

## I. Three visions for post-war Europe

“Let Europe arise!”

European Federalists and Winston Churchill

Federalists gathering on the shores of Lake Lucerne

It was quite a heterogeneous party gathering there on the shores of the Lake Lucerne, at the Rütli meadow, that Friday, 20<sup>th</sup> September 1946 – some seventy people from sixteen different European countries, swearing an oath, just like the representatives of the three original Swiss cantons had done at the same place back in 1291. But now the participants of the congress committed themselves to Europe, to European unification. Among them, a British officer who had served in India and argued in favour of a sort of European, regional version of the still young United Nations Organisation, empowered with a common army; a French couple trying to convince the others that Espinasse would unify the Europeans, and the whole world indeed, in a federal regime; Dutch representatives of the European federalist movement there, among them Hendrik Brugmans, former Secretary of State, who had announced a profound renewal of the Dutch society on the whole, but was repudiated by his own government, had been sent, sort of exile, to Bandoung, then still Dutch colony, and was just back; the Swiss European federalist movement had initiated the meeting, and even Germans – for the first time after the war – had been invited, not an easy decision and in some countries bitterly criticized; but the meeting was to imagine ways of uniting Europe and that could hardly be achieved without the former enemy.

The past three days they had sat together in a hotel of the small city of Hertenstein, just at the opposite shore of the beautiful lake, talking, deliberating, trying to understand each other – and they had achieved something astonishing, a one-page long coherent and ambitious “Charter”, an outline of a “European Community on federal lines” in twelve points<sup>i</sup>. The fundamental idea is deeply rooted in nothing less than a common understanding of human dignity, insisting on “respect for the individual and his responsibility for the various communities to which he belongs.” (§7). This commitment aims at much more than simply sharing power between two levels of government, as federalism is often reduced to; it refers to the “personalist” concept of mankind, which assumes that we all are individuals indeed, but that our existence and identity is as much shaped by our belonging to others, to family, colleagues, villages and cities, regions and nations, and beyond. On this ground only, a European federation makes sense, in the eyes of the Hertenstein group, and should be conceived as a bottom-up construction “beginning at the base” (§2), granting “the rights and duties of its citizens in a declaration of European civil rights” (§6)<sup>ii</sup>

Dignity, at the time, after the threat of European-wide fascist dictatorship, meant after all and above all not only citizens’ rights, but peace: A federal European Community was meant to grant peace for all the European nations living together on the continent, it meant solving conflict no longer by war – as Europe had experienced over so many centuries –, but by common rules, by law: “In accordance with federalist principles which call for a democratic structure [...] the community of European peoples must itself settle any differences that may arise among its members.” (§2) That means nothing less than a revolution of international relations as they had emerged in Europe since Early Modern Times, since state claimed

sovereignty, i.e. the supreme right to do what they want, to deny any interference of whomsoever – the principle of state power and international relations Europe-wide recognized in the Westphalian Peace Treaty which had put an end to the devastating Thirty-Years-War, in 1648. Taken at face value, state sovereignty simply does not allow for an arbiter beyond the states, in case of conflict, to take binding decisions. Such an arbiter would be an instance superior to the states, and sovereignty just denies the legitimacy of something “beyond”. Conflicts then had to be solved without arbiter, and that means in the last resort the “law” of the strongest, i.e. violence, and violence among states is nothing else than war. War had been an inbuilt device for conflict solving in the European system of international relations for centuries – it had led Europe to self-destruction in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. “Settle any differences in accordance with federal principles” would replace the system of international relations based on sovereignty by the recognition of a legitimate arbiter beyond the nation state, entitled to take binding decisions, i.e. to substitute law to violence.

The self-destruction of the former European “Great Powers” and the whole system of international relations in Europe did not only require a revolutionary shift of the relations between the Europeans themselves; it had given rise to the “Super-Powers”, the USA and the Soviet Union, who were about to dominate the post-war world, and Europe in particular. The European federalists sitting together in Hertenstein were aware of the threat that Europe would become an object of history, after being its subject since more than a millennium – an object of decisions taken elsewhere, in Washington and Moscow, but no longer in Paris, Berlin, Rome or even London. The second dimension of their “Charter” aimed at preserving European independence vis-à-vis those new extra-European “Super-Powers”: “The European Union is directed against no-one and renounces any form of power politics. It refuses to be an instrument in the service of any foreign power.” (§9) The Hertenstein group did not address the emerging Cold War, which seemed to be not yet unavoidable, in September 1946, they refused to be obliged to choose either the one or the other camp – they wanted Europe to escape from such a choice, from being divided into two spheres of influence, from being split by an “Iron Curtain” – Winston Churchill had already coined that term in March of the same year<sup>iii</sup>. In the eyes of the Hertenstein federalists, Europe had only one chance to withstand the overwhelming weight and hegemonial pressure of both Super-Powers: to unite. The individual states of Europe were far too weak to defend themselves against Soviet hegemony, or even the much leaner American one – only together had the Europeans the chance to grant their independence, and their diversity indeed, their various cultural, political, social identities: “Only the European Union can ensure to all its peoples, small and great, their territorial integrity and the preservation of their own character.” (§11)

The relationship between the internal and the external dimension of this federal project for Europe is crucial: Unity is not an aim in itself, it is a means to grant diversity. Unity and diversity are not contradictory, but complementary, mutually reinforcing each other. There is a widespread fundamental misunderstanding of federalism, either as a way of splitting up an existing united (national) community (as in the French tradition of political thought), or of aiming at a centralized “Super State” (as in the United Kingdom, or, more recently, in Central European countries). Both misunderstand the relationship between unity and diversity – the Hertenstein group got it right: Without federal unity, the Europeans would not be able to preserve their diversity, in the face of such powerful homogenizing forces like the USSR and USA.