BEN- GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

THE FACULTY OF HUMINITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

**THE IMPACT OF THE LABEL 'FEMINIST' ON ATTITUDES**

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE (M.A)

MORAN DANGOOR

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF: DR. YOAV BAR-ANAN

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Signature of student: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Signature of chairperson of the

Committee for graduate studies: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Abstract

Social identity is a self-view that emerges from the reflexive activity of self-categorization or identification in terms of membership groups or roles. Social identity often shapes people’s attitudes and ideologies. People tend to confirm with what they perceive as the normative attitude in their social group. In the present research, I tested whether people avoid endorsing attitudes that they perceive as the normative attitude of the undesired social identity. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that in order to distance themselves from the undesired feminist identity, people express non-feminist attitudes. In two experiment, participants completed a feminist attitudes questionnaire after a manipulation that either framed these attitudes as related to the feminist identity, or without that manipulation. In Experiment 1 (*N*=1,006), the manipulation made the feminist identity salient by asking participants before the questionnaire whether they identify as feminists. In Experiment 2 (*N* = 978), the manipulation directly presented the questionnaire as measuring feminist attitudes (or not). I expected that framing the attitudes as feminist would decrease self-reported endorsement of those attitudes among people who do not identify as feminists and would increase self-reported endorsement among self-identified feminists. In contrast to my hypothesis, in both experiments, the salience of feminist identity did not influence feminist attitudes.

These results might suggest that people's attitudes on feminist matters are too strong to change only out of desire to avoid the feminist label. On the other hand, these conclusions are limited by my samples' overall Liberal orientation which might have made it difficult to detect the effect of avoidance of feminist identity. Perhaps pre-selection of non-feminist would find the hypothesized effect.

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People hold diverse perceptions and ideas about themselves, all of which contribute to the formation of an identity – a self-view that emerges from the reflexive activity of self-categorization or identification in terms of membership groups or roles (Stets & Burke, 2000). One's identity and group membership are main factors that shape attitudes and ideologies (Diehl, 1990; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014; Tajfel, 1982; Terry & Hogg, 2000). People tend to hold attitudes similar to those held by other members of their group – for instance, with people of the same gender (Jones et al., 2000; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), race (Katz, 2013; Lewis, 2003), age (Czaja & Sharit, 1998), and nationality (Henderson et al., 2015; Sherif, 2015). When the group is ideology-based (e.g., political) it is reasonable to assume that attitudes come before group membership (e.g., people must adopt Liberal attitudes before they declare themselves Liberal). In reality however, political ideology might operate similarly to other social categories, influencing attitudes rather than being “chosen” based on the person’s attitudes (Campbell, 1980; Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1989). Like with other groups, people might adopt or abandon specific attitudes as means to re-affirm their identity through group membership. The main goal of the present research was to add knowledge about political identity and its impact on attitudes. It specifically addressed the feminist identity and studied how the desire to identify as a feminist, or to avoid that identification, influences one’s attitudes.

**The Social Identity Theory and Group Influence**

One of the most important work that addressed the issue of intergroup relations was the ‘minimal group studies’ (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). In series of experiments it was demonstrated that individuals displayed high levels of in-group favoritism - tending to give more points (or money) to unidentified in-group members than to unidentified out-group members (Reicher et al., 2010). These studies suggest that merely being labeled as a member of a group evokes behavior that favors one’s own group members and discriminates against members of other groups. However, this conclusion cannot explain the mechanism which drives people to act this way, and not taking the context of social behavior and group influence; The Social Identity Theory came in the following years as answer to these deficits.

According to the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), allocation to allegedly meaningless groups affects behavior only when people come to define their selves in terms of group membership (Reicher et al., 2010). In other words, the self not only defines the individual in relation to other individuals, but, in some circumstances, people define themselves through the groups to which they belong (Deschamps & Devos, 1998). Thus, group behavior is based on social identity (Tajfel, 1978).

In SIT, one's social identity is defined as "individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership" (Tajfel et al., 1971). Social groups provide their members with a shared identity that prescribes and evaluates who they are, what they should believe and how they should behave (Hogg, 2016). Social identity is simultaneously individual and social. On the one hand, my social identities – ‘I am a woman’, ‘I am an Israeli' – refer deeply to who I am in the world. On the other hand, a gender, or national identity (and all other social identities) have some historical, cultural and social roots that constitute these identities. Therefore, social identity provides the connection between society and the subject. It thereby explains how a large number of people can act in coherent and meaningful ways, by reference to shared group norms, values and understandings rather than idiosyncratic beliefs (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995).

Tajfel and Turner "0875# also noted that there

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An important implication of the SIT is that categorization produces conformity to in-group norms (normative behavior and attitudes) because it assimilates self to the in-group prototype (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Social identity protects one's self-esteem and reduces uncertainty by serving people’s needs to know who they are, how to behave and what to think (Hogg, 2016). In that respect, conformity is not only behavioral compliance, but also a process of internalization of the group’s prototype (Abrams et al., 1990). For example, when reminded of their own race, people show stronger race-compatible attitudes about inequality (Schmitt et al., 2003). After receiving support from people of the same gender, people tend to report more prototypical attitudes of their gender and demonstrated greater attitude–behavior consistency (White et al., 2002).

**Categorization process and Self-Categorization Theory**

Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) was developed to address the limitation of the SIT in defining and explaining the concept of social identity. SCT elaborates in detail the operation of the categorization process as the cognitive basis of group behavior. Through the process of categorization, the perceived similarities between stimuli (physical objects or people, including self) belonging to the same category stressed, along with the perceived differences between stimuli belonging to different categories. This effect occurs on dimensions that the categorizer believes are relevant to the categorization. Categorization of self and others into in-group and out-group defines people's social identity and emphasizes their perceived similarity to people's cognitive representation of the defining features of the group (Turner et al., 1994).

According to SCT, people cognitively represent social groups in terms of prototypes. A prototype is a subjective representation of the defining attributes (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, behaviors) of a social category, which is actively constructed from relevant social information in the immediate or more enduring interactive context (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Because members of the same group are generally exposed to similar information from the same perspective, their prototypes are usually very similar, that is shared. People are essentially perceived as the relevant in-group prototype rather than as unique individuals. This process is practically a contextual change in the level of identity - from unique individual to group member. Self-categorization brings self-perception and behavior into line with the contextually relevant in-group prototype, and thus transforms individuals into group members and individuality into group behavior (Reicher et al., 2010).

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**Political Identity**

Because SIT and SCT are general theories of social behavior, these theories and their implications are also relevant to the case of political affiliation and political identification (Oakes, 2002). Political identity is a self-concept that forms by a set of beliefs connected to political party (e.g., 'Democrats', 'Republicans') and/or ideology (e.g., 'socialist', 'liberal', 'conservative'; Greene, 2004; Miller et al., 1981). It is reasonable to assume that in the case of political identity people endorse certain belief and attitudes in order to identify with a specific political party or see oneself as a member of a political group. Other social identity is usually not perceived as chosen, and people identify as such because we are born or belong to that group (for example, race, gender, nationality, age). In contrast, people tend to see their political identity or party affiliation as "chosen" and as depending on a logical and rational process, that results in a political identification (Huddy, 2001). For example, before I see myself as a socialist I must hold several socialist attitudes and beliefs. However, it is possible that once the political identity is acquired, the identity impacts people’s attitudes and beliefs and not the opposite. In other words, political identity is not different from other social identity. When people see themselves as members of a certain political group (e.g., politicly identified) the group membership influences their behavior, affect and attitudes (Oakes, 2002).

Previous research has found that political identity influences judgment about political ingroup members and political outgroup members and can also affect ideology and political attitudes (Duck et al., 1995; Huddy, 2001). Political identity can also influence the formation of novel attitudes. In one set of studies, people based their support of a new policy based on the group membership of the politicians who supported it, rather than on the ideology that the policy promoted. Democrat [Republican] participants supported the plan supported by Democrat [Republican] politicians even if it was compatible with conservative [Liberal] ideology (Cohen, 2003). These results suggest that people’s party membership (e.g., political identity) influences attitudes and attitude formation, and not the opposite.

**The Feminist label and identity**

Feminism is a set of beliefs and ideas based on the perception that there are structured relationships of power between men and women, which create a system of male dominance. From a feminist point of view, generally speaking, this system is flawed because there should be grater equality between the sexes (Henley et al., 1998; Morgan, 1996). Like other ideologies, Feminism functions as a political-social identity. Therefore, it can shape people’s attitudes, and not just serve as the reflection of their existing attitudes.

One interesting aspect of the feminist identity is that many wish to avoid it (Griffin, 1989; Misciagno, 1997; Percy & Kremer, 1995). There is evidence that while many support the goals and feminist values, few are willing to identify as feminists (Burn et al., 2000; McCabe, 2005; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). In research on the feminist identity, some have found that those who do not label themselves feminists (*non-labelers*) are similar to feminists in their support for gender equality (Liss et al., 2001; Quinn & Radtke, 2006), whereas others found that non-labelers hold the middle ground between feminists and non-feminists with regard to some gender-related attitudes (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999). Although somewhat contradicting, all of these findings suggest that people can hold feminist attitudes but refrain from identifying as feminists. A likely reason for this avoidance is the negative stereotypes of feminists, attributing traits such as unattractive, lesbians, aggressive, men-hating, stubborn, and angry (Berryman‐Fink & Verderber, 1985; Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Kamen, 1991; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Twenge & Zucker, 1999).

**Current Research**

Although there are several studies that tested the influence of political identity on group behavior and attitude, there is a lack of research specifically addressing the influence of political identity on attitudes ideologically related to the identity. Furthermore, most of the research focuses on political party identification, and there is almost no research addressing ideology-based identity (e.g., feminist identity), not represented by a specific political party. In the current study, I tested the effect of the *feminist* identity on people’s feminist attitudes. From the perspective of SIT and SCT the hypothesis of the current research was that the feminist identity, as a political identity, influences attitudes, rather than only reflecting them.

I examined the hypothesis that in a situation of social relevance (e.g. salience) to the Feminist identity (or the non-feminist identity), people will form their judgment on feminist attitude according to their identity, and not according to the actual content of the attitudes itself. As said before, a prevalent finding in research on feminist identity is that many wish to avoid it. Therefore, in the current research I tested whether the need to avoid political identity influences attitude formation, as the need to re-affirm political identity. Previous studies of political identity address situations of relation between two defined groups (e.g. Republicans/Democrats), Thus participants have a defined ingroup and a defined outgroup. In contrast, in this research I examined the influence of political identity which people wish to avoid, and not re-affirm their ingroup identity.

I hypothesize that people who do not identify as feminists will tend to agree less with feminist attitudes when the feminist (or the non-feminist) identity is salient. To test this main hypothesis, I conducted two studies. In Experiment 1, I tested whether asking people to identify as feminist or non-feminist would increase the correspondence between their identity and the attitudes they endorse. Specifically, I tested whether feminist identity would be a better predictor of gender attitudes when people are explicitly required to identity as a feminist or a non-feminist before they report their attitudes. I examined whether people who identify as feminists would show stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, whereas people who avoid that identity would show weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists.

In Experiment 2, I tested the same hypothesis by explicitly framing the attitude questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes. That is, I examined whether the feminist identity would be a stronger predictor of endorsed gender-related attitudes when the attitude measure is explicitly presented as measuring feminism than when no such framing occurs.

In addition to the main hypothesis, I also tested whether, in general, people would report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. That will support previous evidence that people tend to support feminist attitudes although they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). It will also support the main research hypothesis that social identity, in this case feminism, influences attitudes. Finally, I tested whether there were gender differences in feminist identification and in the influence of the feminist identity on attitudes.

**Experiment 1**

Experiment 1, as stated, designed with the purpose to test the hypothesis that people who identify as feminists would show stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, whereas people who avoid that identity would show weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists. Therefore, in this study participants will report their identification as feminist or not and complete a feminist attitude questionnaire. The manipulation will be the measures order. I assume that identification as feminist is a rather stable construct that would not be affected by the attitudes people report before they identify. On the other hand, attitudes might be more malleable, and would be sensitive to explicit identification (as feminist or non-feminist) if reported before the attitudes. Therefore, I will examine whether the correlation between identification and attitudes would be stronger when people report their identity before the attitudes. That would provide evidence that the feminist identity (or avoidance of that identity) influences people’s gender-related attitudes.

In addition to the correlation, I will also test whether, in general, people would report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. That will support previous evidence that people tend to support feminist attitudes although they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). It will also support the main research hypothesis that social identity, in this case feminism, influences attitudes.

Method

*Participants*

Participants were volunteers in the Project Implicit website (Nosek, 2005). Of the 1,377 who started the study, 1,006 (652 females, *Mage* = 33.01, *SDage =* 13.76) completed all the tasks. 940 participants (610 females, *Mage* =33.11, *SDage =*13.72) were included in the analysis, after excluding 66 participants who seemed to use the same key for most of their responses in the feminist attitudes questionnaire (had a standard deviation of 0 in that questionnaire).

*Procedure*

Participants were assigned randomly to the study and completed it on the web. Participants in the "identification-first" condition completed the measures in the following order: a binary feminist identification question, a feminist attitude questionnaire, self-reported identification with–and evaluation of– social categories questionnaire, and an ST-IAT. Participants in the "attitudes-first" condition completed the tasks in the following order: feminist attitude questionnaire, the binary feminist identification question, self-reported identification with–and evaluation of– social categories questionnaire, and the ST-IAT. At the end of the study, participants read the debriefing, including an interpretation of their ST-IAT results.

*Measures*

*Feminist identification*. I manipulated the salience of the feminist identity by asking the participants the question- ‘‘Do you consider yourself a feminist?’’ with the responses yes and no. I used only these options to pressure participants to "take a side", which might increase their need to re-affirm this identity and answer accordingly in the feminist attitudes questionnaire.

The manipulation was the location of this question in the sequence of measures: Half of the participants reported their identification before answering the questionnaire (condition "identification-first") and half reported it after (condition "attitudes-first").

*Feminist attitude questionnaire.* Participants reported their agreement with 12 statements taken from the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996; see Appendix A for the list of statements used in the study). The LFAIS reflects the three general themes: women’s discrimination and subordination, collective action for women’s equality, and sisterhood. The LFAIS has good convergent, divergent, and known-groups validity and demonstrated reliability (Morgan, 1996). The LFAIS appears to be a subtle measure of feminism – it does not use the words "feminist" or "women’s movement." and therefore represents a more covert type of feminism. I chose statements that were not overtly feminist or radical to increase the likelihood that people would generally support them, when they are not explicitly linked with feminism.

The response options ranged from 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree). The instructions before the questionnaire was: '*Next, we will show you several statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions'.*

*Identification with– and evaluation of– social categories.*Participants responded to the question "Do you identify with the following social category?" about each of the categories "Americans", "White people", "Students", "Men", "Women", "Feminist", "Republicans", and "Democrats", on a scale with the response options "Not at all", "Very slightly", "Slightly", "Moderately", "Quite a lot", "Very much", and "Extremely identify", coded from 1 to 7. Afterwards, participants reported their evaluation of the social category on a 1 (dislike) – 7 (like) Likert scale. I used this questionnaire to gauge the sample’s general identification and evaluation of feminists, in comparison to other groups. In addition, I could use the feminist identification question as a continuous variable.

*Implicit measure* *(ST-IAT)*. The Single Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT, for example- Bluemke & Friese, 2008) is a variation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is an indirect measure of social cognition (mainly, attitudes, stereotypes, and self-concept). The ST-IAT is a variant of the IAT, used to measure the evaluation of a single category rather than a prefrence between two categories (which is what the IAT measures). I used the ST-IAT to test the implicit self-concept of participants with feminism. In other words, I measured the implicit feminist identification of participants (the association of 'feminism' and 'self' versus 'feminism' and 'not self'). This measure was not directly related to the research hypothesis. I explored similarities and discrepancies between the indirectly measured and directly measured identification with feminism. Because it is not relevant to the present research, I will not refer to this measure further.

Results

The score of the feminist attitude questionnaire was computed as the mean of the responses to all 12 items in the questionnaire. Higher scores indicated stronger feminist attitudes.

**Feminist Identification**

Of all the participants, 48% (58% of the women and 28% of the men) responded 'yes' to the question whether they considered themselves feminists, and the others responded 'no.' A Chi-Square Tests for Association of sex and feminist identification was significant ( (1) = 73.71, *p* < .001), indicating that women identified as feminist more often than men. The percentage of women who identified as feminists was higher than I expected, probably attesting for the unusual characteristics of participants who visit the Project Implicit website (relatively Liberal-Democrat sample; see also in the following analyses of the reported identification with- and evaluation of- social categories on this study).

I also tested whether the manipulation influenced identification. When participants reported their identification before the questionnaire 51% identified as feminist, in comparison to 43% among participants who responded after the questionnaire, (1) = 5.68, *p* = .017. I examined whether that effect was moderated by the participant's gender with a logistic regression with 2 (Gender) X 2 (Condition). In accordance with the previous analysis there was a significant association between sex and feminist identification: women were more likely to identify as feminist, OR(1)= 63%, *p* < .001. The association between condition and feminist identification was not significant, (1) = 14%, *p* = .063. The interaction of condition and sex was also not significant, (1) = 6%, *p* = .47, reflecting that the proportion of identification between the genders did not differ as functions of condition.

There was a significant correlation between the response to the yes/no feminist identification question and the continuous feminist identification question that appeared later in the study, r(893) = .74, *p* < . 001. Did the manipulation influence the continuous measure? I tested that question with a 2 (Condition) X 2 (Gender) ANOVA on the continuous feminist identification. The ANOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,926) = 103.03, *p* <.001, *ηp²*= .1, reflecting stronger identification as feminist among women (M= 4.18, SD= 1.80), compared to men (M= 2.92, SD= 1.77). There was no main effect for condition, *F*(1,926) = 0.47, *p* =.49, nor interaction, *F*(1, 926)= 0.01, *p* =.93. Importantly, participants always responded to the continuous measure after the feminist attitudes questionnaire. Therefore, in both conditions, the response to the continuous measure might reflect the effect of completing the feminist attitudes questionnaire on one's identity as a feminist.

**Feminist Attitudes**

The main interest was the effect of the feminist identity question on responses to the feminist attitudes questionnaire. The internal consistency of the items in the feminist attitudes questionnaire was somewhat low (α Chronbach = .72). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the score in that questionnaire, by (and beyond) experimental condition and participant's gender.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 1. Experiment 1:** *Means (standard deviations) of the feminist attitude questionnaire by gender and condition* | | | | |
|  | Women | Men | Total |
| Identity-first |  |  |  |
| 5.49 (0.79) | 4.94 (0.93) | 5.30 (0.88) |
| Attitudes-first |  |  |  |
| 5.51 (0.79) | 5.11 (0.83) | 5.37 (0.83) |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 5.50 (0.79) | 5.02 (0.89) | 5.33 (0.86) |
|  |  |  |  |

To test my main hypotheses, that the feminist identity question would influence self-reported feminist attitudes, I tested whether having to commit to– or reject the - feminist identity before reporting one's gender attitudes would increase the relation between participants' feminist identity and their reported attitudes. To test that question, I conducted two GLM analyses. The first used the factors, condition (the manipulation), self-reported gender, and self-reported feminist identity measured on the continuous measure. In the second analysis, I replaced the self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity, measured on a -3 (Extremely Conservative) to 3 (Extremely Liberal) 7-points response scale, completed by a large subset of the participants when they first registered to complete studies in the Project Implicit website. I explored the effect of that factor because it was measured before the manipulation and had a positive correlation with the continuous feminist identity, *r*(875) = .41, *p* <.001. In other word, unlike the self-reported feminist identity (continuous measure), it could not have been affected by the manipulation, or by completing the feminist attitudes measure.

First, I conduct a 2 (Condition: identification-first, attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male, female) ANOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes. The result did not support my prediction, when the only significant effect found was a main effect for gender, *F*(1, 936) = 70.32, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.07. I add to the analysis the continuous feminist identification to test whether the condition influence the relation between participants' feminist identity and their reported attitudes feminist identity. The results of the 2 (Condition: identification-first, attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male, female) X feminist identification (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not support my prediction because the interaction between condition and feminist identification was non-significant, *F*(1, 922) = 1.95 , *p* =.16, *ηp2* = .002. The effect of requesting participants to commit or reject the feminist identity before reporting their gender attitudes was not moderated by the participants' identification with the feminist identity. In other words, I found no evidence that the correspondence between people's reported attitudes and their identification as feminists (as reflected in the continuous identification score) was stronger when they rejected (or committed to) the feminist identity before completing the gender attitudes questionnaire than when they were not reminded of feminism and identity at all before completing the questionnaire. The ANCOVA found the expected large main effect for feminist identification, *F*(1,922)= 248.75, *p* <.001, *ηp²*= .21.

I also found a significant and small main effect for condition, *F*(1,922) = 4.87, *p* = .027, *ηp²* = .005. Participants reported stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly requested to identify with (or reject) the feminist identity (*M* = 5.37, *SD* = 0.83), than when requested to identify (or reject) the identity (*M* = 5.30, *SD* = 0.88). This effect might reflect a negative effect of the identification question on all participants, when controlling for the participants' feminist identity. However, because the effect size is very small and hardly reached significance despite the large sample, it would be highly speculative to make any inference based on this finding alone.

The results of the 2 (Condition: before, after) X 2 (Gender: male, female) X self-reported political identity (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not found different patterns. The interaction between condition and political identity was non-significant, *F*(1, 875) = 0.08 , *p* =.781, *ηp2* = 0.00. The effect of requesting participants to commit or reject the feminist identity before reporting their gender attitudes was not moderated by the participants' identification with the political identity. The ANCOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,875)= 48.22, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.052. Women reported stronger feminist attitudes (*M* = 5.44, *SD* = 0.76), than men (*M* = 5.02, *SD* = 0.86). There was also large main effect for political identification, *F*(1,875)= 204.2, *p* <.001, *ηp²*= .19. Stronger liberal identity predicted stronger feminist attitudes. All other effect was found non-significant.

**Identification with and evaluation of social categories**

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the identification with– and evaluation of– the social categories. The Table also shows correlations between evaluation and identification. As could be expected, there was always a positive correlation between identification and evaluation of each category. The correlations were small for the gender categories (men/women), probably reflecting the fact that heterosexuals often identify with their gender but are fond of people from the other gender. The correlations were strong for political categories (feminist, democrats, and republicans), which is compatible with the assumptions of the Social Identity Theory.

Participants identified more as Democrats (*M* = 3.83, *SD* = 1.80) than Republicans (*M* = 2.71, *SD* = 1.73), *t*(924)= 64.85, *p* <.001, *d* = .63. The feminist identification correlated positively with Democrat identification, *r*(921) = .34, *p* <.001, and negatively with Republican identification *r*(921)= -.23, *p* < .001. Thus, the sample was relatively Liberal-Democrat, which might explain the large proportion of participant who identified as a feminist (compared to the proportion I assumed to find).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 2: Experiment 1:** *Means (standard deviations) and correlation of identification with, and evaluation of, the social categories* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Identification:** | | Americans | Whites | | Students | Men | Women | | Feminists | | Republicans | | Democrats |
|  | | 5.19  (1.86) | 4.81  (1.86) | 5.34  (1.79) | | 3.74  (2.21) | | 5.10  (2.12) | | 3.74  (1.89) | 2.71  (1.73) | 3.83  (1.80) | |
| **Evaluation:** | |  |  |  | |  | |  | |  |  |  | |
| Americans | 5.39  (1.46) | |  | | --- | | **.53\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | .27\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .16\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .12\* | | | |  | | --- | | .04 | | | |  | | --- | | -.15\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .3\*\* | | |  | | --- | | -.05 | | |
| Whites | 5.16  (1.36) | |  | | --- | | .31\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.37\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | .12\* | | | |  | | --- | | .11\* | | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.17\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .29\*\* | | |  | | --- | | -.08\* | | |
| Students | 5.73  (1.20) | |  | | --- | | .24\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .13\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.33\*\*** | | | |  | | --- | | .02 | | | |  | | --- | | .09\* | | | |  | | --- | | .03 | | |  | | --- | | .06\* | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | |
| Men | 5.43  (1.36) | |  | | --- | | .22\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .22\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | | |  | | --- | | **.07\*** | | | |  | | --- | | .13\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.05 | | |  | | --- | | .12\* | | |  | | --- | | .08\* | | |
| Women | 5.96  (1.17) | |  | | --- | | .21\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .17\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .09\* | | | |  | | --- | | .09\* | | | |  | | --- | | **.11\*** | | | |  | | --- | | .08\* | | |  | | --- | | .03 | | |  | | --- | | .13\*\* | | |
| Feminists | 4.75  (1.60) | |  | | --- | | -.06\* | | |  | | --- | | -.02 | | |  | | --- | | -.01 | | | |  | | --- | | -.26\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .29\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | **.69\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | -.26\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .31\*\* | | |
| Republicans | 3.70  (1.65) | |  | | --- | | .22\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .24\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .11\* | | | |  | | --- | | .11\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.06 | | | |  | | --- | | -.28\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.67\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | -.4\*\* | | |
| Democrats | 4.66  (1.53) | |  | | --- | | .02 | | |  | | --- | | -.08\* | | |  | | --- | | .01 | | | |  | | --- | | -.08\* | | | |  | | --- | | .18\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .23\*\* | | |  | | --- | | -.39\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.7\*\*** | | |
| Note: \**p*<.05, \*\* *p*<.001. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Discussion

Experiment 1 test the hypothesis that people who identify as feminists would show stronger feminist attitudes after explicitly identifying as feminists, whereas people who avoid that identity would show weaker feminist attitudes after explicitly stating that they do not identify as feminists. In contrast to my hypothesis I found no evidence that the correspondence between people's reported attitudes and their identification as feminists was stronger when they rejected (or committed to) the feminist identity before completing the gender attitudes questionnaire than when they were not reminded of feminism and identity at all before completing the questionnaire. A significant and small main effect for condition was found reflecting a negative effect of the identification question on all participants, when controlling for the participants' feminist identity. However, because the effect size is very small and hardly reached significance despite the large sample, it would be highly speculative to make any inference based on this finding alone. In addition, I conduct second analysis and replaced the self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity, because it was measured before the experiment (and thus could not have been affected by the manipulation or by completing the feminist attitudes measure), and also had a positive correlation with the self-reported feminist. The analysis did not support my hypothesis demonstrate only large main effect for the political identity on the feminist attitudes. A small main effect for gender was found indicating that women agreed more than men with feminist attitude. Taken together both analysis the feminist identification explains the gender difference on feminist attitudes (compared to the political identity) as shown that women identify as feminist more than men.

These results might suggest that people's attitudes on feminist matters are too strong to change only out of desire to avoid the feminist label. On the other hand, these conclusions are limited by my samples' overall Liberal orientation which might have made it difficult to detect the effect of avoidance of feminist identity.

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 was designed to test the same hypothesis as Experiment 1 with a different manipulation. This time I manipulated the relevance of the feminist identity to the feminist attitudes by framing the attitudes questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes, or without such explicit framing. I examined the hypothesis that the correlation between feminist identification and the self-reported feminist attitudes would be stronger when the questionnaire would be framed as measuring feminist attitudes. That would suggest that the feminist identity (or avoidance of that identity) influences people’s gender-related attitudes. As in Experiment 1, in addition to the correlation, I also tested whether, in general, people would report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism, and whether any of these possible effects is moderated by the participant's gender.

Method

*Participants*

Participants were volunteers in the Project Implicit website (Nosek, 2005). Of the 1,360 who started the study, 978 (684 females, *Mage* = 32.65, *SDage*= 13.91). Of the 978 participants completed the study, 918 (644 females, *Mage* = 32.75, *SDage*= 13.77) were included in the analysis, after excluding 60 participants whose responses in the feminist attitude questionnaire showed hardly any variability (SD = 0).

*Measures*

The measures were identical to Experiment 1, except the following modifications. In Expeirment 2, I did not use the binary feminist identification question (all participants reported their feminist identity after the questionnaire, as part of the identification with other social categories, on the same 7-point scale as in Experiment 1).

*Questionnaire instruction (manipulation).* The instruction to the feminist attitudes questionnaire framed the questionnaire as a measure of feminist attitudes (feminist-framing condition), or without such explicit framing (control condition). In the control condition, the instruction was:

*Next, we will show you several statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There is no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions.*

In the feminist-framing condition, instruction was:

*Next, you will answer a questionnaire that will measure whether you endorse feminist attitudes. We will use that questionnaire to measure how feminist you are. The questionnaire includes statements that most feminists support, and statements that most feminists reject. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement. There is no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your honest opinions.*

*Procedure*

Participants were assigned randomly to the study and completed it on the web. Participants completed the tasks in the following order: Feminist attitude questionnaire, identification with–and evaluation of– social categories questionnaire, and the ST-IAT (not discussed further in the present report). At the end of the study, participants read a debriefing which included an interpretation of their ST-IAT results.

Results

**Feminist Identification**

Figure1 presents a histogram of the responses to the feminist identification question, split by self-reported gender, showing rather high identification with the feminist identity, especially among women. Like in Experiment 1, these results are quite different than what I expected, and might be in conflict with the basic notion of the present research – that women prefer to distance themselves from the feminist identity. However, it is difficult to make inference about people in general from this non-representative sample. A t-test found that women identified more with the feminist identity (*M* = 4.07, *SD* = 1.76) than men (*M* = 2.99, *SD* = 1.73), *t*(912) = 8.51, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.62 . Another t-test found no effect of the manipulation on self-reported identification (Feminist-Framing Condition: *M* = 3.79, *SD* = 1.75, Control Condition: *M* = 3.70, *SD* = 1.88), *t*(912) = 0.8 , *p* = .425, *d* = 0.05.

**Figure 1.** *Histogram of the responses to the feminist identification question, split by self-reported gender.*

**Feminist Attitudes**

The Score of the Feminist attitude questionnaire was computed as in Experiment 1 (α Chronbach = .71). Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of the feminist attitude questionnaire.

To test my main hypotheses, that the salience of the feminist identity (manipulated by the questionnaire framing) would influence self-reported feminist attitudes, I tested whether the feminist identity would be a stronger predictor of endorsed gender-related attitudes when the attitude measure is explicitly presented as measuring feminism than when no such framing occurs. As in experiment 1, to test that question, I conducted two ANCOVA analyses. The first used the factors, condition (the manipulation), self-reported gender, and self-reported feminist identity. In the second analysis, I replaced the self-reported feminist identity with self-reported political identity (same variable as in experiment 1, that also measured before the manipulation and could not affected by it). There was positive correlation between the self-reported political identity and the self-reported feminist identity, *r*(869) = .48, *p* <.001.

First, I conduct a 2 (Condition: identification-first, attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male, female) ANOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes. The result did not support my prediction, when the only significant effect found was a main effect for gender, *F*(1, 914) = 44.44, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.05. I added to the analysis the continuous feminist identification to test whether the condition influence the relation between participants' feminist identity and their reported attitudes feminist identity. The results of the 2 (Condition: identification-first, attitudes-first) X 2 (Gender: male, female) X feminist identification (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not support my prediction because the interaction between condition and feminist identification was non-significant, *F*(1, 906) = 0.91 , *p* =.341, *ηp2* = .001. The effect of explicitly presented the questionnaire as measuring feminism was not moderated by the participants' identification with the feminist identity. In other words, I found no evidence that the correspondence between people's reported attitudes and their identification as feminists (as reflected in the continuous identification score) was stronger when the questionnaire framed as measuring feminist attitudes than without such explicit framing. The ANCOVA found a tiny main effect for gender, *F*(1,906)= 3.95, *p* =.046, *ηp2* = 0.004. Women reported slightly stronger feminist attitudes (*M* = 5.47, *SD* = 0.78), than men (*M* = 5.08, *SD* = 0.89). There was also the expected large main effect for feminist identification, *F*(1,906)= 304.12, *p* <.001, *ηp²*= .25.

The results of the 2 (Condition: before, after) X 2 (Gender: male, female) X self-reported political identity (continuous variable) ANCOVA analysis, on self-reported feminist attitudes did not found different patterns. The interaction between condition and political identity was non-significant, *F*(1, 865) = 0.86 , *p* =.353, *ηp2* = 0.00. The effect of explicitly presented the questionnaire as measuring feminism was not moderated by the participants' identification with the political identity. The ANCOVA found a main effect for gender, *F*(1,865)= 41.16, *p* <.001, *ηp2* = 0.045. There was also large main effect for political identification, *F*(1,865)= 224.72, *p* <.001, *ηp²*= .21. Stronger liberal identity predicted stronger feminist attitudes. All other effect was found non-significant.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 3: Experiment 2:** *Means (**standard deviations) of the feminist attitude questionnaire by gender and condition* | | | | |
|  | Women | Men | Total |
| Feminist-Framing Condition |  |  |  |
| 5.47 (0.80) | 5.06 (0.91) | 5.34 (0.86) |
| Control Condition |  |  |  |
| 5.48 (0.76) | 5.10 (0.87) | 5.37 (0.82) |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 5.47 (0.78) | 5.08 (0.89) | 5.35 (0.84) |
|  |  |  |  |

**Identification with and evaluation of social categories**

The correlation between identification and evaluation of each category, as well as means and standard deviations of each of those variables are presented in Table 4. In regard to the sample characteristic, as in Experiment 1, participants identified more as Democrats (M= 3.81, SD= 1.79) than as Republicans (M= 2.66, SD= 1.74), *t*(902)= 63.66, *p* < .001, *d* = .65. As could be expected, feminist identification was positively correlated with Democrat identification, *r*(900)= .39, *p* <.001, and negatively with Republican identification , *r*(899)= -.27, *p* <.001. Again, these results show that the samples in the present research were rather Liberal.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 4: Experiment 2:** *Means (standard deviations) and correlation of identification with, and evaluation of, the social categories* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Identification:** | | Americans | Whites | | Students | Men | Women | | Feminists | | Republicans | | Democrats |
|  | | 5.22  (1.79) | 4.74  (1.87) | 5.30  (1.79) | | 3.52  (2.12) | | 5.32  (2.02) | | 3.75  (1.82) | 2.66  (1.74) | 3.81  (1.80) | |
| **Evaluation:** | |  |  |  | |  | |  | |  |  |  | |
| Americans | 5.38  (1.46) | |  | | --- | | **.56\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | .21\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .13\* | | | |  | | --- | | .04 | | | |  | | --- | | .15\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.12\* | | |  | | --- | | .27\*\* | | |  | | --- | | -.04 | | |
| Whites | 5.17  (1.37) | |  | | --- | | .30\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.36\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | | |  | | --- | | .08\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.11\* | | |  | | --- | | .24\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .00 | | |
| Students | 5.71  (1.22) | |  | | --- | | .16\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .04 | | |  | | --- | | **.31\*\*** | | | |  | | --- | | -.06 | | | |  | | --- | | .19\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .11\* | | |  | | --- | | -.01 | | |  | | --- | | .16\*\* | | |
| Men | 5.48  (1.35) | |  | | --- | | .23\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .19\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .08\* | | | |  | | --- | | **.03** | | | |  | | --- | | .17\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | -.05 | | |  | | --- | | .17\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .01 | | |
| Women | 6.03  (1.18) | |  | | --- | | .15\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .04 | | |  | | --- | | .06\* | | | |  | | --- | | .00 | | | |  | | --- | | **.12\*** | | | |  | | --- | | .12\* | | |  | | --- | | -.02 | | |  | | --- | | .13\* | | |
| Feminists | 4.75  (1.58) | |  | | --- | | -.04 | | |  | | --- | | -.1\* | | |  | | --- | | -.02 | | | |  | | --- | | -.25\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .28\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | **.7\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | -.3\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .35\*\* | | |
| Republicans | 3.68  (1.62) | |  | | --- | | .26\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .21\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .12\* | | | |  | | --- | | .1\* | | | |  | | --- | | .00 | | | |  | | --- | | -.31\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.67\*\*** | | |  | | --- | | -.39\*\* | | |
| Democrats | 4.76  (1.42) | |  | | --- | | -.02 | | |  | | --- | | -.14\*\* | | |  | | --- | | .01 | | | |  | | --- | | -.07\* | | | |  | | --- | | .16\*\* | | | |  | | --- | | .27\*\* | | |  | | --- | | -.36\*\* | | |  | | --- | | **.66\*\*** | | |
| Note: \**p*<.05, \*\* *p*<.001. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

General Discussion

Social Identity and group membership are a main factor that shapes people’s attitudes and ideologies (Diehl, 1990; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014; Tajfel, 1982; Terry & Hogg, 2000). This study addresses to the feminist identity, and examined how the desire to identify as a feminist, or to avoid that identification, influences one’s feminist attitudes. According to SIT and SCT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) the hypothesis of the current research is that the feminist identity, as a political identity, influences attitudes, rather than only reflect them. Meaning, my assumption was that in order to re-affirm their feminist (or non-feminist) identity, participants will tend to agree (or disagree) with feminist attitudes according to the identity prototype, when this identity is salience. I conduct two experiment, in both I manipulate the salience of the feminist identity: In experiment 1 by asking participant to identify as feminist before answering feminist attitude questionnaire (in comparison to participates that asked to identify after the questionnaire); In experiment 2 by framing an attitude questionnaire explicitly as a measure of feminist attitudes (compared with no such explicit framing). Both studies tested the same main hypothesis that when the feminist identity (or non-feminist identity) is salience, people who identify as feminists would show stronger feminist attitudes, whereas people who avoid that identity would show weaker feminist attitudes. Due to the fact that results of both studies showed almost identical patterns (and also means and correlations) I will discuss the results from both of them together.

The results did not support the main hypothesis, and showed a non-significant interaction between condition and feminist identification. In other words, salience of the feminist identity did not result in stronger correlation between feminist identification and feminist attitude. Furthermore, in both studies the results revealed a large effect to feminist identification, such that stronger feminist identification predicated stronger feminist attitudes. The feminist identification found as the factor that explains the larger part of variance in feminist attitude. The lack of significant differences in feminist attitude resulted from the identity salience might be attribute to characteristics of the feminist identity, as operated in this research. First, empirical evidence for SIT and SCT shows that there are several conditions for ingroup prototype behavior will occur. The main condition is that social identity must be salient and accepted in the relevant context, but this is not enough. It is also necessary that the ingroup members choose to compare themselves with the given ingroup other, and that they seek to differentiate themselves along dimensions that lead to anti-social behaviors (e.g. ‘we are intelligent and hence we exclude them as stupid’; Reicher et al., 2010). It is possible that in this research, although I manipulated the salience of the feminist identity, the manipulation was not addressed the need of participants to differentiate themselves for outgroup members (feminist or not-feminist). Thus, the need to apply the social identity and present the ingroup prototype attitudes was not aroused. The fact that I choose to present the feminist identity as unipolar (e.g., feminist or non-feminist) and not bipolar (e.g., feminist or chauvinist), might be related to this explanation. I assumed that most of the people will not identify as chauvinist, because of the negative view of this identity (even if 'non-feminist' identity is actually a chauvinist identity, to my opinion), and thus there is no logic in salience this category. However, perhaps only referring to feminist (or non-feminist) identity was not enough to arouse ingroup – outgroup relation.

Another explanation that can shed light on this result come from the research on consensus formation (Haslam et al., 1998). When people self-categorize as members of a social group, they need to understand who they are, how they should behave and what should they think, in terms of the characteristics that they share with other group members (Turner et al., 1994). But, those who identify together do not immediately and automatically achieve consensus, rather, there is a process of consensus formation by which the expectation of agreement between group members shifts group discussion and dispute towards a consensus (Haslam et al., 1998). The feminist ideology and theory is a very diverse theory (Henley et al., 1998), thus it is possible that feminist identity has no one agreed and sherd prototype, and that members not obtain sherd attitude consensus. This may result in weaker demand to re-affirm the feminist identity, because there is no one sherd prototype of 'feminist'. In addition, this explanation might be even more relevant to the one who identify as 'not-feminist'. It is reasonable to assume the non-feminist identity, that is identification by way of negation, have no defined prototype or attitudes and behavior consensus of group members.

In the light of past research that had shown that people tend to support feminist attitudes although they do not identify as feminists (Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997), another hypothesis in this research was that people, in general, would report stronger agreement with feminist attitudes when not explicitly reminded of feminism. Therefore, I predict that participants in the "after" condition (e.g., identification question after the questionnaire; study 1) and in the control condition (questionnaire without any explicit framing; study 2) will show stronger feminist attitude compared to participants in the other conditions ("before" condition and "feminist-framing" condition respectively). The results did not support this predication; Although in study 1 there was a significant effect for condition in the direction of my assumption, the effect size is very small (*ηp²*= .005) therefore, apparently, the source of the significance is due to the, relatively, large sample in the study and not indicate on any essential differences. In addition, study 2 revealed non-significant effect for condition (*ηp²*= .003). One explanation for these results can be attribute to the sample characteristic. In both studies the proportion of participants identifying as feminist was larger than I expected, and the sample was relatively democrat-liberal one (which correlates with stronger feminist attitudes; Liss et al., 2001; Berryman‐Fink & Verderber, 1985). Thus, it is possible that in this sample the label of 'feminism' was not perceived in a negative way (and even might perceived somewhat positively for most participants), resulted that reminding feminism did not evoke the need to reject any feminist characteristics (feminist attitudes in this case).

This explanation is also relevant to the lack in significant results for my main hypothesis, as mentioned above. If feminist identity and label are not perceived very negatively the need for conformity behavior according to the ingroup prototype, is reduced because it less relevant for protecting one's self-esteem (Hogg, 2016; Abrams et al., 1990). Together with the theoretical explanation mentioned before, it seems that the operationalization I used to evoke participants need to re-affirm their feminist, or non-feminist, identity was rather weak. Meaning, it might be not enough for group behavior to occur, in this specific context

I also tested if there is gender difference in feminist identification and feminist attitude. Regarding the feminist identification, women identified as feminist significantly more than men. This difference seems quite intuitive, since women are likely to identify more with an ideology and movement that seeks to undermine male dominance and end women's oppression (Hooks, 2000), also go along with previous finding (Robnett & Anderson, 2017). There was also significant gender difference in feminist attitude, women tend to agree with feminist attitude more than men, but the effect size was very small. The feminist identification explains much more from the feminist attitude variance, compared to gender difference.

For exploratory purpose, I used the ST-IAT to test the implicit feminist identification of participants. The results revealed weak but positive and significant correlation between implicit and explicit feminist identification, implicating that the ST-IAT did address participants implicit self-concept with feminism and that explicit feminist identification explain part of the variance of implicit feminist identification (*ηp²*= .05 in both studies). Study 1 also revealed a significant, but rather small, two-way interaction of gender and condition. Women present stronger implicit identification compared to men in the 'after' condition, while there was no significant difference for gender in the 'before' condition. There is no obvious explanation for this finding. Furthermore, the fact that effect size was very small and that this interaction revealed not significant on study 2, suggest that this is a random difference.

In addition to the ones that already mentioned, the current research has several limitations. First, the feminist attitude questionnaire I used showed a quite low internal consistency, what probably indicate on low validity. Apparently, the changes I conducted in the short form of LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) are the cause for this. This may be attribute to the lack in significant results, and future research should use a more reliable and valid measure for feminist attitude. Second, in this research to measure participants feminist identity I used the feminist identification participant reported later in the study. Although, I presented the feminist identification with other categories identification, it is reasonable to assume that reporting the feminist attitude previously in the study can influence the identification, or at least, was not a 'clear' measure for feminist identity. As used in previous research in the field of political identity (Cohen, 2003), it probably better to measure the political identity in separate study. Third, the fact that the study used only online volunteering participants, and taking in regard the specific political and feminist characteristic of this participants (compare to what I expected to be in the general population), may be contribute to the fact that salience the feminist identity had almost no influence on participants agreement with feminist attitude.

In conclusion, this research shows that feminist identification reflects feminist attitude and ideology and, contradicting to the research hypothesis, there shows no evidence that salience the feminist identity influence feminist attitude. Because the finding of other research regarding political and social identity influence attitudes are robust, future research need to further investigate the feminist identity construct and its influence on group behavior.

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Appendix A

*Feminist attitude questionnaire***-** 12-item questionnaire, taken from the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (Morgan, 1996).

1. (5 [in the original scale]) Both husband and wife should be equally responsible for the care of young children.

2. (6) The first duty of a woman with young children is to home and family. (R)

3. (7) A man who has chosen to stay at home and be a house-husband is not less masculine than a man who is employed full-time.

4. (10) Women should be more concerned with clothing and appearance than men. (R)

5. (13) Although women can be good leaders, men make better leaders. (R)

6. (19). Men and women should be able to freely make choices about their lives without being restricted by their gender.

7. (21). There are circumstances in which women should be paid less than men for equal work. (R)

8. (27). A woman should not have to get permission from important people in her life in order to get an abortion.

9. (29). If men were the sex who got pregnant, more reliable and convenient birth control would be available.

10. (40). A woman who has many sexual partners is not necessarily a slut.

11. (42). Women have been treated unfairly on the basis of their gender throughout most of human history.

12. (45). People who complain that pornography treats women like objects are overreacting. (R)

13. (47). Women are already given equal opportunities with men in all important sectors of their lives. (R).

14. (49). Women in the U.S. are treated as second-class citizens.

15. (50). All men receive economic, sexual, and psychological benefits from male domination.

16. (54). A radical restructuring of society is needed to overcome status inequalities between the sexes.

17. (55) Women can best overcome discrimination by doing the best that they can at their jobs, not by wasting time with political activity. (R)

Appendix B

*Implicit measure (ST-IAT)-*

I used two different formats of the ST-IAT:

**1:**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Right key** | **Left Key** | **No. of trails** | **Block** |
| Not-self | Self | 20 | 1 |
| Not self | Self+ feminism | 20 | 2 |
| Not self | Self+ feminism | 40 | **3** |
| Not self + feminism | Self | **20** | **4** |
| Not self + feminism | Self | **40** | **5** |

**2:**


|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Right key** | **Left Key** | **No. of trials** | **Block** |
| Not-self | Self | 20 | 1 |
| Not self | Self+ feminism | 30 | 2-or-3 |
| Not self+ feminism | Self | 30 | **3**-or-2 |
| Not self | Self+ feminism | 30 | 4-or-5 |
| Not self + feminism | Self | 30 | 5-or-4 |

Stimulus list for each category:

**Self:** me, myself, I, mine

**Not-self:** it, that, them, people

**Feminism:** Gloria Steinem, Women’s Rights

תוכן עניינים

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**זהות פוליטית............................................................................................ 5**

**תווית וזהות פמיניסטית.............................................................................. 6**

**מחקר נוכחי............................................................................................... 7**

ניסוי 1**...................................................................................................... 8**

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**תקציר**

**זהות חברתית הינה תפיסה עצמית שמתעצבת מתהליכים של קטגוריזציה והזדהות במונחים של חברות בקבוצה או תפקיד. זהות חברתית פעמים רבות מעצבת ומשפיעה על עמדות וערכים של אנשים. אנשים נוטים להתיישר בהתאם למה שהם תופסים כעמדות הנורמטיביות והמקובלות בקבוצה החברתית שלהם. במחקר הנוכחי, בדקתי האם אנשים נמנעים מלהחזיק בעמדות אותם הם תופסים כעמדות הנורמטיביות של קבוצה חברתית בלתי רצויה. באופן ספציפי, בדקתי את ההשערה כי אנשים נוטים לבטא עמדות לא-פמיניסטיות במטרה להרחיק עצמם מהזהות הפמיניסטית שנתפסת כבלתי רצויה.**

בשני ניסויים, נבדקים השלימו שאלון עמדות פמיניסטיות או לאחר מניפולציה שמסגרה עמדות אלה כמקושרות לזהות פמיניסטית, או ללא מניפולציה זו. בניסוי 1 (*N*=1,006), המניפולציה תפעלה את בולטות הזהות הפמיניסטית בכך שהנבדקים נשאלו לפני מענה על השאלון האם הם מזדהים כפמיניסטיים. בניסוי 2 *N*=978)), המניפולציה הציגה באופן ישיר את השאלון כשאלון המודד עמדות פמיניסטיות (לעומת ללא כל מסגור ספציפי). שיערתי שמסגור העמדות כפמיניסטיות יוביל לירידה בדיווח עצמי של הסכמה עם עמדות אלה בקרב נבדקים שלא הזדהו כפמיניסטיים, ולעומת זאת יוביל לעלייה בדיווח העצמי על הסכמה עם עמדות אלה. בניגוד להשערתי, בשני הניסויים בולטות הזהות הפמיניסטית לא השפיעה על העמדות הפמיניסטיות.

תוצאות אלה מציעות כי עמדות של אנשים בנוגע לנושאים פמיניסטיים חזקות מכדי להשתנות רק על ידי הרצון להימנע מהזהות הפמיניסטית. עם זאת, מסקנה זו מוגבלת משום שהמדגם הנוכחי בעל נטייה ליברלית כללית, מה שיכול להיות הקשה לזהות אפקט של הימנעות מזהות הפמיניסטית. ייתכן ובחירה מקדימה למחקר של נבדקים שאינם מזדהים כפמיניסטיים תמצא את האפקט המשוער.

**אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב**

**הפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה**

**המחלקה לפסיכולוגיה**

השפעת התווית 'פמיניזם' על עמדות

**חיבור זה מהווה חלק מהדרישות לקבלת התואר "מוסמך למדעי הרוח והחברה" (**M.A**)**

**מאת: מורן דנגור**

**בהנחיית: ד"ר יואב בר-ענן**

**חתימת הסטודנטית: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**חתימת המנחה: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**חתימת יו"ר הועדה המחלקתית: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

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