**Introduction**

The revival of interest in Schelling’s philosophy, which has grown in particular in the English-speaking world, has in recent years been usefully and curiously intertwined with both the international debate on ‘new realism’ and the so-called ‘speculative turn’[[1]](#footnote-1). This is probably rooted in the centrality and radicality of Schelling’s ‘realism’ (or ‘overrealism’) within the philosophical-rational project of Modernity and German Idealism in particular. A realism that can certainly be traced back to his positive philosophy, although understanding of this latter phase of Schelling’s speculation can only and inevitably be gained through a preliminary insight into the fundamental theses of his *Naturphilosophie* and thus through the understanding of his particular notion of nature[[2]](#footnote-2), which for Schelling is the great excluded of modern philosophy.[[3]](#footnote-3)

If it is true, as Maurizio Ferraris and Mario De Caro observe[[4]](#footnote-4), that the real novelty of ‘new’ realism lies in the fact that it is aware of coming *after* postmodernism in its various manifestations[[5]](#footnote-5), then the meaning that Schelling’s philosophy assumes within it is even further reinforced. Schelling is in fact the mystery of the philosophy of the crisis[[6]](#footnote-6) that follows the rational philosophical project of modernity, in that on the one hand he contributed to the construction of the Hegelian system and on the other he could therefore show its structural weakness and theoretical unsustainability.

The nihilistic conclusions of postmodernism do not derive, in fact, from the so-called and presumed anti-Hegelian irrationalism highlighted, for example, by Lukács in a reconstruction that sees Schelling himself with his ‘intellectual intuition’ among the first exponents, rather they derive precisely from the typical idea of post-Kantian correlationalism according to which thought and being are fully converted, to the point of considering it impossible “to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently one of another”[[7]](#footnote-7). This attempt to reduce being and thought to their correlation is carried out in a masterly way in Hegel’s panlogistic system, but encounters, in the postmodern shift, the exasperation of the subjectivation of being, that is, of the idea that being depends on the thought applied to it by the thinking subject, whose interpretation (in fact always relative and partial) becomes paradigmatic for being itself, that nothing is outside of that interpretation.

Schelling’s position, as is well known, exceeds these conclusions, since already from his, so to speak, *critical-Fichtean* period he shows how being presents itself as irreparably in excess in relation to thought. The incisive thesis of positive philosophy which states “it is not because there is thinking that there is being, but rather because there is being that there is thinking”[[8]](#footnote-8), finds the theoretical antecedent of reference in the *ontological excess* highlighted with respect to the ‘reflection’ already in the first years of his speculative path. Here, in Schelling, an ‘ancestral’[[9]](#footnote-9), so to speak, concept of *Nature* matures first in opposition to Fichte and then in contrast to Hegel, which on the one hand cannot be relegated to the inert sphere of Fichte’s non-Ego and on the other cannot coincide with the alienation of the idea that must be overcome and re-included in the Hegelian Concept. Nature is therefore understood by Schelling as an autonomous position(*Setzung*) of self, and as an assumption(*Voraussetzung*) of being in general and of the Ego (and therefore of thought) in particular, according to a definition of nature such as *Physis* that Heidegger takes up and develops in the second phase of his thought, in a particularly clear and effective way in his commentary on Hölderlin’s poem, *Wie wenn am Feiertage* (*As When On a Holiday*).

In his critique of correlationalism, appropriately conducted in his *Après la finitude,* Meillassoux even leads the thought of Heidegger’s *Ereignis* to a philosophical stance incapable of thinking about the Absolute, inasmuch as it – by definition – should be freed by the correlation between being and thought[[10]](#footnote-10). This assumption, clearly functional to Meillassoux’s discourse, starts from the idea that Heidegger’s *Ereignis* can be summed up in the theses set out in *Identity and Difference* (1957), where Heidegger effectively insists on the co-appropriation(*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of ‘being’ and ‘thought’ as a distinctive trait of the *Ereignis*, understood precisely as an event of reciprocal appropriation[[11]](#footnote-11). And yet the *Ereignis* is also and above all a co-appropriation of ‘being’ and ‘time’, as can be clearly seen, for example, in the *Zeit und Being* conference held in 1963, where a fundamental aspect of the *Ereignis* is equally clearly clarified. In fact, what is even more important than the ‘accusation’ of correlationalism is that Heidegger’s *Ereignis* always contains the idea of an excess, described by Heidegger through the notion of *Enteignis* (‘expropriation’ which always accompanies the ‘appropriation’ of the *Ereignis*), which prevents one from thinking of being and thought in their full and perfect correlation.

On the other hand, it is precisely the passages of *Identity and Difference* that offer greater legitimization of the theses put forward by Agamben, in an essay from 1982 later published in the collection entitled *Potentialities*, regarding the possibility of Heidegger’s *Ereignis* superimposing on and coinciding with Hegel’s *Absolute*. Agamben’s essay, certainly enlightening on the etymological roots of *Ereignis* and in its general affinity to the Absolute[[12]](#footnote-12), is, however, incapable of restoring the ‘absoluteness’ – the aseity – of both the *Ereignis* and the Absolute, seen here precisely exclusively, in a Hegelian sense, as the ‘result’ of a movement, rather than as an inexhausted and in-it-self origin from which come the various and multiple forms of being.

As an ontological excess that ‘occasions’ (makes possible, makes happen) being without ever resolving itself completely in thought and forms (manifestations) of being itself, the *Ereignis* is rather to be read in affinity with another form of Absolute, namely with that proposed by Schelling in the early nineteenth century and further clarified in his *Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Nature*: a form of Absolute that, *schlechtin betrachtet*, coincides with the groundlessness of being (*Ungrund*) and with its unprethinkability (or, if you like, ‘ancestrality’), that is, with a dynamic that ensures being and its forms (including the thought applied to being) without ever coinciding fully with such manifestations.

Precisely in aligning Heidegger’s *Ereignis* with Schelling’s Absolute, I think I can highlight the basis for a form of ‘positive philosophy’ present in Heidegger’s second phase, that is, in the thinking that follows *Being and Time* and, after the so-called ‘turn’, revolves around the thought of the *Ereignis* as Heidegger himself states in the *Letter on Humanism*.

To speak of ‘positive philosophy’ with regards to Heidegger’s second phase of thought necessarily implies a reflection on what in general is to be understood by the expression, starting with Schelling’s philosophical project. We know that Schelling’s positive philosophy imposes itself as a philosophical programme, also in opposition to Hegel’s theses, starting from the thought about the *Wirklichkeit* (actuality) of being inasmuch as it simply exists. And yet positive philosophy must not be confused with a mere ontic realism that starts from the phenomenological evidence of the existent and is reduced to that evidence: it is rather a thought that intends to think of being *a parte rei*, in its (free) becoming, in its original groundlessness and that is clarified as a philosophy *of* nature, according to an expression in which what prevails is the subjective sense of the genitive, that is, as an expression of nature itself as a Subject that, amongst other activities, also has the thought about itself. It goes without saying that this concept of positive philosophy was not immediately accepted. On the wave of criticism of Hegel’s concept of *Wirklichkeit*,positive philosophy on a purely theoretical level, and therefore beyond its narrative character linked to the exposition of the phases of mythology and the history of revelation, has been understood as a theoretical assumption of historical materialism and twentieth-century existentialism, in fact betraying the theoretical intent of Schelling’s philosophy of existence in both senses.

The juxtaposition suggested by Karl Löwith of Schelling’s positive philosophy with Heidegger’s early philosophy of existence, a juxtaposition that at first seems to partly confirm our thesis, does not fully encompass the theoretical scope of positive philosophy and does not pick up on the closeness that is instead registered on another level.

According to Löwith, “the ‘effectiveness’ of existence – inherent in the *factum brutum* of ‘that-is’ – and Heidegger’s ‘being thrown into the world’ and ‘projecting oneself into the future’, all correspond to Schelling’s ‘real existent’”[[13]](#footnote-13). And yet it is Löwith himself who points out that the Heidegger of *Being and Time* builds a “system of being-there (*Dasein*)” inspired by Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence, which, however, completely lacks the ontological tension that Schelling highlighted between the negative philosophy of ‘reason’ and the positive philosophy of ‘existence’.

The *ontological excess* highlighted by Schelling stems from a philosophy of Existence that cannot be reduced in any way to a *system of Being-there* because it concerns the dynamics of being as a whole, being-there(*Dasein*) and its activities included. On the other hand, after *Being and Time*, Heidegger himself recognizes through the ‘turn’ that to understand the sense of being one cannot start from a particular entity, even if it is the Being-there of man, but must turn directly to the Being. Heidegger is in fact quite clear when, in thinking of the ‘other beginning’ of thought, which is announced in the turn, he describes philosophy as something that directly concerns being even before man and therefore before thought:

If philosophy ‘is’, it is not because there are philosophers, nor are there philosophers because philosophy is discussed, but there is philosophy and there are philosophers when the *truth of being itself becomes its own* [*sich-ereignet*] and in the way in which it becomes its own, and the history of this making itself its own is exempt from all human preparation and planning, since it itself is the first grounding of the possibility of *being* of human history.[[14]](#footnote-14)

This thought does nothing but continue the basic intuition present at the time of *Being and Time*. If the thrown-structure of the *Dasein* is what Heidegger defines there as the *Faktizität* of existence, it in itself still requires as a prerequisite(*Voraussetzung*) a sphere ‘from which’ it is ‘thrown’ (*geworfen*) that includes being in its entirety and in its dynamics: and this is exactly the sphere that progressively becomes the ‘object’ of investigation in a ‘positive philosophy’ from Heidegger’s second phase.

In a first approach the question seems to re-propose the classic problem of metaphysics that thinks of being starting from a grounding: the sphere enlightened by the *Faktizität* of the existence of the *Dasein* can no longer be described in the language of ‘metaphysics’ that thinks of being starting from its oblivion in favour of the entity. Heidegger will therefore begin to describe it, starting with the 1929 conference *Was ist Metaphysik?*, as *Nichts* (nothing): a concept that Walter Schulz already suggested should be read in affinity with Schelling’s *Dass* of existence[[15]](#footnote-15) and that in Luigi Pareyson’s opinion should also be read in continuity with Schelling’s concept of Freedom[[16]](#footnote-16).

This *Nichts*, which intends to describe the ontological excess never solvable in the intellect in terms that are no longer onto-theological and therefore post-metaphysical, anticipates and accompanies, while remaining in the background, the subsequent notion of *Ereignis* with its inevitable proximity to the notion of *Physis*. In this, the affinity with Schelling’s thought clearly emerges, where the actuality of that *ontological excess* is not relegated to a space that is opaque and impenetrable to reason, but rather believes that it should be understood as an inexhaustible ‘reserve of being’, that is to say, as a *natural* and dynamic sphere within which act the original forces and powers of being that, in their becoming and in their coessential interaction with nothingness (a concept necessary to highlight the contingency of being and therefore its unfounded freedom), determine its various manifestations, including thought.

For Schelling this *ontological excess* coincides with absolute Freedom, which, however, in turn, must not be thought of as a sphere pacified and sutured by the definitive victory of Being over Nothing, or Good over Evil, but as the essential and original Conflict between the *Nothing* of the Beginning and the *necessity* of Being inasmuch as it exists: a Conflict which, however, does not take place only at the origin of being, but rather historically (*geschichtlich*) constitutes the very essence of being and the units it produces, and which also reappears in the dynamics that Heidegger intends to describe through the *Ereignis* as the ‘figure’ of being that exceeds the ‘history of being’ as metaphysics.

In the ‘first beginning’ of thought – Heidegger argues in *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, a volume that collects the lectures from 1937-38, a period in which the philosopher was also occupied with *Contributions to Philosophy* where the theoretical bases for the thought of *Ereignis* were laid – the Greeks had the task of answering the question of what being was, and they experienced being as *Physis*. However, *Physis* progressively lost its original meaning of “origin, unfold-impose itself, of unconcealedness (*aletheia*)”, to become ‘nature’ understood as the sum of the entities inasmuch as they are present. For the Greeks originally, *Physis*, as the distinctive character of being, is *aletheia.* In the progressive oblivion of being, the entity is no longer recognized as *Physis*, but as what is grasped and understood (in full ‘correlation’) as being present and so the question about being ends up preventing the questioning of the *aletheia* of *Physis*, but remains with the thought that thinks of entity inasmuch as it is present: to make the entity appear, the horizon (that is the *Physis* as unconcealedness, *aletheia*) in which the entity appears must somehow be neglected.

In the ‘first beginning’, the *Grundstimmung* (the fundamental emotional tonality) was the wonder, the amazement (the *thaumazein*): “a necessity which arose from the entity itself in its totality, in the measure in which the entity had to achieve, in its being-existent, knowledge and be preserved in its truth”.[[17]](#footnote-17) Now, Heidegger says, in the time in which the ‘other beginning’ is being prepared, “the necessity that pushes us in this new turn must come again and only from the entity in its totality”,[[18]](#footnote-18) that is – we should say – from *Physis* in the original sense assigned to it by the Greeks. In fact, since the question of being that guided the first beginning is necessarily accompanied by the oblivion of being, Heidegger rhetorically asks whether this very abandonment of being is not a make-own(*Ereignis*) that comes from the entity in its totality, that is, is not the “most hidden and the most proper grounding and essence of what Nietzsche calls ‘nihilism’”.[[19]](#footnote-19) For Heidegger, access to the being-open of the *Physis* must come from a necessity, that is, “from the abandonment of the entity by the being, when we take seriously the fact that the being escapes the entity”,[[20]](#footnote-20) that is to say it exceeds it. But it is probable, as Heidegger himself hypothesizes, that the being-open of *Physis* “is in the first place the clearing, the enlightenment [*Lichtung*] in the middle of the entity, the enlightenment in which the concealing of the being must become evident”.[[21]](#footnote-21) This means that being shows itself as a becoming, as a process in which the oblivion of being is included, as well as the possibility of the ‘other beginning’: it is a process that, in order to perpetuate itself and to guarantee movement, cannot be fully realised by a definitive appropriation such as, for example, seems to be accomplished in technology as imposition and dominion over being[[22]](#footnote-22), but rather by an ontological and dynamic excess that is precisely described by the *Physis* of the Greeks, a concept to which Heidegger returns with great clarity in his commentary on Hölderlin’s poetic composition *Wie wenn am Feiertage*.

*Physis*, *phyein* means growth. But what did the Greeks mean by growth? Not as a quantitative growth, not even as ‘evolution’, nor as the succession of a ‘becoming’. *Physis* is an emerging and an arising, a self-opening, which, while rising, at the same time turns back into what has emerged, and so shrouds within itself that which on each occasion gives presence to what is present. Thought as a fundamental word, *Physis* signifies a rising into the open: the lighting (*das Lichten*) of that clearing (*Lichtung*) into which anything may enter appearing, present itself in its outline, show itself in its ‘appearance’ (*eidos*, idea) and be present as this or that. *Physis* is that rising-up which goes-back-into-itself; it names the coming to presence of that which dwells in the rising-up and thus comes to presence as open.
 *Physis* is that rising-up which goes-back-into-itself; it names the coming to presence of that which dwells in the rising-up and thus comes to presence as open.[[23]](#footnote-23)

For Hölderlin – quoted and commented on by Heidegger – *Physis*, nature as chaos that opens and presides over entities, is above the gods: it is the sacred itself. “Nature is higher than ‘the’ gods. She, ‘the powerful,’ is still capable of something other than the gods: as the clearing [*Lichtung*], in her everything can first be present”.[[24]](#footnote-24) Only nature guarantees and preserves within itself the possibility for entities to appear, but since entities appear *by* (through) nature and *in* nature, it cannot serve as a grounding. In this lies its superiority over the gods and God. A philosophy that knows how to think about *Physis* and the becoming of entities in this way is no longer onto-theological, because the grounding (*theos*, God) is, if anything, in the very possibility of *Physis*, and this never depends on that. *Physis*, therefore, as a sacred chaos from which everything comes and where everything happens, seems perfectly capable of exposing that double and mutual appropriation of being and thought and of being and time that the *Ereignis*, in all its various forms, would like to describe. In this sense, it is even more plausible to juxtapose Heidegger’s *Ereignis* with Schelling’s Absolute: the progressive definition of the latter is based on Schelling’s reflections on the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of identity. In Schelling it is evident that the Greek notion of *Physis* is used on the one hand, obviously, to describe the process and the productivity of being in general, and on the other to highlight an unfounded and inexhausted origin that guarantees and preserves in the process the entities produced, without, however, ever being reduced to the process itself and its components. What is already described in Schelling’s definition of the Absolute in his philosophy of Identity, where it talks of a ‘double life’ in the infinite and in the finite of the entities, is even more evident in the introduction, in *Philosophical Investigations*, of the *Ungrund* as the absolute absolutely considered(*schlechtin betrachtet*). This introduction further clarifies the affinity of the absolute with the *Physis* described above. On the one hand, in fact, the absolute describes the totality of the entities in the process of their becoming and on the other hand the absolute, as ‘absolutely considered’, is freed by the process itself while guaranteeing it as an inexhausted and unfounded dynamic resource.

The double and reciprocal appropriation of ‘being-time’ and ‘being-thought’, which describes the (temporal) happening of the entities and the possibility of their understanding, is therefore accompanied by both the notion of the Absolute and the notion of the *Ereignis*, on the condition, however, of thinking of the Absolute in itself as ‘freed’, ‘separated’, from the process it describes and from the completed appropriation.

As Giorgio Agamben observes, for Hegel “the Absolute, originating in a past participle, needs an absolution that ultimately allows it to be only at the end what it truly is”[[25]](#footnote-25). In this case, understanding therefore the Absolute as the ‘result’ of a process, the affinity with *Ereignis* is reduced to what has already ‘happened’ and which can therefore be described as a sign of the absolute correlation between being and thought – and, if anything, to the *necessity* of what will always happen in this perspective of full ‘correlation’. However, since the co-appropriation evoked by the *Ereignis* concerns above all the being-time relationship, the absolute cannot merely be resolved in the becoming of the Concept, in its movement, but must remain capable of absolving itself from the process itself, that is, of refraining from the happening (of the entities and forms of thought) that it always ensures. As I believe emerges ever more clearly, the *Ereignis* refers in fact to a dynamic excess that has much to do with the notion of *Physis* mentioned above, as well as with the complex definition of Absolute articulated by Schelling in his *Philosophical Investigations* through the introduction of the *Ungrund*. Thus understood, the affinity between the Absolute and the Event is clarified, even in the contemporary debate, as a passage (or a return?) to non onto-theological metaphysics.

The central question of the so-called ‘new realism’, in which the present reflection on the affinity between Schelling’s Absolute and Heidegger’s *Ereignis* is also inserted, is certainly a question of a purely ontological nature. However, the reflections that this philosophical movement brings with it seem to attest more to the *ontic* level of the reality of facts and things than to the strictly *ontological* level, and this perhaps in order to respond to the worst praxis of postmodernism, in opposition to which, in fact, ‘new realism’ is placed.

In order to understand the ontological instance underlying ‘new realism’, I believe it may be useful to refer to Heidegger’s *ontological difference*, thus highlighting how the question posed by Heidegger, also through the complex notion of *Physis*, inevitably and rightly ends up becoming *metaphysical*.

If it is fair to say, through Quine, that ontology is essentially the philosophical discourse that attempts to answer the question on ‘what is there?’, then certainly it is not legitimate to evade the question ‘what is being, insomuch as it is?’, which immediately follows and indeed, in some ways, is already presumed within it. It is true that this issue is a question of a *metaphysical* nature, but for this very reason I feel it worthy of investigation.

How is it possible to say, in fact, *what there is* without understanding what *being* is and what it means? If we admit that ontology essentially answers the question ‘what *is* being, inasmuch as it is?’, and on that basis establishes what there actually *is*, we must, then, also consider that the first question must be read in the double meaning of the copula *is*. That is, answering the question ‘what *is* being inasmuch as it is?’ certainly means clarifying first of all what actually *is* that which *is* insomuch as it is; and through this interpretation of the question we move into the ontic sphere of being. The other interpretation of the question, ‘what *is* being inasmuch as it is?’ presupposes, instead, a *transitive* reading, so to speak, of the copula: that is, what *is* the being, what *can* the being, what allows the being *to be* what it is? In this truly ‘ontological’ sense of the question lies the *metaphysical* question, which, as Heidegger observed, runs a not insignificant risk of slipping into onto-theology.

However, precisely in Schelling’s Absolute (which anticipates the ‘unprethinkable being’ of his positive philosophy) and then in Heidegger’s *Ereignis*, where in the *giving* ofbeing, as a destinating, the *who-what* of this *giving* always ‘abstains’ in an indefinable – in fact ‘unprethinkable’ – *ontological excess*, inasmuch as it poses the ontological question of the being that *is* (in the *transitive* sense) the existent, there is the possibility of an ‘other beginning’ for thought, the possibility of a *metaphysical* Principle, which escapes the onto-theological concept described and criticized by Heidegger, and yet preserves the *original and ongoing potentiality* of being.

The definition of this Principle, which makes Schelling a *post-Heideggerian* thinker (in the sense that with his positive philosophy he overcomes the limits of the metaphysical thought described and criticized by Heidegger as the history of the oblivion of being), has been found in the ontological Freedom of the Absolute, *in the sense that it is the Conflict itself that precedes the opposition between necessity and freedom*: that is, it is that ineliminable difference that coincides with the *unprethinkable being* and that is described by Schelling (through recourse to Aristotle) in its *pure* accidentality, that the *potency* of being and thus the being itself, in whose average understanding we live and act, is opposed ‘with necessity’.

Heidegger himself, however, through the notion of *Ereignis*, proposes in fact a form of ‘positive philosophy’ that heads towards a non onto-theological *metaphysics*, illuminating in the original *Physis* the possibility of an ‘other beginning’ of philosophy.

At the beginning of Being’s unconcealment, Being, *einai*, *eon* is thought, but not the ‘It gives’, ‘there is’. Instead, Parmenides says *esti gar einai*, ‘For Being is’. Years ago, in 1947, in the *Letter on Humanism*, I noted with reference to this saying of Parmenides: ‘The *esti gar einai* of Parmenides is still unthought today.’ This note would like to point out for once that we must not rashly give to the saying ‘For Being is’ a ready interpretation which makes what is thought in it inaccessible. Anything of which we say ‘it is’ is thereby represented as a being. But Being is not a being. Thus the *esti* that is emphasized in Parmenides’ saying cannot represent the Being which it names as some kind of a being. Translated literally, the *esti* thus emphasized does mean ‘it is’. But the emphasis discerns in the *esti* what the Greeks thought even then in the *esti* thus emphasized and which we can paraphrase by: ‘It is capable.’ However, the meaning of this capability remained just as unthought, then and afterward, as the ‘It’ which is capable of Being. To be capable of Being means: to yield and give Being. In the *esti* there is concealed the It gives.

In the beginning of Western thinking, Being is thought, but not the ‘It gives’ as such. The latter withdraws in favour of the gift which It gives. That gift is thought and conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being with regard to beings.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Heidegger points out that in the ‘history of being’ Western thought neglected the It that gives (the *Es* of *Es gibt*) in favour of the *gift* (the being inasmuch as it is present) that the It gives. The *Es* cannot, however, be thought of as it is in the language of onto-theological metaphysics, since the *Es* of the *Es gibt* is similar to the original *Physis*, that is to the Indifference of the *Ungrund*, to the plainly thought Absolute*,* and to the *unvordenkliches Seyn* (the ‘purely accidental’) of Schelling’s positive philosophy, and all this can be said only in the ‘giving’, in the ‘make happen’, in the ‘to destine’; that is, only ‘after that’, in the dynamics of the process that develops, it (freely) passes from the *Es* to the *gibt*.

The *Ereignis*, as an event of appropriation, is Heidegger’s attempt to think of this inevitably metaphysical passage in terms that are no longer ontotheological, but its exposition is obviously problematic as it constantly runs the risk of slipping between the forms of ‘metaphysics’ criticized by Heidegger himself. The juxtaposition with Schelling’s Absolute and its theoretical outcomes, allows us to see the *Ereignis* as the attempt to think of being from within, in its free becoming, and to therefore develop a form of ‘positive philosophy’.

1. See E.C. Corriero, *Schelling again*, in “Rivista di Estetica”, forthcoming in 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. On the continuity between the philosophy of nature and positive philosophy, see E.C. Corriero, *The Ungrounded Nature of Being: Grounding a Dynamic Ontology, From Philosophy of Nature to Positive Philosophy*, in “Kabiri”, 2018, pp. 17-35.  [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. F.W.J. Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1856-1861 [SW], SW, I/7, p. 356 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cf. M. Ferraris and M. De Caro, *Introduzione a Bentornata realtà. Il nuovo realismo in discussione (Introduction to Welcome back reality: New realism discussed*), edited by M. De Caro and M. Ferraris, Turin: Einaudi, 2012, p. VI. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Bentornata realtà?* (*Welcome back reality?*) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This is how Massimo Cacciari expresses it: “Schelling still represents the ‘mystery’ of the philosophy of *krisis*, that is, of the thought that claims to go beyond that fulfilment of philosophy that classical idealism wanted to represent”, in M. Cacciari, “Schelling postumo” (“Posthumous Schelling”), preface to E.C. Corriero, *Vertigini della ragione. Schelling e Nietzsche* (*The vertigo of Reason: Schelling and Nietzsche*), Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2018 (second edition), p. 17.  [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Q. Meillassoux, *Après la finitude. Essai sur la nécessité de la contingence*, Paris: Editions de Seuil, 2006; *After Finitude*. *An Essay on the Contingency of Necessity*, London/New York: Continuum, 2008, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. SW II/3, p. 162. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. To use an expression from Meillassoux, according to whom “any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species – or even anterior to every recognized form of life on earth” can be defined ‘ancestral’ (Q. Meillassoux, *After Finitude*, cit., p. 10). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid., p.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “The appropriation appropriates man and Being to their essential togetherness. In the frame, we glimpse a first, oppressing flash of the appropriation. The frame constitutes the active nature of the modern world of technology. In the frame we witness a belonging together of man and Being in which the letting belong first determines the manner of the ‘together’ and its unity. We let Parmenides’ fragment ‘For the Same are thinking as well as Being’ introduce us to the question of a belonging together in which belonging has precedence over ‘together’. The question of the meaning of this Same is the question of the active nature of identity. The doctrine of metaphysics represents identity as a fundamental characteristic of Being. Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with thinking to an identity whose active essence stems from that letting belong together which we call the appropriation. The essence of identity is a property of the event of appropriation” (M. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975 ff; vol 11, pp. 47-48 [GA]; *Identity and Difference*, ed. by J. Staumbaug, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969, pp. 38-39). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Agamben clarifies how the Absolute and the *Ereignis* share the reflexive meaning of the etymological root \*self, which both concepts refer to. See G. Agamben, *Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 116-137. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. K. Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche.* (*From Hegel to Nietzsche*)*, Sämtliche Schriften*, 4, Stuttgart: Metzler, 1988, p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. GA 45, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. W. Schulz, *Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schelling* (1955), *(The fulfilment of German idealism in Schelling’s late philosophy),* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer; Pfullingen: Neske, 1975 (new edition). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. L. Pareyson, *Heidegger: la libertà e il nulla* (Heidegger: freedom and nothingness), “Annuario Filosofico”, 1989, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. GA 45, p. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. GA 45, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. GA 45, p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. On the other hand, Heidegger clarifies that technology can certainly decline in the oblivion of being as dominion over the entity, but in fact it is other and characterizes the possibility of actively grasping the original *Physis* and ‘continuing’ it. In the unconcealedness, man does not simply discover himself as *Physis*, but recognizes in himself “that other that is commensurate with *Physis*, that sets it free and yet understands it” and such other is *Techne*, not the technology as imposition and domination that is at the centre of Heidegger’s statement, but rather what that expression meant for the Greeks, namely “a knowledge: a recognition of being able to proceed in the face of the entity (and in the encounter with the entity), that is to say in the face of the *Physis* [...]; a way of proceeding in the face of the *Physis*, not to subdue and exploit it [...], but on the contrary to keep *Physis* from imposing itself through the unconcealedness” (GA 45, p. 179). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. GA 4, p. 56; *Elucidations in Hölderlin’s Poetry,* ed. by K. Hoeller, New York: Humanity Books, 2000, p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. GA 4, p. 59; *Elucidations in Hölderlin’s Poetry*, cit., p. 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. G. Agamben, *Potentialities*, cit., p. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. GA 14, p. 12; *Time and Being*, ed. by J. Macquarrie – E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)