## 3. Identifying Threat Narratives Methodology

### 3.1. General remarks

The reare two factors that define the success of existential threat narratives are: their acceptance at a popular level and political measures aimed at combatting the threatsm. Using From these factors is filtering process, transpires I will analyse a list of threat narratives that will be analysed in detail according to the following criteria. Firstly, the threat narrative will be disaggregated one needs to disaggregate a specific threat narrative into its parts, i.e., establish if the threat thas a significant traction on the audience level and if this audience discussion makes references to personified threats - enemy images. Second, Then, one needs to I determine whether the threat has a collective memory component, i.e., if the threat narrative involves a 'picture memory' (Efal 2007) of traumatic events. Finally, I one needs to establish whether existential threat narratives and personification rhetoric are also promoted at the governmental level. In order to test the argument, this book analyses lesser threats identified at a popular level, which do not have personification and/or have not been addressed by governmental measures.

The aim of Bthis book is to identify the mechanisms of existential threat narratives. ecause As it is impossible to track down all threat narratives in a society, I will choose to examine concentrate on threats identified by public opinion polls that meet seven objectives as shown in Table 3.1: The threat is

- (1) as being widely shared among the population;
- (2). Moreover, as the success of securitization is defined through the adoption of political measures (Buzan et al 1998), so I will select threats targeted by legislation (2); and
- (3) And finally, I will identifyeheek whether the threat narrative is indeed acceptedance by the audience. (3).

<u>TAs he I argued in my theory chapter the success of threat narratives depends on the following felicity conditions that will be accordingly tested on the threat narratives: when there is (4)4) an enemy image structure (threat + personification);</u>

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Commented [AG2]: Integrate Chapter 4 into this chapter.

**Commented [AG3]:** Should this paragraph be moved after the discussion of identifying the threat narratives? First you identify them (objective, method). Then, you analyse each threat narrative based on these 3 factors. Is that an accurate way to sum up what you are saying? If so, move this paragraph later.

**Commented [AG4]:** What is the difference between the filtering process and criteria used to analyse the threat? Please clarify. The criteria also discuss popular acceptance and political measures—which is what the filtering process is based on . Ok as edited?

**Commented [AG5]:** This statement is made a couple of paragraphs later and isn't necessary here.

**Commented [AG6]:** Explain/define what you mean by "mechanisms". Do you mean you will identify how threat narratives become effective?

**Commented [AG7]:** These numbers are listing the steps you will cover, right? These correspond to the table and to the chapter headings—is that correct?

- (55) threat narrative is referenced in collective memory; -and
- (66) the rhetoric on the governmental level upholds the securitization discourse.
- However, in order Tto eliminate a selection bias, I will also create a cluster of lesser threats:
- -(7) that were not tackled by extraordinary measures, but still feature prominently in society on a discursive level or were targeted by political measures, but are no longer perceived as posing an existential threat.

Thus, themy method for analysing threat narratives ology presupposes seven objectives that include their own methods as shown in Table 3.1.:

## Table 3.1. Identifying Threat Narratives Objectives and Methods To Be Analyzed

There are two several-methodological challenges to identifying the threat narratives that will be analysed in this bookmy theory approach. First, there is a range of enemy images that are not intensively debated in the mass media or on the blogosphere, i.e., they are routinized enemy images or the ones that exist on a prejudice level (e.g., anti-Semitism). Thus, the sedimentation of enemy images can be expressed in the fact that they are used matter-of-factly by the mass media, as I will elaborate later in the lesser threats chapter. To address this challenge, I will carry out an elaborate filtering process with the help of public opinion polls and mass media monitoring in order to find out what kinds of threats are debated by the mass media and identified by the population. Moreover, as the government largely controls the mass media, a number of securitizing moves are carried out according to the 'party line'. SFurthermore, sedimentation in the audience will be checked at stage three of the methodology (see Objective 3 in Table 3.1).

# 3.2. Threat Ffilter: Establish Threats in the Popular Opinion

Firstly, it is necessary to establish <u>W</u>what kinds of enemies are debated in <u>atherally</u> Russian political scientists and sociologists (cf. Verkhovsky 2013, Rogov 2013) <u>findnote</u> that the most

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**Commented [AG8]:** Is this title for Table 3.1 accurate as revised?

**Commented [AG9]:** What is meant by "my theory approach"? What other approaches are there? Do you mean your approach to analysing threat narratives?

**Commented [AG10]:** If this is the first use of "sedimentation" it might need a definition.

**Commented [AG11]:** Is stage three the third item in the Table above? If not, please clarify. Does it refer to a group coalescing, coming together as a group?

reliable of all the public opinion centres in Russia is the Levada Centre for the study of public opinion.

But even Levada represents a certain level of bias in their research. On the one hand, a number of studies that the centre is carrying out are longitudinal, so the questions that are asked show a very good balance dynamic of the public opinion. However, even though certain themes cease to be relevant, respondents are supposed to answer them anyway. Therefore, there is a risk that respondents will identity a phenomenon as a 'threat' on a questionnaire simply because it is listed among a limited number of answers and lumped together with other phenomena qualified as threats. Furthermore, S some respondents may actually be afraid to answer truthfully to the agency, as the polls are conducted over landlines and there is a certain degree of distrust towards governmental and non-governmental institutions alike.

Some In order to identify enemy images that are particularly popular in Russia, I will analyse threats that are debated by the public and are specifically identified by opinion polls. These threats are identified and analysed. Levada has a specific poll that asks respondents about threats, which is also helpful for Tthe next stage of analysis the methodology as it provides for key search terms for nodal discourses on threats.

### 4.1. Public Opinion Polls

As suggested in the methodology chapter, this book starts with the list of threats singled out by public opinion polls, carried out by the Levada Centre for Public Opinion. One of the limitations of Levada's research for the purposes of this study is the repetition of featured threats in both the 2013 and 1998 polls, forcing respondents to identify the proposition in a threat/non-threat discourse. For example, a question is formulated as 'Tell us, please, what kind of threat does the following item represent to Russia's security?'. Respondents were required to rate threats from '1' to 5, 1 representing 'no threat' and '5' representing 'a very big threat' (Levada 2013). (See Table 3.2.)

For the purposes of <u>T</u>this research <u>I will</u> concentrates on threats that scored on both parameters to determine whether they are associated with an enemy image on a popular level.

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### 3.3. Establish the Tthreats that Wwere Ttargeted by Llegislation

The second stage of the study aims to Which establish the groups of people/persons that are targeted by legislation? Those groups which constitutes another factor in defining the success of the securitization process. These As I am working with large-scale securitization processes pertaining to Russian population are investigated in this book; these are the 'customized political act' (Balzacq 2011) that is supposed to deal with the threat are is limited to legislation.

Even though the 'customized political act' is supposed to be an indicator of securitization success, it also has a function of reinforcing the enmification narrative as it demarcates both the referent object from the threat and specifically delineates the group targeted by legislation. The same applies to blasphemy legislation. The legislation itself is supposed to 'protect religious feelings' and does not mention blasphemy as a category, but the majority of the population considers the Orthodox feelings as being those in need of protection, especially after the Pussy Riot trial where they were accused of religious hatred.

As previously stated, I do not view tThe internet is notas a completely benevolent open forum for all sides of the debate. As Jenkins mentioned, 'it would be naïve to assume that powerful conglomerates will not protect their own interests as they enter this new media marketplace, but at the same time, audiences are gaining greater power and autonomy as they enter into the new knowledge culture' (Jenkins, 2002, 80-81).

Routinized securitizations/latent enemy images are an interesting facet of enemy images. Also taken into consideration in this book. One species of enemy images that can still be seen, for instance, is anti-Germanism. Ever since the WWII and the creation of two German states, there has been a form of 'doublespeak' with regards to the German topic. Eastern Germany was a socialist brother inhabited by German resistance movement members, while Western Germany was regarded as a successor state to the Third Reich, where supposedly all the Wehrmacht and NSDAP members retired. Thus, as mentioned in the theory chapter, enemy images do not dissolve by themselves and continue to exist on a societal level, with the potential to resurface.

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**Commented [AG15]:** Is this what you mean? Or, do you mean success against securitization?

**Commented [AG16]:** Did you explain this trial in a previous chapter? Ok as edited?

**Commented [AG17]:** Who is Jenkins? (his professional credential?)

Commented [AG18]: There is a sense that you are stating what will be discussed later in the book, and that this chapter is a preview of what is to come. When appropriate, use the present tense and revise so that this chapter's content is being offered to readers as important in its own right, rather than a description of what is coming in later chapters. See how I revised this sentence, and others in this chapter, to achieve this.

Commented [AG19]: Spell out NSDAP.

In order to analyse Twitter data, I input identified threats in separate datasets, which are extracted from Russian language posts. For example, In the case of Pussy Riot, I inputted the Cyrillic transliteration of 'Пусен'. The maximum allowed number of datasets is 10, so I included 6 threats that were addressed by the governments, but also the threats that were identified in the lesser threat cluster. After launching the application, ScraperWiki summarizes the data in Excel spreadsheet and in word clouds and other technical Twitter characteristics. For the objective 1 (establish significant presence on social networks) it is important to show how many tweets get scraped.

# 3.5. Establish $\underline{\mathbf{E}}_{\mathbf{e}}$ mbeddedness in $\underline{\mathbf{C}}_{\mathbf{e}}$ ollective $\underline{\mathbf{M}}_{\mathbf{m}}$ emory

As I stated in the theory chapter, Oene of the crucial conditions for a successful securitization/enmification process is the embeddedness of an existential threat. Guzzini's dispositional condition or Stritzel's (2007) 'embeddedness', both refer to the fact that the securitizing move is supposed to resonate with existing discourses and practices. In memory studies this kind of process is referred to as 'postmemory', which emphasises the importance of reactivation of previous traumatic experiences.

In the case of each threat narrative, I <u>examine how will study the way</u> it was constructed in the Soviet era in popular culture, mass media and official statements, especially given that Soviet tropes are still ubiquitously used in mass media (Meduza 21 July 2015). Thus, every enemy image will receive a sort of 'biographical' note about its previous reincarnation in society.

Moreover, vVisuals are a crucial part of memory construction. As Johnson notes, 'rather than turning to narrative, memory often figures the past with the immediacy of images' (Johnson 2012, 4), especially with their psychological evocation, which, as previously mentioned, Warburg called *Pathosformel*. The images that are used in creating and sustaining an enemy image are all invested with the 'pathos formula' that helped them remain in the European 'picture memory'.

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### 3.6. Establish the **Ee**xistence of **Ee**nemy **Ii**mage **Ss**tructure

### Discourse Analysis

As pointed out in the introduction and in theory chapter, a An enemy image represents a specific set of features. that make up a structure for an effective enemy image. (1) First, eExistential threats can be interpreted differently according to specific cultural contexts and especially through different referent objects; in the Soviet Union/Russia an existential threatit is more about the existence of the Russian state as an entity, while in the USUnited States, for instance, the threatit is often about the destruction of the American way of life. (2) Personification is another important element in the enemy image structure that is about pinpointing and anthropomorphising quintessential Evil with a particular group – it could be a reference to Satan, but also to the more recent embodiment of 'Satan', Hitler and Nazism¹ with such poignant features as ugliness and dark colours (cf. Satjukow and Gries 2004). One of the ways to analyse this is to establish whether the visuals associated with a given threat have a personified component, i.e., whether the threat is y represented a threat as a person and are ascribed anthropomorphic characteristics, either visually or linguistically (cf. Twardzisz 2013).

One of the central points of this book is Tthe notion of audience and the way enemy images sediment in the society can be examined using discourse analysis. In order to analyse the sedimentation of discourse in the audience I will use discourse analysis. Discourse analysis strives to highlight 'the processes by which the social world is constructed and consolidated. Discourse analysis focuses attention on the role that language, texts, conversations, the media and even academic research have in the process of creating institutions [i.e., the established social order] and shaping behaviour' (Burnham, et al. 2008, 249-250).

As Doty (Doty 1996, 6) notes, <u>D</u>discourses are open, unstable and always in the process of being articulated (Doty 1996, 6), because <u>'it is one of the functions of d di</u>scourse analysis to reveals the

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**Commented [AG26]:** Is "society" the term that is used in international relations research? I know you have used "society" throughout, so if you change it, then change it throughout the manuscript.

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Ok as edited? To revise for a broader audience, it is ok to have fewer citations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In the Russian context the word 'Nazism' is replaced with 'fascism' when referring to German National Socialism due to the fact that during the Soviet times, and especially during the Second World War, the state propaganda was reluctant to use the word 'socialism' in relation to Hitler's regime to avoid confusion. Hence, the term 'fascism' is not used in Russian language to describe Mussolini's dictatorship.

bases foundation of these common assumptions, such as [of-how to respond to particular events or crises,] and to show how they are related to the different interests of in society. (Burnham, et al. 2008, 250). Moreover, it is important to pay attention to Of equal importance is the 'combination of interdiscursive analysis of texts (i.e., of how different genres, discourses and styles are articulated together)' (Fairclough 2012, 10), as the context of discursive articulation and its genre may have major significance. This book examines two us, I will be looking at 2 corpuses of texts: governmental rhetoric and personal statements of the public, where the 'bases of these common assumptions' and their context can be traced and revealed.

Fairclough identifies several objects of discourse analysis: the emergence of the discourses, relations of contestation between discourses, dissemination of the discourses and operationalization of discourses (Fairclough 2012, 464). While Fairclough concentrates his research on discourse dissemination and reconceptualization, this book takes a I take a more 'archaeological' approach and examines look at all four stages of discourse's 'life'. In the case of Russian threat paratives Russian case, it is particularly interesting to monitor the

shift [...] from being just representations and imaginaries to having transformative effects on social reality space. (Fairclough 2012, 464-465)

Semiotics interprets the visual by more than itself and its intertext. As Roland Barthes (Barthes 1977) noted in 'Rhetoric of the Image', the signifiers in an image have their own second-tier meanings or connotations that refer to specific messages.

The purpose of this book is to work with the Iiconographic and iconological meanings in visuals as they represent the key markers of an identity. In order to connect iconographic analysis in semiotics (which Panofsky himself compared to ethnographic observations (Holly 1984, 167)) to the my theoretical framework of this book, I will interpret the images are interpreted through embeddedness of the particular artistic motif in collective memory. In my framework Ceertain motifs evoke cultural associations: pasta and tomatoes represent Italy (Barthes 1977), toothbrush

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**Commented [AG29]:** Edited as meant? Please clarify "Russian case"—what are you referring to here?

moustache is a reference to Hitler (which can easily be proven by googling 'toothbrush moustache'), bears and cold weather are characteristically Russian, etc.

I would also argue that iI Images are created in a cultural context and are inextricably linked to it. Thus, in order to interpret them, a close look at the cultural context that they were created in is needed, because if the image is separatedely from it its cultural content, the image will mean something completely different in a different cultural context (Cf. Panofsky 1955). To paraphrase a quote, Images are what people make of them and moreover, certain symbolism can be lost on an audience. Therefore Ergo, a successful enemy image can only play on resonant symbolism that will affect the target audience.

After identifying the cultural codes of the image, it is important to pay attention to the composition and other elements of the image are essential (Kress, Van Leeuwen 2001):

...Most accounts of visual semiotics have concentrated on what might be regarded as the equivalent of 'words' – what linguists call 'lexis' — rather than 'grammar', and then on the 'denotative' and 'connotative', the 'iconographical' and 'iconological' significance of the elements in images, the individual people, places and things (including abstract 'things') depicted there. [...] Just as grammars of language describe how words combine in clauses, sentences and texts, so—...our visual 'grammar' will describe the way in which depicted elements – people, places and things – combine in visual 'statements' of greater or lesser complexity and extension (Kress, Van Leeuwen 2011, 1)

Thus, using iconography and iconology is important to it is still important to pay attention to the way the composition of an image is structured. For example, different parts of the image can represent different areas of polarization: top versus bottom (ideal versus real) and right versus left (given versus new) and according to Kress and van Leeuwen most images are structured along these space divisions

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Another important reason to study vV isuality in the context of enemy image research is significant also because the fact that 'Kremlin trolls' use an extensive and wide library of imagery in order to promulgate pro-governmental discourse (Walker 2015, RFERL 4 April 2015).

To summarize, The analysis of visuals in this book is will be based on the iconographic and iconological meaning of the elements in the visuals, as well as their composition. Iconography represents in this case a perfect tool to interpret visuals, because iconographic and iconological meanings in visuals are based on the collective memory references that create embeddedness, which is crucial for my theory framework.

## 3.7. Governmental Repeteric and Positional Prower

On the governmental level, the enmification process is filled with rhetoric that reinforces the enmification process from the vantage point of positional power and this viewpoint is often reinforced via the mass media. Apart from legislation that singles out certain groups of people, # is important to analyse there is a need to analyse rhetoric on the governmental level, , i.e., the rhetoric that reinforces the enmification process from the positional power vantage point and which is often reinforced via the mass media. Discourse analysis is one way to evaluate statements of parliamentarians and government members, and In order to establish the modality of the governmental discourse, I will employ discourse analysis to evaluate statements of parliamentarians and government members. The sSources for analysing discourse include for this part of discourse analysis contain transcripts from the Russian Parliament – Duma – sessions, as well as statements made by President Putin and the reports from Russian state-controlled TV channels – Pervyi Kanal and Rossiya. The significance of Russian TV as a source for empirical research has been justified by a number of scholars (Hutchings, Ruyolva 2009, Burrett 2010), and scholars note especially given television's massive influence on shaping the Russian public opinion (Gudkov 2005, Dubin 2011, Miazhevich 2014). The significance of TV is even more striking Especially, given that the relationship between the internet and TV in Russia represents a continual loop, affecting each other (Cottiero et al 2015).

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Commented [AG34]: Ok to make this statement, "filled with", which is more subjective than "involves"? If so, you might have a better phrase than "filled with". Readers might like more of your point of view, if you feel comfortable delivering some of that. I would imagine that government rhetoric is strong, influential and often a lot of misinformation that can do damage. How much, if any of that can you allude to here?

**Commented [AG35]:** Overuse of the word "important" so I am suggesting synonyms on occasion.

<u>Unlike A difference from the 'classic' Copenhagen School approach, this book views is that</u> 'customized political acts' are usually taken separately and are not viewed as a discursive construction, rather than as separate acts, that pinpoints the threat. However, I\_egislation is, in a sense, another securitizing move, because it reinforces the collective understanding that a phenomenon is a threat and needs to be dealt with. Consequently, it is necessary to pay attention to\_discursive struggles around the legislation offer a rich pool of information, which is are aimed at combatting the threat and registering the presence or absence of existential threat narratives.

#### 3.8. Lesser Threats

In this part of the study I will still analyse The threats that scored high in opinion polls and/or Integrum World Wide monitoring will be analysed, to make sure that there is no enemy image related to it, even if there is no legislation targeting the said threat. This analysis highlights part of the methodology can actually be extrapolated to the overarching necessity of the governmental involvement in creating and maintaining an enemy image in the securitization framework. Thus, the threats that did not score high in the filtering will receive the same enemy image analysis treatment as the ones that did in order to establish the plausibility of my hypothesis that involves the felicity conditions for the successful securitization process.

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