*Humanities*

Over the last few decades the Jewish-Christian dialogue has thrived, gaining both public and scholarly attention. In most cases, this dialogue has taken place among more open-minded representatives of both Christianity and Judaism, involving participants who have a so-called “liberal” religious attitude—in the sense that both parties are united by a similar political and cultural vision that transcends the differences between them. These dialogues seem to result from the weakening of radical voices, framed as hostile regarding relations with other religions, and from the growth of moderate religious approaches, which enable rational and pragmatic interfaith discussions. Jewish-Christian dialogue, in other words, is judged to be a phenomenon emerging from the secular, liberal setting of the postwar Western world, carried out by means of a modernized and moderated universal religious language.

However, this common understanding of the nature and scope of Jewish-Christian dialogue is limited in two respects. First, it does not cover the entire range of dialogical phenomena. As the studies discussed at the workshop suggest, several dialogical initiatives do not adhere to liberal criteria, which assume a rational agreement about the place of religious commitment and its contribution to a diverse society. In fact, one can find dialogical inclinations in surprisingly illiberal settings. Second, the liberal narrative of the Jewish-Christian dialogue focuses mainly on the geopolitical settings of Europe and North America; it omits those types of unique dialogue that stem from other locations. Non-Western practices are often grounded on alternative religious grammars and are oriented towards other sets of political agendas, which often explicitly reject the liberal program.

In order to overcome a narrow approach to religious dialogue, our workshop shall focus on two topics. First, we will empirically examine a variety of projects that have been performed in contexts not typically deemed amenable to the dialogical logic (narrowly understood). By shedding light on such initiatives, often neglected by the liberal framework of dialogue, we can enhance our understanding of the Jewish-Christian dialogue in its variety. Second, we will perform a critical inquiry into the variety of dialogical initiatives. This will enable us to interrogate the logic behind the very concept of dialogue itself. Through this workshop, we will attempt to formulate a grammar suitable to the multiplicity of religious dialogue, and to deploy a theoretical language befitting this multiplicity to evaluate phenomena that up until now have been poorly understood through the mainstream liberal grammars.

*Social Sciences*

*Please edit to improve the caliber of language and also format the in-text citations according to APA or other widely-used style guide (specify which)*

White-collar crime has dominated global headlines in recent decades, exemplified by reports about the illegal stock manipulation of Nochi Dankner in Israel and the Ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff in the USA. In the wake of these crimes, segments of the population have called for increasing the severity of punishment (Holtfreter et al., 2008; Huff et al., 2010) in the hope that this will prove to be a satisfactory deterrent.

No single definition of white-collar crime exists, nor is there a consensus regarding its interpretation (Ragatz & Fremouw, 2010). Ever since the term was coined by Edwin Sutherland (1939) various definitions have been suggested, attesting, among other things, to the complexity of the phenomenon. According to Mann (1990), the term “white collar offender” suggests a prototype based on a group of parameters: the privileged status of the offender, abuse of one’s position, use of camouflage and deception, causing economic damage, and perpetrating the crime either in an organizational framework or privately. Although these parameters define the phenomenon, the absence of any one of them does not necessarily alter the fundamental nature of the prototype.

Over time, attempts have been made to identify subtypes of white-collar criminals. Friedrichs (2009) makes a distinction between organizational or corporate crime, which are oriented to promoting the interests of a collective, and occupational crime, which is committed in a professional capacity for the sake of personal gain. Grey-collar crime is closely related to white-collar crime, but is committed in a “grey” area (Menard et al., 2011) typified by an abuse of trust, including job poaching, insurance and credit card fraud, and tax evasion.

The present article refers in particular to white-collar felons—whether organizational or occupational—who are members of society’s privileged elite and abuse their senior positions in order to commit and conceal financial crimes (Logan et al., 2017; Onna et al., 2014; Sutherland, 1983). The offences that are normally associated with this category include fraud, blackmail, falsification of official documents, embezzlement, money laundering, breach of trust by means of bribery, insider trading, illegal stock manipulation, tax offences, and computer crimes.

White-collar offenders of the felon class generally hold positions that provide them with an opportunity to commit their crime. Unlike with blue-collar crimes, the victims in this case are faceless, since there is rarely any physical contact between perpetrator and victim (Soltes, 2016). The crimes they commit are usually sophisticated, with few complainants and a host of anonymous collaborators. Discovery of the felony takes a relatively long time since there is a tendency to conceal such cases within the organizations themselves. Law enforcement agents are therefore unsuccessful in exposing most of these crimes, and even if they do succeed, sometimes find it difficult to secure a conviction (Marriott, 2018; Xie, 2015). If a conviction is eventually made, the perpetrators suffer the ignominy of sullied reputations (Marriott, 2018).

Various estimates have been proposed with respect to the prevalence of white-collar crimes. Some claim (e.g., Ben Zvi & Volk, 2011) that their occurrence is low relative to other crimes, though others estimate a high percentage of recidivism among perpetrators. Weisburd et al. (2001), for example, examined criminal dossiers on white-collar criminals and found that a high percentage of them were habitual offenders.

*STEM*

The year 2020 will be remembered as the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and its worldwide effects on human mortality, quality of life, and economics. This year ended with a glimmer of hope when the FDA (U.S. Food and Drug Administration) approved the use of COVID-19 vaccines on people ages 16 and up. The vaccine campaign was a success; in countries with a high uptake rate, the number of new infections declined rapidly despite the easing of lockdown restrictions. However, public health measures are still necessary among the unvaccinated population (mainly teenagers and children). Epidemiological data show that susceptibility to and transmission of COVID-19 decreases with progressively younger child cohorts. Children tend to develop asymptomatic infections, and generally experience a more favorable outcome than adults. However, the recent emergence of new variants increases both the risk of transmission and the severity of COVID-19 infection in children [1],[2],[3].

In May 2021, the FDA and CHMP (European Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use) approved the use of COVID-19 vaccines on teenagers ages 12 and up. Some countries have considered extending the vaccine to children ages 12 to 16 years old. They expect that this step will contribute to bringing the pandemic under control, which is extremely important given the spread of new COVID-19 variants. Increasing the vaccination rate will assist populations in achieving herd immunity and hasten the recovery of the global economy. In order to implement such a strategy it is important to understand hesitancy among parents to vaccinate their children, since parents are usually the decision makers.

In Israel the vaccination campaign started in mid-December 2020, and by June 3, 2021, 59.35% of the population was fully vaccinated. The highest seven-day moving average of new infections per day was 8,624 on January 17th 2021. This number gradually declined with the vaccination of an increased percentage of the population, and reached 15 new cases per day at the beginning of June 2021. Due to the emerging Delta variant, the weekly average of new cases increased to 450 at the beginning of July. Based on Israel’s nationwide observational study, vaccine effectiveness against symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection, COVID-19-related hospitalization, and COVID-19-related death exceeded 96% across all age groups. The study found a positive correlation between vaccination rate and age: for those 70 years old and above, the rate exceeded 95%; for those 50–70 years old it was approximately 90%; and for those 20–40 years old the rate was around 80%. The percentage of people who were vaccinated in Israel reached a plateau over the previous two months; the rate of single vaccination increased by only 2.3%, from 60.7% on April 1, 2021, to 63% on June 1, 2021 [4],[5],[6].This phenomenon has been observed in other countries as well, and is probably caused by vaccine hesitancy. Vaccine hesitancy is defined by the WHO (World Health Organization) as a delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccination despite the availability of vaccination services [7]. The causes of vaccine hesitancy vary by country and are vaccine specific, indicating a need to strengthen the capacity of national programs to identify local casual factors and develop appropriate strategies [8],[9].