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# The Austrian Connection. The Staff of the Office of the SS and Police Leader Odilo Globocnik in the Lublin District

“The Jews are now being pushed out of the Generalgouvernement, beginning near Lublin, to the East. A pretty barbaric procedure is being applied here and it is not to be described in any more detail, and not much is left of the Jews themselves. In general, one may conclude that 60% of them must be liquidated, while only 40% can be put to work. The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is carrying out this action, is doing it pretty prudently and with a procedure that doesn’t work too conspicuously.”[[1]](#footnote-1)

This diary entry by Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels on March 27, 1942, referring to the evacuation of the Lublin ghetto in March 1942 and the deportations of the Lublin Jews to the extermination camp of Belzec, marks the beginning of the so-called “Operation Reinhard” in the Generalgouvernement (GG), in the scope of which more than 1.5 million Jewish women, men and children were murdered in the extermination camps of Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka and Majdanek.

At the very beginning of the mass murder, Goebbels had nothing but praise for the “pretty prudently” acting former Gauleiter of Vienna, Odilo Globocnik, SS and Police Leader (SSPF) in the Lublin district since November 1939, referring to his organizational talent in the murdering of Jews as well as his skillful concealment of the murder procedure.

It can be assumed that the key role is known that Odilo Globocnik, one of the most important Austrian National Socialists, played as the SS and Police Leader in the Lublin district for the realization of two closely connected objectives of Nazi occupation policy, namely the murder of the Jews and “Germanization.”[[2]](#footnote-2) The SSPF Office headed by him can be described as well-nigh prototypical as an institution of ongoing expansion of power characterized by the transfer of functions, usurpation of newly emerging functional areas while claiming new competencies and new institutions as well as by the expansion in the scope of orders once received.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Globocnik had assumed his position as SSPF of the Lublin district only a year after he had had to step down as Gauleiter of Vienna, where he had left behind a financial and organizational chaos—a definite career setback for the prominent Austrian Nazi who had played a leading role in organizing the “Anschluss” (annexation) of Austria.

In the scholarly literature, Globocnik’s enormous activity, his radical behavior and his constant transgression of rules and agreements are often explained by personal qualities, his socialization in Carinthia, a border region torn by ethnic conflicts, as well as this experience of failure in Vienna. Himmler, who had been very close to Globocnik at least since the days of the “Anschluss” in March 1938, had opened up a second career opportunity to him that Globocnik now tried to exploit at all costs. The SSPF position did not automatically entail a chance for him to establish his own empire, however. The special status of the Lublin district for the Nazis’ *Judenpolitik* (policies on Jewish matters), then later as a staging ground and supply base for the war against the Soviet Union, provided Globocnik with a great deal of creative leeway.[[4]](#footnote-4) The institution of an SSPF, conceived by Himmler not as a compact, standardized administrative apparatus but as a flexible instrument of control with open organizational structures, whose efficiency and stability was to be linked to the aggressive personality of the holder of the Office,[[5]](#footnote-5) seems to have complied to a great extent with Globocnik’s way of working. Globocnik’s approach, much admired and supported by Himmler, as a dynamic and ruthless Nazi “man of action” who believes one hundred percent in his mission seems to have been a prerequisite for the special position that Globocnik was able to fulfill as SSPF.

However, focusing on Globocnik as a person should not get make us blind to the fact that the SSPF did not act by himself but depended to a large extent on the personnel who executed the duties assigned to them. The question as to the significance of the staff working in the SSPF Office, involved as it was like no other in the murder of the European Jews and large-scale ethnic cleansing programs, as well as the question of its enormous activism—ascribed to Globocnik personally—has not been sufficiently addressed in scholarly research until now.

To single out Odilo Globocnik so much as an individual person is based, if on nothing else, on the problematic contemporary assessments of him such as that of Maximillian von Herff, chief of the SS-Personalhauptamt (Main SS Personnel Office), who, completely in sync with the argumentation of the Führer principle, praises the SSPF and furnishes him with such attributes as “fanatical,” “obsessed with his mission” and “go-getter.”[[6]](#footnote-6) Although the Führer principle did not leave any leeway for the possibility that the group of underlings might have an impact on the decision behavior, this should not hide the fact that the actions ascribed to Globocnik were definitely shared by a close-knit group of persons who had long known one another and had more in common than just similar ideological attitudes. First and foremost, they shared the political experience over many years of working in the underground when the Nazi movement was banned in Austria from 1933 to 1938. During his entire stay in Lublin (and afterward), Globocnik moved among a group of close Austrian confidants on both a professional and private level. Their influence on the dynamic drive emanating from the Office and the actions of the SSPF cannot be underestimated.

The objective of the present essay is to illuminate more clearly the network of personnel around Globocnik. Who were the decisive protagonists on the staff? How did they get to Lublin? What was their relationship to Globocnik? How great was the dominance of Austrians on the staff? This entails the general question about the selection criteria for the personnel involved in the Nazi crimes in Eastern Europe. Were ideologically trained potential mass murderers active in the SSPF Office? Or were they “ordinary men” (and women)?[[7]](#footnote-7)

There are a number of brief biographical accounts on Globocnik himself[[8]](#footnote-8) on hand; more in-depth monographs about him were written by persons who stand on the fringe of historiography.[[9]](#footnote-9) In terms of his associates, the Salzburg-born Hermann Höfle, staff member responsible for “Operation Reinhard,” became the subject of scholarly studies when British wiretap transcripts of German radio communications became available.[[10]](#footnote-10) One of Höfle’s staff associates, Vienna-born Amon Leopold Göth, gained attention through Steven Spielberg’s film “Schindler’s List” on account of his later position as the cruel commander of the Plaszow forced labor camp.[[11]](#footnote-11) Georg Michalsen, who was especially active under Höfle for ghetto evacuations,[[12]](#footnote-12) as well as Richard Thomalla, another Höfle staff associate,[[13]](#footnote-13) have become more well-known owing to legal documents on hand. Brief accounts also exist on the most important person on the staff, Ernst Lerch.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Two groups who were closely connected to Globocnik’s SSPF Office have been thoroughly investigated. For one, the personnel of the T4 killing hospitals made available to Globocnik by the Chancellery of the Führer, a total of 120 persons who comprised the core personnel of the extermination camps,[[15]](#footnote-15) as well as the guard units in the extermination camps, several thousand in number, trained in Trawniki near Lublin and recruited for the most part from the camps for Soviet POWs.[[16]](#footnote-16)

All in all, however, a systematic study of the staff of the SSPF Office does not exist to this day.[[17]](#footnote-17)

## The Office: Tasks, structure and personnel

The activity of the SSPF Office is relatively well researched. A brief summary of the major developments is given in the following. Right from the onset of his activity in Lublin, Globocnik and his staff came up with radical measures, especially in the realm of policy on Jewish matters, the policy on forced labor in conjunction with it, as well as in the field of Germanization. This includes the establishment of forced labor camps; the construction—useless in military terms—of the defensive trench on the Bug River by thousands of Jewish forced laborers; the brutal repression policy by the Lublin *Selbstschutz* (Volksdeutsche self-defense units)[[18]](#footnote-18); as well as the participation in the resettlement of so-called “Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans),” especially the resettlement from Volhynia.

Globocnik struggled with the civilian administration of the district from the beginning, in particular on the issue of competencies for the policy on Jewish matters.[[19]](#footnote-19) As a former Gauleiter, however, Globocnik also laid claim to the leadership in the district, which was technically given to the civilian *Gouverneur*. Globocnik was appointed the NSDAP district *Standortführer* in May 1940.[[20]](#footnote-20)

As a project of the occupation government, Globocnik and his staff devised a convincing plan for the establishment of SS and police bases in the Lublin district, which met with Himmler’s approval. Himmler appointed Globocnik to be his Commissioner for this task in November 1940.

At the same time, Globocnik established an *SS-Mannschaftshaus* (SS think tank) in Lublin, modeled after the ones in German university towns. The idea was to attract young SS academics to Lublin for concrete planning work for the establishment of the bases as well as, later, for the entire settlement and Germanization projects, thus having at his disposal his own on-site research institute.[[21]](#footnote-21) For the Germanization projects, Odilo Globocnik was not only able to fall back on his role as authorized representative of the *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* (RKFdV, Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom) for the Lublin district in conjunction with his position as SSPF; field offices of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (VoMi, Ethnic German Liaison Office) and the *Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes* (RuSHA, SS Race and Settlement Main Office) were also established in Lublin, all with close ties to the *Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte* (Research Center for Settlements in the East), which had emanated from the SS-Mannschaftshaus in March 1942.[[22]](#footnote-22)

With the attack on the Soviet Union, Himmler expanded Globocnik’s order for the establishment of bases in July 1941 to extend to the entirety of the “new Ostraum(Eastern territory)”; to this end, the Lublin *Standort* was to be expanded into a major SS base. Even though this order to Globocnik was revoked as early as March 1942, when it became clear that the technical specialists of the SS-WVHA (Economic and Administrative Main Office of the SS) were far better equipped to expedite the establishment of the bases, the planning work in the Research Center continued.[[23]](#footnote-23)

“Operation Reinhard,” which Himmler had ordered Globocnik to execute, became the main project of the SSPF Office in 1942. Alongside the establishment of the extermination camps, it included the evacuation of the ghettos, deportation to the extermination camps and utilization of the belongings of the victims.[[24]](#footnote-24) Connected with the ghetto evacuations was the establishment of an economic complex based on Jewish forced labor, the so-called “Ostindustrie GmbH” in the Lublin district, a project that was closed down after the mass executions of “Aktion Erntefest (Operation Harvest Festival)” in the autumn of 1943 by Globocnik’s successor Jakob Sporrenberg.[[25]](#footnote-25)

The first major Germanization project in Zamosc, south of Lublin, was carried out under Globocnik’s responsibility starting in the fall of 1942; it also entailed the forced resettlement of more than 100,000 non-Jewish Polish residents.[[26]](#footnote-26) After it resulted in a massive growth of the resistance movement and chaotic conditions, thus earning vehement criticism from the civilian administration, the project was aborted in the summer of 1943. This led to Globocnik being relieved of this duty in September 1943 on account of his promotion to Higher SS and Police Leader in Trieste.[[27]](#footnote-27)

To cover all the various functions, the SSPF established an institutional web, which could always be adapted to the latest requirements. A good general outline dates from August 1941 when the SSPF Office had to be restructured due to the work entailed in the “establishment of SS and police bases in the new Eastern territory,” [[28]](#footnote-28) which it had taken on shortly after the attack on the Soviet Union. Globocnik divided his office into five main groups, which, under their respective leader from the staff, had to work “as a body by direct order of the *Brigadeführer* (SS brigadier general)”; in contrast to the others, the first two groups had “clear-cut” tasks:

1. SSPF Office (Permanent Representative Chief of Staff SS-Obersturmbannführer Nemec)

2. Office of the Representative for the Establishment of the SS and Police Bases in the New Eastern Territories (Permanent Representative SS-Sturmbannführer Maubach)

3. *Volkspolitisches Referat* (desk for racial and ethnic matters)for the “execution of the entire Germanization work in conjunction with the 4th main group” (Hauptgefolgschaftsführer [main retinue leader] v. Seltmann)

4. Planning and scientific deployment for the “overall planning of the SS and police bases, cleansing of Jews, scientific mission within the scope of the SS-Mannschaftshaus” under the auspices of SS-Obersturmführer Hanelt

5. NSDAP in the district (SS-Obersturmbannführer Nemec).

The motor pool desk under SS-Sturmbannführer Maubach was an independent unit.[[29]](#footnote-29) The order to carry out “Operation Reinhard” led to the creation of another department under the auspices of Hermann Höfle, which was later given the name of “Hauptabteilung Einsatz Reinhard (Main Department Operation Reinhard).”[[30]](#footnote-30) Concurrently, the Base Department was dissolved.

Globocnik’s multifarious tasks were not to be mastered with the rather modest staffing of an SSPF Office. Unlike any other SSPF, he succeeded in having a large quota of personnel assigned to him. The numbers can be seen from a subsequent chart dated October 1943.[[31]](#footnote-31)

1. Members of the SSPF Office in Persons

the various institutions

SSPF task force (with all

SS Führer, SS Unterführer, SS men,

police sergeants, civilian employees 49

Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of

Germandom 16

SS-Mannschaftshaus 42

DAW (Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke) 10

staff members detached to KdS (interpreters) 7

Trawniki work camp 3

Trawniki training camp 26

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In all 153

2. detached persons

For the “resettlement” from VOMI, RKFdV,

RuSHA, SS and police bases 186

for DAW from the SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt 19

for “execution of Operation Reinhard” from

Chancellery of the Führer 92

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In all 297

Total 450

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According to this chart, 153 persons were direct members of the Office of the SSPF; another 297 had been detached to it for various tasks: personnel for ethnic cleansing from the racial and ethnic group institutions; personnel from the SS operation *Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke* for the economic exploitation of forced laborers; and the aforementioned T4 personnel for the extermination camps. Not mentioned in Globocnik’s list are the thousands of “Trawniki” guards. Also unmentioned are the great numbers of young women who were active within the scope of the “Osteinsatz” (East action) program, in particular in the Lublin district for Globocnik’s Germanization projects—female students from Vienna University in the Zamosc[[32]](#footnote-32) area, for instance.

Globocnik’s chart can only be a benchmark. It is unclear to what extent the fluctuation of staff has been taken account of in his data.[[33]](#footnote-33)

This essay focuses exclusively on the members of the SSPF Office. With the exception of those persons working in DAW and Trawniki, most of them were working in Lublin; thus they belonged to the narrower work environment of Globocnik.[[34]](#footnote-34) The Austrians in this group constitute the main focus of this investigation. From the perspective of functions, the following four sub-groups are recognizable:

- a core group of staff members and subordinates from the SS and police apparatus, most of whom were recruited for service without any professional qualification. They included adjutants, chiefs of staff, personal aides and orderlies. On account of their formal position, this core group stood in close contact with Globocnik; concurrently, they had the most influence on the actions and decisions of the Office.

- a group of specialists such as historians, architects, agronomists, builders as well as racial and settlement experts, whose expertise was needed for the fulfillment of Globocnik’s special orders, especially in the area of Germanization policy.

- a group of persons who were predominantly concerned with Jewish matters, from the *Judenreferenten* (experts on Jewish affairs) up to the personnel of the “Operation Reinhard” Office. Some of them, however, were simply personnel redeployments within the Office.

- secretaries and drivers (as well as some interpreters), who were recruited on account of their professional skills. Formally, they had little impact on events in the SSPF Office; but they were in permanent contact with their superiors, they cooperated very closely with them in top secret actions such as the murder of the Jews without any difficulty and supported the actions of their superiors apparently without any reservations.[[35]](#footnote-35) On an informal level, the fact also has to be borne in mind that, especially in the case of the Austrian drivers, they had often been political fellow travelers of their bosses for many years. The secretaries, in turn, often entered into private relationships with male staff members or entertained social contacts with their wives and members of Globocnik’s family.

## The core group around the SSPF: adjutants, chiefs of staff and personal aides

The function of adjutant was filled consecutively by two men, who can be described as long-standing friends and political fellow travelers of Globocnik. Both came from Carinthia and had occupied important positions in the illegal Nazi movement or the SS even before 1938.

The first adjutant was SS-Hauptsturmführer Reinhold (von) Mohrenschildt, born 1915 at Leifling Castle near Unterdrauburg/Dravograd, a Diplomkaufmann (business graduate). The family had moved from the Baltic countries to Carinthia. Mohrenschildt was active in the Hitler Youth even while attending the middle school in Klagenfurt. During this time, he was already friends with Globocnik.[[36]](#footnote-36) When he switched to the Hochschule für Welthandel (University for World Trade) in Vienna in September 1933, he joined the SA, which had been banned in Austria by then, and later the SS. Afterward, he acted for two years as secret courier between the Austrian country leadership of the Nazi party and the *Hilfswerk* (relief organization) for the Gau of Carinthia. Starting in 1935, he worked for the newly established SS intelligence service. In tandem with his course of university studies, Mohrenschildt had completed a diplomatic training course at the Consular Academy in Vienna by 1937. A few days before the “Anschluss,” Mohrenschildt was promoted as an adjutant to Hubert Klausner, the country leader of the Austrian NSDAP. During those critical days in March, he was active right in the midst of events with Klausner, Globocnik and the later Gauleiter Friedrich Rainer.[[37]](#footnote-37) After the “Anschluss,” he switched to a position as expert on policy on the “Staff of the Deputy of the Führer,” Rudolf Hess, for a short time and, afterward, to Vienna as expert on policy to Gauleiter Globocnik. In the preparations for the attack on Poland, Mohrenschildt was ordered to join the Gauleiter in Danzig on August 15, 1939, for the execution of a special order by Ribbentrop (exchange of diplomats).[[38]](#footnote-38) When Globocnik was appointed SSPF on November 1, 1939, Mohrenschildt was appointed his adjutant.[[39]](#footnote-39) Subsequent to that, he worked predominantly in the Volhynia resettlement project.[[40]](#footnote-40)

At the beginning of July 1940, Mohrenschildt switched to the newly appointed Reichskommissar for the Netherlands, Arthur Seyß-Inquart, as secretary for political issues. His position in the Netherlands seems to have disintegrated rather quickly, because he relocated to Berlin as early as September 1940, where he married Margarete Kaufmann, the sister-in-law of the leader of the Lublin *Selbstschutz*, Ludolf Jakob von Alvensleben. [[41]](#footnote-41)

Mohrenschildt returned to Lublin in October 1941. Since the position of adjutant had in the meantime been taken by Ernst Lerch, he was appointed Globocnik’s RKFdV Commissioner. The blatant attempt to polish up his career in the Netherlands was not appreciated everywhere. The HSSPF Ost Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, for instance, refused a recommendation of promotion for Mohrenschildt submitted by Globocnik in February 1942, because “von Mohrenschildt is a so-called political bird of passage.”[[42]](#footnote-42) As RKFdV representative, Mohrenschildt was given a leading role in the Zamosc Germanization project by Globocnik in the fall of 1942.[[43]](#footnote-43) Mohrenschildt was one of 16 members of the Office for whom Globocnik applied for transfer to Trieste along with himself.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Mohrenschildt’s successor as adjutant, Ernst Lerch, born in Klagenfurt in 1914, completed a hotel management school in Vienna from 1929 to 1931 and worked as a waiter in Swiss and French hotels afterward. When he returned to Austria at the end of 1934, he was already a member of the NSDAP and SS.[[45]](#footnote-45) Officially, Lerch worked in his parents’ café in Klagenfurt; in actuality, he was working in the illegal SS intelligence service, which was essentially set up by Globocnik, and later in the SD (Security Service of the SS) sub-section of Carinthia, whose directorship he assumed in February 1936. According to his own statement, Lerch had control of around 80 clandestine associates.[[46]](#footnote-46) This network was to become a main recruiting ground for the staff of the SSPF Office in Lublin. After March 1938, Lerch was entrusted with the full-time directorship of the SD section of Klagenfurt. His close relationship with Globocnik, who by now had ascended to the position of Gauleiter of Vienna, is made evident by the fact that Globocnik, in conjunction with Helmut Ortwin Pohl (another associate in the Carinthian SD), acted as Lerch’s best man when Lerch married Gertrude Fercher from Klagenfurt in August 1938.[[47]](#footnote-47) Lerch was to meet Pohl again in Lublin a little later. In September 1938, Lerch switched to the SD school in Bernau; afterward, he was drafted into the army and took part in the invasion of Poland. For the SD Carinthia, he was exempted from military service as of February 1, 1940; in the follow up to that, he handled resettlement issues for South Tyroleans and those from Val Canale in the *Gaugrenzlandamt* in Klagenfurt.[[48]](#footnote-48)

With the switch to Lublin in July 1940, Lerch’s career took another turn. He was to become Globocnik’s closest and most important collaborator in the Office.[[49]](#footnote-49)

He assumed the position of chief of staff in March 1942 after Josef Nemec had left Lublin. His successor as adjutant was Max von Czichotzki, a high Hitler Jugend official from the ranks of the German-speaking minority in Poland.[[50]](#footnote-50) The adjutant von Czichotzki, who did not belong to the core group around Globocnik and probably got the job owing to a lack of alternatives, was never able to wield the same influence inside the staff as Lerch did in the same position. Globocnik’s intermittent fiancé and secretary Irmgard Rickheim characterized Czichotzki as the “little adjutant,” who was junior to Lerch. According to Georg Michalsen, he played “something midway between an adjutant and an orderly.”[[51]](#footnote-51) As Globocnik’s adjutant, he went to Trieste along with him.[[52]](#footnote-52)

Like the first two adjutants, the two chiefs of staff were long-standing political fellow travelers of Globocnik. The trained mechanical engineer and builder Paul Gasser had been a close friend of Globocnik since the 1920s[[53]](#footnote-53); both were veterans of the Nazi movement in Carinthia. Actively involved in the attempted coup by the Nazis in the Lavanttal in Carinthia in July 1934, Gasser fled to Yugoslavia, clandestinely returning not long afterward and working in the underground until 1938.[[54]](#footnote-54) After March 1938, Gasser became Globocnik’s personal aide and adjutant when Globocnik became Gauleiter of Vienna. Even after Globocnik was relieved of his post, Gasser remained among those in the narrow circle around him. He completed his military SS training with Globocnik[[55]](#footnote-55); together, they switched to Lublin. The Office was established during his term there. But in summer 1940, he volunteered for duty on the front; the reason was probably a fallout with Globocnik.[[56]](#footnote-56)

Gasser’s successor, the Viennese Josef (Sepp) Nemec, belonged to the narrow circle around Globocnik during the time spent underground as well as during Globocnik’s term as Gauleiter of Vienna. Nemec, born in 1901, a trade clerk in a Viennese furniture company, had a key position in the illegal Nazi movement in Austria.[[57]](#footnote-57) Joining the NSDAP in 1932 and the SS in 1935, Nemec was the financial manager and adjutant to the SA-Obergruppe Österreich and head of the illegal Austrian Hilfswerk of the NSDAP as of 1936. After the “Anschluss,” Nemec was SD leader and acted as one of three Gau inspectors in Vienna under the aegis of Globocnik.[[58]](#footnote-58) Globocnik’s great appreciation of Nemec and the services he had rendered to the Nazi movement led to him being awarded with the highest decorations of honor in the NSDAP, the Golden Party |Badge, on January 30, 1939.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Nemec acted as Globcnik’s chief of staff in Lublin from August 1940 to March 1942. Like Gasser, he resigned owing to a personal conflict with Globocnik; the exact cause is unknown, though. [[60]](#footnote-60)

Officially, the position of chief of staff was not filled again. Ernst Lerch took over the agendas of Nemec. After Himmler had decreed in late 1941 that only “heads of the personal office” should be appointed in the future instead of what were formerly chiefs of staff, so as to avoid formal deputy positions, Lerch was given this position title. Suspicious of traditional bureaucracies, Himmler was bent on not letting fixed organizational structures evolve in the (H)SSPF Offices.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Nonetheless, Lerch probably had more influence inside the staff in this position than Nemec did before him given the fact that Czichotzki did not have any strong position and Maubach had left.

Lerch’s important role was perceived quite critically by higher-ranking SS offices, although the criticism was expressed such that the authority of the SSPF was not affected. The Chief of the SS Personalhauptamt Maximilian von Herff, for instance, remarked in May 1943, at a time when there were fierce conflicts about Globocnik’s policy for the Zamosc Germanization project:

“L. belongs to the circle of Ostmärker [Nazi term for Austrians] who were groomed by SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik himself. Old, long-standing comrades-in-arms of Globocnik from the *Kampfzeit* [time of struggle] and completely loyal to him. Too weak to act as a balancing power within the staff and, owing to the long time spent together, too personally allied with the Gruppenführer. Also otherwise, too young for the position and too long in the same place. Has to be replaced at all costs, since he has it in him for superior growth. Needs tough martial education.”[[62]](#footnote-62)

Von Herff’s appraisal makes clear that higher-ranking offices were quite aware of the problem of how a narrow circle of Austrians, melded together by a shared experience of illegal activities in the underground (“Kampfzeit”), with communication forms that were hardly penetrable to third parties, could shield themselves off from any outside scrutiny. What’s significant here, however, is that, despite von Herff’s vehement pleading for a switch of personnel, it did not take place. In stark contrast to the recommendation of the head of personnel of the SS, Globocnik got his way that the major part of his group, among them also Lerch, could rotate to Trieste with him.

Alongside an adjutant, the SSPF was assisted by a personal aide until 1942: Hans-Gustav Maubach, born 1904 near Bonn, did not hail from Globocnik’s narrow circle. He had come to Lublin, however, through the mediation of one of Globocnik’s close political comrades-in-arms, Gauleiter Friedrich Rainer. Maubach was recruited as a senior Hitler Jugend official, who previously had worked as an expert in Ribbentrop’s office, where he was the official in charge of youth matters in the Western countries and concurrently main expert for all countries of the Reich Youth Leadership.[[63]](#footnote-63) What motivated Rainer to play the middleman is unclear. According to Maubach’s version, Rainer believed Maubach would be capable of mitigating the high degree of tension existing between Globocnik and the civilian administration and had him initially placed as an expert on personnel matters with the civilian administration.[[64]](#footnote-64) Admittedly, this conflict didn’t even exist at the time of his arrival in Lublin at the end of 1939/beginning of 1940.[[65]](#footnote-65) It is possible that the decision was about having a person of trust in the civilian administration; a meeting prior to Maubach’s switch to Lublin in Berlin between Maubach and Globocnik, who speculated about taking on the position of civilian Gouverneur himself, tends toward this interpretation.[[66]](#footnote-66) In the early summer, Maubach switched to the Office of the SSPF.[[67]](#footnote-67) As a personal aide, Maubach took on varying extra duties such as the motor pool desk; the supervision over the forced labor camp of Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke in Lublin; and, as of July 1941, he acted as Globocnik’s representative in the latter’s position as Commissioner for the “Establishment of SS and Police Bases in the new Eastern Territory.”[[68]](#footnote-68) After conflicts had arisen with the Austrian core group, Maubach left Lublin in January 1942.[[69]](#footnote-69) Maubach himself stated after the war that the Carinthian and Viennese clique around Globocnik, particularly Nemec and Lerch, interfered so much with his work as personal aide that he and Globocnik became estranged from each other.[[70]](#footnote-70) The specific cause for the break with Globocnik was probably an affair over food involving the supply of Heydrich’s staff in Prague with meat deliveries out of Lublin under the auspices of Globocnik, which was immediately countermanded by Heydrich. According to Maubach, Globocnik shifted the blame for the food affair to him. The rumor circulating within the staff that Ms. Maubach was a Jewess was another item of conflict, which Maubach complained about fiercely.[[71]](#footnote-71) Maubach’s position was left vacant; his agendas were probably divided between Lerch and Czichotzki.

In contrast to his personal aide, Globocnik’s personal orderly was a long-standing confidant from Carinthia. Born in 1906 in Klagenfurt and a trained waiter by profession, SS-Rottenführer Rudolf Schleißner was employed in the Café Lerch starting in 1927. Working for the illegal NSDAP since 1933, Schleißner was employed as a waiter in the Café Lerch, which was well-known as a “extreme nationalist stronghold” and information hub. After joining the illegal SS in 1935, he was active for the Carinthian SD, which was headed by Ernst Lerch from 1936 onward.[[72]](#footnote-72) Already prior to the Anschluss, Schleißner had been engaged to Luise D. from Carinthia, who had been working in Café Lerch as a chef since 1927 and was also working for the illegal party after 1933.[[73]](#footnote-73) Following the Anschluss, apparently owing to excellent Nazi party contacts, the couple was able to lease a beach hotel on the southern bank of the Wörthersee, which was run by Ms. D. during the war.[[74]](#footnote-74) In 1943, when switching from Lublin to Trieste, Globocnik and his narrow circle opted for the location as general meeting point for the staff; from there they moved on to Trieste.[[75]](#footnote-75) In Lublin, Schleißner soon took over the “Deutsches Haus” situated in the center of town; alongside a restaurant and café, it housed a district casino, which was reserved to the officials in the German authorities, and worked as chef and manager of the restaurants.[[76]](#footnote-76) Thus in his function as informal hub for the exchange of information, Schleißner carried forward in Lublin the same position he already had in the Café Lerch before.

In contrast to the main positions on the staff, the departments for administration and personnel were not manned by Austrians. The main reason for this was that people with adequate qualification were presumably unavailable from this circle. The competent personnel expert was SS Hauptsturmführer Herbert Ulbrich from Breslau,[[77]](#footnote-77) who had previously been adjutant to the SSPF Friedrich Katzmann in the Radom district.[[78]](#footnote-78) Wilhelm Scheper was competent for administration. Scheper originated from Lower Saxony and had previously worked for the administrative department of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.[[79]](#footnote-79)

## The “Germanization” experts

The efforts of Globocnik to establish an SS-Mannschaftshaus in Lublin like the ones that existed in many German university towns were apparent as early as in the fall of 1940. The Mannschaftshaus was to be transformed into the “Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte” in 1942. From the onset, Globocnik pursued his objective of establishing his own planning institute for the Germanization of the district to be independent of other Ostforschung institutes (“Ostforschung”: research on Eastern Europe).[[80]](#footnote-80) To that end, Globocnik turned to Kurt Ellersiek, the Commander of the Mannschaftshäuser and chief of the Rassenamt (racial office) of the RuSHA in Berlin, and initiated the transfer of two associates of the Mannschaftshäuser, Gustav Hanelt and Claus Walter Padel,[[81]](#footnote-81) to Lublin. For the first time, in contrast to the narrow circle on the staff, personnel were purposefully recruited from institutions that wanted a field office in Lublin.

SS- Hauptsturmführer Gustav Hanelt was born 1914 in Schmachthagen in Holstein as the son of a master brickmaker. He was anchored in the Nazi movement when he was still attending school and joined the SS in 1933; as early as 1935, he was working as a clerk in the RuSHA. Funded by the Reich Student Union, Hanelt studied history and anthropology in Berlin; he completed his military service by October 1937. Afterward, Hanelt was sent to Königsberg by the RuSHA to establish and manage a Mannschaftshaus there. In the middle of 1938, Ellersiek sent for Hanelt to be his associate in the Berlin headquarters; at the same time, Hanelt was studying law at Hamburg University.[[82]](#footnote-82) After he served in the *Wehrmacht* for a short while after the beginning of the war, he arrived in Lublin in October 1940 in order to organize the Mannschaftshaus there. From then on, he played a vital role in the SSPF Office.[[83]](#footnote-83) The planning needs for personnel and resources of the Mannschaftshaus, which had prior to that been limited to the district, grew enormously owing to the fact that the order given to Globocnik for establishing SS and police bases was now extended to the “new Eastern Territory” early in the summer in 1941. All corresponding planning activities were centralized by Hanelt.[[84]](#footnote-84) Hanelt also belonged to the group that accompanied Globocnik to Trieste in 1943.[[85]](#footnote-85)

Hanelt endeavored to have young SS academics transferred to Lublin to establish and provide the manpower for the Mannschaftshaus. In March 1942, the staff included, among others, 6 young scholars, 8 police sergeants and 3 Polish construction technicians.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Again, a number of Austrians were recruited, especially for the senior positions, although adequate professional expertise was an additional requirement that tipped the balance.

Franz Stanglica, a historian born in Vienna in 1907, was hired as director of the Research Center and person responsible for the Planning, Research and Statistics Main Department. Stanglica had gotten his doctoral degree at Vienna University under Heinrich Ritter von Srbik in 1931. He was moving in the circles of those extreme German nationalist historians who were engaged in writing the “Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums (compendium of Germandom in the border regions and abroad).”[[87]](#footnote-87) As provisional registrar in the Court Chamber Archives, Stanglica was also fully involved in a clandestine project of the Reichsinstitut für die Geschichte des Neuen Deutschlands (Reich Institute for the History of the New Germany) in Munich, which had commissioned a study on the role of Jews in the Austrian economy between 1750 and 1825. As a clandestine associate of the Reichsinstitut, Stanglica had been overseeing this project since February 1937.[[88]](#footnote-88) He joined the NSDAP in 1938, enlisted with the Waffen-SS in October 1940 and was initially deployed as a guard at the Auschwitz concentration camp.[[89]](#footnote-89) His transfer to Lublin probably took place in early 1941. All preparatory planning for the principal Germanization projects in the district was done under the aegis of Stanglica, including the Zamosc resettlement project.[[90]](#footnote-90) That any involvement in “active *Volkspolitik* often requires you to take a weapon in your hand,” as Stanglica wrote to a colleague at the onset of 1942, makes clear that his work was also not performed at the desk alone.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The architectural department was headed by Jürgen Lassmann from Vienna, who had already been active in the Vienna SS-Mannschaftshaus. Lassmann, born in 1914 to a teacher’s family, studied at the Vienna University of Technology. Since 1933, he had been active in the illegal Nazi movement and was barred from the university for a year on account of his illegal activities in 1934. Among other things, Lassmann clandestinely organized the architects into the National Socialist German Students Union for Austria; at the same time, he was at times official student leader of the university until 1938. A member of the illegal SS since 1937, Lassmann was ordered after the Anschluss in March 1938 to recruit personnel for an SS-Mannschaftshaus in Vienna. Upon graduation, he worked for the Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft (German Settlement Society). Having been drafted into the Waffen-SS in mid-1940 and been wounded, he was transferred to the Research Center in early 1942. Both Laßmann and Stanglica, like Hanelt, went along to Trieste with Globocnik.[[92]](#footnote-92)

Two of the three outposts of RKFdV, VoMi and RuSHA that were housed in the Mannschaftshaus or the *Forschungstelle für Ostunterkünfte*, respectively, were dominated by Austrians. The RKFdV office was headed by Globocnik’s first adjutant Reinhold von Mohrenschildt, the VoMi office by the Lothar (von) Seltmann from Graz, later by Ernst Lerch. Only the office of the RuS leaders in Lublin, established in October 1941, was headed by the German Heinrich Thole.[[93]](#footnote-93)

Lothar (von) Seltmann was born in 1917 in Graz; his father was a secretary at the imperial governor’s office.[[94]](#footnote-94) Already at a young age, he was politically militant in the NSDAP. A member of the NS Schülerbund since 1931, Seltmann, by now also a member of the SA, was forced to change schools after a number of bomb attacks carried out by pupils and teachers of Traiskirchner Bundeserziehungsanstalt were uncovered in the spring of 1933. One year later, he was again arrested for selling an illegal Nazi newspaper. Seltmann fled to Germany and joined the Austrian Legion.[[95]](#footnote-95)

Seltmann returned to Vienna in August 1938 and took on the directorship of the Gauverband Wien of the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA).

After the war began, Seltmann did military service in the Waffen-SS for a short time; shortly afterward, he participated in the so-called Volhynia resettlement for the VoMi. Seltmann became the VoMi Commissioner in Lublin in 1940; he was actively involved in the resettlement operations in the regions of Chelm and Lublin that took place at the same time.[[96]](#footnote-96) In the summer of 1941, he was officially appointed head of the Main Department “Volkspolitisches Referat (desk for racial and ethnic policy)” in the SSPF Office, responsible for the support of German resettlers.[[97]](#footnote-97)

With the assumption of additional functions, initially for the Galicia district, later for the entire GG, Seltmann left the SSPF Office in February 1942 and switched to Cracow to the HSSPF of the GG; as of June 1942, he went to the staff of the SSPF in the Cracow district. Transferred to the troops in 1943, Seltmann was reported as missing in action after the battles at Murmansk.[[98]](#footnote-98)

The fact that Himmler ordered Globocnik to establish the SS and police bases in the Lublin district in November 1940 was closely connected to the establishment of the SS Mannschaftshaus and the various Germanization institutions.[[99]](#footnote-99) Hence Hanelt and Padel, who had been brought to Lublin for the establishment of the SS Mannschaftshaus in October 1940, also had initially to deal with the establishment of these bases in the district.[[100]](#footnote-100)

When the order to establish the bases was extended to the entire occupied Soviet Union, a main group under Hans-Gustav Maubach was created; the deputy commander of the police regiment in Lublin, Hermann Kintrup, was appointed chief of staff. Kintrup, however, handed over the responsibility at the end of 1941/beginning of 1942, when he was promoted commander of the order police in Lublin.[[101]](#footnote-101)

While the entire planning of the bases was incumbent on the SS Mannschaftshaus, the new Main Department was to ensure their practical implementation. The field offices set up for the establishment of the bases were headed by non-Austrians; all three had had experience with the exercise of violence prior to Lublin, among other things in the “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz.” Riga, for the North Russia region, was headed by SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Michalsen, who hailed from Upper Silesia; Mogilev (later Minsk) for the Central Russia region by SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Claasen, who originated from Schleswig-Holstein; and Kiev for the South Russia region by the building engineer SS-Obersturmführer Richard Thomalla, who came from Silesia.

Shortages of personnel and material as well as turf wars with the Budget and Building Main Office, on whose construction and economic experts Globocnik depended for the realization of his buildings, led to the base projects in the Soviet Union never going beyond the preparatory stage.[[102]](#footnote-102) After Maubach’s departure, Hermann Höfle, who was competent as an expert for the economic operations since September 1941, assumed the main responsibility for the Office for a short time.[[103]](#footnote-103) The Office was dissolved at the end of March 1942. Himmler gave the reason for Globocnik’s removal from office as due to the fact that the organization of the occupied territories had proceeded to an advanced stage.[[104]](#footnote-104) At the level of planning, however, Globocnik’s remained responsible for the bases.

## Protagonists for policy on Jewish matters and the murder of Jews

The more prominent protagonists on the staff undoubtedly included the so-called *Judenreferenten* (experts on Jewish matters), who all hailed from Austria. As early as December 1939, Globocnik had set up the first “Judenreferat (desk on Jewish matters),” which was not even planned for the SSPF staff; from the very onset, based on this usurpation, he challenged the civilian administration on the issue of authority in ”Jewish matters”[[105]](#footnote-105)—a sustained conflict with Gouverneur Zörner was the consequence.[[106]](#footnote-106)

At a time when Lublin was still considered a “Jewish reservation” and the Volhynia resettlement was being carried out, Globocnik had filled the position with the legal scholar and SS-Untersturmführer Karl Hofbauer, an expert in international law. Hofbauer, who originated from Villach in Carinthia, differs from the rest of SS leaders stationed in Lublin on account of his scholarly training. He had been an assistant at the Institute of Statistics for Minority Peoples of Vienna University[[107]](#footnote-107) and completed numerous research stays in Western Europe. From 1937 to the end of 1939, he had been prefect of law at the Consular Academy in Vienna, where he held lectures on international law.[[108]](#footnote-108) A member of the Nazi party since 1930 and of the SS since 1931, Hofbauer was also active for the SD during his time at the Consular Academy. Hofbauer accompanied Globocnik to Lublin in December 1939.

Hofbauer stayed in Lublin just over six months. Still on August 6, 1940, he took part in a meeting on the labor deployment of Jews, which was held in the headquarters of the Generalgouverneur in Cracow.[[109]](#footnote-109) Shortly afterward, he was commanded to Semlin in Yugoslavia for the Bessarabia resettlement that was to commence on September 23 and did not return to Lublin.[[110]](#footnote-110) Hofbauer probably left because the civilian administration had temporarily gained control of “Jewish matters” at that time.[[111]](#footnote-111)

After Hofbauer had left, Ernst Lerch, who had just been appointed Globocnik’s new adjutant, also assumed the position of expert on Jewish matters, a step that shows the crucial role he played on the staff already in this early phase as Globocnik’s de facto deputy. The conflict about competencies between the civilian administration and the SSPF Office, which had flared up under Hofbauer, continued under Lerch.[[112]](#footnote-112)

After the order was given to Globocnik to carry out the murder of the Jews in the GG, a separate Main Department was created on his staff, since the multitude of tasks entailed in “Operation Reinhard”[[113]](#footnote-113)—from the construction of the extermination camps, the evacuation of the ghettos, the organization of the deportation trains to the extermination camps up to the utilization of the murdered people’s belongings—could no longer be mastered with the structure of a desk in the staff as it was under Hofbauer and Lerch.

This Main Department was headed in March 1942 by Hermann Höfle,[[114]](#footnote-114) an automobile mechanic and owner of a taxi firm, born in Salzburg in 1911. Höfle thus occupied one of the key positions during the implementation of “Operation Reinhard.” Höfle had helped to set up illegal NSDAP and SS organizational structures in Austria since 1933 and had been in prison for a time because of these activities. After the “Anschluss,” he assumed full-time SS leadership as leader of Sturmbann I/76, from which Gauleiter Rainer recruited some personnel for the Gauleitung staff. For a short time, he attended the SS-Führerschule in Dachau and was deployed as provisional leader of the 76th SS-Standarte from the beginning of the war until December 1939.

Höfle was area leader in the *Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz*, an organization that terrorized and murdered members of the Polish elite and the Jewish minority, in the Neu-Sandez (Nowy Sacz) district from 1939 to 1940. After the dissolution of the *Selbstschutz*, Höfle was transferred to Globocnik in Lublin in autumn of 1940. He himself would have liked to have an employment in the West.[[115]](#footnote-115) Initially, Höfle was deployed as camp commander of a forced labor camp for Jews for the construction of the “Bug trench” in Belzec, the largest forced labor project in the district[[116]](#footnote-116); afterward, he was deputy chief of staff right in Lublin, dealing with the establishment of the SS and police bases.

Only a few weeks after the evacuation of the Lublin ghetto, Höfle was appointed the head of the “Operation Reinhard” Main Department—as it was called later—after it had emerged that Globocnik would no longer deal with the establishment of SS and police bases.[[117]](#footnote-117) This suggests that there had been no long-term preparations for “Operation Reinhard” in terms of staff personnel. As late as the end of 1941/ beginning of 1942, Höfle was scheduled to be the head of a planned base in Tbilisi in Georgia.[[118]](#footnote-118) The stagnation of the German advance, however, had made such plans obsolete. Höfle’s most important associates had been all working with him on the project for the establishment of SS and police bases, for instance his deputy Helmut Ortwin Pohl from Klagenfurt as well as the above-mentioned officials Thomalla, Michalsen and Claasen. The Office was reinforced by Amon-Leopold Göth from Vienna and the aforementioned Carinthian Franz Susitti in the spring of 1942.

The evacuation of the Lublin ghetto took place under Höfle’s direction from mid-March 1942 onward[[119]](#footnote-119); the Warsaw ghetto began to be evacuated on July 22, 1942, under the “resettlement staff” headed by Höfle.[[120]](#footnote-120) Not much is known about the relationship between Höfle and Globocnik. What’s conspicuous in any case is that, as an SS man from Salzburg, in contrast to Globocnik’s confidants from Vienna and Carinthia, he did not go along with Globocnik to Trieste but, instead, assumed the position of chief of staff, heading the personal office of Globocnik’s successor SS Gruppenführer Jakob Sporrenberg. In this position, he directed under the code name “Operation Harvest Festival” the mass shootings that took place on November 3-4, 1943, of over 40,000 Jews who had escaped destruction up to now as forced laborers in Lublin, Trawniki and Poniatowa.[[121]](#footnote-121)

Helmut Ortwin Pohl, Höfle’s deputy, friend and the best man of Lerch’s wedding, has the typical biography of those Carinthian SS men in Lublin. Born in 1901 in Klagenfurt, industrial executive; member of the NSDAP and SS since 1930; especially active in the underground before 1938 and arrested several times; working for the SD sub-section Carinthia.[[122]](#footnote-122) From the fall of 1939, he was a member of the SS-Totenkopfverband in Cracow and Posen and participated in various expulsion and resettlement operations.[[123]](#footnote-123) He was working again in his civilian profession in the fall of 1940.[[124]](#footnote-124) A few weeks prior to the beginning of “Operation Reinhard,” he was drafted again and transferred to Lublin, where he worked in the department for the establishment of the SS and police bases, initially under the auspices of Höfle. Later, following Höfle’s appointment as expert on Jewish matters, Pohl took on full responsibility for the department.[[125]](#footnote-125) Afterward, he worked as Höfle’s deputy in Höfle’s new department. Among other things, Pohl was responsible for receiving the daily transports of Jews arriving in Lublin and, after selection of workers, transferring them to the extermination camps.[[126]](#footnote-126) Pohl left the Office in June 1942 and returned to his civilian profession in Klagenfurt, where he remained until 1944.[[127]](#footnote-127) Very likely he was needed in his company, because when Globocnik tried to retrieve Pohl to Trieste in 1944, he was refused owing to Pohl’s exemption from military service.[[128]](#footnote-128)

SS-Untersturmbannführer Amon-Leopold Göth[[129]](#footnote-129) from Vienna has been exhaustively described in the scholarly literature, so only a short mention will be made of him here. Göth joined Höfle’s Reinhard Office in 1942[[130]](#footnote-130);soon after, however, he fell out with Globocnik and was transferred to Cracow, where he was the commandant of the Plaszow camp from February 1943 to September 1944.

SS-Unterscharführer Franz Susitti also joined Höfle. Born in Maria Rain near Klagenfurt in 1910, he also directly came from Globocnik’s Carinthian environment. As a department head in a Klagenfurt sports store, he had been an activist in the Nazi movement ever since 1929. In conjunction with the later Gauleiter Rainer, he founded a club that served as a front for the organizational centralization of all Nazis in the underground.[[131]](#footnote-131) After he had joined the SS in March 1938, Rainer finagled a position as Gaufachwart (Gau warden) for track and field sports; at the same time, he was appointed expert on sports matters in the 90th SS-Standarte until he was drafted in late 1939. Globocnik made an effort to have Susitti transferred from a SS regiment to Lublin as an “expert on sports matters.”[[132]](#footnote-132) Susitti also went along with Globocnik to Trieste later.[[133]](#footnote-133)

Alongside Höfle’s office, two other departments were directly involved in “Operation Reinhard”: the department of the “Inspector of Operation Reinhard,” in which T4 personnel under Christian Wirth were working, which is not the subject of this essay; as well as the Department IVa “Operation Reinhard” for the registration and utilization of belongings of those people who were murdered, especially transfer of any valuables to the Reichsbank. This department was assigned to the head of the SS-*Standortverwaltung* in Lublin, SS-Sturmbannführer Georg Wippern, by the SS-WVHA. Its purpose was to camouflage and concurrently supervise the process of robbery.[[134]](#footnote-134)

The registration of the valuables by Wippern was done within the scope of the organization of the SSPF. A separate Department IVa “Operation Reinhard” was established for the *Standortverwaltung* in the spring of 1942; in this position, Wippern reported to the SSPF.

In order to be able to register the huge amounts of valuables that accumulated from the murdered Jews, trained bank personnel were provided to Wippern. Jewish forced laborers were used for the sorting work itself. Among the bank experts assigned to Wippern for the handling of the valuables was Alois Rzepa, born 1908 in Lower Austria.[[135]](#footnote-135) It is not known whether Globocnik was directly involved in his recruitment; it can be shown, however, that Rzepa was not only an expert as a clerk of the Länderbank in Vienna but was also as a SS member with experience working in the Nazi underground prior to 1938. [[136]](#footnote-136)

## The general personnel: secretaries and chauffeurs

Researchers know a total of 15 women from those female typists working in the SSPF Office. Most of the secretaries were a lot younger than the SS leaders for whom they did secretarial work. In 1941, their average age was just over 20. With five persons working there, the share of secretaries of Austrian origin is again disproportionally high; all of them worked for Globocnik personally or for the core group.

Well-nigh all 15 secretaries had had professional, political or private contact with one of the men who later became staff members of the Office. The biographies of some of the Austrian women exemplify this. Rosalie B., an office employee at the Gauleitung of Gauinspektor Sepp Nemec since 1938, came to Lublin together with Nemec in the summer of 1940. Berta G. from Salzburg, *Jungmädelführerin* (leader in the Nazi Young Girl’s League) in the BDM in 1939, was designated for Poland within the scope of the “Osteinsatz.”[[137]](#footnote-137) She got to Lublin through the regional NS network and the contact to Hermann Höfle resulting therefrom. As Höfle’s personal secretary, Gottschall was also active during the evacuation of the Warsaw ghetto.[[138]](#footnote-138) Margarete S. from Vienna switched to Lublin owing to a personal acquaintance with the sister of Reinhold Mohrenschildt.[[139]](#footnote-139)

The Viennese bookkeeper Wilhelmine Trsek, who worked for the Nazi party on the side,[[140]](#footnote-140) was recruited in Vienna for Lublin. The pool of secretaries also included the wives of staff members of the SSPF or members of other offices in Lublin. Globocnik’s intermittent fiancé Irmgard Rickheim also worked as a secretary in Lublin; Hans-Gustav Maubach had acted as mediator in this regard.[[141]](#footnote-141)

The group of secretaries with their overlapping private and professional relationships with their superiors considerably enhanced the familiarization tendencies already extant within the core group around Globocnik.

The drivers of the Office also belonged to a group of employees who due to their profession stood in close contact with their superiors and spent a great deal of time with them. The work of the SSPF Office was characterized by great mobility, an essential prerequisite for an efficient occupation government with little personnel. Globocnik’s personal aide Maubach was responsible for the motor pool up to the end of 1941.[[142]](#footnote-142) After a short transition period, SS-Untersturmführer Max Meierhofer[[143]](#footnote-143) from Salzburg assumed the position in the summer of 1942. Meierhofer, born 1909 in Mattsee,[[144]](#footnote-144) had been responsible for the motor pool with the HSSPF Alfred Rodenbücher in Salzburg since 1939. It is very likely that a connection with Höfle—Meierhofer was seen as Höfle’s friend in Lublin and was his driver at times—led to his transfer to Lublin in May 1942.[[145]](#footnote-145) After working a couple of weeks in the Department IVa “Operation Reinhard” as administrator of the clothing warehouse where the belongings of the murdered Jews were collected, Meierhofer in his position as Höfle’s motor pool expert on matters and driver participated actively in the evacuation of the Warsaw ghetto. It is documented that he, as an ardent amateur photographer, took a photograph of an old, terminally-ill woman in a wheelchair, then shot her and sent the pictures as souvenirs to a comrade.[[146]](#footnote-146) Meierhofer also accompanied Globocnik to Trieste.[[147]](#footnote-147)

30 to 40 drivers worked at the motor pool desk, among them the Ukrainian personnel.[[148]](#footnote-148) 6 of the 15 German-speaking drivers hailed from Austria, where they all belonged to Globocnik’s close political or official circle. They also comprised the personal drivers of the principal members of the staff.[[149]](#footnote-149) Most of the drivers from Germany, on the other hand, hailed from the police. All of Globocnik’s personal drivers—Leopold Veith, Franz Bertl, Franz Eigner and Benedikt Farkas—hailed from Vienna or Lower Austria. Eigner had been Globocnik’s second driver in the winter of 1938-1939 when Globocnik was Gauleiter in Vienna.[[150]](#footnote-150) Several of the Austrian drivers went along with Globocnik to Trieste.[[151]](#footnote-151)

Not only were the Austrian secretaries and drivers among the most well-informed members of the Office on account of their work; owing to the diverse private relationships with other staff members, they constituted a vital part of the group around Globocnik who provided emotional support.[[152]](#footnote-152) With one exception, all the drivers denied after the war that they had any knowledge of the murder of the Jews. The same is true for the secretaries who were extremely loyal to their former superiors, even decades after the events.[[153]](#footnote-153) None of the male members of the staff, even the ones already deceased, were incriminated by their statements. Nor was the activity of the Office a reason for any of the secretaries to leave; the reasons given were personal quarrels with Globocnik due to his moral conduct; sexual harassment on the part of superiors was also hinted at.

## Conclusions

The question of how it was possible to put the million-fold murder of the European Jews into motion in a very short time and who were the protagonists and institutions behind it is still relevant. There can be no doubt that the Office of the SSPF Lublin was one of the key institutions for the murder of the Jews in the territory of the GG.

There not only was a disproportionate share of Austrians on the staff who worked at all levels of the Office; almost all key positions in the SSPF staff were occupied by Austrian SS members.[[154]](#footnote-154) The main criterion was not the background, however, but the membership to Globocnik’s political network. All the male Austrian members of the Office had long-standing connections with the Nazi movement. A great many of them had been part of the Carinthian group in the illegal Austrian Nazi movement, which was characterized by violent conflicts. Globocnik was one of the leading figures of the group. Most of these staff members had been organized in the illegal Carinthian sub-section of the SD, which had been set up by Globocnik and was headed by Ernst Lerch from 1936 onward. Some were political fellow travelers from Globocnik’s time as Gauleiter in Vienna, mainly SS members; here too the relationships had been established as early as in the days of the underground. The criterion for the recruitment was not professional expertise but primarily the many years of political work they had in common.

The group of specialists who were brought to Lublin is a different matter. They included significantly fewer Austrians, because the mobilization of personnel resources from previous political networks was less suitable to this purpose.

With regard to the group of secretaries and drivers, previous professional contacts prior to Lublin constituted an important criterion alongside political connections.

The recruitment of personnel had an impact on the dynamic structure of the Office, many aspects of which still require further in-depth research. Consensus about the objectives and tasks of Nazi policies on occupation matters, Jewish matters and Germanization did not have to be created. They all subscribed to the same ideology and militancy. There is not one case known where an Austrian member of the Office quit because he or she rejected the Nazi policy of extermination. The Austrian men on the staff left the Office only after they had fallen out with Globocnik or if other career opportunities opened up to them.

What especially linked Globocnik with his long-standing confidants and comrades-in-arms as a group was the shared experience of political agitation in the underground in the 1930s. The experience of illegality with its complicated oscillation between informal and formalized forms of action and communication was an advantage they had over their German colleagues, to whom such practices remained a secret for the most part. This was the reason that only a few staff members of German origin could ascend to the core group around Globocnik.

Transferring already extant political networks to Lublin was obviously in the interest of both Globocnik and his subordinates. For the latter, it was for a bundle of reasons: loyalty to Globocnik, who was seen as an agreeable and gregarious boss among his entourage, among whom private and professional closeness overlapped; new career opportunities that had been blocked for Austrian Nazis up to then in general and in particular for Globocnik’s retinue after his failure as Gauleiter of Vienna; status enhancement and participation in power presumably played a role, as did the chances to enrich oneself and the spirit of adventure. For Globocnik, in turn, personnel he could rely on in every way constituted an enormous advantage in the conflict-ridden process of expanding his position of power within the GG.

It can be assumed that the communication processes at a place like Lublin, quasi a colonial outpost in the protagonists’ self-conception, became even more consolidated owing to the shared experience of a strange environment that was perceived as hostile, in tandem with the feeling of omnipotence relative to the governed population.

The political background of the male Austrian members of the staff shows that they were by no means “ordinary men” but men who were solidly anchored in the Nazi movement both ideologically and politically. This explains that there was no long-term recruitment of personnel for “Operation Reinhard” on staff level. The assignment of Hermann Höfle, who had delivered ample proof of his capacity for excessive violence since his time as “Selbstschutz” leader, is a good example of this.

Although the handicraft of murder in the extermination camps was outsourced to the tried-and-tested T4 employees, reinforced by guard units from Trawniki, the members of the SSPF Office were anything but just paper-pushing criminals. Globocnik’s office was able to exercise such a great impact because its personnel at all levels was extremely flexible—alongside their handling of bureaucratic day-to-day tasks, they were able to exercise physical violence very directly and close to where the main crimes were committed.

The close bonds within the group around Globocnik, however, had limits in terms of the efficiency of the SSPF Office. Thus the Germanization and settlement policy brutally carried out in the Zamosc area without regard to the military or political situation since the fall of 1942 was completely counterproductive in terms of governance. That the criticism by the civilian authorities had remained without effect was connected to the fact that the loyalty prevailing in the core group around Globocnik did not permit any reflection, let alone revision, of the strategies on occupation matters. Despite the fact that Globocnik had become unsustainable in Lublin, he was promoted and transferred, very likely due to the great “services” he had rendered, not only in the eyes of Himmler but for the entire Nazi leadership, by his successful realization of the destruction of the Jews.

Globocnik knew very well that such “successes” could be only accomplished thanks to his loyal staff and he put up a stiff fight to have as many people from Lublin transferred to this new office as Higher SS and Police Leader of the [Operation Zone of the Adriatic Littoral](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Zone_of_the_Adriatic_Littoral).[[155]](#footnote-155) It was with the selfsame personnel that Globocnik attempted to carry forth seamlessly in Trieste the Lublin policy of occupation and murder.

1. Quoted from Joseph Goebbels, *Tagebücher 1924 – 1945*, *vol. 4: 1940 - 1942*, edited by Ralf Georg Reuth, 3rd ed. (München: Piper Verlag 2003), 1776 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A research project on the Office of the SS and Police Leader in the Lublin district constitutes the basis of this essay. A monograph on the subject is in progress. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ruth Bettina Birn, *Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer: Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986), 41. On the question of the effectiveness of the Nazi persecution apparatus within the “organized chaos” of the Nazi administration, under the keywords of personalization, informalization and ideologization, see Sven Reichardt and Wolfgang Seibel, ed., *Der prekäre Staat: Herrschen und Verwalten im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. On the position of the Lublin district in general cf. Dieter Pohl*, Von der „Judenpolitik“ zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939-1944* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Birn, SS- und Polizeiführer, 102-105. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Appraisal note by SS-Gruppenführer von Herff (May 1943), Federal Archive, Berlin (BArchB), formerly BDC (BerliN Document Center, BDC), SSO, Globocnik, Odilo. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Christopher Browning*, Ganz normale Männer: Das Reserve-Polizeibataillon 101 und die „Endlösung“ in Polen* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993); on the question of the selection of German administration staff, although not for the SS and Polizei: Stephan Lehnstaedt, „´Ostnieten´ oder Vernichtungsexperten? Die Auswahl deutscher Staatsdiener für den Einsatz im Generalgouvernement Polen 1939-1944“, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 55, no. 9 (2007): 701-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Peter Black, "Odilo Globocnik: Himmlers Vorposten im Osten", in: *Die Braune Elite II: 21 weitere biographische Skizzen* edited by Roland Smelser, Enrico Syring, and Rainer Zitelmann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), 103-15; Zygmunt Mańkowski, "Odilo Globocnik und die Endlösung der Judenfrage", *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae* 21 (1994), 147-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Siegfried J. Pucher’s biography was a student’s thesis; Joseph Poprzeczny and Berndt Rieger are not historians. Siegfried Pucher, *„… in der Bewegung führend tätig“: Odilo Globocnik – Kämpfer für den „Anschluß“, Vollstrecker des Holocaust* (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1997); Joseph Poprzeczny, *Odilo Globocnik: Hitler`s Man in the East* (Jefferson, North Carolina – London: McFarland & Company, 2004)¸; Berndt Rieger, *Creator of the Nazi Death Camps: The Life of Odilo Globocnik* (London – Portland,OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Peter Witte and Stephen Tyas, "A New Document on the Deportation and Murder of Jews during ´Einsatz Reinhard´ 1942", *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 15, no. 3 (2001): 468-86; an extensive compilation of material on Höfle: Charles Ajenstat, Daniel Buk and Thomas Harlan, *Hermann Höfle l`Autrichien artisan de la Shoa en Pologne* (Paris: Berg International Éditeurs, 2006); an early biographical outline on Höfle in: Joseph Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Vollstrecker: Die Liquidation der Juden im Warschauer Ghetto. Dokumente und Berichte* (Wiesbaden: fourier, 1989), 275-87 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. On Göth’s biography, even though it contains some errors, cf. Johannes Sachslehner, *Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Wien: Leben und Taten des Amon Leopold Göth* (Wien-Graz-Klagenfurt: Styria Verlag, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Andrej Angrick, "Georg Michalsen - Handlungsreisender der ´Endlösung´", in In*: Karrieren der Gewalt. Nationalsozialistische* Täterbiographien, edited by Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004), 156–65. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Michael Tregenza, "Bełżec: Das vergessene Lager des Holocaust", in: *„Arisierung“ im Nationalsozialismus: Volksgemeinschaft, Raub und Gedächtnis*, edited by Irmtrud Wojak and Peter Hayes, (Frankfurt (Main), New York: Campus, 2000), 241-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. On the biography of Ernst Lerch cf. Alfred Elste, *Kärntens braune Elite* (Klagenfurt/Celovec-Ljbujana-Wien: Verlag Hermagoras/Mohorjeva, 1997), 104-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ernst Klee, "Von der "T4" zur Judenvernichtung. Die ´Aktion Reinhard´ in den Vernichtungslagern Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka", in: *Aktion T 4 1939-1945: Die "Euthanasie"-Zentrale in der Tiergartenstraße 4*, edited by Götz Aly, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1989), 147-52; Patricia Heberer, "Eine Kontinuität der Tötungsoperationen. T4-Täter und die ´Aktion Reinhard´", in: *„Aktion Reinhardt“. Der Völkermord an den Juden im Generalgouvernement 1941-1944*, edited by Bogdan Musial (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2004), 285-308; Patricia Heberer, "Von der ´Aktion T4´ zum Massenmord an den europäischen Juden: Der Transfer des Tötungspersonals", in: *Neue Studien zu nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas Historische Bedeutung, technische Entwicklung, revisionistische Leugnung* , edited by Günter Morsch and Bertrand Perz (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), 165-75; Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Sara Berger, "Das T4-Reinhardt-Netzwerk und der Massenmord: Täter und Organisation der Vernichtungslager Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka" (PhD. diss, Ruhr University Bochum, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Peter Black, "Die Trawniki-Männer und die ´Aktion Reinhard´", in: *"Aktion Reinhardt": Der Völkermord an den Juden im Generalgouvernement 1941-1944*, edited by Bogdan Musial, (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2004), 309-52; Peter Black, "Foot Soldiers of the Final Solution: The Trawniki Training Camp and Operation Reinhard," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 25, no. 1 (2011): 1-99 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. It should be mentioned that both Poprzeczny and Rieger pointed to the immense significance of Globonik’s staff; not entirely successfully, though, mainly due to the highly problematic overemphasis on Globocnik’s fiancé Irmgard Rickheim. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Peter Black, "Rehearsal for „Reinhard“? Odilo Globocnik and the Lublin Selbstschutz," *Central European History* 25, no. 2 (1992): 204-226. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Bogdan Musial, Deutsche Zivilverwaltung und Judenverfolgung im Generalgouvernement: Eine Fallstudie zum Distrikt Lublin 1939-1944 (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz-Verlag, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Armin Nolzen, "Die Arbeitsbereiche der NSDAP im Generalgouvernement, in den Niederlanden und in der besetzten Sowjetunion," in Roberg Bohn (Hg.), *Die Deutsche Herrschaft in den „germanischen“ Ländern 1940-1945*, edited by Robert Bohn (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 247- 275; Musial, *Zivilverwaltung*, 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Michael Esch, "Die ´Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte´ in Lublin." *1999: Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts* 11, no. 2 (1996): 62-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Isabel Heinemann, "Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut": Das Rasse- & Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 357-416. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Letter Reichsführer-SS to SS-Brigadeführer Globocnik dated July 17, 1941, BArchB (BDC), SSO Globocnik, Odilo, 21.04.1904; Jan-Erik Schulte, *Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung: Das Wirtschaftsimperium der SS. Oswald Pohl und das SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt 1933-1945* (Paderborn-München-Wien-Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001), 259-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camp (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987); Bogdan Musial, ed., "Aktion Reinhardt": Der Völkermord an den Juden im Generalgouvernement 1941-1944 (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2004) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Hermann Kaienburg, *Die Wirtschaft der SS* (Berlin: Metropol, 2003), 550 – 61; Helge Grabitz and Wolfgang Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren: Ghetto Warschau – SS-Arbeitslager Trawniki – Aktion Erntefest* (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1988), 328 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Czeslaw Madajczyk, ed., *Zamojszczyzna ‑ Sonderlaboratorium SS: Zbiór dokumentów polskich i niemieckich z okresu okupacji hitlerowskiej*, 2 vol. (Warschau: Ludowa Spóldzielnia Wydawnicza, 1979); Bruno Wasser, Himmlers Raumplanung im Osten: Der Generalplan Ost in Polen 1940‑1944 (Basel, Berlin, Boston: Birkhäuser, 1993), 133-229; Heinemann, *Rasse- & Siedlungshauptamt, 403-413* [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Musial, *Zivilverwaltung*, 38-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Note for the Brigadeführer, Ha., SS-Obersturmführer, Lublin, 9.8.1941, betr. Stabsbesprechung am 6.8.41 AIPN, RG Der SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin (SSPF Lublin), CA. 891/6, pp. 11-12. Cf. reprint of this document by Michael Esch, for some inexplicable reason without indication of source. Esch, “Forschungsstelle,” 68 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Note for the Brigadeführer, Ha., SS-Obersturmführer, Lublin, 9.8.1941, Betr. Stabsbesprechung am 6.8.41 AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, pp. 11-12 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. SSPF Lublin to staff SSPF Lublin et al., June 11, 1942, about the “people’s march” on Sunday, June 14, 1942, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/4, pp. 130-131 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Copy HSSPF [Operation Zone of the Adriatic Littoral](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Zone_of_the_Adriatic_Littoral) to SS-Personalhauptamt, v. Herff, October 27, 1943 BArchB (BDC), SSO, Globocnik, Odilo, 21.04.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. For the participation of German (and Austrian) women and specifically on Zamosc: Elizabeth Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Thus it has been clarified that the number of 92 persons provided for the “execution of Operation Reinhard” is too low. All in all, probably 121 persons from the apparatus of the T4 killing institutions were transferred to Lublin. Berger, „T4-Reinhardt-Netzwerk“, 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Although there were some among the dispatched persons who influenced events in the Office, e.g. Christian Wirth as “Inspector of Operation Reinhard”; all in all, however, the narrow staff was the group from whose midst Globocnik acted. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. On the subject in general, *Eine Frau an seiner Seite. Ehefrauen in der „SS-Sippengemeinschaft“* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1997), 99-111. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Rieger, *Creator*, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Letter SSPF Globocnik to SS-Personalhauptamt dated February 2, 1942 re promotion recommendations, BArchB (BDC), SSO, Höfle, Hermann. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. BArchB, (BDC), RS, Mohrenschildt, Reinhold; about the activities in Danzig in the run-up of the attack arranged to provoke Poland cf. Philip Matić, *Edmund Veesenmayer: Agent und Diplomat der nationalsozialistischen Expansionspolitik* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002), 81-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. BArchB (BDC), RS Mohrenschildt, Reinhold. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Cf. Götz Aly, *"Endlösung": Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998), 62 and 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. BArchB (BDC), RS Mohrenschildt, Reinhold; Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, *Der „Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz“ in Polen 1939/40* (München: Oldenbourg, 1992), 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Copy letter HSSPF Ost to SS-Personalhauptamt, dated February 17, 1942, re promotions Beförderungen, BArchB (BDC), DC, Höfle, Hermann. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Madajczyk, *Zamojszczynzna,* 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Copy RFSS SS-Personalhauptamt to HSSPF East, September 9, 1943, re transfer of SS leaders, Unterführer and men from the area of the SS and Police Leader Lublin to the SS and Police Leader Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral in Trieste. BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914. Actually, Globocnik achieved the transfer of a significantly higher number of persons to Trieste. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Elste, *Kärntens braune Elite*, 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Elste, *Kärntens braune Elite*, 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Globocnik “to all,” Lublin, November 26, 1941, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/3, fol 33; letter Globocnik to HSSPF East, attachment to promotion recommendation for Lerch dated December 20, 1941, BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Interrogation Max Runhof, previously Czichotzki, September 15, 1961, proceedings against Georg Michalsen et al., Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg (ZStL, Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes), 208 AR-Z 74/60, Bl.779 (from now on: ZStL, Michalsen); Poprzeczny, Globocnik, 108-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Born in 1916 near Bromberg/Bydgoszcz as the son of a farmer, he grew up as a member of the German minority in the new Polish state. When the foreign department of the Reich Youth Leadership was looking for Polish-speaking youth leaders for the GG, Czichotzki was appointed HJ leader for the entire Lublin district. ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.9171-9395 close instruction. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Interrogation Max Runhof, September 15, 1961, ZStL, Michalsen, 779. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Rieger, *Creator*, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. BArchB (BDC), PK-Akte Gasser, Paul, 18.11.1904; about the return of escaped Nazis from Yugoslavia, Dušan Nešak, *Die österreichische Legion II: nationalsozialistische Flüchtlinge in Jugoslawien nach dem misslungenen Putsch vom 25. Juli 1934* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1996), 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Rieger, *Creator*, 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Transcript, Rosa Benesch, July 28, 1965, Austrian National Archives, Archives of the Republic GeZ 91.707-2C/65 (Vzl: 0, Nzl 59.025/65); folder number 55.074 - 18/71, subject Georg Michalsen; Gasser has been registered as killed in action on October 21, 1941. ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.9171-9395 close instruction. This is based on information by WAST. See Vn Benesch, Rosa, July 28, 1965, Klagenfurt District Court, proceedings against Helmut Ortwin Pohl and Ernst Lerch, 25 Vr 3123/71, (Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch) ON 2216 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Vienna Regional Court, VG 1 d Vr 590/47 against Nemec, Josef, 23.04.1901 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Gerhard Botz, *Nationalsozialismus in Wien: Machtübernahme, Herrschaftssicherung, Radikalisierung* (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2008), 286. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Copy Head of the Chancellery of the Führer of the NSDAP to Gauleiter Globocnik, January 28, 1939, Austrian National Archives, Archives of the Republic (ÖStA, AdR), Gau personnel office of the Vienna Gau (Gau file) 230.599, Nemec, Josef. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Interrogation Josef Nemec, March 17, 1949, Vienna Regional Court, VG 1 d Vr 590/47 Nemec, Josef [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Birn, *SS- und Polizeiführer*, 100-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Appraisal on the occasion of an official trip of SS-Gruf. von Herff through the Generalgouvernement in May 1943, BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. BArchB (BDC), SSO, Maubach, Hans-Gustav 19.12.1904; cf. Roland Ray, *Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers?* *Otto Abetz und die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1930-1942* (München: Oldenbourg, 2000), 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Interrogation Hans-Gustav Maubach, August 30, 1961, ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.765 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Musial, *Zivilverwaltung*, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Interrogation Hans-Gustav Maubach, Augsburg, February 22, 1966, ZStL, Michalsen, 7451-7453. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Interrogation Hans-Gustav Maubach, August 30, 1961, ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.765. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Hanelt, note for the Brigadeführer, August 9, 1941, re staff meeting on August 6, 1941, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, pp. 11-12; BArchB (BDC), RS and SSO, Maubach, Hans-Gustav, 19.12.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. BArchB (BDC), RS and SSO, Maubach, Hans-Gustav, 19.12.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Interrogation Hans-Gustav Maubach, August 30, 1961, ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.765 bzw. ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.9171-9395 close instruction. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Copy, letter Maubach to Globocnik, 31.1.1942, BArchB (BDC), RS, Maubach, Hans-Gustav 19.12.1904; ZStL, Michalsen, Bl.9171-9395 close instruction. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. BArchB (BDC), RS, Schleißner, Rudolf, 14.03.1906; cf. Alfred Elste and Dirk Hänisch, *Auf dem Weg zur Macht* (Wien: Braumüller Verlag, 1997), 269; questionnaire for staff, dated June 1, 1938, AdR GA 357.668 Lerch, Ernst. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. BArchB (BDC), RS, Schleißner, Rudolf, 14.03.1906. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. AdR, BMI Mappe GrZ 26.540-2A/61, GeZ. 26.540-2A/61. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Interrogation Michalsen through Chief Prosecutor Hamburg on January 7, 1964, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2176 Interrogation Michalsen through Chief Prosecutor Hamburg on January 7, 1964. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Testimony Lerch on April 9, 1962, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2110. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Herbert Ulbrich, June 17, 1937, handwritten curriculum vitae, BArchB (BDC), SSO Ulbrich Herbert, 15.10.1908. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Letter HSSPF East to SSPF Radom and Lublin as well as SS-Personalhauptamt dated August 30, 1940, BArchB (BDC), SSO Ulbrich Herbert [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. SSPF Lublin, 27.4.1942, circular for the notification of all staff members of the SSPF Lublin re Ordinance on Registration in the GG. AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/1fol 47. List of suggestions no. 6 of the SSPF for the awarding of the War Merit Cross, dated July 1, 1942, BArchB R 70 Polen /105. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Memo on the meeting with the Reichsführer SS on October 26, 1940 in Cracow, November 5, 1940, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, pp. 16-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Unlike Hanelt, Claus-Walter Padel, who was born in 1911 in Christiansfeld (then Schleswig-Hollstein) into a pharmacist’s family, member of the SS-Mannschaftshaus in Jena and active in the Reich leadership of the German Students Union, did not play any special role in Lublin. Padel was killed in action in 1943. BArchB, (BDC), PK, Padel, Claus, 25.10.1911. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. BArchB (BDC), SSO, Hanelt, Gustav, 21.09.1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Interrogation Hanelt, April 29, 1963, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2174. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Memo Hanelt on staff meeting on August 6, 1941, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. BArchB (BDC), SSO, Bareuther, Adolf, 24.11.1902. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Laßmann and Hanelt, SS-Mannschaftshaus Lublin, März 1942, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, pp. 18-23, interrogation Gustav Hanelt, April 8, 1963, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2173. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch, Handbuch der völkischen Wissenschaften: Personen – Institutionen – Forschungsprogramme – Stiftungen (München: K.G.Saur, 2008), 428-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. ÖStA, AdR, Gauakt 8.400 Stanglica, Dr.Franz; cf. Helmut Heiber, *Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut für die Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1966), 474 [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Letter NSDAP Gauleitung Vienna, Office for Civil Servants, to an Gau Personnel Office Vienna re political appraisal, March 17, 1942, ÖStA, AdR, Gauakt 8.400 Stanglica, Dr.Franz. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Stanglica’s memorandums have parially survived, in AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/4 or 6. Cf., albeit without indication of source, Esch, “Forschungstelle,” 62‑96. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Cited from Haar and Fahlbusch, *Handbuch*, 431. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. BArchB (BDC), SSO, Lassmann, Jürgen; interrogation Jürgen Lassmann on May 10, 1965, by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Abt. 2C, ZStL, Michalsen, 6527. Stanglica was found dead after being imprisoned as a POW under the British forces in Weissensee in 1946. Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 988 [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Heinemann, Rasse- & Siedlungshauptamt, 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. BArchB (BDC), SSO, von Seltmann, Lothar, 12.01.1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. BArchB (BDC), RS, von Seltmann, Lothar, 12.01.1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. BArchB (BDC), SSO, von Seltmann, Lothar, 12.01.1917; Aly, *Endlösung*, 157 [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Note of the Brigadeführer, Ha., SS-Obersturmführer, Lublin, August 9, 1941, re staff meeting on August 6, 1941, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, pp. 11-12. The name “Volkspolitisches Referats” (desk on racial and ethnic matters) refers directly to the political situation of the Austrian Nazi movement in the 1930s. With its establishment in 1937, Globocnik’s allies Rainer and Seyß-Inquart had succeeded, during the vehement struggles with the different Austrian Nazi groups, in making legal positions in the united party of “ Vaterländische Front” available to Austrian Nazis, thus infiltrating it at the same time. Cf. Alfred Elste, Michael Koschat and Hanzi Filipič, *NS-Österreich auf der Anklagebank*: Anatomie eines politischen Schauprozesses im kommunistischen Slowenien (Klagenfurt, Ljuljana, Wien: Hermagoras Verlag, 2000), 89 [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. File Seltmann, Lothar von, AdR BMI Mappe GrZ 26.540-2A/61, GeZ. 26.540-2A/61. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Report by Globocnik re establishment of SS and police bases (handwritten, dated July 18, 1941), BArchB (BDC), SSO Globocnik, Odilo, 21.04.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Interrogation Gustav Hanelt, April 8, 1963, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2173. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Pohl, *"Judenpolitik"*, 184; Schulte, *Zwangsarbeit*, 269. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. In greater detail: Schulte, *Zwangsarbeit*, 276–308. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Schulte, *Zwangsarbeit*, 272; Globocnik to HSSPF East, Cracow, December 20, 1941, BArchB (BDC), Höfle, Herrmann; instruction for SS HStuf Höfle dated February 12, 1942, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/2, p. 46; filling positions in the staff SSPF Lublin, BArchB (BDC), SM, Czichotzki, Max. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Excerpt from the economic and administrative instructions dated May 15, 1942 no. 3, signed H. Himmler, BArchB (BDC), SSO Globocnik, Odilo, 21.04.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Minutes of the meeting at the SSPF on April 22, 1940, about the deployment of Jewish forced laborers. Wojewodzkie Archiwum Panstwowe w Lublinie (APL), RG: Gouverneur of the Lublin district, CA 891, p. 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Musial, *Zivilverwaltung*, 110-123. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. About this institute, cf. Bernhard vom Brocke, "Bevölkerungswissenschaft im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland," in: *Demographie – Demokratie – Geschiche: Deutschland und Israel, Tel Aviv Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte* (2007), 145-163. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. BArchB (BDC), Hofbauer, Karl, 02.05.1911. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Minutes of the meeting on the deployment of Jews dated August 6, 1940, in the Department for Work at the Office of the General Gouverneur, August 9, 1940, APL GK Syg. 906 [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. On Semlin, cf. Aly, "Endlösung", 158 and 341-342. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Musial, *Zivilverwaltung*, 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. The SS and Police Leader in the Lublin district, Gl/Ri.Tgb.No:517/41 to the Chief of the Office at the Office of the district leader Lublin, May 15,1941. APL RG: Gouverneur of the Lublin district, Syg.892, p. 458. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. HSSPF Globocnik, Economic part of the Operation Reinhardt, January 18, 1944, Nuremberg Documents, NO 057. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Political curriculum vitae dated February 2, 1942, BArchB (BDC), Höfle, Hermann, 19.06.1911. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Letter HSSPF Ost to SS-Personalhauptamt, August 22, 1940, re SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann Höfle, BArchB (BDC), Höfle, Hermann; Jansen and Weckbecker, *"Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz"*, 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Pohl, *"Judenpolitik",* 83-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Excerpt from the economic and administrative instructions dated May 15, 1942 no. 3, BArchB (BDC), DC Globocnik, Odilo. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Testimony Berta Gottschall, June 27, 1962, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 1187. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Arad, *Belzec*, 72 [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Grabitz and Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren*, 151 ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Grabitz and Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren*, 328 ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Curriculum vitae dated August 4, 1940, BArchB, (BDC), SSO, Pohl, Helmut Ortwin, 27.09.1901. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. In tandem with the eviction policy, the occupants of the institutions for mentally ill people located there were murdered. Cf. Aly, *"Endlösung",* 20 and 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. HSSPF Ost to SS-Personalhauptamt dated July 15, 1942, re SS-Untersturmführer Helmuth Pohl, BArchB (BDC), SSO, Pohl, Helmut Ortwin, 27.09.1901. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. SSPF Lublin to Chef SS-Personalhauptamt, February 4, 1942, re appointment as Sonderführer of the Waffen-SS, or Globocnik to SS-Personalhauptamt, March 6, 1942, BArchB (BDC), SSO Pohl, Helmut-Ortwin, 27.09.1901. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Note T(ürk), interior administration, department for demography and welfare, March 23, 1942, APL, RG: The Gouverneur of the Lublin district, Syg. 273 expulsion of Jews. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. In the staffing plan from the second half of 1942, Pohl is not listed any more. BArchB (BDC), SM Czichotzki, Max, 25.03.1916. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Telegram SS-Personalhauptamt Becker to HSSPF [Operation Zone of the Adriatic Littoral](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Zone_of_the_Adriatic_Littoral), April 29, 1944, BArchB (BDC), SSO Pohl, Helmuth Ortwin [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Staffing list 1942, BArchB (BDC), SM, Czichotzki, Max. On Göth’s biography cf. Sachslehner, *Tod*. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Letter RFSS, SS Main Office, to the personnel departments in the house, August 10, 1942, re draft to the Waffen SS, BArchB (BDC), Göth, Amon. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Rainer was in prison from August 20, 1935, to March 5, 1936. Cf. Elste, *Kärntens braune Elite*, 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. BArchB (BDC), RS Susitti, Albert. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. SS-Personalhauptamt to HSSPF Ost, dated September 16, 1943, BArchB (BDC), Lerch, Ernst, 19.11.1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Bertrand Perz, "Die Verwertung des Opfergoldes aus den Vernichtungslagern der ´Aktion Reinhard´", in: *Forschungen zum Nationalsozialismus und dessen Nachwirkungen in Österreich*: *Festschrift für Brigitte Bailer*, edited by Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (Wien: DÖW, 2012), 131-53; Bertrand Perz and Thomas Sandkühler, "Auschwitz und die ´Aktion Reinhard´ 1942-45: Judenmord und Raubpraxis in neuer Sicht," *Zeitgeschichte* 26, no. 5, (1999), 283-316. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. BArchB (BDC), Rzepa, Alois, 17.02.1908. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. For his “outstanding merits” in “Operation Reinhard,” Rzepa, on the occasion of a visit by Himmler, was promoted to SS-Oberscharführer “unscheduled” on April 1, 1943. Letter HSSPF Ost, the SS economist to the SS-WVHA, October 15, 1943, re promotion of SS-Oscha. Alois Rzepa, BArchB (BDC), Rzepa, Alois; transcript Rzepa Alois, March 4, 1964 ÖStA, AdR folder GrZl 91.342/20. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Elizabeth Harvey, „,Osteinsatz‘ des Bundes Deutscher Mädel im Krieg“, in: *Die BDM-Generation. Weibliche Jugendliche in Deutschland und Österreich im Nationalsozialismus*, edited byDagmar Reese (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2007), 289-319. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Testimony Berta Gottschall, June 27, 1962, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 1187. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Interrogation Margarete S., April 26, 1965, ZStL, Michalsen, 6408. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Rieger, *Creator*, 61; transcript, Wilhelmine Trsek, by Ministry of the Interior, state police, April 27, 1965, ZStL, Michalsen, 6411. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Poprzeczny, *Globocnik,* 276-300; Rieger, *Creator,* 69-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Note for the Brigadeführer, Ha., SS-Obersturmführer, Lublin, August 9, 1941, re staff meeting on August 6, 1941, AIPN RG SSPF Lublin, CA 891/6, 11-12 or letter HSSPF [Operation Zone of the Adriatic Littoral](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Zone_of_the_Adriatic_Littoral) to an SS-Personalhauptamt, May 11, 1944, re appraisal of former SS-Sturmbannführer (F) Maubach, BArchB (BDC), SSO, Maubach, Hans-Gustav 19.12.1904. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Staffing overview dated October 28, 1942, BArchB (BDC), SM Czichotzki, Max [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Transcript Meierhofer Max, March 18, 1964 ÖStA, AdR, BMI, folder GrZl 91.342/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. BArchB (BDC), SSO Meierhofer, Max. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Grabitz and Scheffler, *Letzte, Spuren*, 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. BArchB (BDC), SSO Meierhofer, Max. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Franz Bertl, interrogation on April 29, 1965, ZStL, Michalsen, 6428; minutes of the main hearing, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch; interrogation of Franz Eigner by Ministry of the Interior, 2C, Hermagor, April 2, 1964 source?, Vn Franz Eigner, Hermagor, May 3, 1965, department 18, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, folder GeZ 91.707-2C/65. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Minutes of the main hearing, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch; interrogation Franz Eigner by Ministry of the Interior, 2C, Hermagor, April 2, 1964, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, folder GrZl 91.342/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. ÖStA, AdR, Gauakt 177.846 Eigner, Franz. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Interrogation of Franz Eigner by Ministry of the Interior, 2C, Hermagor, April 2, 1964, ÖStA, AdR, BMI, Mappe GrZl 91.342/20 [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. See the detailed descriptions of people’s private lives in Lublin, in Rieger, *Creator,* and Poprzeczny, *Globocnik* [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Testimony Berta Gottschall, May 10, 1965, Klagenfurt Regional Court, Pohl/Lerch, ON 2102 [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Almost one-third of the 150 people in the staff had Austrian roots; the total share of the population in the entire German Reich amounted to only 8.5%. It is difficult to establish the exact number of persons of Austrian background. Higher numbers that are given time and again have to do with the confusion of T4 members who had Austrian roots, such as the commandants of extermination camps, Stangl, Eberl and Reichleitner, with the direct staff members of the SSPF Office. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. See the relevant correspondence between Krüger, von Herff and Globocnik, BArchB, (BDC), SSO, Bareuther, Adolf, 24.11.1902. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)