy as a reaction to what he calls “non-democratic liberalism,” that is to say the establishment of the European Union, on the one hand, and the massive waves of immigration coming into Europe, on the other, which are perceived as threats to European states’ national sovereignty.[[8]](#footnote-8) If that is so, what then has spurred the growth of populism in Israel and in the United States? Illiberal democracy sprouts in opposition to what in Trump's America is called the “deep state,” or, as Netanyahu’s campaign manager, Erez Tadmor, posed the issue: “Why do the people vote to the right only to get a leftwing government?”[[9]](#footnote-9) The populists’ answer to this question is that the system itself, the public servants, those they call “officials”, the cultural, legal and intellectual elites – all have a tight hold over the state’s apparatus and are protecting them in the interest of what they call a “leftist agenda.” If Bennett and Shaked want to crush Hamas and restrain the Supreme Court, as their election slogans in 2019 claimed, they are only following in the footsteps of Netanyahu’s 2015 campaign when he issued a uniform denunciation of the “anyone-but-Bibi” crowd, which in his words included the Israeli broadcasting authority, journalists, union members, and Hamas terrorists.[[10]](#footnote-10) And what is the accusation against the media, the state officials, the judges, the academics? The accusation leveled against them is, in the words of the retiring Deputy Attorney General Avi Licht: “Who put you in charge?” You have not been elected, you are not legitimate or democratic, so who are you to make any decisions in the name of the people? You are working directly to maintain and preserve your own power and thus you must be branded, restrained, eliminated, and crushed under the wheels of popular choice.

To go back to the theoretical context: as a thin-centered ideology, populism is always in search of a host ideology to latch onto. It can feed of leftist ideology just as well as centrist, anti-Semitic, or rightwing ideology. However, Netanyahu’s club mates are stern leaders of a rightwing populism. But is it indeed a thin-centered ideology? Michael Freeden – author of the study of ideology through a morphology of the core and periphery concepts and the scholar who coined the concept of a thin-centered ideology, challenges Mudde’s characterization. Freeden argues, essentially, that populism is too thin even to be a thin-centered ideology.[[11]](#footnote-11) One central problem is with the host ideologies in which populism usually nests. For one, traditionalist conservatism in itself presents a problem of a weak core as it centers on objecting to change, preserving the historical social order, it is anti-progressive and adheres to nationalism.[[12]](#footnote-12) Indeed, the other ideology which populisms usually latches onto is nationalism – which is itself, according the Freeden, a thin-centered ideology. Nationalism is often defined by external political enemies whereas populism is looking for the enemy from within, or about to be from within – like immigrants.[[13]](#footnote-13) Populism compensates for this anti-progress anti-change anti-foreigner thin core by often building on contemporary crises – an economic crisis, immigration wave or court ruling which is being perceived as part of the core. Freeden does characterize the core of populism by ascribing three concepts to it: social monism – society as a cohesive body; defining a founding moment ‘we were here first’ idea; and the fear of change potentially caused by other groups.[[14]](#footnote-14) Freeden criticizes the elite-masses dichotomy proposed by Mudde and others as a core concept of populism, on the basis that the leader of the populist nation is himself part of an elite very foreign to those characteristic with which the masses are identified. This is a problematic critique as the study of ideology does not ask what is the real situation, but how is it presented through the ideology in question. Namely, the fact that Netanyahu is a son of a historian residing in Rehavia, the top neighborhood in Jerusalem, and owns a mansion in Caesarea and he is a millionaire, does not change the fact that the narrative that Netanyahu sells to the poor and disenfranchised people is that he is their authentic representative who is being persecuted by the media and the elites on their behalf. Especially in the deep-state argument context, Trump, Orban, Modi and Netanyahu are making use of the antagonism of the people to the rich abusive elites who control the state. At least in the ideology of these leaders, anti-elitism is an ineliminable core concept. Nevertheless, it is clear that populism emphasizes a monolithic concept of ‘the people’, and that the main claim of both Freeden and Mudde is that populism offers neither complex nor comprehensive enough answers to societal and political questions. Moreover, it is usually combined with reactionary ideologies like conservatism or nationalism which themselves refrain from a comprehensive outlook of state and society.

If populism, conservatism and nationalism are too thin ideologies to explain the rising phenomenon of these popular leaders, who view differently both the idea of the nation and the idea of democratic rule, are we as theoreticians at an impasse? Crucially, unlike the European extreme rightwing parties which are usually characterized as populist, we are dealing with ruling parties with a thick liberal-national ideology which undergo change. It is the changing ideology of the dominant right parties – reconceptualizing the idea of the people, the idea of democracy, the idea of liberalism and the very idea of the right as the ‘national camp’ itself – that are here at stake. Thus, the subject matter is the ideational transformation of the conceptual configuration of a ruling party and the government which it leads: how was the liberal tradition of the Herut (Liberty) party – ancestor of the Likud – maintained and changed? What was the effect of neoliberalism as an economic creed on the shifting ideas concerning political liberalism? How was the democratic tradition of the Likud reflected in the new image of the rule of the people and the idea of governability? What role played the anti-constitutional revolutionists of the conservative right in reshaping the balance between the executive and judicial systems? How did the political instinct of Netanyahu after 2009 – to rebuild the party system spectrum so as to reframe the traditionalists, religious and ultraorthodox parties as the Likud’s ‘natural partners’ – reshape the public discourse in terms of collective identity, the Jewish people and the ethnoreligious exclusionary robustness which therewith emerged? How did the import of American notions, like the distinction between liberal and conservative judges, transform the left-right axis of Israeli politics?

While the study of conceptual morphologies traditionally relies largely on speech acts – speeches, declarations, interviews – the subject matter of this research transcends ideas into actual changing realities, which in turn are also being reflected in a change of discourse. This exploration engages in delineating core and periphery concepts from diverse public arena which were central to imprinting systemic change. Methodologically, the corpus from which the conceptual building blocks are delineated transcends campaigns, speeches and rallies. In order to assess the emerging worldview of Netanyahu’s governments we analyze also new basic laws, changing constitutional blueprint, legislation, ministries’ programs, policy making and international agreements, all comprising the analytical corpus. Being a ruling party means having the ability to transform policies and realities – not just words and speech acts. The nexus of ideas and practices is the black box of politics. The contention of this book is that the worldview developed throughout Netanyahu’s rule, and especially over his 2015-2019 government, the pure rightwing government Israel has never had before – entailed structural changes in major public arena: from the balance between the parliamentary, judicial and executive branches to civic education, from a different paradigm in foreign policy to rewriting the national narrative and collective identity. The story unfolds in three major parts, analyzing very different arena of ideas-cum-structural changes. Each such arena is investigated through the relevant corpus associated with it, deciphering the core concepts and new ideational formations which operate and reassembled in the concluding chapter.

1. **The Structure of the Book**

The book has three parts. **The first part of the book** explores the changing ideas of Israel as Jewish and democratic. This was the consensus self-understanding of the majority of citizens well into the late 1990s, and witnessed an attitudinal change in the 21st century. The changing constitutional design – the changing concepts of nation and people, is enshrined in the blueprint of Israeli Basic Laws. In terms of ideological analysis – the transformation of a liberal-national creed, once it is being infused with nationalistic, neoliberal, neoconservative and populist themes – is at the center of the analysis. The balance between ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ is studied through three case studies.

**The first chapter** looks at the attempted immigration of African workers who entered Israel unlawfully – referred to as “illegal infiltrators” with double negation by Netanyahu and his ministers. The analysis centers on the policy flip-flop from the UN blueprint celebrated by Netanyahu as a breakthrough to a total rejection of any arrangement, succumbing to the ‘base’ and the pressure coming from social media. By way of introducing the three analytical levels of the book, I apply a threefold analysis to this case: the concept of Netanyahu’s rule, encapsulated in the term ‘governability’; the emerging image of the people, the Jewish people who must be protected from the infiltration of non-Zionist, non-Jewish, non-Israelis immigrants, the ultimate others; and the ideological tension between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, as exemplified in the policy battle in the Prime Minister’s Office regarding the illegal immigrants. Neoconservatism, translated in Israeli discourse into a robust ethnoreligious Jewish nationalism and a populist democracy, defines Netanyahu’s government – the Likud party and its “natural partners” (the religious and ultra-Orthodox parties) – as a radical right-wing coalition. Under the government’s populist neoconservative approach, the party system has realigned: Shas, United Torah Judaism and the Jewish Home, which used to be considered pivot parties that could partner with either leftist or rightist coalitions and remain neutral – have closed ranks with the deep right. This realignment serves as a foundation for Netanyahu’s continued hold on to power.

**The second chapter** centers on the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, the “law of all laws” as the joint committee that drafted the legislation often referred to it. The new basic law, enacted in 2018, does much more than just state a historical fact. It involved a vehement struggle over the definition and character of the State of Israel. In particular, this struggle came to fore in the debate over adding an equality clause affirming that Israel is not only the nation-state of the Jewish people, but also a democracy that extends equal rights to all its citizens. (Netanyahu’s coalition won the battle against adding the equality clause.) Likewise, a fierce debate raged on whether to stipulate in the law (or at least in its preamble) that Israel is both Jewish and democratic, as noted in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). The Nation Law is perhaps the most significant achievement of the 2015-9 Netanyahu government. It symbolizes the reaction to what his ministers have called ‘the constitutional revolution’ in terms of redrawing the balance between the liberal-democratic creed and the national-conservative one over the last decade. The corpus in this chapter are the different proposals of the National Law forwarded by different parties and the protocols of the special committee which was established in the Knesset to discuss it. The Nation-State Law transformed the constitutional design of the state of Israel. Ultimately, can a state in which collective rights are equal, or superior, to individual rights be classified as a democracy? Was this the real goal of the legislatures, or merely redrawing the balance, between the bill of rights and the national law, the chapter asks.

**The third chapter** exposes this constitutional revolution as an anti-court revolt against the Supreme Court in Israel. The actors behind this national revolution are seldom in the spotlight: the think tanks of the settlers’ camp, including the Institute for Zionist Strategies and the national-conservative Kohelet Policy Forum. It is important to emphasize that it was far from just a legalistic revolution; it was a struggle over the character of the state of Israel, redrawing the balance between the Jewish and democratic components, essentially putting the former above the latter. The corpus for this chapter consists in the expert opinion and policy papers which were part of the Nation-State Law committee. The battle between the experts, the branding of the experts and their relation to the MKs was not contained in the change of the basic law and the constitutional design. The chapter demonstrates how the national-conservative philosophy, shaped by the same people, radically transformed the arena of civic education in Israel. The debate over the national vs. democratic features of citizenship education, and the clear victory of the national ethnoreligious agenda, demonstrates the pervasive impact of this radical philosophy of Zionist nationalism on the socialization of the future citizens of Israel. National identity in the making.

**The second part of the book** centers on the national-conservative right as a ruling ideology, devoted to its cluster of concepts shaping the idea of governability, thus taking the idea of “the people” a step further. It examines the concept of governability and the framing of the civil service as ‘the rule of the bureaucrats’ examining the war of the government against the professional ranks and the relations between the executive, legislative and judicial branches in Netanyahu’s regime. **The fourth chapter** discusses two facets of loyalty, analyzing citizenship laws and the cultural reconstruction of the Jewish narrative under Netanyahu’s most loyal minister, Miri Regev. Her way of reinventing the national story is interwoven to a new concept of governability: structural changes in policy direction and a new configuration of popular culture as worthy of governmental funding. The corpus here is composed both from an analysis of the 70th anniversary ceremony, narrated and produced by the minister, and the policy decisions in terms of culture funding, transformed by Regev. **The fifth chapter** develops further the analysis of governability and the centrality of the concept of loyalty to it, by addressing what Yariv Levin and Ayelet Shaked, the ideological spearheads in Netanyahu’s government, call “the tyranny of attorneys” to justify their attack against the old elites, the judicial system and the civil service. Four major proposals are the methodological backbone of this chapter: The Legal Advisors Law, described as supreme justices as a real danger to Israel’s democratic rule; the civil service code, asking loyalty to whom do the government workers owe: the minister or the public; and the attempts to change the mechanism of appointing judges. Finally, the war waged against the officials of the finance ministry under the Covid-19 economic policy exemplifies the tensed relations between the political and bureaucratic ranks, asking whether professionalism is no longer an option for civil service in Israel.

**The sixth chapter** tells a manifold story of the central battle of the Netanyahu government – the one against the supreme court and its reliance on the bill of rights – the two basic laws which enshrine human freedom and dignity in Israeli constitution. The chapter explicates the long struggle of the ultraorthodox, the settlers and the anti-immigrationists to demonstrate the longevity of this power struggle. It then analyzes the anti-constitutional revolution of Netanyahu’s ministers, long before he himself joined forces and unleashed his personal rage against the judicial system, as part of his deep state argument in the context of his trial. The battle of Netanyahu’s coalition for enacting an “override clause” is explicated, using the different legislation proposals and the ever more extreme demands for a greater majority of the supreme court judges, the ever-smaller majority required from the Knesset and the ways to restrict the supreme court from ruling on basic laws and major issues on the political agenda.

**The third part of the book** explores the tensions within the right-wing camp between two sister-ideologies within the rightwing family – neoliberalism and neoconservatism, outlined already in King’s study of the Thatcher government in the UK.[[15]](#footnote-15) **Chapter seven** analyzes the case of the Arabs – on the one hand, the Arab Israel citizens were portrayed as a fifth column, as stealing elections and as terror-supporting extreme Islamists, based on neoconservative analysis. On the other hand, the Netanyahu government has forwarded the most extensive and comprehensive economic program for the Arab society. The electoral campaigns and the fundaments of the economic 922 program are analyzed. **Chapter eight** looks at the Abraham accord and the Trump-Netanyahu deal of the century through the tension between an economic approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a neoconservative quasi-religious approach. The chapter analyzes the speeches of the world leaders which Netanyahu sees as his personal friends and co-leaders, and asks whether a new paradigm is emerging from Netanyahu’s leadership, and the toll it may take in terms of radicalization, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. **The final chapter, chapter nine,** analyzes Netanyahu’s relations with the media. I examine the love-hate relationship between Netanyahu and the media, how Netanyahu portrays himself as the sole representative of the Jewish people while the media is the enemy of the people. I then analyze systemically seven strategies used by Netanyahu to create what he calls ‘media of his own’, from the complex relations with the media-owning tycoons and his attempts to control the appointments of CEOs and chief editors, to his tactics in infiltrating public news channels and his initiation of TV, radio, print and internet news outlets which are loyal to him. Netanyahu is using legislation and regulation to materialize his vision of a Fox news like Israeli media conglomerate under his control. The chapter is based on the investigative reports of journalists as well as on the recorded conversations put as evidence in his trial. It concludes with reading the indictment of Netanyahu’s trial and the charges against him of fraud, breach of trust and bribery as charges against his attempt to gain control over the news media in Israel. **The concluding discussion** assembles the core concepts from the three clusters of the book – Jewishness, governability and the neoliberal-neoconservative tension to outline the conceptual configuration of the national-conservative Netanyahu government. It analyzes the ideological realignment and conceptual change of collective identity as tools in realizing structural changes in Israeli society and assesses Netanyahu’s legacy and its influence on Israeli democracy. Far from being a thin-centered ideology, it is a ruling ideology of the dominant party and the rightwing government which is at the center of this study. How it defines the public sphere, collective identity, the friends and foes, the institutional arena, the relations of the political and professional ranks, the public media – become reality-changing cases of an ideology which strives to change not just the concept of democracy, but the rules of the national – and democratic – game itself.

1. Ayelet Shaked, "The Path to Democracy and Government," *Ha-Shiloah* (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The 263th Meeting of the 20th Knesset, *Speech from the President of the State of Israel for the Opening of the 4th Seating of the 20th Knesset*, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Desmond King, *The New Right: Politics, Markets & Citizenship* (London: Macmillan, 1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Akiva Bigman, *How Netanyahu Turned Israel into an Empire* (Tel Aviv: Sela Meir, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See for example - Bruno Araújo and Hélder Prior, "Framing Political Populism: The Role of Media in Framing the Election of Jair Bolsonaro," *Journalism Practice* 15, no. 2 (2021); Michael Kazin, "Trump and American Populism: Old Whine, New Bottles," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 6 (2016); Prabhash Ranjan to EJIL: Talk!, September 24, 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/narendra-modis-nationalist-populism-in-india-and-international-law/. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Erez Tadmor, *Why Do You Vote 'Right' and Get 'Left'?* (Israel: Sela Meir, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ? [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Michael Freeden, "After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22, no. 1 (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ideologies and Political Theories: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 332-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. . [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid., 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. King. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)