Manuscript Title

Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Cold War Soviet Union, 1945-1970

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Introduction

~~Our exploration of Soviet organized cultural recreation begins with t~~The 1955 movie "Carnival Night" (*Karnaval'naia noch'*)~~.~~,[1] ~~D~~directed by El'dar Riazanov, ~~the film~~ depicts a New Year's Eve celebration in a club (*klub*), one of many similar institutions that hosted mass cultural activities. ~~These~~ Clubs hosted ~~included~~ amateur music, dancing, and theater with widescale participation, termed amateur artistic creativity (*khudozhestvennaia samodeiatel'nost'*), ~~and~~ along with festive events such as youth parties and New Year celebrations. In "Carnival Night," Comrade Ogurtsov took charge of the club just before New Year's Eve. Discontent with the plan for the festive evening, he demanded that the program "be typical" and "most importantly, serious!" Ogurtsov forced a ballerina to put on less revealing attire and drained all the humor from the clown show. He banned the performance of the club's amateur ensemble, whose large complement of saxophones suggested a controversial jazz overtone and therefore foreign cultural influence. Instead, Ogurtsov wanted to invite a traditional, orthodox ensemble from the pensioners' association. He proposed starting the celebration with a speech on the club's achievements, followed by a propaganda lecture.

However, the young club workers and volunteer amateur performers refused to accept Ogurtsov's plan for such a boring and politicized event. Taking matters into their own hands, they used subterfuge to achieve their goals, for example, by getting the propaganda lecturer drunk. The club's amateur ensemble dressed up as pensioners, beginning their performance with staid classical music. The camera's close-up of Ogurtsov showed his surprise when the "pensioners" launched into a jazz-style number heavy on saxophones and brass, and his anger when they began to do somersaults. By the

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[1] On this film and the controversies surrounding it, see Josephine Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 51-56.

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end of the movie, the club's young employees and amateur performers had managed to ensure a festive and fun evening for everyone except Ogurtsov.

The movie proved controversial from the first. ~~Some p~~Prominent officials disparaged the script for its focus on entertainment and fun over politics, and for encouraging undue initiative from below. Such attacks came from individuals who held what may be defined as a hard-line, conservative position, which included ~~some combination of the following:~~ some combination of ~~committment to a~~ militant, narrowly-defined ~~construal of~~ Marxism-Leninism, the official Soviet ideology; demand for close control from above; support for a xenophobic version of Soviet nationalism; ~~finally~~and, espousal of traditional, rural social and cultural values. Each cadre holding a hard-line view shared some or all of these elements, explaining her or his antagonism toward this film. Only the sustained advocacy of those bureaucrats expressing more liberal, soft-line sentiments–advocating a combination of pluralism and tolerance in interpreting Marxism-Leninism, a more cosmopolitan and internationalist outlook, and greater engagement from and autonomy for the grassroots–enabled the movie's completion. Regardless of hard-line censure, "Carnival Night" drew a huge audience, becoming one of the most popular Soviet films of all time.

The film's portrayal of the tensions in clubs between political propaganda and popular entertainment, between orthodox music and foreign jazz, and between popular initiative and bureaucratic directives reflects the broader strains within the state's cultural recreation offerings. This book examines such official cultural activities during the first quarter century of the Cold War, often called the First Cold War. It tells the story of how Soviet authorities attempted to construct an appealing version of socialist popular culture as an alternative to the predominant "western" model that had such enormous worldwide allure.[2] Soviet cultural functionaries strove to define the public norms

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[2] This book does not capitalize "western," "west," or "western Europe" to avoid giving the impression of homogenizing a widely varied set of historical experiences and dividing a supposedly cohesive "West" from "East." See Martin W. Lewis

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for cultural "fun." I use "fun" to refer to those cultural activities in which people found meaning, pleasure, and joy, and into which they invested time, energy, and resources primarily out of their own volition and initiative. Many youngsters responded enthusiastically to the Kremlin's cultural policies, and had fun within government-managed cultural spaces. However, popular desires did not overlap fully with top-level guidelines, resulting in hidden tensions and open conflicts.

My monograph brings to light a little-studied sphere that I call "state-sponsored popular culture"–cultural activities by the masses within government institutions. Looking at state-sponsored popular culture helps move away from the traditional focus on intelligentsia elites as cultural creators, instead spotlighting ordinary citizens. State-sponsored popular culture elides the traditional distinctions between "high" culture, sophisticated artistic forms aimed at elite tastes, and "low" culture, entertaining cultural activities intended to appeal to the masses, with both typically performed by professional artists. State-sponsored popular culture contained a broad spectrum of genres for a ~~wide~~ variety of tastes, all produced by non-professional volunteer artists in officially-managed cultural settings.[3]

That 4,800,000 Soviet citizens performed as amateurs by 1953, a number that rose to 9,000,000

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and Karen E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1-19; Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 1-30.

[3] For a broader take on Russian popular culture that considers cultural activities produced both by and for the masses, see Louise McReynolds, "Russia's Popular Culture in History and Theory," in Abbott Gleason ed., *A Companion to Russian History* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 295-310. For more on post-1945 amateur arts, see Susan Costanzo, "Amateur Theaters and Amateur Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86.2 (April 2008): 372-94; Bella Ostromoukhova, "Le Dégel et les troupes amateur. Changements politiques et activités artistiques des étudiants, 1953-1970," *Cahiers du monde russe* 47.1-2 (January-June 2006): 303-25; and A. G. Borzenkov, *Molodezh' i politika: Vozmozhnosti i predely studencheskoi samodeiatel'nosti na vostoke Rossii (1961-1991 gg.), Chast' 1* (Novosibirsk: Novosibsirskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 2002), 2-4. For an analysis of the debates about elite-oriented versus the mass-oriented cultural production, see Herbert J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste* (New York, Basic Books, 1999).

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in 1962, underscores the broad appeal of organized cultural recreation.[4] The Communist Party managed this sphere through government institutions and Party-controlled social organizations such as trade unions and the Komsomol, together known as the Party-state complex. The Komsomol, the mass Soviet youth organization, accepted those ranging from approximately fourteen to twenty-eight, and this study defines "youth" as those eligible to join the Komsomol. This social demographic had ~~some~~ significant divisions based on factors such as age, occupation, social class, gender, and geographical location. Nonetheless, since the Party-state's cultural recreation policy treated this cohort in a largely unified fashion, which powerfully shaped the opportunities, experiences, and societal perceptions of the young, it makes analytical sense to consider young people as a cohesive category for this study.

Examining the artistic creativity of millions of amateurs belies typical classifications of Soviet cultural activities within the official/unofficial binary. The label "official" typically refers to thoroughly vetted cultural production by state-employed artists in government cultural venues; "unofficial" encompasses cultural activities that did not pass through cultural censorship and occurred in non-state settings. Amateur artists performed in Party-state cultural institutions, with some degree of oversight, making these official activities. However, amateurs had much greater room to maneuver, due to their non-professional status, presumed lack of cultural knowledge, and performance to small audiences. Moreover, as most amateurs did not intend to build careers around artistic activities, they had much less to fear from pushing the boundaries. Likewise, the mass nature of amateur arts, with millions of

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[4] For 1953, see Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), *fond* (f.) M-1, *opis'* (op.) 32, *delo* (d.) 741, *list* (l.) 3. For 1962, see S. P. Pavlov, *Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii XXII s''ezda KPSS* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 51. Like all Soviet statistics, these were probably manipulated by lower-level officials eager to inflate their accomplishments. Still, this evidence reflects the reality of widespread participation in amateur arts. Moreover, as local bureaucrats were just as likely to massage numbers in 1953 and 1962, we can validly speak about the growth of participation in amateur arts over this period.

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participants, made it a challenge to impose thorough top-down controls. These factors resulted in substantially weaker censorship over state-sponsored popular culture as compared to professional cultural production.

The USSR's vast network of club buildings, numbering over 123,000 in 1953, functioned as the chief venue for cultural recreation.[5] A typical mid-size club had two halls for concerts, dances, theatrical performances, movie showings, lectures, political meetings, and other events, several smaller rooms for amateur groups to practice their artistic activities, a recreation area with various games, books, newspapers, and sport equipment, and a cafeteria. The club administration had the mission of providing financial and logistical support for amateur arts and cultural events, while ensuring that these activities followed the cultural policy dictated from above. The Party-state leaders considered clubs as an important site of socialist construction, where youth subjectivity—, meaning a sense of self and one's place within society—, gets reforged into that of a model Soviet subject ready to help the country transition to communism. Owing to the widespread popularity of state-sponsored cultural entertainment, clubs constituted central public spaces for youth entertainment, socializing, leisure, and romance. While this made clubs a crucial location for the construction of personal worldview and self-identity of young club-goers, such individual subjectivities did not always match top-level intentions.[6]

These disparities resulted from divergent visions of appropriately "socialist" fun. A key point of tension resulted from a large proportion of young people enjoying western popular culture, such as jazz in the style of Louis Armstrong and John Coltrane, rock and roll by the Beatles and Elvis Presley, and dances such as the foxtrot and boogie-woogie, while not perceiving their behavior as anti-Soviet. By

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[5] O. K. Makarova, *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1956), 273.

[6] I define "identity" as a concept encompassing an individual's personal worldview and beliefs–their selfhood or subjectivity. I will thus use these terms interchangeably. For criticism of the undefined use of "identity," see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society* 29.1 (February 2000): 1-47.

contrast, many militant ideologues considered western cultural influence as subversive, especially in the Cold War context. Such hardliners proclaimed that young people should have fun by partaking in heavily politicized cultural activities, or at the very least highly orthodox and traditional ones such as ballet, perceived widely as instilling appropriate cultural values. In some years, such militant perspectives prevailed in defining central policy. Yet even then, certain club managers continued to host the controversial but popular western-inflected cultural forms, using deceptive practices to do so. A key motivation sprang from their need to fulfill the annual plan, which required enticing audiences to visit the club and encouraging amateurs to perform there voluntarily. Club administrators functioned at the uncomfortable intersection of carrying out top-level cultural mandates while organizing artistic activities that had wide popularity among the citizenry. ~~This speaks to a more general point. Namely, the shape of~~Their experience shows that organized cultural recreation did not simply reflect from the Kremlin's guidelines at any given point. State-sponsored popular culture was defined by the always-evolving and frequently-strained relationship between the leadership's directives, the varied incentives facing the cultural apparatus, and the desires and activism of ordinary citizens.

Socialist Fun and the Soviet Project

Socialist fun was central role to the overarching goal at the heart of the Soviet project: developing a socialist version of modernity. "Socialist modernity" refers to a society, culture, and a way of life widely perceived as progressive and advanced, as informed by Marxism-Leninism, and as actively constructed by human efforts. Scholars such as Anthony Giddens consider "modernity" a new stage in history defined by a break with notions of a tradition-based static society. Replacing these assumptions with the conception that humans themselves construct and order social structures, modernity implicitly promised that people can build a perfect world on the basis of reason. From the beginning, the Soviet project endeavored to construct an alternative to the dominant western paradigm of a capitalist modernity: Zygmunt Bauman thus termed socialism the "counter-culture of modernity."
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Indeed, perceiving western modernity as characterized by class divisions, social conflict, consumerism, and individualism, the Party sought a different path to the future–a socialist modernity, one placing greater value on egalitarianism, community-mindedness, altruism, and collectivism. However, the emphasis on these values, the vision of the specific form that such modernity would take, and the methods of attaining it changed over time.[7]

The early Soviet years involved a series of radical transformations aimed at building the utopian future. By the mid-1930s, the Stalinist leadership proclaimed that the country had built the foundations of socialism, changing the focus to guarding its accomplishments. During the "Thaw," the decade and a half following I. V. Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, the new leadership under N. S. Khrushchev revived the drive to move from socialism to communism. The term "Thaw" should not be read as equating the post-Stalin period with unvarnished liberalism, but as conveying the series of thaws and chills in this ambiguous and multivalent, but overall more pluralistic, tolerant, and grassroots-oriented era. The complexities, zigzags, and contradictions in Thaw-era policy resulted, to a large extent, from a combination of the Soviet Union engaging in the Cold War while trying to transition to communism.[8]

The post-Stalin authorities transformed the isolationist and top-down late Stalinist vision of socialist modernity into a novel Thaw-era model that aimed for grassroots engagement and for broad popularity at home and abroad. The new leadership rejected the previous tendency of simply dictating

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[7] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 1; Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 263. For a variety of historically-informed perspectives on modernity, see "*AHR* Roundtable: Historians and the Question of 'Modernity'," *American Historical Review* 116.3 (June 2011): 631-751.

[8] On the Stalinist leadership's shift, see David L. Hoffmann, "Was There a 'Great Retreat' from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered," *Kritika* 5.4 (Fall 2004): 651-74. On the term "Thaw," see Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1-13; Nancy Condee, "Uncles, Deviance, and Ritual Combat: The Cultural Codes of Khrushchev's Thaw," in William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason eds., *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 160-76.

cultural norms from above and gave some weight to actual youth desires and preferences; moved away from demanding disciplined compliance to the officialdom and instead encouraged the young to express some autonomous initiative; finally, they decreased the politicization of club activities and placed a much greater emphasis on entertainment and fun, including by giving official sanction for a modicum of western-style cultural forms. Likewise, the post-Stalin administration increasingly pulled aside the Iron Curtain, to showcase the USSR, including its organized cultural recreation, as an attractive socialist alternative to the western modernity. Indeed, the socialist alternative had wide global acclaim, especially in the 1950s and 1960s when the Soviet project seemed most vibrant due to its apparent creation of social harmony, rapid economic growth, technological achievements, military might, and anti-colonial internationalist orientation. Billions in East and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and eastern Europe oriented themselves toward the socialist version of modernity rather than the western one. So did a significant minority of westerners.[9]

Yet to secure legitimacy for a socialist modernity, the post-Stalin Kremlin needed to present an alluring version of socialist fun. This proved especially important and difficult in popular culture, the sphere where western modernity had a vast global influence. The Soviet leadership wanted to forge a socialist popular culture, of equal or greater attraction than the western one, that would convey socialist

[9] On the global appeal of socialist modernity after 1945, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 131; Odd A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 79-109; and Kate A. Baldwin, *Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Black and Red, 1922-1963* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 202-52. On interwar efforts to impress visiting cultural intellectuals with Soviet culture, see Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-27; Katerina Clark, *Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 1-41; and Liudmila Stern, *Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920-1940: From Red Square to the Left Bank* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1-11.

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values, the latter defined by whatever the current Party line prescribed. In doing so, policy makers also aimed to ensure their cultural hegemony, meaning support among the masses for the cultural standards propounded by the ruling elites, necessary for maintaining political power and ensuring social stability.[10]

My analysis builds upon the work of Stephen Kotkin and David Hoffmann, who demonstrated the Soviet project's ideologically-driven rejection of capitalism as part of the drive to build a modern alternative to the western model in the pre-World War II USSR. While extending their insights about the importance of Soviet ~~ideological constructs~~ ideology to the postwar years, my research indicates that World War II and especially the Cold War acquired a great deal of weight after 1945. ~~On the one hand,~~ .this conflict The Cold War served as an existential threat to the Soviet Union~~,~~ and ~~thus~~ its achievements in building the foundations of socialism. On the other hand, ~~the Cold War~~ it revived the possibility of socialism triumphing around the globe, not only in one country, reinvigorating the dream of reaching communism in the foreseeable future.[11]

This book challenges those, such as Martin Malia, ~~-~~who treat the USSR as unique ~~such as Martin Malia~~. It also departs from György Péteri and others who underscore the similarities between different socialist states in trying to build a socialist exception to the western version of modernity, without placing these modernizing projects in a global setting. ~~My narrative perceives~~ Tthe Soviet version of socialist modernity ~~w~~as one ~~among~~ of many socialist modernities, ~~although acnowledging that the Soviet~~ though it ~~model~~ functioned as the archetypal and most influential socialist modernity. Furthermore, I argue that the USSR constituted one among many "multiple modernities," countries that

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[10] On cultural hegemony, see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith trans. and ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 57-58, 263-76.

[11] David L. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-41* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 1-14; Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 355-66.

seek to forge a modern society different from the western model. Situating Perceiving the Soviet Union as a among a field of multiple modernitiesy provides significant analytic benefit by helpingallows us to move beyond the Eurocentric emphasis of traditional modernization theory, which assumes an inevitable eventual convergence of all systems on a western modernity.[12]

A multiple modernities perspective highlights the contributions that the USSR as a case study brings to other fields. Thus, this book develops the theory of multiple modernities by noting that during the Cold War, the USSR aimed to construct the most prominent alternative modernity and also presented itself as a model to emulate for all others countries striving to forge a modern society distinct from the western one. Likewise, I highlight the tensions inherent in the Soviet version of modernity. Differing ideas of what constituted a truly socialist modernity sparked conflicts within the USSR. Comparing these to debates over modernization projects in other contexts produces illuminating insights.[13]

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[12] Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917- 1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 1-20; György Péteri, "Introduction: The Oblique Coordinate Systems of Modern Identity," in György Péteri eds., *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 1-12. On multiple modernities, see the essays in Dominic Sachsenmaier, Schmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Jens Riedel eds., *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese, and Other Interpretations* (Boston: Brill, 2001); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt ed., *Multiple Modernities* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002); and Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzak Sternberg eds., *Identity, Culture, and Globalization* (Boston: Brill, 2001). For an application of this idea to the USSR, see David L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 3. On modernization theory, see Michael E. Latham, "Introduction," in David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 1-24. On moving beyond Eurocentricism, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-26.

[13] On debates over modernization projects in other contexts, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1998), 1-8; Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 2-39; Mike

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~~Undertaking an in-depth scrutiny of the~~Scrutinizing clashes over state-sponsored popular culture from 1945 to 1970, my study also looks backward to their origins. Adopting this wide-lens approach exposes their roots in early Soviet and even pre-revolutionary disputes over "spontaneity" versus "consciousness," namely whether a socialist cultural industry should privilege grassroots spontaneity or top-down ideologically conscious guidance, as well as the extent to which it should focus on ideological propaganda, on cultural enlightenment, or on pleasurable entertainment. The answers to these questions evolved throughout Soviet history, defining the nature of state-sponsored popular culture at any given time.[14]

Likewise, this monograph looks forward to the consequences of these struggles during the 1970s and 1980s, ~~which underscores the sizable degree of~~underscoring the key role that contingency played in the ~~eventual~~ failure of socialist modernity. After the 1964 coup against Khrushchev, ~~the new L. I.~~Leonid Brezhnev and his allies ~~leadership~~ gradually turned away from soliciting initiative from below. This militant turn had an especially powerful impact on youth, as it went against early the Thaw-inspired ~~rising~~ expectations ~~among the young~~ that the Party-state would grant them ever-increasing cultural autonomy. The Brezhnev administration's choice severely undermined youth commitment to the Soviet project, a conclusion complicating accounts that posit the inevitable triumph of western over socialist culture.[15]

Featherstone, *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007 [1991]), 1-12; and Raymond Williams, *The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists*, Tony Pinkney ed. (New York: Verso, 1989), 1-30.

[14] For two different scholarly takes on early Soviet debates over spontaneity versus consciousness, see Anna Krylova, "Beyond the Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: 'Class Instinct' as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis," *Slavic Review* 62.1 (Spring 2003): 1-23; Leopold H. Haimson, "Lenin's Revolutionary Career Revisited: Some Observations on Recent Discussions," *Kritika 5.1* (Winter 2004): 55-80.

[15] Such accounts include Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 3-6; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "The Empire of the Fun, or

Addressing the lived experience of socialist youth culture provides insights into the Soviet system's endeavor to build a modern socialist youth–the New Soviet (Young) Person. The Marxist-Leninist canon assigned the young a central role as those not only constructing but also slated to live in communist utopia; in turn, youth represented a major social demographic. Consequently, the Kremlin invested a great deal of resources into managing the young. Recent archive-based histories have revealed much about post-1945 young intelligentsia. Scholars have also investigated extensively the small numbers of countercultural youth. Such studies have shed much-needed light on the inadequecies in the Party-state's cultural policies. Nonetheless, the cultural practices of the large majority of ordinary youth who did not openly deviate from official cultural norms remain largely in the shadows. This problematic dynamic implicitly reproduces the imbalance found in writings on western youth, which excessively privileges nonconformists. Consequently, the overarching image emerging from scholarship on Soviet and non-Soviet youth alike conveys an unrepresentative picture of reality.[16]

Talkin' Soviet Union Blues: The Sound of Freedom and U.S. Cultural Hegemony in Europe," *Diplomatic History* 23.3 (Summer 1999): 499-524.

[16] For New Soviet People, see Igal Halfin, *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 205-82; Peter Fritzsche and Jochen Hellbeck, "The New Man in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany," in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 302-44. On young cultural elites, see Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 1-22; L. B. Brusilovskaia, *Kul'tura povsednevnosti v epokhu "ottepeli": Metamorfozy stilia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo URAO, 2001), 169-74. On countercultural youth, see William J. Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 179-250; Sergei Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 65-106. On western countercultural youth, see the essays in Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris eds., *After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., *Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain* (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1975]).

An investigation of mass-oriented cultural entertainment casts doubt on the widespread notion, expressed by David Caute, Sergei Zhuk, and Reinhold Wagnleitner among others, that Soviet youth generally longed for western culture and did not find pleasure and fun within official culture. Building on Alexei Yurchak and Kristin Roth-Ey's work on other cultural spheres, my analysis of club activities indicates that many Soviet youngsters saw no contradiction between a full commitment to building communism and an appreciation for certain elements of western culture. In other words, loyal Soviet youth could like both communism and jazz, Khrushchev and Coltrane.[17]

> **Comment [M3]:** Nicely put!

Moreover, Soviet organizations not only permitted, but in some cases even encouraged, a surprising amount of room for agency. Agency refers to behavior primarily motivated by an individual's personal interests and wants, as opposed to conduct imposed forcefully by external forces. Exploring Soviet organized cultural recreation underscores that grassroots agency did not necessarily translate to resistance or subversion, countering narratives that juxtapose state and society and postulate an inherent rift between a genuine, everyday culture and an official, state-managed one. Significant numbers among the young readily devoted themselves to cultural activities that bore a substantial ideological load, such as singing songs eulogizing Stalin. Their conduct demonstrates what I term "conformist agency," the conscious and willing decision, stemming primarily from one's internal motivations and desires, to act in ways that follow top-level guidelines closely.[18] Plenty, however,

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[17] David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2; Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City*, 3, 6; Wagnleitner, "The Empire of the Fun, or Talkin' Soviet Union Blues"; Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 219; and Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 1-5.

[18] My definition of agency draws on Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5-11; Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *The American Historical Review* 99.5 (December 1994): 1475-90; Ken Roberts, *Youth in Transition: Eastern Europe and the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 14; and Birgitte Søland, *Becoming Modern: Young Women and the*

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expressed their individual agency by abstaining from amateur arts with thoroughly politicized repertoires. Instead, they enjoyed singing folk songs and acting in Russian prerevolutionary plays, and a . Moreover, a large number engaged in western-themed cultural activities in clubs. The most avid fans took deceptive measures to avoid censorship during periods of top-level militancy and anti-western jingoism.

In the early Thaw, the authorities opened up a great deal of room forallowed young people to shape state-sponsored popular culture through a major campaign to promote initiative from below, greatly expanding the space for autonomous youth agency and self-determination within official settings. This drive helped lead to the transformations in behavior, worldview, and cultural tastes from those growing up in the period between the end of the war and Stalin's death, whom Juliane Fürst called the "last Stalin generation," and those coming of age in the turbulent mid- and late 1950s. I term this age cohort the "post-Stalin generation." While those who grew up at the same time may Generations share many characteristics, but a a shared sense of belonging to the same social group is a crucial component of a powerful generation consists of a shared sense among its members of belonging to the same social group. In this way, a generation parallels any otherwhat Benedict Anderson has called an -imagined community, Benedict Anderson's term for a group, such as a nation, -whose members share a common sense of identity and community, though their relations are distant and "imagined," rather than direct and personal. based primarily upon people imagining themselves to belong to it, thereby feeling a sense of identification with and loyalty to that community and its

The comment bubble **Comment [M4]:** Only of a powerful generation?

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members. The post-Stalin generation, I find, possessed a much greater sense of belonging to the same age cohort and consequently generational cohesion than the last Stalin generation, which helped the post-Stalin generation push for major cultural reforms and stand up to older authority figures. The post-Stalin generation met with some notable successes in changing top-level cultural policy and its grassroots implementation. The minute actions of millions of young people uniting with others of their age group to advocate for their personal and mutual wants not only shaped their everyday environment, but also powerfully influenced the wider Soviet cultural field. Youth agency thus helped determine broad historical processes, a parallel to what Lawrence Grossberg found about the social impact of young people in western contexts.[19]

State-sponsored popular culture helped define a socialist mode of cultural consumption. The burgeoning historiography on socialist consumption, which largely focuses on material consumer goods, has underscored the obstacles faced by Soviet rulers in finding an appropriately socialist approach to consumption. This book proposes that mass-oriented collective cultural activities in clubs served as a lynchpin in the Kremlin's efforts to define and enact a socialist form of consumption and build a socialist version of a consumer society. However, deep tensions existed between ideological imperatives and market-like financial consumerist forces in state-sponsored popular culture. Different Party-state bodies gave more weight to one or the other, according to their varying missions and the political positions of the bureaucrats in each organ. These agencies frequently acted at cross purposes, undermining the imposition of a cohesive mode of socialist cultural consumption. This underscores the inefficiencies and contradictions within the Soviet top-down bureaucratic system. Such problems helped ordinary citizens and lower-level administrators alike maneuver within official institutions and

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[19] Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 17-18; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7; Lawrence Grossberg, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 113-27.

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challenge the center's cultural policy, ensuring that both groups possessed real agency. Furthermore, youth used their agency to refashion the nature and meanings of club cultural consumption offerings to fit their own individual interests. This data expands our understanding of how individuals remake mainstream products to suit their own needs.[20]

Setting my case within an international framework highlights intriguing parallels and distinctions between how twentieth-century European authoritarian states, such as the USSR, socialist eastern Europe, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, used cultural production for the masses as a tool for governance. The Soviet Union, in this regard, constituted what Bauman termed a "gardening state," referring to how modern authoritarian governments strive to transform–to garden–their populations into an ordered society that fits the leadership's needs and ideals. Drawing attention to commonalities and differences around the globe in the struggle against the postwar expansion of American popular culture, my work contributes to our understanding of how both socialist and non-socialist societies resisted US cultural globalization. By emphasizing that governments could play a substantial role in shaping popular culture, consumerism, aesthetic tastes, and leisure, my project expands the western-centric academic models that used only North American and western European capitalist democratic contexts as the basis for their evidence and gave minimal attention to state structures.[21]

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[20] On cultural consumption in Soviet Ukraine, including in clubs, see Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City*, 7-9. For cultural consumption in the center, see Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time*, 176-222. On socialist Cold War consumption, see the essays in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid eds., *Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010); Péteri eds., *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. On how people refashion mainstream products, see Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* Steven F. Rendall trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 29-42.

[21] For organized cultural recreation in socialist eastern Europe, see Uta G. Poiger*, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 1-30; Paulina Bren, *The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-10; and Esther von Richthofen, *Bringing Culture to the Masses, Control, Compromise and Participation in the*

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Investigating the grassroots impact of top-level cultural guidelines gets at the notoriously difficult issue of reception of popular culture. At one end of the spectrum in my narrative stand young cultural activists and performers who embraced officially-prescribed, orthodox cultural offerings. Many youth found themselves closer to the middle, participating in mainstream club activities while occasionally testing the boundaries. On the far end of the range lie avid fans of western popular culture who pushed state-managed cultural institutions to host their favored musical genres. A crucial subgroup among the latter consisted of "jazz enthusiasts," my translation of the term *dzhazovye liudi* used by one of the most famous Soviet and post-Soviet jazz musicians, the late ~~G. A. Garanian~~Georgii Garanian, to describe himself and his friends in his interview with me: "we were so into jazz that we had no other interests, it was jazz and nothing else," he stated. These jazz enthusiasts formed a fan community, getting together with other aficionados to: listen to jazz, especially the newest and most fashionable styles; learn everything about this music and spread their knowledge to anyone interested; collect and trade jazz records; and, in many cases, to perform this music. While acknowledging their countercultural status in the late Stalin years, my study shows that many young jazz enthusiasts eagerly participated in state-sponsored popular culture once the post-Stalin leadership adopted a more pluralistic cultural stance. This finding ~~nuances the traditional paradigm~~ challenges scholarship that treats jazz behind the Iron Curtain as embodying oppositional attitudes, a longing for freedom, and a

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GDR (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 1-27. For Fascist Italy, see Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 3-7. For Nazi Germany, see Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40-74. On "gardening states," see Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, 20. For a standard account of consumption that relies only on evidence from the United States and western Europe, see Daniel Miller, *Material Culture and Mass Consumption* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 147-217. On leisure, see Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions* (New York: The Modern Library, 1934 [1899]), 68-101. On popular culture, see Richard B. Gruneau eds., *Popular Cultures and Political Practices* (Toronto: Garamong Press, 1988). On taste, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Richard Nice trans. and ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 466-85.

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desire for an American way of life.[22]

      Speaking of "socialist fun" engages with literature that treats emotions not as simple biological givens, but as largely cultural constructs of a specific society that reflect underlying social values. For instance, the psychologists Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson have ~~thoroughly~~ demonstrated how people's emotional experience results, to a significant extent, from the feelings expressed by those around them, as well as from what individuals consider as the emotional norms in their society. Building on such ~~social science~~ research, recent publications by historians have drawn attention to the historical significance ~~of and~~ evolution ~~in~~ of emotions. William Reddy used the term "emotional regime" to describe the normative sentiments prescribed by the political, social, and cultural authorities at any given time, along with the mechanisms enforcing these feelings. The term "emotional community," coined by Barbara Rosenwein, refers to a group whose members follow shared norms of emotional expression and possess the same outlook on appropriate affect. Any society has an overarching emotional community and subordinate emotional communities, which engage with but elaborate upon and occasionally oppose the affective values of the primary emotional community. Looking at organized cultural recreation helps illuminate the evolution of Soviet emotional regimes and emotional communities in the first decades of the Cold War. Soviet cultural policy strove constantly to ensure that young people expressed and experienced officially-prescribed sentiments within state-

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[22] On reception of popular culture, see Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decoding " in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis ed., *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79* (London: Routledge, 2005 [1980]), 107-16; Toby Miller and Alec McHoul, *Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 1998), 1-5. For more on fan communities, see Simon Frith, "The Cultural Study of Popular Music," in Lawrence Grossburg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler eds., *Cultural Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 174-86; John Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction* (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2009), 223-25. For a typical narrative that considers jazz behind the Iron Curtain as inherently oppositional, see Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter, "Introduction," in Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter eds., *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 7-10.

sponsored popular culture. Yet the nature of the emotional regime changed a great deal between 1945 and 1970. ~~One~~ For example, a substantial shift occurred from a restrictive and militant emotional regime in the late Stalin years to a more pluralistic one in the early Thaw. This transformation represented a conscious step by the Khrushchev Kremlin to bring officially-prescribed emotions closer to the reality of youth emotional communities, as policy makers sought to mobilize feelings of enthusiasm and excitement among the young and channel these into renewing the drive toward communism. Still, top-level guidelines never entirely overlapped the actual tastes and sentiments of young club-goers, resulting in gaps between youth emotional communities and the Party-state's emotional regime. These fissures grew wide during periods of cultural conservatism, whether in the postwar Stalin era, at brief periods during the Khrushchev era, or in the late 1960s under Brezhnev, with many youth garnering pleasure and having fun from thumbing their noses at uptight prescriptions.[23]

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[23] Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson, *Emotional Contagion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 78-127; William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 128-29; Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2. Other scholarship on the importance of feelings in history includes Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis, "Introduction," in Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis eds., *An Emotional History of the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 1-14; Peter N. Stearns, *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 1-15; Randolph Roth, "Measuring Feelings and Beliefs that May Facilitate (or Deter) Homicide: A Research Note on the Causes of Historic Fluctuations in Homicide Rates in the United States," *Homicide Studies*, 16.2 (May 2012): 197-216; and Patricia T. Clough, "Introduction," in Patricia T. Clough with Jean Halley eds., *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 1-33. For insights on Soviet emotions, see the essays in Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol eds., *Interpreting Emotions in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011); Jan Plamper, Schamma Schahadat, and Marc Elie eds., *Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010).

Exploring how youth cliques readily engaged in and invested deep personal meaning into state-sponsored cultural activities contributes to recent scholarship questioning the traditional distinctions drawn between the Soviet public sphere–everything associated with the Party-state, such as official cultural production–and the private sphere–individual emotions, personal life, friends, sociability, family, and home. Organized cultural recreation embodied a liminal space that contained ~~a mixed bag of~~ elements ~~from~~ of what earlier scholarship labeled as public and private. These elements intertwined in a complex fashion to enmesh ordinary citizens within Party-state structures and ~~Marxism-Leninism-inflected ways of thinking about the world~~ideology. Simultaneously, the population's attitudes, preferences, and behaviors powerfully shaped the conditions facing and perceptions of local cadres and policy makers.[24]

The post-Stalin Kremlin's drive to build a modern and socialist popular culture that offered an alluring yet ideologically appropriate alternative to western popular culture placed the Soviet club network at the heart of the Cold War domestic cultural front. As recent publications have shown, the cultural struggle played a vital role in the Cold War's eventual outcome. In the contest for the hearts

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[24] For the traditional approach to public and private in the USSR, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3-18; Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 279-302. For an analysis depicting Soviet state and society as "us" and "them," see Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 124-46. For recent challenges to the traditional private/public paradigm, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "Introduction: Mapping Private Spheres in the Soviet Context," in Lewis H. Siegelbaum ed., *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-21; Deborah A. Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev's Russia* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007); and Benjamin K. Tromly, "Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948-1964" (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2007), 94-150. For a theoretical take on public and private spheres, see Peter U. Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere, and Culture: Jurgen Habermas and His Critics," *New German Critique* 16 (Winter 1979): 89-119.

and minds of domestic and foreign audiences, both sides deployed culture as a weapon of soft power, the ability to achieve international geopolitical goals through attraction rather than coercion. ~~The scholarship has substantially~~ Scholars have furthered our understanding of western cultural diplomacy, government efforts to promote its domestic culture abroad and thereby win over world publics. Yet the more complex, and ultimately more revealing, question of the actual fruits of this soft power offensive on ~~the~~ Soviet daily cultural life remains poorly explored. By illuminating the grassroots effect, and effectiveness, of western cultural diplomacy–an issue just now starting to receive serious attention from pioneering scholars–my work complements and enriches our comprehension of the Cold War.[25]

Exploring Soviet state-sponsored popular culture enriches our understanding of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Surprisingly little work exists on how ~~the~~ authorities within socialist and non-socialist contexts alike deliberately utilized internal cultural structures to ~~impact~~ sway the opinions of foreign visitors. I term this practice "domestic cultural diplomacy" to distinguish it from the traditional understanding of cultural diplomacy, ~~government efforts to promote its national culture beyond its own~~

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[25] My definition of "soft power" draws on Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), x. For "cultural diplomacy," see Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xv. On cultural relations in international exchanges, see Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1-12. For western cultural diplomacy, see Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-30; Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), xii-xiv. For literature on the impact of western cultural diplomacy in the USSR, see Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 66-267; Susan E. Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959," *Kritika* 9.4 (Fall 2008): 855-904. For an overview of recent historiography on cultural diplomacy, see Thomas W. Zeiler, "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field" *Journal of American History* 95.4 (March 2009): 1053-073.

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~~boarders and thereby win over world publics,~~ which I suggest deserves the name "foreign cultural diplomacy." Existing scholarship has not drawn such distinctions, and as a result has overlooked cultural diplomacy oriented toward foreign visitors. ~~Failing to draw such distinctions has resulted in cultural diplomacy oriented toward foreigners within a country's own borders being overlooked in the scholarship.~~ The Party-state's leadership aspired to use its domestic mass cultural network to convince outsiders that the Soviet Union ~~has~~ had an attractive and socialist popular culture. State-sponsored popular culture also proved useful for foreign cultural diplomacy, as the Soviet authorities sent amateur artists to international cultural events, such as jazz festivals. Tracing the impact of these activities on both Soviet visitors and the foreigners with whom they interacted enriches the growing scholarship on the significance of Cold War cross-border interactions among non-state actors. Moreover, examining both domestic and foreign Soviet cultural diplomacy helps place the Soviet Union within the context of twentieth century transnational history.[26]

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[26] Works dealing with western Cold War cultural diplomacy occasionally mention efforts to impact foreigners who visit through cultural activities, but do not explore this topic in a systematic manner: Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 243. For young foreign visitors in particular, see Karen M. Paget, "From Cooperation to Covert Action: The United States Government and Students, 1940-52," in Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford eds., *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 66-82; Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 122-28; Jöel Kotek, *Students and the Cold War*, Ralph Blumenau trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 210-24. On the importance of sub-state interactions in the Cold War, see Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklossy eds., *Reassessing Cold War Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2011). On transnational history as it applies to the Soviet context, see Michael David-Fox, "Introduction: Entangled Histories in the Age of Extremes," in Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin eds., *Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914-1945* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 1-12; György Péteri, "Introduction," in György Péteri ed., *Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe* (Trondheim: Trondheil Studies on East European Cultures & Societies, 2006), 1-14.

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The gGrassroots events and exchanges in the mass cultural network constituted a critical daily experience of the Cold War for the population, while also representing a central component and microcosm of the superpower conflict as a whole, demonstrating the necessity of using micro-level case studies in order to grasp key elements of the Cold War. Moreover, sSuch evidence suggests the validity of treating the Soviet Union as one among many "Cold War cultures," countries that experienced powerfully the struggle between the blocs on an everyday cultural level. I wish to avoid Cold War determinism, the idea that every development from 1945 to 1991 stems from the superpower conflict, and acknowledge fully that the Cold War did not touch everything, and that other international processes had important transnational impacts during this period. far from everything in that period had a substantial Cold War component, in the USSR or elsewhere. Other international processes had important transnational impacts. Likewise, each individual polity had particular internal historical trends that drove domestic developments prior to and after 1945. HoweverNevertheless, the Cold War played a very significant role in many historical developments during these years, including in Soviet cultural practices., as my My narrative shows by that linking the superpower struggle to influenced day-to-day lived experiences., and Additionally, that the cultural Cold War at the grassroots had real significance for Soviet rulers., as the growing Growing concerns about what many political elites saw as the subversive impact of western culture, along with top-level desires to influence foreign attitudes through domestic cultural diplomacy, influenced their actions in the domestic and foreign policy arenas.[27]

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[27] On the need for micro-level case studies of the Cold War, see Jeffrey A. Engel eds., *Local Consequences of the Global Cold War* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2007). For Cold War cultures, see Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger eds., *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Rana Mitter and Patrick Major eds., *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2004). On a nuanced take on the impact of the Cold War on US culture and Cold War determinism, see Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, "US Culture and the Cold War," in Peter J.

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Sources and Structure

A diverse complement of sources illuminates four interlinked elements of state-sponsored popular culture. First, my book examines the nature of and debates over policy formation within central institutions using central archives, including the files of the Komsomol, the trade unions, the Ministry of Culture, and the Party. Second, recognizing that local practice frequently diverged from federal intentions, this project uses regional archives to compare top-level policy implementation in Moscow and Saratov. A regional center on the Volga, Saratov, as most provincial Soviet cities, was closed to non-socialist foreigners. It thereby offers a representative example of youth experience in the Russian heartland outside of the atypical, and exhaustively researched, settings of Moscow or Leningrad. This study surveys closely two working-class neighborhoods, Moscow's Krasnopresnenskii and Saratov's Kirovskii districts. The documents of several large enterprises and universities reveal ground-level policy enactment. These include Moscow State University (Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet), the USSR's flagship educational institution, and Saratov State University (Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, SGU), one of the strongest Soviet regional universities. The experience of working-class youth emerges from Saratov's Third State Ball-Bearing factory, and Moscow's "Krasnyi Bogatyr'" and "Trekhgornaia Manufaktura." My work thereby brings to light both federal policies toward and the grassroots daily life of young urbanites–middle class and working class, women and men, in the capital

> **Comment [M7]:** Seems like this should have "factories" at the end of the sentence

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Kuznick and James Gilbert eds., *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 1-13. For a different view, see Lary May, "Introduction," in Lary May eds., *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 1-18. For how domestic concerns and priorities, including about western popular culture, influenced post-Stalin Soviet foreign and internal policy, see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 1-5; Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 39-82.

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and in the Soviet Russian provinces–who attended official cultural events; while the center's directives applied to organized cultural recreation offerings for peasants and those in non-Russian regions, my study does not deal with their day-to-day cultural experience.[28]

Third, this study explores the depictions of organized cultural recreation in official discourse. Tracing the evolution in this rhetoric furthers our comprehension of the shifts in the official ways of thinking, talking about, depicting, and understanding Soviet reality, which also played a powerful role in constituting the worldview and cultural practices of young people. My sources here include national, regional, and local newspapers, instruction booklets for cultural officials, literary works, movies, and musical repertoires.

Fourth, to comprehend how young people perceived and experienced state-sponsored popular culture on the day-to-day level, this work relies on first-hand accounts, including memoirs, diaries, and most importantly a series of open-ended interviews I conducted with fifty-eight individuals. My interviewees include lower-level, mid-ranking, and top officials who participated in formulating and enacting organized cultural recreation, for instance Liubov. K. Baliasnaia, a high-level official in the Komsomol central hierarchy, and A. I. AvrusAnatolii Avrus, the leader of the Komsomol cell at Saratov State UniversitySGU. I spoke with youth cultural activists who engaged extensively in state-sponsored popular culture, such as Iurii. V. Gaponov, the leader of an innovative amateur artistic collective at Moscow State University, and Iurii. V. Sokolov, who participated in a variety of mass cultural activities. Jazz enthusiasts constitute the third category of interview subjects, whether Muscovites famous across the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, for instance Garanian or Aleksei. A. Kuznetsov, and Saratovites well-known in that city, including Felix. M. Arons and Iurii. P. Zhimskii.

Treating these oral sources as autobiographical texts, my methodology follows Donald Raleigh

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[28] On the divergence of local practice from central directives, and for more on Saratov, see Donald J. Raleigh, "Introduction," in Donald J. Raleigh ed., *Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2001), 1-14.

and other scholars in considering interview accounts to reflect people's interpretation of the narratives of their lives rather than an entirely accurate portrayal of the past. Taking into account that the stories individuals tell about themselves change throughout the course of their own history caused me to look for patterns across my interview subjects rather than trusting the memory of any one person and to remain aware of how new experiences shape recollections. My approach involves paying the greatest attention to those narrators who consciously differentiated between the values and emotions of their youthhood and their current sense of self. In analyzing the self-reported meanings that former youth ~~told me they~~ drew from and the feelings they experienced in state-sponsored popular culture, I most valued accounts that illustrated how behavioral changes eventuated from such emotions and meanings. This book used archival and published sources to complement and test oral evidence, holding highest those interviews that best correlated with written documents. The interviews served as invaluable tools for uncovering what happened behind the scenes of cultural events and within the interstices of youth cultural practices, spaces generally not reflected within archival documents and official publications. More than this, the interviews offer the best available instruments for getting insights on the meanings, emotions, and evaluations that young people associated with mass-oriented cultural activities. I follow a similar approach in analyzing memoirs and diaries, informed by Irina Paperno.[29]

The eight chapters combine a chronological and thematic structure. Chapter 1 overviews Soviet organized cultural recreation from its origins to the end of World War II, and then examines more thoroughly the immediate postwar period, 1945 and 1946. The next chapter investigates the extreme

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[29] Donald J. Raleigh, *Russia's Sputnik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk about their Lives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 10-12; Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 3-15; and Irina Paperno, *Stories of the Soviet Experience: Memoirs, Diaries, Dreams* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 209-10. On analyzing autobiographical sources, especially oral ones, in non-Soviet settings, see Harold Rosen, *Speaking from Memory: A Guide to Autobiographical Acts and Practices* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham, 1998), 1-15; Alessandro Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 45-58.

ideologization of the official prescriptions for club activities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Chapter 3 takes an in-depth look at the attacks on western-style music and dancing during the same period. In chapter 4, the book explores how the pluralistic cultural turn during the early Thaw, 1953-56, impacted organized cultural activities. The fifth chapter presents a case study of Thaw-era transformations, particularly the explosion of youth enthusiasm, by focusing on novel institutions such as youth initiative clubs. Chapter 6 provides insights on the Kremlin's campaign to instill normative cultural tastes among youth in a brief hard-line turn during the late 1950s. The seventh chapter deals with the revival of a more pluralistic approach to cultural policy from the end of the 1950s and into the early 1960s. Finally, chapter 8 teases out the ambiguities of the early post-Khrushchev years and the turn toward militancy by the end of the 1960s, concluding with the May 1970 Sixteenth Komsomol Congress, which defined the shape of the overarching Brezhnev-era policy toward cultural recreation.

The book illustrates the evolution in the Party-state's use of state-sponsored socialist fun in the Cold War context to help elucidate the primary alternative to the western paradigm of modernity. My research highlights the challenges faced by the authorities in achieving their goals, whether owing to disagreements among officials, incongruities within the Soviet institutional structure, or noncompliance by young people. At the same time, it demonstrates that the state's cultural policy, riven by tensions between a hard-line and soft-line approach, opened up significant room for youth agency and grassroots activism, with young people themselves playing a crucial role in defining state-sponsored popular culture.

Chapter 1: Ideology, Enlightenment, and Entertainment: State-Sponsored Popular Culture, 1917-46

The postwar Stalin years, 1945 to 1953, are widely depicted as a time of cultural militancy, when ~~with~~ official policy den~~yied~~ing the population's desires for truly enjoyable cultural fun. Yet ~~a late 1945 Komsomol report commended Moscow clubs that "regularly show movies" and "hold evenings of youth leisure," meaning youth-oriented events with dancing.[30]~~ ~~I~~in 1945 and early 1946 ~~both~~ Komsomol official reports ~~meant for internal policy guidance~~ and Komsomol newspaper articles intended for public consumption frequently praised mass-oriented cultural institutions for staging entertaining and widely popular events with little or no ideological content, such as youth dances and foreign movies.[31]

~~Understanding~~ To explain this unexpected cultural pluralism, the first part of this chapter ~~requires an appreciation of the~~ examines the broader historical context of Soviet cultural production . ~~The first part of the chapter accomplishes this goal,~~ and provides the framework for the rest of the book~~,~~ by tracing the history of state-sponsored popular culture from its pre-revolutionary origins through the end of World War II. It describes the basic institutions of organized cultural recreation and the ~~relevance to and~~ illuminates the primary tensions ~~surrounding~~ within them,~~organized cultural recreation~~. The second part of the chapter focuses on the first postwar year, elaborating upon the tolerant policy toward state-sponsored popular culture. This postwar permissiveness ~~approach~~ resulted from ~~several factors:~~ the momentum of wartime cultural lenience,~~;~~ the immediate needs of physical reconstruction~~;~~, and the Komsomol's lack of capacity to enforce a hard-line cultural position. ~~Consequently, organized~~ Organized cultural recreation demonstrates that the late Stalinist authorities,

[30] ~~RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.~~

[31] "Za poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, July 4, 1946. For the difference between internal and external official discourse, see Donald J. Raleigh, "Languages of Power: How the Saratov Bolsheviks Imagined Their Enemies," *Slavic Review* 57.2 (Summer 1998): 320-49.

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Comment [M8]: Seems like this is unnecessary; you could just fold it into the next sentence.

Comment [M9]: year or years?

Comment [M10]: is the policy is being elaborated, or is your analysis being elaborated?

for a few short months, actually sought to appeal to the population and satisfy popular desires for a more pluralistic society. Official discourse in this period presented a commitment to building a form of communism that was not irreconcilable with a desire for western popular culture, allowing young people a surprising degree of cultural space for maneuver, and marking a break with prewar Stalinist policies.

The Antecedents of the Soviet Mass Cultural Network

The antecedents of Soviet state-sponsored popular culture date back to the late nineteenth century. Some Russian industrialists, progressive lower-level officials, wealthy philanthropists, and members of the intelligentsia began to sponsor various forms of popular culture for the lower-class urban population, such as popular theaters and people's houses (*narodnye doma*), intended . They intended these offerings to promote what they saw as healthy, appropriate, modern, and cultured leisure activities over supposedly wasteful or harmful ones, , instead of what they considered wasteful and even harmful traditions such as drinking.[32] Liberal pedagogues also established several organizations that provided cultural education activities for lower-class youth.[33] Such initiatives responded to the social, economic, and cultural changes owing to the escalatingof industrialization and urbanization

[32] Louise McReynolds, *Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 14-75; E. Anthony Swift, *Popular Theater and Society in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Gary Thurston, *The Popular Theatre Movement in Russia, 1862-1919* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998); Kh. A. Khrenov, *Chelovek igraiuschii v russkoi kul'ture* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2005), 574-76; Kate Transchel, *Under the Influence: Working-Class Drinking, Temperance, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895-1932* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 1-11; and Lynn M. Sargeant, "High Anxiety: New Venues, New Audiences, and the Fear of the Popular in Late Imperial Russian Musical Life," *19th-Century Music* 35.2 (Fall 2011): 93-114.

[33] V. A. Berezina ed. *Dopolnitel'noe (vneshkol'noe) obrazovanie detei Rossii* (Moscow: "Dialog kul'tur," 2008), 10-11; Joan Neuberger, *Hooliganism: Crime, Culture; Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 205-09.

~~within~~ in imperial Russia. After the 1905 Revolution, autonomous workers' clubs ~~sprang up~~emerged, where ~~socially active and ambitious~~ workers gathered for cultural self-education, aided by intellectuals eager to assist them~~.~~ ~~;~~ ~~T~~these clubs occasionally served as cover for underground political ~~activities~~groups, including ~~by~~ the Bolsheviks~~.~~ ~~,~~ .[34] ~~This development~~ exacerbat~~ing~~ed ~~the extant~~ some tsarist officials' ~~skepticism of~~ toward ~~most tsarist government officials toward~~ organized cultural recreation,~~ severely limiting the Russian imperial state's support~~.[35]

~~The o~~Organized cultural activities ~~that did exist~~ in Russia drew inspiration from ~~parallel~~ institutions and developments in western Europe and North America.[36] During the eighteenth century, British authorities suppressed ~~the~~ working-class popular culture ~~of the poor~~ without offering ~~any~~

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[34] ~~G. G. Karpov and N. D. Sintsov, *Klubnoe delo: Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 14; I. S. Rozental', *"I vot obshchestvennoe mnen'e!' Kluby v istorii rossiiskoi obshchestvennoisti. Konets XVIII – nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2007), 239-82; Adele Lindenmeyr, "Building Civil Society One Brick at a Time: People's Houses and Worker Enlightenment in Late Imperial Russia," *The Journal of Modern History*, 84.1 (March 2012): 1-39; Lynn M. Sargeant, "Civil Society as a Do-It-Yourself Project: The People's House in Late Imperial Russia" (unpublished manuscript); and Victoria E. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Worker's Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 328-34.~~

[35] G. G. Karpov and N. D. Sintsov, *Klubnoe delo: Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 14; I. S. Rozental', *"I vot obshchestvennoe mnen'e!' Kluby v istorii rossiiskoi obshchestvennoisti. Konets XVIII – nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2007), 239-82; Adele Lindenmeyr, "Building Civil Society One Brick at a Time: People's Houses and Worker Enlightenment in Late Imperial Russia," *The Journal of Modern History*, 84.1 (March 2012): 1-39; Lynn M. Sargeant, "Civil Society as a Do-It-Yourself Project: The People's House in Late Imperial Russia" (unpublished manuscript); and Victoria E. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Worker's Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 328-34.

[36] While the influence flowed from western Europe in this case, Russia shaped the rest of the world in other ways: Steven G. Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1-6.

enjoyable cultural recreation in exchange.[37] ~~The situation changed by~~ By the nineteenth century, ~~when~~ some middle-class social reformers began to sponsor~~ed~~ what they perceived as fun, healthy, and "rational" leisure to British workers. ~~in~~ The so-called Working Men's clubs, based on middle-class culture, ~~as~~ were meant to ~~a means of weaning~~ wean ~~them~~ workers ~~away~~ off ~~from~~ traditional ~~worker~~ sociability ~~in~~ of bars ~~or~~ and ~~the new commercialized mass culture of~~ dance halls.[38] In the United States, fin-de-siècle cultural elites ~~at the turn of the 20th century~~ disparaged the explosive growth of what they considered "low" cultural forms, ~~for instance~~ such as blues and jazz, and instead promoted appreciation of "~~high" culture, by which they meant the cultural heritage of~~ white European "high" culture~~elites~~.[39] Social activists promoted the need for organized leisure activities for young people, founding organizations such as the Boy and Girl Scouts.[40] These initiatives represented part of a broader sweep of social interventionist measures within industrializing countries aimed at improving the discipline, cultural level, productive capacity, and social welfare of the population.[41]

[37] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 401-08.

[38] Peter Bailey, *Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the Contest for Control, 1830-1885* (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 169-82; Peter Borsay, *A History of Leisure: The British Experience since 1500* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[39] W. Fitzhugh Brundage, "Working in the 'Kingdom of Culture': African Americans and American Popular Culture, 1890-1930," in W. Fitzhugh Brundage eds., *Beyond Blackface: African Americans and the Creation of American Popular Culture, 1890-1930* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 1-42.

[40] Steven Mintz, *Huck's Raft: A History of American Childhood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 185-94; John R. Gillis, *Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-Present* (New York: Academic Press Inc., 1981), 37-131.~~; and John Springhall, *Coming of Age: Adolescence in Britain, 1860-1960* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillian Ltd, 1986)~~.

[41] For western Europe, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 104-35; Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction*, Robert Hurley tr. (Pantheon: New York, 1978), 53-73. For social interventionism in late imperial Russia, see Laura Engelstein, *The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 17-56.

The parallels between the efforts of Russian and western social reformers hint at broader congruencies between the~~ir~~ visions of ~~the~~ an ideal future ~~held by each~~. Both wanted all of society to share their middle-class cultural values and engage in "rational" and "modern," not "traditional" or commercial leisure. Yet these initiatives, without ~~mass~~ popular support or substantive government backing, ~~made only small inroads~~had limited success ~~into the lives of the population~~ in ~~either~~ western countries ~~or~~ and still less in imperial Russia~~, though significantly more in the former than the latter~~. ~~Similarly, other forms of social welfare intervention found minimal sponsorship from the imperial Russian government prior to World War I~~.[42]

State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the USSR, 1917-1944

~~The situation changed drastically a~~After the October Revolution, ~~when~~ the Bolsheviks made state-sponsored popular culture a major sphere of activity for the Soviet Party-state. ~~Through their actions, t~~The Bolsheviks ~~enacted~~ took up many of the ~~hopes and aspirations~~ projects first elaborated by progressive professionals in late imperial Russia ~~of liberal intellectual professionals for~~ in the sphere of organized cultural recreation, as they did in the realm of social reform more broadly. ~~This fit within the broader pattern of the early Soviet regime adopting on a wide scale the conceptions of social reform first elaborated by progressive professionals in late imperial Russia~~.[43] Moreover, at least some ~~of the~~

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[42] ~~Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 12-46;~~ Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 254-66; and A. S. Tumanova, *Obshchestvennye organizatsii i russkaia publika v nachale XX veka* (Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2008), 289-94.

[43] Daniel Beer, *Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 165-204; Lynn M. Sargeant, *Harmony and Discord: Music and the Transformation of Russian Cultural Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 271.

small number of imperial-era mass oriented cultural establishments created in imperial Russia carried over much of their staff and spirit across the revolutionary divide.[44]

During the Civil War, (1917 to 1922), the Party leadership emphasized the need role for of mass-oriented cultural activities to focus on in promoting loyalty to the new regime.[45] The central government's focus on the war, however, left a great deal of room ample space for grassroots initiatives. , with iIndividual factory committees, village councils, and Komsomol cells createding a network of semi-autonomous trade union, village, and youth clubs at the local level.[46] These establishments often collaborated with the Proletkult, a semi-autonomous Union-wide cultural organization that strove to forge a uniquely "proletarian" culture via grassroots amateur cultural activities.[47]

The end of theFollowing the Civil War and the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP), (1922-1928), witnessed the coalescence of these disparate activities coalesced into a centralized mass cultural network. This process featured involved a series of controversies about the most fitting cultural activities for the masses, part of larger debates about the best path to communism. At one end of the

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[44] Lindenmeyr, "Building Civil Society One Brick at a Time."

[45] James Von Geldern, *Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Richard Stites, "Festival and Revolution: The Role of Public Spectacle in Russia, 1917-1918," in John W. Strong ed., *Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism* (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990), 9-28.

[46] O. Tumim, *Zhenskii klub v derevne* (Petrograd: "Nachatki znanii," 1919), 19-31; Gabriele Gorzka, "Proletarian Culture in Practice: Workers' clubs, 1917-1921," in Strong ed., *Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism*, 29-55; and Isabel A. Tirado, *Young Guard! The Communist Youth League, Petrograd 1917-1920* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 117-43.

[47] Lynn Mally, *Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 253-59; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of the Education and the Arts under Lunacharsky, October 1917-1921* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 89-109; and Donald J. Raleigh, *Experiencing Russia's Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 208-15.

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~~political spectrum, h~~Hard-line officials <u>associated with the the militant Left faction</u> favored a rapid and coercive transition to communism led by an authoritarian elite committed to ~~radically~~ enacting Marxist-Leninist ideology with minimal consideration for public opinion. ~~At the opposite end,~~ <u>In contrast,</u> soft-line cadres <u>affiliated with the pluralistic Right faction</u> supported a gradual path, one that relied more on persuasion over coercion, called for an alliance with non-Party technocratic specialists, and sought to appeal to popular desires and elicit initiative from below as a means of achieving communism with ~~widescale~~ grassroots support.[48] These conflicts date back to disagreements within the prerevolutionary Bolshevik Party over whether to depend on a small and ideologically conscious revolutionary vanguard or trust in broad-based worker spontaneity to forge communism.[49] ~~Broad groupings emerged within the NEP-era Party-state upholding these distinct perspectives, most notably the militant Left faction and the pluralistic Right one.~~ While some officials consistently favored either soft- or hard-line viewpoints, most stood closer to the center of the political spectrum. They shifted from ~~favoring either one or the other approach,~~ <u>their approaches</u> and sometimes mixed ~~and matched~~ elements from both, depending on the ~~general~~ political, social, and economic situation, and on intra-Party political struggles over leadership after Lenin's demise. The Right and Left factions thus constituted ~~loose and in-flux~~<u>fluid</u> coalitions rather than well-defined blocs within the Party.

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[48] Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Soviet State and Society Between the Revolutions, 1918-1929* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 135-223; Michael David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918-1929* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 83-132; Igal Halfin, *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 205-82; Stuart Finkel, *On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 1-12; Sharon Kowalsky, *Deviant Women: Female Crime and Criminolgoy in Revolutionary Russia, 1880-1930* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 187-95; and Eric Naiman, *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 27-78.

[49] David L. Hoffmann , *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 1-16.

The difference between the militant and pluralistic approaches found its reflection in state-sponsored popular culture. One conflict centered on the main priorities of this sphere. Three possible areas of focus existed: first, promoting communist ideology, Party loyalty, Soviet patriotism, and production needs; second, transforming traditional culture into an appropriately socialist one by instilling socialist norms of cultural enlightenment; finally, satisfying the population's cultural consumption desires for entertainment and fun. More conservative officials held that state-sponsored popular culture needed to serve primarily as a "transmission belt" for Marxist-Leninist ideology, commitment to the Party and the USSR, and concern with production, with cultural enlightenment a secondary goal. Soft-line cadres stressed satisfying the population's desires for engaging and entertaining cultural activities, with cultural enlightenment secondary and political-ideological education last.[50] In another area of disagreement, pluralistic administrators expressed tolerance for western popular culture such as jazz music and foxtrot dancing, while those more militant condemned such cultural forms as ideologically subversive incursions of "foreign bourgeois" culture.[51] Finally, those holding a conservative position demanded close control from above over cultural activities at the grassroots, while those toward the opposite end expressed more welcome of popular initiative and

[50] Elizabeth A. Wood, *Performing Justice: Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 150-73; John B. Hatch, "Hangouts and Hangovers: State, Class and Culture in Moscow's Workers' Club Movement, 1925-1928," *The Russian Review* 53.1 (January 1994): 97-117.

[51] Anne E. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 41-95, 139-66; Gorsuch, *Flappers and Foxtrotters: Soviet Youth in the 'Roaring Twenties'*, in the series, *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 1102 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 1-33; S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917-1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 37-78; Tricia Starks, *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 81; and Katerina Clark, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 162-65.

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grassroots autonomy.[52] The latter point of tension proved especially significant for the fate of Komsomol-managed clubs that sprang up during the Civil War and the early NEP, with hardliners expressing wariness of and striving to limit youth autonomy in state-sponsored cultural activities, and those favoring a soft-line approach endorsing youth grassroots initiative.[53]

These divisions ~~outline above~~ embodied ~~the~~ two extremes ~~ends~~ of the political spectrum, with most cultural officials standing somewhere between these poles and holding a mixture of views. Further, their perspectives evolved over time due to changing domestic and external developments. Moreover, even those on the ~~opposite ends~~extremes largely agreed on the need for some cultural enlightenment and, more importantly, shared the common goal of trying to build a communist utopia. Still, the different positions generally correlated to fundamental tensions between conservative and liberal outlooks on the Soviet cultural field in the NEP years and afterward, continuing to inspire debates and reform drives throughout the history of the USSR.

As the Party-state recovered from the Civil War and assumed more and more authority, those more radical increasingly dominated.[54] This process accelerated in 1928, as Stalin took the reins of power and put an end to the cultural pluralism of the NEP. The government centralized organized cultural offerings for the masses. It directed cultural institutions to carry a much heavier ideological

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[52] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 16-36; K. G. Bogemskaia, "Vvedenie," in K. G. Bogemskaia and L. P. Solntseva eds., *Samodeiatel'noe khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo v SSSR. Ocherki istorii, 1917-1932 gg.* (St. Petersburg: "Dmitrii Bulanin," 2000), 10-23.

[53] S. Dolinskii, *Klub molodezhi v den' 1 maia* (Moscow: "Novaia Moskva," 1925); S. Dmitrovskii, *Mezhdunarodnyi iunosheskii den' v klube* (Kiev: "Proletarii," 1925); *Molodezh' v rabochem klube* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1927); M. A. Rastopchina, *Kak privlech' v klub massu* (Moscow: Izdanie G. F. Mirimanova, 1925). Also see Matthias Neumann, *The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917-1932* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 131-32.

[54] Michael David-Fox, "What is Cultural Revolution?" *The Russian Review* 58.2 (April 1999): 181-201.

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load, censured light entertainment as unacceptable "cultural excess" (*kul'turnichestvo*), and harshly condemned western-style popular culture.[55]

By the mid-1930s, the Party-state began to step back from most of its militant policies, declaring that it achieved victory in constructing the foundations of socialism.[56] The state began to invest more resources into improving living conditions.[57] The number of clubs grew rapidly: between 1927 and 1932, the USSR built 912 urban clubs, but from 1932 to 1937, it built 2,951, for a total of 8,054.[58] Clubs began to include more light entertainment.[59] The mid-1930s even witnessed a brief

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[55] V. Kirov, *Klub i byt: doklad na vsesoiuznom klubnom soveshchanii i rezoliutsii po dokladu* (Moscow, 1930), 4-20; Lynn Mally, *Revolutionary Acts: Amateur Theater and the Soviet State, 1917-1938* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 215-16; S. Iu. Rumiantsev and A. P. Shul'pin, "Samodeiatel'noe tvorchestvo i 'gosudarstvennaia' kul'tura," in K. G. Bogemskaia ed., *Samodeiatel'noe khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo v SSSR. Ocherki istorii, 1930-1950 gg.* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi institut iskusstvoznaniia, 1995), 7-52; Amy Nelson, *Music for the Revolution: Musicians and Power in Early Soviet Russia* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 207-40; and Benjamin Harshav, *The Moscow Yiddish Theater, Art on Stage in the Time of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3-35.

[56] ~~David L. Hoffmann , "Was There a 'Great Retreat' from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered," *Kritika* 5.4 (Fall 2004): 651-74.~~

[57] Amy E. Randall, *The Soviet Dream World of Retail Trade and Consumption in the 1930s* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008), 134-57; Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (New York: Berg, 2003), 1-13; Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade*: *Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 197-250; Karen Petrone, *Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades. Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 203-10; and Elena Osokina, *Za fasadom "Stalinskogo izobilia": Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii naseleniia v gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998).

[58] O. K. Makarova, *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1956), 273.

[59] Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "The Shaping of Soviet Workers' Leisure: Workers' Clubs and Palaces of Culture in the 1930s," *International Labor and Working class History* 56 (October 1999): 78-92; Lynne Attwood, "Women Workers at Play: The Portrayal of Leisure in the Magazine *Rabotnitsa* in the First Two Decades of Soviet Power," in Melanie Ilič ed., *Women in*

period of tolerance for western popular culture. Millions of people openly listened to and danced the foxtrot, tango, Charleston, lindy-hop, and rumba to jazz music played both by amateur ensembles and by professional jazz stars such as Alexander Tsfasman and Leonid Utesov.[60] Still, top-down directives and oversight rather than grassroots initiative pervaded the mass cultural network. Furthermore, young amateur artists had to conform to the cultural standards imposed by cultural professionals.[61]

In the late 1930s, official policy turned toward isolationism and expressed fear of foreign ideological contagion, along with declarations of Soviet superiority in all spheres of life.[62] This development brought a renewed clampdown on jazz and western dancing, with former jazz bands (*dzhazy*) either dispersed or forced to play variety (*estrada*) music. The repertoire for variety bands included an admixture of Russian classics, ballroom music, folk tunes, and mass-oriented patriotic and ideological Soviet songs. They also played a Sovietized version of jazz cleansed of allegedly "decadent" elements. Official discourse expressed this division by speaking of acceptable Sovietized jazz, and contrasting it to harmful American-style jazz (*amerikanskii dhaz*). Sovietizing jazz meant minimizing improvisation, syncopation, blue notes, and fast swinging feeling, and instead playing in a

Comment [M11]: blues?

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the Stalin Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 29-48; and Anne Gorsuch, "'Smashing Chairs at the Local Club': Discipline, Disorder, and Soviet Youth," in Corinna Kuhr-Korolev ed., *Sowjetjugend 1917-1941: Generation Zwischen Revolution und Resignation* (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 247-61.

[60] David MacFadyen, *Songs for Fat People: Affect, Emotion, and Celebrity in the Russian Popular Song, 1900-1955* (Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 114-40; Starr, *Red and Hot*, 107-56.

[61] Malte Rolfe, *Sovetskie massovye prazdniki* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), 96-97; Alaina Lemon, *Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from Pushkin to Postsocialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 124-65; and Susannah L. Smith, "From Peasants to Professionals: The Socialist-Realist Transformation of a Russian Folk Choir," *Kritika* 3.3 (Summer 2002): 393-425.

[62] Michael David-Fox, *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 285; Katerina Clark, *Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 307-44.

smooth and slow style, with traditional jazz brass instruments such as trumpets and saxophones diluted by the addition of string and Soviet folk instruments. Fully choreographed and approved in advance by censorship organs, this Sovietized jazz hardly measured up to the spontaneity and improvisation so essential to jazz as a musical genre; Sovietized jazz most resembled big-band swing music, flavored with Soviet and especially Russian national themes.[63]

World War II caused tremendous disruption to youth lives across the Soviet Union, and the European continent., [64] ~~This~~ includ~~inged~~ within Soviet state-sponsored popular culture. [65] The state directed resources away from cultural activities, while most ordinary citizens had little leisure time or energy for culture. Despite these obstacles, some opportunities existed for mass music making and other forms of entertainment. Frequently, this occurred on the basis of local initiatives by committed cultural enthusiasts ~~in the context~~. Moreover, concerts aimed at military personnel enabled cultural entertainment to explicitly serve wartime needs. In fact, the government loosened the limitations on western popular culture imposed during the Great Purges. The Party-state now welcomed American-style jazz tunes as a way of lifting the morale of the troops and populace, and demonstrating a close relationship with wartime allies.[66]

The Mass Cultural Network

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[63] Starr, *Red and Hot*, 157-80; Martin Lücke, "The Postwar Campaign against Jazz in the USSR (1945-1953)," in Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter eds., *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain* (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2010), 83-98. For more on jazz as a musical genre, see Mark C. Gridley, with contributions by David Cutler, *Jazz Styles: History & Analysis* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003); David Meltzer eds., *Reading Jazz* (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1993).

[65] Tara Zahra, *The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 1-24.

[66] Karpov and Sintsov, *Klubnoe delo*, 20; Starr, *Red and Hot*, 181-203.

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Regardless of the war, the framework of state-sponsored popular culture that emerged during the early 1930s survived largely unchanged throughout the Stalin period, and much of it carried over into the post-Stalin years as well.[67] Trade unions controlled most urban and some rural clubs. Similar to the Party, trade unions had a hierarchical structure, with local enterprise committees overseen by district (*raion*, also translated as neighborhood), city, province (*oblast'* or *krai*, also translated as region), and republic-level ones. The All-Union Central Trade Union Council (*Vsesoiuznyi Tsentral'nyi Sovet Professional'nykh Soiuzov*) oversaw all trade unions. Government organs in each province, in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture (Ministerstvo Kul'tury), also established a number of large mass-oriented cultural institutions in most district capitals, known as a House of Folk Creativity (*Dom narodnogo tvorchestva*, also called House of Amateur Arts, *Dom khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel'nosti*). These provided cultural guidance, assistance, and some limited oversight of organized cultural recreation. Village councils and large collective farms operated most of the smaller rural clubs. Parks of culture and leisure (*parki kul'tury i otdykha*), run by city-level cultural organizations, played a significant secondary role in the cultural life of young people in the larger cities from late spring to early fall, providing stages for concerts by professional and amateur artists, dance floors, and spaces for large celebrations. Libraries often had dedicated spaces and logistical support for amateur artistic collectives.

Urban clubs ranged from large, well-funded establishments, frequently called palaces of culture or houses of culture, to smaller, typically one-story buildings of a few rooms with a concert/movie hall referred to simply as clubs, down to one-room "red corners" (*krasnye ugolki*), in dormitories, factory shops, and large apartment buildings. Villages had smaller, poorly supplied clubs, or tiny reading huts (*izba-chital'nia*). A manager directed clubs, hiring staff, planning and managing events, and balancing

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[67] Mark Slobin, "Introduction," in Mark Slobon ed., *Returning Culture: Musical Changes in Central and Eastern Europe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 1-13.

the budget; volunteer activists or housing supervisors managed red corners. In clubs, a volunteer club council (*pravlenie kluba*) helped run the institution. Clubs devoted most of their activities to cultural activities and political propaganda, but also hosted other forms of recreation, such as games and athletic activities, and provided spaces for various community and political events.

The Gor'kii House of Culture in Moscow, owned by the bread-making trade union, exemplifies the largest club type. In 1947, it had a two-story building with a large hall for 1,000, a small one for 300, 3 rooms for amateur collectives, a leisure room, a library, a foyer, a sports hall, a buffet, and several additional rooms such as a buffet. Its inventory included a variety of musical, theatrical, movie, radio, and other cultural equipment. The club had a sizable budget of 2,900,000 rubles, and employed 56 people.[68]

The manager's primary concern consisted of fulfilling the yearly plan, which outlined . This had two parts: income and expenditures, and the scope and number of cultural activities. Of these, the financial component management was usually had primary importance more important than planning cultural activities, especially for trade union and village clubs, and for parks of culture and leisure. The other aspect of the plan generally had a secondary, though far from meaningless, role. Fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan, particularly the financial aspect, meant significant bonuses for club managers and workers, a powerful incentive; failing to do so could result in serious repercussions, including job loss.[69] By contrast, the Ministry of Culture expressed more concern with the ideological purity and quality of events than with financial revenue, producing friction with bodies that had differing priorities. whether in the institutions it supervised directly or those in the local area over which it had some say. This distinction spurred frictions with bodies that had differing priorities.

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[68] See Tsentral'nyi arkhiv goroda Moskvy (TsAGM, Central Archive of the City of Moscow), f. 44, op. 1, d. ll. 24-25.

[69] For the similar role of incentives in industry, see Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

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Comment [M12]: This sentence could be more specific. Does this simply mean staying within (or below) a budget while providing the activites outlined in the plan? It could say "Staying within or under the plan's budget meant significant…"

Comment [M13]: Was there a competing ministry demanding plan fulfillment?

Comment [M14]: Which ones?

Comment [M15]: This is also a little vague, and perhaps could be cut.

Clubs served as the main hosts for amateur artistic circles, in which . These consisted of amateur participants, mostly youth, who gathered voluntarily gathered together on a regular basis to learn, practice, and perform music, acting, dancing, and other artistic activities. Each circle had a leader with some expertise in the relevant art form. The cultural organization hosting the amateur collective usually solicited volunteers to serve as circle leaders; however, well-financed clubs sometimes paid for professional artists and pedagogues to lead the circles.

Amateur collectives represented an obligatory part of the function for clubs. The majority of circles lost money, which generally did not charge fees for amateurs to participate or, in most cases, for audiences to come to amateur concerts, in order to ensure sufficient numbers of both to fulfill the plan. However, some amateur collectives, frequently those playing popular music, helped to fill club coffers through drawing large enough audiences to hold paid events; they even performed in other venues besides their home institution on a contract basis. In other cases, some high-quality circles, even when their artistic genre lacked broad popularity, increased the club's prestige through winning amateur artistic competitions.

Amateur musical bands frequently performed at cultural events called "evenings" (*vechera*), a broad term encompassing events held for all sorts of purposes. Some had free entry, others required an official invitation or purchasing a ticket, depending on the event. Evenings frequently had two parts. The first generally focused on politics and ideology, such as a lecture or ceremony, and the second on entertainment, often with a concert or theatrical performance followed by dancing late into the night. Some evenings specifically targeted young people, with local Komsomol cells frequently assisting club administrators in the planning, organizing, publicizing, and distributing tickets to the event.

The Komsomol

Dedicated to socializing young Soviet citizens, the Komsomol (*Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi*, All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League) had direct

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responsibility for carrying out the Party's youth policies. The Komsomol's pyramid-like internal structure paralleled the Party and the trade unions. Its base consisted of primary cells located in most establishments with a youth presence, with larger establishments having several internal levels of cells. Primary cells were overseen by organizations at the level of the district, and above that the city, the province, and the republic. At the top, the Komsomol Central Committee directed Komsomol policy and had a large central apparatus to enact its goals. A Bureau composed of top officials called secretaries headed the Komsomol Central Committee, with a First Secretary in charge. Nikolai. A. Mikhailov held that post from 1938 to 1952.[70]

The Komsomol enrolled only 10 percent of all Soviet youth in the mid-1930s, serving as a vanguard organization. However, the post-World War II years witnessed a major growth in membership, as the Party leadership now wanted the Komsomol to grow into a truly mass organization. In 1949, the Komsomol embraced 20 percent of those eligible, and by 1958, about half, a time when the of the USSR's had over 55 million Komsomol-age youth, over a quarter of the total Soviet population.[71] Those who joined the Komsomol generally had some social ambitionsus, such as attending college, becoming a Party member or government official, or rising in rank at their workplace. Belonging to the Komsomol required expressing public dedication to Marxist-Leninist ideology, paying dues, engaging in volunteer work, and attending obligatory events, especially Komsomol meetings at primary cells, which featured discussions of and resolutions on various organizational activities and policies;. fFar from all members dutifully fulfilled these requirements, creating a significant point of tension within the Komsomol.

In a process loosely supervised by higher officials, Komsomol organizations elected their leaders from among their members at a special conference, usually held each year. These conferences

[70] A. A. Alekseeva, *Stroka v biografii* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 17-18.

[71] E. M Andreev, L. E. Darskii, and T. L. Khar'kova, *Naselenie Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1922-1991* (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 63.

Comment [M16]: elite?

Comment [M17]: social or professional?

also served as a forum to report on the activities of the Komsomol branch and to discuss plans for the upcoming year. Those chosen formed the Komsomol committee of the primary organization, which had responsibility for the daily management of the cell's affairs. A first secretary led each committee, with the other committee members responsible for distinct spheres of Komsomol work, such as propaganda, production, education, cultural events, athletics, etc. Often, these local-level officials had extra compensation or time off for their Komsomol organizational activities, depending on the size of the cell. Generally, the larger the primary cell, the more oversight higher-ups imposed over the election process. Above the primary cell level, higher-ups effectively selected officials to manage Komsomol organization, with yearly election conferences serving mainly as a venue to discuss the state of affairs in the Komsomol branch. District, city, and republic Komsomol mid-level officials formed part of the Komsomol bureaucracy, usually working full time for the Komsomol; the most well-funded of these organizations, usually at the city and especially republic levels, also had ~~some~~ hired staff, such as cultural inspectors who helped manage and direct youth cultural activities.

The Komsomol organized occasional congresses that determined the organization's broad agenda, with only one held in the postwar Stalin years. Between the congresses, the most important rulings originated from Komsomol Central Committee plenums ~~, followed by~~ and the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau ~~decrees between plenums~~. Each level of the regional Komsomol hierarchy had to adopt the directives enacted above and also passed separate resolutions relevant to its own needs. As a result, lower-level Komsomol committees faced a torrent of decrees, meaning that they had to mostly ignore some in order to work on others. New top-level initiatives generally pushed previous ones into the background, unless higher-level Komsomol committees repeated its decrees or ~~stressed~~ checked on ~~the need to implement older resolutions through checking up on the work of~~

implementation among lower-level cells ~~and through issuing decrees containing messages similar to the ones passed earlier.~~[72]

Reconstituting State-Sponsored Popular Culture After the War

With the ~~transition from a total war~~ to a peace~~-time setting~~, the ~~USSR's~~ Soviet population widely expected a postwar relaxation of wartime strains and improvements in living and working conditions.[73] The Kremlin dashed these hopes. Stressing self-sacrifice and ~~strict~~ discipline, the rulers aimed to mobilize the citizenry for an extensive, rapid, and exhausting reconstruction. Despite ~~the appalling~~ overcrowding, a lack of consumer goods, and famine in parts of the USSR, the new Five-Year Plan ~~from~~ (1946~~- to~~1950) focused on heavy industry, basic infrastructure, and military might. The Kremlin justified this course by stressing ~~not only the need to rebuild the country, but~~ both the demands of reconstruction and ~~also~~ the need to prepare for conflict ~~future wars in the context of the escalating Cold War~~ with the United States and western Europe.[74]

The Komsomol tried to mobilize young people to pursue the Kremlin's goals, but the Second World War had ravaged the Komsomol~~.'s structural and financial cohesion.~~ Thousands of primary cells disappeared, along with cash from dues, the Komsomol's main funding source. The Komsomol ~~Central~~

[72] For more on the Komsomol's structure, see Peter Konecny, *Builders and Deserters: Students, State, and Community in Leningrad, 1917–1941* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 38-100; Neumann, *The Communist Youth League ~~and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917-1932~~*, 126-45; Ralph Talcott Fisher Jr., *Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 279-91; and Allen Kassof, *The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1-8.

[73] Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957*, Hugh Ragsdale trans. and ed. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 31-39.

[74] Jeffrey W. Jones, *Everyday Life and The "Reconstruction" Of Soviet Russia During and After The Great Patriotic War, 1943-1948* (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2008); Nicholas Ganson, *The Soviet Famine of 1946-47 in Global and Historical Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

Committee CC ~~took steps to solve these problems, primarily by~~ launch~~ed~~ing a ~~widescale~~ membership drive to reestablish its structure, finances, and ability to influence Soviet young people.[75]

Simultaneously, the Komsomol strove to enact the Party's broader agenda, . ~~The Komsomol's~~ ~~discourse called~~ calling on young people to devote most of the~~ir~~ scarce ~~small amount of~~ free time ~~left over after work, education, and taking care of basic living needs~~ to the goals of reconstructing the country and preparing for a potential war.[76] Consequently, the Komsomol ~~Central Committee~~ CC invested little energy into organized cultural recreation ~~at this time~~.

Besides, state-sponsored popular culture suffered from extensive damage brought about by the war. ~~If o~~Official statistics list 94,371 clubs in 1946, down from 118,032 ~~clubs~~ in 1941~~, in 1946 the country had 23,661 fewer establishments~~.[77] However, ~~already~~ even before the end of the war, the bureaucracies in charge of mass-oriented cultural institutions, trade unions and the Ministry of Culture, sought to reconstruct their cultural networks, although paying little heed to the particular needs of young people or to the Komsomol ~~as such~~itself.[78]

The central Komsomol organization did undertake ~~some~~ limited efforts to increase organized cultural recreation for young people. Already in 1944, the Komsomol Propaganda Department ~~came up with~~ developed a comprehensive proposal to improve cultural recreation ~~activities~~. It suggested having *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, the ~~national organ of the~~ Komsomol's national newspaper, publish more articles on this topic, training Komsomol members to run amateur collectives, and having a secretary

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[75] Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32-63.

[76] On the need for youth to prepare for war, see Anna Krylova, *Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35-59. On children, see Olga Kurchenko, *Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 249-53.

[77] Makarova, *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR*, 273.

[78] GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. 278, ll. 7-17; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 35-36.

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responsible for state-sponsored popular culture in each Komsomol committee. Most radically, it spoke of having local Komsomol branches establish youth clubs and amateur collectives.[79] Recalling NEP-era cultural establishments, these ~~latter~~ proposals paralleled top-level discussions at the time over the possibility of mobilizing the population through ~~spurring~~ grassroots initiative~~s and enthusiasm~~.[80] However, higher-ups rejected the idea of Komsomol-managed clubs, likely perceiving these as permitting youth too much autonomy, which was unacceptable to the Party leadership at the time; proposals for activism from below in other spheres eventually suffered ~~parallel~~ similar fates. Still, the Komsomol enacted ~~much~~ many of the other elements proposed by the Komsomol Propaganda Department~~. Also, and sought to~~, ~~the Komsomol Central Committee passed decrees about~~ strengthen~~ing~~ club services for young people.[81]

Komsomol newspaper rhetoric also promoted organized cultural recreation.~~, as expressed by a~~A January 1945 ~~front-page~~ *Komsomol'skaia pravda* editorial about factory clubs~~. The author~~ claimed that young people wanted clubs to sponsor more youth-oriented events, ~~such as~~ including lectures, ~~on Russian military leaders, on the international situation, and on science and technology, as well as~~ literary evenings, and amateur performances. The editorial specifically praised Moscow's Zuev club for lectures allegedly "based on the requests of youth," such as "The Dynamo and How to Care for It," "Electricity and Magnetism," and "Energy of the Future."[82]

Representative of ~~other~~ youth newspaper articles published at this time on ~~youth~~ involvement ~~in the cultural network~~, this editorial presented a narrative of what idealized young New Soviet Men and

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[79] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 1-9.

[80] On these discussions, see A. V. Pyzhikov, *Khrushchevskaia "ottepel'"* (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2002), 15-40; Alexander Titov, "The 1961 Party Program and the Fate of Khrushchev's Reforms," in Melanie Ilič and Jeremy Smith eds., *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 8-25.

[81] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 382, l. 125; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 429, ll. 2-4.

[82] "Priblizit' klub k zavodskoi molodezhi!," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, January 6, 1945.

Women should desire, including.[83] ~~The main topics of concern for model youth consisted of~~ lectures on the domestic and international political situation, ~~on~~ Russian history, ~~on~~ science and technology, and ~~on~~ literature. Amateur arts concerts lay last on the inventory of model young people's priorities~~,~~; ~~with~~ dances and movies were not mentioned at all.

~~As later sections of this chapter will demonstrate, the~~ The article hardly matched the actual priorities ~~among~~ of the young, and instead depicted an idealized, ~~situation that looked toward the~~ hoped-for future. Thus, the journalist's writing embodied Socialist Realism, the Stalinist canonical style in rhetoric and cultural production that presented the officially-prescribed model as the true reality, with the goal of transforming the imagined ideal into the real by remaking popular consciousness.[84] Simultaneously, this editorial served as a signal to the ~~leaders of~~ Komsomol's ~~branches of~~ top-level cultural ~~policy~~ officials ~~regarding what they needed to focus on in organizing events for young people~~. Internal Komsomol messages repeatedly emphasized ~~P~~ that political propaganda and production-oriented concerns had the most importance~~;~~, ~~followed in distant second place by~~ cultural enlightenment was a distant second, ~~with~~ and entertaining fun a low priority~~minimized, messages repeated within internal Komsomol discourse~~.[85]

These efforts from above faced serious problems. Regional Komsomol committees in Saratov and elsewhere ~~duly~~ made statements acknowledging the importance of state-sponsored popular

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[83] For other articles, see "Komsomol'tsy sela Tatishchevo," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, January 6, 1945; "Za poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, July 4, 1946; and "Khudozhestvennuiu samodeiatel'nost' – na sluzhbu vospitaniia molodezhi," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, January 7, 1945.

[84] On Socialist Realism, see Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 54-105; Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3-24; Matthew E. Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 245-54.

[85] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.

culture.[86] However, such rhetoric frequently resulted in little follow-through, as~~, despite some statements to the contrary,~~ cultural recreation remained a low priority. *Komsomol'skaia pravda* related that, ~~despite~~ although the Kirov province Komsomol committee ~~passing~~ passed a decree promoting ~~the growth of~~ amateur arts, "there was a problem: a resolution existed, but no one worked on actually enacting it."[87] This situation was quite typical, as seen, for example, in Moscow.[88]

Factors relating to ~~the tough~~ postwar conditions played a role as well. ~~In the harsh postwar months, c~~Clubs suffered from a deficiency in basic supplies such as fuel and furniture that severely hampered their function.[89] The cultural network lacked well-prepared club managers and amateur arts leaders.[90] Postwar lawlessness and hooliganism in club activities presented a further obstacle to the Komsomol's intentions.[91] German~~. E.~~ Krichevskii told me that he and his friends targeted the members of an amateur art ensemble ~~at a cultural institution~~ in his neighborhood, since in his words, "street kids" like himself "despised the ensemble" for its association with the officialdom.[92]

In many cases, the high cost of popular mass-oriented cultural events, imposed by managers eager to fulfill the yearly financial plan, prevented young people from enjoying organized cultural recreation~~s~~. In the fall of 1945, the Komsomol Propaganda Department claimed that trade union clubs charged "unacceptably high" entrance fees, with tickets for concerts costing twenty to thirty rubles and

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[86] On Saratov, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 323, l. 8. On Moscow, see Tsentral'nyi arkhiv obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Moskvy (TsAOPIM, Central Archive of Social-Political History of Moscow), f. 635, op. 3, d. 120, ll. 9-10.

[87] "Khudozhestvennuiu samodeiatel'nost' – na sluzhbu vospitaniia molodezhi," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, January 7, 1945.

[88] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 433, ll. 17-19.

[89] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.

[90] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 378, l. 2.

[91] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.

[92] ~~G. E. Krichevskii~~German Krichevskii, born 1934, interviewed February 6, 2009. Also see his unpublished memoirs, which he graciously provided: "Samoanaliz, ili razveiat' mify."

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dances running at ten to twenty-five rubles.[93] Regional Komsomol branches related that young

workers expressed "much displeasure" over high prices for tickets to club dances and concerts.[94] These

complaints offer revealing insights into the actual popularity of club events, since dances and concerts

drew youth into clubs. with lLectures were notably missing from this list of points of complaint, a

dynamic similar to that of the 1930s.[95] The Komsomol Central CommitteeCC took some measures to

deal with the costs, asking the Soviet leadership and the Central Trade Union Council to decrease the

cost of tickets.[96] The Komsomol press printed exposées of high costs, using social censure to press

cultural institutions.[97]

The Komsomol's promotion of youth access to such cultural activities reveals some of the

ambiguities inherent within the Komsomol's cultural policy in the immediate postwar months. The

most popular cultural forms deviated significantly from the desired emphasis of the policy makers, who

ranked political propaganda as primary; yet the actions outlined above promoted entertaining and non-

ideological events such as dances. Some statements in the internal and external Komsomol discourse

even offered guarded blessings for such activities. In late 1945, the Moscow Komsomol praised clubs

in the capital for regularly showing movies and holding youth dances.[98] A *Komsomol'skaia pravda*

article lauded young workers from the "Serp i Molot" factory who organized dances.[99]

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[93] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.

[94] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31.

[95] On the 1930s, see David L. Hoffmann, *Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 161-64.

[96] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.

[97] "Dobro pozhalovat'!" *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, July 13, 1946.

[98] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.

[99] "Za poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, July 4, 1946.

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In contrast, certain Komsomol cadres censured what they perceived as excessive orientation toward fun entertainment. Some officials in the Komsomol Propaganda Department expressed concerns in ~~a 1944 internal report~~ over western-style dancing~~,~~ <u>. The document</u> propos<u>ing to</u> ~~ed~~ teach~~ing~~ "folk and ballroom dances to youth" ~~as a means of~~ <u>to subvert</u> "~~agitation against~~ youth fascination with western dances."[100] Likely, the traditional intelligentsia preference for ballroom dances, perceived as calm, controlled, and rational, over western dances, considered wild, uncontrolled, and irrational, also played a role in this criticism.[101]

A Brief <u>Period of</u> Postwar Pluralism, 1945-1946

Such criticism, nonetheless, proved exceptional and rarely ~~made its way~~ <u>entered</u> ~~into~~ public Komsomol discourse in the concluding stages of the war and the immediate postwar period.<u>.</u>~~, when western movies and dances proved all the rage and youth engaged in these activities largely free from official opprobrium~~. Foreign movies entered the Soviet Union largely as spoils of war, ~~receiving the label of~~ <u>known as</u> "trophy" films. <u>For instance,</u> ~~One example,~~ the 1944 German musical *Dream Woman*, drew many more spectators than any of the ~~generally~~ staid and bombastic <u>Socialist Realist Soviet</u> movies ~~in the Socialist Realist style made in the postwar Stalin years~~. *Tarzan's New York Adventure* (1942) inspired young Moscow college students to imitate Tarzan's ape-like howling in the dorms. The popular 1941 film *Sun Valley Serenade*, featuring the Glenn Miller jazz orchestra, helped advance the popularity of western music among Soviet youth.[102]

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[100] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 1-9.

[101] Irina Sirotkina, "Pliaska i ekstaz v Rossii ot Serebriannogo veka do kontsa 1920-kh godov," in Jan Plamper, Schamma Schahadat, and Marc Elie eds., *Rossiiskaia imperiia chuvstv: Podkhody k kul'turnoi istorii emotsii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), 282-305.

[102] Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125-26; Josephine Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 3-4;

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For club managers, ~~the~~ Foreign movies ~~proved a bonanza,~~ enabled club managers ~~ing them~~ to fill depleted club coffers. ~~A case in point, t~~The Gor'kii House of Culture, owned by ~~the~~ Moscow's bread-making trade union ~~in Moscow~~, declared in its 1946 yearly report that the club received 1,164,100 rubles ~~in revenue~~ from movies, a whopping 69 percent of ~~the total 1,681,300 it collected~~its total revenue, generating a tidy profit of 164,500 rubles. ~~For comparison, the club made 268,700 rubles from theater performances, 221,200 from concerts, 22,800 from varied evening events, and a paltry 4,500 from lectures. Moreover, the club spent only 999,600 on the movies, turning a tidy profit of 164,500 rubles.~~ While concerts also made money~~,~~ (12,700 rubles)~~,~~ the rest of the events cost more money than they brought in, with ~~. Theater performances lost 34,500, evening events 32,200, and~~ lectures ~~34,900, with the latter by far the most disproportionate in terms of cost of event versus revenue taken in~~ generating by far the greatest losses.[103]

The money obtained from each event reflected the scale of the ticket-paying audience. The 1946 plan for the club called for lectures to take in 109,800 rubles, but abysmally low attendance instead generated only ~~of the measly~~ 4,500 rubles ~~they actually managed to get.~~, fulfilling only 4 percent of the planned goal. ~~This sum underlines the abysmally low level of attendance at lectures.~~ Moreover, ~~The club's 1946 plan also underscores another crucial point about lectures. A~~according to ~~the~~ its plan, the club expected movies, concerts, theater performances, and evening events to ~~take in more money than they lost~~yield a profit, ~~, although it proved wrong about the latter two.~~ ~~but L~~lectures, ~~however,~~ were ~~written into the plan~~planned ~~as~~ to be a money-losing activity ~~from the start~~, since the

since the

Sergei Kapterev, "Illusionary Spoils: Soviet Attitudes toward American Cinema during the Early Cold War," *Kritika* 10.4 (Fall 2009): 779-807; and Sarah Davies, "Soviet Cinema in the Early Cold War: Pudovkin's *Admiral Nakhimov* in Context," in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major eds., *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2004), 49-70.

[103] TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 4, l. 19.

plan included anticipated revenue of 109,800 rubles, and cost of 141,600.[104] Keeping in mind theGiven top-level demands from above for financial profit from that cultural recreation institutions turn a profit, the fact that financially unsustainable lectures figured prominently in the club's plan indicates the political pressure placed on clubs to have lectures, and support them materially with profits from money-making events such as movies and concerts.

Western films went hand-in-hand with western dancing and music. Growing steadily before the conclusion of the war, the number of youth from all social backgrounds dancing the foxtrot, tango, rumba, and Charleston exploded across the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period. They danced to music played by At dances, musical ensembles played whose repertoire included everything from Soviet variety music and mass songs to full-blown American-style jazz, with extensive improvisation and fast swinging feeling, and everything in between; plenty ofmany bands and musicians performed only or mostly American-style jazz. Utesov, Tsfasman, Eddie Rosner, and other popular jazz musicians brought their bands to Moscow and Leningrad, while plenty of talented amateur musicians joined professional groups.[105]

Western music and dances had explicit clear financial benefits. A number of jazz ensembles performed in the Gor'kii park of culture and leisure in Moscow during 1946, including Rosner's band, and . That year, not coincidentally, the park dance hall greatly overfulfilled its plan, with 487 people present on average per dance instead of the 350 as anticipated, resulting in 759,000 actually coming to

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[104] TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 4, l. 19.

[105] Starr, *Red and Hot*, 205-06; Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, 201-05; Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 50.1 (2002), 37-61; and Gleb Tsipursky, "Living 'America' in the Soviet Union: The Cultural Practices of 'Westernized' Soviet Youth, 1945-1964," in Eva-Maria Stolberg ed., *The Soviet Union & The United States: Rivals of the Twentieth Century. Coexistence & Competition* (New York: Peter Lang, 2013), 139-64.

the dance hall that year instead of the planned 450,000.[106] Komsomol internal reporting similarly confirms the profits accruing to mass-oriented cultural institutions from western dances.[107] ~~Such y~~Youth interest in ~~and commitment to~~ dancing served the Gor'kii park of culture and leisure and other cultural recreation institutions well, helping cover the losses incurred by the much less popular lectures.

Conclusion

Soviet state-sponsored popular culture had roots in initiatives by social reform~~ersists~~ in imperial Russia, and took its subsequent shape in the dynamic and turbulent NEP years. During this period, several points of conflict emerged over organized cultural recreation, which reflected broader struggles between ~~a~~ hard-line ~~versus a~~ and soft-line vision~~s~~ of communist construction. In contrast to the militant perspective, the pluralistic one encouraged more space for youth agency and fewer restrictions on initiative from below; supported entertainment, cultural enlightenment, and political propaganda, in that order; and permitted a degree of western cultural influence. The conservative position won out by the end of the NEP as the Stalin leadership took power. Wartime needs, however, pushed the regime to adopt a more pluralistic approach. The war severely damaged the system of mass-oriented cultural recreation. This fact, combined with the general lack of attention by the Party-state in the immediate postwar months, limited youth access to state-sponsored popular culture.

However, such neglect ~~proved at least partially benign in regard to~~helped satisfy~~ing~~ youth wants. ~~After all, p~~Policy makers expressed a ~~definite~~ predilection for heavily politicized club events, with a substantially smaller dose of cultural enlightenment activities, and little room for fun and pleasure. ~~Still~~In spite of this, the vast majority of the Komsomol's statements on cultural activities from 1945 to mid-1946 lacked criticism of hedonistic behavior and western cultural influence.

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[106] TsAGM, f. 2011, op. 1, d. 37, l. 86.

[107] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 7-9.

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A confluence of factors explains this dynamic. First, western-themed culture had genuine popularity among the young, and provided an easy and cheap means of satisfying desires for a postwar return to a more relaxed peacetime setting. Likewise, movies, dancing, and jazz helped relieve the enormous strains of rebuilding the country. ~~In the context of a drive to~~ As they tried to reconstitute the Komsomol by recruiting new members and getting them to pay dues and serve as lower-level cadres, Komsomol higher-ups likely questioned the wisdom of fighting against such a popular form of entertainment. Conversely, the frailty of the Komsomol and its focus on assisting the Party-state's infrastructural reconstruction drive in this period meant that the Komsomol had few resources left to change youth behavior. Furthermore, considering the top-down imperative for cultural institutions to fulfill the financial plan, the willingness of young cultural consumers to pay for light entertainment made the cultural network unlikely to change its offerings without strong pressure from policy makers. At the same time, the Komsomol would have been extremely unlikely to adopt a policy of condemning ~~such~~ western popular culture independently of the Party, since the Soviet leadership would have seen doing so as a dangerously independent act. As a result, in state-sponsored popular culture the Party-state actually did meet postwar expectations for relaxation of prewar constraints, at least briefly.[108]

In this fleeting period, then, young people could successfully reconcile a self-image of a good Soviet citizen ~~and New Soviet Person~~ with a real interest in western popular culture. This represented a significant shift from the way that official discourse depicted the model young New Soviet Woman and Man in the immediate prewar period as necessarily rejecting western popular culture. My findings here

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[108] A conclusion in accord with other findings for a brief postwar relaxation: Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 31-39. However, this contradicts Sheila Fitzpatrick's view of the postwar Stalin period as exclusively a time of tightening controls, in her "Postwar Soviet Society: The 'Return to Normalcy', 1945-1953," in Susan J. Linz ed., *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 129-56.

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support the arguments ~~of historians who postulate~~ that World War II represented a major break in Soviet life, as opposed to those who see the Stalin period as cohesive and holistic.[109]

Youth hedonism gained prominence outside the USSR. In East and West Germany, the postwar period witnessed plenty indulging in jazz and dancing.[110] Such youth conduct spread widely throughout the Soviet bloc.[111] These years saw similar pleasure-seeking behavior across central and western Europe.[112] Within the US, the end of the war brought a rapid increase in the number of youth dancing to jazz and watching movies at drive-in theaters.[113] These parallels among the countries participating in World War II indicates a postwar trend common to capitalist and socialist states, with a large portion of young people reacting to the strains of the war by plunging into entertaining fun as the conflict ended.

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[109] For more on how the war served as a major break, see Juliane Fürst, "Introduction–Late Stalinist Society: History, Policies, People," in Juliane Fürst ed., *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-20.

[110] Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 31-70.

[111] Claire Wallace and Sijka Kovatcheva, *Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 153-84.

[112] See the contributors to Sabrina P. Ramet and Gordana P. Crnkovic eds., *KAZAAM! SPLAT! PLOOF! The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003); Alexander Stephan ed., *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); and Axel Schildt and Detleft Siegfried eds., *European Cities, Youth, and the Public Sphere in the Twentieth Century* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005).

[113] James Gilbert, *A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-61.

<u>Chapter 2</u>: Ideological Reconstruction in the Cultural Recreation Network, 1947-53

In stark contrast to the immediate postwar period, from the late 1940s and into the early 1950s the Komsomol vigorously censured ~~vigorously~~ events that devoted "excessive" effort to entertainment and lacked "sufficient" ideological content. Newspapers carried stories condemning clubs for focusing on dances and movies, instead demanding more politicized activities.[114] Komsomol leaders, such as Komsomol First Secretary P. A. Mikhailov, called for "vigilantly defending youth from pernicious foreign influences."[115]

This chapter explains the transition in central policy to a militant stance. It ~~and~~ considers the impact of this shift on cultural activities considered fully appropriate, leaving more controversial club events to the next chapter. Noncontroversial cultural forms, such as choruses and drama collectives, came to bear a hefty political load~~,~~; they ~~meaning devoting~~ devoted much more effort to propagandizing Marxism-Leninism, loyalty to the Party and especially Stalin, Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism, and escalating economic production, while praising discipline, militancy, and a rejection of anything western. Nevertheless, ~~Showing that plenty~~ many Soviet citizens enjoyed participating in such profoundly ideologized club activities. By ~~, this chapter~~ illustrat~~inge~~s the nature of conformist agency and emotions, this chapter ~~. Doing so~~ brings to light the cultural life of the large numbers who toed the line on the newly-militant official norms, a topic understudied in scholarship on the USSR and youth culture more broadly. ~~Still, some problems, such as the lack of commitment by lower-level cadres to organizing cultural events, undermined the effectiveness of central policy;~~

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[114] "Skuchno molodezhi v Kirovograde," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, June 19, 1948; "Bol'she vnimaniia studencheskim obshchezhitiiam," *Stalinets*, March 25, 1952. The latter newspaper, the organ of Saratov State University, changed its name to *Leninskii put'* in January 1957.

[115] P. A. Mikhailov, *Otchetnyi doklad na XI s''ezde komsomola o rabote TsK VLKSM* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1949), 33-35.

Comment [M19]: Shouldn't this be N. A. (Nikolai) Mikhailov? The WorldCat entry for this volume lists N. A. Mikhailov as the author.

Comment [M20]: This as well – Nikolai Mikhailov?

~~likewise, the top-enforced imposition of the ideologically restrictive cultural standards in the late 1940s turned off many of those who otherwise enjoyed orthodox genres in state-sponsored popular culture.~~

Soviet Cultural Policy, 1946-1953

From the late 1940s, living conditions in the Soviet Union began to improve markedly. As the widescale postwar famine of 1946-47 drew to a close, the government ended systematic rationing. The initial wave of Sovietization swept through western Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Baltic states, suppressing resistance by armed nationalists as the Soviet Party-state imposed its authority. Currency reform, while disruptive at the time, led to more financial stability. The high levels of postwar crime also dropped. Housing stock and social services grew slowly, while price reductions made consumer goods slightly more affordable.[116]

Yet, many Soviet citizens considered these very gradual gains insufficient. The population looked forward to a better life and much faster improvements in living conditions. People proved more and more willing to speak and act against state demands in the late 1940s. The Stalin leadership, however, refused to accede to the population's desires. Considering its victory over the Germans as fully validating its power and authority, the Kremlin strove to maintain its wartime insistence on Soviet people expressing absolute obedience and self-sacrifice for the good of the state, as best embodied in

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[116] Mark B. Smith, *Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 25-58; Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Postwar Soviet Society: The 'Return to Normalcy', 1945-1953," in Susan J. Linz ed., *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 129-56; and A. Z. Vakser, *Leningrad poslevoennyi. 1945-1982 gody* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Ostrov, 2005).

Stalin's famous postwar toast praising Soviet citizens as "small cogs" holding together the "state machine."[117]

~~Likewise~~Moreover, Soviet authorities ~~had~~ could mobilize its citizenry against a clear target ~~to mobilize its citizenry against~~, as the Cold War escalated in the late 1940s. The Kremlin used the fear of another world war to justify maintaining a wartime footing, which enabled it to demand disciplined behavior from Soviet citizens, continued intense economic reconstruction, and a focus on heavy industry and basic infrastructure.[118] In this sense, the Cold War for the Soviet Union had just as much importance for domestic as for foreign politics, underlining parallels with the Cold War in western states.[119]

The authorities did make some improvements in consumption, including clubs. Soviet cities reportedly had 6,450 functioning clubs in 1946, 7,970 in 1948, 9,170 in 1950, and 10,050 in 1953.[120] Trade unions controlled over 8,000 mostly urban club institutions in 1951, with 600 built from 1946 to

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[117] Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957*, Hugh Ragsdale trans. and ed. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998): 27-30, 40-56, 101-08, 139-48; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 7-40.

[118] Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-93; Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 17-70; and A. V. Fateev, *Obraz vraga v sovetskoi propagande, 1945-1954 gg.* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999).

[119] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" *The American Historical Review* 104.2 (April 1999): 501-24; Geraint Hughes and Saki R. Dockrill, "Introduction: The Cold War as History," Saki R. Dockrill and Geraint Hughes eds., *Palgrave Advances in Cold War History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-18.

[120] O. K. Makarova, *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1956), 273.

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1950, and many of the rest renovated from wartime damage and neglect.[121] Amateur performers in club activities also gained more cultural materials: for example, the Komsomol's complaints over the lack of published repertoires for amateurs in 1950 transformed into expressions of satisfaction over the quantity of such literature in February 1953.[122]

To a significant degree, such investment resulted from the potential for the cultural recreation network to convey political propaganda, a function that came to the fore in the late 1940s as part of a broader ideological reconstruction campaign. The political and ideological loosening in Soviet culture during the wartime and the immediate postwar period worried ~~the~~ top-level authorities. The Kremlin also aimed to recast cultural production for its Cold War needs on the cultural front.[123] Consequently, once past the initial wave of postwar consolidation of power in 1945 and early 1946, the leadership placed increasing emphasis on ideological reconstitution. Soviet rulers ramped up ~~the~~ Stalin's cult of

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[121] Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation), f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 900, l. 11.

[122] RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 185; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, ll. 1-6.

[123] For more on the role of culture in the conflict between the superpowers during the postwar Stalin period, see Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Mind*s (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 65-96; Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 22-80; David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 441-67; Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal eds., *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 93-106; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 1-56; Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 10-66; Jenny Anderson, "The Great Future Debate and the Struggle for the World," *American Historical Review*, 117.5 (December 2012): 1411-30; and Frances S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 1999), 7-84.

personality in the late 1940s, stridently demanding that the population show extreme gratefulness to the Party and ~~especially~~ its leader for victory over the Nazis and for any improvement in living conditions, as opposed to their own individual initiatives.[124] The Kremlin also ~~launched a campaign to~~ intensif~~ied~~y ideological and political propaganda and education in all spheres of life, emphasizing Soviet and especially Russian nationalism and hard-line interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.[125] The public discourse's focus on the cult of Stalin and increasingly xenophobic patriotism formed the core of Soviet ideological statements in these years, crowding out claims of advancing to communism, which made only rare and pro-forma appearances.

Furthermore, the Kremlin launched the campaign against "cosmopolitanism," a label used ~~by official discourse~~ to condemn anything perceived as foreign to the Soviet way of life. Beginning in late 1946, reaching its apogee in 1948, and continuing largely unabated throughout the rest of the postwar Stalin years, this campaign aimed to purge "anti-Soviet" elements, overtly targeting foreign influence of all sorts.[126] Anti-American propaganda proved especially prominent.[127] Less openly, this initiative also targeted Jews.[128]

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[124] Jan Plamper, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 60-85; Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 195-232.

[125] David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 183-96; Robert Edelman, *Spartak Moscow: A History of the People's Team in the Workers' State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 165-66; and Terry Martin, "Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism," in David L. Hoffman and Yanni Kotsonis eds., *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 161-184.

[126] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 238-57; Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 41-71; and V. D. Esakov and E. S. Levina, *Stalinskie "sudy chesti": Delo "KR"* (Moscow: Nauka, 2005).

In arts and culture, the first waves of this campaign began in the late summer of 1946. Instigated by Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, a series of high-level Party Central Committee decrees appeared in August and September 1946 on literature, theaters, and movies.[129] For instance, an August 1946 resolution censured drama theaters for putting on too few plays dealing with Soviet reality and too many by foreign playwrights.[130]

Although sporadic censure of western influence in music began in late 1946, such criticism took off only in late 1947, when a revived series of attacks on jazz appeared in the press. These presaged the expansion of the anticosmopolitan campaign into the sphere of music with the infamous Party Central Committee resolution of February 10, 1948, condemning Vano Muradeli's opera "Great Friendship." The decree stated that Muradeli and other prominent Soviet composers had wrongly taken a "formalist path," with a style that that "transformed music into

[127] Rósa Magnúsdóttir, "Keeping Up Appearances: How the Soviet State Failed to Control Popular Attitudes toward the United States of America, 1945–1959" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006); Konstantin V. Avramov, "Soviet America: Popular Responses to the United States in Post-World War II Soviet Union" (Ph.D. diss, University of Kansas, 2012); N. I. Nikolaeva, "Nekotorye itogi antiamerikanskoi kampanii v SSSR v kontse 40kh-nachale 50kh godov," in A. V. Gladyshev and V. S. Mirzekhanov eds., *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* (Saratov: Izdatel'stvo Saratovskogo universiteta, 2004), 100-12; and Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 7-25.

[128] Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 1-11, 249-83; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 282-300; and Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 204-371.

[129] Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116.

[130] Reprinted in: A. N. Iakovlev ed., *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia. Dokumenty TsK RKP(b) – VKP(b) – OGPU – NKVD o kul'turnoi politike. 1917-1953* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 1999), 591-96.