

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From War to Revolution

Political Aspects of the Mood of Russian Officers between 1914 and 1917

The article deals with the evolution of military officers' political moods during the First World War. Democratization of the officer corps was a result of mass mobilization in war time, which united different classes and social groups. Among the main factors politicizing the military officers were the course of the war and the growing crisis in Russia. The most typical perception models, which determined the oppositional political views of the officers in 1916–1917, have been analyzed.

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Notes have been renumbered for this edition.

Translated by Kenneth Cargill.

The social situation of the officer corps of the Russian Imperial Army has attracted the attention of researchers in recent decades.[1] Despite the considerable differences in the points of departure of scholars and in their assessment of the traditions of the development, ideology, and morale of the officer class, they have in principle agreed that the officer corps in prerevolutionary Russia was largely apolitical. This observation is rightly justified by the fact that until 1917 the tsarist army was thoroughly isolated from political life, which naturally transformed the officer corps into a politically backward group. On the one hand, this state of affairs was natural for an autocratic regime, in which politics as a field of activity was considered the prerogative of just a narrow circle of elites consisting of the person of the autocrat and his closest associates. On the other hand, the authorities had every reason to be alarmed since the experience of the nineteenth century showed many examples of officers who took up political struggles, ranging from the Decembrists to officer circles and populist and social democratic groups.

When most researchers characterize the political features of the officer corps, they invariably begin with the formula "For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland," which formed part of the official oath. Accepted as a "symbol of faith" of the Russian officers, at different times it served either to bolster their patriotism, which was inextricably linked with devotion to the throne, or to form the officers into a monarchical grouping that acted as an obedient tool to serve the autocracy by virtue of their class and property status. In my opinion, neither of these models allows us to fully characterize the political cast of mind of the Russian officer corps in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries since its political culture cannot be entirely characterized as one of subordination. Its social composition during the decades after the Great Reforms in fact changed significantly due to the influx of representatives of various social strata and estates. This change largely transformed the system of its views, ideas, and values. The officers of that period could be considered monarchical only by virtue of their loyalty to the political regime. The principle of nonparticipation in politics in turn excluded any political activity, including both oppositional and pro-monarchical.

World War I brought about a number of extreme transformations in Russian society, including how society related to state institutions, the opportunities for internal mobility, certain structural characteristics, and, as a consequence, attitudes and views. The nature and scale of the military conflict, which was unprecedented in Russian history, initiated changes of fundamental significance within the Russian Imperial Army, affecting both rank-and-file soldiers and the officer corps.

The fielding of a massive army during wartime and the high losses of officers at the various fronts demanded the creation of a sufficiently large reserve of command staff. Thus, during the war the officer corps was replenished not just from its former personnel base, but also from a new and expanded base of

reservists. During the war years, about 220,000 people had achieved the first officer rank of warrant officer [*praporshchik*] and, according to expert calculations, by October 1917 there were about 250,000 officers in the army.[2] Though it had increased by more than five times compared with its size in peacetime, the officer corps still constituted only a negligible fraction of the country's overall population of 170 million (0.15 percent). However, the problem of how officers defined themselves during the emerging sociopolitical conflict is especially important in light of the role that this self-identity played in the life and combat activities of the army during the course of the war and the subsequent revolutionary events.

As a result of changes that occurred during the war, the officer corps both increased significantly in size and absolutely democratized its ranks. The numerous reinforcements as well as losses of long-serving career officers eliminated the former class features of the officer corps. The social composition of officers now reproduced the national population's class structure and represented a cross-section of all educated or at least literate people.[3] The most common type of officer was the infantry warrant officer, who either was trained according to a three- to four-month accelerated schedule or received this rank for acts of valor on the battlefield or on the recommendation of superiors without special training. However, it would be incorrect to overly generalize from this insight since the older staff of generals and career officers were and continued to remain in charge of the army during the second and third year of the war. They commanded bodies of troops and units, staffed headquarters, and served in various branches of service and institutions. They also continued to teach in military academies. They were mainly responsible for the outcomes of the army's military campaigns.

Given the conditions of the world war, the officer corps was no longer able to keep its distance from the country's political life. The most important factor that determined the growth of the politicization of the officer corps as well as of society as a whole was Russia's military setbacks, which temporarily sublimated its other problems. The gradual decline in the combat readiness and morale of the Russian armed forces during the world war reflected the deep social and political problems of Imperial Russia as well as the metastasizing social and political crisis. The large group of front-line officers, who did not directly participate in the political life of the country, responded to these processes with alarm. The state of society and the government influenced the mood of the officers in their own way.

The political cast of mind of the officer corps underwent considerable changes during the war years, as many mind-sets and values were tested during wartime that had existed and been cultivated in a declarative form during peacetime. On the other hand, the mass reinforcement of the ranks brought

social and political changes to the officers' milieu. By 1917, many members of the revolutionary movement, members of political parties, and persons sympathizing with them had joined the ranks of the army. With the outbreak of the war, a number of deputies of the State Duma, who were officers of the reserve, enlisted in the army. Two of them—Cadet Lieutenant A.M. Kolyubakin and Octobrist Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Zvegintsev—were killed at the front. Right Monarchist Warrant Officer V.V. Shul'gin returned to the Duma after being wounded. A fairly large number of members of the *zemstvo* intelligentsia who entered and expanded the officer corps held liberal and moderately leftist views. Finally, there were also officers during the war who were members of socialist parties. Bolshevik officers who conducted agitation activity in the army included A.Ia. Arosev, R.I. Berzin, A.E. Dauman, P.V. Dashkevich, Iu.M. Kotsiubinskii, D.I. Kurskii, N.V. Krylenko, A.F. Miasnikov, and I.P. Pavlunovskii. Their very presence in the army influenced the soldiers and officer corps. They helped spread leftist views and opposition sentiments, although the scale of this activity before February 1917 should not be exaggerated. In the front-line conditions, this agitation was, more often than not, limited to conversations with soldiers, which necessitated the observance of caution. Academician S.G. Strumilin, a veteran of the socialist movement and later a major Soviet economist who achieved the rank of warrant officer in command of a company of the 432nd Iamburg Regiment on the Northern Front, recalled:

> It was not hard for them to suggest that those Sukhomlinovs, Miasoedovs, and other Russian landlords were no better than the German barons, and that we had many enemies in our own country…. But it was much more difficult to gage to what extent such half-articulated thoughts had their intended effect, were digested and incorporated into the conclusions of those who listened to them.[4]

The actions and statements of officers attracted the attention of the security agencies. The secret reports of the gendarmerie directorates to the Police Department repeatedly noted that "students who are warrant officers play an important role in spreading political agitation among soldiers."[5] A.A. Svechin, a General Staff colonel who later became a major Soviet military theorist, characterized the reserve officers who were recruited from among the intelligentsia into his regiment as being mostly socialists. However, as a commander he did not see this as a problem since the combat qualities that he valued most in his men were honesty, professionalism, and performance of duties.[6] Participation in the common cause of defending the fatherland united people who held widely contrasting points of view. The only position that was condemned in this circle was a defeatist one, and only an openly expressed one at that.

The course of military events, the development of the social situation in Russia, as well as the work of the political parties themselves all facilitated the politicization of the officer corps. The views of the officers, like the majority of the population who perceived political life at the level of primitive everyday stereotypes and cliches, changed under the influence of a complex and dynamically evolving situation. The most important factor that spurred the growth of critical attitudes in the officer corps was the army's failures at the front and its apparent inability to defeat the enemy. Attempts to explain these failures inevitably led not so much to finding the real causes behind what was happening as to naming scapegoats. In this regard, I should note a few intellectual frameworks that best describe the mood of the officers during the war and, in particular, during late 1916 and early 1917.

The country's unpreparedness for war, the weakness of its armed forces, the backwardness of the economy, and the shortcomings of its cultural development were naturally blamed on the country's *political leadership and chief military commanders*. Far removed from political struggle and concerns, A.A. Brusilov characterized the general background of the officers' political views as follows: "We can say that the officer corps and all the intelligentsia that have enlisted in the army are extremely hostile to the government."[7] Various opinions and assessments were expressed concerning the significance of the autocratic regime and the monarch's degree of personal responsibility for what was going on. The most conservative part of the officer corps, who were not inclined to reproach the monarch, concentrated their criticism on the government and generals (or rather on specific individuals in the government and military) without linking them to the figure of Nicholas II. N.V. Voronovich, a guards captain who clearly represented this point of view, recalled:

> During the second and especially the third year of the war, when I experienced the consequences of the criminal negligence of the irresponsible people at the head of our military administration, I increasingly became disillusioned with the regime to which I had become accustomed since the earliest of ages and which I was accustomed to regarding as just and fair. But even then I felt only deep pity for the tsar, for whom I had never experienced any dislike. If I allowed myself sometimes to condemn him, then it was only for his poor selection of advisers and weak character.[8]

The section of the army elite that was more pragmatic and less influenced by monarchical illusions was able to reason through the problem more thoroughly. In early 1917 Lieutenant-Colonel General of the General Staff A.I. Verhovskii wrote the following in his diary:

> It is obvious to everyone that the main reason why we have not won so far is the autocratic system, which kills all self-initiative in the country and fills the army with so many unqualified commanders. Everyone is aware of this, everyone talks about this and … the whole problem boils down to this.[9]

By this time, criticism of the ruling circles had become a common occurrence in the army in both the rear and at the front. A.I. Denikin quotes a prominent figure in the Union of Zemstvos and Cities who first visited the army in 1916: "I was quite struck … by how freely and constantly everyone in the military units, at officers' meetings, in the presence of commanders, in the staff offices, etc., speaks about the government's worthlessness and what scum the members of the royal family are."[10]

The disillusionment with the government and the ruling authorities in Russia gradually penetrated the officer corps. Military events led even people who had been completely loyal and far removed from politics during the prewar period to develop critical views. M.K. Lemke, a well-known historian and publicist who worked in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, recalled the following about his colleague S.M. Krupin, a young officer who had been called up from the reserve and who was acting as adjutant under M.V. Alekseev:

> As he described it, before the war he was a real official, a nationalist, and a man who did not think deeply about the conditions of Russian life. Now he realized that the society and the government were two poles … and that a revolution was absolutely inevitable, but it would be wild, spontaneous, and unsuccessful, and afterwards we would resume living like swine.

Lemke continued, "Indeed, now there are tens of thousands of such Krupins." He said that he himself knew many whose minds and hearts were not swayed at all by the events of 1905, but who were completely changed by 1914 and 1915.[11]

Officers were no longer prevented from determining their own political views by such once unquestionable formal limitations as the oath of allegiance to the throne. Lemke also made another observation:

> The story of Cornet Andrei Andreevich Chaikovskii is quite symptomatic. He often visits the house of Princess Drutskaia-Sokolinskaia, whose son is the vice-governor here. The whole family, especially the vice-governor, is completely sympathetic to the Black Hundreds. All of the guests, including our officers, engage in lively conversations about politics. Recently, a dispute

> became so heated that the vice-governor reminded his guests of the oath of loyalty that they had sworn to the service:
>
> "You swore an oath, after all!"
>
> "Yes," Chaikovskii replied, "but was this really a conscientious and free act on our part? We swore this oath out of ignorance. The way I would describe it was that we made a bad deal with our consciences. In fact, we swore to serve honestly and without hypocrisy, but the essence of our understanding of precisely these concepts has changed."[12]

At the end of 1916, when the unpopularity of the government reached its peak, the officers increasingly turned their attention to its main legal critic, the State Duma. Officers voiced anger at the authorities and described their expectations of the Duma and the Duma politicians in the letters that they wrote from the front:

> Our government doesn't give a damn. It is not working for the good of the people, but for their own personal benefit…. The rumors make your hair stand on end, and everyone believes that they will not call the Duma into session. They will deliberately not call it into session. Everyone is amazed by the patience of the people in the rear.[13]

Another letter notes: "We greedily read the speeches of such real Russian patriots as Miliukov."[14]

Given the low level of political culture, attempts to explain Russia's problems and military failures as being the result of an *internal conspiracy*, claims of German influence in the ruling elite, and speculation about the activities of enemy spies were natural. The case of Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Miasoedov in the spring of 1915 resonated strongly with the public. Miasoedov was convicted of being a German spy and executed by the verdict of a military court. Various emigrant and Russian historians have at various times very reasonably challenged the accusation that Miasoedov was involved in espionage (including S.P. Mel'gunov, K.F. Shatsillo, N.N. Iakovlev, and O.R. Airapetov), believing that the "case" against him was brought due to the intrigues by the factions competing in the government that aimed to compromise and eliminate Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov.[15] Nevertheless, contemporaries did not question the fact that Miasoedov was a spy who had enjoyed the patronage of Sukhomlinov. The commander of the Gendarmerie Corps, General V.F. Dzhunkovsky, insisted that Miasoedov penetrated the headquarters of the 10th Army in violation of established official procedures and it was his machinations that led to the defeat of the army in February 1915.[16] This version of events was accepted by the higher military circles, as it gave a satisfactory explanation for the failures of the Russian army. Denikin years later declared the following in his memoirs: "Personally, I never

had any doubts about Miasoedov's guilt."[17] He repeated Alekseev's opinion when he indirectly confirmed the accusations of treason against Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, which had been persistently whipped up in the press in 1916.[18] Rumors that German spies had penetrated everywhere agitated society and had a rather negative effect. The army, including officers, began to grow wary of the state leaders.

Mistrust and irritation with the authorities subsumed all *political life*, the essence of which was little understood by front-line officers. Politics was a subject susceptible to all kinds of speculation, and it was assumed to be dominated by abuses perpetrated by government officials and Duma members. It was naturally assumed that politics were alien to the interests of the front. The chief of staff of the 64th Infantry Division, General A.E. Snesarev, who was on leave in the capital at the end of 1916, observed that Petrograd was "nervous, full of gossip and rumors, and completely lacking any normal or balanced perspectives…. As for the political mood, it is uniformly left-leaning: everyone repeats the stubborn idea that the government does not want to work with society, that it does not take public opinion into account, that we are standing on the brink of the abyss, etc."[19] The general was not eager to believe such opinions, but he was indignant over Duma members who turned their public calling into a means of private enrichment.[20] Verkhovskii articulated the attitude that front-line soldiers had toward the activity of politicians in extremely emotional terms: "At the same time that we are losing our strength here, behind our backs in the rear there is some kind of bacchanalia of domestic policy."[21] Even many officers, though they did not have very politically developed opinions, perceived the increase in political activity in the rear with concern. Cossack officer and *pod'yesaul*[22] A.A. Upornikov shared his impressions about this at the end of 1916 in a letter to his wife:

> Now when I have nothing else to do I read newspapers line by line. It's the same mess day in and day out. I can imagine what tremendous pressure must now exist at the top and how many things are happening there behind the scenes that we do not know about. You get the impression that everyone wants to make off with the best spoils. And the war provides the perfect distraction for all of this activity.[23]

Three weeks later, at the beginning of January 1917, he wrote the following in a letter home: "Politics have ceased to concern me. I read the newspapers, when they are available to read, with revulsion."[24]

Finally, a general feature of the mood of the active army and, in particular, of the officers, was *discontent with what was happening in the rear*. Numerous flaws in the military and political leadership, constant problems with the supply of troops, and information about life in the rear

gave birth to the notion that not only the authorities but society as a whole had turned away from the front, and that the army remained the only force fighting for Russia's fate and interests. Verkhovskii wrote the following in his diary on the last day of 1915:

> We are currently going through painfully and insultingly difficult times in the army. Back at the time when the war was first declared, everything in life seemed to assemble behind the single common cause. Now we are forgotten. Soldiers who spent time in Russia recuperating from their wounds and who have now arrived back at the front say that people back in the rear are on one continuous holiday and that the restaurants and theaters are full. They never saw so many elegant toilets at once. Society has forgotten about the army.[25]

The belief that there was an abyss that divided the front from the rear was further intensified. The following lines from a letter in verse written by a front-line soldier and warrant officer A.N. Zhiglinskii in late 1916 provide unique evidence of the situation: "Here we are gassed and shot at, and there they have gold and diamonds,/Here we have humble wooden crosses/And there the merchants and speculators proudly hold sway,/But here we are pressed in by famine and tailings."[26]

The front-line soldiers were also concerned and alarmed by the obvious signs of economic disorder in the rear. Soldiers on the front learned a lot about conditions in the rear from letters that were sent from home and reports by those returning to their regiments from their leaves. The first profoundly disillusioning impression that officers on leave often noted was of the chaos that was paralyzing the railway transport system and the difficulties that they experienced on the road home.[27] The drop in the standard of living in the rear especially concerned officers who had a worker or peasant background. Lieutenant D. Os'kin, who returned from leave in September 1916, told his fellow soldiers:

> Life in the rear has become extremely expensive…. A dozen eggs in the village costs seventy kopecks, there is no white flour nor any butter, and it is difficult to find any sugar. Rumor has it that in the city they will soon start rationing bread. In the City of Kozelsk, which I often had to visit, the shops are empty and there are no goods for sale. The trains are full of a ton of speculators traveling from city to city in order to buy things cheaper in one place to sell them more expensively somewhere else. The population is tired of war and it is waiting with impatience for peace.[28]

By the end of 1916, the concern over the situation of families in the rear, the discontent with high prices, and the hatred of the hardship conditions of war

that allowed the bourgeoisie to grow rich became central themes of the letters written by soldiers as well as officers. One letter writer ventured, "Those poor, poor residents of Moscow. You are at the mercy of the genuine internal enemies, meaning the traders and merchants. That's where the true patriotism of the Russian merchants can be seen. In the end they will get their just comeuppance."[29] And another opined, "Moscow, after all, is not just the center of the whole of Russia. It is also the center of all our disgraceful speculators and insolent scam artists. After all, the city is full of enemies who are more dangerous than the Germans."[30]

The impression that there was an opposition between the rear and the front was also partly psychologically conditioned. In a sense, this psychological framework anticipated the postwar problems that the former front-line soldiers would have when they had to adapt to peacetime life. However, when they went on leave in the rear, they acutely felt estranged from a society living with other problems and that, moreover, believed that the army was culpable for the military failures. These sentiments are expressed in one of Upornikov's letters:

> Now, just as the last of our forces are giving out and we are losing our health and often our very lives, at a time when there are weeks when we do not even have the time to wash ourselves, people look at us as though we were little better than ordinary criminals. I had to endure such stares on my last trip. I simply wonder how many people actually think this way. Just imagine: this is a time of war! What will happen after the final shot is fired? Are we really so despised in the eyes of the majority, have we really earned such scorn? … When I think about this, when I involuntarily recollect the conversations I have had on trains and elsewhere during my leave, then I experience a terrible feeling of resentment boiling over in my soul.[31]

Front-line soldiers were invariably resentful of all the young men, including both soldiers and civilians, in the rear who were avoiding service at the front, including reserve officers and members of various military institutions, civil officials, and servicemen in paramilitary organizations of the Unions of the Land and City [Zemskie i Gorodskie soiuzy], who were given the contemptuous nicknames "zemhussars" [*zemgusary*] and "hydro-uhlans" [*gidroulany*].

Special attention should be paid to what Russian officers thought about the aims and objectives of the war, which were closely related to their level of political knowledge and guiding ideals. Researchers have come to the conclusion that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the military elite of the Russian army mainly believed that Russia was surrounded by hostile forces and that its

security was threatened by foreign powers in both the West and the East.[32] When they considered the original reasons why Russia entered the world conflict, Russian military leaders explained that a geopolitical, economic, cultural, and even moral confrontation between Germany and Russia had been inevitable.[33] In general, as Denikin admitted, the "officer corps, like most members of the middle-class intelligentsia, was not too interested in the sacramental question of what were the 'aims of the war.'"[34] Neither the idea that the war was a joint struggle among members of a coalition nor feelings of solidarity with the Entente allies were ever prominent in the views of the officers. In fact, since these views formed part of the official rhetoric, they gradually evoked increasing annoyance especially among the front-line soldiers. In 1915, the allies were already so unpopular among the troops that commanders did not dare to refer to the need for coordinated action with the allies.[35] The experience of the war persuaded them that, even if Russia was not fighting a one-on-one struggle with the enemy, it nevertheless had to endure the brunt of the war on account of its unscrupulous allies. Thus, in the international space Russia was not surrounded by both enemies and allies, but only by opponents of varying degrees of hostility. Snesarev mentioned how in July 1916 a group of Japanese officers toured the positions of his division. The Russians were not lulled by the temporary alliance made necessary by the situation, and they remained wary of their recent adversaries from the Far East. Snesarev offered high praise for the Japanese, and he immediately made a very revealing observation: "We will fight them again, of course. It's just a question of whether they are our next top priority or whether we will tend to them after the English."[36] According to the general, Russia had long had to prove its position in the world by force of arms.

With the outbreak of the war, the entire society would only respond more or less unanimously to the idea of fighting a defensive war in the face of aggression by Germany and Austria-Hungary. This idea remained the leading motivating factor behind the war for all categories of officers. There was no doubt that there was a need to defend the Motherland. However, members of various strata of society changed their conceptions in particular about the motherland, its welfare, and its responsibility to ensure this welfare under the influence of the above-mentioned set of factors. Career officers achieved the greatest consensus on questions where conceptions of professional and public duty were almost identical, but the military setbacks and the obvious regress of the army and state during the war destroyed this consensus. Accusations against the high command and the authorities, politicians, and other forces that personified the state led to the natural conclusion that the government in its present form was preventing the officers from fulfilling their professional duties and the army from achieving victory over the enemy.

Representatives of other social groups that had joined the officer corps during the war expressed an even broader spectrum of oppositional views against the state and public authorities. The abstract patriotic moods of the most loyal segment of them, namely the intelligentsia, can be gaged fairly accurately from the reasoning of A.N. Zhiglinskii in a letter from the front to his relatives:

> I am Russian, and every Russian must think similarly…. Mine is not an ersatz patriotism. After all, I am *not fighting for the government* [emphasis mine—I.G.]. When you are putting your life on the line, you are fighting for mama, for yourself, for your motherland writ small, and for all of your relatives and friends. And I am proud of the fact that I can be useful to both you and Russia.[37]

Young officers shared the same fundamental concepts of "Russia" and "government," whereby their attitude to the fate of the latter was indifference at best. The extreme revolutionary point of view penetrated the officer's environment, which negated the abstract understanding of the fatherland. This point of view can be found in the letter of former Moscow student Warrant Officer E.A. Petrov:

> There, at the front, millions of soldiers are called upon to save the "fatherland," that is, the Russian capital, the squalor of the Russian peasants, and to cure unemployment, cold, famine; those sitting in slush and mud … and somehow we are reminded of our responsibility to this people, who selflessly go to die for the benefit of others…. Having become aware of this guilt, I began to work in an element that is very receptive to the issues of our time. I clearly point out to them who are friends and who are enemies, and that the time to decide the fate of Russia has come…. If I die, I will die for a cause that for me is almost sacred …, to die for the government, for the "fatherland" [emphasis mine—I.G.] would not just be immoral but completely beyond the pale and wicked.[38]

In late 1916 Petrov was brought before an inquiry where he was accused of spreading revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers of the 184th Infantry Regiment, though investigators failed to reveal his membership in any social democratic organizations.

The views of the officers in one way or another reflected the mood of the broadest sections of society that were experiencing the conditions of the social, political, and economic crisis that swept Russia in late 1916 and early 1917. By now, they had all experienced fatigue and disappointment during the course of military events as well as irritation with the activities

of the authorities and commanders and the attitude of society toward the army, and they were beginning to show signs of a lack of internal unity. This social background can be clearly seen in one officer's letters:

> You think that only I alone have lost patience. No, in fact all of the officers and soldiers have already lost it, and we are waiting for either "peace" or for the gray greatcoats to end the war without the involvement of any superiors. The entire army has been talking about this now for a long time.[39]

Thus, the overwhelming majority of officers, sensing the ineffectiveness and hopelessness of their military service, gradually became more frustrated over time and thus more open to participating in opposition movements. The weakness of the government and the loss of the last remnants of its public authority, in a sense, posed a threat to the professional interests of the officer corps. The awareness of this threat gradually turned the officer corps into an oppositional social force.

Notes

1. See, for example, L.G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1973), p. 267; P.A. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX i XX stoletii* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 233–234; S.V. Volkov, *Russkii ofitserskii korpus* (Moscow, 1993), pp. 287–288; A.A. Plekhanov and A.M. Plekhanov, *Otdel'nyi korpus pogranichnoi strazhi imperatorskoi Rossii (1893–1917): Istoricheskii ocherk* (Moscow, 2003), pp. 99–101.
2. See, for example, L.G. Beskrovnyi, *Armiia i flot Rossii v nachale XX veka: Ocherki voennogo potentsiala* (Moscow, 1986), p. 47; A.G. Kavtaradze, *Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov 1917–1920 gg.* (Moscow, 1988), p. 28.
3. See S.V. Volkov, *Tragediia russkogo ofitserstva* (Moscow, 2002), p. 12.
4. S.G. Strumilin, "Iz perezhitogo (1897–1917 gg.)," in *Vospominaniia i publitsistika* (Moscow, 1968), p. 170.
5. *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v armii i na flote v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny. 1914–fevral' 1917 g.* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 190–191.
6. See A.A. Svechin, *Iskusstvo vozhdeniia polka po opytu voiny 1914–1918 gg.* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 86–87.
7. A.A. Brusilov, *Moi vospominaniia* (Moscow, 2001), p. 201.
8. N.V. Voronovich, "Vechernii zvon," in *Potonuvshii mir* (Moscow, 2001), p. 122.
9. A.I. Verkhovskii, "Rossiia na Golgofe (iz pokhodnogo dnevnika 1914–1918 g.)," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1993, no. 4, p. 31.
10. A.I. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty* (Moscow, 1991), vol. 1, p. 106.
11. M.K. Lemke, *250 dnei v tsarskoi stavk* (Minsk, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 201–202.
12. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 356.
13. Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), f. 13835, op. 1, d. 79, l. 70 ob.

14. Ibid., l. 91 ob.
15. See, for example, S.P. Mel'gunov, *Na putiakh k dvortsovomu perevorotu* (Moscow, 2003), pp. 30–31; K.F. Shatsillo, "'Delo' polkovnika Miasoedova," *Voprosy istorii*, 1967, no. 4, pp. 103–116; N.N. Iakovlev, *1 avgusta 1914* (Moscow, 2003), pp. 190–201; O.R. Airapetov, *Generaly, liberaly i predprinimateli: rabota na front i revoliutsiiu. 1907–1917* (Moscow, 2003), pp. 69–72.
16. V.F. Dzhunkovksy, *Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 531–532.
17. A.I. Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera* (Moscow, 1991), p. 216.
18. A.I. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty* (Moscow, 1991), vol. 1, p. 87.
19. "Frontovye dnevniki generala A.E. Snesareva," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 2004, no. 8, p. 35.
20. See ibid., p. 52.
21. A.I. Verkhovskii, "Rossiia na Golgofe (iz pokhodnogo dnevnika 1914–1918 g.)," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1993, no. 1, p. 66.
22. *Pod'yesaul* was a rank in the Cossack units equal to the rank of Staff Captain in the Army.—Au.
23. "Frontovye pis'ma esaula A.A. Upornikova perioda Pervoi mirovoi voiny," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 2007, no. 3, p. 52.
24. Ibid., p. 53.
25. A.I. Verkhovskii, "Rossiia na Golgofe (iz pokhodnogo dnevnika 1914–1918 g.)," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1993, no. 1, p. 66.
26. "'Ia gord tem, chto mogu byt' polezen Rossii' Pis'ma russkogo ofitsera s voiny," *Istochnik*, 1996, no. 3, p. 29.
27. See, for example, "Frontovye dnevniki generala A.E. Snesareva," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 2004, no. 8, p. 35; M.N. Gerasimov, *Probuzhdenie* (Moscow, 1965), p. 231.
28. D. Oskin, "Zapiski praporshchika," *Otkrovennye rasskazy* (Moscow, 1998), p. 256.
29. RGVIA, f. 13835, op. 1, d. 79, l. 6 ob.
30. Ibid., l. 512 ob.
31. "Frontovye pis'ma esaula A.A. Upornikova," p. 51.
32. E.Iu. Sergeev, "Predstavlencheskie modeli rossiiskoi voennoi elity nachala XX veka," in *Voenno-istoricheskaia antropologiia. Ezhegodnik. 2002: Predmet, zadachi, perspektivy razvitiia* (Moscow, 2002), pp. 248–249.
33. See A.A. Brusilov, *Moi vospominaniia* (Moscow, 2001), pp. 71–77; Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera*, pp. 227–229.
34. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty*, vol. 1, p. 89.
35. See A.A. Svechin, *Iskusstvo vozhdeniia polka po opytu voiny 1914–1918 gg*. (Moscow, 2005), pp. 381–382.
36. "Frontovye dnevniki generala A.E. Snesareva," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 2003, no. 9, p. 34.
37. "'Ia gord tem, chto mogu byt' polezen Rossii' Pis'ma russkogo ofitsera s voiny," *Istochnik*, 1996, no. 3, p. 24. A.N. Zhilginskii wrote this letter dated June 14, 1916, to his aunt S.E. Gibschman.
38. *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v armii i na flote v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny. 1914–fevral' 1917 g*. (Moscow, 1966), p. 428.
39. RGVIA, f. 13835, op. 1, d. 79, l. 70 ob.