# Introduction

In January 1952, after a three-and-a-half-month trial, the Tel Aviv District Court issued its verdict in the case brought by the State of Israel against Holocaust survivor Yechezkiel Jungster*.* Referring to the defendant, whose wife and children had been murdered by the Germans, the lead judge, Pinchas Avishar, declared that Jungster “had turned himself into a tool in the hands of the barbaric Nazi regime in its plan to annihilate the Jewish people.” Jungster, the court determined, had been a Jewish collaborator with the Nazis.[[1]](#endnote-1)

Onlookers who saw the defendant seated in the dock must have viewed with disbelief the portrayal of Jungster as barbaric. Jungster, 41, had lost his left leg, his right leg was rotting away, one of his kidneys had been removed, and his blood pressure was 240, all as the result of Buerger’s disease. The panel of three judges, however, stated that when Jungster served in 1943–1944 as a kapo in the Grodziszcze and Faulbrück camps in western Poland, he had been a “heavily built person […], dressed in a leather jacket, shod in boots, who walked about with a rubber-coated metal-wire rod in his hand, beating at whim anyone who crossed his path.” He administered most of the blows, aimed also at reproductive organs, with no Nazi in sight.[[2]](#endnote-2)

The case of Jungster was just one of about forty so-called ‘kapo trials’ that took place in Israel between 1950 and 1972. In these trials, that are the focus of this book, ghetto and camp functionaries, such as policemen and barrack supervisors, faced indictments for their behavior during the Holocaust. Israeli prosecutors accused them of having collaborated with the Nazis in assaulting Jews, inflicting on them grievous harm, blackmailing and surrendering a persecuted person, membership in an enemy organizations, murdering of prisoners and even war crimes and crimes against humanity.[[3]](#endnote-3) And in two-thirds of the cases, the courts sided with the prosecution, with all but one of those convicted serving time behind bars for an average of twenty-six months.

This book asks What motivated these trials against Jews accused of collaboration in the first place? How did the judicial and social treatment of collaborators change over time? How did the kapo trials help shape and were shaped by the two central Holocaust trials of this period, the Eichmann and Kastner trials? Were Jewish and non-Jewish collaborators viewed as equally culpable? How did the meaning of collaboration change from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s? And finally, what implications has the suppression of these stories had on contemporary memory of the Holocaust?

In contemporary culture which views all Holocaust survivors as heroes the idea that a victim behaved in a questionable manner sounds inconceivable. This view, however, was not the dominant one for the first twenty years following the end of the Second World War when many viewed the victims as a whole and especially those who served in leadership positions, such as, members of the Jewish council, Jewish police or kapos, as sharing responsibility with the Germans for the catastrophe that befell them. Through a focus on the kapo trials and their development this book traces the changing attitude towards those accused of collaboration to a point where today there is hardly any public recollection of Jewish functionaries who served under the Nazis. This obliteration from memory of these functionaries, I believe, allowed the rise of the simplistic view of all victims as heroes.

When Allied Forces broke open concentration camp gates in 1945, they discovered inside not only piles of corpses and dozens of gravely ill inmates but also revenge seeking victims. Many of the freed sought payback not only from the Germans but also from former Jewish functionaries in camps and ghettos. The freed lynched and beat Jews who had surrendered or harassed them and their family members.

This violence carried over to life outside the camps. To quell brutality, heads of the Jewish communities in towns and DP camps channeled the disputes into honor courts, institutions established to resolve disagreements among members of the community. These courts, made up of recognized individuals, examined the moral behavior of functionaries and issued social punishments such as public denunciations and excommunication from the community. In most instances, these social judgements succeeded in curbing the violence within the community and also helped rebuild its identity as a purified society.

With survivors’ immigration to Israel, the clashes experienced in Europe also erupted in public spaces in Mandatory-Palestine. There, in some instances, like in honor courts in Europe, *Landsmanschafts* (communal organization of expatriates from either a specific city or country) and the Zionist Congress Honor Court weighed in on accusations against functionaries. But these institutions could hardly address the many dozens of disputes that erupted between survivors. To resolve the tensions, media commentators and public figures called upon the heads of the Yishuv (The Jewish community in Mandatory-Palestine) to establish a public committee of socially prominent figures to deliberate these cases. Yet the leadership failed to establish such public committees that would issue social punishments, which the leadership found to be not severe enough for those whom it believed had supported the Nazi’s mission of annihilating the Jewish people.

Only with the establishment of the State of Israel and after repeated demands from the heads of the police, did the ministry of justice in the early 1950 bring to the Knesset’s approval the Nazi and Nazis Collaborators (Punishment) Law, a bill aimed to try functionaries and harshly punish them. Israel’s legislators determined that functionaries would face their accusers in criminal courts. This legislation allowed the opening of the kapo trials that came before courts for the next twenty-two years.

Over those years, the kapo trials had gone through four main phases from an initial perception of functionaries as equal to Nazis to a final view of them as Jewish victims. The first phase (August 1950-January 1952) of viewing **functionaries like Nazis**, presented uncompromising treatment of alleged collaborators. Israeli legislators and prosecutors fervently sought retribution from these Jews whom they viewed as partners with the Nazis in their crimes against European Jewry. Knesset Members formulated the law so as to draw no distinction between Nazis and their Jewish collaborators. The law treated both equally as “a person,” neglecting to account to the antithetical worlds in which a Jew and a German lived. Only in the sentencing phase did the law take account of functionaries’ position as victims, allowing in very limited cases some leniency.

Like legislators, prosecutors too viewed anyone who had taken a position under the Nazis as guilty unless proven innocent. In their indictments and court arguments they treated Jewish functionaries as equal in their actions to Nazis. Prosecutors charged almost each and every defendant, even one who had merely beaten one camp inmate, with the offense of ‘crimes against humanity.’ When judges expressed the opinion that ‘crimes against humanity’ fit only for actions taken against a mass, prosecutors frequently replaced the count of ‘crimes against humanity’ with the count of ‘war crimes,’ that was also punishable with death, equating in this the functionaries to Nazi war criminals. In the first year and a half of the kapo trials district courts sentenced those convicted to an average of close to five years of imprisonment and in the case of Yechezkiel Jungster, which opened this book, they issued the only death penalty in these trials.

The second phase (February 1952-1957), which cast **functionaries not as Nazis but as Nazi collaborators**, followed the District Court issuing of Jungster’s death penalty and the Supreme Court’s 1952 overturning of it. After the issuance of the death penalty, the prosecutors rushed to change all indictments that included counts that could result with a death penalty and almost never again used the counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Jewish functionaries. The Supreme Court’s overturning of Jungster’s death verdict, adopted the new line prosecutors drew between Nazis and their Jewish collaborators: the former could face charges of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes,’ the later could not. In all other respects, the justice system continued to view the functionaries as one and equal to the Nazis and their trials continued unabated.

Yet, outside the courtrooms first doubts emerged if one should prosecute functionaries. In the theater and media artists and journalists asked if it was possible to judge “those who were there.” The case of Dr. Rudolph Kastner, the head of the Budapest Rescue Committee, emboldened those doubts that did not yet result in any policy change. Survivors from the Hungarian Jewish community accused Kastner that he had collaborated with Adolf Eichmann in deceiving half a million Jews to unsuspiciously board trains that shipped them to Auschwitz. In exchange for his collaboration in the Hungarian Jewish community, they accused, the Nazis helped Kastner save his family members and cronies. In a trial that opened in 1954, which was *not* one of the kapo trials, Attorney General Haim Cohn sued journalist Malkiel Gruenwald for defaming Kastner when he published those accusations. In a trial, in which Kastner turned out to be the de-facto defendant, the court concluded that Kastner “had sold his soul to the devil,” that he had collaborated with Eichmann and his associates in surrendering Jews. In summation of his arguments, which the court did not heed, Cohn expressed skepticism about the court’s ability to judge those who acted in the Holocaust, stating that “this is a matter between them and heaven.” Cohn, however, did not extend this doubt from the Kastner defamation case to the kapo trials. While he questioned the ability to assess Kastner’s behavior, he still believed in the court’s ability to weigh the motivations and actions of functionaries.

In the third stage (1958-1962), the legal system viewed most **functionaries as men and women who had acted badly but with good intentions**. The Supreme Court Kastner verdict, Cohn held, indicated that a person could have legitimately taken negative actions, including ones of surrendering hiding places, because he believed that sustaining his good relations with the Nazis would enable him in the future to save Jews. Even if he was wrong in his choice, the court determined, one could not judge him for that. As a result of this understanding, Cohn redrew the course of the Attorney General’s Office policy of indicting functionaries, ordering in one case prosecutors to withdraw an indictment. From here and on the prosecution filed charges only against functionaries it believed had aligned themselves with the Nazis’ aims. In this period also some survivors had come to believe that it was time to place past controversies aside and continue life. Others still called to place alleged collaborators on trial.

The Eichmann trial and the result of a trial that followed it, the Barenblat trial, marked a shift to the fourth and final stage (1963-1972). In this phase the legal system viewed **functionaries as ordinary victims**, a change in view that signaled a full reversal from the initial view of functionaries as guilty unless proven innocent to seeing them as innocent unless proven guilty. One of several goal that Eichmann’s prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, had in this trial was to remove the image of collaborators from kapos and policemen. In his selection of witnesses for the Eichmann trial, he portrayed functionaries as harmless in their treatment of Jews and in some instances even as heroic. The prosecution created a stark distinction between Jews, including functionaries, who were portrayed as pure in contrast to the evil Nazis. The image of those who in the terms of Primo Levi lived in the ‘gray zone’ – discussed below in detail – those who were victims and at times acted in ways that benefited the perpetrator, vanished.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Eichmann trial, a young and ambitious Israeli prosecutor, David Libai temporarily challenged the new view of functionaries as innocent. With the retirement of Hausner and the change of policy in the attorney general office, Libai, filed an indictment against the former head of the Jewish police in the Polish town Bedzin, Hirsch Barenblat. The indictment included one unprecedented count, hardly ever deliberated in an Israeli court, that charged Barenblat with membership in a hostile organization “one of whose aims was to assist in carrying out actions of an enemy administration against persecuted people.” Conviction of Barenblat on this count would result with the justice system viewing anyone who had joined the Jewish council or police, regardless of their intent or actions, as guilty of *aiming*to assist the Nazis. Libai hoped that like Hausner had utilized the Eichmann trial to prosecute the entire Nazi regime, so too would he use the trial of Barenblat to attain a conviction of the entire Jewish leadership in the councils and the police.

Half way through the trial, however, Libai’s superiors in the ministry of justice ordered him to remove this count from the indictment. After the Tel Aviv District Court issued a guilty verdict against Barenblat on other counts, the case arrived before the Supreme Court. In their verdict the justices indicated the prosecution was wrong to indict Barenblat with a count of membership in a hostile organization. Justice Moshe Landau, who headed the panel that tried Eichmann, determined that it was hypocritical to judge the functionaries, those ordinary men and women who lived in a morally upside world, by a standard of those living in safety in Israel. The functionaries had taken their positions not with the “aim” to progress the goals of the persecutors but to save their skin and that of their kin. That was the case also with Barenblat whom the court cleared of all counts.

Yet, the highest court in the land continued to hold that in cases in which functionaries acted in “sadistic” or “monstrous” fashion they should face trial. In the view of the court, in extreme cases victim’s actions can face legal scrutiny, as indeed occurred in a 1972 case against a women accused of cruelly treating inmates. With that legal procedure the kapo trials had come to an end.

This book will focus, on one level, on those in Israel’s judicial system who investigated, prosecuted, and judged these functionaries. I will demonstrate how Israel’s legal authorities changed their view of these men and women from one that saw them as equal to Nazis to one that almost completely exonerated them from blame for any questionable action. On a second level, I present the drama that took place within the courtroom confines where survivors accounts were pitted against each other. In a handful of cases I either endorse or oppose a court’s ruling. Courts have a duty to carefully follow the letter of the law and weigh each piece of evidence in front of them, but I as a historian can evaluate the actions of protagonists in a more circumstantial and contextual manner as well as with evidence that the court did not have in front of it.

While the book follows the development of the entire set of trials it focuses more attention on eight out of the forty trials. I choose these eight cases for two reasons. First, some of them mark important points in the development of the entire set of trials. Thus the case of Julius Siegel (1952-1953) helps highlight the form of justice conducted against functionaries in both Jewish honor courts in Europe and in Israeli courts; the case against Andrj Banik (1951), the only non-Jew tried in the kapo trials, is the first of the kapo trials to take place in Israel; The case of Yechzkiel Jungster (1951-1952) resulted with marking of Jewish collaborators as distinguished from Nazis in being not punishable with death; The Barenblat trial (1963) points to judicial system’s adoption of the view that judging ordinary men who chose to take positions so as to save their skin is impossible and inappropriate.

A second consideration of mine in selecting these cases was the moral issues they present to judges issuing verdicts. Some of the cases resulted with a resolute guilty verdict (Elsa Trenk [1951], Jungster and Honigman [1951-1952]). Two other cases resulted with acquittal. Yet these acquittals were very different in nature. The case of Raya Hanes (1951-1952) highlights the complexity of serving as a kapo in a death camp, trying to do right but forced at the same time to act in seemingly harsh ways. Her case presents an image who sophisticatedly managed to maneuver between the Nazis malicious intents and her goal of saving humans, a position hardly understood by many of the inmates she oversaw. The acquittal of Pinchas Pashititzky (1951-1952) presents a case where the court cleared the defendant but placed a moral blot on his choices and actions in a labor camp. Taken together these eight cases present the complexity of assessing the moral behaviors of these men and women.

Initially, when I began to pore over the thousands of pages of protocols of these trials, I had a hard time deciding about the appropriateness of prosecuting these alleged-collaborators. At first I asked myself, How could one judge those who had gone through hell on earth, men and women who had lost their entire families, experienced unimaginable hunger, and lived under harsh oppression, striving only to survive? Why had Israeli prosecutors indicted these survivors? Was this part of the dominant culture in the 1950s that accused the victims of “going like sheep to the slaughter,” hinting in this expression that diaspora Jews had taken part in their own annihilation? In these indictments, I believed then, the State of Israel had failed miserably. In its search for scapegoats to blame for the catastrophe, it had done ill to innocent survivors.

Then I began reading the harsh stories recounted by survivors in the courtrooms and my view swung to the opposite side. One witness described how, in 1942, the commander of the Jewish police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst) entered the town orphanage, climbed to the attic and uncovered dozens of pale children, dragged them down the stairs, and handed them over to the Nazis to be transported to Auschwitz. Was this not an act that deserved punishment? I wondered.[[4]](#endnote-4) Or the testimony of a former camp prisoner who saw her cousin collapse in the barrack, rushed out to get water, only to be blocked upon her return by a Jewish kapo who cursed her, grabbed the bowl of water, poured it out, picked up a stick, and beat the prisoner. Yes, I thought, it was the Nazis who had put these women in the inhuman conditions of the camp, but did this status of victimhood permit the kapo to beat this inmate and many others so viciously? How, with no German in sight, could one justify such pointless violence of one human toward another?[[5]](#endnote-5)

In considering these cases, I swung back and forth, from viewing these inmates as innocent scapegoats to seeing them as criminals. It was Primo Levi’s seminal essay on the gray zone that first laid out before me the unresolvable tension between the victims’ perceived guilt and the inability to judge them. According to the Italian-born survivor, “The condition of the offended does not exclude culpability, which is often objectively serious, but I know of no human tribunal to which one could delegate the judgment.”[[6]](#endnote-6)

Oppression, he holds, does not sanctify victims. Functionaries, not minor ones such as lice checkers or messengers but rather kapos who frequently used violence, served, in Levi’s words, as “collaborators” and are “rightful owners of a quota of guilt.”[[7]](#endnote-7) Yet, he went on, there is no legal tribunal capable of judging them and issuing any final judgment of them. “I believe that no one is authorized to judge them, not those who lived through the experience of the Lager and even less those who did not.”[[8]](#endnote-8)

One scholar, Adam Brown, explains that Levi believes that one must suspend judgment of those functionaries. Those who did not experience the exhaustion, the hunger, the fatigue, and the humiliation that resulted in “the death of the soul” cannot judge those who took on positions as functionaries (and even those who did cannot judge them).[[9]](#endnote-9) Yet, suspending judgment, continues Brown, does not mean that it is not important to attempt to evaluate their actions whiles not coming to any conclusive statement. The gray zone between perpetrator and oppressed, Levi writes, is filled “with obscene or pathetic figures (sometimes they possess both qualities simultaneously) whom it is indispensable to know if we want to know the human species.”[[10]](#endnote-10) We must study these functionaries, those whom Levi—despite contending that one cannot judge—constantly describes as those who “collaborated” and as “sadists,” individuals “fatally intoxicated by the power” who “committed atrocities.” [[11]](#endnote-11) At the same time that we assess their behavior, we must always remember that these kapos were indeed *victims* of the Nazi perpetrators who placed them in an inverted moral world.

Levi published his essay about the gray zone in the early 1980s. Prior to his publication, he expressed the view that “it is very hard indeed to judge. … But they should be judged….”[[12]](#endnote-12) And so too thought the Israeli Knesset when in the summer of 1950 it legislated the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law. The primary intention in establishing this law was to judge “the Nazis assistants,” those survivors who had allegedly collaborated with the Nazis.[[13]](#endnote-13) In the view of some Israeli legislators, these Jewish men and women who would face trial had served as “murderers and betrayers,” “collaborators,” and “war criminals.” Here in the Knesset legislation and in the kapo trials to come there was no place for the gray zone, only for verdicts of guilty or innocent.[[14]](#endnote-14)

While my aim in this book is to unpack the historical development of the kapo trials, I believe it is important that I spell out my view about the appropriateness in the context of the 1950s and 60s of placing these individuals in front of a court to weigh their behavior. On the one hand, the social unrest within the community of Holocaust survivors in this period required that Israeli authorities channel these accusations into a system that would help resolve the disputes and minimize violence. While as pointed out above this was not an ideal solution, judging suspects successfully curtailed the violence between survivors.

On the other hand, I view the choice of the heads of the Israeli judicial system to try these former functionaries in the criminal system as mistaken. The criminal system cannot judge events that occur in a world that exists outside its realm of imagination nor one that the law is unable to capture. In addition, a system whose primary means of punishment is incarceration seems to me unfit to punish traumatized victims who for years lived behind concentration camp fences. In sending them to jail the State of Israel executed its power on a group of vulnerable and weak, whose sitting behind bars did not serve in any way to protect Israeli society.

Rather, I believe that in these unique cases of Jewish functionaries during the Holocaust, the authorities should have accepted the proposition of establishing communal courts that would have issued social judgments. These committees could have addressed alleged crimes as they aroused in testimonies and they would not be limited by a list of offenses that appeared on an indictment or to judging these actions against a specific choice of words in the law. Instead the committees would weigh the actions against a broader moral code established by its members who would constitute of survivors. These committees could also issue social judgement from verbal condemnation to social excommunication. In the end, however, for over twenty years the State of Israel and its institutions choose to execute their full power against these individuals, trials that embody a hardly discussed aspect of the Holocaust.[[15]](#endnote-15)

In addition to examining the trials and their legitimacy this book also examines the changes in Israeli society’s views and treatment of alleged collaborators. In the 1950s, Israeli society had taken a negative view of survivors in general and an especially vindictive approach towards the leaders of the Jewish communities and those who took positions of responsibility in the ghettos and camps. Israelis commonly viewed the latter as a group that had acted relentlessly in favor of the Nazis and their scheme of persecuting the Jews. Following the Kastner and Eichmann trial, and especially the 1963 Barenblat trial, this view shifted radically to one that sees all victims, including those who had been just years earlier viewed as betrayers of the nation, as victims and heroes. Israeli leaders and laypeople could no longer imagine the possibility demonstrated in the kapo trials that any Jew had without Nazis in sight beaten, let alone murdered, one of their brethren.

Israeli society has moved from one extreme view to another, from complete guilt to total vindication, a shift that I believe indicates a lack of understanding of the position of a ‘victim’ in the Holocaust. In these two extreme views, observers have eliminated the possibility of a person simultaneously serving as a functionary and being a victim or alternatively of being a victim who behaves in a hurtful and merciless manner. Being a victim does not position a person in a morally superior position, as being a kapo does not mandate that she be viewed as cruel. The cases that unfolded in the kapo trials demonstrate the complexity of the position of victims, a complicated stance that Jewish society must comprehend if it wishes to truly come closer to understanding and overcoming the Holocaust.[[16]](#endnote-16)

1. **Introduction**

 Verdict, *Attorney General v. Yechezkiel Jungster*, *Piske Din*, vol. 5, 9/51, 165. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Verdict, *Attorney General v. Yechezkiel Jungster*, *Piske Din*, vol. 5, 9/51, 157. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/nazis%20and%20nazi%20collaborators%20-punishment-%20law-%20571.aspx> (last accessed December 12, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Testimony of Avraham Fischel, July 4, 1963, *Attorney General v. Hirsch Barenblat*, Israel National Archives (hereafter ISA), Record Group (hereafter RG) /32/LAW/15/63, pp. 79–80. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Testimony of Malka Goldstein, November 27, 1951, *Attorney General v. Elsa Trenk*, ISA, RG/32/LAW/2/52, p. 35. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Vintage, 1989)*,* 44. In his coining of the term “choiceless choices,” Lawrence Langer seems to take a stronger view than Levi about victims’ inability to act in a moral manner in what he defined as a non-moral world. See: *Versions of Survival,* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 72–75. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Levi, *The Drowned,* 44–45, 49. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Levi, *The Drowned,* 59. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Adam Brown, *Judging Privileged Jews: Holocaust Ethics, Representation, and the ‘Gray Zone,’* 15–16. Levi proposes this suspension in regard to the *Sonderkommando*. See, Levi, *The Drowned*, 59–60.See also, René Wolf, “Judgement in the Grey Zone: The Third Auschwitz (*Kapo*) Trial in Frankfurt 1968,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 9(4) (2007) 617; Susan Pentlin, “Holocaust Victims of Privilege,” in *Problems Unique to the Holocaust*, ed. Harry James Cargas (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 26, 39; Sander H. Lee, “Primo Levi’s Gray Zone: Implications for Post-Holocaust Ethics,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 30(2) (Fall 2016) 277–278, 280. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Levi, *The Drowned,* 40. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Levi, *The Drowned*, 40, 43, 46, 47. Brown, *Judging “Privileged” Jews,* 48. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Giuseppe Grassano, “A Conversation with Primo Levi (1979),” in *The Voice of Memory – Interviews 1961-1987,* eds. Marco Belpoliti and Robert Gordon (New York: The New Press, 2001), 132. While in this interview Levi brings German political prisoners as an example for those who need to be judged, his statement is general and in my mind there is no reason to believe that he excludes Jewish functionaries from this requirement of judgement. In his essay *The Gray Zone* he explicitly says of the action of a specific SS man that “it is enough… to place him too, although at its extreme boundary, within the gray brand….” (58). See also Brown, *Judging* “*Privileged” Jews*, 58. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. The official translation of the name of the law into English is Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law. Yet, the more accurate translation from Hebrew of the words “*ozrei ha-Nazim*” at the end of the law’s title is “Nazis’ assistants” or “Nazis’ helpers.” [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Knesset Member Mordechai Nurock, *Divrei ha-Knesset*, November 29, 1951, 187; *Maariv*, June 22, 1949. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. This view that sees preference to social over criminal judgment draws from the view of Lawrence

Douglas who argues that atrocity trials should be viewed as didactic trials. See Lawrence Douglas, ”Crimes of Atrocity, the Problem of Punishment and the Situ of Law,” in: Predrag Dojčinović (ed.), *Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law – From Speaker’s Corner to War Crimes* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 281-283. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. On the complexities of viewing the Holocaust in moral terms see, Langer, *Voices of Survival* [↑](#endnote-ref-16)