**Sample translation: source**

The Problem of Unity in Kant’s Conception of Philosophy: The form and modality of the theoretical-practical conception of philosophy

My current research question concerns the form and modality of Kant’s unified theoretical-practical conception of philosophy. I focus on: (1) Kant’s general conception of philosophy, which I argue needs to account for the necessary relation between the two disjunct domains of reason, i.e., theoretical and practical. On such an account, Kant’s conception of philosophy departs from the method narrowly defined in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), and also from Kant’s account of metaphysics; and on (2) Kant’s unique theory of modality in relation to the problem of unity between the two domains of philosophical cognition.

With my future academic work I hope to contribute to the elucidation of philosophical method in general. Such a study is new both in Kant’s scholarship and for the present day philosophy in general. It is only recently that methodological questions on the nature, ground, and explanation of philosophical activity have gained prominence in analytic tradition (Williamson 2007, Gutting 2009) and in a broader historically informed context (e.g., Moore 2011, Brandom 2013). In my take on it, I will draw from Kant’s theory of modality.

Modality for Kant is a foundational concept for the dualism about the structure of human cognition: it allows restricting the domain of theoretical knowledge to that what is sensible, but it permits the super-sensible claims in the moral-practical domain. In this regard, modality is also a foundational concept for understanding the unity of Kant’s methodology in a most general sense, i.e., his conception of philosophy. My proposed research goes further than exploring the traditional tripartite structure of modality in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. My interpretation is new in that I take a further step in attempting to understand the pervasive concern in Kant’s later thought with the fact that the two functions of reason belong to the same capacity, an insight that Kant himself never adequately develops. Kant struggles with but never solves the problem of whether or not the two modalities of reason are grounded in a higher genus of modality (logical in some broader sense, or alethic, etc.). My question focuses thus on the possible unity of the two distinct modal domains present in Kant’s system, which I will tie to the interpretation of Kant’s two-hinged (theoretical-practical) conception of philosophy.